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## SOUTH AFRICA: BEYOND LIBERALISM

by

Walusako A. Mwalilino

Donald Woods, a self-described white South African "liberal" now living in exile in Britain, recently wrote that:

*...Steve Biko represented, in my opinion, the last hope for a peaceful accomodation to resolve the growing South African race crisis.<sup>1</sup>*

To be sure, one can understand why Woods feels this way about Biko; for the loss of a personal friend, as Biko was to Woods, is always a traumatic experience for the living. However, the tendency to view a fallen political friend largely in heruclean terms can also serve to obfuscate certain important (historical) facts when made to appear as political analysis.

I shall argue here that Biko certainly was *not* "the last hope for a peaceful accomodation to resolve the growing South African race crisis." On the contrary, I contend that the "last hope" for a peaceful change in South Africa actually *vanished* some 18 years ago--the day when the police opened fire on a peaceful demonstration by Blacks at Sharpeville on March 21, 1960, killing 69 and wounding 186 others. This was followed by the banning of the most prominent Black parties: the *African National Congress (ANC)*, and the *Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)*.

Later, I shall also examine some of the solutions that have been offered by some Western intellectuals to end apartheid. But, before we discuss the present, let us take a look at the past.

Both the ANC and PAC enjoyed wide following among Blacks, and both parties believed in the philosophy of non-violence as the best way to achieve equal rights with whites. (The term "independence" was not in vogue in the early 'Sixties.) Even though the two parties vied with each other for leadership, and disagreed tactically on how to confront the Government towards the abolition of apartheid, there is no secret about their unanimity of hatred against the racist Afrikaner regime. Such unity, for instance, was demonstrated clearly during their common mourning for those who died at Sharpeville, despite the fact that the demonstration had been

organized by the PAC.<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, it is a wonder that Blacks' hope for a peaceful change to end apartheid did not vanish even years *before* the Sharpeville massacre.<sup>3</sup> When whites merged the four South African provinces of Natal, Orange Free State, Transvaal and the Cape, into the Union in 1910, Blacks were afraid that their interests in a federal state would be further adversely affected. Their fears soon turned out to be true as a series of regulations were passed in parliament to exclude them from sharing with whites in the nation's political, economic and social rights. But the anti-Black sentiment was more acute among the Afrikaners than the English-speaking whites. For the Afrikaners

*It was not enough...that the union brought about with Britain's connivance was founded on white interest. Nor that the new parliament had only white members, with only some blacks in the Cape being allowed to vote. Nor was it enough that parliament immediately began to extend and entrench racial wars: in 1911, giving the government power to decide who could do skilled work in mining and engineering, legislation which became known as the Colour Bar Act; in 1913, the Land Act prohibiting black Africans from acquiring any land outside the "reserves," forming 13 percent of South Africa, to which conquest had confined them. Nor was it enough that master and servant legislation prohibiting black workers, under pain of prosecution, from leaving their jobs without permission was taken over from the former colonies, and that the pass laws, first introduced by Britain early in the previous century and later used by Boer republics, also became Union law.*

*Instead, the aggressive Afrikaner Nationalists loathed, anything associated with or derived from Britain, and did everything possible to put blacks in their place.<sup>4</sup> (my emphasis).*

And so, in reaction to the Union, Black resistance took on a new perspective: it shifted its strategy from one of parochial and unco-ordinated struggles based on ethnicity to embrace all Africans now living under the Union, irrespective of language or region.

The first such all-Black movement to be formed was the Native National Congress (1912), later known as the *African National Congress*. One of ANC's primary objectives was to "encourage a sense of supratribal unity, a sense of Native or African nationality transcending the jealousies and suspicions of the tribes."<sup>5</sup> Yet, this does not mean that the ANC was bent on what might be described as reverse discrimination. "Throughout its progress (evolution), in spite of its more militant wing, the Youth League, [the ANC] continued to check any inclination towards a black counter-racialism...A non-racial ethic...remained the central characteristic of Congress as it evolved..."<sup>6</sup> To demonstrate its commitment towards a new multi-racial society in South Africa, the ANC made alliances, as in 1949, with other racial groups, e.g. the South African Indian Congress (SAIC); and, in the mid-Fifties, along with SAIC, with "the small South African Coloured People's Congress, and the white congress of Democrats (which stood for complete equality regardless of race or color...)." <sup>7</sup> Hence it is quite correct at this point in time to assert that Blacks did have high hopes of changing the system peacefully.

