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Land Use Choices for
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**SHAPING THE AMERICAN DREAM:
LAND USE CHOICES FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Land and its use are fundamental to the "American character." We are defined by where we live and work and what we own. Francis Fukuyama has capsulized this notion in his now famous work *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) by arguing that,

as standards of living increase, as population becomes more cosmopolitan and better educated, and as society achieves a greater equality of condition people begin to demand not simply more wealth but recognition of their status (Fukuyama, 1992: xvii-xix).

The Los Angeles riots of April 29, 1992, provided ample evidence of what place means to status in this country and how it shapes behavior. These riots were an illustration of frustration over status rather than absence of resources and opportunity. In an urbanizing and decentralizing nation, land values become uncertain. In places like South Central Los Angeles and other inner cities, these locations have all the attributes previously associated with high-valued localities. Land is the fundamental building block that shapes the American dream. The manifestation of that dream is becoming an ever-more important national policy issue.

Land use policies are increasingly being used as local social control devices to alter both the physical landscape and public status. For example, some groups want to shape land use policies to slow suburbanization and the sprawling, formless character of the emerging decentralized urban metropolis. On the other hand, other policy advocates invoke land use policies to try to solve urban ills ranging from persistent poverty to air pollution.

This paper will focus on the forces and factors that are stimulating new and diverse interests in land use policies. External forces are one aspect of a changing economic form rooted in the world and not in the domestic economy. On the other hand, local/parochial internal factors are driven by the changing demography and the nation's social preferences.

Land use policy is no longer a simple local government concern. We can observe the changing nature of external forces on land as central-city industrial precincts are abandoned and inner-city neighborhoods decline. We also see this process at work in the gleaming new office towers in the downtowns of these same cities and in the farflung suburban office parks.

The decentralization of commercial activity has its own momentum separate from that of the central city. Suburbs are not really sub-, they are de-urban. They are new urban places with

their own land markets, more volatile and less stable than the earlier central-node-based market system. As a consequence, the new reshaped urban landscape is very uneven and difficult to control. It is this new, uneven, non-central or de-centered metropolis that is the focus of land policy concern. While some urbanologists argue that this new metropolitan form is a natural evolution of city building, others suggest that it is destructive economically and unconscionable socially.

In addition to forces outside the nation, there are new attitudinal dimensions to land use regulation, described in this report as "forting up." That is, in their desperate attempts to secure a perch on a smaller middle-class ladder, many Americans are doing everything they can to secure their position by slowing down or restricting the opportunities of others. These attitudes are reflected in slow, no-growth, gated communities, private new towns, and the rise of special enclaves. These policies and approaches seldom retard growth or provide any innovative settlement arrangements, but they do alter the socio-economic dimensions of the community. As a result, we are becoming a more divided rather than a more diverse nation.

Land use policies are also being increasingly proposed as the new antidote to congestion and sprawl. As a result, air pollution management agencies are becoming powerful land use planners. No one knows exactly what to make of this situation or how land use policies will in fact achieve the air quality goals. Nonetheless, new policy approaches are being developed that are altering land management. Communications technology in the form of telecommuting from home and telecommuting centers, and not transportation technology, may provide a much more cost-effective means of improving air quality.

Furthermore, these same telecommunication technologies are now freeing workers and employers from central city locations. They are moving into the countryside, and commute distances are increasing around almost all metropolitan areas. These new ex-urban commuters are pushing farmers out of agriculture by changing land prices and restrictions on farming practices, leading to conflicts in rural areas that range from environmental to social concerns. Other concerns over natural and agricultural areas, stemming from conflicting views on how to and who should manage the nation's natural reserves, are being fought in courthouses, city halls, and state legislatures. Regional land use planning is one manifestation of these conflicts.

There is little doubt that land use policies are a new and very difficult frontier for policy-makers. Policy research is needed to help better understand what policies fit a decentralized urban setting with "islands of neglect" and fortress urban villages lacking any coherent unifying land management approach. The only means of acquiring a better land use system is to develop a clear vision with a common purpose.

In sum, we need to know what our American dream is, and to shape the land to meet the nation's premise and its promise.

I. INTRODUCTION

Land and its use have formed an essential part of what can be termed "the American character." Americans define themselves by the place, style, or social status which their living patterns confer. Where a person lives or where commercial activity is located provides fundamental cultural clues as to who they are and what they represent. The ownership of land, usually in the form of a home or business, is the universal American symbol for inclusion. No better *dictum* can be found that manifests this fundamental notion than Frederick Jackson Turner's powerful and influential work *The Significance of the American Frontier*. In this historical assessment of the development of the national character, Turner concludes ". . . not the constitution, but free land . . . open to a fit people, made the democratic type of society in America . . ." (Turner: 266-293). Thus it should not come as a surprise, when the tenets of this fundamental belief in the land are rapidly changing, that it is difficult to gain consensus on public policy regarding land use alternatives for communities and the nation.

New forces are reshaping land use planning and development approaches, making them more volatile, raising land costs, and altering the perceptions of land values. This transformation places new pressures not just on the use of a commodity—land, but on the social institutions that form the national character. They are altering the fundamental relationships among citizens.

The new factors altering the national perception of social values as displayed in land use include issues such as (1) globalization of the nation's metropolitan economies; (2) increasing transportation and environmental concerns, creating new dimensions of regulatory authority that remove land management sovereignty from local/parochial control; (3) unanticipated large-scale foreign investment, which is placing pressure on commercial real estate and the housing stock as well as the social fabric; (4) a combination of new waves of immigration, aging, and smaller household composition, which, combined with a shrinking middle class, is altering the demographic base of urban and rural economies; and (5) the urbanization of rural and natural resource areas, blurring the traditional distinction between urban and rural landscapes, thereby distorting the market for agricultural and natural resource lands. All of these factors combine to reshape how Americans think about their status and opportunities.

II. THE CHALLENGE

Owning a piece of land was the core of the "American Dream." Historian Scott Webb refines Frederick Jackson Turner's treatise when he notes that the American ". . . civilization was left on one leg—the land" (Webb, 1931: 8). A central component of this social leg was defined by *Euclid v. Ambler*,¹ which used land use zoning to protect land values by placing conditions on the absolute

¹Village of Euclid, Ohio, v. Ambler Realty, U.S. Supreme Court, 1926. This case established the government's right to control land use through zoning controls.

use of private property. This court decision is still the center of controversy concerning community versus individual rights over the appropriate use of land.

Henry George believed that land ownership was unethical since labor was the only thing of real value. From George's point of view, land should approach zero-gain value through heavy taxes so that speculation cannot occur. George's perspective is totally lost as land becomes not merely a grant of ownership but a grant of both local and increasingly international power. This transformation of land values is at the base of this analysis. Land is becoming a bundle of wealth-creating rights protected by government rather than a socially controlled commodity. It is this change that is altering our perspective on how to organize and control land (Cord, 1984).

Land is increasingly a vehicle to carry out private rather than public purposes. These new private purposes and values are dominating the land use debate. Some land use policy advocates view reshaping land use patterns for desirable public goals such as achieving urban configurations that reduce air pollution and auto dependence; others view land use as a means to limit community size and preserve open space or certain lifestyles. Still others see the need to reshape land use patterns in order to revitalize the central city or accommodate new industrial and residential mixes.

These land management tensions are leading to distortions in land markets and the misapplication of land use regulatory tools in attempts to affect not only spatial allocations but racial, economic, and environmental outcomes as well. Such management tools were not designed to meet many of these challenges; nonetheless, they are being applied with uneven consequences for both land markets and community patterns.

Land use policies are also being used as tools to fashion desired/preferred socio-economic outcomes. The core question is how such planning tools, either "new" ones or the traditional approaches, help to realize a desired end state. The basic issue is what kind of America is preferred by whom, and how can we begin to understand land choices, limits, and opportunities as we shape America's dreams.

III. THE CORE ISSUES

The United States is urban. Over 80 percent of the population lives in urban settlements, over half of which are home to more than one million people. This urbanization of the population, which began with the advent of manufacturing, has had a marked impact on the nation's land use patterns. In fact, it was national policy to build bigger, modern, dense cities as a means of improving human settlement for a modern manufacturing nation. Industrial policy shaped settlement policy.

