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ABSTRACT:
We contribute to the debate on the optimal design of multiunit auctions by developing and testing robust implications of the leading theory of uniform price auctions on the bid distributions submitted by individual bidders. The theory, which emphasizes market power, has little support in a dataset of Finnish Treasury auctions. A reason may be that the Treasury acts strategically by determining supply after observing bids, apparently taking into account that the auctions are part of a repeated game between the Treasury and the primary dealers. Bidder behavior and underpricing are affected by the volatility of bond returns in a way that suggests bidders adjust for the winner’s curse.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Matti Keloharju, Kjell G. Nyborg, and Kristian Rydqvist, "Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions" (May 1, 2004). Finance. Paper 9-04.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/anderson/fin/9-04