Title
Which Kind of Democracy for Whom? Explaining Citizens' Expectations from Democracy

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7jz4638z

Author
Heyne, Lea

Publication Date
2016-07-31

Introduction & State of Research[1]

According to Campbell (2013), "few claims of 20th-century political science have proved as enduringly relevant as the notion that stable democracy depends upon a concordant wellspring of supportive citizen attitudes". At least since Almond & Verba (1963) and David Easton (1957, 1965) have introduced the notions of *civic culture* and *political support*, the question of citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy has been an important topic for social scientists. When researchers analyze if citizens are satisfied with "the way democracy works" in their country, or whether they support specific democratic institutions, they implicitly suppose that democracy means the same for individuals all over the world. This is, however, a problematic assumption, given that democracy is a multidimensional concept, and that citizens might differ concerning the criteria they expect a democracy to fulfill. In this paper, I argue that in order to be able to analyze support for democracy in a more nuanced way, we need to take a step back and ask what democracy actually means to citizens, what they expect from a democracy, and how such expectations are formed.

Following the typology proposed by David Easton and revised by Pippa Norris (1999, 2011), political support can be measured on different levels, ranging from specific support for political actors to diffuse support for the political community and political regime. Satisfaction with democracy as a regime can be located on a medium level of this typology. In the respective literature, two main approaches to explain country-level differences in citizens' attitudes towards democracy can be distinguished: A democratic history and political culture approach (Almond and Verba 1963; Anderson 1998; Mishler and Rose 1996; Oskarsson 2010; Anderson and Guillory 1997) focusing on the ways in which different democratic (or authoritarian) experiences and concomitant political values affect support for the political system, and a system performance approach claiming that political and economic performance as well as institutional quality affects whether citizens are satisfied with their democracy (Finkel, Muller and Seligson 1989; Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg 1993; Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Bernauer and Vatter 2012). Both approaches showed to have some empirical leverage, but the results differ considerably on

1

the data and methods used (Wells and Krieckhaus 2006), and the best explanatory power seems to be reached with models that combine both factors (Wagner, Schneider and Halla 2009). Further, several studies have also focused on the effects of individual-level factors such as support for the incumbent government (Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Curini, Jou and Memoli 2012) or the economic situation (Schäfer 2012) on democratic support. Empirical results suggest that personal characteristics like being part of the political majority and a favorable individual economic situation lead to higher degrees of satisfaction with democracy.

Yet, little evidence is available that could answer the question whether ordinary citizens agree with political scientists on what democracy is and what it should be about. Indeed, several studies imply that most people, even in authoritarian countries, identify democracy in terms of political rights such as freedom and civil liberties (Dalton, Shin and Jou 2007; Huang, Chang and Chu 2008). But apart from that, no systematic analysis of citizens' expectations from democracy is available. Hence, although there is a large body of research on the political cultures of Western democracies, "little is known about what democracy actually means to average citizens […] or the relevance of these beliefs for understanding how satisfied people are with the operation of democracy in their country" (Kornberg and Clarke 1994). In the light of this theoretical and empirical gap, research about citizens' support for democracy is potentially misleading, given that it is based on the assumption that democracy is a clearly defined and thus internationally comparable notion. According to Canache (2012), researchers in the area of political support are "well advised to step back and ask more fundamental questions regarding what citizens think democracy is and how democracy is defined […]". Hence, if we want to know more about the factors that explain individual satisfaction with democracy, we need to consider citizens' definitions of and expectations from democracy first. Democracy is a highly complex concept, and it might well be that we measure different things across countries and across individuals when we try to capture support for democracy.

In this paper, I want to contribute to the theory-building and the empirical knowledge in this under-researched area by exploring what citizens expect from a democracy, and why. Using individual-level data from the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 6 as well as country-level data from the Democracy Barometer, I test if and how citizens' expectations are influenced by the democratic context in their respective country. *Expectations from democracy* are defined as the normative ideal of how a democracy in general should work. I suppose that every citizen - in a more or less precise way - has a picture of how an ideal democracy should be in mind. In other words, citizens expect a democracy to fulfill specific criteria, and these criteria differ across citizens. The *democratic context,* on the other hand, consists of two factors: First, the *democratic culture* of a country, referring to the age and quality of its institutions as well as its authoritarian legacies. Second, the *democratic model*, designating the way democracy is realized in a specific country - referring to the literature on "varieties" or "models" of democracy, I suppose that each country implements democratic principles in a different way by emphasizing some dimensions more than others.