But, in spite of ANC's commitment towards a multiracial society through non-violent means, the Government infringed greatly on its operations: it monitored its activities and harassed its leaders. Part of the reason for the harassment was due to the fact that the ANC preferred to change the system within the established law. Thus by operating within such a law, the ANC became an easy target of the Government and civilian white racists. As Benjamin Pogrud has said:

*For more than thirty years the ANC devoted itself to begging and pleading with whites to spare a thought for black disabilities and aspirations; it was spurned by whites and turned away when it sought help from the British government.<sup>8</sup>*

There were also other movements besides the ANC which tried to challenge the Government's policies. For example, from 1906 to 1914 the most active group was Mahatma Gandhi's passive resistance movement. Then came "the African women's anti-pass campaign of 1913-20, the strikes and boycotts by the Industrial and Commercial Worker's Union in the 1920's, the national anti-pass campaign of 1944-45, the second Indian passive resistance campaign of 1946-48, the passive Defiance Campaign of 1952, [in which many Blacks were killed by the police<sup>9</sup>], and the Pan-Africanist Congress anti-pass demonstration of 1960 that culminated [in the Sharpeville massacre].<sup>10</sup> Like the ANC, all these parties and/or movements subscribed to the philosophy of non-violence.

But Sharpeville shattered any such illusions. It broke the philosophy of non-violent resistance that Blacks had long nursed and cherished, and introduced a new kind of political ball game. The effect of the ban on the African National Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress was that it forced hitherto law-abiding, non-violent parties, to go underground. From below, a new uncompromising, revolutionary, attitude emerged. While underground the ANC formed its militant wing, *Umkonto we Sizwe* (*Spear of the Nation*); the PAC, which was formed in 1958 under the leadership of the late Robert Sobukwe as an alternative to ANC's internationalist philosophy, gave rise to *Poqo*. Of the two, *Poqo*, then was the more militant, but it was quickly nipped in the bud. *Umkonto*, on the other hand, was more well-known partly because its bombings were directed mostly at Government property (railways, buildings, etc.), and also because of its charismatic leader, Nelson Mandela (now serving a life prison sentence at Robben Island).

Mandela's now famous defense statement delivered during the Rivonia Trial in April 1964, where he was charged as a co-conspirator to overthrow the South African government by force, underscores the view that Blacks' hopes for peaceful change did vanish after Sharpeville in 1960--and not after the death of Steve Biko in September 1977; as Woods believes. Woods' mistaken view, which correspondingly explains his slow rise to political consciousness, is rooted in his bourgeois past. As part of the ruling class, a man who "came from a resolutely conservative, racist family"--and once thought that the best way to end the racial conflict in South Africa was to "Shoot the niggers or send them to the reserves"<sup>11</sup>--he could not comprehend the social forces that galvanized Mandela and his comrades in the early Sixties to resort to revolutionary measures. Woods' naivete about the system comes through more clearly as when he says:

*...for many years I...opposed the [world's] breaking of international links with South African associations--especially in the sphere of sport--until I was proven wrong by a young fellow South African named Peter Hain, who organized anti-apartheid demonstrations in Britain.*<sup>12</sup>

Donald Woods entertained this view as late as 1970. This is why his initial encounter with Biko was somewhat of a confrontation; for Biko wanted Blacks to develop a sense of self-reliance and pride in themselves; whereas Woods, being a liberal, thought he knew all the solutions to Blacks' problems.

The point to emphasize here is that at the Rivonia

Trial, Mandela fully unmasked what the Donald Woods was then unable to understand about Blacks' overall feelings and living conditions in South Africa. As he declared in court:

*I do not deny...that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of my people by the Whites.*<sup>13</sup>

Mandela then went on to recount the times in which the State had used terrorism against the Black people. He told the court that in 1920 twenty-four Blacks who had gone to demand the release of their leader, Masabala, were shot dead by the police. The following year, one hundred Blacks died at what is known as the Bulhoek affair. In 1924, when a group of Blacks protested against a dog tax in South West Africa (Namibia) more than 200 people were shot dead by the police. Then there were the deaths of eighteen Blacks who were killed during the strike of May 1950. And later, of course, Sharpeville in 1960.<sup>14</sup>

Because of these grim events in the history of Blacks in South Africa, Mandela and his comrades finally "came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force."<sup>15</sup> Later on Mandela made "a formal statement to the press that only violent methods remained. This turn to violence was formally approved by the ANC...in 1961. Late in 1962, the PAC also adopted this policy."<sup>16</sup> Thus began the revolutionary actions of *Umkonto we Sizwe* and *Poqo* respectively.