As we enter the last decade of the twentieth century, we are witnessing an urbanization process based on an internationalized, de-industrialized, and decentralized economy. These factors have intersected to reshape the way cities are designed and built — affecting every dimension of metropolitan life. First, globalization has altered the relationships between cities and regions by

increasing the economic strength of the metropolitan systems around the world, uncoupling them from their domestic base. Industrial functions no longer require a central unitary control center located within a single geographic area. In fact, cities must adapt their CBD (central business district) space requirements to the logic of information rather than goods production. As a result, the demand for central nodal production space within the central city for industrial precincts has waned. Reduced human resource requirements and technology have moved manufacturing overseas.

Second, metropolitan regions have decentralized as they have globalized, because information technologies as well as production processes have reduced the agglomerative demands of central nodes like CBDs. This is not to say, as Cohen and Zysman point out, that the national or international economies are totally spaceless. In fact as they stress,

It is quite possible that an economy like ours is characterized by an enormous number of [spatial linkages] and is not simply a system of slide-in-slide-out linkages like those that exclusively dominate the models from which conventional economics produces its conventional prescriptions. Certainly the possibility ought to be explored before routine, and therefore horribly glib, refutations and prescriptions are allowed to affect policy (Cohen and Zysman, 1987: 16).

Third, while national policy should not be based on ill-formed opinions and thin facts, it still must react to such realities as the internal re-adaptations of space within the central urban core. Inner-city or core areas are constantly re-adapting to internal and external demands for retail, cultural, and government services for a rapidly changing metropolitan demography.

Finally, cities and regions, including rural areas, seek to shape their economic options by using their land assets to develop new enterprises no longer associated with a natural resource base, declining in importance. Metropolitan and rural areas now have greater freedom to define their destiny, since they are not bound by their natural resources or geography in an international marketplace (Hall, 1991a).

Urban land use patterns illustrate a mix of all these forces at work simultaneously. While globalization creates some new agglomerations of urban space, it also allows decentralization through telecommunications and advanced related information technology. On the other hand, these same processes generate adaptive uses of existing space by re-organizing urban locations for international trade and new technologies. Each of these forces has some influence on how cities and regions adapt as places to the functions of a rapidly changing world economic order.

IV. CHANGING PLACES

Globalization, De-industrialization, and Decentralization

On an international scale, the nation's largest metropolitan areas have been transformed into entry and exit points for global goods, information, and/or finance. World trade is now the

most important aspect of metropolitan economies, reaching over 4 trillion dollars per year in 1990 from only 1.3 trillion, less than a decade earlier. This trade is supported by and directly related to worldwide telecommunications, which has soared from only 300 million minutes in 1977 to 11 billion minutes in 1989. The U.S. manufacturing economy is so tied to world sourcing that it is not possible to produce most consumption products out of domestic materials (Kasarda, 1991). As a result, a new international hierarchy of cities is emerging that relates a set of metropolitan areas to one another across international boundaries. These *meta metrosystems* are the new international trading partners because they both create and cause the flow of commerce. This hierarchy is anchored in the transformation of the international economy as well as the adaptive adjustment of city-regions to internal economic and social environments.

Since cities are based on their local economies, as their functions demand new spatial form, they internationalize. The change from a manufacturing production base to a trade-information base has generated a new urban spatial geography that adapts old spaces to new purposes. However, these twin processes of globalization and informationalization do not affect all cities and regions in the same manner. They are transforming the relative importance of some cities and shifting the settlement structure within most metropolitan areas. International trading space is now the dominant force in metropolitan space economy. International airports as business centers are one small illustration of this change. For example, since the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport opened in 1974, 13 million square feet of new office space have been created near the airport, as much office space as downtown Cincinnati (Fulton, 1991). In many cities, airport areas are the "hubs" not merely for airlines but for metropolitan enterprise as well. Every major city in the nation is now re-orienting its space economy to accommodate new air cargo and telecommunication-driven producer services. As Castells puts it, "The growing internationalization of the American economy reshapes cities and regions following the logic of space flows" (Castells, 1989).

The logic of the global information flows notion has several levels. First, there is a new international organizational logic of world city flows. First-order cities like New York, London, Tokyo, and Los Angeles command the global market systems. They are also the international financial and air gateways (O'Connor, 1991). These global ports have strong downtown areas with highly dense communication and finance systems spread across their regions.

Second-level national centers like Miami, Dallas, San Francisco, Chicago, etc., are linked to the global market via the major world centers and control their own special service-production links. These cities' space economy is oriented to their international function, such as air and ground cargo (in Dallas) or tourism/technology (in San Francisco). Their peripheries are composed of strong interdependent nodes that are also internationally linked.

Finally, there are the domestic regional centers such as Pittsburgh, Boston, Seattle, Houston, San Diego, etc., which are part of the international production system but do not exercise signifi-

cant control over major producer-services within it. This latter category of community usually lacks a very strong center; it is multi-nucleated to a higher degree than other metropolitan areas.

The newly formed international city is a system, *not a place*, creating spatial forms that Webber described three decades ago as consisting of nodes, links, and structures (Webber, 1963). This system, Wurster suggested, generates a planning template for even those communities that remain outside the direct influences of internationalization (Wurster, 1964). Thus, an international city spatial form is emerging far more decentralized than the pre-airplane and computer era. The emerging metropolitan economy, Hall points out,

... is indeed governed by access to information. And that comes in two ways: first by direct face to face communications, and secondly by electronic transfer. The first encourages agglomeration in major cities and their surrounding regions... they have historically developed strong concentrations of specialized information generating and information exchange activities. . . . they (also) serve as the key nodes for national and international transportation. . . (Hall, 1991b: 5).

As a result, the old central CBD city system has been transmuted into part of a *metrosystem* that is part of a much larger integrated network of places, economically linked even if they are politically separated. This new system is vastly different in character from earlier generations of the urban landscape. In almost all other eras, improved technologies reinforced the primacy of the central node. Previously, the introduction of new technology from the development of steam to the automobile has equated urban life with increasing wealth and power at the core city of the urban system.

Wurster has bemoaned the emerging non-centered metropolitan trends as having "... destroyed the traditional concept of urban structure, and there is no new image to take its place" (Wurster, 1964). Internationalization and information technologies have changed this pattern permanently. The evidence of this change, at least in the United States, is very compelling. The core areas are in fact losing both jobs and residents to peripheral locations even while the total metropolitan area is growing. In fact, central cities lost over one million production jobs in the last decade, while suburban areas gained over two million processing and distribution jobs. This transition should not be viewed solely as the outcome of a competition between cities and suburbs but the natural outcome of a new space economy. As Sassen suggests, "The spatial dispersion of production, including internationalization, has contributed to the growth of centralized service nodes for the management and regulation of the new space economy. . ." (Sassen, 1991: 5).

Many of these new control nodes are in decentralized centers and not in the core metropolis. Allen Scott (1988) and others have shown that these new decentralized centers are not dependent on the central node. Pivo (1990) suggests the decentralized metropolitan areas are new networks or clusters of commercial and residential activities growing like a "net of mixed beads" composed of large and small office clusters strung along the freeways (Pivo, 1990: 465). This new space economy,

Castells suggests, is a radical departure from predecessor forms because it is free of locational requirements. In essence, Castells counters the arguments of Cohen and Zysman (1987), who see manufacturing rooted in places as the real building block for the information economy (Cohen and Zysman, 1987; Gershuny and Miles, 1983). In Castell's view the information/knowledge-based economy is independent and determines the uses of space anywhere in the world (Castells, 1989). One indicator of how much this space economy has decentralized is shown in the rapid loss of corporate headquarters functions from New York's Manhattan. It lost 80 of 128 *Fortune 500* firms since 1965 and a corresponding loss of almost 500,000 manufacturing jobs (Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991: 7). As early as 1975, Wolfgang Quante, working under Chester Rapkin, identified the decay of New York City locational advantages within its own region when he very presciently observed,

Economic and demographic trends in the New York Metropolitan Region (NYMR) have been more responsible for headquarters relocations from the City than national factors. The greatest impact on headquarters relocations has been from the growing availability of clerical labor in the suburbs, as well as various problems associated with residential location of corporate managers and the overall racial composition of the region (Quante, 1976).

