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Marcos and U.S. Aid

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**MARCOS
AND
U.S. AID**

**Statement by
D.B. Schirmer
and
Summary of
Logistics
of Repression**

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TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE,
SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUE, HAWAII, PRESIDING, JUNE 24, 1975.

STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL B. SCHIRMER, MEMBER OF CORE FACULTY, GODDARD/CAMBRIDGE GRADUATE PROGRAM IN SOCIAL CHANGE

ACCOMPANIED BY WALDEN BELLO, DOCTORAL CANDIDATE, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Senator Inouye. Our next witness is Dr. Daniel B. Schirmer, member of the Core faculty, Goddard-Cambridge graduate program in social change.

Dr. Schirmer. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask permission to have Mr. Walden Bello sit with me at the table. He is a doctoral candidate, Princeton University, and helped prepare the statement on martial law in the Philippines and United States aid thereto.

My name is Daniel B. Schirmer. I live in Cambridge, Mass., and teach Philippine/United States history at Goddard-Cambridge graduate program in social change.

My interest in the contemporary Philippines was occasioned by a book I wrote on the popular opposition to the United States conquest of the Philippines around 1900.

I speak today on behalf of the Friends of the Filipino People and the National Coordinating Committee of the Anti-Martial Law (Philippines) Movement.

PREPARED STATEMENT

Senator Inouye. Dr. Schirmer, would you care to have your full statement made part of the record?

Dr. Schirmer. I would appreciate that, sir.

Senator Inouye. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The statement follows.]

STATEMENT OF DANIEL B. SCHIRMER

My name is Daniel B. Schirmer. I am presently employed as a member of the Core Faculty of the Goddard/Cambridge Graduate Program in Social Change where I teach a seminar on the history of U.S.-Philippine relations. I am a member of the organization called Friends of the Filipino People. My involvement in this movement of concern was occasioned by a book I wrote on the American anti-imperialist movement, Republic or Empire. American Reaction to the Philippine War. Young Americans and Filipinos who have been victimized by Marcos, read my book, sought me out, and enlisted my interest in the contemporary problems.

NATURE OF THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP

It is about a year since a representative of the Friends of the Filipino People spoke before a Congressional Committee calling for an end to the U.S. military aid to the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines. In this year some things have changed, some have remained the same.

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BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
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WASHINGTON: U.S. PRINTING OFFICE, 1975

The nature of the Marcos regime remains much the same: it still is a one-man military dictatorship that prohibits freedom of speech, press and assembly, that bans the Philippine Congress and outlaws strikes and demonstrations.

If anything the rule of Marcos has grown more autocratic in the past year; he has, for instance, taken upon himself the appointment of all local officials in his country. In a recent analysis of the dictatorship entitled "Philippines: 75, the Far Eastern Economic Review, a magazine for investors, writes:

Slowly and sedulously, President Marcos has moved to a position in which every office holder in the land—local councilors, city mayors, provincial governors and all judges—hold their position at his pleasure. The many other once prominent Filipino families, "the oligarchs", retain resentments, but no power. The military shares power, but shows no signs of wishing to grab it.

After he declared martial law Marcos tried to win popular support by promising land reform, an end to government corruption and crime in the streets. Last year Professor Kerkvliet who spoke before Congress for the Friends of the Filipino People was forced to declare, from all the evidence available to him, that the land reform was still-born. Today the Far Eastern Economic Review writes:

Little is heard these days about land reform, but we seem scantly realized corruption remains endemic. In fact, the lower levels of small salary earners find their own way to remain in the high income brackets. So, a teacher has to pay a bribe of \$600, for example, in order to obtain bail for a student wrongfully detained in the first place. Even the gains in law and order are questionable—ask the Asian Development Bank official who was still waiting for a police investigation of the stabbing of his night watchman three days after the event—and when last heard from was still waiting?

In the past year the oligarchic Lopez family publicly leveled charges of corruption on a grand scale against President and Mrs. Marcos, accusing them of using dictatorial powers to appropriate for their own profit valuable Lopez properties. Moreover, much as President Marcos tries to obscure the fact, the Philippine regime continues to be a one-man military dictatorship of a neo-colonial type, i.e., it is the government of a country that is independent: in name only. This neo-colonial character is given to the Philippine government by the nation's colonial past from which no real break has yet been made.