This paper is structured as follows: In the next section, I discuss the notion of varieties of democracy both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Then, I explain my theoretical model and my hypotheses concerning the impact of this democratic context on individual expectations. Further, I introduce the data and methodology I use to test these hypotheses empirically. Subsequently, I present and discuss the results, to then finish with a general conclusion.

Conceptualizing Democracy in Theory and Practice

Theoretical Approaches to Democracy

From a normative point of view, the fact that "democracy" can mean different things has long been established - democratic theory offers plenty of different and often opposed conceptions of what "government by the people" is supposed to mean and how it is to function. For proponents of the minimalist perspective, democracy is merely a means of protecting citizens against arbitrary rule. The main aim of this type of democracy is to elect skilled representative elites capable of making public decisions, and protecting individual liberties, and elections serve to express and aggregate people's interest. Having its roots in classical republicanism and the liberal model of democracy established by Mill or Tocqueville, modern versions of a minimalist democracy can for instance be found in Schumpeter's economic model of democracy (Schumpeter 1943) and in pluralist models, i.e. from Dahl (1971: 2ff.). In a participatory conception of democracy, to the contrary, participation is valued for its own sake and is considered the core of a democracy. Involvement in politics is assumed to foster political efficacy and democratic skills and to generate concern with collective problems, and citizens are thus supposed to have opportunities to deal more profoundly with political issues in deliberative ways. Based on the classical Athenian democracy, this type of democracy was brought forward by Rousseau, and later on picked up by modern proponents of participatory and deliberative democracy such as Barber (1984: 99ff.). Further, a social democratic approach to democracy also considers political outcomes like social equality as essential for fair and meaningful democratic participation. A government thus has the duty to guarantee the resources that are necessary for the use of these rights as well as an equal allocation amongst the citizens (cf. Held 1987: 274ff). According to scholars such as Fuchs (1999: 125ff.), the distinction between liberal and social(ist) democracy is the most important one when it comes to normative models of democracy. He sees the main difference between the two models in the emphasis of the organization principle of relationships between individuals: While in the liberal model this principle is competition, in the socialist model it is solidarity (*ibid.:* 128).

Democratic Culture, Authoritarian Legacies and Varieties of Democracy

Additionally, democracies can be classified empirically - democracy and democratic cultures differ considerably across countries. A first approach is to look at the overall level of democratic quality, hence the realization of liberal democracy as a principle. Clearly, some countries are more democratic than others, because they offer more political rights, more civil liberties, or a better rule of law. Even amongst established democracies, such qualitative differences can be found, as for instance the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann et al. 2012) has showed. Using this approach, existing democracies can be ranked based on their performance: Some of them fulfill liberal democratic principles better than others. Further, democracies have different historical legacies: Depending on the time and circumstances of their democratization, institutions vary in their strength and consolidation. A broad strand of literature focuses on what has been labeled "attitudinal consolidation of democracy" (Linz and Stepan 1996): The development of democratic culture and values in newly democratized, post-authoritarian countries. Within

Europe, this applies mainly to former communist countries, which have been proven to show different democratic dynamics than their older democratic counterparts in Western Europe. Yet, communist legacies are not necessarily the same across countries either: Kitschelt (1999) claims that the historical legacies of communist regimes have shaped the post-communist democratic politics of these states. He argues that communist regimes differed largely in their bureaucratic apparatus as well as their strategies of repression and cooptation, leading to very different levels of openness. In addition, Southern European countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal share a different recent authoritarian past of military dictatorships.