Most of these headquarters did not leave the greater metropolitan area of New York. They merely, as Quante (1975) points out, migrated across the river to New Jersey or up the freeway to Connecticut or New Hampshire. Similarly, the central downtown areas of Chicago, San Francisco, Houston, Dallas, and Detroit also lost headquarters functions to their peripheries nearly two decades ago. These losses started before the oil crisis of 1973. They were rooted not in global change but local change. Rather than an absence of labor or even the lack of a skilled labor force, these corporate migrations reflected a clear attempt to de-select certain labor on the basis of social rather than technical capacity. This was a watershed event for economic development theory since in all earlier economic eras labor was sought, organized, trained, or developed to meet the needs of industry rather than eschewed on the basis of its type and not its capability. Simply put, it is race and not space that is altering locational attributes.

As a result, social and not world economic restructuring has changed the primacy of the core or inner city as the historic collection point for labor (Quante, 1976: 2). The core or central city is now, at best, an interdependent community with its surrounding labor pools. As O'Connor and Blakely (1990: 99) assert,

a new pattern is emerging where the vitality of the central area is related to the economic activity in the whole metropolitan economy. This linkage runs counter to conventional wisdom; it means that we must reconceptualize urban policy for metropolitan areas. In this new pattern of central city-suburban linkage, the current land use policy which emphasizes central city development whilst attempting to contain suburban development is likely to be both ineffective as well as counter-productive.

A new pattern of development based on a *de-centered* metropolitan system has emerged with its own land use logic. Chinitz (1991) offers a conceptual framework for this post-city system which relies on "locator" functions related to the perceptions of certain desirable "places" and their relative "accessibility" (Chinitz: 7). These three forces form a very complex web of market factors based in part on the external interaction of globalization and information, as well as the internal requirements for certain locations like those adjacent to airports or to desirable executive housing and freeways. Simultaneously, other locations both inside and outside the urban core are desirable for their location because of the requisite demographics, skill base, or a preferred specialized infrastructure (e.g., university). The journalist Garreau in describing his *Edge City* (1991) presents a picture of the new metropolis in which the

purpose is to make distance irrelevant. When you start thinking about these technologies you begin to wonder why we build cities at all. . . The key determinants in real estate have always been location, location, location. But the point of these machines is to make location meaningless (Garreau, 1991: 134).

Garreau goes too far. But his basic notions reflect the fact that there are new factors external to the natural location of land and to the availability of labor, capital, and markets. A new class of land use pattern is forming that defies the old planning assumptions rooted in the past regarding the physical dimensions of a locality alone. Moreover, physical and financial factors no longer determine locational choice. We now turn to how an assortment of new technologies is creating a totally new, unparalleled potential for all communities to alter their physical factors and their economic destiny.

Technospaces: Decentralized Agglomerations

Even as distance becomes less relevant, some locations within the metropolitan area are increasingly important as specialized technology-based nodes, or *technospaces*. The most well-publicized technospaces are those that house the nation's highest density of high-technology firms in highly agglomerated nodes outside the core city areas. They are very fragile innovative milieus predominantly concentrated in a few coastal areas of the nation such as Silicon Valley, in the San Francisco Bay Area, and Route 128 outside of Boston. These zones or so-called *innovative milieus* were spawned by a strong, well-established research and development base in major universities and/or government laboratories. These venues are similar to the old factory/company town areas inasmuch as they are co-dependent upon a resource base such as a university for their economic survival. They are primarily suburban in form, however, even when the base scientific institutions are central and urban.

In part, the decentralization of high-technology firms is related to land cost. However, another aspect is the relative difficulty employees experience in finding housing and the package

of amenities, like good schools and open space in an urban location, deemed the necessities of modern knowledge-profession lifestyles (Blakely, Roberts, and Manidis, 1987). The reasons for this pattern seem to be based on some historical accidents and the subsequent agglomeration of special infrastructure. Yet this infrastructure is not entirely unique or non-replicable. It can be replicated in other locations. As a result we see a new burst of telecommunities based on information infrastructure and a technology-oriented workforce (Goldstein and Luger, 1992).

Over three million workers are now involved in another form of tele-based community called *telecommuting* that is creating a different form of intentional technospace. This new ordering of space is created by information or by firms utilizing information technologies to alter their spatial organization. On the high-tech end of telecommuting, home telecommunications are liberating workers from the office and even from relocating to new areas when they change jobs (e.g., software engineers). On the other end, telecommuting centers are emerging in distant suburbs to ease the number of days workers have to spend on congested freeways (*New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1992: 1). The option of telecommuting is a new device to retain valued employees who are raising families or to cut the cost of providing high-priced office space that meets new environmental regulations.

A number of researchers (Saxenian, 1985; Downs, 1985; Moss, 1988) have attempted to determine the special land form of information-based technology areas. The reasons for focusing on land use patterns is that, in the industrial era, communities that wanted to attract plants used land and land use tools as the major attractor. Land use explanations have not captured the diverse rationales associated with these specialized technology-based developments. Current research has only provided cursory evidence on the power of these locations/technology combinations to attract these new industrial forms. The land use aspect of this movement has been the subject of intense debate and public policy discussions in both Europe and Japan; regional and national policy has been devoted to emulating the U.S. technology development model using a package of land use and social systems approaches combined with information technologies (Brotchie et al., 1991). Cervero predicts that,

Overall, telecom systems . . . and other advances that reduce the friction of distance will not only enlarge urbanized regions, spawn new conurbations, and radically transform once rural areas, but will lead to even a greater size and functional hierarchy of cities and towns. Maglev and high speed trains will promote concentration at the top of the hierarchy and linear spines of intra- and interstate growth while telecom advances will help nurture the development of many new secondary and tertiary urban centers (Cervero, 1991.)

The land use pattern for this settlement type is derived from the political dynamics of the national landscape. These dynamics are described in terms of their effects on transportation and environment.

Bad Intersections: Transportation, Environment, and Land Use Policies

There is considerable public debate regarding whether land use patterns or transportation are the major issues that confront planners today. As Mitchell and Rapkin said as early as 1954, traffic is "derived demand" (Cervero, *ibid*: 119). Cervero adds,

It derives directly from how activities are organized on land. Residential densities, the degree of land use mixing, site designs, the location of housing with reference to job centers—all set the stage for travel behavior, affecting the volume and length of trips as well as the modes and routes travelers choose (Cervero, *ibid*: 119).

This debate is giving rise to a revival of "old form" higher-density solutions to land utilization. In part, this revival represents the recognition that new commercial and industrial activities do not require as much spatial segregation as they did in the past because of economic and technological innovations. However, the real link between land use and transportation remains untested and unclear. The empirical evidence developed by John Holtzclaw (1990) indicates that density as the organizing tool for urban space alters travel behavior more than other incentives and inducement (Holtzclaw, 1990). His analysis of increased density creates up to a 30 percent reduction in per capita travel as density doubles. This study confirms similar work on east coast cities. Anthony Downs in *Stuck in Traffic* (1992) provides additional insights into the need to move people or jobs. He suggests multiple combined strategies for changing the job/housing balance, such as blocking the creation of jobs in areas with a surplus of jobs and a deficit of housing, and limiting further residential suburbanization (Downs, 1992: 98).

