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Contexts of Asian Democracy: A Cross-National, Within-Nation Analysis of Asian Nations

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A long tradition in psychology, sociology, and political science links individuals' affective relationships to government with early-life socialization to cultural norms (Erikson, 1959; Easton and Dennis, 1969). Hart (1978) argues that socialization to cultural norms accounts for different levels of trust in politicians in Great Britain and the United States. More recently, Inglehart , et al. (1998) and Inglehart (1997) link political norms and attitudes to inter-generational social and value attitudes.

These latter works imply that such relationships can be identified on a cross-national basis. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), for example, attribute effects of dummy variables representing unique country-effects to national cultures or traditions regarding European integration. In a later analysis, however, Palmer and Gabel (1995) argue for a more fully specified model in which dummy variables have fewer important effects in explaining national-level public support for European unification.

By contrast, many skeptics of cultural and socialization theories suggest that institutional characteristics and government performance are more likely causes of varying degrees of distrust in governments. Klingemann (1999) found that nations engaged in the process of democratization tend toward lower levels of political trust. Mishler and Rose (2001), in a 10-country analysis, showed that micro-level institutional factors, rather than culture or socialization are the keys to explaining political trust in Eastern and Central European nations.

This paper undertakes testing of these rival explanations, especially the claim that such relationships obtain across nations, in an Asian context. In attempting to generalize to individual behavior from aggregated data, any analysis encounters problems of ecological inference. The projects represented by various "barometers" are an effort to penetrate this individual level as a perspective for examining governments and their associations with beliefs, attitudes, and cultural orientations within nations, but, in fact, also grounded in behavioral theories that transcend any one history, society, or culture.[1]

The study utilizes data from eight nations that make up the data set on "Democratization and Value Change in East Asia." These nations have sufficient data on questions expressing various forms of support for government as well as coding that lends itself to generation of

[1] Countries used in this study include Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Mainland China, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. The data represent probability samples from nationwide surveys.

indicators of a variety of societal cleavages. The data were obtained by probability sampling from eight national populations. From the roughly 12,217 respondents, we were able to obtain over 8,500 respondents on all indicators relevant to the study.

Traditional frameworks of comparative analysis are not always the most productive for understanding such factors. Despite the large Ns of national surveys (including the NES), examination of important dimensions of democratic development, such as support for democracy, support for democratic pluralism, trust in government, and subjective perceptions of governmental legitimacy, that enable democratic governments to sustain themselves and consolidate over time, is still shaped largely by idiographic studies that assume unique national histories, cultures, and ideologies. Social and economic supports for governments have been addressed at an aggregate level in comparative, cross-national analysis, but Linz and Stepan suggest that support is rooted primarily in beliefs about government and procedures and the general acceptance of laws, procedures, and institutions created for the purpose of governing (2001, 95). Positing such sources of support, a conceptualization of support for democracy appears amenable to relative effects of cultural socialization and interactions with government along the lines of Mishler and Rose's study of institutional trust.

Having amassed quantities of data at the individual level, it is puzzling as to why scholars aggregate the data for comparison with other nations, given the substantial variation within societies that, to use an ANOVA analogy, is often greater than variance between nations. If within-nation variance is greater, analysis should be guided by Prezworski and Teune's admonition from decades ago that the goal of comparative study should be to "substitute the names of variables for the names of social systems" (1971). If supports for government are rooted in individual variations, more than national ones, aggregating data from large surveys of national populations for purposes of comparing across nations discards opportunities for general theoretical knowledge as to why governments succeed or why citizens fail to support governments, controlling for specific national contexts.

Hypotheses to be Investigated

Mishler and Rose negotiate the relative impacts of social and cultural explanations of trust in government institutions versus institutionalism as a source of trust in government by positing four hypotheses. In our re-examination of their conclusions, we adopt similar hypotheses, but use dummy variables for countries (no aggregate data from Freedom House and the Transparency Index – both of which represent constants within nations anyway) as well as some additional indicators of culture and socialization that vary across individuals within the nations of the study. Mishler and Rose offer the following hypotheses to explain trust in institutions:

> *Hypothesis 1* (National Culture): Trust in political institutions varies between countries rather than among individuals according to historically rooted national experiences embedded in interpersonal trust.
>
> *Hypothesis 2* (Individual socialization): Trust in institutions varies within and across countries according to individuals' trust in others as shaped by their places in the social structure.

Hypothesis 3 (Government performance): Trust in institutions varies across rather than within countries in proportion to the success of government policies and the character of political institutions.

Hypothesis 4 (Individual evaluations): Trust in institutions varies within and across countries in accordance with both individual attitudes and values and the social and economic positions individuals occupy.

We simply replicate the theoretical perspective offered in these hypotheses, but apply them also to support for democracy, democratic pluralism, and political legitimacy, with one exception. The exception is that we include institutional trust as an endogenous variable and expect it to be a significant determinant of individual-level support for democracy, democratic pluralism, and political legitimacy.

The data also permit testing of two social forces representing cultural socialization not available to Mishler and Rose. The first is a measure of traditionalism-modernism constructed from eight questions indicated in Appendix 1. Although the expectation might be that traditional society would be less amenable to democratic forms of government, more recent evidence suggests that social values associated with modernism – such as globalization, neo-liberalism, and individualism – produce suspicions of mass democracy among elites who view it as a threat to social and economic control and, therefore, to social stability. Previous research on Asian data shows that higher levels of education and income are associated with lower levels of support for democracy (Albritton and Bureekul, 2002). This finding is counter-intuitive, especially in the face of widely held views that the urban middle class is the engine of support for democracy. The hypothesis we offer here is one noted from previous studies of Thailand – that the middle class is highly suspicious, if not fearful, of popular democratic governments, especially in the absence of pluralist institutions that protect them from what Tocqueville and members of the American constitutional convention called the "excesses of democracy" and, therefore, less likely to trust governmental institutions.

This perspective becomes even more salient when examining the highly significant cleavages between urban and rural societies – urban and rural cultures, if you will – specifically in the Asian context (Albritton and Bureekul, 2002). The data strongly support findings that people in urban locations tend to be less supportive of government than those from rural, more traditional backgrounds (Laothamatas, 1996). We suggest that this perspective is generalizable across nations. The ability of rural constituencies to acquire substantial power in democratic societies leads to doubts among the middle class, the mass media, and even academics as to the efficacy of the democratic process. For these groups, "democracy turns out to be the rule of the corrupt and incompetent" (Laothamatas, 1996, 208). This creates a significant dilemma for urban elites. Although the middle class opposes authoritarian rule, in principle, they hold government by rural constituencies in contempt, regarding them as "parochial in outlook, boorish in manner, and too uneducated to be competent lawmakers or cabinet members" (Laothamatas, 1006, 208).

