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Berkeley Program in Law & Economics
University of California, Berkeley
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Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements
Federico Echenique, California Institute of Technology
Aaron S. Edlin, School of Law and Economics Dept., University of California, Berkeley

Download the Paper (370 K, PDF file) - October 16, 2004 Tell a colleague about it.
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ABSTRACT:
In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria - equilibria that are not in pure strategies - are unstable for broad class of learning dynamics.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Federico Echenique and Aaron S. Edlin, "Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements" (October 16, 2004). Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series. Paper 168.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/art168

 
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