At the beginning of the 20th century U.S. corporate industry and finance sought new markets abroad for goods and capital, and, as a result, the U.S. government turned to imperialism, conquering the Philippines and holding that nation as a colony for nearly fifty years. Then in 1946 the United States returned the Philippines independent. But even at this time there were those in the Philippines and in the United States who felt that this independence was only a fiction and that actually the Philippines was still a colony of the United States because of the Treaty of Manila, by which the Philippines had demanded as the price of freedom, investment and by two huge U.S. military bases, Clark Air Force base and Subic Naval base, so that the country's subordination to the United States is more readily apparent than ever.

The neo-colonial character of the Marcos dictatorship is particularly to be seen in the way martial law has changed the country's policy toward U.S. investment. In the decade preceding martial law there had been a growth of nationalist restrictions placed upon U.S. investment by a Philippine Congress evidently tired of watching U.S. multi-nationals take five dollars in profit out of the country for every dollar of investment they put in. Ferdinand Marcos, immediately upon the declaration of martial law set about reversing this trend; nationalist restrictions on foreign investment were removed or liberalized, areas like rice cultivation, and commercial banking once closed to foreign investment were opened. "Red Carpet for Foreign Investors," was the slogan the Marcos government placed at the top of an ad it placed in the New York Times last November listing the many advantages martial law now offered U.S. investors ("... tax unrestricted remittance of earnings and repatriation of investment, no re-training expenses, accelerated depreciation on machinery and equipment, carry-over of

¹ Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1975.

² Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1975.

³ Parade, March 2, 1975.

⁴ Prepared from a study by the Office of Statistical Coordination and Standards of the Philippine National Economic Council.

net operating losses incurred during the first ten years of operation," etc.). The ad boasted that martial law had reversed the previous decade's net capital outflow from the Philippines. In this way the Marcos dictatorship puts itself in direct line with the former U.S. colonial regime. For William Howard Taft, the first U.S. colonial governor of the Philippines repeatedly asserted he was setting up a U.S. government in the Philippines in order to keep U.S. investment there, to prevent U.S. capital from leaving the Philippines. Today Ferdinand Marcos sets up a Philippine dictatorship to do the job.

U.S. investors have responded positively to the reforms Philippine martial law has brought about in their favor. For example, investment in the country (by U.S.) amounted to \$358 million up 274% compared to 425.7 million the year before. In November 1974 U.S. corporate approval of the highest sort was bestowed on the Marcos dictatorship when David Rockefeller chose Manila as the site of the annual meeting of the Chase Manhattan Bank international executive committee.

For yet another year, then, many Filipinos have seen the Marcos dictatorship thrust aside their nationalist, economic aspirations in order to appease U.S. multi-national corporations. For another year Ferdinand Marcos has deprived the Filipino people of their liberties, while the improvement in their well-being he promised under martial law has not, in most cases, materialized.

OPPOSITION TO MARCOS

That these conditions have not yet brought all evidence of disaffection to the surface can be understood. As the Far Eastern Economic Review states: "political quiescence . . . today reflects the hard times many Filipinos face as they struggle to survive, amid inflation, which, as ever, has benefited the rich few much more than the poorer masses."

Nevertheless, in the past year there has been a decided display of public opposition to the Marcos dictatorship and indeed a growth of such opposition. Outstanding has been the position taken by large numbers of the Catholic clergy in the Philippines, representing a faith held by 85% of the Philippine people. Last summer all 82 Catholic Bishops of the Philippines addressed a letter to President Marcos protesting the "climate of fear" which they said gripped all sections of society under martial law, and Archbishop Sin of Manila (the leading Catholic churchman of the Philippines) engaged in his first public confrontation with President Marcos over questions of repression, torture and loss of civil rights (two more such confrontations followed in the following months). Finally in February 1975 the Catholic Association of Major Religious Superiors called for a boycott of the third showcase referendum on martial law conducted by the dictator. Members of the Catholic and Protestant clergy initiated a protest against the referendum signed by some 38,000 citizens and 5,000 demonstrated in the streets of Manila, under clerical leadership, against martial law.¹⁹

Outlawing all legal forms of political change and failing, since its inception, to solve the acute problems of a restive Muslim minority (4 million strong) and of the rural poor (the country's majority), the Marcos regime has been faced with two movements of armed opposition: the New People's Army led by Communists, and that of the Muslims.

