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RACE AND ECONOMICS IN SOUTH AFRICA

by

Keith Gottschalk

The phrase "apartheid vs. economics" is, in one permutation or another, currently a popular debate. This phrase is misleading and obscures part of what is going on in the Republic. To explain and predict the workings of our society we must understand the relationship between race and economics in South Africa. This paper examines the three main alternate views of the relationship between race and economics in our society, how the society works, and why it has an intrinsic built-in tendency to more race discrimination, an increasing Black-White wage gap, and growing repression to maintain the whole system.

The three main alternative hypotheses on the relationship between race and economics are:

- that "the imperatives of economic growth" will ultimately cause apartheid to wither away;
- the second view, that economic growth will adapt itself to the existing pattern of race discrimination; and
- the third theory, that race discrimination will increase with industrialization to neutralize its political consequences, and apartheid will finally slow down the rate of economic growth.

The first hypothesis is that economic growth/foreign investment/raising the gold price, will wither away apartheid and color discrimination. Big business, its academic sympathizers, the business-owned daily press, and official and non-official agencies supporting White supremacy, from the Department of Information to the South African Foundation, all plagiarize the Beatle's refrain: "It's getting better all the time." The view that if only South Africa is left alone economic growth will make things better for everyone is endlessly publicized by such pillars of South African finance and entrepreneurship as Dr. Frans Cronje (Netherlands Bank), Jan Marais (Trust Bank), Harry Oppenheimer (Anglo-American), Anton Rupert (Rothman's Tobacco), and Albert Wessels (Toyota), with academic sympathizers such as Ralph Horowitz and F. van den Bogaerde.

The lengthiest exposition of the view that economic growth, the industrial revolution, will erode apartheid is found in the writings of Michael O'Dowd, a director of Anglo-

American and the English Academy of South Africa (1). Very briefly, O'Dowd says that as all states undergo their industrial revolutions, feudal-type systems are undermined. Society is disrupted by the industrial revolution, inequality increases, mounting protests are crushed by intensified Government repression lasting not longer than thirty years, after which liberal constitutional reforms usher in some form of the welfare state.

This hypothesis is vulnerable to severe criticism. O'Dowd based his theory on Rostow's stages of economic growth theory, which has met with academic scepticism (2). Only a minority of countries in Western Europe followed O'Dowd's pattern of gradual constitutional reform leading to democracy and the welfare state. Some countries, Bolivia and Syria for example, have had many violent swings or coups; other states (Outer Mongolia and Yemen) went straight from a feudal *ancien regime* to a socialist or Communist regime; still others (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Argentina, Japan, Rumania) moved from a feudal-type government to a short-lived, multi-party liberal democracy, which was overthrown by a Fascist or semi-Fascist military regime, which in turn was overthrown and replaced by either a capitalist government (West Germany) or a Communist government (East Germany).

The second hypothesis, that the industrial revolution adapts itself to pre-existing patterns of racialism, is argued by Herbert Blumer, a California professor, and Frederick Johnston, a fellow of St. Anthony's College in England. Blumer, through studies of the United States Deep South and South Africa, has reached the following conclusions: a factory owner, if a local, will probably share his community's racial views; if a foreigner, he will be anxious to seek acceptance. He usually depends on the local society for his supplies, staff and market. The authorities' and society's goodwill or at least neutrality may be essential to the running of his business. Consequently, the manager's hiring policy is likely to obey "the customs and conventions of the community." Race discrimination was in no way weakened in the United States even after three score and ten years of industrialization. It was only ended, not by "natural" economic forces, but by the deliberate, outside political intervention of the Federal Government, which passed far-reaching civil rights laws in the 1960's and sent in federal police and army troops to help enforce the law (3).