However, inasmuch as *Umkonto* and *Poqo* represented a new phase in Blacks' political consciousness and revolutionary strategies, they hardly put a dent in the overall racist structure. This can be attributed to the swift, harsh, Gestapo-like measures used by the State to "neutralize" its adversaries. But, true to form, the lack of a potent underground military network did not discourage Blacks from further challenging the system. The spontaneous uprising of June 1976 by primary and high school children was not only an unprecedented sight but it clearly showed the depths to which the spirit of resistance had penetrated the people. This was abundantly shown, for example, by the students' rejection to learning the colonizer's archaic language—Afrikaans—and by their objection to be represented by Government-appointed "leaders" in airing grievances

to the State.

In conclusion, it is not inappropriate to say that with the lines drawn between the Government and the Blacks since Sharpeville, any move by the latter to aggravate for change stands the risk of being severely crushed.<sup>17</sup> Biko, however, not only sought change above the ground, but envisioned the creation of a socialist state.<sup>18</sup> The swift reaction by the State to "neutralize" him was not unexpected. His death, therefore, does not mark a new turning point in Blacks' search for a proper revolutionary action as Wood fears: The course of action was long endorsed by Mandela and others at the Rivonia Trial when Biko was only 16 years old! To say this is not to suggest something less of the dynamism of Biko, but to situate him more properly in an environment that has been seething with anger for many, many years.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, what seems significant about Biko was his fearlessness in confronting a faceless system with, literally and figuratively, empty hands. For without a military machine of his own to counter the States' assault, Biko could never have been more vulnerable. That strategy, even if it was not intended to be a permanent feature of his *Black Consciousness Movement*, shows the extent to which he understood the *fascist* system. For fascism, by definition, does not entertain common reason nor engage in thorough rational discussions; its only instinct is to act *violently* against real or imagined opposition.

Hence, the impending violent revolution in South Africa will occur *not* because of Biko's loss, as Woods fears, but because it had already been set in motion since Sharpeville--if not much earlier.

#### "WHAT IS TO BE DONE"--AN AMERICAN STYLE

Before going further, I wish to point out that there was a time when some people felt that the best way to abolish apartheid was not to have a confrontation with the South African leaders, but to win their hearts by talking to them. This view was popularized by President H. Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, who was the first black African leader to visit Pretoria in August 1971. Earlier, in May 1970, Prime Minister John Vorster had paid a visit to Malawi--a visit that was kept secret to Malawians until a few hours before his arrival. One of Dr. Banda's favorite lines at the time was that he wanted to "kill apartheid with kindness,"; but, later events in South Africa have proven him wrong: execution rates of Blacks have continued to soar; Blacks' houses in urban areas have been razed to the ground, etcetera. What has happened is that it is he, Dr. Banda, who has been influenced by Pretoria, rather than the other way round.<sup>20</sup> Because this "dialogue" approach has failed miserably

to affect the hearts of the white South African leaders, we therefore quickly brush it aside as nothing but a futile policy.

In the United States some liberals have contended that American private investments should continue to operate in South Africa. This investment, so goes the argument, will enable the United States to have a leverage over South Africa to force it to change its discriminatory policies. This is the position of some black American big guns such as U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Andrew Young; and Vernon Jordan, head of the Urban League; and various heads of multinational corporations. But, as Steve Biko and others have argued, American investments in South Africa have not helped Blacks; they have been used by the State to further their oppression.<sup>21</sup> The role of Polaroid which used to manufacture passbooks for Blacks is one such example. Perhaps the worst kind of American involvement in South Africa has been the sales of military technology<sup>22</sup> which have been used towards the "neutralization" of Blacks.

Yet, other liberals have tried to circumvent the problem of linking the U.S. to South Africa's racial policies by calling for U.S. decisions to be taken in international institutions such as the United Nations or International Monetary Fund. That way, it is argued, if anti-apartheid resolutions are vetoed, it won't be the U.S. alone to take the heat from anti-apartheid advocates but all those member states which joined in the veto. However, a look at the U.N. Security Council--a body empowered to make final decisions on crucial matters--reveals that three of the five permanent members happen to be the ones with investments in South Africa. These are Britain, the U.S., and France; as opposed to the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. Consequently, because a two-thirds majority vote is required for a resolution to be passed in the Security Council, most anti-apartheid resolutions are defeated by Britain, the U.S. and France.