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that urban, educated, cosmopolitan elites, who are skilled policy experts, are often held in equal contempt by villagers. They are often regarded as being alien to rural electorates in terms of taste, culture, and outlook, who "fail to stay close to the voters in both a physical and cultural sense" (Laothamatas, 1996, 208). Veiled contempt for rural-dwellers by sophisticated elites poses no problems under authoritarian regimes. However,

once democratic elections tip the balance in favor of rural areas, significant gaps in perceptions of government develop.

The major threat posed by this cleavage lies in a relative lack of enthusiasm for government in the more influential urban areas. There is growing evidence that, while the urban middle class opposes authoritarian forms of government that restrict individual freedoms and exercise a heavy hand over commerce, the uncertainty of changes in government, even by democratic processes, can be viewed as destabilizing economic environments on which entrepreneurs depend. The possibility that government may be seized by politicians with "populist" agendas poses an even more direct threat to the interests of a class that stands significantly above the average voter in democratic elections. The traditional emphasis on the middle-class as an engine of democracy thus appears to be declining in favor of a view that middle-class support for democracy exists primarily when it coincides with class interests in curbing the power of government.

What are the sources of this difference between urban and rural society that have an impact on attitudes toward trust in government? People living in rural areas have a significantly greater dependence upon social networks for "getting by" in life and, as in almost any society, rural dwellers are significantly more communal, as well as being interested in the welfare of their neighbors (which can be either positive of negative, from some perspectives). Urban dwellers live in an environment in which they are more autonomous, isolated, and individualistic, relishing the anonymity presented by urban life. For these urbanites, individual independence from society and government leads to a greater interest in protections from government interference that we often associate with what are generally described as "civil liberties." These divergences between urban and rural populations appear to have significant impacts on how government is viewed by individuals living in these two contexts, rural dwellers opting for community and urban dwellers for freedom. Our expectation is that rural residents will, thus, have a greater trust in and dependency upon government as a mitigating factor in their uncertain environment.

A fundamental assumption of this study is that, whatever its content, the rural-urban cleavage is a significant factor in support for government in a variety of national contexts. In addition, we assume that some proportion of the variance in support for governments across nations is a result of differential experiences of the urban culture and that these experiences may be mistaken for unique characteristics of nations and cultures, rather than more generalized, common factors that happen to coincide with national differences. We anticipate that these relationships will be sustained across the other Asian nations.

Typically, analysis of cross-national data relies on national "dummy" variables to account for unspecified idiosyncratic effects. We follow the lead of Prezworski and Teune in the attempt to substitute variable names for national social systems from the project on "Democratization and Value Change in East Asia." The findings hint that variations among nations in support for governments are often more a function of variables that transcend national boundaries and of similarities in these respective cultures associated with these variables, regardless of country, than they are of peculiarities of national cultures or other social or economic configurations represented as geographic entities.

Data Analysis

Appendix 2 shows that indicators of institutional trust, regime legitimacy, support for democracy, and pluralist values, produce independent factors representing each of the four concepts (See Appendix 1). Some indicators, such as satisfaction with democracy, load jointly on support for democracy, but also on institutional trust. The higher loading is on support for democracy. Furthermore, theory linking institutional trust to satisfaction with democracy posits a causal relationship rather than a definitional one. Both conceptually and statistically, it makes sense to assign this indicator to the concept of support for democracy.

Components of the underlying concepts become clearer in the factor loadings reported in Appendix 3. These loadings represent single natural factors, implying that within the concept, these indicators fall on the same dimension. Most loadings exceed .5.

Support for Democracy

As Linz and Stepan indicate, one of the most significant measures of democratic consolidation is the level of public opinion holding the belief that democracy is the most appropriate system for governing collective life (2001). Following Mishler and Rose, we examine impacts of cultural socialization and interactions with government on this minimalist indicator of democracy. Our measure of "support for democracy" is constructed from responses to six questions noted in Appendix 1. Although there is some difference of views as to whether "satisfaction with democracy" represents attitudes towards democracy or satisfaction with government performance (Norris, 1999), the indicator loads in excess of .5 on a single natural factor of the six questions (Appendix 3). In the absence of empirical evidence to the contrary, we accept all six indicators as both face-valid and construct-valid measures of respondents' attitudes toward democracy. The results are presented in Table 1.

In testing *Hypothesis 1*, we find, contrary to Mishler and Rose, that "dummy-variable" analysis across nations shows significant differences in support for democracy in five of the eight nations examined in this study (Table 1, Equation 1). In addition, over 20 percent of the variance in support for democracy is explained by differences among nations alone (Korea is the omitted category). Hong Kong, Korea, and the Philippines do not differ significantly from Korea, but the dummy-variable analysis also indicates that Korea and Taiwan fall below the other nations in support for democracy, while Thailand and the People's Republic of China (PRC) show the greatest adherence to the idea of democratic government. [2]

An irony is that belief in democracy is quite strong across Asian nations, even in mainland China. We infer from this finding that affinity for democracy is independent of specific structures of government to some degree.

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[2] These results also require some interpretation of the dummy-variable coefficients. Because dummy variables do not lend themselves to an interpretation that the regression coefficients represent changes in the dependent variables for each unit of change in the independent variables. A proper interpretation is that the coefficients represent the differences in specific countries from the association of the omitted category with the dependent variable, the intercept representing the measure of the omitted category on the dependent variable. In Table 1, Equation 1, then, the coefficients show significant differences between five of the remaining seven countries and Korea. These differences are significant below $p<.01$. It is, then, also possible to infer relative levels of support for democracy among the nations from the coefficients relative to Korea.

