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Security and the Political Economy of International Migration

ABSTRACT

Given the strong economic gains possible through openness to migration, why do advanced industrial states advocate openness with respect to trade and capital flows but not to international labor mobility? In this article I explain this anomaly using a statist model of political behavior based on perception of threat and its effect on the equilibrium between security's three dimensions—military, material, and societal. Emphasis on one dimension of security over another depends on the type of threat perceived. While external threats prompt an equilibrium sharply skewed toward security's material and military poles, the changing ethno-cultural characteristics of increasing international migration flows has generated increasing societal insecurities in receiving states since the mid-1960s. Examining migration trends and border policies in the United States and Europe since 1945, this analysis explores the relationship between external and internal security interests and identifies those elements of international migration that generate perceptions of societal threat. Because societal interests clash with the material objectives of the state, especially given the growing importance of services and skilled labor as well as the economic benefits of an elastic labor supply, policy makers in advanced industrial states increasingly attempt to finesse societal fears while pursuing an overall grand strategy seeking economic maximization through openness.

I. Trading States and Migration

Richard Rosecrance (1986) argues that the world has transformed into a system of trading states, where power is increasingly based on Ricardian notions of comparative advantage, factor mobility, and free trade. As gains from trade and interdependence increase, as they have under the past half-century of American hegemony, the use of a military-territorial strategy is a less appealing means of maximizing state power, especially since war has become increasingly costly, complicated, and destructive (Cf. Morgenthau, 1948; Kennedy, 1988; Mueller, 1989; Kupchan, 1994). Proponents of "Washington consensus" neoliberalism argue that liberal trade policies and laissez-faire treatment of international factor flows moves economies toward a Pareto-optimal frontier, one that will create a "rising tide to lift all boats" in both developed and developing nations, though perhaps not evenly (Krugman, 1995; Krugman and Venables, 1995; Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997). Considerable evidence supports the argument that trading state globalization has emerged as a global norm and as a widely accepted basis of state grand strategy since World War II. Since the 1940s, successive rounds of the GATT (now the WTO) have resulted in consistently lower tariff rates that have helped stimulate world trade. From 1980—1998, world trade has grown anywhere from 4.2% to 10.3%, and between 1990—1999 world trade has grown at over three times the rate of global output (World Bank, 1998; WTO, 2000). Moreover, financial transactions, once an adjunct of trade, now tower of trade flows by a ratio of 50:1 (Ruggie, 1995:48; see also Cohen, 1998).

Given the gains available through open, trading state policies, it would seem logical that states would seek economic maximization through labor mobility as well as trade and capital flows (Ghosh, 2000). Howard Chang (1998:373) argues that, "economic efficiency in the global labor market would call for unrestricted migration, which would allow labor to move freely to the country where it earns the highest return. Market forces would thus direct labor to the market where its marginal product is the highest. Given the large international differences in wages, it should be apparent that the potential gains from international trade in labor . . . are large."¹ Economic transformations resulting from the IT revolution and changes in the global division of

labor (Mittelman, 2000) have created a tremendous surge in demand for services and skilled labor (Cornelius, Espenshade, and Salehyan, 2001), and knowledge-based human capital is emerging as an ever more important component of state power. Services already constitute 70% of the GDP in the United States, of which 64% are in the high-value category (Rosecrance, 1999). World exports of commercial services reached a level of \$1.35 trillion in 1999, of which Western Europe's commercial services exports account for 47% of the world total (WTO, 2000). Even with the slowdown in the high tech sector, the U.S. Bureau of Labor forecasts that the nation will need 1.7 million computer technicians during the decade ending in 2008, with demand increasing exponentially (*Los Angeles Times*, 5 August 2000:C1). As the domestic labor force in advanced industrial economies shifts toward higher-skill professions, demand for low-skilled labor in industry, agriculture, and domestic services has concomitantly risen (Cornelius, 1998).

In addition to increasing demands for an elastic supply of labor, migration represents an increasingly important element of material power in other ways. Economic historians examining trade and migration during the 19th century have suggested that migration may be a necessary condition to receive the overall economic gains of openness to trade and capital flows, due to total specialization or locational economies of scale (Hatton and Williamson, 1998; O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999).² Given these links between migration, labor demands of the new global economy, trade, and economic maximization, openness toward migration flows makes perfect sense. And yet, while the contemporary logic of trade and international finance has been one of openness, the logic of migration has been one of closure, at times even equated with a foreign invasion (Cf. Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield, 1994; Weiner, 1995; Hollifield, 1998; Andreas and Snyder, 2000). For power-maximizing states operating under a trading state logic, this behavior doesn't make much sense. Why do trading states make such a sharp distinction between trade/capital flows and migration?

In this paper, I seek to explicate the socio-political dynamics of migration and to construct an IR-based theory of migration and border policy that accounts for this disjuncture.

Most of the existing literature on the determinants of immigration and border policy focuses exclusively on domestic factors. Two variants have dominated the domestic approach. Marxist theories argue that immigration policies favor business interests because of their privileged access to the capitalist state, noting that use of foreign labor can be used as a mechanism to keep wages low and confound union action by dividing the working class (Cf. Castles and Kosack, 1973; Castells, 1975; Nikolinakos, 1975; Petras, 1981; Miles, 1986). Liberal, interest-group oriented scholars agree that policies generally favor the interests of domestic employers, though for different reasons. Some suggest that policies are the product of a process of collective action (Freeman, 1995). Specifically, because the benefits of migration are concentrated (benefiting employers) while the costs of migration are diffuse (general public), employers have a greater incentive to politically mobilize than those who bear its costs (Olson, 1965). Moreover, because employers face fewer collective action problems, they can more easily mobilize and generate interest-group pressure on policy makers.³ In effect, liberal models minimize the role of the state by suggesting that the clientist relationship that emerges through domestic political processes results in these groups "capturing" the state, which then forms policy to conform to their interests (Wilson, 1980).

If the state were truly beholden to the interests of domestic employers, we would expect policy to display two consistent characteristics. First, because of the advantages of foreign labor—including controlling domestic wages, elasticity, willingness to perform jobs that natives are reluctant to accept, and favorable work ethic—one would expect a continual process of liberalization in policies concerning labor mobility. This has clearly not been the case in any advanced industrial state. In fact, policies over the past thirty years have been overtly hostile to migrants and have stressed a strong political will to "regain control" of the national borders. Second, policy would not display racial or ethno-cultural preferences in the allocation of immigrant visas or temporary work permits. From a strictly economic standpoint, "a worker is a worker," regardless of their skin color or ethno-cultural background. Rather, we would expect that preferences would be based solely on the economic needs of the country and the specific

skills a given migrant possesses that might fill those needs. Again, this is not the case in any advanced industrial country, though Canada's point system has done better than most in such regards. Instead, migration and border policies in most advanced industrial countries have displayed an acute sensitivity to the racial, ethnic, and cultural composition of flows.

Clearly, these incongruities suggest the limitations of a solely domestic perspective. Migration is increasingly shaped by both domestic and international/structural forces, and as such, should be considered within that context (Zolberg, 1992:316). Even though IR-theorists have traditionally had little to say about migration, using IR-theory as a basis for inquiry makes perfect sense given the domestic and international/structural dynamics involved with migration processes. Placing migration and border policy within this wider, IR-theory based context reveals that migration not only has significant implications from an IPE perspective, in that labor mobility is an increasingly important element of service- and knowledge-based economies, but also from a security perspective. While the traditional security paradigm has focused exclusively on the domain of "high politics"—including the causes of war, alliance behavior, and military strategy—I will also make clear that contemporary trading state grand strategy indirectly created the emergence of a new referent object of security in the post World War II era—societal security (Wæver, et al. 1993; Weiner and Russell, 2001).