The same strategy is used in the IMF by Western powers. To cite one example:

*On November 9, 1976 [writes Jim Morrell] the UN General Assembly voted to request the International Monetary Fund, a specialized agency of the UN, to "refrain forthwith from extending credits to South Africa."*

*On November 10, 1976--one day later--the IMF approved a \$186 million credit to*



*South Africa. Together with previously approved loans, that brought the IMF's total credits to South Africa up to \$464 million--more than to the rest of black African put together.*<sup>23</sup>

Morrell notes, for instance, that South Africa has not only been able to draw credits from the IMF while Gerald Ford was President of the United States, but also under Jimmy Carter. What is equally interesting is that at about the same time the IMF was giving financial credit to South Africa, it was also increasing its subsidy to the new military government of Pinochet in Chile, which had come into power after the overthrow of the freely-elected Marxist government of Salvador Allende. Pinochet's regime, unlike Allende's, is widely known for its human rights violations. As the Washington-based Center for International Policy stated in its Report of September 1976:

*In 1971 and 1972 the IMF loaned the Allende government over \$80 million in short-term credits.... However, the IMF and the Allende government were unable to agree on the terms for additional money from the IMF...the IMF insisted that as a precondition the government would have to initiate severe austerity measures that would have had a negative impact on the standard of living of the working class, Allende's main source of political support.*

*Since the coup, the IMF has come to the junta's aid with massive short-term balance-of-payments support. In fiscal years 1975 and 1976 the IMF loaned the junta \$231.8 million....In early 1974 the IMF agreed to a \$95 million...that paved the way for another rescheduling of Chile's foreign debt in 1974 and in effect put the IMF's stamp of approval on the junta's economic policies.*<sup>24</sup>

So, what is the significance of the IMF? is it solely an economic institution? No, says Morrell.

*The directors and staff of the IMF have developed a remarkably Aesopian language whose function is to disguise political decisions by using economic terms and to maintain the fiction of the institution's purely technical, purely economic character.*

*In reality, nothing in the world is more political than money, and the IMF, one of the most aloof and untouchable institutions in Washington, is also one of the most political.*<sup>25</sup>

That in effect, demonstrates why neither the U.N. nor the IMF can be relied upon, *in practice*, to bring about *change*--not improvement--in South Africa. For the same Western members with veto powers in the U.N. and IMF also have a stake in the perpetuation of reactionary governments in the world. And this is why, as Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman have said about the United States, it is "not accidental" that she is aligned with some of the most oppressive regimes; rather, her relations are "systematic."

*The linkage arises out of the significant positive relationship between client fascism and a 'favorable investment climate' and the long-standing predominance of investment criteria over human rights considerations. Under 'conservative' administrations, the United States supports client fascism aggressively and with little bother for the public relations aspects of human rights issues. Under 'liberal' auspices, the United States supports fascism, but then sometimes urges its leaders to give it a more human face. The basic supportive relationship persists without marked real differences in either case.*<sup>26</sup>

There are some Americans who genuinely would like to see "black majority rule" in South Africa. But, unfortunately, these people are not many; and, by and large, they do not have much influence in the country. Clyde Ferguson and William R. Cotter--the first, a professor at Harvard Law School; the second, president of the African-American Institute--are some of what might be described as "American friends of Africa." In their well-written *Foreign Affairs* essay, with a catchy title, "South Africa: What Is To Done" an essay which is largely a rebuttal to George Ball's in *Atlantic Monthly*--they recommend some "41 distinct steps which the United States, acting alone or in concert with its Western allies through the United Nations, might employ" against South Africa.<sup>27</sup> Surely, this is a very broad number of options. However, they note that these options do "not contain such highly controversial items as cessation of trade, withdrawal of current investment, military support to the liberation forces or other 'drastic' measures which were

embodied in the recently vetoed U.N. Security Council resolutions."<sup>28</sup> Rather, their list contains simply "moderate steps" which, they point out, have already been discussed in the U.S., including on Capitol Hill. Ferguson's and Cotter's moderate recommendations involve the use of conventional diplomatic pressures, stoppage of military sales, humanitarian aid to the refugees, non-military support to the liberation movements, and tightening of screws on financial transactions.

Without going into the depth of each recommendation--the reader can see this for himself--we assert that it is *precisely* the so-called "controversial items" which Ferguson and Cotter exclude from immediate possible use by the United States and its allies, which we believe, will have the quickest results of bringing down the Afrikaner regime.