Table 1: Impacts of Socialization and Interactions with Government on Respondents' Support for Democracy

Variables	Equation 1	Equation 2	Equation 3	Equation 4
Constant	*- 276**	*-.073*	*.047*	*.018*
Country Dummies±				
Japan	**.266***	**.282***	**.286***	**.291***
	(.142)	**(.136)**	**(.134)**	**(.139)**
Hong Kong	**.021**	**.041**	**.070***	**-.021**
	(.009)	**(.017)**	**(.028)**	**(.009)**
Mainland China	**.503***	**.494***	**.466***	**.272***
	(.360)	**(.366)**	**(.346)**	**(.193)**
Mongolia	**.320***	**.328***	**.306***	**.261***
	(.156)	**(.161)**	**(.152)**	**(.135)**
Philippines	**.023**	**.017**	**.021**	**-.057**
	(.021)	**(.009)**	**(.011)**	**(-.032)**
Taiwan	**-.091***	**-.090***	**-.093***	**-.072***
	(-.048)	**(-.048)**	**(-.050)**	**(-.038)**
Thailand	**.740***	**.723***	**.688***	**.573***
	(.412)	**(.411)**	**(.393)**	**(.342)**
Demographic Socialization Indicators				
Age group		**.001**	**.001**	**.003**
		(.005)	**(.005)**	**(.011)**
Education		**-.010***	**-.005**	**.000**
		(-.043)	**(-.020)**	**(.003)**
Household Income		**-.012***	**-.005**	**-.008**
		(-.030)	**(-.013)**	**(-.020)**
Subjective Social Status		**-.044***	**-.038***	**-.012**
		(-.061)	**(-.053)**	**(-.016)**
Gender (male)		**.047***	**.041***	**.033***
		(.039)	**(.034)**	**(.028)**
Cultural Socialization				
Urban Residence			**-.095***	**-.072***
			(-.076)	**(-.058)**
Traditionalism-Modernism			**-.036***	**-.006**
			(-.030)	**(-.005)**
Trust Others			**.043***	**.019***
			(.066)	**(.029)**
Interactions with Government				
Economic Satisfaction and Optimism				**.071***
				(.082)
Perception of Corruption in Local Government				**-.045***
				(-.060)
Personal Witness to Corruption				**-.040***
				(-.029)
Trust in Institutions				**.144***
				(.176)
Legitimacy of Government				**.017**
				(.018)
Pluralist Values				**.050***
				(.061)
R-square=	**.211**	**.229**	**.240**	**.290**

*** = p<.01** **() = Standardized Regression Coefficients**

+ = Korea omitted category

Furthermore, including China among the nations examined in this study indicates what may be fertile ground for democratic development should political institutions move in the direction of democratic practices, as, some argue, they already do at local levels in the PRC.

When variables representing demographic characteristics associated with socioeconomic socialization (*Hypothesis 4*) are added to the equation, there is significant improvement in the goodness of fit, the equation now explaining roughly 23 percent of the variance among respondents in the study (Table 1, Equation 2). Age differences, however, prove to be inconsequential, casting doubt on generational effects as determinants of democratic support. An important finding that confirms other research is that higher socioeconomic status indicators are all negatively associated with support for democracy. The evidence appears consistent with a revised view of impacts of SES and that the middle-class is not necessarily the "engine of democracy" posited in earlier studies of democratic development.

When "cultural" indicators associated with cultural socialization (*Hypothesis 4*) are included in the equation, some of the indicators of socioeconomic status are compromised - specifically education and income (Table 1, Equation 3).[3] The strongest addition is urban residence (or urban culture) in adding to the explanatory power of the equation. What is important is the finding that urban dwellers are significantly less supportive of democracy than their non-urban counterparts. In addition, modernistic values (compared to more traditionalist views) also depress democratic support, a finding with significant implications for the course of democratic consolidation in conflict with corresponding trajectories of modernization. Finally, the data indicate support for *Hypothesis 2*, that a general trust in other people is a substantial determinant of support for democracy.

According to Mishler and Rose, interactions with government are significantly more important than cultural factors in producing trust in government. We test *Hypothesis 3* for impacts of such interactions on support for democracy. The results are mixed (Table 1, Equation 4). The data provide six questions related to respondents' evaluations of the national economy and their own family economic welfare, particularly with regard to expectations about the future (Appendix 1). We find that all six indicators load on a single natural factor, all measures loading at above .5. A combined measure that we call "economic satisfaction" translates into significant support for democracy.

Even more significant is the perception of and experience with government corruption, definitely interactions with governments in a contemporary context.[4] Even more than personal experiences with corruption, *perceptions* of corruption at the local government level are highly significant in decreasing support for democracy (Table 1, Equation 4). An even stronger relationship exists between trust in institutions of government and support for democratic government. In fact, institutional trust becomes the most important substantive variable in the equation. The ability to trust government thus constitutes a substantial influence on support for democracy. Sense of deference or legitimacy of government, plays a role, although not nearly as much as trust in government institutions. The indicator of pluralist democracy also contributes positively to support for democracy, a finding that will be explored in more detail below.

One further factor bears mentioning. Note that when appropriate substantive variables are added to the equation, differences between Korea and an additional country (Taiwan) in support

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[3] Mishler and Rose rely essentially on demographics as surrogates for cultural socialization. We use different, direct measures of culture in terms of participation in urban or rural cultures and specific measures of traditional versus modern attitudes.

[4] The indicator refers only to local government corruption, as the question was not asked in the PRC survey.

for democracy virtually disappear. The ability to eliminate differences by a fuller specification of the equation implies that what are often observed as idiographic characteristics of nations, are, in fact, simply different distributions of individual characteristics. When such characteristics are identified, we are able to substitute variable names for country designations, as Prezworski and Teune urge.

Support for "Pluralist" Values

Pluralist democracy is distinguishable from majoritarian democracy in focusing on expression of and protection for minorities and individual rights. It is characterized by a strong affinity for the rule of law and guards against dissenting views being overwhelmed by majoritarian processes. Pluralist democracy (or "liberal" democracy) differs significantly from majority rule as a form of democracy (Dahl, 1971). In one respect, support for pluralist forms of democracy is an alternative to the "ideology of democracy" common in democratically developing nations.

This study focuses on several indicators that we have designated as representing pluralist orientations to democracy (Appendix 1). They are face valid and factor on a single natural factor. What is most intriguing is that the indicators of pluralist democracy are significantly associated with support of democracy in a *negative* direction ($r = -.090$; $p < .000$), indicating that support for the ideology of democracy as opposed to protection of minority rights, for example, are not directly related in a positive way, but, rather, negatively related in mass opinion. This finding suggests problems for combining indicators of these two dimensions into a single definition of democracy.

We examine the same set of hypotheses in the context of pluralist values using the same four hypotheses suggested by Mishler and Rose as in Table 1. One exception is that support for majoritarian democracy is included in the equation as a way of examining the relationship controlling for a variety of exogenous (or even extraneous) factors.