Precisely because of the paucity of theorizing on the subject from an IR perspective, I first seek to address what IR theory offers to help explain state behavior regarding migration. I argue that understanding contemporary state behavior regarding migration—as well as the globalization of all other trans-border flows—requires that we reconsider the traditional security paradigm. I suggest that there are three dimensions of security for nation-states—two focused on territorial integrity (the state), the other focused on the composition and cohesion of the people (the nation). State behavior is a function of a given mode of the security environment, and while economic priorities generally dominate trading state grand strategy, changes in migration patterns can change security priorities to reflect a desire to maintain stable social identities and national culture. To analyze these political dynamics, I examine policies and political discourse

in four western trading states since 1945, including the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain.

I seek to build a theory of state behavior based on threat perception and its effect on the equilibrium established between security's three dimensions—military, material, and societal. This is outlined in Section II. Section III shows how high external threats in the unstable early Cold War period resulted in a security equilibrium skewed toward the military and material poles, and hence, toward policies that favored openness and factor mobility (consistent with trading state grand strategy). Section IV then discusses how societal insecurities were generated by decreasing external threats, the result of increasing Cold War stability, as well as the effects open trading state migration policies had on the qualitative composition of new migration flows. Section V then explains why policies in the 1990s were not characterized by increasing closure across the board vis-à-vis migration, but rather, by the state's desire to finesse societal insecurities while concurrently maximizing economic gains. This was accomplished by shaping policy to address *fears* rather than *flows*. Section VI then explains the significance of these findings both for understanding state behavior regarding cross-border flows, as well as for our understanding of contemporary world politics more generally.

II. Three Dimensions of Security

At the core of neorealist thought concerning state behavior is the notion that the structural environment establishes the rules of the game, which then creates interests and drives state responses (Waltz, 1979). Much of neorealist thought has focused on the distribution of power, although Stephen Walt (1987) observed that states react to threats, not just differences in material or military power. Nation-states and the people that comprise them can perceive threats along many dimensions. Let me suggest two, depending on whether we identify the object of security as "the state" or "the nation." In the case of the state, because economic production is necessary to maintain military defense and bolster domestic political stability (and thus regime strength), phenomena that affect a state's ability to maximize material power must be considered

a threat to national security. In the case of the nation, phenomena that significantly alter the make-up, character, or identity of the nation's people without the consent of the mass majority must also be considered a threat to security. Just as a change from one system of government to another is considered by security scholars to constitute state "death," a significant change in the social characteristics or self-identity of a social entity creates a fundamentally new entity, and thus, the "death" of the old paradigm of social identity. It can represent the "death" of a nation.

Each of these dynamics are significant elements of security in the post-World War II era, and international migration has been integral to both dimensions during this period. To incorporate both dimensions into our understanding of security and state behavior, I hypothesize a new security paradigm. I propose that we replace the traditional "high politics" versus "low politics" paradigm, and in its place, conceptualize security as a three-dimensional spectrum of security objectives—military, material, and societal. [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] Military interests refer to territorial integrity and the maintenance of political sovereignty.⁴ Material interests are defined largely in terms of economic production and wealth. Societal interests are defined largely in terms of national identity and culture. As shown in Figure 1, this security paradigm can be conceptualized as a triangular plane. We can then define a security equilibrium as the constellation of relative emphasis reflected in state policies, shown here by the location of the conical fulcrum on which the triangular plane rests. This study examines the effect of threat on the location of this security fulcrum, which then affects resultant policy outcomes. Whereas IPE scholars have challenged traditional security paradigms by examining the political tensions between the military and material poles, my focus here generally will be on the material and societal poles and the political tensions existing between the two.

The equilibrium between security interests is a product of threat perception. Policies related to each dimension are then affected when a change in equilibrium occurs. I suggest that there are two fundamental types of threat—external (military-political) and internal (societal). In times when external threats are acute, the security equilibrium is sharply skewed toward the material and military poles. These two dimensions are highly correlated. Economic production

is necessary for military defense, as well as to reduce the risk of domestic unrest and political subversion. A state's ability to maintain an economically dominated policy equilibrium is also aided by the "rally-round-the-flag" effect that the presence of external enemies have on social cohesion. While these "rally effects" don't increase economic interests, they reduce the likelihood of societal pressures demanding more emphasis on the societal pole of security.

When external threats decline, "rally-round-the-flag" effects no longer bolster social cohesion. In this environment, the security lens shifts its focus inward and sensitivities to societal differences become more acute. Generally, societal threats are centered on traditional markers of national identity, including race, ethnicity, culture, religion, and language (Anderson, 1983; Smith, 1991), although among western, liberal democracies an internal tension exists between such ethno-cultural and ideological (liberal) dimensions of the national identity.⁵ By introducing large numbers of people of diverse racial and cultural backgrounds to a society, international migration represents a potentially significantly threat to notions of stable social and national identities, culture, and ways of life—perhaps even the most significant threat (Weiner and Russell, 2001).

What then are the most significant variables associated with migration that contributes to perceptions of societal threat among western states? I propose that the four factors most relevant to threat perception include: 1) cultural proximity; 2) visibility; 3) entry channel; and 4) the unintended or latent effects of prior policies. Cultural proximity is gauged in terms of race, ethnicity, language, religion, and culture, including political ideology, while assimilability is measured in public discourse revolving around these dimensions. Perceptions of assimilability are also strongly affected by perceptions of migrant attitudes regarding assimilation. Migrant preferences for "segmented assimilation" rather than the more traditional "melting pot assimilation" often increases perceptions that these groups are less assimilable (Cf. Glazer and Moynihan, 1963; Schmitter-Heisler, 1992; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes, 1995). These perceptions may be compounded when accompanied by migrant demands for dual or multiple citizenship rights (Schuck, 1998; Koslowski, 2000).

Visibility refers to the concentration of migrant flows, both in terms of time and space. Flows are more visible when they occur at a single point in time, as well as at a particular geographic place. Examples include refugee flotillas, such as the Mariel boatlift from Cuba, or mass border crossings, such as those that occurred in the early 1990s at the San Ysidro port-of-entry at the San Diego—Tijuana border. Visibility is also a function of settlement patterns, both geographic and social. Migration flows are generally focused geographically rather than evenly dispersed, flowing not only into specific states or regions, but also into specific cities and parts of cities, where they create ethnic enclaves (Massey, 1987; Massey et al., 1998; Money, 1999). Moreover, social visibility is increased when families migrate more so than single men, as opportunities for social interaction between migrants and the general public increase (Hargreaves, 1995).

Entry channel simply refers to whether migrants gain access to the country through legal immigration or work visa procedures, or whether migrants enter via "side door" or "back door" mechanisms. These include legal entry followed by overstaying the terms of their visa, or through clandestine border crossing.

Lastly, unintended or latent effects of policy can also contribute to threat. For example, because prior migration facilitates future migration through the creation of migrant networks, a system of "chain migration" can be established, making control of flows more challenging for states (Cornelius et al., 1994; Massey et al., 1998). They can also redirect migrant flows from front-door channels, which are less threat producing, to illegal channels, which have greatly contributed to contemporary anxieties regarding migration more generally (Cornelius, 1998).

In general, what we have is a situation where two security logics stand in direct opposition. Material power is best maximized through openness and is threatened by forces that push for closure. Accumulation of economic power is best achieved through effective management of global flows, taking advantage of a state's comparative advantage in resource endowments and managing cross border flows to compensate for areas where other states enjoy a comparative advantage.⁶ Change is the goal of economic activity, both in terms of continued

development, and presumably, in terms of increasing productivity and financial gains. Conversely, national identity is based on a myth of permanence, stasis, and stability, all of which are maximized through closure. Openness and the fluidity associated with it are thus inherently threatening to notions of stable identities. Change in this domain is inherently threatening. Yet both dimensions represent security interests of the nation-state. The question then arises, how can states square this apparently irreconcilable circle?