Frederick Johnston examines the relationships in South Africa between White employers, White employees, and Black workmen. He defines what he considers "the core structure of White supremacy," as extreme economic inequality between

Black and White, and the power to maintain this. White employers and White employees clash over the division of privileges between them, but their interests coincide in seriously underpaying Black and Brown workmen, and in police repression of Black political parties and trade unions who seek to oppose this extreme economic inequality (4).

The third hypothesis is that race discrimination *increases* with industrialization in order to neutralize its political consequences. This view seems to have been first elaborated in the novel *When Smuts Goes* by the historian Arthur Keppel-Jones (5). Recently an economist at Oxford, Sean Gervasi, and Dr. Francis Wilson of the University of Cape Town, have both marshalled evidence to demonstrate that the century of South Africa's capitalist industrial revolution has not reduced the extreme economic inequality between Black and White, but appears to have possibly increased such inequality.

Keppel-Jones' book, subtitled *A History of South Africa from 1952 to 2010*, was published in 1947. It claims that whatever temporary fluctuations are caused in race policy by splits in, and coalitions between the Nationalist and United Parties, the Afrikaner-dominated Republic drifts inexorably towards a rigidifying *verkamptheid*. The institutions and ideology of the Republic narrowly limit its rulers' options to a number of predictable, historically-repeated responses: confrontation not compromise, repression and rearmament, not reform of race relations.

To ascertain which of these alternatives is accurate, we must examine the facts of South Africa's society and history. Let us discuss three questions:

- Why did race discrimination start in South Africa?
- Why did race discrimination continue in South Africa?
- Why does race discrimination increase in South Africa?

Professors Wilson and Thompson warn us that in an unequal society "historical writing is not merely a reflection of social inequality; it is also a powerful instrument for the maintenance of inequality." (6) In South Africa this has gone so far that even misleading words are used. In this paper those people called in schoolbooks "Bushmen," "Hottentots," and "Bantu" are referred to as San-speaking Africans, Khoi-speaking Africans, and Bantu-speaking Africans. Persons who misuse the linguistic term "Bantu" thereby avoid having to admit that San- and Khoi-speakers were also Africans. They can thus deny that the whole of the Cape Province and Orange Free State, the whole of South Africa, is the

homeland occupied before the White conquest by Black and Brown South Africans who are now confined to reserves, locations and group areas demarcated for them by the Whites.

Similarly, it has become fashionable for even some liberals to imitate the Nationalists and call the reserves "homelands." But the official renaming of the African reserves as "Bantu homelands" serves a specific propaganda use. It implies that these reserves must be in some way the "homelands" of Black South Africans, in which they once lived and to which they may justifiably be 'repatriated.' In fact the reserves are only the *remnant* of the "homelands" of the indigenous South Africans; they are only 12.8% of the "traditional homelands."

It is an often-repeated White myth that the San- and Khoi-speakers were ruthlessly exterminated by the "Bantu invaders" and were only saved by the protection of the peaceful rule of the Whites; a sort of *pax Afrikaner*. In reality wars between Khoi- and Bantu-speaking Africans appear not noticeably more frequent than wars between Khoi and Khoi, or wars between Xhosa and Xhosa. Khoi- and Bantu-speaking African tribes lived intermingled in various areas, they traded, their chiefs formed dynastic alliances by inter-racial marriages of each others' daughters. In one case two separate tribes of Khoi-speakers and Xhosa-speakers, through inter-marriage, formally merged into one tribe called the Gqunukwebe (who incidentally lived west of the Fish River and Eiselen line).

The San-speakers were exterminated by the Boers in campaigns of genocide between 1715 and 1862. The White settlers also seized virtually all the pastures of the Khoi-speaking Africans, killing those who resisted, the landless survivors being forced to either starve, emigrate, or become laborers for the White farm-owners.