If we combine density improvements with new information technologies, then a new dwelling pattern must be devised, not merely new modes of travel or denser housing types. To address this option, urban planner/architects are gaining a new theoretical footing by proposing urban forms that essentially Europeanize urban America through land use and new rapid rail, light rail, and mass transit-organized community patterns. These speculations defy almost every principle of the American quarter-acre suburban dream (Hall, 1991c). Theorists, dreamers, schemers, pragmatists, and environmentalists are finding expression for the concept of "neo-traditional town planning" with a greater internal density as the means to liberate Americans from their automobiles. This concept thrives among planners and architects in spite of public demand for lower-density environments that mirror the land-rich historical pattern of the nation. Neo-traditionalists are proposing to remake towns by rethinking the function of streets for people first rather than cars in order to pedestrianize community environments (Bookout, 1992). This approach is still manifest as a movement rather than a concrete community type. The question is whether America can be re-made or if the "genie is already out of the bottle." Transportation policy is land use and not movement policy. In essence,

can transportation policy be used to move people out of their cars or to create new land use patterns that reduces cars/auto dependency?

Older cities like Portland, Oregon, are trying to design a transportation plan aimed at moving residential space closer to the light rail system because it does not provide enough parking at the stations. San Jose, California, has taken a slightly different approach with a light rail plan that includes the introduction of housing at key points along the routes (*The Connection Newsletter*, May 1992). The real problem is whether transportation can lead land use reformation or whether development must be made to be more transportation-intensive. Cervero makes it very clear where he stands on this question when he states,

A central finding of this [his research on the land use transportation links] is that suburban work settings with a mixture of uses (i.e. housing/commercial) are essential if workers are to be lured out of their private automobiles (Cervero, 1989: 207).

The issue is, can Americans be lured out of their cars for a denser form of development in the suburbs or the central city? The evidence is very mixed. Surveys repeatedly indicate Americans generally believe more transportation and higher density are very desirable. Yet, developments that offer that form of living have few takers. As Ruth Knack observes, ". . . Out in the suburbs lot size is not shrinking" (Knack, 1991). The land use question here is whether space can be allocated by external control rather than the market place. There is little evidence that regulatory solutions or limitation on land have the desired effects on ownership preferences. Some smaller households may elect higher-density alternatives, but even here there are selective locational preferences at work.

It seems apparent that the land use transportation linkage is not resolved by public pronouncements but by better knowledge regarding the bundle of land use and development amenities that will work in the American context. Moreover, rational land management would build on and not require additional infrastructure commitments. Transportation is the core of the infrastructure planning approach, but no land can be used without water and sewers. Much new literature on the demand for new infrastructure investment has ignored the land use management choices contained within this question. The real issue for both new and old infrastructure allocation is what land use planning goals infrastructure should serve. Transportation infrastructure can only be developed after many other basic decisions have been made regarding the appropriate form of a community.

Further environmental regulations, no matter what their intentions, are in effect land use planning. This issue will be addressed at length elsewhere, but its impacts on land use regulation approaches must be captured as well as its intended goals to protect the "environment." The major issues under this topic are the social aspects of environmental regulation. The price of such regulation, both on alternative land uses as well as the application of new preservation and conservation

rules, may be to intentionally or unintentionally immobilize lower-income minorities and price them out of suburban housing and commercial real estate markets.

Planning the Air with the Ground

Air quality, as another aspect of transportation, has taken precedence over community, commercial, or market controls. The Los Angeles Air Quality Management District was the first to use its broad powers to intervene in land use decisions. In a set of well-publicized opinions and regulations upheld by the courts, the Los Angeles basin is being replanned by air quality standards and not land use planners. These standards include the locations of both light and heavy industries, workforce movements, and commercial sitings. L.A.'s precedent has moved well beyond vehicles and roads to include the location of housing, business types, and the siting as well as the appropriate means of conducting business or organizing residential space. This form of land use control has no precedent. How land use tools will be used within this context remains an open question.

Is there any there, there?

The new locator functions we have discussed do not build on the old concentric hierarchy models. A new, yet-to-be-defined urban land use pattern is emerging within metropolitan areas. However, there remain strong pressures for regenerating the "old core city" pattern for social and economic reasons. As a social use, the old form represents an important "integrator" function. The city provides a level of social, ethnic, and racial diversity that less dense environments do not replace. In fact, most decentralized areas are intended to be socially homogeneous.


In addition, the core city infrastructure is vastly under-utilized as the nation decentralizes. City sewers, streets, transportation systems, and facilities were all built to serve high density, to increase face-to-face interactions, and to reduce automobile movements. As Castells points out,

it remains true that technology exists today that would allow a substantial proportion of office work to be performed in spatially scattered networks. . . . should such a trend develop, the consequences for the urban system would be phenomenal, as well as the social life. . . . (it) would signal the end of the basic material from which the industrial culture emerged in the 19th century (Castells, 1989: 43).

There are adaptive forces at work to revitalize core areas for new enterprises and the influx of new immigrants. These adaptive forces can best be observed in the revitalization of many of the core areas of the "old city" for new purposes. In addition, core city areas have been the target of a very large amount of foreign investment. Japanese investment alone was over 10 billion dollars per year for most of the decade (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1990) (Figure 1). The bulk went into downtown commercial real estate and fueled the speculative investment levels of central cities. This often helped more local money find its way to the suburbs, where an enormous orgy of

Figure 1

Japanese Investment Diversification by Metropolitan Area



speculative office building occurred for markets that never materialized. While some real estate leaders felt that the over-building was a manifestation of weak market analysis, more realistically there were few real market studies done on the existing market potential of these projects. The assumption was that the suburban growth machine had no immediate limits.

The restoration of the city includes developments like Baltimore's Inner Harbor, numerous downtown festival marketplaces, new urban precincts such as those emerging at New York's South Shore and Pike's Market in Seattle, along with publicly induced developments in downtown Detroit, Oakland, St. Louis, Boston, Atlanta, and Los Angeles, among others. In many of these cities, new projects seem to be doing well in spite of the growth of suburban market areas (Frieden, 1990).

The core city downtown developments, Mollenkopf and Castells (1991) point out, have begun to contribute to the creation of a new dual city. This duality can be easily observed in most major cities both in the physical and social environments.

The arguments as to whether planners, developers, or the market creates this new spatial unevenness is very relevant. If planning interventions, in the form of new planned uses, or re-uses, of urban space are possible using the new information and other technologies to rekindle these areas, then there is hope for core cities. It is unclear what kind of urban structure will emerge from these processes and what the role of the CBD will be in this pattern. But it is clear that there will be central corporate business and government as well as residential space for an urban workforce. The question, as Catherine Bauer Wurster (1964) implores, that will sustain the structure is what will be the vision that sustains the city's functions and what will be the required land use pattern.

V. A NEW CITY SYSTEM: THE METRO-BURBANIZATION OF AMERICA

Decentralized commerce and industry is related to new patterns of residential segregation. But what is generally termed suburbanization is not merely a physical pattern but a social phenomenon. As a social movement, it has deep consequences for the role land plays in the American dream. As a social message, land use patterns are dividing a nation that is becoming increasingly racially and economically diverse. Some Americans see this diversity as a threat and seek to lock themselves into the land ownership dream and lock others out of it. Decentralization relates to industrial flows that have their own locational logic. As pointed out earlier, the nation's industrial/commercial spatial logic is increasingly dictated by information and international dimensions. On the other hand, suburbanization is a habitation pattern, based on social preferences. These two dimensions are now overlapping, but they have slightly different land use implications. The majority of Americans (57 percent) live and work in the suburbs (Census, 1990). This is not a trend anymore but the established pattern. In fact, as Chinitz points out,

In the 39 metropolitan areas with 1980 populations in excess of 1,000,000, the suburban rate . . . was consistently and strongly positive in the three decades, 1950-60, 1960-70, 1970-80. . . (Chinitz: 1).

The term "suburban," which suggests these places are less urban or inferior to the core city, is inaccurate at best and misleading at worst. If national preference indicates superiority, then the suburb is the superior form. Garreau's (1991) use of the term *Edge City* is a help in providing a new label. But this term is inadequate because it infers a central place with a single form. It would be a mistake, however, to think of all suburbs within a metropolitan system as uniform in character. Some are major service and services production centers, while others remain primarily residential bedrooms with only modest capacity for self-sufficiency. In most metropolitan areas there are a variety of these suburban communities. In fact, this variety allows suburbs to link with one another as a *system* without using the central city any longer. This pattern is well documented by Cervero in his studies of suburban land use. He points out that the important commute pattern is suburb-to-suburb (42 percent) today and not suburb-to-city (Cervero, 1989: 7). In 1976 Quante could write,

More importantly, the rapid suburbanization . . . has brought increased self-sufficiency to localities outside the City. A superb supply of retail stores, ranging from conveniently located supermarkets to high-class specialty shops now serves suburbanites, reducing travel to old centers . . . (they) can now almost function independently of the region's core (Quante: 30).