Another empirical approach refers to the idea that democracies can also differ from each other without being qualitatively different: The literature on varieties of democracy assumes that established democracies diverge in the way they realize democratic principles. Although they are all democratic, they have implemented different principles through formal institutional arrangements and informal practices and procedures. As Bochsler and Kriesi have put it, "they are all variations on a general theme" (2013). Democracy, thus, consists of several dimensions, and existing democracies emphasize these dimensions differently. They approach the 'general theme', democracy, in different ways. For instance, as Lijphart (1984, 1999) has famously stated, some democracies rely more on majoritarian decision-making, whereas others emphasize consensus-oriented forms of power-sharing. According to him, the distinction between majoritarian and consensual decision-making (measured on a vertical dimension between executive and legislative as well as on a horizontal dimension in form of federalism or unitarism) accounts for most of the variance among established democracies. This distinction also seems to play a role for citizens' attitudes: As Anderson and Guillory (1997) have found, living in a consensual democratic system increases satisfaction with democracy, especially amongst election losers. Vatter (2009) has added another dimension to this approach by claiming that democracies also vary between representation and direct participation. The impact of this dimension on citizens has been analyzed as well: Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter (2012) find a positive effect of using direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy in general, and Bernauer and Vatter (2012) identify a negative effect on the difference in satisfaction between election winners and losers.

Explaining Citizens' Expectations from Democracy

Both from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view, democracy is thus not a unidimensional concept simply ranging from democratic to non-democratic. Hence, it seems consequential to suppose that citizens also conceive of democracy in variable terms, and that they have different democratic ideals. Several authors have analyzed individual attitudes towards democracy and mapped different "types of democrats" among citizens (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Kriesi 2013). Their findings indeed suggest that citizens' beliefs which model of democracy is desirable differ - some emphasize liberal notions more, others have a social democratic perspective or find direct participation important (Ferrín Pereira 2013; Wessels 2013). But if individuals vary in their normative conception of what a democracy should be, then where do such individual preferences come from? Expectations from democracy, as defined above, refer to the *normative ideal* of how a democracy in general should be like and which criteria it should fulfill. Generally, they could be inspired by both theoretical and empirical notions. In this paper, I want to focus on the way how these notions differ across countries. In

other words, I assume that there is a relationship between the national democratic context - the way in which democracy is realized a specific country - and citizens' expectations from democracy. My hypotheses concern two factors: First, the *democratic culture of a country,* referring to the democratic quality, age of the democratic regime, and authoritarian past; second the *democratic model*, designating the way democracy is realized in a specific country. Concretely, I assume that democratic culture have an impact on citizens' preferences concerning liberal and socialist democratic norms, while democratic models affect citizens' expectations towards majoritarian (vs. consociational) and direct (vs. representative) democracy.

This implies that the way democratic principles are implemented in a specific country has an impact on individual expectations from democracy in general. Such a macro-micro-effect could be caused by two mechanisms: One way for citizens to "learn" democracy is through socialization - that is, living under a democratic regime and adapting its values due to "passive" exposure to the regime principles. Following the literature on democratic learning and political socialization, we can assume that individuals acquire political attitudes and values through processes of socialization (Mishler and Rose 2002). More generally, social constructivist approaches in sociology assume that individual norms and values are generated in a process of social experiences and interactions (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Such processes can occur in micro-contexts such as families, schools or peer-groups as well as in macro-contexts - in a society or culture as a whole. As Fuchs (1999) puts it, "ideas about what a democracy is and how it should look [...] are instilled by primary and secondary socialization processes." Whereas micro-level socialization can lead to differing values among individuals of the same society, depending for example on their gender, class and education (Almond and Verba 1963), macro-level socialization should have similar effects on all the members of a society or cultural sphere: "Everyone socialized into a culture is exposed to the same set of values supporting the regime and its basic rules of the game" (Mishler and Rose 2002). Hence, democratic values are, at least partly, created through regime-specific socialization.