The following sections will examine the threat environment in the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain, over the past half-century, and will also examine the effect differences in threat perception have on state behavior with regards to the security equilibrium. These cases represent good "critical cases" for theory development because all are liberal trading states that have encountered a range of threats during the post-war period. These include external/territorial threats, in the form of emerging bipolarity with the Soviet Union following World War II, and in the form of internal threats, as each of these states have been exposed to large numbers of population movements from ethno-culturally diverse sending states. What emerges from an examination of the empirical evidence is a pattern of political learning among trading states. This process is characterized by an early period of unusual openness as states sought to maximize material power in the face of significant external threats. This is followed by a reactionary period of restrictionism, and later, by an evolving grand strategy based on establishing a political equilibrium between these opposing state interests.

III. Trading State Grand Strategy and the Cold War

I characterize the security equilibrium in the early Cold War period as being dominated by military and material interests, with policies reflecting an open trading state orientation. The acute sense of external threat posed by the Soviet Union, both in terms of military power and bellicosity, left Western nations vulnerable and made the production of material power a state imperative. The period of trading state grand strategy is marked by openness and integration, as

states sought to maximize economic/material power through aggressive policies based on liberal economics and collective security.

A. Rebuilding and Defending Post-War Europe

External threat in Europe was significant in two respects. Geographic proximity and apparently expansionist intent of the Soviet Union, coupled with the devastating effects of the war on Western Europe, made the possibility of Soviet military invasion a credible threat to the security of continental Europe. Moreover, the bleak domestic economic situation in Europe, especially during the long and severe winter of 1946, made the possibility of domestic unrest and Communist insurgency all too likely. European security was initially based on two associated strategies: 1) integration for economic development and collective security, and 2) managing trade and factor-mobility to maximize economic gains and speed the pace of post-war reconstruction. Because war casualties were high and fertility rates were low throughout Europe, population management emerged as a key element along this second dimension of grand strategy.

Nowhere were military-political (external) threats more acutely felt than in Germany, whose infrastructure was obliterated during the war, suffered significant casualties, and was an occupied nation at that time, divided into American, British, French, and Soviet zones. A widespread belief among Western policy makers that economic weakness would induce Communist insurgency (and/or a possible Soviet invasion) soon led to Marshall Plan aid. While foreign aid assisted in establishing domestic stability and assisting in the reconstruction of infrastructure, Germany's use of foreign labor soon became a primary factor in Germany's tremendous post-war economic growth. Initially, labor inflows occurred without governmental recruitment in the form of post-war refugees from the East. Between 1945 and 1950, West Germany received 8.3 million refugees, expellees and displaced persons from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and they soon constituted one-sixth of the population in West Germany (Martin, 1994:198; see also Schlenger, 1959:40-42). Although this large influx of migrants

represents a potentially significant threat to societal security, the fact that most were ethnic-Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) reduced potential societal friction with the host population. In fact, the presence of the *Vertriebene* actually served to strengthen German national identity. Maintaining strong blood ties with ethnic Germans kept the notions of the German *Volk* and the *Kulturnation* intact, even as the country was partitioned into occupation zones, and later, into separate political entities (Brubaker, 1992).

Because the skill levels of these initial migrant inflows were generally high, they constituted one of the finest sources of additional labor in all of Europe (Kindleberger, 1967:31; Ulrich, 1994). From 1950 to 1960, West German economic productivity rose by an average of 6.7% annually, while unemployment in key industrial areas such as Baden-Württemberg and North Rhein-Westphalia remained very low (2.2% and 2.9%, respectively) (Korte, 1985:30; Bendix, 1990). As *Vertriebene* migration from the East slowed over time and the need for labor increased as the post-war economy surged, Germany established a program of worker recruitment through a series of bilateral agreements. Initially, these agreements were established with other European states, including Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960). Encouraged by the success of these programs and the positive effect worker recruitment was having on economic development, policy makers gained confidence that labor inflows could be managed effectively to maximize economic development. As pools of European labor declined, *Gastarbeiter* recruitment programs were extended toward more ethno-culturally distant sending countries, including Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), and Tunisia (1965).⁷ The rapid growth of the West German economy during the 1960s ensured that the economic primacy of Germany's immigration and labor recruitment policies were never questioned (Collinson, 1993:51).

In France, the post-war emphasis on population management was perhaps most conspicuous, stemming from some 600,000 war casualties and the lowest fertility rate in Europe (Lannes, 1953; Debré and Sauvy, 1946). Population was widely considered not only the number one problem facing economic reconstruction and growth, but was also associated with military preparedness, signaling a predominant "populate or perish" attitude (Tapinos, 1975:16). The

first five-year plan adopted by the newly created *Conseil Général du Plan* clearly articulated the desire to make management of migration a key element of post-war French grand strategy (Kindleberger, 1963). On 2 November 1945, the *Office National d'Immigration* (ONI) was established by government ordinance to manage labor recruitment to meet economic demands.

In 1945 the ONI established labor recruitment offices in Italy, and in 1947, the Ministry of Labor negotiated a bilateral labor recruitment agreement with Italy in 1947. While French elites were confident of the nation's ability to assimilate immigrants regardless of their background,⁸ Italians dominated initial migrant flows. In 1946, 27,831 of the 30,171 foreign workers who entered France came from Italy (Freeman, 1979:79). Colonial legacies also accounted for some of the initial migrant inflows, as the Algerian population living in France increased from 20,000 to 210,000 between 1946 and 1954. However, even with such increases immigrants from the Maghreb accounted for only 12.9% of France's foreign population by 1954, while Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese accounted for 46.25% (INSEE, 1985:20; Silverman, 1992:41; Hargreaves, 1995:11).

The rapid economic growth in France during the 1950s not only generated increased demand for foreign labor but also created incentives for employers to circumvent the bureaucratic apparatus set up by the ONI. Employers soon began to engage in direct labor recruitment with workers abroad, who were then later "regularized" by government officials, creating what Gary Freeman has characterized as a *laissez-faire* approach to migration control (Freeman, 1979). While early CGP plans promoted governmental control over migration to meet the nation's labor demands, attitudes among policy makers seemed comfortable with allowing the free-market to regulate supply and demand. During these early stages of labor recruitment, economic gains from migration were substantial, and few socio-political tensions were associated with these initial inflows. This open trading state approach led to sizable increases in annual immigration (Figure 2). [FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] From 1955 to 1973, the total inflow of foreigners rose from 58,952 to 347,160, with much of this labor being utilized in key economic sectors including mining, manufacturing, construction, and services (Kindleberger,

1967; Hollifield, 1992). As competition with other European states (especially Germany) for foreign workers increased, bilateral recruitment agreements were directed farther from the *Metropole*. Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia were reached in 1963, while immigration from Algeria increased after the Evian agreement of 1962 that established independence for the former colony.

Though Britain's post-war situation was similar to its continental neighbors, its policies regarding economic development (including labor requirements) was based on its existing imperial grand strategy. In addition to the Soviet threat that menaced continental Europe, Britain's external threat was also predicated on the decline of its relative status as a major world power. Britain's focus on the Commonwealth as the source of material power was based as much on the defense of the declining Pax Britannica and the nation's status as an elite world power, as it was on concerns regarding the Soviets. As with its European neighbors, there was widespread recognition that labor shortages threatened post-war recovery and reconstruction. Initially Britain made use of European workers. In 1945, 335,000 European POWs were employed in Britain, and in 1947, the Polish Resettlement Act and the European Volunteer Workers Program brought in roughly 180,000 migrants (Holmes, 1988:210-214). However, Britain's long-term focus was placed on the Commonwealth rather than continental Europe, both in terms of trade and migration.