In essence, the suburbs in some respects are recreating a new form of metropolitan system or *metro-burb*. In this system, each node performs a specialized residential and employment function. One center might act as the medical/health node while another acts as the entertainment center and another, the major financial and business services node. These suburbs are out-performing the central cities as employment and population generators. As Robert Fishman concludes,

The complex economy of the former suburbs has reached a critical mass, as specialized service enterprises of every kind, from hospitals. . . to gourmet restaurants. . . These multifunctional late 20th century "suburbs" can no longer be comprehended in terms of the old bedroom communities. They have become a new kind of city (Robert Fishman, 1990: 30).

The segregation of this system transcends its employment base and extends to its racial composition. Whites, particularly higher income groups, have fled to the suburbs much faster than African Americans.

But the rate of African American suburbanization is growing. In fact, in the 1970-80 decade, African American suburbanization exceeded whites. In that decade African-American population in the cities increased 5.1 percent while the comparable rate for the suburbs was 46.1 percent. As a result the proportion of African-American suburbanization increased from 4.8 to 6.1 percent (McGeary, 1990). This increase was almost entirely confined to the inner ring of older suburbs

that were generally less well racially integrated than the outer suburban areas (Galaster, June 1991). This income racial division is clearly illustrated in Los Angeles where there is a very clear income suburb division among African Americans (Grigsby, 1992). As Frey and Speare conclude,

While population continued to suburbanize in most large metropolitan areas, . . . significant shifts in suburban selectivity began to emerge . . . with respect to race and status population characteristics, household characteristics, and the relationship between workers' residences and workplaces (Frey and Speare: 431-4).


Suburban development is more than a rearrangement of space. It reflects a new racial, economic, and political organization pattern of communities that continues to build on itself as it moves outward. The political force of the suburbs has been recently documented as a major transformation in the nation's geopolitics. (Schneider: 33). That is, the old suburban areas become the new central location for an extending suburban system that continues to move outward without relinking itself to the central city and forming a new political and economic system with its own internal capacity. The issue as to whether this pattern is more energy-intensive, worse for the environment, creates more congestion, and/or extends the infrastructure or is bad economic policy remains unclear (Real Estate Research Corp., 1975).

Some recent research has cast doubt on the earlier findings regarding the ill effects of suburbanization. Altshuler and others suggest that commute times and other issues have not been adversely affected by continuing suburbanization (Chinitz, op. cit.: 7). But despite the merits of the suburbanization process, environmentalists, planners, and many policymakers find suburbs repugnant and socially damaging to the nation. As Robert Fishman suggests,

The movement of urban functions to an environment never designed for them has produced the anomaly of urban-style crowding and congesting in a decentralized setting. Through greed and ignorance we could destroy the very thing that inspired the new city and build instead a degenerated urban form that is too congested to be efficient, too chaotic to be beautiful and too dispersed to possess the diversity and vitality of a great city (Fishman, op. cit.: 30).

This less centered and more fluid urban land use pattern is difficult to predict in terms of its ultimate form. For better or worse the United States is decentralizing faster than any other society in history. For example, Detroit, which had a population of 1.7 million in 1960, has less than a million in 1990. Meanwhile, Chicago and Newark lost 7.5 and 16 percent of their populations respectively in the 1970-1980 decade. Even cities like Atlanta, which gained in overall population, had the largest gains in the immediate suburbs and not in the heart of the city. Figure 2 amplifies this point. The land use issues that arise from this are not merely spatial but social. In this country, with large tracts of land, land use has conferred social values as well as allocating physical space. The question remains: for whom are we creating space?

Figure 2
Central Cities and Suburbs 1900-1990



KeyChart 2000

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, September, 1991

07-12-92

VI. DIVIDED WE FALL! RACE, SPACE, AND LAND USE

The nation is increasingly internationalized in terms of its population dynamic in two respects. First, the nation's ethnic mix is changing rapidly, incorporating more Latino and Asian people. Second, the real increase in the nation's population is coming from the new immigrants, and our national age composition is beginning to resemble Europe and Japan (*The Economist*, June 12, 1992).

According to the Census Bureau, the nation will only grow .7 percent from 1990 to 2000, compared with 1.1 percent in the 1970s and 1.0 percent from 1980-90. Households are becoming smaller. Only the immigrant newcomers' birthrate is higher than native-born, particularly Latinos and Asians. These groups are growing very rapidly in metropolitan areas, and the foreign-born will make up the largest cohort of births in the coming decades, dominating the labor force. By 2000 barely 10 percent of the total workforce growth will be white males, creating unknown implications as Vernon, Downs, and Hall (Vernon, 1991) predict for a nation based on a white male model of planning and development. (Sternlieb, 1990: 492).


Another important demographic trend is the decline in middle-level-income families. In a recently published report, the Federal Reserve Board indicates a drop of nearly 6 percent in the middle class since 1970 (*Oakland Tribune*, Jan. 7, 1992: C1). Income growth has fallen off dramatically since 1973 whether measured by average or median. As Figure 3 shows, from 1947-73, median income rose at 2.8 percent a year; since 1973 it has grown only 0.5 percent. Some researchers attribute this to the demise of manufacturing and others to the composition of the workforce (Leigh-Preston, 1988).

No matter which argument one accepts regarding demography or the economy, there are real implications for housing stock requirements and land use policy. For example, in 1987 it took 32 percent of a young married couple's earnings to purchase a home, versus 22 percent in 1967. In some metropolitan areas of the country, primarily the Northeast and California, up to 50 percent of dual household incomes are necessary to secure a first home. Economists forecast a decline of nearly half of the 1970-80 decade demand for both single and multi-family units (Armijo et al., 1990: 21-42). These changes were reflected in settlement patterns, inasmuch as the cost of home ownership is pushing home buyers farther out in search of cheaper and better housing and neighborhoods (Leigh-Preston, 1988: 7). And changes in the nation's demographics signal general slowdowns in housing demands of the traditional population. But it may also signal a new and different competition for space. A tendency exists,

to fort up, to turn away from public initiatives. . . to very privatized actions by which one strives to control some small piece of one's environment. This is evident increasingly in public attitudes and in living space preferences. . . The problems of land use development are just one manifestation of this. . . (Sternlieb, 1990: 494).

Figure 3

**Annual Growth in Family Income,
Selected Parts of Distribution, 1947-1989**



Recent demographic changes described here are *dividing* and not *diversifying* the nation. Metropolitan areas have become increasingly spatially pluralistic and segregated in terms of race, class, and land values. Urban areas are pluralistic in the sense they contain more ethnic groups over a wider space than before. But they are more deeply segregated in the sense that new entry groups vie with one another over relatively segregated land markets. As increasing groups of minorities are coming into the nation, they are occupying both traditional metropolitan and older suburban space. These immigrants, primarily from Latin America and Southeast Asia, have carved out areas of the central city and re-invigorated many of them. Unlike earlier migrants, the new groups have maintained ties to their native lands and the resources of their former communities. This is most easily observed among the Korean population, who tend to receive significant amounts of financial and other assistance from their homeland. But some groups, such as the Filipinos, Mexicans, Turks, and other groups, also maintain structured relationships to their homelands (Valenzuela, 1991). This allows these new immigrants to continue to use their native country as both a fiscal and political support structure to shield themselves from discrimination of the dominant culture (Vernon, 1991: 4). They form new colonies within the inner city and older suburbs. This new mosaic of urban space has both positive and negative attributes. While many inner-city areas are growing with these new communities, as seen so vividly in the Los Angeles riots, there is increasing competition over the remaining inner-city and older suburban habitable space. This conflict is increasingly manifesting itself by rising levels of violence in urban neighborhoods.