The monopolistic merchants of the Dutch East India Company set up a garrison-farm in the Cape Peninsula in 1652; from 1657 they encouraged the growth of what was to become a class of virtually hereditary White land-owners called the "Free Burghers." In 1659 their seizure of pastures started the first of three dozen wars against Black and Brown. The point is not usually made that the prosperity of the Free Burghers depended on a class of Unfree Burghers. Initially most of the laborers were indentured White servants called *knechts*; then the D.E.I.C. handed out free to the Free Burghers donations of slaves; later the subsistence White farmers obtained most of their labor from non-slave San- and

Khoi-speaking Africans.

The D.E.I.C. merchants subscribed to an unequal society based upon class discrimination; they were opposed to a color bar, as may be seen by the fact that three-quarters of all births at the Cape were Coloured children, and 10% of all peninsula marriages were inter-racial. During the seventeenth century the Governors Simon and Willem Adriaan van der Stel were Coloured persons. When their laborers were indentured Whites, the Free Burghers could rely on class distinctions; when their labor source was predominantly slaves (who were freed if they became baptized and spoke Dutch) the dividing line was religion and language. When later the poor illiterate White trekboers obtained most of their labor from non-slave Black and Brown, only color divided them from those whom they found it convenient to regard as their social inferiors (convenient because they could be paid inferior wages 'when paid at all,' with a larger profit for the White farm-owner).

Notice that the order of succession of the source of labor determined what are still, in ascending order, social divisions in South Africa today - class, religion and language, and color.

Having explained how color discrimination started in South Africa, we must discuss why it continued. The eighteenth century Cape contained a trading society based on class inequality, and an unequal society of subsistence White trekboers, based on color discrimination. The trekboers became dominant with their 1707 triumph of having the Governor recalled for not promoting their interests against those of the company; they, not Black and Brown, gained dominance on such legislative, administrative and judicial organs as existed. The government initially pampered them with virtually free supplies of labor; later it almost always retrospectively legalized their conquests of land and thefts of cattle. Hence the Boers' society based on color discrimination, on feudal-like "proper relations between master and servant," became dominant. When they left the Cape to conquer most of South Africa between 1838 and 1868, the color bar society spread over South Africa with them (7). The franchise allowed Whites to dominate the Cape Colony; it was restricted virtually exclusively to them elsewhere. This political power was used to perpetuate their privileges, enshrined in the Transvaal constitution: "The volk shall not suffer equality between Black and White in the church or state" (8).

By enforcing the color bar the majority of Whites forced class divisions to follow race cleavages. As new sectors of the economy rose, they were forced to follow the pre-existing pattern of race relations:

a) Between 1657 and 1869 the main source of wealth came from land-ownership (stock-farming), so most of South Africa was conquered and parceled out among White farmers between 1836 and 1896; the reserves and group areas laws perpetuate this.

b) Following the major mineral discoveries of 1870 and 1886, laws confiscated all mineral-bearing land owned by Balck and Brown.

c) As manufacturing became increasingly important after World War I, laws prohibited Black and Brown from owning industrial or commercial sites in the central business districts of the cities.

Hence South Africa was organized into a plural society - a society where the primary division were into racial *blocs*. Class clusterings and cleavages were organized into these primary race divisions:

INTEREST GROUPS

Economic

businessmen
intelligentsia
professionals,
some middle class

Ethnic

originally Dutch expatriates; later predominantly English-speaking Whites.

lower-middle class;
landed and labor aristocracy

overwhelmingly Afrikaans-speaking Whites

some skilled and semi-skilled work;
manual labor

Africans, Coloureds and Indians,

peasantry

virtually only Africans.

If society has been organized into race *blocs* ever since, if more apartheid laws are passed annually and none repealed, why do we keep on reading the claim in the daily press that "Apartheid is failing"? What Frederick Johnston calls "the core structure of White supremacy," namely, the increasing Black-White wage gap, and exclusion of Black unions and

political parties, still exists.

To claim that "Apartheid has failed" will sound grotesque to the family of Msini (a liberation partisan), or the 1,000,000 other dependents separated by the pass laws from their breadwinner, or the 1,000,000 persons evicted from their homes under the group areas, "black spots" removal and squatter laws, or to the Black or Brown university graduates denied a job because of the color bar.