One of the most intriguing aspects of Table 2 is the finding that sources of support for pluralist democracy work in almost opposite directions from those of general support for democracy. For example, Korea, scored as one of the lowest nations in support for democracy, ranks higher than all the other nations in support of pluralist democracy Nations high in general democratic support (Thailand , Mongolia, and the PRC, for example) are among the lowest in affinity for pluralism (Table 2, Equation 1). In addition, one demographic indicator (gender) shows modest, but significant, support for alternatives to popular majoritarianism; indicators of socioeconomic status suggested in *Hypothesis 4* (education and income), as representing one form of socialization, however, are non-significant in the overall picture. Urbanism or urban political culture is associated negatively, but not significantly, with pluralist democracy; however, modernism in cultural orientation becomes very important in *supporting* a concept of democracy that is more nuanced and complex, a different picture from the equation of support for majoritarian democracy. Trust in other people (*Hypothesis 2*) becomes inconsequential in this latter context (Table 2).

Indicators of interactions with government economic performance (*Hypothesis 3*) have no significant impacts on orientations toward pluralist democracy. Ironically, experiences of government corruption have relatively modest impacts; institutional trust, however, is a significant, *negative* factor.

Table 2: Impacts of Socialization and Interactions with Government on Respondents' Association with Pluralist Values

Variables	Equation 1	Equation 2	Equation 3	Equation 4
Constant	*.218**	*.052*	*.112*	*.134*
Country Dummies±				
Japan	**.080***	**.049**	**.062**	**.028**
	(.035)	**(.020)**	**(.025)**	**(.011)**
Hong Kong	**-.167***	**-.157***	**-.154***	**-.141**
	(-.058)	**(-.055)**	**(-.043)**	**(-.047)**
Mainland China	**-.438***	**-.415***	**-.401***	**-.316**
	(-.256)	**(-.255)**	**(-.247)**	**(-.186)**
Mongolia	**-.731***	**-.723***	**-.588***	**-.582***
	(-.306)	**(-.308)**	**(-.252)**	**(-.249)**
Philippines	**-.084***	**-.039**	**-.036**	**-.014**
	(-.036)	**(-.018)**	**(-.017)**	**(-.007)**
Taiwan	**-.078***	**-.058**	**-.070**	**-.041**
	(-.035)	**(-.026)**	**(-.032)**	**(-.018)**
Thailand	**-.211***	**-.146***	**-.085***	**-.086***
	(-.101)	**(-.070)**	**(-.041)**	**(-.042)**
Social Measures				
Age group		**-.004**	**-.001**	**-.001**
		(-.015)	**(-.003)**	**(-.016)**
Education		**.011***	**.006***	**.004**
		(.068)	**(.033)**	**(.022)**
Household Income		**.016***	**.005**	**.003**
		(.076)	**(.045)**	**(.040)**
Subjective Social Status		**.011**	**.006**	**.004**
		(.013)	**(.007)**	**(.004)**
Gender (male)		**-.042**	**-.031**	**-.025**
		(-.030)	**(-.022)**	**(-.017)**
Cultural Socialization				
Urban Residence			**-.005**	**.007**
			(.001)	**(.005)**
Traditionalism-Modernism			**.261***	**.247***
			(.184)	**(.176)**
Trust Others			**.010**	**.012**
			(.013)	**(.016)**
Interactions with Government				
Economic Satisfaction and Optimism				**-.012**
				(-.011)
Perception of Corruption in Local Government				**-.008**
				(-.009)
Personal Witness to Corruption				**-.030**
				(-.019)
Trust in Government Institutions				**-.092***
				(-.096)
Support for Democracy				**.080***
				(.067)
R-square=	**.113**	**.117**	**.146**	**.152**

*** = p<.01**
() = Standardized Regression Coefficients
+ = Korea omitted category

In other words, the higher the support for pluralist values, the lower the levels of trust in institutions. Most significant is the finding that, contrary to the bivariate association, support for democracy becomes an important, *positive* determinant of support for pluralist democracy when other variables are controlled. Clearly, support for democracy and support for pluralist values are competing perceptions in the minds of Asian respondents. Although elements of trust in people and government appear to create greater support for democracy, trust in institutions is negatively related to support for democratic pluralism. Perhaps majoritarian democracy requires a modicum of trust of other people and institutions in one's society. On the other hand, democratic pluralism is designed specifically to curb propensities of majorities to rule, apparently not conceived as support for legitimized government authority. The data, particularly the changing sign in the association of support for popular democracy and support for pluralist democracy, however, show that the relationship between the two is not only complex, but that it is subject to a variety of factors that can be identified in a multivariate analysis modifying the zero-order relationship.

In summary, the analysis indicates that, unlike support for popular democracy, support for pluralist (or "liberal" democracy) comes from respondents who have left behind traditional cultural orientations in favor of values associated with modernism. These values, of course, focus attention to individual freedom and rights of minorities against the tyranny of majoritarian rule. There is also a suspicion of government, whether legitimate or not, that poses a threat to constrain these freedoms and rights. When factors related to both are controlled, attitudes toward popular democracy and pluralist democratic values converge, as one might expect and, certainly, as one might hope.

Development of the more fully specified model eliminates differences between five nations and Korea. This provides the most persuasive evidence that the distribution of some indicators by nations, such as pluralist values, are actually representations of differing distributions of other causal factors, in this case modernistic values and institutional trust. For this variable, at least, national aggregates tend to obscure causal factors contributing to the dependent variable of interest and documents Przeworski and Teune's concern that names of variables should replace names of nations.

Government Legitimacy

"Legitimacy" represents, essentially, deference to government. Although some scholars operationalize this concept by performance-based indicators, other scholars approach it as a "subjective psychological orientation" toward the political system (Yang, 2005:70).
Like Linz and Stephan's view that democratic consolidation is rooted in citizen attitudes, scholars also regard legitimacy as indigenous to the attitudes and opinions of citizens. Even in an effort to produce a philosophical, normative concept of legitimate authority, Morris concedes that legitimacy depends on peoples' attitudes and admits that "something cannot be a *de facto* authority without being regarded as legitimate or justified by a significant proportion of the population" (1998: 112); or, to quote an older study, "A legitimate authority is one which is recognized as valid or justified by those to whom it applies" (Vincent, 1987: 38). Relying on the notion that, in the final analysis, government legitimacy is a highly subjective orientation of mass publics, rather than conformity to characteristics imposed externally, we examine orientations of Asian respondents in essentially the same model as Tables 1 and 2.