In early 1974 the Marcos government admitted that the New People's Army had expanded its activities on Luzon to the north to the Visayas and Mindanao in the martial law period. In 1975 the island of Samar became one of the New People's Army expansion areas. The number of New People's Army regulars, according to estimates of the Philippine Army, has increased since martial law to over 2,000, with a support population numbering many thousands more.²⁰

Even more threatening to Marcos is the Muslim resistance in the southern Philippines which puts forward the demand of this minority for some form of autonomy. A recent New York Times report on the Muslim resistance states:

¹⁹ New York Times, November 14, 1974.

²⁰ See, for example, Taft's testimony before a Senate Committee in 1922, quoted in American Imperialism and the Philippines, by John H. Coatsworth, Editor (Little Brown, Boston, 1969), p. 41.

¹ Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1975.

² Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1975.

³ New York Times, Philippines, February 27, 1975 and "Protest," America, February 1, 1975.

⁴ New York Times, Philippines, February 27, 1975 and "Protest," America, February 1, 1975.

⁵ The Logistics of Repression, The National Coordinating Committee of the Anti-Martial Law (Philippines) Movement, p. 3.

"... it is worth bearing in mind that with an estimated 16,000 men under arms, it is being by twice as large as the biggest Communist movement going in South-east Asia [that of Thailand]. This year it has spread to cover practically the whole of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago and, as numerous journalists report on the spot, it enjoys wide popular support. It is, seemingly, an intractable source of militant opposition to the Marcos regime, and conditions in the Muslim areas border on civil war."

U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP

Bernard Wideman, a U.S. journalist in the Philippines, last year wrote of the Marcos dictatorship's attempt to suppress the Muslim guerrillas: "Opposing them are the 25,000 government troops have a full American supplied arsenal of M-16 rifles, machine guns, F-86 and F-5 fighter bombers, and a navy equipped with gunboats, frigates and landing ships." As Wideman reports, the Marcos dictatorship represses domestic opposition by relying almost exclusively on supplies of U.S. military aid. This must be especially kept in mind today as President Marcos makes vigorous efforts to proclaim his government's independence from the United States.

Here it must be remembered that from the neo-colonialist standpoint the more the actual dependency of the former colonial state is minimized and kept from view the better it is, in this way the democratic and nationalist aspirations of the people's conscience are less easily antagonized. Such is not only the explanation for Marcos' posture of independence today; it is also the explanation for the formation of the State Department has accorded the Marcos dictatorship from its very beginning—in blatant contrast, of course to the very real material support the United States government has given the Marcos dictatorship, also from the very beginning, and especially in terms of military aid.

Since 1946 the greatest amount of U.S. military aid has come to the Philippines in terms of grant aid under the Military Assistance Program. Such aid had been drastically declining in period before martial law but experienced a steady rise after martial law. Total military grant aid for the three years after martial law was thus \$3.8 million more than total military grant aid for the three years preceding martial law.¹¹

Grant aid, foreign military sales credits and the transfer of excess defense articles comprise the three major components of U.S. military assistance. Prior to martial law the Philippines had no access to credits extended by the U.S. government under the Foreign Military Sales Program. But in 1974 \$5 million were extended in Foreign Military Sales credit and \$5 million in 1975.¹²

In the case of excess defense articles there is an even more noticeable pattern of increase after martial law. Whereas in the three years before martial law only \$2.8 million worth of excess military equipment was sent to the Philippines, in the three years after martial law the total value of such equipment rose to \$14.4 million.¹³ Taking U.S. military assistance as a whole (including ship transfers, the military advisory assistance program, officer training, in addition to the three items already mentioned) and comparing its total levels in the three years before martial law with the three years after martial law, we see an increase of about 64% in the latter period, from \$63.5 million in FY 1970-72 to \$104.5 million in FY 1972-75.¹⁴

The connection between increased U.S. military aid and the establishment of martial law is unmistakable. The jump in aid was the sharpest in 1973, first year of the Marcos dictatorship, more than doubling the figure for 1972.¹⁵ So that the Pentagon was energetically bolstering the newly fledged martial law dictatorship at the very moment that the State Department was keeping a tight-lipped silence, presumably on the theory, so often pronounced, that it would not be proper to meddle in what was, after all, an internal affair of the Philippine people.