What the daily press mean when they announce that "apartheid is failing" is that White businessmen are granted additional quotas of migrant laborers, and that they are allowed to employ Black and Brown in formerly White jobs. In short they mean that those apartheid restrictions which hinder White businessmen have been relaxed. That there has been no removal of those apartheid restrictions hindering Black and Brown workmen (pass laws, Group areas), does not appear to greatly concern the White-owned press.

White employers oppose apartheid over the specific issues of feudal-like restrictions on the horizontal and vertical mobility of Black and Brown labor. They in no way complain over police repression of Black unions and political parties. This enables them to employ Black welders on construction sites for thirty cents an hour, one-quarter of what White welders are paid on sites (9). When state-owned steel mills reclassified a job from White to Black, they also reclassified the wage rate from sixty-eight cents an hour to twenty-two cents an hour (10). What happened to those missing forty-six cents? Part were paid to White employees, the rest to White employers.

Another technique of inequality is "job fragmentation." Consider how this works by an example: a White employer paying a White employee say, R200 (1 Rand=\$1.40) monthly needs to hire a second person at R200 monthly as the firm expands. Instead, he fragments the job. What happens to the second R200? The unpleasant part of the job is given to a Black workman at say only R60 monthly. The White employee, for condescending to let a Black do half of his former work, gets a pay raise to say R260.

Thus: the BLACK WORKMAN knows at R60 he is getting under one-third of what his job is worth, he is paying Whites an invisible tax of R140 monthly. But his union leader has been endorsed out (Government practice of banishing African opposition), and anyway, the White-owned press forgot to ask him, so he says nothing.

- the WHITE EMPLOYEE gets R260 monthly for less work, and he say "Apartheid is the best for South Africa."

- the WHITE EMPLOYER would prefer to employ two Black workers for a total of R120 rather than pay out total wages of R320. But he still pockets R60 extra monthly and says "You know, Separate Development is not as bad as the overseas critics claim."

- the NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT, by taxing the bigger incomes of the White employer and White employees, takes R20 towards buying French helicopters.

Job reservation enables White employees to blackmail their employers for wages far above what they would otherwise get:

Black bricklayers at resettlement camps	R24	monthly	
White bricklayers, average Cape Town	R160	"	
White bricklayers, average on Rand	R300	"	
White bricklayers, freelance on Rand	R1000	"	(11)

This wage differential of 41 to 1 for the same job would soon reduce itself in the absence of job reservation and the pass laws. In short, the more apartheid laws "fly in the face of economic imperatives," and "restrict the economy," the more prosperity this means for large sections of White employees (12). The more these restrictions are relaxed the more profits this means for White managers, shareholders and investors. In other words, the phrase "economic growth vs. apartheid ideology" really means "economic growth for White employers vs. economic prosperity for White employees."

A creeping or sliding color bar is a key technique in maintaining inequality between the races. Depending on White unemployment or manpower scarcities for entrepreneurs, the color bar is adjusted to slide downwards ("civilized [White] labor") or to creep upwards ("job reservation exemptions"). By sliding the color bar upwards slower than entrepreneurs desire, artificial manpower shortages are created in jobs classified "White." Employers are compelled to offer high wages to attract White artisans and the blue-collar aristocracy, but enabled to offer low wages to Black and Brown labor (suffering unemployment because of the color bar and pass laws). Thus, regardless of which jobs are at any one moment classified as "White" or "Black" the ratio between White and Black paypackets remains constant, or becomes more unequal.