But these authors do not stop here. They further state that "by using selected pressures" on South Africa, this will eventually "cause moderate whites in the society to take to the streets in civil disobedience."<sup>29</sup> Obviously, Ferguson and Cotter do not seem to have a very realistic view of the South African situation. As things stand in South Africa, whites ("moderates" and "conservatives" alike) have no cause to take to the streets in opposition to John Vorster, a man who provides them with everything at the expense of Blacks. Indeed, there once was a slim chance of poor whites and Blacks forging links against the State, as during the 1922 general strikes and 1930 Depression when a lot of whites were put out of jobs because of fall in prices of gold;<sup>30</sup> but, such a possibility no longer exists. Today there are no poor whites in South Africa; and the overall economic gap between them and Blacks is much wider than at anytime in history. If anything, it is the whites in Rhodesia who should have taken to the streets since it is *they* who had a brush with an economic embargo, on top of the fact that their economy is much weaker than South Africa's. But they didn't! We therefore leave it to Ferguson and Cotter to ponder why, in the first, the embargo was not genuinely carried out, especially by the same Western powers, in whom they have so much faith.

Ferguson and Cotter also invoke the notion that there is "a future possibility" for "mandatory sanctions" to be imposed against South Africa "if all intermediate steps fail."<sup>31</sup> At the most, this is a very remote possibility. But, going back to the Rhodesian case, white South Africans have learned from that country that not only are *total* sanctions from their Western cousins *not* forthcoming, but that military support for Black is definitely out of the question. To appreciate the meaning of Western benign neglect and insolence, let us look at the behavior of Britain for a moment.

We recall that when Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rho-

desia "independent" on November 11, 1965, the whole of Africa was in uproar. President Julius Nyerere, for one, threatened to quit the (British) Commonwealth unless Britain sent troops to Rhodesia to put down the white rebellion. Britain refused. Nyerere sulked for a long time, but he swallowed his pride and remained in the Commonwealth. Yet, 12 years later, in December 1977, Britain was concerned enough to send 260 soldiers to the island of Bermuda to crush the Black uprising there which followed the State's execution of two Black nationalists, and to protect the white bourgeoisie—including what the *New York Times* called a group known as "The 40 Thieves," which is composed of "old families of merchants, bankers, lawyers and others who own or control much of the island's economy and dominate its politics."<sup>32</sup>

This incident is not an aberration of British foreign policy; it is part and parcel of her general posture toward Black liberation struggles everywhere. Thus, while Ferguson and Cotter are sympathetic to Blacks, they are wrong in calling for "moderate steps" to bring about change in South Africa. Indeed, if there was ever a "ripe" time when the West, and particularly the United States, could have withdrawn its investment from South Africa, it was soon after the Sharpeville and Soweto massacres. Yet, nothing significant happened;<sup>33</sup> it was, both literally and figuratively, business as usual.

#### CONCLUSION

What needs to be emphasized thus far is that liberals, by and large, perceive African aspirations and struggle for liberation solely in terms of the ever continuing struggle for world dominance between the United States and the Soviet Union. That Africans themselves have their own problems which, in fact, are a result of Western colonialism and racism, hardly seem to convince our liberal friends. On the other hand, those who are concerned enough to seek change not only come up with passe recommendations but want the West to be at the center of making change. Any attempt by revolutionaries in southern Africa to seek help from the Soviet Union is seen by the liberals as a new form of Soviet colonialism. But, let's face it, if the Soviets hadn't come to the rescue of Neto's forces in Angola, and Machel's in Mozambique, the Portuguese, who were militarily supported by South Africa, and the United States through NATO, would most probably still be in power in their African "provinces." The real issue, therefore, as President Sekou Toure once said in the U.N. General Assembly, is this:

*It is not Africa which should be asked  
whether it belongs to one camp or another;  
it is rather to the two camps, to the East*

*and to the West, that we must put the question which we consider as fundamental and of paramount importance: Yes or no, are you for the liberation of Africa?*<sup>34</sup>

For Blacks in South Africa it is clear that their liberation will never come through international institutions such as the U.N. or the IMF, or by arguments for a dialogue with Vorster (or whoever might succeed him), or even through politics of foreign private investments. These channels have been tried at one time or another but to no avail. The only option left, therefore, is one of a military confrontation. Indeed, even the Lusaka Manifesto recognizes this option as inevitably and morally right. However, confrontation with a formidable opponent, as the Afrikaner regime is, is a risky business. Besides Egypt, for example, there is no other military force on the continent which rivals South Africa. Nonetheless, we should not confuse formidability with invincibility. Perhaps only the US and the USSR can boast of being invincible but that, too, is now in doubt as each side is capable of annihilating the other.

