Title

Lessons for the "Third Wave" from the First: An Essay on Democratization

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The "first wave" of democratization occurred in the late nineteenth century.* The word "democratization" would then have denoted the creation of new citizenries: the inclusion in the political process of groups previously excluded from it. In the late twentieth century, the period of the "third wave," democratization denotes the process of transition from authoritarian rule and the full-scale fashioning of democratic institutions. But this, like the first wave, includes the creation of large new citizenries, so that it should be possible to derive lessons for contemporary democratizers from the earlier experience.

As always in making historical comparisons, there are differences between the periods and processes that enjoin caution in projecting one period onto the other. Perhaps the most notable difference is that in some cases of political inclusion, notably in the Anglo-American countries, mature institutions of representative government had largely developed prior to large-scale political inclusion. However, in most countries during the earlier period, e.g. in France and Germany, new citizenries and new constitutional orders developed simultaneously, as they do now. In all, large new citizenries required large institutional adaptations, such as the modern systems of mass parties. Above all, the late nineteenth century, like the present period but unlike any other, was an era of unprecedented, broad-scale, and discontinuous change toward democracy. The two "waves" thus are not so dissimilar as to make it implausible to look for guidance for the later process on the earlier. 1 If these reinforce established theories about the conditions of viable democracy, the theories themselves acquire added credibility and it seems even more prudent to base present actions on the historic lessons.

The Process of Political Inclusion

By political inclusion I mean the extension of citizen-rights to those who have not previously possessed them: legal rights to participate in the selection of incumbents of political offices and to achieve governmental office oneself. Political inclusion in the nineteenth century ended patrician privilege in politics and gave electoral preponderance to ordinary people.

In a few cases, the process can be traced back to the 1820s and 1830s. Mostly, however, it occurred, as if by contagion, in a period from roughly 1865 to 1905 with the two decades from 1865-1885 a particularly significant divide.2 In each country the process took special forms, but all can be placed on a dimension that runs from more gradual and incremental change to more abrupt and broad-scale change.

As usual, Great Britain is the prototypical gradualist case, although the principal inclusionary reform, that of 1867, was radical by British standards. The more celebrated Reform Act of 1832 did not create new citizens. Rather, it is significant for the fact that it changed the electoral system from one of corporate representation to individual representation. The institution of individual representation, however, was necessary to prepare the ground for the inclusionary

reforms that came later. Since the Middle Ages, representation in Parliament had been of corporate entities - boroughs, counties, universities - with the number of individuals in them disregarded, so that, among other effects, some individuals possessed plural votes as members of different corporations. This had led to glaring anomalies, especially the "rotten boroughs": constituencies without any or with little population. To remedy the anomalies, the Reform Act of 1832, for the first time in British history, related representation to size of individual population. The Act was a dramatic instance of a much more general change from corporalistic to individualistic thinking, but it was not radically individualistic; even in 1865, the largest British constituency still had thirty-five times the population of the smallest.

The Reform Act of 1867, which falls into the critical period of inclusion elsewhere, was the crucial legislation. Despite using some property qualifications, it not only greatly increased the electorate, but, more important, gave a preponderance of votes to members of the working class. Still, even that huge change was accomplished in a gradualist manner: only by broadening the citizenry that lived in towns. The countryside remained a stronghold of aristocratic and squirearchic privilege, until, seventeen years later, the same qualification was extended to the rural constituencies. By 1885 inclusion had become the norm. Sixty percent of adult males were enfranchised, compared to about three percent before the first Reform Act.

Other reforms slowly followed, intended gradually to realize fully the ideas contained in these essential reforms: the secret ballot (1872); stiffened penalties against electoral bribery and limiting the election expenses candidates could incur (1883); redistribution that abolished seats for tiny boroughs and limited to a single member all but huge ones (1885) - although it was not until 1918 that one could speak of tolerably equal constituencies; then female suffrage after the first World War, the Boundary Commission which keeps constituency-size under constant review (1944); and the abolition of plural voting in 1948. The whole process was spaced out over more than a century, and it unfolded in what seems now to have been a logical sequence of first things first and next things next.

It is more difficult to generalize about the United States, because formal political inclusion was a matter for the states. The general outline, however, is clear. The United States got an early start on political inclusion during the great wave of popular politics that swept the country between 1820 and 1840, when the suffrage was granted to virtually all adult men. Slaves (and females) of course were the glaring exception. The great wave of inclusion in Europe later in the century, however, had an American counterpart in two occurrences. One was the inclusion of ex-slaves, and implicitly of all minorities, through the 15th amendment (1870). The second was the arrival of waves of new immigrants who were considerably different ethnically and in class composition from most earlier immigrants. Through immigration, the United States had to deal with a large new citizenry that was perhaps even more predominantly lower-class than the new European citizenries.

The continental pattern was more abrupt. In Spain universal suffrage was instituted suddenly in 1890. In France political privilege ended all at once with the Basic Law of 1875 that instituted the Third Republic; this abruptly granted full manhood suffrage. In the newly unified Germany, less radically, the ancient method of weighting "estates" was abolished and the franchise, for the first time, was widely granted - to about 20 percent of the population, compared to two to five percent before 1871.

The Scandinavian patterns were mixed. Norway had an extensive franchise already upon its creation in 1814, at least by the standards of the time. Moreover, most of the enfranchised were ordinary people - specifically, ordinary farmers, since a property qualification that favored

landed property was used. However, there was a critical year of inclusion, 1884, when a lenient minimum income qualification replaced the property qualification, with consequences comparable to the British Reform Act of 1867. In 1900, universal manhood suffrage was introduced. Political inclusion also came early to Denmark, which instituted nearly universal male suffrage already in 1849. Finland and Sweden, however, did not have a broad suffrage until the first decade of the twentieth century, when it was instituted abruptly, in the continental manner.

The wave of political inclusion that occurred in the late nineteenth century had sources in other social changes, such as industrialization, urbanization, and working-class mobilization. The effects of these changes on politics have been widely discussed. Less known is the fact that, as in the present period of democratization, the earlier wave resulted as much from the bankruptcy of the old order as from the aspirations of the new.

The privileges of the old exclusive "political classes" had been justified in large part by the argument that good breeding and well-being made for the largess and selflessness of outlook required for true civility and statesmanship. But, in the nineteenth century, this had become transparent embellishment on a contrary reality. Economic development, even pre-industrial development, presented many opportunities to use privilege for gain, and thus made political positions more attractive to opportunists. Oligarchic politics became increasingly a bazaar for obtaining grants and contracts, places and sinecures. This coincided with the loss by the old order of its traditional legitimacy through ideological shifts that accompanied socio-economic change. The forces underlying current democratization are a similar combination of socio-economic changes and the corruption and decay of an established order.3

Human Nature and Democracy

After the last fifty years of political science, the first lesson that should be learned from nineteenth-century political inclusion might seem obvious and not necessary to point out. Nevertheless I will discuss it at some length here because it is fundamental- and also because, judging by contemporary writings and actions, it has in fact been hard to learn. The lesson is that *human beings do not have some natural affinity for democratic political orders; inclusive democracy, even if properly instituted, cannot be expected to develop of itself.* Effective democratization requires far more than a process of formal inclusion and the design on paper of a democratic constitution. It is an intricate and difficult task.

Expectations from Inclusion

Expectations from political inclusion in the nineteenth century, as now, were great, and the obstacles that might impede their realization were considered to be minimal. The prevailing view seemed to be that people are somehow democratic by instinct. All that was needed to achieve inclusive representative government was the opportunity to participate, a well-designed constitution, and some rudimentary popular education.

The ideas of the British utilitarians typify this. Their views are best represented by James Mill's article on representative government in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* of 1825. This became the utilitarians' holy scripture on political inclusion. Mill wrote that the "security of unselfish interest" would, and would only, be attained through an "identity of interests" between the public and the polity through full political inclusion. It was impossible for a community to act against

its own interests, and it knew its interests "by instinct." Citizens needed some education, but no more than was necessary to read. Bentham similarly thought that ending parliamentary corruption and achieving liberal democracy only required universal suffrage with a literacy requirement, the secret ballot, and annual parliaments.

Even more striking is that the advocates of political inclusion thought little about obstacles to the realization of their vision. They did not think about whether or not political inclusion would make necessary structural adaptations in governmental

and political organizations. They gave no thought to the possibility of public apathy. They seemed unaware of the need by the newly enfranchised for organization and leadership, or of the opportunities for exploitation that might arise from this. Least of all did it occur to them that the laboring classes might not be strongly attached to liberal-democratic values themselves.

A particular psychology was associated with the liberal advocacy of political inclusion. Graham Wallas (1908) called it the psychology of "enlightened self-interest." Its model was de Tocqueville's depiction of public associations. In the participatory polity people would enlarge one another's minds and feelings through reciprocal influence; through public discussion people would become conscious of being particles of "a great community," of the interests of that community, and of the fact that personal interests and the communal interests were identical. De Tocqueville had associated this psychology with small, self-governing bodies like the New England town meetings, but advocates of inclusion took it to hold also in mass electorates.