Trade opportunities and acquisition of raw materials within the sterling area provided a financial buffer against Britain's accumulated wartime debt and the financial requirements needed to rebuild its war-torn infrastructure. Canada accounted for over 40% of Britain's exports, while Australia and New Zealand provided dollar-free sources of meat, wheat, timber, and dairy products (Paul, 1997:1). While British imperialism was based on a logic of emigration, turning to the Commonwealth as a source of labor made perfect sense. Because good colonial relations was the cornerstone of British grand strategy, both in terms of trade opportunities and as a source of labor, the U.K. established the British Nationality Act of 1948 which emphasized the equality of Commonwealth citizens. This symbolic equality was manifest

in the free movement rights accorded to all citizens of the Commonwealth. Though policy makers showed a distinct preference for Old Commonwealth (OCW) immigrants—largely white and English speaking—over New Commonwealth (NCW) immigrants, "the imposition of immigration controls, particularly if seen to be racist, would have threatened Britain's moral authority as leader, or at least *primus inter pares*, of the Commonwealth" (Layton-Henry, 1984:33).

While free movement provisions of the Nationality Act provided an abundant source of labor for the U.K., racial preferences were initiated *de facto* rather than *de jure*. For example, representative of the British government in the Indian sub-continent, the Caribbean, and Africa were encouraged to "use discretion" in issuing travel documents to those who were not closely connected to the British Isles through the descent of both parents. Other means of dissuasion were used as well, including 1) changing rules regarding the proof necessary to document an applicant's connection to the U.K.; 2) attempts by government officials to manipulate the cost of passage from the Caribbean to the U.K.; and 3) the use of propaganda in these areas which suggested severe living and employment conditions awaited migrants seeking entry into the U.K. (Spencer, 1997). These measures kept the initial number of NCW migrants relatively low, allowed the U.K. to maintain cordial relations with its colonies, and enabled policy makers to forward racial preferences without making official policy statements which reflect racial biases. Unfortunately, the more limited use of foreign labor has been traced as a likely reason why economic growth in post-war Britain lagged behind its continental neighbors, Germany and France (Kindleberger, 1967).

B. External and Internal Security in the United States

Security in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s can be seen as having two concurrent logics, both external and internal. Soviet military power challenged the U.S. to boost material production and military defense, creating an external focus and diminishing attention on domestic ethno-cultural differences. Yet because the Cold War was soon cast as a struggle

between two identities, two ways of life, as documented in the Truman Doctrine, we might also recognize that external defense and identity questions were tightly correlated. Ideological markers increasingly replaced traditional sources of societal threat—namely, race, ethnicity, and culture. This was partly the result of the Cold War, but was also aided by the existing immigration regime which was based on a national origins quota system, thus keeping the ethno-cultural character of migrant inflows somewhat stable during this time (and thus, decreasing societal insecurities).

Foreign policy considerations did have an effect on migration policies during and after World War II. In order to bolster relations with key allies, overt discrimination against nationals of allied nations was deemed to be counterproductive to the national interest. In 1943, Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Acts to improve ties with China, a U.S. ally in the war against Japan (Reimers, 1985). In 1946, Congress established quotas for Asian allied nations, including India and the Philippines. Rather than emphasizing ethno-cultural elements, internal security considerations were focused more on questions of political ideology, allegiance, and fears of internal insurgency by Communist sympathizers. The Internal Security Act of 1950 amended various immigration laws to strengthen the screening of aliens based on political ideology, and made present of former membership in the Communist party or any other totalitarian party grounds for inadmissibility.

As was the case in Europe, the United States established a labor importation program with Mexico to meet the manpower requirements of its post-war industrial boom. On 10 March 1947, the Bracero program begun during WWII was renewed. Mexican contract labor during the war not only provided needed manpower in agriculture, but also enabled domestic workers to shift into industrial production jobs (Garcia y Griego, 1980). As domestic labor shifted toward higher paying industrial production jobs, opportunities in agriculture became less appealing to native workers both in terms of relative wages, working conditions, and status. Figure 3 shows the dramatic rise in the use of contract labor from Mexico during the 1950s, signaling both acute economic demand and positive economic gains. [FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] In addition to

levels reflected through official recruitment channels, Mexican workers were increasingly recruited directly by employers and then regularized ex post facto. As in France, the economic gains for key economic sectors were perceived to be significant enough to warrant a *laissez-faire* government attitude toward this circumvention of official recruitment channels. As in Europe, tremendous economic growth during the 1950s left policy makers hesitant to implement policies that might hamper the remarkable economic growth they were enjoying in the country.

Instead of being considered a societal threat, Mexican workers were largely considered an important part of the U.S. economy. Societal concerns focused on Communists, abroad and at home. This relative lack of an ethno-cultural threat, combined with policy makers' desire to emphasize America's condemnation of illiberal Communist policies (including the suppression of free movement) led to the landmark amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965. While the civil rights movement can be considered the most direct cause of both the timing and shape of the 1965 amendments, we must also recognize that the unique security environment of the early Cold War period emphasized the multi-cultural ethos of American nationalism, while societal threats were focused on political ideology.

To summarize, external threat and the need for material production moved the security equilibrium sharply toward the economic pole in both the United States and Europe. Governments either facilitated trade and factor flows directly, or did so indirectly by adopting a *laissez-faire* approach. While Britain and the United States displayed more sensitivity to ethno-cultural threats presented by migration than Germany or France, all adopted a remarkably open trading state approach to trade and factor mobility. Clearly, the economic gains from such a Ricardian approach are clearly demonstrated in the material growth in these countries during the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. However, the windfall economic gains clouded the slowly building social effects of such policies, which were to become manifest during the late 1960s and increase during the 1970s, introducing a new security mode.

IV. Changing Patterns of Migration and Societal Insecurities

For several reasons, the ratio between external and internal threats declined beginning around the mid-1960s. First, the bipolar Cold War system had stabilized, a distinct departure from the post-war turmoil surrounding the Soviet's move from ally to enemy (see Larson, 1985). Moreover, confidence in policy makers' ability to effectively manage the East-West relationship also increased. Proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam did not escalate into a nuclear exchange between the superpowers, though each was destructive and bloody. Lastly, post-war economic growth in both the U.S. and Europe bolstered Western material power and reduced perceptions of territorial threat and political vulnerability. While trading state openness resulted in unprecedented economic growth among western nations, it also served to increase the disparity between North and South that not only increased global migration pressures, but also qualitatively changed the composition of migrant flows. The 1970s are marked by a reactionary societal backlash to trading state openness.

The conventional wisdom suggests that closure was primarily a function of the 1973 oil embargo and the recession that followed (Hargreaves, 1995:17). While economic conditions contributed to the timing of political closure, such economic explanations alone do not capture the wider socio-political processes at play and cannot account for several aspects of the shift toward closure. First, impulses toward closure actually began in the mid- to late-1960s with the end of the Bracero program in the U.S., labor importation reductions in Germany, and the adoption of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in the U.K. Second, if economic protectionism were the sole determinant of policy, we should expect closure toward all immigration flows, since any inflow represent a potential threat to jobs. Yet, policy decisions reflected ethno-cultural considerations. In Europe, closure was directed at non-European migration, while EC nations remained committed to open migration as an integral part of European integration. Lastly, the impulse toward closure has continued and even grown in the decades following the recession, even though domestic economic conditions have vacillated. While the recession of the early 1970s certainly had an impact on policy, the evidence suggests that these factors

provided a justification for an impulse toward social closure that had already been developing for some time.