There are two things which suggest the eventual collapse of the Afrikaner regime: 1) through protracted guerrilla warfare. Precisely because this is warfare which relies on the element of surprise through space and time, it is inconceivable that the South African forces—even as they move to recruit Blacks in their ranks as cannon fodder<sup>35</sup>—can counter both factors simultaneously and permanently. Not even the Americans could carry out these two tasks in Vietnam forever; only earlier, the French had also failed in the same region and for the same reasons. And, 2) because of a shift in international balance of power. Western nations are now fully aware that they no longer have a monopoly over Africa; the Whites in Africa know this to be a fact, and so do the Blacks. For white South Africa, it means whereas before they could count on total Western support, now they must largely depend on themselves in fighting on two fronts: internally, against boycotts and other forms of urban disruptions; externally, against infiltrating guerrillas supported by international progressive forces. All this requires a growing increase in South African military budget, which in turn drains the economy. Thus over a period of time—and it may be a very long time indeed—psychological, economic and military problems are bound to take their toll on white resistance, including on the so-called "die-hards."

But the military defeat of whites in South Africa does not necessarily guarantee freedom for Blacks. As a matter of fact, it is my foregone conclusion, that as the struggle intensifies in South Africa Western powers will try to find a Rhodesian-type of "internal settlement" in order to maintain

"Black" capitalism and safeguard the political and economic privileges of the white minority. Nothing could be more disastrous than for Blacks to fall for this scheme. And such a scheme can be avoided only if their organizations stop feuding with one another and concentrate not only on gaining political power but, also, on building a truly socialist Azania.<sup>36</sup>

But here one runs into a problem. Critics of socialism are fond of citing statistics to evaluate "progress" of a country, which is often equated with political stability. In a special report on socialism, *Time* magazine, for example, said as much:

*...in comparing neighboring countries where one is socialist and the other is not (North Korea v. South Korea, Tanzania v. Kenya), the statistical evidence almost always favors the nonsocialist nation.<sup>37</sup>*

Yet anyone acquainted with economics will concede the fact that the use of the gross national product (GNP) as an index of progress does not tell the whole truth of a nation's well-being. Indeed, if GNP was such a reliable index, we wouldn't be calling for a socialist transformation of South Africa. For South Africa has one of the highest GNP in Africa (\$1,340), superceded only by Libya (\$6,310) and Gabon (\$2,590). But it has the worst economic and political conditions for its majority population!

Furthermore, to praise Kenya over Tanzania is not to be realistic with either case. According to *Time*,

*Although [Kenya] lacks significant natural resources, it has one of black Africa's most successful economies. Its secret: limiting the government's role in the marketplace, encouraging the development of a black middle class and welcoming foreign investment. Poverty exists, to be sure, as does corruption, but Kenyans live better than their neighbors in Tanzania.<sup>38</sup>*

The evidence that Kenyans live better than Tanzanians is attributed to the fact the former have a GNP of \$240; the latter, \$180. (It is significant to note here, however, that corruption is not attributed to Tanzania but to "successful" Kenya.) The truth of the matter is: while GNP is higher in Kenya, that country is hardly more truly developed than Tanzania. In fact, the Tanzanian Government is engaged in minimizing, if not eliminating altogether, the exact social ills that are at the

center of Kenya's "progress": corruption; the development of a capitalist middle class at the expense of the peasants; and continued dependence on foreign investments. In short, Tanzania is trying to achieve self-reliance; while Kenya, with the blessings of *Time* magazine, perpetuates neocolonialism.

It is because of neocolonialism in Kenya that there has now been an increase in the number of whites living in that country. At the time of independence in December 1963, there were about 55,000 whites; today, in spite of the exodus on the eve of independence, there are about 60,000. The *Wall Street Journal* quoted a former British colonel now a resident in Kenya as saying: "I'm as happy [here] as a mongoose at a cobra rally." Another banker said: "This place epitomizes free enterprise. This is the easiest, most realistic market I've ever functioned in."<sup>39</sup> But, for the majority of black Kenyans, the opposite is true. As the late Kenyan parliamentarian Josiah Mwangi Kariuki once lamented "...we do not want a Kenya of 10 millionaires and 10 million beggars."<sup>40</sup> Kariuki went on to predict that the Kenyan system was "going to fall because it does not have deep roots, it is not firmly rooted in the people and in society."<sup>41</sup> This phenomenon equally applies to the Ivory Coast, where there are now more Frenchmen than before independence.