Liberal psychology was associated with great faith in the ability of constitutions to institutionalize viable liberal-democratic polities. Faith in constitutional contrivance had deep roots in an important element of Enlightenment thought: belief in the mechanical nature of societies. The conception of the polity as a "machinery of government" has an obvious affinity for constitutional "engineering." Mechanisms, unlike organisms, are artifacts; they function as they do principally because of their construction, and they function about the same under most conditions. The viability and working of organisms, to the contrary, depends much more on their interplay with their environments. Political inclusion and the belief that appropriate constitutional design was the only thing needed to guarantee its success thus went hand in hand.

Disillusion

Dissenting voices were few, even among conservatives. However, about a generation after the principal period of inclusion - over a period that runs roughly from 1890 to 1920 - thoughts about democratization underwent a massive change. Great expectations now gave way to great disillusion. This, initially, was greatest on the part of good liberals and champions of ordinary people themselves. Graham Wallas, a gentle and moderate Fabian socialist, is a paradigmatic case-in-point. In *Human Nature in Politics* (1908), Wallas wondered whether representative government might not "prove to be a mistake after all"; and, he adds, "it is the growing, not the decaying, forces of society which create the most disquieting problems." Wallas, like others at the time, sought a more adequate psychology to make sense of the political behavior of the new citizenries. In fact, much of the drive that led to modern psychology and social psychology derived from mystification about the behavior that followed political inclusion. S.E. Finer (in Pareto, 1966) even attributed the growing repudiation of all rational thought by men like Poincaré, Bergson, and Sorel to deep disillusion with the intellectualist trappings of liberalism.

Four perceptions were involved in this disillusion. They pervade both the scholarly and popular literatures of the time. [4] The first of these is that *political inclusion does not equalize*

anything, but only re-ratifies political life. During the period 1895-1920 the discovery was made that "ruling elites" were being spawned in democratized societies, not least in the very political organizations of the newly included. Earlier there had been openly privileged patriciates; now, their place was taken by clandestine "elites sprung from the people." The new elites simply put effective political exclusion on an implicit and murky basis, where earlier it had been frank and transparent. Political inclusion thus was considered a fraud. Indeed, it was argued that patrician rule had better inhibited the more cynical and brutal aspects of domination, because it was explicit and based on traditional norms that also restrained elites rather than on brute success in power-struggles.

Second, effective exclusion by new elites was made worse by the perception that *much of the general public, through apathy, excludes itself from full citizenship.*

We have become so accustomed now to apathy in politics, that it is hard for us to imagine the sense of shock, indignation, and derision that went with its initial discovery. Wallas estimated from his own experience as a politician that not more than 10 percent of ordinary people were politically aware enough to attend an occasional political meeting, and those who did were derided by their neighbors as busybodies. [5] Wallas was outraged when no one in a neighborhood could tell him where a political meeting he was to address was being held. J.E.C. Bodley, the principal historian of the Third Republic at the time, wrote that the new French voters tend to avoid elections because they prefer "unalloyed recreation" to political participation; ask the great majority about elections, he went on to say, and they will reply: "Je ne m'occupe pas de politique" - a peasant may use a more vigorous verb. Just as well, says Bodley, given their fixation on picturesque personages and their lack of genuine interest in political issues.

Political apathy was the main reason that new elites could spring up in the very midst of organizations set up to mobilize and champion the newly included. Wallas had already noted the strange indifference of workingmen toward their own political organizations, but it is of course Michels who holds the patent here (1949; originally 1910).

A third general perception of the effects of political inclusion was that *the ordinary public is not a "public" at all but a "crowd."*

We are generally aware now of the elitist reaction to inclusion and of the disillusion caused by political apathy; these have continued as major themes in political science. What was involved in the belief that the public is only a "crowd" is less familiar, but this was an even more strident theme of critical writing about inclusive democracy.

The liberal idea of a "public" derived from de Tocqueville, particularly from his account of the operation and effects of small bodies of citizens, like the New England town meetings. To account for experience with inclusion, a very different social psychology clearly was wanted. In individual psychology, perhaps not coincidentally, ideas appeared that played down ratiocination and stressed impulse and instinct, imitation, suggestibility, and conditioning, and this provided the basis for a new social psychology as well. Impulses and instincts, wrote Wallas, play a large role in individual behavior, but "they increase in their importance with an increase in the number of those influenced by them." A model was now sought for what a mass public driven by impulse would be like, and the model seized upon was that of French revolutionary crowds. For a time, in fact, social psychology and the psychology of crowds were close to synonymous.

The most influential work on the subject, LeBon's *The Crowd* (1960; originally 1893), was explicitly about behavior "attendant on the entry of the popular classes into politics." LeBon's was a fanatical book. He was a racist, and his book has a racist contempt for ordinary

people. They suffer from "socially induced stupidity"; they have "mediocre wits," a high tolerance for pious fraud, and a disposition to violence. They are childishly subject to caprice and impulse. Acting in "crowds" further reduces their wits. The public mind worships heroes, especially criminal heroes. Its morality is debased. Through the entry of the popular classes into politics we are launched on a new "tide of barbarism." And so on.

Astonishingly, this bilious and prejudiced book became, according to Gordon Allport, "perhaps the most influential book ever written in social psychology." *The Crowd* became a popular vogue-book upon its appearance. It also influenced scholars as diverse as Freud, Robert Park, William McDougall, and Michels. Even Max Weber, who characterized the supporters of popular leaders as "soulless followings" who had been "intellectually proletarianized," was susceptible.

Fourth, as for the new political organizations that were both to educate and channel public opinion, it was thought increasingly that *the leadership of mass political organizations operate like gangs that prey on the masses.*

The advocates of civic inclusion had thought that the relationship between the new citizens and their leaders and organizers would initially be one of temporary tutelage. The better educated and more large-minded workers, would guide the inexperienced citizenry through the early stages of mass citizenship.

By the end of the century, that idea was thoroughly discredited. It was particularly discredited by the discovery of the American political machine in large cities where crowds of new immigrants settled. "Crowds" and political "machines" were closely associated, having the same source. The machines themselves were internally authoritarian: they were "bossed," hierarchical, monocratic, and strictly disciplined, almost as if they were para-military forces. In this they resembled urban gangs, and, as Whyte (1943) has shown, they were in fact closely connected to the gangs; one graduated out of the gang into the machine, applying lessons learned in the earlier experience. At bottom, the machine's purpose was not even political, except for the use of politics for despoliation. Weber thought that machine bosses were like tax-farmers and Bryce compared them to stockbrokers and called them "street vultures."

The machines did render important services to the new citizens through patron-client relations: as intermediaries to unfamiliar and threatening powers. But the people they served were also their victims, as ballot-fodder and for doing the machines' dirty work. The most cruel fraud of all was that the leaders of the urban masses tended to be social climbers who used the new politics to rise into or near the old patriciate. The new lower-class political organizations were, to a great extent, vehicles for co-optation into the old patriciate.

The political scientists who fashioned democratic theory after the Second World War were mainly influenced by the collapse of some democracies and the serious malfunctioning of others during the inter-war period. However, long before this, a great change of mood concerning democracy had already occurred in political science. The later reconstruction of democratic theory, beginning with Schumpeter, was an extension of this. The changed mood grew from puzzlement in regard to political behavior attendant on inclusion. Its fruit has been more systematic and empirical political studies - political science as we know it. Long before World War II this had started to develop in studies of political behavior, the pioneers being men like Wallas and Lippman, who began to wed political science to psychology, and Lasswell, through the study of elites. Later, the new political science was extended to the study of how political systems really work. The initial impetus for both of these changes came from

experiences with political inclusion, so that political science may be regarded as above all a science that tries to illuminate the puzzles originating in political inclusion.

The New Optimism

I have dwelt on this subject because now, when a new wave of democratization is under way, the lessons learned earlier seem to have faded. It is a little as if there had been no political science in the meantime. A new democratic optimism that is much like the old is again developing. Giuseppe Di Palma's recent book, *To Craft Democracies,* is a case-in-point, and a good representative of the contemporary transitions-to-democracy literature.[6]

Di Palma pretty much dismisses revisionist democratic theory on the astonishing ground that the people who produced it were misled by earlier experiences with democracy. He makes some concessions to the revisionists, and we are counseled to keep expectations from the new democracies moderate. However, Di Palma also holds, as his central position, that building democracies is mainly a matter of managing properly the transitions to it. Earlier theory held that the conditions of viable democracy lie deep in social structure and culture. Not so, says Di Palma. Democratization is mainly a matter of being crafty during the transition from authoritarianism - a matter only of nursing democracy through infancy.

No doubt the management of transitions to democracy is important, and transition-theorists say much that is persuasive about it. No major change can be accomplished without a transition to it, and obviously mistakes, even fatal mistakes, can be made during the process of transition. However, laying the groundwork for effective democracy after a limited period of transition to it also is a crucial problem. After all, the old failed democracies (Weimar for instance) failed after a rather extended and apparently successful period of transition to democracy. No one thought around 1930, eleven years after its founding, that the Weimar Republic was seriously endangered. So how does one try to assure that democratization will be more than a short-lived transition? The answer now seems again to be that we may entrust its success to human nature and well-designed constitutions. The perception of human nature is not quite the same, but the argument about democracy is similar.