Table 3: Impacts of Socialization and Interactions with Government on Respondents' Sense of Government Legitimacy

Variables	Equation 1	Equation 2	Equation 3	Equation 4
Constant	*- .247**	*.226**	*.156**	*.239**
Country Dummies±				
Japan	**-.418***	**-.362***	**-.366***	**-.367***
	(-.210)	**(-.171)**	**(-.169)**	**(-.167)**
Hong Kong	**.088***	**.071***	**.077***	**- .023**
	(.035)	**(.028)**	**(.031)**	**(-.009)**
Mainland China	**.538***	**.496***	**.464***	**.146***
	(.374)	**(.364)**	**(.343)**	**(.099)**
Mongolia	**.419***	**.457***	**.278***	**.066***
	(.196)	**(.220)**	**(.136)**	**(.033)**
Philippines	**.361***	**.286***	**.292***	**.218***
	(.173)	**(.146)**	**(.152)**	**(.119)**
Taiwan	**.114***	**.084***	**.102***	**.080***
	(.058)	**(.043)**	**(.053)**	**(.041)**
Thailand	**.556***	**.451***	**.371***	**.230***
	(.296)	**(.245)**	**(.203)**	**(.024)**
Demographic Social Measures				
Age group		**.006***	**.001***	**.002**
		(.024)	**(.006)**	**(.002)**
Education		**-.025***	**-.016***	**-.012***
		(-.181)	**(-.112)**	**(-.081)**
Household Income		**-.040***	**-.024***	**-.023***
		(-.096)	**(-.056)**	**(-.054)**
Subjective Social Status		**-.033***	**-.026***	**-.016**
		(-.045)	**(-.035)**	**(-.021)**
Gender (male)		**-.023***	**-.037***	**-.045***
		(.019)	**(-.031)**	**(-.036)**
Cultural Socialization				
Urban Residence			**-.038***	**-.019**
			(-.030)	**(-.014)**
Traditionalism-Modernism			**-.349***	**-.260***
			(-.283)	**(-.214)**
Trust Others			**.013**	**-.007**
			(.019)	**(-.010)**
Interactions with Government				
Economic Satisfaction and Optimism				**.053***
				(.058)
Perception of Corruption in Local Government				**-.015**
				(-.019)
Personal Witness to Corruption				**-.022**
				(-.016)
Trust in Government Institutions				**.141***
				(.168)
Support for Democracy				**.016**
				(.016)
Pluralist Values				**-.219***
				(-.253)
R-square=	**.251**	**.284**	**.346**	**.413**

*** = p<.01** **() = Standardized Regression Coefficients**

+ = Korea omitted category

The picture of government legitimacy among respondents is, like pluralist values, quite different from that of support for democracy (Table 3). It is important to point out that the questions we have chosen to represent legitimacy turn out to be orthogonal to the measures both of institutional trust and pluralist values (Appendix 2). In addition, they have quite different origins in both socio-cultural socialization and interactions with government. The measure is an index representing sense of government legitimacy operationalized as the average of Z-scores on six questions indicating respondents' deference to government (See Appendix 1).

The first item that bears mention is the fact that the dummy-variable analysis shows significant differences in sense of government legitimacy among respondents by country (Korea is the omitted category). Even more intriguing, however, is the fact that Japan shows significantly less sense of legitimacy than the other seven nations. Ironically, respondents in the nations with the longest experiences of democracy tend to show lower sense of government legitimacy than those only recently emerging from more authoritarian rule (Table 3, Equation 1).[5]

Equation 2 in Table 3 shows significant variations from the pattern in Table 1. Unlike Table 1, women tend to accord significantly more legitimacy to government, but age is not a significant factor. As in Table 1, indicators of socioeconomic status (*Hypothesis 1*) are significantly and negatively related to government legitimacy (with the exception of a weak association with subjective social status), but modernism becomes even more important in that more modernistic cultural orientations are also negatively associated with attitudes of government legitimacy.

The marked differences in the models, however, come from the fact that the roles of interactions with government are considerably less significant than in support for democracy (*Hypothesis 3*). Evaluations of the economy become significant in that respondents who are more positive about the economy are also more likely to be deferential toward government and regard it as more legitimate. Attitudes toward government corruption, however, have no impacts on sense of government legitimacy, as they do in support for democracy. As one might expect, trust in government institutions is a highly important factor explaining government legitimacy among the Asian nations, and, clearly, both cultural socialization and interactions with government play a role.

Finally, it is important to note that support for democracy does not contribute to a sense of government legitimacy, and persons holding pluralist values are far less likely to be deferential to government or to regard it as having high levels of legitimacy. In other words, supporters of "liberal democracy" appear to have a fundamental resistance to the authority of government in general. This finding can be interpreted in terms of citizens who prefer freedom over order and are, therefore, suspicious of government as "critical citizens." Given the association of pluralist values, as well as negativity concerning government legitimacy, with higher levels of income and education, however, the data also lend themselves to interpretation as a class cleavage in which lower status respondents view government as an agent to redress fundamental social and economic inequalities (a "countervailing power") that higher status respondents seek to defend.

[5] Japan, Hong Kong, and Korea are lowest.

Trust in Government

Mishler and Rose purport to negotiate competing perspectives of both cultural traditions and institutional theories as explanations of trust in government using individual-level data. Their strategy is to incorporate both perspectives in an explanatory model and, given the indicators they employ, argue that institutional perspectives trump social and cultural factors in impacts on the level of trust individuals place in governments. Their analysis, however, posits several conclusions that may be peculiar to Eastern Europe. In this paper, among other purposes, we replicate their study across eight Asian nations and produce somewhat different findings.

Unlike the group of Eastern European nations, the East Asian Barometer survey covers an extremely diverse region. The eight societies come in all sizes, ranging from the Pacific islands of Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan to the continent-sized mainland China. Their socio-economic conditions also diverge widely. While Japan boasts the second largest economy in the world and Hong Kong's GDP per capita surpasses most of the OECD countries; millions of people in mainland China and Mongolia live off less than a dollar a day. What is more, the political systems that East Asians have experienced in recent decades run the spectrum from military dictatorship to multiparty democracy. While the "third wave" of democratization has brought about political transitions throughout East Asia, the Chinese Communist Party's grip on power hardly seems weakened.

The first difference we discover between the Mishler and Rose sample and our own is that, contrary to their study, we find high levels of trust in government institutions. Furthermore, national variations in levels of trust across nations are not only highly significant, but national variations, alone, account for over 40 percent of the variance in institutional trust.

Table 4 compares evaluations of trust in institutions between the Eastern European and Asian cases. In every area, Asian nations have much more confidence in government than their counterparts in Eastern and Central Europe. Although Mishler and Rose explain the levels of trust in their sample persuasively as socialization to the legacy of authoritarian rule, most of the Asian nations also have histories of authoritarian dominance comparable to that of Eastern and Central Europe.