A. Societal Reactionism in Europe

In Europe, the threat new migration represented to national identity increasingly dominated political discourse in the 1970s and 1980s. In France, laissez-faire recruitment of foreign labor led to a gradual transformation of migration inflows (Figure 4). [FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] From 1946—1955, Italians accounted for 66.8% of migrant inflows, but by 1973 they accounted for only 4.6% (Hollifield, 1994:153). In contrast, by 1975 over 30% of France's foreign population came from the Maghreb (INSEE, 1992). Moreover, uneven geographic distribution of these new immigrants served to increase their visibility and raise awareness of societal changes among the general public. In contrast with prior inflows, migrants entering France in the 1960s were concentrating in the industrial Paris and Lyon regions where industries that utilized foreign labor were concentrated (Money, 1999:120-23; see also Ogden, 1989; Hollifield, 1992; White, 1995). The lack of suitable housing and the emergence of ethnic enclaves created urban ghettos and shantytowns (*bidonvilles*) in many of these industrial centers. Where immigrants were previously associated with economic growth, they increasingly became associated with urban plight and ethnic segregation.

The increase in family-oriented migration also served to increase the visibility of changing migration patterns. Initially, migrants from the Maghreb were primarily single males. The rise in family immigration led to deeper societal penetration into the mainstream housing market, while children enrolled in French schools, providing additional opportunities for interaction with mainstream French society (Hargreaves, 1995). The fact that Maghribi migrants were largely Muslim also served to generate societal fears because of the cultural distance perceived, doubts regarding their assimilability, and the increasing social visibility of the Muslim population in France (Oriol, 1992; Roy, 1994). In 1968, domestic political and social unrest prompted a re-evaluation of migration policies by the French government. Reports

commissioned by the government suggested that even though migration offers considerable economic gains, "the problems that immigration poses to our society put at risk society's future cohesion" (Calvez, 1969; Schumann, 1969; Massenet, 1970). These reports argued that while French society was based on liberal principles founded during the revolution, it had a "threshold of tolerance" (*seuil de tolérance*) for assimilating immigrants, and that neglecting this dynamic could have significant negative socio-political effects. It must be noted, however, that this *seuil de tolérance* applied primarily to Maghribi migration, not European migration (Silverman, 1992:75-76).

In response to the rise of societal security concerns, the government first sought to limit Maghribi migration through the Franco-Algerian Accords of 1968 (and also in 1971) (Hollifield, 1992:68-69). Also in 1968, new sanctions were implemented against employers of illegal aliens in order to gain control of the market-based migration system that had developed over time. On 3 July 1974 recruitment of foreign workers was temporarily halted, and options for reducing the country's non-European foreign-born population were considered. France offered financial incentives (10,000 francs) to foreign workers to voluntarily return to their home country in 1977 (Kubat, 1993:174-75). Unfortunately for policy makers, the program met with limited success as the number of participants was relatively low (80,000) and was dominated by Spaniard and Portuguese rather than Maghribi, to whom it was primarily directed (Lebon, 1984; Weil, 1991). Moreover, as official recruitment channels closed, migration flows increasingly shifted toward clandestine immigration and asylum/refugee channels. As asylum applications grew in the 1970s and 1980s, the rejection rate in France increased accordingly. In addition, the need for multilateral cooperation with European neighbors became increasingly evident if refugees and asylum seekers were to be effectively regulated.

As in France, the socio-political problems associated with the *Gastarbeiter* program became increasingly evident in Germany in the late 1960s. In the period from 1968-1972, the foreign work force in Germany rose from 1 million to 2.6 million, which amounted to an increase from 5 to 12% of the total German work force (Martin, 1994:201). More important was

the change in sources of migration, as Turkish migration increased from 2,500 in 1960 to 605,000 in 1973 (Bade, 1983:70). In addition, it soon became apparent that the "temporary" guest workers were increasingly less interested in returning to their home countries and were becoming a permanent part of German society (Rogers, 1985; Collinson, 1993). From 1963 to 1967, the percentage of foreign workers who had been in Germany for over three years increased from 22% to 45% (Bendix, 1990:44).

More permanent and family-oriented migration led to changes in preferred housing among immigrants. While the communal housing offered by the German government was initially appealing to guest workers (largely single males), by the end of the 1970s more than 80% of the foreign workers chose to live in individual apartments and rooms secured on the open market (Heckmann, 1985:73). This change brought the resident foreign population into closer contact with German society, increasing social visibility. Rather than creating anti-immigrant sentiment, the recession of the early 1970s served to focus existing anxieties and prompted a re-examination of the social changes generated by the *Gastarbeiter* program. Ulrich Herbert (1990:324-35) suggests that "the oil embargo had been little more than a supplementary factor; it had provided a useful occasion to check the influx of foreign workers and reduce their numbers--without any great resistance from the worker-exporting countries and without wearying public discussion on the social consequences of this measure." Labor recruitment was halted in November 1973.

After the foreign population in Germany reached a peak of 4.7 million in 1982, financial assistance (DM 10,500) was offered to former guest workers who were willing to voluntarily return to their homeland. However, as with France's attempt at similar policies, the program had little effect on the size and composition of the foreign population. In addition, closure of recruitment channels simply redirected flows. Many of those seeking entry sought to exploit Germany's liberal asylum policies, codified in Article 16 of the German basic law. In the year following the recruitment stoppage, new asylum claims almost doubled, from 5,595 to 9,424, and the number of applications increased annually, reaching a level of 100,000 by 1980 (Joppke,

1997:277). Throughout the 1980s, Germany received 60% to 70% of Western Europe's refugee applicants (Joppke, 1999:90). While public demand to amend Article 16 was vociferous, doing so was considered contrary to Germany's desire to emphasize its post-war liberalism and to distance itself from its totalitarian past. Thus, initial responses centered on administrative and procedural changes, including provisions articulated in the 1982 Asylum Procedures Law that sought to "fast track" dismissal of "patently unfounded" claims. [FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] Asylum applications continued to grow sparking continued debate regarding the need to close Germany's open door regarding asylum (Figure 5).

Britain's transition to a societal reactionist mode is slightly different than France or Germany. While Britain's free movement regime did not initially generate significant migration from NCW countries, over time flows from these sources increased dramatically (Figure 6). [FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] During the first months of 1958, immigration from India and Pakistan rose sharply, and in February, the number of new arrivals from these sources was equivalent to 30% of the total flow in 1957 (Spencer, 1997:91). Between 1959 and 1961, immigration from the West Indies surged from 16,400 to 66,300 (Patterson, 1969:3). Even though they were still relatively insignificant levels in relation to the total population in Britain they generated considerable perceptions of threat. However, societal insecurities were based more on fears of the size of future flows if trends continued unabated rather than on the size of current flows. These fears became especially acute during the race riots in 1958, which increased perceptions among policy makers that changing ethnic demographics had volatile political consequences (Pilkington, 1988). Attitudes among the general public mirrored these concerns. A Gallup poll conducted in June 1961 found that 67% of the public favored immigration restrictions (Patterson, 1969:18).

In the wake of rising New Commonwealth migration, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act subordinated entry of all Commonwealth citizens and CUCKs whose passports were issued outside the U.K. to immigration and labor market controls consisting of a three-tiered voucher system. When in 1963 it became apparent that Indians and Pakistanis were

disproportionately applying for all three categories of vouchers, the government stipulated that no Commonwealth country could receive more than 25% of the available "C" vouchers. In August 1965, a Labour Government White Paper tightened the 1962 controls by establishing a ceiling on New Commonwealth immigration to 8,500 per annum, and abolishing the "C" voucher category altogether (Layton-Henry, 1994:284). Subsequent amendments to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1968 stipulated that only patrial CUCKs remained free from immigration controls while others were regulated via an entry-voucher system, with initial levels set at 1,500 heads of household.⁹ Restrictions on Commonwealth immigration were also strengthened with the passage of the 1971 Immigration Act, which removed most remaining privileges accorded to Commonwealth Citizens.