In one sense it was accurate for a perceptive businessman, when he addressed an Institute of Industrialists meeting,

to comment that although the South African economy depends increasingly on manufacturing and commerce the Government's labor policies are still "feudal." For the aim of apartheid is to deflect as big a proportion as possible of the national income from Black and Brown to those who were the wealthiest before South Africa had a capitalist economy - the White land-owners and their urban descendants of the lower-middle class: bureaucrats, policemen, supervisors, foremen, railway porters, White artisans, etc.(13)

Since the "Whites only" franchise ensures that White employees can always outvote White employers (notwithstanding the articulate business-owned press) apartheid will continue to win over "the imperatives of economic growth." This is, of course, the reason why sympathizers of big business advocate a franchise qualified by wealth and education - it would allow the wealthy classes to outvote both the lower-middle class White and the working class Black and Brown. That this would, à la Brazil, merely shift the basis of extreme economic inequality from color to class, but not reduce the inequality itself, is not a point such political circles care to emphasize. Neither can they explain why a "Whites only" electorate with compulsory secondary school education elects an apartheid government, whereas the overwhelmingly illiterate voters of Botswana elect non-racial democratic governments. The subordination of educational qualifications to class and ethnic interests can best be observed by noting which political movements are supported by the majority of Afrikaner university graduates, by the majority of English-speaking White university graduates, and by African university graduates, all of whom have equal educational standards.

The fundamental difference between those who advocate a vote qualified by race or by class and those who advocate universal suffrage is between those who see the vote for Parliament as an instrument of power for their own group, and those who see the vote as an instrument to channel the political process into peaceful, constitutional methods to arbitrate between different interest groups. Indeed, the Progressive Party's suggested franchise is so conservative that the proportion of the electorate who would be Black or Brown would be smaller than it was in the Cape Colony electorate of 1886! It would replace a race oligarchy with a permanent class oligarchy; rule by a minority race with rule by a minority class. This is at best a step towards democracy; it is no substitute for government by consent of the governed.

We must now ask the third question: Why does race discrimination not merely continue, but increase? Every year more apartheid laws are passed, none are repealed.

YEAR	NO. of BLACKS ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE.	COL. 3	COL. 4	COL. 5	COL. 6
1935-6		2,0	20	100	
1946	2905,063	11,0 (a)	25,3	100	180
1960	3881,489	3,0	18,5 (b)	100	125
1969	4747,000	0,6 (c)	17,5 (d)	100	115-120

(a) statistic for 1945; (b) statistic for 1965; (c) statistic for 1967; (d) statistic for 1970.

- COLUMN 3: Approximate percentage of urban Black labor unionized.
- COLUMN 4: Average Black wage as % of av. White wage in secondary industry.
- COLUMN 5: Average wage of Afrikaners (=100%).
- COLUMN 6: Average wage of English-speaking Whites as % of av. Afrikaner wage for that year.

(It should be noted that some of these statistics are not completely comparable.) (14)

Our clue to answering the question lies in the semantic lineage of Nationalist policy - apartheid *alias* vertical separate development *alias* multi-national development. The clue lies in the oft-repeated insistence of White supremacists that the "urban Bantu" are the worst "problem." By which is meant that Black and Brown in the rural areas, especially in earlier times, "naturally" (after their conquest) accepted what E.P. Thompson calls the "situation of power and deference in the countryside" (15). They indeed had to obey the racist "customs and conventions of the community" if they were to escape violent assault for being "cheeky."

But in the urban areas, obedience to traditional authorities such as chiefs, clergy and White land-owners withers away. The dislocations of urbanization spawn political parties and trade unions. Rural deference gives way to urban protests and riots. The Nationalist Government is hostile to Black trade unions because they seek to reduce the Black-White wage gap and because unions and strikes are incompatible with the deference the Black lower orders are expected to render to those in a higher station in life. The

Afrikaner Nationalist attitude to Black trade unions is similar to that of the High Tory English judge who commented on trade unions during a test case in 1759: "If inferiors are to prescribe to their Superiors, if the Foot aspire to be the Head....to what end are Laws enacted? It is the indispensable Duty of everyone as a friend of the Community to endeavor to suppress them in their beginnings" (16). As the then Nationalist Minister of Labour, Ben Schoeman, stated two centuries later, it is the policy of the Nationalist Government to "bleed African trade unions to death" (17). African political parties and leaders were suppressed and banned in the 1950's and 1960's.