One finding in Table 4 represents a further anomaly. While trust in institutions is comparatively high, trust in other people is significantly lower. This does not mean, however, that individual trust does not produce institutional trust in the Asian context. To make such a generalization would involve the ecological fallacy. We are able, then, to test the finding of Mishler and Rose that individual trust has little significant impact on institutional trust in a regression analysis that includes individual trust as an explanatory variable in the Asian context (*Hypothesis 2*).

The Asian data seem to contradict findings posited by Mishler and Rose in two respects. Their study concludes with a macro-cultural theory assertion that experience with authoritarian values breeds political mistrust, so that, from an institutional perspective, initial political trust in new democracies will be low. Most of the Asian nations examined in our study have traditions of authoritarian rule, yet the trust of citizens in their institutions is quite high by comparison. The difference may arise from the fact that Eastern European nations were treated as occupied territories by a foreign power, whereas, authoritarian governments in most Asian nations of this study were indigenous and related to traditional cultural and social values within those nations.

The very low level of trust in “others” among Asian respondents is a bit more puzzling. In the Thai case, however, children’s traditional literature advocates caution and even distrust of

other people. Contrary to the view of Asian cultures as encouraging solidarity with others, many aspects of Asian culture, including Buddhism, actually support a high degree of individualism (or at least familiism) and autonomy not generally recognized in the debate over Asian values.

Table 4: Levels of Trust in Governmental Institutions and People in Asian versus Eastern European Nations (In Percent)[6]

	Trusting (%)		
	Asian Nations	**Mishler and Rose**	**Difference**
Parties	**47**	**12**	**-35**
Parliament	**52**	**21**	**-31**
Police	**59**	**28**	**-31**
Courts	**64**	**28**	**-36**
Press	**64**	**37**	**-27**
TV	**73**	**39**	**-34**
Military	**74**	**46**	**-28**
Most People	**30**	**49**	**+19**

Source: Mishler and Rose (2001) and data from the East Asian Barometer.

Tables 1 and 3 indicate that institutional trust comprises a major factor in accounting for support for democracy and regime legitimacy. It also is an endogenous variable determined in a more direct causal process by the exogenous variables. Thus, an important consideration from Mishler and Rose is the causal determination of institutional trust and its role in bringing about stable, democratic states. We examine determinants of trust in institutions of government based upon seven questions representing the respondents' trust in a variety of institutions.[7] (See Appendix 1)

The data indicate that, on an aggregated indicator of "institutional trust," Thailand, China, and Mongolia show higher levels of institutional trust (in that order); the Philippines have slightly lower trust levels; and Korea, Japan, and Taiwan fall well below all other nations in the ability of citizens to trust government institutions. (Korea is, again, the omitted category.) Ironically, in parallel to regime legitimacy, citizens in nations with longer experiences of democratic government, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan also appear to have lower levels of institutional trust.

When demographic variables representing social and economic conditions individuals occupy (*Hypothesis 4*) are added to the equation, the explanatory power of the equation increases (Table 5, Equation 2). Equation 2 implies that variations in gender have little impact on institutional trust, but older persons have slightly higher levels of trust than younger respondents.

[6] Mishler and Rose use a "neutral" category that we have omitted from the questionnaires. The Asian data are based solely on percentages of respondents indicating either a "great deal of trust" or "quite a lot of trust."

[7] The questions on governmental trust and those on deference to government or legitimacy load on orthogonal factors (Appendix 2).

Table 5: Impacts of Socialization and Interactions with Government on Respondents' Trust in Government Institutions

Variables	Equation 1	Equation 2	Equation 3	Equation 4
Constant	*-.519**	*.000*	*-.010*	*-3.392**
Country Dummies±				
Japan	**.110***	**.110***	**.107***	**.197***
	(.047)	**(.043)**	**(.040)**	**(.075)**
Hong Kong	**.414***	**.401***	**.424***	**.396***
	(.138)	**(.132)**	**(.138)**	**(.126)**
Mainland China 1	**.258***	**1.167***	**1.127***	**1.088***
	(.744)	**(.709)**	**(.686)**	**(.646)**
Mongolia	**.321***	**.325***	**.245***	**.219***
	(.127)	**(.139)**	**(.098)**	**(.090)**
Philippines	**.243***	**.190***	**.220***	**.191***
	(.098)	**(.080)**	**(.093)**	**(.086)**
Taiwan	**.158***	**.126***	**.130***	**.236***
	(.068)	**(.055)**	**(.056)**	**(.102)**
Thailand	**.660***	**.529***	**.481***	**.371***
	(.295)	**(.242)**	**(.221)**	**(.180)**
Demographic Social Measures				
Age group		**.001**	**-.002**	**-.004**
		(.003)	**(-.008)**	**(-.015)**
Education		**-.039***	**-.027***	**-.025***
		(-.137)	**(-.093)**	**(-.087)**
Household Income		**-.030***	**-.014***	**-.022***
		(-.059)	**(-.027)**	**(-.043)**
Subjective Social Status		**-.059***	**-.049***	**-.029***
		(-.067)	**(-.056)**	**(-.033)**
Gender (male)		**.025**	**.013**	**.024**
		(.017)	**(.009)**	**(.018)**
Cultural Socialization				
Urban Residence			**-.094***	**-.055***
			(-.061)	**(-.037)**
Traditionalism-Modernism			**-.197***	**-.170***
			(-.133)	**(-.118)**
Trust Others			**.084***	**.063***
			(.103)	**(.079)**
Interactions with Government				
Economic Satisfaction and Optimism				**3.800***
				(.141)
Perception of Corruption in Local Government				**-.166***
				(-.181)
Personal Witness to Corruption				**-.065***
				(-.039)
R-square=	**.408**	**.436**	**.462**	**.491**

*** = p<.01**
() = Standardized Regression Coefficients
+ = Korea omitted category

Socio-economic status criteria, such as education and income, have significant, negative associations, however, indicating that trust in government is stronger among lower status citizens than among elites.

Other factors, of course, come into play. When the three variables representing later socialization are added to the equation, the results begin to take on more theoretical significance. Trust in others, participation in urban culture, and "modernist" cultural orientations supersede social status as explanations of institutional trust.