While the most conspicuous closure policies on the continent occurred in 1973-74, the passage of the British Nationality Act of 1981 was a milestone in the British shift toward a societal reactionist posture. Through the Act, the status of "British subject," which had long been synonymous with "Commonwealth citizen," was for the most part abolished (Hansen, 2000:214). Harry Goulbourne (1998:54) argues that, "The measure continued the principle of differential rights first begun in the 1971 Act by abolishing the ancient Anglo-Saxon tradition of *jus soli*, that is, citizenship deriving from the place of a person's birth, and implementing the principle of citizenship by descent, that is, the Continental European practice of *jus sanguinis*." The Act also sought to shore up loopholes in migration and border policy that could be exploited by those wishing to circumvent state control. It established the "primary purpose" rule which prohibited the entry of fiancées or spouses of British women citizens unless they could prove that the primary purpose of the marriage was not to garner settlement rights in the U.K. A few years later, the Tamil crisis of 1985 raised British sensitivities to the possible exploitation of refugee and asylum policy by economic migrants, and Home Office officials used its deportation powers with extreme prejudice. As the number of asylum applicants increased, societal calls for closure increased as well.

B. Societal Reactionism in the United States

The emergence of societal insecurities occurred in the mid-1960s, and gained strength throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Even as momentum was building for the eradication of the national origins quota system, a process strongly linked to the civil rights movement (King, 2000:246),¹⁰ concerns over illegal immigration surrounded the latter days of the *Bracero* program. While the number of Braceros continued to rise from 1947 to 1959, this rise was accompanied by a rapid growth in the number of illegal aliens apprehended by the INS. Between 1946 and 1954, apprehensions of illegal immigrants increased from 99,591 to 1,089,583 (INS, 1959:54). INS officials referred to the growth in apprehensions as characteristic of "the greatest peacetime invasion complacently suffered by a country under open, flagrant, contemptuous violation of its laws" (Qtd. in Galarza, 1964). Media reports also served to generate increased levels of societal threat. A *New York Times* service broadcast on 9 May 1953 proclaimed, "Illegal immigration from Mexico . . . has reached such overwhelming proportions that officers of the United States Immigration Service admit candidly . . . that there is nothing to stop the whole nation of Mexico moving into the United States, if it wants to."

Not only was labor recruitment discontinued, but discourse in the 1970s and 1980s revolved around notions of "regaining control" of our "neglected borders." While the percentage of foreign-born population in the U.S. declined from about 8% in 1945 to just over 4% in 1970 (Fetzer, 2000:155), the proportion of Mexican/Latin American and Asian migration into the United States grew significantly following the 1965 amendments (Passel and Edmonston, 1992) (Figure 7). [FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] Faced with growing numbers of migrants from non-European sources, efforts to respond to societal insecurities came in the form of revised western hemisphere limits on immigrant visas, as stipulated in the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976. The Act implemented the 20,000 per country limits---a change which most significantly affected Mexico, who had previously only been subject to the hemispheric limit of 120,000.

The Interagency Task Force on Immigration Policy (1979:2) formed in 1977 surmised, "there is presently no credible deterrent to illegal migration [...]." [FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]

The number of illegal aliens apprehended by the INS continued its sharp rise throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 8). In 1978, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy recommended a comprehensive control policy aimed both at the border and the interior. The commission recommended 1) sanctions against employers that hire illegal immigrants; 2) the development of a secure identification system; 3) enhanced border enforcement; and 4) amnesty for illegal aliens currently residing in the country. Most of these recommendations comprise the basis of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) passed in 1986. Declaring amnesty for existing illegal immigrants was intended to provide a "clean slate" for the increased control provisions articulated in IRCA, especially border control. Between 1986 and 1990, the budget allocated for the Border Patrol increased from \$154 million to \$262.6 million, which constituted the largest portion of the INS's budget for enforcement activities (Rolph, 1992:45).

The public discourse and politics leading up to IRCA suggests that the rise of identity as a security object created strong pressure for closure in the U.S. Increases in non-European migration and a concomitant rise in illegal immigration, especially from Mexico, were greeted with alarm and calls for firm measures to halt such migration. Policies enacted in response to such threats included *both* external (border) and internal (sanctions) measures, even though IRCA's employer sanctions provisions were vehemently opposed by business interests who saw this as a negative externality on business processes. In both the United States and Europe, the strong negative reaction to new migration trends resulted in calls for closure and made policy makers aware that U.S. grand strategy could not be based on pure trading state openness. Societal security was an increasingly volatile issue that would have to be seriously taken into account.

V. Finessing Societal Insecurities

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, marking the end of the Cold War, served to further decrease external military threats among trading states. The widespread belief that these events represented a sea-change in international order are captured in George Bush's often used characterization of an emerging "new world order." Given that external threat declined significantly at the close of the 1980s, the threat-based paradigm hypothesized herein would predict a continued—perhaps even dramatic—rise in societal insecurities. In addition to the loss of an external enemy, other trends suggested an increasing salience regarding societal security, including policy legacies that kept migration flows coming into the country, and the rise in illegal immigration after official recruitment channels were closed to potential migrants. Because the security equilibrium would thus shift toward the societal pole, we should then see even more restrictive border and migration policies across cases in the 1990s. Consistent with the model presented herein, societal insecurities continued to increase in the 1990s, especially in those areas most acutely affected by migrant flows. In the U.S., large numbers of illegal aliens brazenly crossed the border at the San Ysidro port-of-entry, fueling rhetoric of an "alien invasion." Similarly, in Europe, increasing violence levied against foreigners and the rising popularity of anti-immigrant party platforms signaled increasing perceptions of societal threat (Baumgartl and Favell, 1995).

Yet, European nations remained committed to open migration within the EU, even though this left individual states dependent on the ability of other European states to police their borders effectively. Moreover, the Schengen Agreement (1995), adopted by nearly all continental European nations, opens internal borders even more by doing away with visa checks among member states. In the United States, immigration quota levels remained steady, and the first legislative change enacted in the 1990s actually resulted in a 40% increase in overall legal admissions. These developments might seem to be at odds with the statist, threat-based explanation I've proposed. The model hypothesized herein suggests a three-step process: 1) perceptions of threat drive 2) security interests that 3) shape policy outcomes. With regards to

migration, the security environment did in fact lead to an increase in societal insecurities as predicted. The anomaly is solely in the link between security interests and policy response. However, when considered closely and in proper context, policy in the 1990s is not necessarily inconsistent with this model.

Policies in the 1990s must be taken in the context of the impact of the IT revolution on material security interests, the continued transition to flexible production modes, and the growing importance of human capital (Mittelman, 2000). While societal insecurities may be increasingly generated by migration, the movement of labor has become increasingly linked with the accumulation of material power, creating a strong political tension between material and societal interests. What has emerged from this environment is a governmental response similar to that utilized with trade issues. When confronted by political impulses that run counter to the nation's material interests, Goldstein (1986:166) suggests that states need to "appear responsive, not be responsive." The same would appear to hold true for migration. When confronted by calls for closure, states increasingly try to finesse societal pressures because they exact an increasing cost on economic maximization and the production of material power. How is this generally done in practice? Rather than responding by stopping migration flows, policies are directed specifically at the source of societal threat, not on volume per se. These include flows from less ethno-culturally proximate sending societies, those that are concentrated in time and space and are thus highly visible, and by projecting an image of control with respect to illegal immigration. At the same time, openness is maintained as much as possible in order to reap the economic gains of immigrant labor.