What this means, therefore, is that Black leadership in and of itself is not enough. What is needed in South Africa is a socialist-minded leadership which, among other things, will redistribute the 87 per cent of the fertile land now annexed by the whites amongst the masses; reduce income-gap between the rich and the poor; diversify the nation's foreign relations, instead of being solely dependent on the West; and let the State, not a bunch of privileged individuals, run the affairs of the nation.

For Blacks in South Africa who live in a relatively industrialized state, and yet suffer from high infant mortality, high illiteracy and high crime, the experience of socialism in Cuba is something to think about. As *Time* reported but with less enthusiasm:

*When Fidel Castro's forces triumphed in Cuba in 1959, nearly one-quarter of the population could neither read nor write. Compulsory primary education and an ambitious classroom construction program have reduced illiteracy to 4%. Cuban infant mortality is 29 per 1,000 and average life expectancy is 70 years. By contrast, the nearby Dominican Republic has a 32% illiteracy rate, infant mortality of 98 per 1,000 and an average life expectancy of only*

58 years.<sup>42</sup>

Indeed, the level of crime is so low, if it exists, that *Time* did not even bother to belabor on it. However, it is interesting to note that barely two months after *Time* made this report in March 1978, a new Revolutionary Party led by Antonio Guzman won the presidential elections in the Dominican Republic. Mr. Guzman promised to move the country in a socialist direction in order to cure the ills cited above, including curbing the role of the multinational corporations.<sup>43</sup>

To be sure, there are some economic and political problems in Cuba, in spite of its achievements. But I need not stress that not all of the problems are of her own making; we all know the hostility of the West, particularly the United States, against that island. (It is also significant that while the U.S. senate has decided to lift economic sanctions against Ian Smith's Rhodesia, the embargo against Cuba still remains in effect.)

Thus like Cubans, Blacks in South Africa who attempt to develop a socialist Azania will not escape the wrath of the United States. In fact, it may well be said that a people's true meaning of liberation from colonialism can be measured more accurately by the degree to which the United States vents its hostility. And that is the task Blacks in South Africa must be ready to face and sacrifice.

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Footnotes:

1. Woods, Donald. "The Indictment," *The New York Review of Books*, May 4, 1978. p. 27.
2. See Carter, Gwendolen. "African Nationalist Movements," in John A. Davis and James K. Baker, eds., *Southern Africa in Transition* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).
3. For a partial documentation of State violence, see Nelson Mandela, *No Easy Walk To Freedom* (London: Heinemann, 1965). See also Edward Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope*, (Madison University of Wisconsin Press, 1964; 2nd ed.).
4. Pogrund, Benjamin. "The Anatomy of White Power," *Atlantic Monthly*, October 1977. p. 56.
5. Walshe, Peter. *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress 1912-1952* (Berkeley



and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p. 412. It is unfortunate that Walshe refers to Blacks in terms of "tribes", and equates "Native" with "African". As Archie Mafeje has stated in his searing critique of the ideology of tribalism, "In South Africa the indigenous population has no word for 'tribe'; only for 'nation', and 'lineage' and, traditionally, people were identified by territory--'Whose which Chief's]land do you come from?'. Tribalism, therefore, is an invention of white scholars, not Africans. See his "The ideology of 'Tribalism'," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9:2, 1971.

6. *Ibid.* p. 419.
7. Carter, pp. 9-10. This early unity between "nonwhites" shows that they have not been uninterested in forging links against the white power structure. When the three non-white parties led by chief Gatsha Buthelezi (Inkatha), Sonny Leon (Colored Labor Party), and Y.S. Chinsamy (Indian Reform Party) recently met and proposed an alliance against the government's racial policies, the *New York Times* (January 12, 1978) erroneously assumed that it was "the first high-level gathering of the country's three categories of nonwhites."
8. Poggrund, p. 56.
9. Davidson, Basil. *The Darkening Shadow Over Africa* (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1953).
10. McKay, Vernon. "Southern Africa and Its Implications for American Foreign Policy," in William A. Hance, ed., *Southern Africa and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 8-9.
11. Hentoff, Nat. "Donald Woods: 'A Proper Child of Africa'," *The Village Voice*, May 22, 1978. p. 18.
12. Woods, pp. 28-29.
13. Mandela, p. 163.
14. *Ibid.* p. 173.
15. *Ibid.* p. 169.
16. Carter, p. 17.
17. This, for example, has been shown by the recent arrest of Ishmael Mkhabela and Lybon Mabasa--the first, chairman;

the second, secretary—of the newly formed Azanian People's Organization. The arrest came only four days after the founding of the Organization. *New York Times*, May 5, 1978.