How then does one "craft" democracy by transition-management? First, it is presupposed that the situation in which democracy-crafting can occur must be "ripe" for it. This, however, does not refer to social-economic-cultural conditions of democracy as the older democratic theorists envisioned them. It means only that there must be a prior regime-crisis in the authoritarian order, a perception of its bankruptcy. In crisis, "normal" determinants of stable democracy supposedly are off; crisis makes the system available for creative artifice. It helps if the crisis-situation is

perceived to be a stalemate between the major interests in society - the officials, the military, owners, and labor - so that no special group can envisage a win without concessions to the others. At the deeper socio-economic level, only a certain amount of economic development (not very high) is presupposed.[7]

The perception that an old order is bankrupt and a new one is needed as a way out no doubt is a sounder basis for building democracy than the bare belief that democracy need only exist to succeed. However, a myriad of crises have occurred in authoritarian regimes without the outcome of viable democracy. In many of these crises before our own time, mutual reconciliation in a more open polity must have been the sensible outcome. A politics of reconciliation and openness has in fact been a common outcome of regime-crises in the past. The trouble is that

almost always the appetite for authoritarian dominance sooner or later overcomes the former sense of deadlock, and thus the will to reconcile competing forces in open democratic competition.

The mechanism that seems to operate here is something like charisma in Weber's political sociology. Charismatic authority occurs in crises and operates outside of normal routines. However, it is itself doomed to be routinized. It may leave major traces in the routines of society - Weber thought that only charisma could overcome ingrained social rigidities - but it does not permanently suspend "normal" laws of social life, and it is not necessary that it should have any lasting effects on the reconstituted institutional life of society. Charismatic phases are as likely as not to be merely transitory periods of excitation.

Why then should the present wave of change due to crisis turn out differently from the earlier period of democratization? Because, says Di Palma, there is available now a recipe for getting viable democracy out of the raw material of regime-crisis. It is a simple recipe that has three ingredients. First, one should avoid "Jacobin radicalism," i.e., the desire to reconstitute the whole social order. Secondly, a policy of *garantismo* should be adopted, as in Spain - the model-case for the new optimism. *Garantismo* is a policy that guarantees to all major groups in society - the political left, center, and right and structural interests in society like the church, labor, business, bureaucrats, and military officers - that they will survive democratization pretty much intact and that they will be able to realize their fundamental interests in the new regime. How is this to be done without again risking the old stalemates and the old subversions? Through formal "pacts" among the interests. What then will guarantee that the pacts will be observed more than temporarily? Here enters the third ingredient: constitutions that institute democratic rules of the new political game and guarantee the arrangements. These should be adopted quickly, says Di Palma, at the very outset of transition. They should be planted early to develop early roots. What details go into constitutions is less important than the fact that they exist, provided only that they institute the requisite amount of *garantismo*. People will get used to playing the constitutional game by playing it - presumably, rather quickly and by getting from it some tangible benefit, like civil peace.

This position differs from nineteenth-century optimism, in part, in that it supposes some modicum of social learning, rather than just relying on raw, unacculturated human nature. It makes a small concession to cultural theories of democracy. More notably, it relies more on special sectional interests than on "natural" civic spirit. Still, human nature remains the root of viable democracy. It is no longer the human nature of "enlightened self-interest," but a less pretty human nature: narrow interest, illuminated by regime-failure and by formal guarantees to special and powerful interests, plus a presumed tendency of people to become quickly habituated to any institutions under which they live. But this difference, I submit, is pretty much the mixture as before: much the same in form, though somewhat different in content.

Along with this, as we saw, faith in constitutional engineering, and thus much interest in it, have reappeared. The formal-legalism of the old political science, once thoroughly discredited, has been reborn, and it has been instituted in a great many new projects dealing with constitutional design. No doubt this reflects an unavoidable need for devising new institutional orders. However, one is struck by the faith again put in constitutional projects to yield viable democracies. Certainly no comparable effort is being devoted to thought about how to bring about deeper social and cultural conditions in which new constitutions might take root and flourish. The matter is not wholly ignored, as in the first wave of inclusion, but it is anything but

center-stage. What is different about the new faith in constitutions, is only that they are now regarded as repositories of rules that interests observe in playing the "game" of politics.

Democratization and Economic Liberalization

The second lesson that should be learned from earlier experience with inclusion is that *economic liberalization is far from a sufficient condition for democracy, or even a very favorable one.* To this we may add that *the process of "marketization" of an established command-economy" in fact occurs in tension with that of democratization.* [8] There are several reasons for this.

One reason is the simple fact that countries that earlier experienced democratization, both successfully and unsuccessfully, had market-economies. More often than not, in fact, the outcome was failure. Seventeen countries, Huntington has pointed out, adopted democratic institutions during the wave of democratization between 1915 and 1931 but only four maintained themselves throughout the 1920s and 1930s (1991, 17-21). These four cases all had market-economies, but so did all the others. And market-economies then were a great deal more like literally "free" markets than now - less regulated and constrained by public laws and rules, more ruggedly individualistic, less subjected to public legislation, less "commanded," and thus better equipped with the qualities that are supposed to be the link between economic and political liberalization. The new market-economies that recently have sprung from the ruins of command-economies are likely to be just such unrestrained and unmitigated "free" economies, in the manner of the inter-war western economies. Minimally, this suggests that market-economies generally are neutral in regard to democracy, and less than neutral in their ideal-typical form. Their political counterparts, on evidence, are as likely to be authoritarian as democratic.[9]

"Marketization" might conceivably play an indirect role in democratizing by promoting general economic development. One of the best-established hypotheses we have about the conditions of viable democracy is the Lipset-hypothesis, linking it to level of economic development (Lipset, 1960; also 1993; 1994). This hypothesis could certainly help account for earlier experiences with democratization, since it enables one to hold that most societies had not yet developed sufficiently to be ripe for successful democratization, regardless of the prevailing type of economy. However, the economic-development hypothesis has become increasingly ambiguous as it has been applied and tested. It now seems clear that the hypothesis leaves a large area of indeterminacy, whether conceived, in Huntington's manner (1984), as a zone of transition to democracy, or in Dahl's (1971), as just an area of indeterminacy. It also seems clear now that there exist more powerful determinants of viable democracy that mediate the effects of economic development, and that might therefore be capable of explaining stable democracy independently.[10]

An even stronger argument for the position I have taken here is that the *logical* connection between free markets and free polities is far from obvious. That we sometimes use the same word, "liberalization," for processes that institute both democracy and markets does not make the processes similar or even related. "Economic man" seems in fact to be a species strikingly different from "democratic man." The ideal market-actor is egocentrically absorbed in personal optimizing, in competition with and often at the expense of others. For him, the pursuit of collective benefits, as Olson (1965) and many others since Olson have shown, is highly problematic. Self-interest as identical with communal interests does not exist for him. Per contra, the ideal democratic actor, as even the utilitarians who invented economic man knew well, is

concerned with and aware of the general interest, and subordinates to it personal or factional advantage. He trusts other people and works harmoniously with them to attain common goods. He is certainly an individual, but an individual who, as Aristotle said, is human only in a *polis*.

Why then is there a seemingly strong association between market economies and democracies? For two reasons, I suggest. First, we make the association because we tend to consider the totalitarian model the prototype of the command economy. The Soviet or Nazi economies, however, did not result from an earlier developed command economy which somehow contained their seeds; nor did they ultimately safeguard and preserve the authoritarian political system. Rather than being *conditions* of a political system they developed as *reflections* of the political orders they served. There is no reason then why, if they continue for a time without radical alteration, they should rule out viable democracy.

Secondly, I suggest that an important reason for the association is that, over a long period of adaptation, pure market-relations in the utilitarian sense have been attenuated by democratic legislation and adjudication, and by the gradual evolution of what one might call market-cultures. These have reduced considerably the contradictions with democracy. Democracies and markets have gradually, over a long period, adapted to one another. Such adaptations of contrary behavior-patterns - adaptations that produce viable symbioses - always take much time. A couple of generations ago, the association of capitalist markets with democracy would not have seemed at all evident, even in the United States and Britain. The countries of the ex-Soviet Union provide glaring illustrations of the principle that the liberation of greed far from suffices for instituting a smooth market-economy, let alone democracy. But we should already know this sufficiently from our own history. We should also know it from Weber's analysis of the "spirit" of modern capitalism (1958), because Weber stresses the role played in modern capitalism by values and norms that *limit* the *aura sacra fames*. One may even suspect that the development of an appropriate market-culture - a complex of norms and laws that allow the potential for good of market-economies to be realized while also being safeguards against their potential for social evil - is as difficult to accomplish as a political culture appropriate to democracy.

A third argument against the hypothesis that economic liberalization is favorable to democratization is based on well-established theories that pertain to all general forms of social change. These have to do with the pace and scope of social changes intended to accomplish successful transformation.