The indicator of "traditionalism-modernism" again captures some of the cultural-socialization dimension. (See Appendix 1) Including other variables, specifically demographic characteristics, help to replicate the Mishler-Rose variables as closely as possible. At this point of the analysis, we find support for hypotheses of Mishler and Rose in the Asian context. Although interpersonal trust supports a corresponding level of trust in government, socialization to urban and modernist cultural values appears to produce significantly negative orientations in the ability of citizens to trust government institutions.

We test the Mishler-Rose *Hypothesis 3* by adding respondents' evaluation of government performance to the equation. These indicators consist of evaluations of the government's economic performance in both national and personal terms and evaluations of governmental corruption by respondents. Equation 4 of Table 4 shows that, in general, these factors take precedence over all other factors explaining institutional trust.

Two aspects of these indicators are particularly intriguing. The first is that respondents' evaluations of national economic performance, as well as their own economic situation, past, present, and future combined, are highly significant in determining their evaluations of democracy and institutional trust. The second is that perceptions of corruption in local government are more important for explaining institutional trust than personal experiences of corruption. The latter finding suggests a need for research into information networks, such as media use, that assist citizens in creating attitudes independently of personal experiences. In fact, these perceptions, rather than the experiences of corruption become the strongest of all the negative factors contributing to citizen orientations toward institutional trust.

Finally, we note that the sense of institutional trust, as well as overall support for democracy, become the most important explanations of other endogenous variables. Because institutional trust and regime legitimacy both have significant, independent impacts on support for democracy, for example, the results of the analysis indicate that a better specification of the model may be explored further in a simultaneous equation estimation, rather than the conventional single equation models. (This also supports the strategy of Mishler and Rose, who resort to a two-stage least-squares model for analyzing Eastern European data on institutional trust, although specific findings go unreported.)

Analysis and Interpretation

The findings above indicate that individual-level data (within-variance) contribute in significant ways to explaining the endogenous variables of interest in governments across several of the eight nations in this study. Indicators of cultural socialization (urban location, traditionalism-modernism, in particular) as well as interactions with government (performance in managing the economy and perceptions of corruption) all contribute to the explanations of support for democracy, pluralist values, regime legitimacy, and trust in government even controlling for country contexts. What is noteworthy is that the measures of higher socio-economic status –

income, education, and subjective social status – often have significant, negative effects on factors, such as trust in government, that are supposed to lead to democratic consolidation.

Given the tremendous differences among East Asian societies, some scholars would probably doubt the explanatory power of individual-level variables. The statistical analysis of this paper has clearly demonstrated that, although dummy variables representing national idiosyncrasies unsurprisingly do contribute to the variation in individual support for democracy, pluralist values, government legitimacy, and institutional trust, the utility and potential of demographic variables, cultural socialization, and especially interactions with government are nonetheless highly significant. We are confident that the results of this paper, having survived the difficult test of the disparate East Asian setting, can be generalized to other contexts as well.

Of particular interest are the more personal, psychological factors – trust in other people, traditional-modern orientations, and attitudes toward corruption. Sources of these attitudes deserve much deeper study and analysis. Tables 1 and 5 indicate clearly, however, that early socialization and cultural factors are significant in sustaining both support for democracy and governmental trust across all nations examined in the study.

The issue of class cleavages clearly comes into play. Although the more fully specified equations eliminate initial effects of education and income for support for democracy and pluralist values, these indicators of socioeconomic status survive to have significant impacts on sense of government legitimacy and institutional trust. The findings show that higher status respondents regard government as less legitimate and that institutions associated with government are less trustworthy. The evidence suggests a political cleavage in which lower socioeconomic status people view government as a countervailing force to curb dominance by elites. Correspondingly, elites show less trust in democratic systems, especially those that curb their control of instruments of the economy and society.

Several other findings are especially worthy of note. First, it appears that if scholars are interested in idiosyncratic cultural and historical impacts, the area of investigation should focus on sources of trust and general optimism concerning the future. This line of investigation might lead to an uncovering of reasons why persons most removed from traditional values are least likely to trust political and social institutions. Further analysis indicates that higher levels of education and urbanization are associated with higher levels of modernism, *ergo* also with lower levels of support for democracy and institutional trust.[8] Strength of the urban location variable suggests further attention to implications of the cleavages between urban and rural people. As with socioeconomic status, such a cleavage poses a threat of political conflict that may represent more fundamental issues of populist versus elite-dominated democracy.

Clearly, the ability to trust other people contributes to overall support for democracy, as well as trust in social and political institutions (*Hypothesis 2*). As one might expect, support for democracy is also significantly related to a sense of optimism about economic futures, although the survival of both in the equation indicates that they have independent effects. The sense of optimism represented by these two sets of indicators has its origins in more complex life experiences, particularly childhood socialization. The data may offer clues to this process, but such an analysis extends well beyond the scope of this paper.

The study identifies a variety of indicators for which national identities are surrogates. Some of the differences among nations are, really, attributable to differences in respondents' location in urban versus rural culture, their movement away from "traditional" attitudes and

[8] The equations reported in this study are very robust. In fact, the eight-nation analysis yields findings that are virtually identical to previous studies of Thailand alone.

patterns, their ability to trust other people, their optimism about future economic status, and, most especially, their views of government corruption. When these variables are included in the model, differences among several of the eight nations sometimes disappear. Even when they do not fully eliminate the differences, they generally reduce the disparities across the nations.

We believe that this analysis holds significant promise for rethinking how we approach comparative politics. The explanations in this analysis support the view that what we observe as between-nation variation often masks individual-level variation; that what we see as national differences are really different distributions of individual-level characteristics. It is these latter characteristics that produce outcomes of interest. The ability to substitute names of variables for names of nations in this way permits development of general theories of politics (and, of course, varying dimensions of democracy) that can be far more useful than comparisons of national aggregates. The development of such general theory is, after all, what we should be about.

Idiographic characteristics of nations that contribute to levels of support for democracy, pluralist values, regime legitimacy, and trust in institutions in some cases survive the effort to replace the national dummies with substantive variable interpretations. Even inclusion of variables indicating traditionalism versus modernism and trust in other people does not eliminate the fact that at least half of the nations differ significantly from each other on national characteristics of interest (*Hypothesis 1*). Origins of these differences may be evident from a future analysis of the data, but, clearly, this is the area most requiring further investigation in the political culture arena of comparative politics.