18. Biko expressed the need for socialism ("egalitarianism") in an interview with Edmund Wolff. See *Guardian* (New York), December 21, 1977, p. 13.
19. That the Black Consciousness movement, of which Biko was one of its leaders, was more progressive than the older parties such as the ANC and PAC, is not in dispute. However, its revolutionary inspiration was due more to the PAC than to the ANC. See Heribert Adam, "The Rise of Black Consciousness in South Africa," *Race*, xv:2, October 1973.
20. Chipembere, Henry B. Masauko. "Malawi's Growing Lonks with South Africa—A Necessity or a Virtue?," *Africa Today*, 18:2, April 1971; Mpakati, Attati. "Malawi: The Birth of a Neo-Colonial State," *The African Review*, 3:1, 1973; "The maverick's betrayal," *Africa* magazine, No. 76, December 1977.
21. See Steve Biko's Memorandum to U.S. Senator Dick Clark, *African Affairs*, 77:306, January 1978, pp. 101-103; and Timothy Smith, "U.S. Firms and Apartheid: Belated Steps Analyzed," *Africa Today*, 24:2, April-June 1977.
22. See Michael T. Klare, "U.S. Arms Deliveries To South Africa: The Italian Connection," (Washington: The Transnational Institute/Institute for Policy Studies, February 1977. TNI Special Report); Walters, Ronald W. "Apartheid and the Atom: The United States and South Africa's Military Potential," *Africa Today*, July/September 1976; and, Gervasi, Sean. "What Arms Embargo?," *Southern Africa*, 10:6, August 1977.
23. Morrell, Jim. "Underwriting Apartheid," *Inquiry* magazine, April 17, 1978. p. 8.
24. "Chile's Chronic Economic Crisis: 1976 and Beyond," (Washington: Center for International Policy, September 1976), pp. 11-12.
25. Morrell, p. 9.
26. Chomsky, Noam and Edward S. Herman, "The United States versus Human Rights in the Third World," *Monthly Review*, 29:3, July-August 1977), p. 41.

27. Ferguson, Clyde and William R. Cotter. "South Africa: What Is To Be Done," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1978, p. 268.
28. *Ibid.* pp. 268-69.
29. *Ibid.* p. 273.
30. See Robert Davies, David Kaplan, Mike Morris and Dan O'Meara, "Class Struggle and the Periodisation of the State in South Africa," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 7, September-December 1976, pp. 6-11.
31. Ferguson and Cotter, p. 269.
32. See two articles by John Kifner, "British Troops Land in Uneasy Bermuda," *New York Times*, December 5, 1977; and, "Bermuda: Tenacious Island Pondering a Fragile Future," *New York Times*, December 9, 1977. Stapp, Andy, "British Colonial Invade Bermuda," *Workers World*, December 9, 1977.
33. It is generally agreed that there was some outflow of foreign investment soon after Sharpeville; but, it is necessary to stress that the outflow proved very insignificant to the inflow that followed later on. But more telling was the reaction of the United States: "Even the Kennedy Administration, with its strong stand against apartheid, came to the aid of South Africa in 1960...in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre...Overall foreign investment increased at a rate of 5 percent a year throughout the decade of the 1960s." El-Khawas, op. cit. pp. 325-26. Mhlongo, Sam, "Black Workers' Strikes in Southern Africa," *New Left Review*, No. 83, January-February 1973, p. 41.
34. Quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Independence*, New York: Vintage Books, 1961).
35. In an interview with the *Guardian* (New York) December 28, 1977, Oliver Tambe, president of the African National Congress, said that as the struggle intensifies in South Africa, "We expect [the regime] to collect all the weapons it can, all the techniques of repressions to increase its armed power, to recruit, if it can, from the slaves themselves and try and use the slaves to defend their slavery."
36. That there is a feud between some South African organizations can be exemplified by the views of Theo Bidi, representative of the Pan Africanist Congress. See the interview in *Pan Africanist Congress (South Africa)*, a pamphlet, published by Liberator Press, Chicago, Illinois,

1977.

37. *Time* magazine, March 13, 1978, p. 25.
38. *Ibid.* p. 29.
39. Northrup, Bowen, "Rhodesia, as Viewed From Kenya," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 1976.
40. *The Economist*, March 22, 1975. p. 56.
41. Davidson, Basil, "African Economies," *The Nation*, January 3-10, 1976. p. 20.
42. *Time*, op. cit., p. 30.
43. *Daily News* (New York), May 28, 1978. p. 16.

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