Minorities, be they newcomers or long-term minority residents, are located in residential isolated neighborhoods. Indices of segregation in 1980 showed that nearly 79 percent of African Americans, 48 percent of Hispanics, and 43 percent of Asians would have to move in order to achieve racially mixed neighborhoods (Farley, 1986). This pattern of segregation differs slightly by region of the country. The 1990 census indicates two ominous trends. First, racially segregated areas in the 1980 census were both race- and income-segregated in the 1990 Census. In essence, the position of the minority poor, particularly the African American poor, deteriorated over the decade. As William Julius Wilson says, "Social isolation deprives residents of certain inner-city neighborhoods not only of resources. . . (it) restrict(s) social mobility" (Wilson, 1991).

These areas are continuing to deteriorate because minorities with more resources are moving away from them, as shown in Table 1.

The second factor is the rapid reduction of employment opportunities in these same neighborhoods. Recent studies of the so-called *underclass* show how deep the economic and residential segregation has become. Studies of the underclass show consistent trends in occupational, spatial, and economic segregation. As Mollenkopf and Castells (1991) summarize,

We may also say that New York and many other cities are characterized by a dual structure society. . . . While granting that local labor market is complex,

Table 1**Residential Segregation, Ten Largest Metropolises, 1980**

Metropolis	Population Size, 1988 1,000	Percent Black	Index of Racial Segregation	Racial Composition of Tract of Typical Black	
				Percent Black	Percent White
New York	17,053	15%	78	64%	28%
Los Angeles	13,920	8	79	61	30
Chicago	7,396	21	88	84	14
San Francisco	4,950	8	71	51	42
Philadelphia	4,904	17	78	70	28
Detroit	4,434	20	88	80	20
Washington	3,849	14	71	69	30
Dallas	3,513	28	78	67	30
Houston	3,306	16	74	66	31
Miami	3,212	20	79	68	30

Source: Goldsmith & Blakely, 1992

we must also acknowledge the reality of inclusion and exclusion, rooted in racial and social discrimination. . . (Mollenkopf and Castells, op. cit.: 414).

These poor neighborhoods are increasingly isolated from the municipal land and social markets. Landis provides evidence of the economic geography through location quotients to show the geography of race, poverty, and space. In a sense, they form a new land and social pattern. They are not responsive to the regular real estate market. Even the reduction in land values does not attract buyers or lenders. Consequently, the fate of these neighborhoods cannot rest on the workings of market forces as in previous decades. This pattern is increasingly the focus of major research efforts indicating that the duality in the urban structure is intensifying. Moreover, the new immigrants to the nation are bringing with them different expectations as to how the urban landscape should be organized and developed.

Both land use controls and land use management approaches are important elements in segmenting the society. Urban space is increasingly uneven socially, and subject to fluctuations in values, based on perceptions of the user and not the use. The form of interventions to deal with these problems is fraught with new dilemmas. William Julius Wilson, Christopher Jencks, and others suggest that public policy should open up suburban jobs and housing opportunities through transportation and active anti-housing discrimination along with required low-income housing (Jencks and Peterson, 1991; Wilson, 1986). On the other hand, Goldsmith and Blakely along with Galaster suggest that planning and land use tools be used to attract jobs and housing investment to the inner cities (Goldsmith and Blakely, 1992; Galaster, 1987). Obviously, some mix of each of these policy approaches will be required; the questions are what will the mix be and how will land use policies and planning contribute to designing this mix?

Whose Environment Needs Planning for Whom?

The environmental movement's upper-middle-class values orientation assumes that their quality of life values are best for the whole nation. As a result, siting issues are battles between the haves and the have-nots. Almost all locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) or not in my backyard (NIMBYs) are related to the preservation of the environment of a strong community and the deterioration of a weaker one. The range of LULUs is well beyond hazardous substances. It includes jails, half-way houses, drug treatment centers, multiple dwellings, schools, and parks, as well as landfills and toxic furnaces. Land management tools are at the center of this debate. Recent studies show that almost 40 percent of the communities with multiple hazardous waste disposal facilities were predominantly minority. These studies also show that 15 million African Americans and 8 million Hispanics live in communities with one or more hazardous waste facilities (Commission on Racial Justice: 12). These figures indicate that the burden of environmental management is not equally shared. It is unlikely that this situation will change without some form of national burden-sharing legislation.

VII. FORTING UP

It is in this context that we must consider the set of suburban policies of suburban and smaller metropolitan communities that aim at restricting or limiting access. Several land use planning and policy tools are again being used for this purpose. The reasons for these actions

are not simply racist. . . like many in the New America (people) are gripped by the fear of falling off the housing train. They are afraid that if you make the wrong housing decision, if you jeopardize your housing equity and your housing-buying, you will never be able to get on the housing train again. This feeling is becoming dominant everywhere. There is a growing crisis of future expectation in America's middle class (Sternlieb, *op. cit.*: 494).

This psychology is well documented by Karl Case in his studies of the housing market booms. He demonstrates that most Americans purchase homes as their savings and investment portfolio, leading them

to see (housing as) a market driven largely by expectations. People seem to form their expectations on the basis of past price movements rather than market fundamentals. This increases the likelihood that price booms will persist as home buyers in essence become destabilizing spectators (Case and Shiller, 1988: 45).

It is this growing fear of the loss of house wealth that is recasting land use planning tools and giving rise to a new surge of land management efforts aimed at retarding growth. According to Glickfeld and Levine (1990), over 300 of California's 415 municipal jurisdictions have initiated no-growth legislation. Most are suburban and outer-ring communities that have taken these actions to stem the tide of minorities moving out of the cities. No-growth is not merely a land use regime but a bundle of policies that have remarkably little impact on growth but strong impacts on community composition (Landis, 1991).

Each of these is a land use response to social environmental control, or "forting up" as Sternlieb so aptly describes it. No-growth and other population management systems serve a variety of purposes well beyond managing population (Frieden, 1979), such as limiting access to certain groups by controlling land prices. There is clear evidence that local groups who prompt no-growth policies recognize their intrinsic capacity to limit the movement of minorities out of the inner city. As Rabin (1991) says,

local government and use regulations; segregative policies and practices of housing authorities; the failure to enforce civil rights laws; severe federal funding reductions. . . . These diverse policies and activities differ widely in the nature and intensity of their impacts on isolation. Some exert powerful influences on the spatial distribution of development; some influence the nature of development; while others establish conditions of access to the benefits of development. It is important to recognize those public policies that disproportionately increase the opportunity for whites to leave the central city. . . (Rabin, 1991: 2).

Landis conducted one of the few careful longitudinal studies of California's myriad municipal no-growth ordinances only to conclude that, "Clearly, the types of growth measures adopted in many . . . cities and counties have not been all that effective at curtailing growth" (Landis, 1991). Landis is wrong; they do work.

Privatizing Community

The new privatized communities are a new form of the new town of three decades ago. They are a new social fort. In the 1960s a number of new communities were proposed by private developers influenced by the British new town experiences of the previous decade. The new town experiments of the 1960s failed to capture the public's imagination. However, more recently the new private towns are re-emerging with considerable public support.

The reason for this change is that developers are increasingly required to control land use because of environmental, zoning, and development fees. Alonso anticipated this movement as early as 1969 when he described new town development as having ". . . fewer institutional constraints on innovation in design, organization and technology" (Alonso, 1969). Today he would add taxes and development fees as well as control of externalities to the list. Developers are becoming city builders. These cities are intended to be completely self-contained environments with both jobs and housing. In contrast to the older form of new town, they aim to connect with the surrounding city or suburban areas rather than isolate themselves. This is in part due to environmental regulation, but it also represents the desire of the developers to provide a socially and economically secure environment. There are now over 30 new towns being proposed in Central California alone, not including 16 under construction in other states (ULI, 1990). These communities are economically homogeneous. It is the economic and social homogeneity that sells. While minority interest groups tend to criticize these developments as exclusive, the data indicates that these communities tend to be as racially diverse as their professional income structures allow (*Sacramento Bee*, Nov. 24, 1991).