A. The "Fortress Europe" and the Problem of "Third Country Nationals"

European states have made it clear that the problem of migration rests with the movement of "third country nationals" (TCNs), *not necessarily with migration per se* (Cf. Papademetriou, 1996; Newland and Papademetriou, 1998; Thouez, 1999). EU cooperation has not only been engaged to facilitate migration internally, but also to help stem TCN migration from outside of

the "fortress Europe." This includes information sharing, linkage politics, border enforcement, and policy harmonization concerning asylum and refugee policies. Linkage politics, including linking foreign aid and possible entry into the EU in exchange for cooperation in controlling TCN migration into the EU, has emerged as a common approach. Given its large land borders to the East, these methods have been used vigorously by the Germans. In 1993, Germany linked the continuation of visa-free travel for Poles entering Germany with their acceptance of a readmission agreement. By accepting, the Polish government was committed to "reaccepting" all undocumented TCNs attempting entry into Germany across the German--Polish border. Germany also offered to provide \$80 million of direct financial assistance as an additional incentive and to offset costs during the first two years of the implementation of the agreement (Freudenstein, 2000). In 1997, Germany provided another \$66 million of aid to Poland in order to help secure the border and stop clandestine entry of TCNs (Sassen, 1999:116). In addition, EU policy makers have made it clear to both Poland and the Czech Republic that future entry into the EU was contingent on gaining cooperation in controlling migrants into Germany from the East (Andreas, 1999:20).

When labor recruitment programs were halted in the early 1970s, applications for asylum from TCNs increased dramatically. While Western states supported the establishment of a liberal refugee regime in the wake of World War II,¹¹ perceptions that economic migrants were increasingly exploiting liberal policies rose sharply during the 1980s and into the 1990s. This connection between illegal immigrants (generally TCNs) and the exploitation of asylum procedures was supported by emerging evidence in Britain, where in 1995 it was found that two-thirds of the illegal aliens detected by authorities applied for asylum to prevent deportation.¹² Because the asylum/refugee channel was specifically associated with TCN migration, closure and control mechanisms during the 1990s were focused on this mode of entry. The Dublin Convention (1990) established a mechanism for policy harmonization among EU states and sought to close policy loopholes being exploited by TCNs. It has been argued that acceptance of the Dublin Convention "was one of the key preconditions agreed upon by the EU member states

in order to proceed with consolidating the single European market and eliminating border controls within the EU" (Newland and Papademetriou, 1998:643). The Convention stipulates that asylum applicants must generally submit their claim in the first EU country they enter, who is then responsible for deciding their case. This ensures that asylum decisions are made once---and only once---since the decision of the first EU nation will be considered binding in all other EU member states, and eliminates the practice of "asylum shopping" among potential applicants.

New policies have been established in Germany, France, and the U.K. that provided the means to fast-track asylum procedures and have granted the state considerable discretion in dismissing "patently unfounded" claims. Moreover, the concept of the "safe third country" has emerged as another means of reducing asylum claims from TCNs. The third country option, adopted domestically by most European states, automatically dismisses claims if applicants arrive from other European nations or transit countries that *prima facie* do not produce refugees. These lists of "safe countries" are established in consultation with the UNHCR and may vary—albeit generally slightly—between member EU states. The combination of control measures has served to significantly reduce the number of asylum applications filed in the EU during the 1990s (Newland and Papademetriou, 1998). In Germany, these various provisions and procedures resulted in a 70% decline in asylum applications from 1992—1995, while in France, applications from 1990—1996 declined over 30% (Newland and Papademetriou, 1998:645; Joppke, 1999:94). In the U.K., the percent of asylum applicants granted acceptance declined from 85.9% in 1990 to 23.8% in 1997 (Newland and Papademetriou, 1998:645).

To summarize, migration and border policies in Europe during the 1990s reflect a desire to maintain de jure internal openness while crafting an image of a hard-shell border around the "fortress Europe." While policy makers have increased control mechanisms in the wake of increasing societal insecurities, they have directed these efforts at the specific elements of migration that generate societal threat, while concurrently seeking to maximize the benefits of migration from sources that pose fewer political problems regarding societal security.

B. Finessing Policy in the United States: The Gatekeeper Approach

In the 1990s, public concerns regarding immigration continued to increase. Yet, as was the case with European states, the government increasingly sought to craft a balance between societal and material demands that quelled societal fears while maximizing (given political constraints) economic gains. Closure mechanisms established during the 1990s have not stopped illegal immigration flows as stipulated in their stated goals, prompting some analyst to suggest that such policies were a failure. However, these policies must be analyzed within a larger context, and with recognition of their symbolic value in reducing perceptions of threat, if not volume. In the 1990s, the equilibrium mode of state grand strategy is comprised of three dimensions: 1) continued liberal immigration quotas, generally about 700,000 per annum; 2) adjusting for the unintended effects of the 1965 amendments to the INA with regard to European migration; and 3) crafting an image of security along the U.S.—Mexico border, while maintaining a de facto open regime internally.

In addition to liberal immigration quotas, policy makers in the 1990s sought to respond to societal insecurities by reshaping the ethno-cultural composition of front-door migration flows. As outlined above, the 1965 Amendments to the INA, which established family reunification as the basis of immigrant visa preferences, served to greatly increase migration from Mexico, Latin America, and Asia, while the relative proportion of European migration to the United States declined. The Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) resulted in a 40% increase in overall legal admissions into the U.S., but also sought to shape the qualitative characteristics of immigrant inflows in two ways. First, IMMACT increased the number of employment-based visas from 54,000 to 140,000, an increase of 260%. IMMACT created the H-1B visa program for foreign workers with skills that are in high demand. Reflecting the growing importance of the IT sector, statistics compiled in 2000 by the General Accounting Office found that roughly 60% of the H-1B visa holders worked in the computer programming and IT fields.¹³ In addition to additional employment-based quotas, IMMACT also established an allocation for "diversity immigration" (DV-1), intended to "correct" for the adverse effects of the 1965 amendments. Beginning in

October 1994, IMMACT provided 55,000 immigrant visas to be distributed among nationals or nations that had sent fewer than 55,000 legal immigrants to the U.S. over the previous five years—a move clearly intended to "balance" the dramatic rise in the proportion of Latin American and Asian immigration. In the first apportionment of such visas, nearly 50% (24,550) were allocated to European nations. Adding "diversity visas" enabled policy makers to attempt to balance the ethnic make-up of current immigration flows while avoiding racist rhetoric (and overtly racist policies), and without dismantling the liberal preference system in place since 1965. IMMACT was the first attempt to finesse contradicting interests politically in the 1990s, though it was only the beginning.

While employer sanctions laws had been on the books since the passage of IRCA in 1986, less and less of the INS budget was allocated for inspections and investigations, whereas allocations for border policing consistently increased (Andreas, 2000). Critics noted that, "there is strong evidence that the [employer sanctions] program is not receiving the mandate or support necessary to allow it to effectively deter undocumented immigration," (Abowd and Freeman, 1991:50) adding, employer sanctions "appears to be more symbolic than real in its effects on [illegal immigration]" (Bean and Fix, 1992:55). "Out of status" migrants—also known as "visa overstayers"—have rarely been an issue in terms of societal security and public demands for closure, even though they represent roughly 50% of the illegal immigrant population in the United States. As such, a de facto situation of internal openness has emerged which countenances the presence of illegal immigrants once they have gained access to the interior. In terms of societal security, "out of sight, out of mind" has been the rule of the day.

