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Berkeley Program in Law & Economics
University of California, Berkeley

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Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation
Bruno S. Frey, University of Zurich
Benno Torgler, Visiting Scholar, UC Berkeley & Research Fellow of CREMA

Download the Paper (228 K, PDF file) - December 4, 2006 Tell a colleague about it.
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ABSTRACT:
Why so many people pay their taxes, even though fines and audit probability are low, is a central question in the tax compliance literature. Positing a homo economicus having a refined motivation structure sheds light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 West and East European countries. We find a high correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale. The results remain robust after exploiting endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. We also observe a strong positive correlation between institutional quality and tax morale.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Bruno S. Frey and Benno Torgler, "Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation" (December 4, 2006). Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series. Paper 189.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/art189

 
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