One of these theories might be called the *discontinuity-hypothesis*. This says that highly discontinuous social change (rapid change, broad in scale) generally has pathological consequences. Lipset (1960), for instance, has argued that, although level of economic development is directly related to viable democracy, the pace of development is inversely related to it. This equally important part of his argument now seems largely overlooked. Olson (1963) has argued similarly that rapid economic change has broadly dysfunctional social consequences. A still stronger and more general case for linking discontinuous social change to social and political dysfunctions was made by Kornhauser in *The Politics of Mass Society* (1959). "Mass society" à la Kornhauser is a society in which typical political behavior ("mass behavior") resembles "crowd" behavior and which, according to Kornhauser and other theorists of mass society, has a particular affinity for dictatorship, even totalitarianism. Kornhauser summarizes work done on mass society by a long succession of important social thinkers, including Heberle, Arendt, and Ortega y Gassett, all of whom link mass behavior to the rise of totalitarian movements. By all odds the most important source of mass behavior Kornhauser argues, with much evidence and reason, is discontinuous, disruptive social change.11 In fact, he regards such

change as their indispensable condition. Such change has also long been linked to the occurrence of anomie in society, and that in turn to all sorts of mild and intense social pathologies, alongside individual pathologies of the sort Durkheim studied.12

Contemporary changes from command-economies to market-economies certainly come under the discontinuity-hypothesis. Marketization hardly is something that may develop smoothly and gradually, by a kind of self-generation, alongside gradually receding remnants of a command-economy. In its very nature and however cushioned, the changes that marketization entails will be abrupt and large, as has in fact been the case in recent experience. If anomic pathologies in behavior follow, no one nowadays should be surprised.

The second hypothesis can be called the *sequence-hypothesis.* This hypothesis has to do with the spacing in history of major, or "critical," changes. It pertains specifically to the effects of combining major changes in the social or political order. The hypothesis says that such changes are the harder to digest, and the more likely to lead to severe disorders, the more they overlap in time or occur simultaneously.

More specifically, the hypothesis argues this:

(1) Certain highly consequential political issues generate especially intense conflicts. They include issues of national identity, the relations of church and state, regime-structure and popular participation, and redistributive social policies. These involve deep and broad questions of the boundaries, nature, and purpose of the polity, and of legitimacy. Consequently, the problems which the issues pose contain great potential for becoming "crises," in which the viability of the political order is at stake. (2) If these issues are settled sequentially - that is, one-by-one and in some logical order of "fundamentality" (the very deep national identity problem first, then the regime-issue, then redistributive policies, or something of this kind) - then viable democracy is likely. Britain and the United States are cases-in-point. (3) To the extent that the issues are tackled simultaneously, as they were in Germany for instance, the effects will be pathological, due to the much greater burden of disruptive change and to the deep and complex political cleavages that are likely to result.

The gist of this hypothesis also was already intimated by Lipset, but it is now associated more with Binder et alia (1971). The hypothesis was specifically intended to explain the difference between countries in which inclusive democracy was not associated with conspicuous system failures and those in which it was. It fills this bill well.

There are, of course, newly democratizing countries in which the burden of democratization is not much added to by other transformations. The most conspicuous cases, however, are models of what to avoid in light of the sequence-hypothesis. The most fundamental and cleavage-charged issues concerning the political regime and economic organization are raised simultaneously in these cases. Furthermore, any dysfunction in one area is likely to spill over into the other, and with a vengeance. Marketization would be difficult even if there were a stable political order to oversee the process. Democratization would be difficult even if there were a reliable economy to supply basic material needs. The difficulties increase exponentially in each area if government and economy both are tenuously established.

Gradual, Incremental, and Syncretic Change

A third lesson that should be drawn from the early experience with political inclusion is that *democratization should proceed gradually, incrementally, and by the use of syncretic devices.*

The argument in the previous section implies that social transformation is only likely to be accomplished, and to be accomplished without highly destructive disorders, if it is spaced out over a good deal of time, if it is approached incrementally (that is, sequentially) and if it builds syncretically upon an existing order rather than trying to eradicate it. This is the sense in Di Palma's counsel to avoid "Jacobin radicalism" in democratization.

There is clear evidence for this hypothesis in the history of political inclusion. The more successful cases all were countries in which inclusion was a prolonged process that had at least some features of logical sequencing. In Great Britain, as we saw, the process of inclusion was spread over generations, each step being digested before the next, and it was also carried out as if logically planned. Without the abolition of corporate representation, extending the franchise to individuals would have made no sense. Without individual representation, the idea of including the kinds of individuals who constituted a majority in society would not have been compelling. Only after highly inclusive individual representation was it really necessary to face the issue of equal districts. And so on.

Also, throughout the process, change was always tempered by continuity of aspects of the old order. Most of the old represented corporations had been territorial entities, boroughs and counties, and most of these were retained through the use of "constituencies" - a corporate concept that is not to be confused with the individualistic concept of a voting district. Proportional representation would have been the logical expression of the idea of individualistic representation, but it would also have been a more substantial break with the past than the plurality system. The initial broad extension of the franchise occurred only in towns and cities, where the spirit of reform was most advanced. It also still involved income or property qualifications which restricted it to those more prosperous members of the working class who were most like the old patricians. And so on again.

If a hypothesis fits evidence, one should also be able to specify the reason or logic in it. This is not difficult. The great advantage of gradual and incremental processes is that they allow time to accomplish the further adaptive changes in behavior and institutions that important reforms always entail. For example, political inclusion and democratization make necessary something like a modern political party system. Parties in turn require leadership schooled in the arts of political organization; they require activists who do party work; they require party premises, party records, party bureaucracies, party treasuries, party publications, party conferences to select nominees and to define party policy. The fully developed party system has formed stable party identities in the electorate and the identification of parties with symbols; this certainly is not possible in little time. Above all, parties require skills in the arts of interest-aggregation, without which party systems will be greatly fragmented and divisive.

In Britain, modern political parties in fact emerged gradually, step by step, from what had been parliamentary cliques and factions. In the early nineteenth century, being a Tory or a Liberal meant mainly being identified, usually by inheritance, with certain political notables. In the subsequent development of modern parties there were important episodes, but at no single point in, or small range of, time can one point to the beginning of modern British political parties. A date here would be as arbitrary and meaningless as saying that the industrial revolution occurred in 1760.13

In contrast to Britain (and also the United States, where parties were already highly developed when the new immigrant citizenries arrived), fully inclusive democracy came to Germany when the party system was still unripe for it. Granted that political parties antedate the Weimar Republic. In certain respects, they were even highly developed in Imperial Germany,

much more so than in pre-1900 Britain. Party competition, however, had little to do with competition for power and policy, and thus with interest aggregation. The Reichstag was essentially a debating society. Under these circumstances, parties developed highly abstract and typically extreme ideologies, sometimes around mere nuances of policy. Not having any reason to compromise and coalesce, they became ideologically pure - that is, intransigent. Though well-organized and well-equipped with treasuries, bureaucracies, party newspapers and the like, the parties were anything but training grounds for responsible legislative and executive leadership. Nor were they arenas for aggregating diverse interests or even, like most developed parties, electoral machines. The Weimar Republic paid a heavy price for that.

There are numerous other areas in which democratizing change imposes further imperatives to adapt. For example, early democratizing change entailed the progressive extension of public schooling, as a prerequisite for the attitudes and skills that citizenship and eligibility for office require. The extension of education in Britain in fact parallels political inclusion, always lagging some years behind; needs arising from inclusion gave impetus to educational reforms. Such reforms also cannot be achieved overnight. Schooling requires buildings and equipment, teachers, teacher training, curricula, syllabi, textbooks, and examinations; above all, it requires appropriate attitudes toward occupations and the future of one's children; and all of this takes much time even just to put in place.

In Germany, in contrast, the educational system, although, like parties, highly advanced, had not developed in symbiosis with political inclusion, or as an adaptation to it, as in Britain and the United States. If any civic training was provided, it was training in being a good subject in an authoritarian and highly bureaucratic state. Schools were in place, but what they inculcated was far from socialization for democracy. The German schools required numerous adaptations to democracy, and these are probably harder to accomplish when a system has already developed and hardened than when it is embryonic. In most currently democratizing countries making such adaptations of established systems of education is precisely what is required.

The point is that any limited social change has repercussions in many segments of society, and these in still other social areas, so that time and experience are needed to "digest" change fully and to metabolize it into the social order.

Gradual and incremental change also allow some incorporation of the old elite into the new order - co-optation in reverse. This may spare the new order the enmity of old elites and thus the enmity of people who command resources that make for a high capacity to resist and to do mischief. Among those resources is a set for which any new order has particularly great need: "human capital," which includes education, technical skills, administrative experience, and the like. One of the great ironies of social life is that new social structures that lack well-established routines have especially great need for people who already possess such capital, which tends to be accumulated mainly by old privileged segments, and which cannot be appropriated and redistributed. The result often is a paradox. This is exemplified by Kelley and Klein's important study of the Bolivian Revolution of 1951 (1978): an egalitarian revolution that initially did much to equalize, but that, over time, accomplished no equalization at all, precisely because the new order required human resources concentrated in the old elite. Human capital can never be created overnight, and so the cooperation of old elites becomes essential in any social transformation.