¹¹ New York Times, May 11, 1975, The Logistics of Repression, p. 2.

¹² In discussing the question of U.S. military aid to the Philippines I shall rely heavily on a most useful study, The Logistics of Repression, recently made by the National Coordinating Committee of the Communist Party (Philippines) Movement for the People, and published by the Communist Party of Chicago, January, 1975.

¹³ This Logistics of Repression, p. 3.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 8.

Since 1973 there has been a decline in overall aid levels, due largely to decreases in such categories as excess defense articles and ship transfers. But with regard to Military Assistance Program grant aid and Foreign Military Sales Credits, the two principal components of the U.S. military assistance package, there has been a steady annual increase since martial law.¹⁶

At this point an interesting parallel presents itself: the flow of U.S. military aid to the Philippines has increased since martial law, as has the flow of U.S. investment capital, suggesting a symbiotic relationship that may well be typical of U.S. neocolonialism at this time.

U.S. military aid to the Philippines has been officially described as providing what the Marcos government needs to suppress domestic dissent. Admiral Thomas Moorer, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated during the congressional hearings on the 1974 military assistance proposal that U.S. military aid to the Philippines was "designed to provide mobility, fire power, and communication—the three basic elements required to combat insurgency forces. We are providing helicopters and transport aircraft, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and other weapons, together with long range commandos, the Philippine Army uses them."

Comment must be made upon the fact that the Philippine Army uses U.S. supplied equipment. Bernard Wideman stated the problem faced by the "what, to some degree, there are committed to protecting the cities and towns, leaving the countryside (and the initiative) to the rebels. Moreover the MNLF (Moroccan National Liberation Front) intelligence from the generally friendly three million Muslims is better than the Army's intelligence so that MNLF forces can usually move undetected in Muslim areas whereas government forces cannot."¹⁷

As in Vietnam under the Thieu regime, U.S. arms and equipment in the Philippines are used in such massive quantities that indiscriminate killing and injury of the civilian population takes place, further weakening whatever popular support (or neutrality) the Marcos dictatorship can muster in the areas concerned. In March 1973 the New York Times reported from Cotabato Province, one of the main battle areas: "Townfolk and villagers say that the ponderous use of equipment that the army already has is killing civilians and destroying their homes."¹⁸ In June the same year the Washington Post reported from the island of Basilan, "residents complain that the army uses destructive artillery, mortars, bombing and offshore shelling rather than face the enemy on the ground."¹⁹

POST VIETNAM

There has been, since last June, a radical change in the world scene that has already had an effect upon the Philippines and Philippine-U.S. relations. That is the victory of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam over General Thieu, who was (like Marcos) a corrupt dictator given military support by the U.S. government.

This victory was especially the result of the persistent struggle of the Vietnamese for the elimination of the Thieu dictatorship and the unification of their nation. But there was another contributing cause—the massive anti-war movement that the people of the United States organized. This movement forced the U.S. government to withdraw its troops from Vietnam where they were fighting in support of the Saigon dictatorship, and in the last years of the war, after the troops were withdrawn, was responsible for cutting back military aid to Saigon.

The defeat of the U.S.-sponsored Saigon dictatorship had numerous results. For example, as Saigon was taken over by the military forces of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the multi-national oil corporations which had been operating on the shores of South Vietnam at the invitation of General Thieu, packed their bags and left, most likely in reticence of the efforts of the Philippines where they had been exploring and still do now explore at the invitation of President Marcos.²⁰

But there were effects nearer home, and with greater portent for the future of President Marcos and U.S.-Philippine relations. The ultimate defeat of the Saigon dictatorship despite several years of U.S. military intervention and even

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁷ U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Committee, Hearings, November 25, 1974.

