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Download the Paper (156 K, PDF file) - December 29, 2006 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing.

ABSTRACT:
Compared to budget-balanced Sharing contracts, Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. If a team members becomes Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. Anti-Sharing is more likely to yield a higher team profit than Sharing, the larger the team, the curvature of the production function, or the marginal effort cost. Sharing is more likely to be better, the greater the marginal product, the cross-partials of the production function, or the curvature of the effort cost.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Roland Kirstein and Robert D. Cooter, "Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams" (December 29, 2006). Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series. Paper 205.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/art205