What is more generally involved here is the desirability of "syncretic" change, if real change is to be achieved effectively. Syncretic change is change that grafts on to what exists, rather than destroying it. It adapts the old to the new and vice versa. Its model is the extraordinarily successful missionary spread of early Christianity; the idea of syncretism was in

fact first developed to describe religious practices and doctrines. Christianity, it has been argued, could expand from being a mere Judaic reform movement, like other such movements before Jesus, by being adapted to the universalism of Greek philosophy early on. Subsequently, missionary Christianity displayed a remarkable ability to incorporate paganism into itself. Christianity especially incorporated pagan rituals and symbolism, from gargoyle decorations on churches to Christmas trees. The Venerable Bede, writing about the successful mission to the Anglo-Saxons in the sixth century, already saw this as a major source of the spread of Christianity.

Political inclusion in Britain certainly entailed the extensive use of political syncretism. On the symbolic level of politics it hardly changed anything. A politician of the early nineteenth century would probably not feel at sea even nowadays in the House of Commons. He undoubtedly would gasp at the presence of women in the chamber, and he would be dumbfounded by the fact that the Speaker is a female. The Speaker's wig and garb, however, would be familiar, as well as all the rest of the House's extensive ceremonialism. Today's Speaker of the House of Commons, in fact, is ideal-typical syncretism incarnate. Political syncretism during the period of inclusion is especially evident in the fact that it was the Tories, under Disraeli, who enacted the crucial Reform Act of 1867; Disraeli, it was said, "caught the Whigs bathing and stole their clothes." Disraeli's doctrine in fact was intentionally syncretic. He envisioned what he called "a union of the cottage and the throne," an alliance between the traditional oligarchy and both the old and new lower classes, to preserve tradition against a common enemy: bourgeois liberalism. What we think of as welfare state socialism, Disraeli thought of as a continuation of the best in the feudal tradition: the hegemony of uncommon people with large stakes in society, in exchange for their assuming responsibility for the welfare of ordinary people.

In the United States and Norway, syncretic adaptations could readily be accomplished because representative governmental institutions and comprehensive civil rights and liberties had developed similarly before mass inclusion, along with political parties in something like modern form. Political inclusion thus could be absorbed by a preexisting and suitable institutional apparatus. In the United States, as well, political inclusion was handled incrementally early on, over quite a long period (about two decades) because of federal devolution. It did not become universal all at once; nor was there much of an "old order" to overcome. The main fact, however, is that the more problematic new citizenry, the new immigrants who started to arrive in the late nineteenth century, could be incorporated into a fully fashioned democratic order - although even so, as we saw, the process of incorporation was bumpy, giving rise to anomalies like the urban political machine.

Democratic Culture

A fourth lesson that may be drawn from the "first wave" of inclusion is that *viable democracy requires an appropriate political and general culture, and this, in turn, a social structure appropriate for such a culture.*

A few democracies, as we saw, developed early, when economic development was still low, so that subsequent democratization could build on a substantial base. These have also been the democracies that best accommodated large-scale political inclusion. What accounts for this? It must surely be the fact that these societies already contained seeds of democracy at its inception, and, to extend the metaphor, an appropriate soil in which the seeds could sprout and

grow spontaneously, or in which even mature transplants could flourish. In other words, these were societies that could self-generate democracy. That surely is how democracy must have begun. The favorable conditions are more likely to be found in aspects of culture rather than in social structure or economic development, since the prototypical democracies differed little from other societies in regard to these. If so, cultural factors must surely continue to be important for the flourishing of democracy.

Consider first de Toqueville's classic explanation of the American case.14 De Tocqueville argued that America could be a liberal democracy even as early as 1830 because it had a culture conducive to democracy, and also a social structure conducive to democratic culture. The culture came, in part, from the egalitarian and liberal attitudes associated with Puritan Protestantism, which from the outset was the thematic American culture - the culture into which young Americans were socialized and which was gradually diffused also to new arrivals. That, however, was only one face of a cultural syndrome conducive to democracy. A second crucial ingredient is less apparent but equally important, namely religion, through the moral restraints which it generates. Democracy, said de Tocqueville, is a system that particularly requires self-restraint. This is so because it liberates choice and action, and therefore also mischief, and indeed a considerable potential for tyranny. Religion disciplines democratic liberty. Thus the liberal and restraining forces in American democracy had a common source in the culture of the settlers.

Nowadays we would recognize this argument as an early statement of what may be called the mixed-culture hypothesis (à la Almond and Verba and others). This is the hypothesis that viable democracy must have two faces, one liberal the other not, however contradictory that may seem.

Norms and values, however, are nothing much without the ability to act upon them skillfully. Here enters the structural condition of democracy: Americans, argued de Tocqueville, could learn the proper exercise of liberal democratic citizenship and leadership in the myriad "small republics" of local government, like the New England town meetings which practiced a highly collective democracy. They could also get a democratic civic education in the myriad more small republics of voluntary associations that existed in early America. Note that de Tocqueville never thought of education for democratic citizenship as schooling; rather, democracy was learned by practice. There are good reasons to think that this position still holds in the age of mass schooling - indeed that there is something of a paradox in the use of the inherently authoritarian relationships of schools to instill democratic values and know-how. Structural conditions in America thus provided a framework in which behavior conducive to democracy - collective decision making, the aggregation of narrow interests, the art of compromise, and so on - could be learned. Nowadays we can recognize this thesis as the equivalent of what may be called Putnam's social-capital hypothesis.

Perhaps most important was that America was a thoroughly egalitarian society, at any rate in the North where the dominant culture resided. Tocqueville still believed in something like an underlying "spirit of the laws" that pervaded all aspects of a society. In America this was equality. In fact, de Tocqueville virtually equated democracy and equality. Democracy as government equalized citizenship, but this was part and parcel of a much more general egalitarian spirit that pervaded all of American social life, making for a fundamental congruence among all its segments.

Since Norway also developed liberal democratic institutions early we should, if de Tocqueville is right, find equivalents of the American conditions there. Anyone familiar with my

book on Norway (Eckstein, 1966), will know that indeed we do, and strikingly so. Egalitarianism, a long tradition of democratic local governance, the pervasive development of associations large and small, on a scale scarcely imaginable even in America - these are primary themes in Norwegian society, and have been virtually from the start. One special trait of Norwegian politics, however, is especially noteworthy here; it provides perhaps the most telling corroboration of de Tocqueville's position. An extraordinarily large proportion of politicians on the national level serve long apprenticeships as legislators and officers, e.g., mayors, in local government. Local government thus is the fundamental school for national leadership. It can serve the training-function well because the national government's structure and processes are simply a macroscopic version of those of local government. (I will come to this point again in the next section of this paper.)

Britain does not quite fit this mold. Local government has never played a similarly central role in Britain, although an intense and extensive associational life also developed early there. More important, Britain has been a stratified and deferential society, and was emphatically so in the era of political inclusion. What then made the British recipe successful?

In part, I would suggest, the British mix succeeded because there existed in the earlier British oligarchy a substantial liberal culture, along with representative institutions. This could be adapted smoothly to liberal democracy. Liberalism was almost as traditional in parts of the British oligarchy as Toryism was in others. In part, I suggest further, the recipe worked because the oligarchic political class deliberately adapted to, in fact promoted, inclusive democracy. Also in part, it succeeded, as I have suggested, because the mutual adaptations of old to new and new to old were extraordinarily spaced out over time and sequentially carried out, so that mutual adaptations had a chance to be worked out. The result, say Almond and Verba, was a "civic culture" like the American, but a "deferential civic culture," unlike the "participant" variety found in America.

From this argument we can extract another lesson. This is that *the speed with which democratization can be carried out successfully varies directly with the extent to which preexisting culture and social structure are conducive to it.* To apply this hypothesis we must, of course, know what these conducive conditions are.

Through the work of contemporary political scientists, conceptions of the cultural conditions of viable democracy, and of the structural conditions conducive to democratic culture, have become less intuitive and more based on evidence and reasoning. The subject is large, but suffice it to say that de Tocqueville's position on the subject has been much elaborated and improved, but never essentially altered. The overall picture that emerges is this:

(1) The democratic culture is a *mixed culture*, in which disparate, perhaps even contrary, elements are balanced. Liberal and participant elements always play a vital role in it, but they require balancing by other norms and practices.

(2) Democratic political culture coexists, and probably is based on, a more general culture, in which major themes are (a) high s*ocial trust* and (b) what might be called *"civicness"*: the tendency to act "horizontally," viz. cooperatively, with others rather than "vertically" through hierarchical relations, such as patron-client relationships.

(3) Democratic political culture is based on a highly developed *associational life in society,"* the hallmark of what is now generally called "civil society."