Locking In and Looking Out: Gated Communities

Another approach to the new town is the neo-traditional community. This community is a reaction to the suburban form. It is in part an architectural and social product, attempting to recreate the old small town atmosphere with mixed housing and commercial space. Architecturally, it represents a most modern environmental approach to design and land management (Handy, 1991).

This neo-traditional form itself has become a subject of intense debate. But the underlying ideas that have brought it into being are not widely discussed. These include the desire of millions of Americans to redevelop the sense of community that does not exist in the suburbs. The typical

components of a mixed-use development have been rearranged and connected to create a new sense of community (Baltake: 138). The neo-traditional village style represents an important new urban form with its own land use planning and design requirements. It has been roundly criticized as being too superficial, elitist, and too physically deterministic (Handy, 1991).

A related form of development to the new town and neo-traditional village is the gated community. City or town gates are as old as cities themselves. But the new gated communities are not self-contained cities. They are large private-development security-controlled environments located within a city or county boundaries. These new gated communities are intentional for certain lifestyles such as retirement, golf/sports, or wealth. They are designed to insulate the inhabitants from the perceived dangers of modern urban life. Available data, which is scant, indicates that gated communities, particularly those built for retirement, are among the most segregated in the nation (Farley, 1986).

Urban villages, new towns, gated communities, and similar developments have been lightly researched even though they are becoming an important element in community development in the exurbs, suburbs, and more recently proposed for the inner city.

VIII. LAND AND LAND USE REGULATIONS: THE NEW CIVIC TREASURY


As mentioned earlier, no matter where people live, land use is increasingly inspired by local economic concerns rather than the actual value of the land. The planning process must serve the current stringent financial atmosphere of local governments as a means to balance budgets and (not physical planning order). Clearly, local governments are using land use controls to achieve economic and political objectives. Politically correct land use equates to how land can be used to extract new forms of taxes.

The emphasis on the fiscal impacts of growth began to crowd out other concerns; development was approved when it made fiscal sense, denied when it was insufficiently profitable. Small residential developments (which were perceived to cost more to service than they generated through fees) were discouraged, while retail and office projects (which generated additional tax revenues or cost less to service) were encouraged (Landis, op. cit, 1991: 29).

Commercial and residential development fees, in essence, have replaced property taxes as the basic source of municipal income. As a result, cities are actively engaged in searching out retail developments to meet their operating expenses. As Figure 4 indicates, impact/development fees have escalated geometrically over the last several years.

Development fees or other forms of exactions are not only a means to collect money, they also represent a vehicle that community uses to continue, as Deakin puts it, to provide the "good life" of ". . . social and economic advancements and freedom of choice" (Deakin, 1987: 8). This

Figure 4
Average Impact Fees, 1988-1991



KeyChart 2000

07-12-92

Source: National Association of Industrial Office Parks, 1991

freedom of choice extends to who lives in the community. Deakin quotes one Marin, California, supervisor's view of how development fees are used in that locality with,

Around here, ballot box downsizing is a real possibility. If a developer won't provide the mitigations and amenities that the people want, they may find themselves stopped altogether (Deakin, 1987: 21).

Development fees serve the purpose of rationing residential opportunities. By raising the cost by uncertainty, communities can effectively limit growth. This has been a device used in a number of communities, most notably Boulder, Colorado, and Petaluma, California (Deakin, 1989).

As a result, land values have become markedly disassociated with any potential use of the land. This has resulted in a considerable amount of building residential and commercial space to service community tax or amenity values rather than market need.

Walled and Malled: Urban Commercial Space in the 1980s

No one is certain how much speculative commercial shopping center space was produced in the 1980s. This space was produced on the basis of the new suburbanizing and decentralizing environment. Market estimates were developed that indicated a demand for all of this space. But the Savings and Loan debacle indicates that many of these projects were built on very poor market assessments, misapplications of market tools, or the inability to determine the difference between current and future demand. In the 1980s, over 80 million square feet of office and commercial development were built in the suburbs annually and about one-quarter of that amount of space in the downtown cores. Foreign capital contributed nearly 10 percent of those totals. Anthony Downs says, "there (was) too much money flowing into real estate and this created . . . many money-driven (taxes and finance) rather than demand driven markets" (Downs, 1985).

While it is clear that much of this development was built to serve the development community, it is also clear that the tools used to project or determine demand for such space were woefully inaccurate and inadequate. Or, if they were accurate, there were other forces that superior to them operating at the same time.

Finally, this space has already been produced. The fact that it is there will have a major impact on what space is built in the near future, if any at all. In essence, this space that had low or no demand will dictate the demand curve for the land use market for some time to come.

IX. DEMISE OF THE URBAN-RURAL GRADIENT

Thirty years ago, it was relatively easy to determine the difference between rural and urban. This is no longer true. In part, the collapse of this distinction is a tribute to the remarkable application of modern technology to rural settings. The advent of universal telecommunications, electric power, and highways has made every corner of America easily accessible. Rural land has come into

the purview of urban influences both directly and indirectly. In a direct sense, the pressures for suburban growth have led to the conversion of millions of acres of formerly agricultural land into urban uses ranging from shopping centers and residential areas to industrial parks and airports. Indirectly, rural land is subject to urban influences through the demands for agricultural lands for hobby farms, nature preserves, and recreational space.

These pressures have transformed the nature of rural economic activity from natural-resource to a services base. "Rural" no longer translates to agriculture/natural resources. The vast majority of the rural workforce is now engaged in manufacturing and services. Natural resource employment continues to fall, and the amount of both land and people required to support it dwindles.

Moreover, there are 159 million acres of agricultural land in metropolitan areas (MSAs) and 643,000 farmers. These farmers occupy some of the richest agricultural land in the nation, producing over 70 percent of the nation's specialty fruit and vegetable crop and almost 40 percent of the dairy products. So farming is not just rural (Heimlich, 1989).

Thus, it is not the economic value of agriculture that creates the current rural land use debate. In fact, conversion of agricultural land to urban uses is only a small fraction of the amount of agricultural land lost to erosion, salinization, and poor farming practices. The real issues are the competing visions for how agricultural land should be treated within the economy. Is agricultural land deserving of some form of protection not extended to other industries? If so, why? Moreover, is the conversion of agricultural land, much of it marginal, to urban uses better? Or, finally, does agricultural land offer an "open space" or landscaping or set of preservable social values that should be protected?

Farming is becoming increasingly subject to urban influences. There are three types of rural areas: those in the shadow of major metropolitan areas; those that are non-metro communities with a mixed manufacturing/service base with some agriculture; and traditional rural settlements dependent on natural resources and only marginally attached to the major metro systems. The influences of urbanization are felt in all three of these areas. These range from the pressures of urban development on rich agricultural land to preservation and open space pressures in traditional agricultural areas that are no longer competitive in the international agricultural market.

Room for Whom

California's metropolitan Central Valley produces almost 12 percent of all the nation's agricultural product. This area, only 400 hundred miles long and less than 50 miles wide, is the home of enormously productive agricultural production. It is also subject to intense development pressure to accommodate up to another four million people by the turn of the century; as are rural areas in Florida, Arizona, and New England. These growth pressures come from a variety of sources. They are in part related to the aging of the population. As senior citizens escape the

cities in search of a more tranquil life in small-town America, they spill over into rural areas as the suburban commute shed lengthens. Immigration is having an impact on non-metropolitan areas as well as immigrants moving into non-metro farm areas. These exurbs on the fringe of major metropolitan areas provide the new migrants with two things they desire. First, they have metropolitan services without the size of metropolitan areas. Second, they are cheaper to live in and provide opportunities for formerly rural immigrant people to maintain family gardens and small farms as a supplement to the family income. The metro farming areas represent a transition zone for immigrants.

Several sets of land use issues are emerging from these different types of metro/rural areas. Within the metro/rural areas primarily in the West, Florida, and the Northeast, there are preservation, conservation, and urban/rural environmental interface factors that impact on land use. These factors are being played out in community disputes over future land use alternatives.