¹⁸ New York Times, March 27, 1973.

¹⁹ Washington Post, June 6, 1973.

²⁰ New York Times, April 27, 1975.

more years and many billions of dollars of U.S. military aid was a very powerful demonstration of the criminal folly of supporting reactionary and corrupt foreign dictators (no matter how well regarded by U.S. multi-nationals). This lesson was becoming obvious for a whole period before the overthrow of Thieu who was not lost on the people of the United States nor on some of their elected representatives in Congress. In the past year, while Congress was engaged in cutting back aid to Thieu, more than one voice was raised on Capitol Hill against further aid to foreign dictatorships in general and against aid to Ferdinand Marcos in particular.

These expressions of Congressional opposition were also related to the growing anti-Marcos movement among U.S. citizens, of Philippine descent and otherwise. They took place at the same time that anti-Marcos dissent in the Philippines was finding new voices, particularly in the ranks of the Catholic clergy.

This new situation—linking Saigon, Manila and Washington all together—has had an electrifying effect on the Marcos dictatorship in its domestic and foreign affairs, giving even those policies previously initiated by Marcos and his associates thousands of his opponents and clapping them in the face. What critics have suggested is the number of those so arrested to be around 20,000, the Marcos dictatorship has set the figure at 5,000 to 6,000 (of whom 10% without a difference).²⁴ Then in December 1974 Marcos released 1078 martial law detainees. While all those released had to sign pledges of allegiance to martial law and otherwise agree to cooperate with the dictatorship, while, by Marcos' own admission, over 5,000 martial law detainees were still left in jail, still the intent of this deed was clear: it was to give a new "boost" to the morale of the dictatorship. Domestic reasons for prisoner release lay in the growth of the internal opposition, in particular that of Archbishop Sin and the Catholic clergy.²⁵ Matthew Storrin of the Boston Globe Asian Bureau explains the external motivations for this act of Marcos:

Diplomats attribute some of the relaxation to an increasingly critical U.S. Congress. There have been substantial efforts to cut American aid to South Vietnam and South Korea and diplomats in Manila reason that Marcos fears they may begin looking at the Philippines. . . .²⁶

But, the new foreign policy initiatives that the Philippine dictator has carried through in the past year have made an even more spectacular display. Chief among these have been the steps taken to open diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (a similar move has been made to open up relations with the Soviet Union). Last fall Mrs. Marcos made a trip to Peking and Mr. Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai. Just recently—with even more fanfare—the Marcos made the same trip and visits. Since then there has been much talk of the new independence of Philippine foreign policy. In the past few weeks the point has been made again and again: the recognition of the People's Republic of China proves that the Philippines is no longer on U.S. leading strings.

Does it really? A previous discussion of such recognition throws an interesting light on this. On December 20, 1949, the Philippine ambassador to the Philippines Myron Cowen wrote Secretary of State Dean Acheson:

We would urge that at some time prior to its announcement Embassy be authorized to inform Philippine Government of U.S. intent. We feel Philippine Government in pressing courtesy front with U.S. by postponement recognition has earned right to expect the courtesy from U.S. which would enable it to announce its decision regarding recognition in advance of U.S. should it wish to do so. If Philippine Government finds itself in position where it feels impelled accord recognition at same time as U.S. or immediately thereafter it would be put in position suggesting absence true independence. . . .

Acheson answered Cowen, December 27, 1949: "Dept expects keep Phil Govt fully informed in advance any definitive step on part U.S. to recognize Chi Commies. Dept sympathetic Phil Govt desire avoid appearance for U.S. lead in the matter. . . ."²⁷

²⁴ New York Times, January 13, 1974; Bangkok World, January 22, 1975.

²⁵ Boston Globe, January 2, 1975.

²⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol. II, pp. 255-256, 247. I am indebted to Steve Shalom of the Philippines Information Bulletin staff for this piece of research.

It is a question whether the scenario described in the Cowen-Acheson correspondence has not finally been enacted. Only the other day the State Department announced it "certainly has no objection" to Philippine recognition of the People's Republic of China.²⁸ So Ferdinand Marcos has recognized the People's Republic of China first, the State Department is understanding—and the neo-colonial game of appearances keeps on.

