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Download the Paper (364 K, PDF file) - December 24, 2006 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing.

ABSTRACT:
Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. However, if a team members assumes the role of an "internal" Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. External Anti-sharing may induce the team members to choose efficient effort. The paper presents possible applications of Anti-Sharing: while internal Anti-Sharing may provide an explanation for the existence of senior (or managing) partners, external Anti-Sharing leads to a new theory of the incorporated firm.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Roland Kirstein and Robert D. Cooter, "Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms" (December 24, 2006). Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series. Paper 204.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/art204