From the literature on the democratic culture in post-communist countries (Fuchs and Roller 2006; Mishler and Rose 1996; Fuchs 1999), we know that exposure to a democratic regime has an impact on individual attitudes towards democracy: The longer citizens have lived in a (functioning) democracy, the higher their support for liberal democratic principles tends to be. Further, evidence from Germany shows that citizens in the former Eastern Germany, contrary to Western Germans, prefer socialist ideas of democracy over liberal principles (Sack 2014: 12ff.): While in the West an understanding of democracy near to the liberal model of democracy dominates, in the East the dominating understanding of democracy is one that corresponds to the socialist model of democracy. Such differences in democratic values are attributed to the varying socialization in the former West and the former East. Other authors could confirm this result for other post-communist states (Fuchs & Roller 2006; Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2014). Hence, differences in democratic norms between the Western and the former socialist states in a great part can be explained by diverging socialization experiences in these states (Fuchs 1999). Similarly, Bochsler and Hänni (2015) can show that citizens in younger and especially in post-communist democracies tend towards a performance-based view of their regimes' legitimacy, whereas established democracies dispose of a more procedural legitimacy.

If we refer these arguments to the democratic culture in a country, we can assume that longer exposure to liberal democratic institutions should enhance support for procedural liberal democratic principles. On the other hand we can expect citizens of post-communist democracies to have rather performance-based expectations from democracy – hence, that they prefer a social

model of democracy over a liberal one. Yet, these effects are very likely to not be uniform amongst all citizens: First of all, the quality of liberal democratic institutions as well as the durability of a democratic regime should have positive effects on support for liberal democratic principles. Secondly, authoritarian legacies should decrease support for liberal principles, while enhancing social democratic ideals amongst citizens. This effect is dependent on the length of exposure and the level of closedness of the regime, as defined by Kitschelts' typology.

H1: Exposure to liberal democratic institutions leads to higher support for liberal democratic principles among citizens: The longer the exposure and the better the democratic quality, the stronger the effect.
H2: Exposure to authoritarian regimes leads to higher support for social democratic principles among citizens: The longer the exposure and the more closed the regime, the stronger the effect.

These arguments are based on the democratic culture of a regime. Yet, as described before, democracies also differ in the way they realize democratic principles, independent of the age and the quality of democracy. Based on Lijphart (1999) and Vatter (2007), I use the two main dimensions of democracy, which are majoritarian vs. consensual and direct vs. representative democracies. I assume that growing up in a specific democratic model also leads to favorable attitudes towards these aspects of democracy. Be it via the media, through formal education or in interaction with other citizens, the way democracy is realized in a specific country will very likely have an impact on individual conceptions of democracy. Such a macro-micro effect can also be caused by the mere definition of the term democracy: In a country with strong direct democratic institutions, speaking about "democracy" will often imply direct democracy. Hence, a citizen of such a country might immediately think of direct participation when hearing the word democracy. This leads to the third hypothesis:

H3: Citizens tend to value those democratic principles more that they experience in their own model of democracy.

So far, I assume an indirect socialization effect. A more specific way of socialization is the adaptation of democratic attitudes through active participation in democratic processes: Participatory approaches to democracy (Barber 1984; Mansbridge 1999) presume that political participation has an educational component. In other words, participation in democratic processes serves to "form" the democratic citizens. Individual political interests are thus seen as something that is not endogenous to a person, but develops in the course of democratic processes. As Quintelier and van Deth, Jan W. (2014) have found, political behavior affects political attitudes, and not (just) vice versa. Their findings indicate that it is much more likely that political participation strengthens political attitudes than that attitudes trigger participation. Institutionalized social contacts are thus seen as a 'school of democracy' where people learn and internalize political attitudes (ibid.: 4). If we confer these arguments to democratic structures, the type of democratic participation might also affect individual preferences from democracy. In addition to the passive socialization effect, there could thus also be a form of active socialization. From a social psychology perspective, this means that people change their attitudes and emotions based on what they infer from their own (political) behavior (Quintelier and Hooghe 2012). In other words, the democratic structures citizens experience in their political participation will have an effect on the democratic values and thus the normative ideal of democracy they hold. In

this context, we could speak of a procedural effect of democratic structures. Hence, Citizens who actively participate in democratic processes should be more likely to orient their expectations from democracy towards the democratic context they experience. Yet, other than the regime socialization hypothesis, this theory only applies to those citizens that are actually participating in democratic processes, and not to all citizens: Someone who abstains from elections, referenda or other ways of democratic decision-making is not subjected to a procedural effect of democratic participation. When it comes to democratic models, the most obvious example would again be direct democracy - a citizen who experiences direct participation in referenda himself might also develop positive attitudes towards this form of democracy, more than someone used to representative democratic elections. The same also applies for majoritarian and representative democratic systems. H4 hence is:

H4: Active participation in democratic decision-making reinforces the effect of democratic models on citizens' democratic ideals.