Simultaneously with police repression of Black parties and unions went the erection of the ideology and institutions of "vertical separate development." Sovereign independence (except it seems, for controlling post offices) is to be bestowed upon the reserves, now renamed "Bantu homelands." In the Transkei "self-rule" meant that the proportion of elected members in the Bunga Council was reduced from 2/3 to 1/3, the Transkei election being marked by the banning of Liberal Party candidates. Some Bantustan Legislative Assemblies are completely unelected. It is interesting to note that the executives of all the Bantustans "Legislative Assemblies" and the Coloured "Representative Council" are either hereditary or appointed personages.

It has of late become fashionable in some White political and journalistic circles to claim that the Bantustan policy has "reached the point of no return." Such persons should remember that the Government faced scarcely a riot in terminating the Parliamentary representation rights of Black and Brown in the Cape Province, though these rights were over a century old. It did not hesitate to smash by any means that proved necessary (bannings, 18,000 interned in concentration camps and prisons in 1960) all Black mass movements and militant trade unions. There is no reason to suppose it should meet with any trouble in abolishing its Bantustans and "Representative Councils" should it so choose. These have not brought benefits on any scale to the vast bulk of the subject races (if I may use an appropriate phrase); neither have these institutions the power to repeal apartheid laws; their ceremonies and installations are attended by far fewer people than protest meetings over bus fares, wage demands, or funerals of distinguished African political leaders and their relatives.

The Bantustan policy has simply assembled the already existing chiefs, with already increased powers of juris-

diction over their political opponents, into debating chambers graced with a ceremonial mace symbolizing such properties (as the Minister reminded the Tsonga-Mashanganaland Territorial Assembly), as ORDER, OBEDIENCE AND INDUSTRIOUSNESS (18). These would seem to be less the attributes of constitutional sovereignty than the qualities which imperial rulers desire instilled in their subject races.

These ethnic political institutions, "Legislative Assemblies," and "Representative Councils," dominated by hereditary or appointed members, have had conferred upon them what in the United States or Britain would be considered only local government responsibilities - maintenance of public works and roads, education, some taxes, some part of the police. These ethnic institutions, perhaps following the precedent of Kruger's *Tweede Volksraad* (a *Rooinek* Representative Council), are analagous to the feudal state-general of medieval France, or the *Duma* of Tsarist Russia, in that they

- have no power to remove the central government from office;
- cannot repeal either the laws or decrees of that government; and
- are elected separately and convened apart by the different 'estates.'

One economic aspect of the Bantustan policy is a new, and intensified form of exploitation called "border industries," *alias* "economic growth points," *alias* "industrial decentralization." It must be emphasized that what the Nationalist Government refers to as "industrial decentralization" has nothing whatever to do with what anywhere else in the world is understood by such a policy. From Capitalist Britain to Communist China "industrial decentralization" refers to a policy of state intervention in the economy to give people in depressed regions a higher income than they would otherwise have. In South Africa, let us take the example of the first year the Physical Planning Act was fully applied, 1968:

The Government, using its powers under various laws, prohibited industrialists from building factories which would have employed 220,000 Black South Africans in urban areas. In the same period only 5,000 new jobs were created in "border areas" (19). In short, what Pretoria called "industrial decentralization" meant: (a) 215,000 Black workers were unemployed, who would have been offered jobs in urban areas; (b) even the 5,000 Black workers who obtained jobs in "border areas" were forced to accept wages much lower than in urban areas - down to 29% of the current