Mr. Marcos is said to fear a rise in domestic insurgency following General Thieu's defeat. To put a shine on his reputation as a nationalist might tend to forestall some of these effects. As the New York Times reported from Manila June 12: "According to sources believed to be familiar with his thinking . . . one reason he went to China . . . was to outflank the Philippine Communists. . . (The Far Eastern Economic Review sees an additional and related motive for the new nationalist image Mr. Marcos is projecting: an attempt to compensate for the failure to achieve the land reform and other populist measures he promised when he seized power)."²⁹

Evidently not content with this China initiative, Mr. Marcos recently has called for a review of the status of U.S. bases in the Philippines, even suggesting that they might have outlived their usefulness. Again this seems keyed to forestalling possible domestic repercussions from the Vietnamese events. Thus the New York Times wrote in May: "A desire to adopt a more nationalist stand, or at least to seem to do so, following Communist victories in Indo China, apparently behind the scenes by United States officials, has led to renegotiate that country's security agreements with the United States."³⁰

The position I belong to, the Friends of the Filipino People, would heartily support any bona fide demand from the Philippines for the removal of U.S. bases. We believe they constitute an unjustified intervention in the internal affairs of the Philippines (the New Peoples Army has charged that Philippine Army planes have carried on counter-insurgent bombing missions from Clark, and the State Department admits to the training of Filipino army pilots there).³¹ Moreover we believe that their presence enhances the danger that both the United States and the Philippines will be involved in a new Asian war.

But it appears that demands coming from Mr. Marcos for the removal of U.S. bases must be taken with a grain of salt. On May 24 the New York Times Manila correspondent reported a statement from President Marcos re-assuring the United States of Philippine good will; the correspondent further reported that "a source close to the President said that the current review of ties with the United States was not a drastic one."³²

A month earlier David A. Andrieman, writing the New York Times from Manila about the Marcos demand for a re-assessment of U.S.—Philippine ties, said:

"Senior American officials said this week that what most of the statements could mean in concrete terms would be demands for a new cash rental arrangement for Clark Air Base. . . . and the . . . Subic Bay naval facility, as well as greater Philippine control over the bases."³³

"Washington offered further explanation: "With the expanding general war against Moslem dissidents in the southern part of the country, the country is facing some major cash needs that officials here feel may be met by a restructuring of the bases agreement."³⁴

It is more than likely that this discussion about a new direction in Philippine foreign policy and U.S. bases is also projected with its possible effect on the U.S. Congress in view. Marcos is aware—as who is not—that the threat of neutrality or a slant to the socialist nations on the part of a Third World country is supposed to cause members of the U.S. Congress to be generous with grants in aid. The Far Eastern Economic Review reports that some observers are of the opinion that the Marcos dictatorship:

" . . . is raising objections to the bases in the belief that . . . the Americans must be made to value Clark and Subic more than they do . . . So, U.S. Congressmen, believing that the bases are essential, will mute their criticisms of

²⁸ Philippine News, week of June 12-18, 1975.

²⁹ New York Times, May 4, 1975, in Economic Review, June 13, 1975.

³⁰ New York Times, May 4, 1975, my emphasis.

³¹ The Logistics of Repression, pp. 16-17.

³² New York Times, May 19, 1975.

Marcos' authoritarianism, and at the end of the day, the bases will rightfully secure a substantial sum in rent.²⁸

In this light Ferdinand Marcos' agitation about foreign policy and bases can be seen as a double pressure. First to silence Congressional criticism of the Philippine dictatorship so that the political atmosphere of Washington becomes more like that of Manila and aid will be forthcoming. Secondly for payment of rent for the bases, so that should Congress fail to knuckle under before the dictator's bluff, base rent would help make up the loss in aid.

There are two things that must be remembered about the Marcos dictatorship: it has demonstrated its close relationship to U.S. multi-national corporations by the measures it has adopted to improve their investment position in the Philippines; it is almost exclusively dependent on U.S. military aid in its attempt to suppress domestic dissent. If these two facts are kept in mind, the Philippine dictator's new claims to be independent of U.S. influence can be put in proper perspective.