One of the most interesting battles affecting metro farms is the "new right to farm." Farmers increasingly threatened by urban development are asking for more than current preservation ordinances. They are taking the offensive against residential communities that want to limit their farm activities, such as aerial spraying, farm equipment operations, or even the types of herbicides and insecticides that farmers can apply on their crops. In effect, the farmers are claiming their land is being inversely condemned by local community actions aimed at curbing their livelihood. On another front, farming land is being legislatively impeded from conversion to other non-farm uses. Several states have initiated legislation that either restricts farmland conversions or prevents urban sprawl on to farmland areas. The practical impact of these approaches on farmland preservation is not well researched. The available evidence indicates that it has a very small impact on the urbanization of farmland (Deakin, 1989).

Another approach is to make it valuable to farm through tax incentives and sharing the land development pie among farmers through transfers of development rights and bonuses. These approaches seem to meet with less resistance but they are certainly no panacea.

Whose values should shape rural space, those of agriculture, commuters, or new immigrants? They all have different visions of how this land should be shaped, and these visions are clashing in city council meetings and the courts.

Communities Left Behind

On the other end of the spectrum, hundreds of rural communities are dying. They are dying because of the emergence of the mega suburban shopping centers and the decline in rural farm work. These communities, primarily in the upper midwest, are being marginalized by technology and not enhanced by it. Their destiny is by no means certain.

For a few agricultural communities, land use/land management discussions are as charged as the issue of preserving prime agricultural, forest, and other lands. While there may be strong rationale to do this as social policy, there are few economic arguments for it. The Western nations already produce too much agriculture and protect it too heavily. Nonetheless, good arguments, ranging from providing a national security land reserve to natural habitat, can be advanced for the preservation of the natural landscape. The land management issue is to accomplish this without limiting the right of farmers, ranchers, and foresters to determine their own economic destiny. Interventions in these marketplaces via development restrictions, transfers of development rights, land banking, and other vehicles seem noble but are they applicable to a nation of this size and complexity—can we afford them in a changing global economy no matter what the cost? Or alternatively can we afford not to preserve these resources?

The federal government is the nation's largest natural-resource land manager. Its stewardship over much of the grazing and timber land is under severe attack by farmers and environmentalists as well as local communities. The federal government manages over 25 percent of all the natural resource land in the country. This land has become the subject of intense debate as to the goals and objectives of the management regime. Some see the land returning to a natural state and even the acquisition of more land to create new natural preserves restricted from grazing and urban uses. Various public land trusts and naturalist groups are acquiring natural habitat areas in farmers' ranch and farm land and converting it to natural habitat (Popper, 1983). The issue here is how to coordinate, organize, and manage such approaches since the land cannot manage itself.

Urbanization brings with it issues beyond development pressures in natural-resource-producing areas. Wild lands are subject to fires, vegetative disease, and other natural disasters. Urbanization increases the likelihood of natural-area catastrophe. As a result, the amount of urbanization that can and should be tolerated near wildlife/natural areas is an important land use question. Even access to sensitive areas introduces numerous hazards such as fire and erosion. Finally, the increasing number of senior citizens choosing to live in a non-metropolitan/natural resource setting; who are and building mobile home parks and bringing in domestic animals presents challenges for land management with respect to added environmental pressures on natural areas.

Community Size and Capacity in a Global Economy

Size and purpose in a more gentle era were not significant issues. However, in a global economy the ability of a community to sustain itself is a central question. Hundreds of formerly productive agricultural communities can barely reach a sustainable threshold. Some policy analysts suggest that a natural death is the best alternative for these communities. Others propose a new rationale for their continuation based on connection to a larger economic system. The

question of sustainability needs immediate attention because the nation no longer has the resources or the will to subsidize these communities (Blakely, 1991).

While urbanization and environmental preservation issues receive significant attention, the declining population, economic instability, and lack of economic development options for most of rural America receive less attention. Over 400 rural counties remain desperately poor even after modest influxes of retirees and immigrants. These communities have lost their natural resource advantages or had them reduced due to environmental regulations or international market actions. Some of these areas were among the earliest to attract branch textile and auto plants. But rural branch plants were among the first to close. As a result, many very rural and dependent counties are now destitute. The fortunes of only a handful of these communities near large population centers in California, Florida, and Georgia are being restored by population influx. The vast majority are growing poorer. Their salvation has been to attract new service firms such as tele-marketing, publishing (in the Midwest), or to move into new agricultural areas like aquaculture or silviculture in the South.

It does not appear that any new technological breakthroughs are going to alter the fate of these communities. In spite of much hope that the computer and biotechnology industries could and would relocate to rural areas, there is scant evidence of this beyond small spillovers in the far west from Silicon Valley to Oregon, Arizona, and Utah.

Rural America, like urban America, is witnessing a new duality. High-value agriculture areas are blending into the new metropolitan form to serve as an economic activity as well as part of the open space amenity package of the new suburbs. As Heimlich says,

the new pattern of metropolitan developments are less rural; they blend elements of both urban and rural land uses. Relationships between development and the concept of "urban" and "rural" are increasingly difficult to reconcile. Thus, the (Census) redefinition reflects growing recognition. . . . these new development patterns are straining the limits of the metropolitan concept (Heimlich, 1989: 461).

It is this strain in concept that is reflected in the seemingly contradictory and mostly ineffectual attempts to control the uses and abuses of rural land. No land management system yet devised meets the manifold goals of preserving the environment, facilitating urban growth, and protecting a sector of the economy as well as a way of life.

X. CONCLUSION: A LAND USE POLICY RESEARCH AGENDA FOR AMERICA

Land use and land values are being reshaped. The use value of land, Henry George would recognize, is less tied to its exchange value than in previous eras. That is, for certain locations, for environmental or social reasons, land values associated with them are not related to what they

would fetch in the open market. On the other hand, much land has acquired an exchange value because of the current social fear factor beyond its intrinsic value. In a perfect market situation, land use research and planning would be able to determine what land is best suited for the optimal public social purpose so as to zone or control its use. This is not the case. We know precious little about what the land market is and the development potentials for any parcel of land in our current environment. We are unsure of what future land use regimes can be created for urban or rural areas. We are left with several issues that bear further analysis for us to gain the knowledge we need to set public land use policies.

First, it appears there is no current planning or land use approach for an internationalized and decentralized urban environment. Nor has land use planning taken into consideration the combination of agglomerative and dispersion impacts of new technologies and their impacts on metropolitan settlement patterns.

Second, it seems no matter which of the above economic forces influence the metropolitan economy, central cities or downtown areas have to become even more specialized in their economic functions and play a smaller role in their own metropolitan system. As a result, we are witnessing a new organization of urban space without a strong controlling core as the fundamental shape of a new international/information-based system. Whether any land use form can serve this system is an important public policy matter that requires immediate attention. Is Henry George a dead letter in today's environment?

Third, there will be more adaptive re-uses of space within the urban system. The transition one whose economy is an information/trade-based economic system will create more opportunities for a much greater mix of economic and residential activity both within and outside the urban core. Planning regulations and zoning systems lag far behind these adaptive re-use demands.

Fourth, the metropolitan system will be increasingly uneven in its land use pattern. "Islands of neglect" are growing within the urban and rural space economy. These islands seem to be impervious to changes in the larger space economy. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. However, as we continue, the suburbanization of people and economic activity is creating a large social gulf—straining the economy and the land.

Fifth, environmental and land use issues are intersecting one another in both rural and urban environments. The collision of these very powerful land management policy forces is inevitable, lacking any systematic or informed means of addressing the issues central to the environmental debates such as described as preserving agriculture, open space, or community patterns.

Land uses have always been the backdrop for shaping the American dream. No matter how archaic, the dream of securing a piece of land is under intense pressure from social, demographic, and environmental pressures. As we enter the next century it is clear that the old American land use dream will not be shared by all Americans. The consequences for the nation of this transition

may be viewed from the conflicts that arose in South-Central Los Angeles, the privatization and fortifying-up of communities, and the volatile movement of business and industry from urban areas. What these changes portend for the nation is difficult to determine. The only thing that is clear is that somehow Americans of every class and race want land as one element of the American dream.

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