Johannesburg wage in one instance (20); (c) White employers in urban areas claimed "undercutting" competition from border areas meant that they would have to refuse further wage demands from African and Coloured and Indian textile workers; (d) during 1968, 61,658 "superfluous appendages" (the aged, women and children, cripples) were endorsed out of the urban areas, to become an additional burden on the increased poverty and unemployment in the reserves (21); (e) ALL minimum wage legislation was abrogated in the reserves in 1970, leaving Black labor completely unprotected (22). Extreme unemployment forced hundreds of Black women to work in border area factories for R6.00 per month. Some of the catering staff at a Government Institute of Higher Education in one reserve (Turflow) are paid R7 *monthly* for a living-out job with a 14 1/2 hour working day (23). The color bar still applies to most of the border areas. Thus the interests of the lower-middle class Whites are maintained, and the White employers get added privileges at the expense of Black workmen. To be more precise, Nationalist businessmen tend to obtain privileges at the expense of their "English-Jewish" competitors. For the labor restrictions are applied most severely on the Rand (a largely "English-Jewish" enclave) and in the Cape, and border area concessions are extended to such as Vryheid, Dundee, Newcastle (a Nationalist enclave in a United Party province), and Rustenburg, Brits, Phalaborwa, Pietersburg, etc.

Two other consequences of the color bar are not without relevance; every White immigrant may bar a Black or Brown person from promotion. For it is only when wage bribes and immigration fail to solve a "manpower bottleneck" that the Government condescends to suspend job reservation, to raise the color bar to permit Black and Brown to rise another rung or two higher up the corporation ladder. Indeed, the cumulative effects of work reservation determinations now have theological consequences.

Recently much has been said about foreign investment. One effect of foreign investment is surely that for every dividend check which leaves the Republic, someone, somewhere in the world beyond the borders, is saying, "You know, separate development isn't really as bad as the newspapers make out. The Bantu are really quite happy; they're better off under it."

To return to the question why race discrimination increases: growing urbanization of Black and Brown brought growing demands for a proportional say in decision-making, and increasing demands for political power to defend them-

selves against discriminatory laws. This caused increased political discrimination and repression, including the end of Parliamentary representation. More repression of Black trade unions left workmen undefended from exploitation. As growing numbers of Black and Brown persons acquire the education for artisan, white-collar, professional and managerial posts, so job reservation is *extended* to protect the added numbers of Whites now facing competition. Racists only need symphony, concert and opera house apartheid when numbers of Black and Brown persons are educated enough to attend such activities.

To conclude: 1) South Africa's unequal society, based on color discrimination, had its genesis in the semi-feudal society of White stock-farmers during the eighteenth century.

2) The interest-group of White land-owners, and their urban counterpart of the "labor aristocracy" forced its patterns of control and inequality onto capitalist mining in the nineteenth century, and industry and the whole of society in the twentieth century.

3) The White minority gained political control over the whole of society. The electoral system enabled the lower-middle class White pressure-group (Afrikaners) to dominate the state. The power of the state was used to create and rigidify a plural society based on ethnic cleavages.

4) The response of the ruling White minority, more specifically the Afrikaner minority, to challenges to its rule or policies is to repress those challenges, maintaining intact the imbalance of power between the various ethnic *blocs*. In fact, it reacted to the political consequences of Black and Brown urbanization by strengthening the primary racial cleavages in society. The political consequences of urbanization and economic integration are neutralized by *increasing* political and social segregation.

5) One consequence of police repression and coercion is the helplessness of Brown and especially Black against discrimination. This results in increasing inequality between the average wages of Black and White.

6) The nature of the plural society makes peaceful, constitutional economic or political reforms radically redistribution power and income very unlikely.

7) The political importance of the state bureaucracy, industrial interests, military establishment, intelligence community and possibly Afrikaner political parties will continue to increase. The political power of traditional authorities such as the Afrikaner churches,

White land-owners and Afrikaner academics will increasingly be shared with these groups.