MILITARY AID AND U.S. DEMOCRACY

What is at stake in the question of cutting off aid to the Marcos dictatorship in truth is directly connected to the future of democracy in the United States. Congress, when it rejected the urgent advice of President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger and moved to cut off aid to South Vietnam, was merely responding to the declared will of the American people measured in poll after poll.²⁹ And public opinion on this question had been molded by the popular movement against the Vietnam War, probably one of the greatest expressions of grass-roots democracy the United States has ever seen.

When President Marcos mutters doubts about the ability of the United States to live up to commitments in Asia, he is placing the commitments of the U.S. government to foreign dictators friendly to U.S. multi-nationals above its commitment to the people of the United States. As H. D. S. Greenway wrote the Washington Post from Manila early in June, "To President Marcos, whose martial law government is unsympathetic to constitutional processes, the realization that the U.S. Congress was no longer going to act as a rubber stamp for the Administration in these matters came as a shock."³⁰

There are two other people in the United States who have expressed similar misgivings. Henry Kissinger, for example, has recently warned about the intervention of Congress in foreign affairs, (forgetting apparently the Senate's constitutional prerogative). And Harvard's Samuel Huntington, who masterminded so much of U.S. policy in Vietnam, has recently taken note of the "democratic surge" and increased political activism in the '60s and blames the problems of the '70s "on increased democracy."³¹ Huntington, who has evidently since repented of his frankness, made these views known in a report he prepared for the Trilateral Commission, a private organization of government officials, businessmen, academics and labor leaders from the United States, Japan and Western Europe that was formed in 1973 by David Rockefeller.³²

Today the United States multi-national corporations have billions of dollars of capital invested in many countries of the world, placing the United States government at the center of a huge neo-colonial empire, the interests of which—becomes clearer day by day—are antagonistic to those of the majority of the American people.

In the last days of the slave system Lincoln said that the country could not exist half slave and half free. There are signs today that the country cannot exist half empire and half democracy. One or the other must give way.

I urge Congress to follow the lead of the members who have spoken out against aid to the Philippine dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. In this way they will be aligning themselves with the vast majority of the people of this country who have grown sick and tired of sending U.S. taxpayers money around to shore up the rule of corrupt foreign dictators. They will be speaking for a democratic foreign policy.

²⁸ For Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1975.

²⁹ For example, the Harris poll, quoted in the Boston Herald-American of March 11, 1975, found sentiment against further aid to South Vietnam 74 to 17 per cent.

³⁰ Harvard Crimson, June 11, 1975.

Senator Inouye. As you know, Doctor, the administration has not submitted to this committee the budget relating to military assistance, and, therefore, we have no idea as to what is involved in the Philippines and other parts of the world.

We have tried to get some indication as to the level involved, but to date we have not been successful, especially a large sum in the Middle East. I assume the administration is keeping this close to its chest as part of the poker game.

So I am in no position to respond to you as far as the dollar figures are concerned.

I appreciate the statement you have submitted. Although I am the only one here, I will urge that my colleagues on the subcommittee look over the statement, sir.

Dr. SCHIRMER. Thank you very much.

Senator INOUE. Does your colleague wish to make a statement? Mr. BELLO. Yes, Senator. With respect to this, we have heard that the levels of funding might be the same as last year, and we would just like to make the comment that for 1975 fiscal year the proposal of the State Department stood at about \$27 million, but at the end of the year, according to the figures that were submitted, actually the real levels of aid, according to Mr. Marcos, were \$32 million, so that between what they proposed at the beginning of the fiscal year and what was actually appropriated at the end of the year a significant difference occurred.

We would just like to call that to your attention. If there could be some more restrictions made on this, on the levels that go to the Philippines.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Dr. SCHIRMER. Senator, I have some additional information that I would like to submit for the record.

[The information follows:]

Summary of Logistics of Repression, a report on the volume, forms, functions, of U.S. military assistance to the Marcos regime prepared by the National Coordinating Committee of the Anti-Martial Law Movement.