(4) Democratic culture and structure are constituted by substantially *congruent* segments, in which the norms and practices of smaller entities substantially resemble those of national governance, especially those smaller entities that play important roles in political socialization

and the recruitment of politicians and leaders. Society in this way can be a school for learning democratic citizenship and governance. From this it follows that political democratization should be accompanied by a good deal of *social democratization* - the democratization of social life in a more general sense.[15]

One more point should be added. There are substantial reasons for holding that people of low socio-economic status - poorer people, unskilled workers, etc. - are generally the least well-fitted of all segments of society for incorporation into a liberal-democratic order. The phenomenon of "working-class authoritarianism" in politics was already given prominence by Lipset in the 1950s, and massive evidence to support the position that such authoritarianism is common could already then be marshaled. In my own work, I have developed the broader hypothesis that authority relations among poorer people (in families, for instance, or in predominantly lower-class schools) typically are highly authoritarian: the lower one goes on the economic scale, the more pronounced becomes authoritarian behavior, so that socialization to democracy is weakened or prevented. I have also tried to show that the adaptation of behavior to great scarcity, viz. to poverty per se, is the source of this. Being highly adaptive to a given, one would expect lower-class authoritarian attitudes and practices to be especially hard to change, short of changing them at their source (Eckstein, 1984a). This point matters because the principal beneficiaries of political inclusion have been people who are far from affluent.

The Practice of Democratization

The arguments developed here may be used as a basis for prudent actions in the process of democratization. I want now to summarize some maxims of prudence that seem to follow from them.

The most fundamental of these is to recognize what problems must be solved, or alleviated, for democratization to succeed. On my analysis, there are two crucial practical tasks that face democratizers. One is short-run: to manage the transition to democracy. Contemporary transition-theorists deal with that problem, often wisely. However they say little about the most difficult question for strategy which democratic transitions pose: how to democratize at a proper pace, on a proper scale, and in a sensible sequence. The long-run problem is how to foster the emergence of democratic culture, without which transitions to democracy can bear no permanent fruit.

The Pace and Scope of Democratization

A critical problem for all ambitious social engineering is how to proceed with what the American Supreme Court has called "deliberate speed": not too rapidly and also not too slowly. We may add to this the concomitant problem of how to limit changes to a proper scope that is neither too broad nor too narrow. There will be strong pressures in the democratization process to go in both of these directions, and also strong reasons for doing so. Since this is just not possible, tricky choices must be made.

That there is no single ideal pace or scope for democratization is implicit in the hypothesis stated on below: how rapidly and broadly one can proceed depends on the materials with which one starts. If a country already has in large degree the cultural and social traits associated with viable democracy, one can no doubt even have something like instant inclusive democracy - although in that case inclusive democracy probably already exists, and has existed

for some time. If some of the traits are in place prior to democratization, one can proceed faster, and with a higher probability of success at any pace.

Spain would furnish a good test of this assertion. After a long history of unstable democracy and stable dictatorship Spain seems to be well on the way to becoming a stable democracy. The returns are not yet all in, but all the signs point in that direction. One should expect to find therefore that at least some of the traits of viable democracy were already well in place prior to recent democratization, but not when broad political inclusion first occurred in the late nineteenth century. I assume here, of course, that the present political order in Spain endures and functions well. One may also expect that this was not the case to nearly the same extent in Portugal. Studies of these countries, especially comparisons of them, can pay large dividends for democratic theory.

In most contemporary cases it will no doubt be necessary to proceed deliberately and on a narrow scale rather than speedily and broadly. In other words, in most cases one has to face what is probably the single most important and intractable problem in engineering social transformations: how to put brakes and limits on the process so that changes can be "digested," in the sense I spelled out above. There are several reasons for this difficulty.

One reason is that when an old order has substantially disintegrated a new order cannot be long postponed without the risk of chaos. Total disintegration, to be sure, is unlikely in the first place. Even in the late Roman Empire and in the so-called Dark Ages society went on with some degree of order. Nowadays bureaucracy will function as a powerful negentropic force even while more conspicuous institutions are in ruins or embryonic; democracy, as Weber forcefully argued, does not alter the power and permanence of bureaucracy. But even limited social entropy must be countered, or it will increase. A highly predictable new institutional order must grow from the ruins of the old.

Secondly, on the plain historical record, when the spirit of transformation has been unchained, there will be enormous pressures to bring change about quickly and broadly. The new order will be awaited impatiently, both by leaders and the general public, and it will be expected to transform more than a limited functional aspect of society. The more is expected from change, on the record, the greater is historical impatience. Most revolutions thus go through a phase of intense overheating - a fever, in Crane Brinton's apt analogy - to accelerate the pace of change. All too commonly, when change falls short of expectations, this involves scape-goats and bloodletting of people perceived as subversive obstacles in the path of progress. Hence Di Palma's counsel against "Jacobin radicalism." The problem has always been *how* to avoid it.

I have already mentioned another basic reason for not proceeding radically - namely that any partial change in a desired direction will not have the full effects intended unless accompanied by many concomitant adaptations. Being unable to move with high success on any narrow front, there will always develop a Jacobin temptation to move on all fronts simultaneously.

In addition, and quite apart from Jacobin temptations, if the pace of transformation is slow and the scope narrow, one risks the consequences of "relative deprivation" in society. One such consequence, as Gurr has shown, is political violence. Already de Tocqueville, in his other masterpiece, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution,* pointed out that the potential for upheaval is greatest when social and political conditions are being ameliorated, not when they are getting worse. The mechanism involved, relative deprivation, results from rising expectations and thus growing gaps between expectations and reality. Put this together with Jacobin temptations on the part of rulers and you have a recipe for catastrophe.

Democratizers therefore must typically perform an extraordinary balancing act. The problem of how to perform it is in fact not a "problem" in the technical sense, for problems in that sense have possible solutions (Weldon, 1953). Rather, it is a "dilemma," because no real solution of it is possible. Not all difficulties have solutions. Some are like the difficulty that arises when you want to eat your cake and to have it too. The logical structure of the problem of proceeding toward democratization both speedily and slowly, broadly and narrowly, is exactly like that. Nevertheless, like it or not, there is no more pressing problem for thought about prudent action in attempts to bring democracy about. Problems like what to put into new constitutions - whether, for instance, one should use a presidential or parliamentary system, one or another of the numerous varieties of electoral laws, a unicameral or bicameral legislature, and so on - pale in comparison. Not that these issues are negligible. They simply do not seem to be at the crux. Yet they have tended currently to monopolize effort and research support in studies of democratization.

Dilemmas cannot be "solved." However, they may be reduced, or at least coped with, through some *via media* between their extremes; it is always possible to eat part of a cake and to have the rest. In democratization "eating part of the cake" means proceeding in a manner that may suffice to buy time early on without overloading the process and then continuing sequentially, in some reasoned manner, over a good deal of time, so that changes can be "digested" and so that they can prepare the way for further changes. Amount and sequence of change are the core of the problem of proceeding deliberately in democratization. Current theories of democratic transition tell us much of merit in regard to disarming enmities that might destroy a nascent democracy in short order, and that can thus buy time for its development. They do not, however, say much about how such development might proceed in regard to its overall pace, scope, and sequence. That of course is the critical problem in choosing strategies and tactics of democratization.

Here then are some reasoned suggestions for such strategy and tactics. Bear in mind as these are proposed that pressures toward the radical extreme of accomplishing change may be so great that no policy can overcome them.

How can one be both radical and moderate without contradictory actions? A possibility is to appear radical while in fact acting moderately - moderately enough to give change a chance and radical enough to appease pressures toward greater and faster change. A useful, and much used, way to do this involves the short-run long-run distinction. If short-run policies explicitly aim at the achievement of the equivalent of radical transformation and if sufficient reason exists not to regard the short-run processes as dishonest dodges, then the contradiction between radicalism and gradualism might conceivably be resolved. No one can guarantee that it will be, but I know of no other way that it even has a chance.

Accordingly, I propose that one should work out a comprehensive, explicit, detailed, and scheduled agenda for proceeding from partial to full democratization, and - crucially important - proceed with it faithfully, step-by step, strictly in accordance with its schedule, so that the process of trying to accomplish large-scale change may be perceived as dependable from the start and later. The agenda must be large and comprehensive because what is sought as an outcome is big change. It must be explicit, because the whole must constantly be affirmed at least as a detailed plan while progress-in-pieces is pursued. It must be carried out in a reliable manner, without significant departures from plan, so that its deliberateness will not appear as evasion or betrayal. The checkered history of the implementation of *Brown v. Board of Education,* in which the "deliberate speed" principle was enunciated, is a good example of the

problems that arise when one states an ultimate principle without a definite plan for approaching it. Plans can and should, of course, allow for a fair amount of flexible adaptation as experience is acquired. But in attempted social transformation it seems advisable to risk rigidity in order to promote perceptions of honest intent. Most people probably are far too used by now to would-be democratizers who promise but do not honestly deliver.