8) The nature of the Republic's race society indicates that the historically most probable trend is that race discrimination, police coercion and inequality will continue to increase in the future. Resistance to White supremacy will be responded to not by removing or ameliorating color discrimination, but by coercion and elaborating the ideology and institutions of "vertical separate development." Segregation will be intensified and strengthen the ethnic, primary cleavages in the Republic's plural society vis-a-vis others.

These trends will continue into the future for as long as the present imbalance of power and its determinants are not upset by major developments, such as intervention by foreign powers, rebellion or some combination of these, on a scale so large as to physically overwhelm the capacity of the security apparatus for dealing with it (24).

Footnotes

1. Michael C. O'Dowd, *The Stages of Economic Growth and the Future of South Africa*, (1966).
2. W.W. Rostow's works include *The Process of Economic Growth*, and *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Criticisms include, Baran and Hobsbawm, in *Kyklos*, 14(1961) and H.J. Habakkuk (review) in *The Economic Journal*, (1961).
3. H. Blumer, "Industrialization and Race Relations, in G. Hunter, ed., *Industrialization and Race Relations*, (1965).
4. F. Johnston, "White Prosperity and White Supremacy in South Africa," in *African Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 275 (April, 1970), pp. 124 ff.
5. A. Keppel-Jones, *When Smuts Goes*, (1947).
6. M. Wilson and L. Thompson, *The Oxford History of South Africa*, Vol. I (1970), p. vi.
7. But the Cape peninsula remained, more than anywhere else in South Africa, a society based on class rather than specifically color discrimination, with most public amenities integrated, until Nationalist laws forced its segregation after 1948. That this regional difference is primarily caused by the dominance of the values of a commerce-oriented society, and not religious, language or urban factors may be seen by comparison;

- Durban has always been as segregated as Pretoria or as any *platteland* village. (These towns were in societies dominated by the White farm-owners' views of race relations.) Protestant Cape Town had less segregation than the Catholic Belgian Congo.
8. The word *volk* has been wrongly translated by some to mean "people" - *volk* here means the Afrikaner people, *i.e.* an ethnic group.
 9. *Argus*, September 30, 1970.
 10. *Sunday Express*, April 7, 1968. For increasing Black-White wage gap on mines see, *Financial Mail*, May 10, 1968 and March 26, 1970.
 11. *Rand Daily Mail*, February 24, 1971.
 12. With one qualification: inflation will leave the White bricklayer with a large increase in income, but other Whites might lose more than they gain through such side-effects of the color bar.
 13. Strictly speaking, the Nationalist Government's economic policy cannot be called feudal, for it does not aim at returning to a subsistence agrarian manorial economy. The compromise of benefiting the White urban lower-middle class, the White land-owner, and to a lesser extent the White businessman, at the expense of Black and Brown labor, is more akin to the economic policies of Fascist regimes as in Nazi Germany and Corporate Italy.
 14. Relative incomes of ethnic groups compiled chiefly from Statistical Year-books. Also, E. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa*, (1962), p. 734; M. Horrell, *South Africa's Workers*, (1969), pp. 6-28, 44 ff; *Cape Times* April 30, 1969.
 15. E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, (1968), p. 240.
 16. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 304.
 17. B. Schoeman quoted in M. Ballinger, *From Union to Apartheid*, (1969), p. 313.
 18. From *Bantu*, December, 1969. Emphasis in original.
 19. *Beeld*, November 9, 1969 (deliberate unemployment); *Rand Daily Mail*, April 1, 1970; *1969 Survey of Race Relations*, p. 98.
 20. *Cape Times*, April 20, 1968.
 21. *Black Sash*, (1970).
 22. Proclamation 84 of 1970-suspension of all minimum wage legislation.
 23. C. Desmond, *The Discarded People*, (1970), p. 162.
 24. South Africa's May 1970 election results do not necessarily indicate a shift towards a repeal of discriminatory laws. See R. Molteno, "South African Election: An Analysis," in *South African Outlook*, July, 1970.

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