1. Total military assistance to the Philippines increased by about 100 per cent in the three years after martial law compared to the total of the three years before martial law, when it was erratically declining. Military assistance in FY 1973, 1974, 1975 was \$118.7 million compared to \$60.2 million in FY 1970, 1971, and 1972. This indicates concrete behavioral support for martial law regime.

2. Admiral Moorer admitted that weapons being provided the Marcos regime are counterinsurgency weapons. Weapons systems transferred which were monitored included: Huey helicopters for anti guerrilla warfare, large M-16 rifle shipments, Vietnam-proven M-79 grenade launchers, M-60 machine guns, M-113 armed personnel carriers, fragmentation bombs, napalm, C-47 gunships, C-123 and C-130 cargo craft, easily convertible into gunships, inshore patrol craft suitable for naval counterinsurgent operations in the troubled Sulu Archipelago. U.S. Navy recently offered to provide OV-10 counterinsurgency ground support planes. MAAG in Philippines has been intimately involved in upgrading quality of an increasing number of combat battalions, basic Philippine Army counterinsurgency units.

3. Extra-official military aid provided to Marcos regime has included use of U.S. bases for pilot training and very possible as launching pads for air strikes against NPA insurgents. U.S.-financed, joint exercises under U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty and SEATO, and civic action exercises by Special Forces are also forms of extra-official aid. Four of six provincial areas where Special Forces were assigned after declaration of martial law were lighted bases. While in field, Green Berets operated on a "co-act" basis with the Armed Forces of the Philippines counterinsurgency program. This was a reversal of long-standing established policy. Other counterinsurgency projects like constructing radio installations seemingly neutral and "benign", projects like constructing radio installations for Philippine Government and before martial law, undertaking "cloudseeding exercises", important to note that Naval Weapons Center exposed as having developed training techniques in order to obstruct traffic on Ho Chi Minh Trail was same outfit directing cloudseeding operations in the Philippines.

4. Use of U.S. military assistance by Philippine Army has parallels with behavior of ARVN and Lon Nol's troops—indiscriminate employment of firepower to detriment of Muslim and Christian civilians and their homes and historic cities; reliance on meaningless quantitative measurements like body counts and disregard for questions of popular legitimacy; sale of arms to other side U.S. military assistance also goes toward arming bandit groups—the very groups Marcos promised to crush in his justification of martial law.

5. AID-Office of Public Safety assistance, especially in period 1968-73 was major factor in upgrading the Philippine police forces with which Marcos imposed martial law. In 1973, first year of martial law, largest batch of Filipino police trainees were graduated from International Police Academy. Equipment transfers (patrol cars and communication devices) took place in 1973. Techniques of repression and torture noted to be remarkably similar to those employed in Iran, Brazil, Uruguay, South Korea, all of which have been significant recipients of police aid.

6. Threat of interference from CIA especially critical in Philippines because of presence of Ambassador Sullivan, old CIA-hand in Laos; Sullivan is apparently assembling his battle-hardened Laotian staff in Philippines.

7. Security-relevant economic assistance: Bicol River Basin Development Program must be mentioned here. Funded in FY 1975 to tune of \$460,000, complemented by rural roads improvement project. Bikol area is major expansion area of NPA today, especially Sorsogon Province. 200 isolated rural feeder roads will be rehabilitated, many of these being in Sorsogon, where Philippine Army's concern for poor quality of roads is well known. Bicol River Basin Project evinces many similarities with the proposed but never carried out Mekong River Delta Regional Development Project.

8. Provincial Administration Development Project. Started in FY 1973 and led and staffed by ex-CORDS (Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) personnel. One of chiefs apparently has a CIA past. Coordinated with Office of the President. Interesting parallel with Vietnam: in Feb. 1975 power to appoint all provincial and local chiefs and officials taken over by Marcos.

9. Rural roads program. Among provinces listed by AID as receiving top priority are high insurgency areas or war zones.

10. 127 DHC-2 Beavers given as economic aid were used for military operations in 1973. ■

NOTE: ON PAGE 4, 11TH LINE FROM BOTTOM OF TEXT,
64 PER CENT SHOULD READ 100 PER CENT,
BASED ON MOST RECENT STATE DEPARTMENT FIGURES.