This raises a problem often encountered in political inquiry, but far from solved: the problem of appropriate time-spans. Over how long a period should one proceed in democratization? I know of only one study that can shed logical light on this: Gurr's study of the duration of regimes, which, among other things, contains measures of their overall "life-expectancy" at different points of their duration. It seems that after a period of about fifteen years just about anything is still about equally likely to occur, from quick demise to something approaching permanence. After that, however, persistence becomes more likely as time from the start increases (Gurr, 1974.) This is not just a quantitative finding; it also contains a certain logic. If time to "digest" major change is needed, then some span of time will always be required; and if digestion involves cultural changes - changes in orientations through learning - spans of time must be measured in generational terms. This does not necessarily mean several generations. One may suffice, at least to achieve some self-sustaining momentum. Note, for instance, that by about 1970 the present German political system appeared to have stabilized sufficiently to make persistence more likely than demise. Likewise, the Fifth French Republic by the late 1970s seemed definitively to have outlived its charismatic founder.

Thus a plan to democratize fully should probably cover some twenty-five years - more or less, depending on local conditions. That is something near the normal half-life of regimes and sufficient for at least a good deal of generational replacement. Nor is such a period beyond most people's conception of what is "reasonable" if, as it elapses, progress toward an explicit goal really is in fact made as scheduled, to signify honest intent. It will also seem honest if the earlier changes are the more essential for legitimating democracy - those that are salient in public perceptions. [16] Less essential changes can be left for more gradual introduction. In any case, one generation is about the most that historical patience will bear among latecomers to any advanced development, while less time involves a good deal of disruption.

If this principle makes sense for strategy, the first important problem for tactics is where to start. In regard to this, there is no way to avoid devising some sort of constitution early on, so that governance can proceed on a reliable legal basis, without constant arbitrary improvisation. That part of Di Palma's recipe for crafting democracy has merit. But there is still a problem with this: how to avoid hasty design and too-early rigidity of the constitutional order, without experience of how well it is adapted to prevalent conditions. If we had a lot of well-tested theories covering the effects that different constitutional formats will have under varieties of initial conditions, that problem would not arise, but we have none that come even close. In that case, having the best of both worlds might be achieved by beginning with a brief and explicitly *provisional basic law* that concentrates on the core-contents of constitutions, in something like the manner of the French Third Republic at its founding. Thereafter, over time, some constitutional committee or small body should work out a more definitive constitution, profiting from experience along the way. The best outcome would be that of the French proverb, "only the provisional endures." The provisional Basic Law of the Third Republic in fact endured longer than any other French constitution.

There is every reason to have broad public debate over particular proposals, on the lines of the Federalist Papers, over a good deal of time. This would allow constitutional provisions to

become implanted in popular attention, and public sense to be reflected in the provisions. There is also a potential for excitement in the open airing of basic issues, particularly in an era of mass communications. Nor is there any reason why a provisional basic law should not be amended piecemeal as experience with it grows. We have no adequate theories for adapting constitutional orders to the social conditions under which they must operate, but learning from experience with results and adjusting innovations to results as these become obtrusive is a useful alternative. The French call this *bricolage*, which is not engineering but a substitute for it and sometimes the superior process. Constitutions in any case must be culturally "internalized" to have reliable foundations and effects.

The part of the constitutional order that should be fixed earliest is guarantees of civil rights and liberties, together with a judicial system that can deal with violations. Openness without retribution is an absolute sine qua non in democracy and thus for its legitimacy. In the model cases of successful democratization, rights and liberties in fact were substantially established before the machinery of inclusive democratic governance was developed: the systems were "open" before being democratic. There also is evidence, for instance from surveys in the former Soviet Union, that liberal democratic values tend to be widely agreed upon at an early stage, long before there is adequate practical training in the subtle intricacies of democratic governance, or the development of structural requisites for democratic politics, above all a party system. Most aspirations will usually be concentrated on rights and liberties anyway, and especially on their reliability. Reliable political openness also is a prerequisite for the sort of deliberate discussions on which a well-adapted constitutional order must be based.

We know by now that the most salient figure in government, and often the only salient figure, is the head of state. The ideal seems to be a pompous ceremonial figure like a monarch. The only conceivable democratic equivalent of such a figure is a plebiscitary president. There are dangers of Caesarism in such a presidency, which Max Weber wrote about presciently before the installation of the Weimar Republic. But risks must always be run, especially if we are pretty sure that the risks entailed by alternatives are greater. Democratization, after all, is a system of government, a system for directing societies. Thus it requires some clear focus of authority, so that governance can go on, so that violent dissidence can be dealt with, and so that the progressive realization of democracy can itself occur. Clear authority at the center is especially required when democracy is young and fragile. The subject of whether in general presidential or parliamentary systems are preferable is complex and there is a large and growing literature about it. The debate, however, largely ignores the special requisites for short-run consolidation.

As for detailed governance, it seems to me most essential to give a great deal of scope and autonomy to local governments, including quite small-scale local governments, and to do so early. In that way the load on central authority is reduced and, just as important, experimentation with various formats of governance can proceed. (A greatly decentralized system of local government also has another, even more important, advantage that I will come to in the next section.) Highly decentralized autonomy will, of course, be messy, and there will be temptations to make centralized order out of it, but remember that the one thing worse than a fragmentary mess is a uniform mess.

Three other matters also need to be done early, in the logic of democratization. One is the adoption of an electoral law, because democracy equals elections. The two others are matters about which also we are still highly ignorant: fashioning a workable system of political parties and incorporating the inherited bureaucracy into the democratic order. I will come to these a little

later, for reasons that will be apparent then. Most other matters secondary to these, and thus are appropriate subjects for *bricolage*.

There is a catch in all this. However well planned one may want to proceed, there will be only partial control over the spacing and sequencing of democratizing changes. Events and conditions tend to run away from planners and authorities, with their own momentum, almost from the start. Read the Epilogue to Tolstoy's *War and Peace* to see how this is so in battles, and in all of history. The further away from first and early steps are actions, the more likely detailed plans for them at the start are to be moot. Initial overall sequencing therefore should be general and vague - as, according to Napoleon, should be all constitutions as blueprints of governments.

The counsel to proceed syncretically with as much of the old order as can be brought into symbiosis with the new should also be observed. How to do this depends, of course, on the specific materials with which one has to work, so that it is difficult to discuss this subject in general terms.

Economic liberalization, if it must also occur, should also be gradual. The reasons for this are the same as for democratization, but even more imperative, because the satisfaction of basic material needs and wants is at stake. The principal practical issue concerning marketization is its sequencing relative to democratization - assuming that one has a choice. In light of what I argued above, steps toward economic liberalization clearly should follow steps toward democratization, not vice versa, though overlap will often be unavoidable. Tackling both tasks simultaneously with equal priority, as we saw, is the worst option, and the hypothesis that economic liberalization provides conditions for democracy, as we also saw, is dubious.

Fostering Democratic Culture

Democratization can proceed on three levels. One is the surface-level, so to speak, of designing democratic institutions. I call this the surface-level because the institutions might be or become mere facade. Another level lies deep beneath the surface; it involves trying to create social conditions and individual personalities that can provide deep roots for democracy. The third level is intermediate; it involves fostering a specifically democratic political culture, together with those particular aspects of social structure that are most closely related to such culture.

The intermediate level is the critical level if democratic institutions are to be more than scenery. Without specific democratic orientations, moreover, general democratic personalities are unlikely to be formed. The deeper level of overall social structure and personality also is hard to access, except through some intermediate level. Thus a crucial task in building democracy, perhaps the one essential task, is to provide a framework for fostering democratic culture.

The nature of culture is such that it is impossible to create it, as one may create formal institutions. [17] One can, however, try to create conditions in which an appropriate culture may have a reasonable chance to develop.

The most important condition required for fostering democratic culture, and also the only one accessible to engineered change, should be apparent in light of the analysis made earlier. It is the creation of strong, small-scale local governments ("elementary republics," in Jefferson's words), together with a large network of associations, particularly occupational associations. To some extent, associations and "small republics" can substitute for one another, since they have similar effects, but it is better to have both because they reinforce one another and because they might engage different people for different purposes.

The functionality for democracy of a vigorous associational life (or, more broadly, what is now called "civil society") is a recurrent theme in democratic theory, from de Tocqueville to the present. De Tocqueville, as we saw, argued the case for strong local government a century and a half ago, and the logic of his case, which turns on the socialization and training functions small republics can perform, does not depend on time. Most recently, Putnam has argued, convincingly, that only acting in cooperative groups fashions the sort of "social capital" on which a "working" democracy depends. The theme probably is recurrent simply because it is correct.

Associations can be mandated just as much as local governments, at any rate, provided that there is a pre-established structural basis for them, similar to locality for local governments. Occupations and professions provide such a basis in modern societies. Already Durkheim argued that occupational and professional associations would be the fundamental building blocks of societies that have an advanced, complex division of labor, as they had already been in medieval cities and even in the cities of the Roman Empire. They would be, so to speak, the "neighborhoods" of complex societies, in which interaction is close and frequent and in which incentives to mutual help and considerateness - to pursuing "collective goods" - are great. It is strange that in contemporary constitutions and writings on constitutional design associations are generally overlooked, except for the standard provision of the right to form them. A proactive approach to the forming of associations surely is conceivable. No doubt forming associations voluntarily requires preexisting social capital, but once associations are in place they themselves create such capital.