The generalizations noted above also apply to respondents' sense of government legitimacy. The major difference from the other variables under consideration is that interactions with government, as a form of socialization, are not necessarily more important than earlier social and cultural socialization, at least in the Asian context. Trust in government institutions is most significant, with the traditionalism-modernism indicator and urban location following as important determinants of institutional trust. The variable, institutional trust, is similar to those of the other endogenous variables and the model requires some sorting of the causal paths. The patterns represented here strongly suggest a need for modeling with simultaneous equations, making institutional trust endogenous in the equations determining support for democracy, support for pluralist values, and government legitimacy. The results may offer significant departures from what one would conclude from the single-equation models.[9]

The endogenous variables are among the most significant predictors of each other in several cases, implying that they are significantly related in the causal process. As one might expect, institutional trust contributes substantially to support for democracy and government legitimacy. What is more puzzling is the negative relationships between government legitimacy and pluralist values. The answer may lie in what Pippa Norris (1999) calls "critical citizens," who are more "modern," "individualistic," and of higher SES and who adhere to anti-state ideas and ideologies.

In effect, we find support for all of the hypotheses suggested by Mishler and Rose to some degree. Conceptually, we treat experiences with the economy and interactions with government that generate perceptions of corruption as another form of socialization. Trust in government institutions appears to come primarily from this later socialization, while sense of government legitimacy appears more subject to earlier experiences in a temporal and cultural

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[9] Treatment with instrumental variable analysis eliminates virtually all of the exogenous variables, making support for democracy, pluralist values, and regime legitimacy dependent on each other to the exclusion of other variables of interest.

chain. As noted above, however, we find highly significant differences between Eastern Europe and East Asia in institutional trust. It would be intriguing to combine the data sets to ascertain whether variance between regions is greater than intra-regional variation. If the former is the case, an analysis would require identification of factors that distinguish between Eastern Europe and East Asia that would account for these regional differences or the addition of dummy variables to account for regions. Because issues of democratic governance are critical to defining world futures, the search for and expansion of these models is critical to an understanding of democratic development in the contemporary world.

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APPENDIX 1
Definitions of Variables Used in the Analysis

Support for Democracy: Average Z-scores of responses to 6 questions:

1. satisfaction with the way democracy works
2. wanting democracy now
3. preferring democracy to authoritarian government
4. suitability of democracy for the country
5. ability of democracy to solve country's problems
6. choice of democracy or economic development as most important

Pluralist Values: Average Z-scores of responses to 5 questions:

1. politicians may ignore procedure to accomplish goals
2. political leaders should disregard minority views
3. government leaders should not compromise with minorities

Modernism: Average Z-scores of responses to 8 questions:

1 obedience to parents even when they are unreasonable
2. hiring preferences for friends and relatives
3. give way in opinions if co-workers disagree
4. family needs take precedence over those of individual
5. elders should be consulted to resolve disputes
6. one should accommodate neighbor if conflict occurs
7. wealth and poverty, success and failure are determined by fate
8. a man will lose face if he works under supervision of a woman

Trust Other People: Response to question: Which is closest to your view?:

1. one cannot be too careful in dealing with other people.
2. most people can be trusted

Optimism about Respondent's Economic Past, Present, and Future: Response to questions on economic status:

5-point scale from "Much Worse – Much Better"

Trust in institutions: Average Z-scores on four-point scale from "none" to "a great deal":

1. courts
2. national government
3. political parties
4. the Parliament
5. the military
6. local government

Government legitimacy: Average Z-scores on four-point scale – "Strongly disagree" to "strongly agree":

1. our form of government is still the best for us
2. generally trust people in government to do what is right
3. government leaders are like heads of families, we should follow their decisions
4. the government should decide what is permissible to discuss
5. judges should defer to government
6. legislative interference hinders ability to govern

Economic optimism: Average Z-scores on five-point scale – "Very bad" to "Very good" or "Much worse" to "Much better."

1. Rate overall economy of the country today
2. Change in economy of the country over the past five years
3. Expectations of the country's economy in five years
4. Rate family economic situation today
5. Change in family economy over the past five years
6. Expectations of family economic situation in five years

APPENDIX 2
Factor Loadings Among All Dimensions of Democratic Governance in Appendix 1

	Institutional Trust	Government Legitimacy	Support for Democracy	Pluralist Values
Trust in Courts	*.629*	.005	.118	.092
Trust National Government	*.803*	-.115	.108	-.113
Trust Political Parties	*.778*	-.115	.111	-.151
Trust Parliament	*.771*	-.148	.117	-.145
Trust Military	*.660*	-.051	.078	-.082
Trust Local Government	*.630*	-.102	.056	.047
Our form of government is best	-.270	*.413*	-.166	.215
Trust people in government	-.322	*.568*	-.223	.032
Government leaders are like heads of a family, we should follow their leadership	-.102	*.646*	-.050	.192
Government should decide what can be discussed	-.055	*.605*	.018	.255
Judges should be guided by government in making decisions	-.123	*.632*	.060	-.101
If government is checked by the legislature, it cannot be effective	.075	*.487*	.099	.209
Satisfaction with democracy	.353	-.230	*.389*	.002
Wants democracy now	.108	-.135	*.632*	.124
Democracy is suitable	.179	-.143	*.668*	.012
Prefer democracy over other systems	.067	.056	*.599*	.069
Democracy can solve problems	.057	.035	*.615*	-.071
Choice of democracy over economic development	.037	.187	*.423*	-.179
Leaders should ignore procedure in emergencies	-.066	.261	-.054	*.588*
Leaders should refuse compromise if they believe in their program	-.021	.067	-.026	*.748*
Leaders should disregard minority	-.110	.173	.078	*.617*
Eigenvalues	3.475	2.208	2.076	1.620

APPENDIX 3
Factor Loadings of Indicators for Latent Concepts
(Single Natural Factors)

Support for Democracy

Indicator	Loading
Satisfaction with Democracy	.535
Want Democracy Now	.660
Democracy is Suitable for Us	.724
Prefer Democracy over Other Systems	.574
Democracy Can Solve Our Problems	.592
Favor Democracy over Economic Development	.380

Government Legitimacy

Indicator	Loading
Our form of government is best	.600
We can trust government leaders to make the right decisions	.680
Government leaders are like heads of a family, we should follow them	.715
Government should decide what can be discussed	.657
Judges should be guided by government in their decisions	.555
If government is checked by the legislature, it cannot do great	.455

Pluralist Values

Indicator	Loading
Government should be able to ignore procedure to accomplish goals	.728
Government Leaders Should Refuse to compromise	.717
Government leaders should disregard minority	.696

Institutional Trust

Indicator	Loading
Trust in Courts	.617
Trust National Government	.855
Trust Political Parties	.847
Trust Parliament	.844
Trust Military	.727
Trust Local Government	.637

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