Openness with regards to immigration quota levels has been politically "purchased" through highly symbolic border closure policies directed at Mexico and Latin America. In the early 1990s, illegal border crossings from Mexico became more brazen and voluminous, increasing visibility and generating threats. In 1994, voters in California overwhelmingly passed Proposition 187, an anti-illegal immigration bill riding the crest of societal insecurities. Though almost immediately struck down in the courts, organizers and proponents often suggested that

the bill was intended to "send a message" to policy makers to do something about illegal immigration—especially from Mexico (Calavita, 1996; Andreas, 2000). The government responded with a series of border enforcement programs initiated by the INS along the U.S.—Mexico border, beginning in El Paso (1993), and then being employed in San Diego (1994), Nogales (1995), and East Texas (Operation Rio Grande, 1997). Given the highly visible flows crossing along the San Diego-Tijuana region, "Operation Gatekeeper" (October 1994) became the symbolic flagship for the new operations. Operation Gatekeeper employed a highly visible, multi-layered approach to sealing this porous border region. A reinforced 12-foot steel fence running along a 14-mile stretch of the border was followed by a zone illuminated with high-intensity stadium lighting and policed by an army of border patrol agents armed with military-grade technology. In 1996, additional funding for such border enforcement measures was secured as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), which also called for 1,000 additional Border Patrol agents to be hired annually. From 1993—1997, the annual budget for the INS increased from \$1.5 billion to \$4.2 billion, while the annual budget for the Border Patrol increased from \$354 million to \$877 million.

Some critics have suggested that these methods are a failure, since they have failed to stem the flow of illegal immigrants entering from Mexico (Cornelius, 1998b:392). Indeed, examining apprehensions statistics at the sector level reveals that while apprehensions in the San Diego sector decreased, apprehensions increased in zones East of San Diego (Figure 9). [FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE] In aggregate, Border Patrol apprehensions actually increased between 1992 and 1998, from 1,199,560 to 1,555,776 (INS, 1998:209-10). Moreover, it appears that border enforcement measures have increased use of migrant smugglers, adding a new criminal agent to the equation (Andreas, 1999; Koslowski and Kyle, 2000). From 1992—1998, aliens apprehended using migrant smugglers increased sharply, from 69,538 to 174,514 (INS, 1998:209-10). The local media reported that, prior to Operation Gatekeeper, "illegal immigrants would simply run through the checkpoints in packs" (*San Diego Union Tribune*, 17 July 1998:B6). The border enforcement strategy that has emerged during the 1990s has focused on

curbing flows in high-traffic zones such as San Ysidro and dispersing them geographically. While this may not reduce overall *volume*, it has significantly reduced the *visibility* of border transgressions, and thus, an element significant to societal threat perception. If the goal is "out of sight, out of mind"—as is the case with "out of status" migrants---Gatekeeper and policies like it represent a tremendous political success (Andreas, 1999).

Because the economic interests of the state are forwarded through relatively open migration, the fact the overall migration levels have not declined significantly should not necessarily represent policy failure, but rather, political success. In the emergent equilibrium mode of grand strategy, states increasingly desire—and have been increasingly able—to address societal insecurity and perceptions of threat without undue sacrifices of national economic or material interests. They do so by creating the *appearance* of balance, if not actual balance, along the security spectrum. Again, states must appear responsive, not necessarily be responsive.

VI. Conclusion

That belief that material power is best maximized through trading state globalization has emerged as the post-World War II consensus, especially among advanced industrial countries. However, this is only one—albeit significant—element of contemporary world politics. Trading state policies have contributed to the growing economic inequalities between North and South, increasing pressures for international migration. Moreover, the growing value of services and knowledge-based capital in the emerging IT economy and the benefits of an elastic labor supply make effective management of international migration an increasingly important component of trading state grand strategy. This may be even more significant given a growing belief among economists that migration complements trade—a view which breaks with traditional beliefs regarding the substitutability of trade for factor mobility (and vice versa) which were for the most part unquestioned from the time of Heckscher-Ohlin, and later, Robert Mundell (1957) (Cf. Collins et al., 1999).

What this research reveals is that those factors that maximize material wealth and state power have given rise to a new object of security in most—if not all—trading states (Waeber et al. 1993; Weiner and Russell, 2001). While migration is an increasingly important part of trading state grand strategy, Peter Schuck (1990) suggests, "the master theme of immigration politics is the fear that we are losing control of our way of life." Even among western democratic states where national identity is comprised at least in part of liberal notions of toleration and assimilation,¹⁴ perceived threats to societal sovereignty have created new objects of security. These threats to identity often command our deepest emotions, generating formidable political pressures that are not only difficult for policy makers to ignore, but most desire to avoid altogether by setting appropriate policy before changing demographics generate perceptions of threat. As mentioned earlier, when the analytical focus is on threat, potential migration flows are as important—if not more so—than actual flows.

Given these conflicting objects of contemporary security, states have increasingly sought to politically finesse societal calls for closure while maximizing material gain within the given socio-political constraints. Reflecting on the U.S. case, sociologist Douglas Massey (1999:318) observed that, "[...] policies in the United States have been largely symbolic, signaling to angry or fearful citizens and workers that their concerns are being addressed while marginalizing immigrants socially and geographically to make them less visible to the public." He adds, "Repressive policies such as vigorous border enforcement, the bureaucratic harassment of aliens, and the restriction of immigrants' access to social services may or may not be effective, but they all serve an important political purpose: they are visible, concrete, and generally population with citizen voters." In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the now more credible link between illegal immigration and terrorism/national security, the ability of states to craft such a political equilibrium no doubt will be tremendously more challenging, especially in the short-run. Whether these events truly mark a turning point in the security equilibrium or whether such fears can also be finessed politically remains to be seen.

What this research provides is a more comprehensive model of security that unifies its various dimensions under a single, dynamic framework. Ultimately, it suggests that how states balance impulses toward openness and closure will shape much of world politics in the coming years.

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Figure 1. *A Security Equilibrium in Three Dimensions*






Figure 2. *Annual Immigration into France, 1955---1973*




Source: OMISTATS

Figure 3. *Mexican Foreign Workers Admitted Through the Bracero Program, 1945---1964*




Source: Calavita 1992, 218.

Figure 4. *Nationality of the Foreign Population in France, 1946---1975*




Source: INSEE 1992.

Figure 5. *Asylum Applications in Germany, 1980---1994*




Source: Martin 1994, 212.

Figure 6. *Estimated New Commonwealth Migration to Britain, 1959---1962*




Source: Patterson 1969, 3.

Figure 7. *Legal Immigration to the U.S. by Country or Region, 1951---1990*




Source: Fix and Passel 1994, 26.

Figure 8. *Illegal Aliens Apprehended, 1965---1998*



Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service

Figure 9. *Deportable Aliens Located by the Border Patrol by Sector, 1992---1998*



Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service

Notes

¹ See also (Simon, 1989).

² See also (Rogowski, 1998).

³ Jeannette Money (1999) provides a spatial component to these domestic political dynamics. She argues that because the unequal geographic distribution of migrant inflows affects costs and benefits at the sub-national level, these can explain fluctuations in policy that generally favors business interests.

⁴ Krasner (1999) refers to this as “Westphalian sovereignty.”

⁵ Rogers Smith (1993) refers to this tension in terms of "multiple traditions." (Cf. Huntington, 1981; Citrin, Reingold and Green, 1990; King, 2000).

⁶ This forms the basis of Ricardian economics. See (Ricardo, 1955; Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997).

⁷ However, migration from Morocco and Tunisia never reached significant levels. See (Bade, 1987:153).

⁸ Indeed, Rogers Brubaker (1992:184) remarked that France is "a classical country, perhaps *the* classical country, of assimilation."

⁹ "Patrials" were defined as those who were tied to the U.K. through family descent or settlement. See (Money, 1999:69).

¹⁰ Indeed, while the 1965 amendments to the INA signaled liberalization, the emphasis on establishing a new system based on preferences for family reunification was based as much on beliefs that it would shape inflows to mirror existing racial and ethno-cultural balances as it was on promoting human rights liberalism.

¹¹ See the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

¹² *Migration News* (January 1997).

¹³ *Los Angeles Times*, 21 November 2001, A29.

¹⁴ This is the case even in Germany, who has actively cultivated such ideas in order to distance itself with its totalitarian past and atrocities committed in the name of racial superiority.