If local governments and associations are to serve a democratizing function, it is also important that they themselves have internal liberal and democratic structure. Norwegian local government, as I have described it (1966), might well serve as a model in this regard. It particularly emphasizes action in common, that is, collective decision-making on all levels and thus agreement-seeking. It also interweaves, in somewhat complex ways, local governmental committees with local associations and with lay participation. If local government is wanted as a school for democracy, the Norwegian model certainly provides a good start. The New England town meetings that de Tocqueville so admired also could serve as a model, though much less so in the age of bureaucracy and managerialism than when de Tocqueville wrote.

This point involves something generally overlooked in the deliberate engineering of political order: that pieces of social and political systems must fit with other pieces, and that an overall aim must be the fashioning of a certain congruence and consonance among the pieces. Only thus can they mutually impinge on one another in a reinforcing manner. If the internal organization of associations is legally mandated to parallel those of local governments, and if the two are interwoven on collective local bodies as they are in Norway, fit and congruence obviously are promoted. It is particularly important to mandate and enforce democratic associational structures because, upon much evidence, the tendency toward non-democratic organization is strong if associations are left entirely free to define their own internal structures. This tendency seems to be particularly strong in occupational associations like trade unions. It will be especially strong if cooperation, reciprocity, and trust are not solidly rooted in the historic cultures of societies.

The recipe, then, is devolution in all phases of politics and governance, the deliberate engineering of structures that might foster democratic skills and behavior patterns, and an overall interlocking and congruent fit of structures, as in coherent systems. The results of this recipe, above all initially, will be messy, but democracy-values always exist in some tension with

efficiency-values. A certain messiness always is a built-in cost of democracy, but it also has an advantage: it is a good hedge against something highly ordered, but badly ordered.

To begin to bring about a general social structure systemically articulated with democratic governance and political culture, two considerations seem especially important.

One is socio-economic stratification. Liberal and participatory values and behavior, as stated, do not have fertile soil in which to grow in material scarcity. That there will be a great deal of fundamental want is, on the evidence, a great risk in forming market economies from command economies. Economic liberalization should therefore be cushioned considerably by comprehensive welfare services. These mitigate some of the more cruel consequences of free markets in general, but, more important here, they guard against a condition always inimical to the formation of democratic orientations and personality.

The second factor is participatory structure in "everyday life," particularly workplace participation - social democracy to underpin political democracy. Pateman's argument that this is critical for the general formation of participatory attitudes seems to me convincing. There is, in any case, nothing else that might form a similarly general basis for democratic civic experience and training. In most advanced democracies, workplace democracy has in fact developed a great deal, and often, and without harm, on a compulsory legislative basis. A considerable literature on workplace democracy already exists. Most of it is sobering in one respect: it is one thing to provide participatory frameworks and quite another to get people to use them. That, however, is no argument against providing such frameworks.

A Case for "Indirect" Representation

A great deal of constitutional designing is done nowadays as part and parcel of democratization processes - as it must be. Even if constitutions matter less for the viability of democracy than was once thought, and now seems to be thought again, designing a formal constitutional order, provisional or permanent, is necessary and so might as well be done thoughtfully, with an eye on the future of new democracies. We have a large contemporary literature on this by now. Some of it is thoughtfully based on contemporary theory (for instance the literature on consociational devices), but not much of it is innovative. We find almost no creative ideas, tailored to contemporary conditions and designed to help create the socio-cultural bases on which the fate of democratization must ultimately rest. The old chestnuts are again discussed: federal versus unitary structures, parliamentary versus presidential systems, plurality elections versus PR. Choices among these surely matter. However, a great opportunity now exists to innovate in devising democratic institutions, comparable to the opportunity provided by the first wave of democratization. Innovation is required now as then, to adapt democratic structures to conditions of late democratization.

In conclusion, therefore, I want to make a proposal for a novel procedure that is based on the logic of the preceding arguments. Being novel it may seem odd, especially since the only precedent for it goes back centuries.

The logic of the arguments made here adds up to a general maxim: *In democratization, small democracy (local and associational democracy) should be as direct as possible and large democracy (national democracy) as indirect as possible.* How might this be accomplished?

A simple way to make national governance indirect is to staff national legislatures with members who represent local governments and perhaps also associations, and who are elected or designated by the smaller units. As we saw, local units earlier were adapted to plurality elections

as "constituencies." Nothing prevents their now being adapted as *corporate* bodies that select national representatives and leaders in the manner of electoral colleges. Corporate representation in the oldest representative government antedates 1832, but it is not necessarily bad because it is pre-modern, if now adapted to modern conditions. [18] Nothing like a full system of indirect national government has ever been devised, but surely, upon the logic of the analysis I have presented, the idea should be entertained. The proposal also makes sense if local government is to be the vital core of democratization.

A particularly important advantage of an indirect national representative system is that it would assure that national political careers are based on local experience and the civic training it provides. If this experience is highly democratic, then democratic behavior on the higher level will also be encouraged. And fostering appropriate civic education is particularly important when political orders have not yet been fully developed.

Using associations similarly would realize an old idea that has undeservedly faded from attention. This is the idea of "functional representation," as canvassed by some political theorists, particularly the British "pluralists" (Figgis, Cole, Laski, et alia) early in this century. The general idea behind functional representation was that the geographic division of constituencies was by then outdated, and that it would become more so. Geography once was the "natural" basis for grouping people politically; however, it was argued, with social development local differences and identities had declined and would decline much more over time. Hence, the "natural" basis of differentiation increasingly would be functional - that is, based on the division of labor in society. For the first hypothesis, the decline of local differences, there is overwhelming evidence, and the second follows from the first.

The case for functional representation of some sort in late democracies thus is strong. It has in fact been strong for a long time, as the significance of geography has declined and that of functional differentiation has increased. Using it would be a step into the remote past but also an adaptation of processes of representation to advanced modernity, the hallmark of which, it has been argued since Durkheim a century ago, is the growing complexity of functional differentiation.

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Endnotes

* An early version of this essay was presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, New York Hilton, September 1-4, 1994.

1 Throughout this essay I will use the expression "viable democracy" to mean something like a democracy in good health: able to persist, to adapt smoothly to changed circumstances, to command legitimacy, to avoid civil strife, and to do work efficaciously.

2 As always in historical periodization, these dates are somewhat arbitrary.

3 A comparative history and analysis of nineteenth-century political inclusion has not yet been written, and is overdue. The subject would be ideal for a doctoral dissertation, or indeed a larger research project.

4 I have discussed these perceptions in much more detail than here in Eckstein, 1984a.

5 Wallas made a very good guess, or else showed very good judgment. The systematic quantitative analysis of participation has arrived at just about the same figure now. That an estimate and a carefully measured figure, more than a half-century apart and in two quite different countries, should so closely coincide should suggest some interesting hypotheses.

6 For representative studies of transitions to democracy see Stepan, 1989 and O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986.

7 Di Palma subscribes to Samuel Huntington's argument (1984, 1991) that there is a "zone of transition" between very low and very high development, in which the possibility of managing democratic transitions successfully exists. Earlier, for instance in Dahl (1971), the argument that economic development has a strong relationship to viable democracy only at its lowest and highest levels had been used more to impugn the general economic-development hypothesis than to argue as Di Palma does.

8 Note that the argument here involves the process of economic liberalization, not the political consequences of well-established market economies.

9 That, of course, might give democracy better odds than it has when a command-economy exists. I use the term "quasi-totalitarian" because totalitarian in the abstract denotes a regime in which all boundaries between what is private and what is public have disappeared. Thus a totalitarian liberal economy is a contradiction in terms.

10 There is no space here to support these arguments properly. Fortunately, that has been done already, in a masterly article by Larry Diamond (1992). An important recent contribution to the evaluation of the hypothesis can be found in Putnam (1993).

11 "Mass society" also is the result of a structural condition: the lack or underdevelopment of what is now called "civil society" - social entities' intermediary between isolated individuals and central political power. Much more about this will be said below.

12 Still the best study of the political consequences of anomie is De Grazia (1948), a work that should have a prominent place in postwar revisionist democratic theory.

13 See Robert McKenzie's classic study of British political parties for details (1963).

14 I will be very brief here, because most readers will already know de Tocqueville's theses.

15 Sources for this summary include Kornhauser, 1959; Lipset, 1960; Almond and Verba, 1960; Eckstein, 1993; and Putnam, 1993.

16 I discuss below what these essential changes probably would be. This depends of course on actual perceptions. These will vary, but we now have adequate instruments for finding out what these are. For instance, facilities for survey research now exist almost universally.

17 The reasons for this are discussed in Eckstein, 1996.

18 The advisability of various electoral systems is at present much discussed in the literature on democratization. This discussion deals almost exclusively with the merits of systems of plurality and

proportional elections, in their several varieties. The fact that plurality elections originated in a third general type of electoral system - corporate representation - is overlooked, although some modernized version of it might be the most appropriate of all.