Figure 1: Exposure Effects (Hypotheses)

7

Methodology

Data & Operationalization

In order to analyze the effects of macro-level democratic structures on individual attitudes towards democracy, data on two levels is needed. On the individual level, the 6th wave of the European Social Survey contains a set of questions about citizens' expectations from democracy in general, and covers 53.000 respondents in 27 European democracies[2]. Some examples for these items are:

"And now thinking about democracy in general rather than about democracy in [country]: How important do you think it is for a democracy in general…

…that the courts are able to stop the government acting beyond its authorities?

…that the rights of minority groups are protected?"

Each question can be answered on an 11-point scale from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (very important). All in all, the ESS offers 19 items on different democratic characteristics, ranging from input criteria such as the voting system to output criteria such as social policies. These items are used to capture citizens' democratic ideals. The second data source, covering country-level data, is the Democracy Barometer (Bochsler & Merkel et al. 2014). This dataset offers a large set of more than 100 variables, measuring the fulfillment of different institutional characteristics in 70 democracies, which I use to measure the democratic context in a country.

Dependent variables: To capture citizens' expectations from democracy, I use the ESS items.[3] Liberal and social democracy are each measured by several variables: The liberal dimension by preferences for free and fair elections, freedom of opposition, media freedom, transparency, minority rights, and equality before the law. The social dimension is measured by citizens' expectations concerning the protection against poverty and redistribution.[4] For the two dimensions distinguishing democratic models, I use the item on direct participation ("How important do you think it is for a democracy that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums?") for the direct-representative dimension, and the item asking for government preferences ("The government in some countries is formed by a single party; in other countries by two or more parties in coalition. Which is better?") to capture the majoritarian – consensual dimension.

Explanatory variables: For the 27 democracies in my sample, I measure the democratic culture as well as the democratic models on the country level. Democratic culture consists of different variables: *Democratic quality*, first, is measured with the overall score of the Democracy Barometer, with values ranging from 0 to 100[5]. The age of a *democracy* is measured by the years since the country's transition to democracy. Further, I code the country's *communist past* – former communist countries are coded as 1, no-communist countries as 0.[6] Additionally, I account for the type of communist regime by using Kitschelts' (1999) distinction between patrimonial communism, national accommodative communism and bureaucratic-authoritarian communism. The first regime type is the most closed one, while the latter is the most open type. Countries with an authoritarian, but not communist legacy - Spain and Portugal - are coded as military dictatorships. For a list of countries with authoritarian legacy and their coding see table H in the appendix. Further, to account for socialization effects, I use years of individual socialization under communist regimes. Following Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014, I code exposure to communism into early (# of years between age 6-17 living under communist rule) and adult (# of years aged 18 and up spent living under communism) exposure.

For the different *models of democracy*, I use two sets of variables from the Democracy Barometer: To capture the majoritarian – consensual dimension I use the share of coalition governments over the past 23 years, where 0 indicates only single-party governments, and 1 indicates only coalition governments. To measure the direct-representative dimension, I use the component "constitutional provisions for direct democracy", consisting of two indicators for direct democratic institutions as well as for participation quora, again ranging from 0 to 100. To count for socialization into models of democracy, I use interaction effects between the country level-democratic model and individual level political behavior. On the individual level, voting is a dummy (1 = voted last election), whereas non-electoral participation is a scale ranging from 0 (no non-electoral participation at all) to 7 (participation in seven different forms).

Control variables: I control for GDP per capita as well as population size on the country level, and for gender, age, education (in years), unemployment, left-right self-placement and being born in another country on the individual level. For descriptive statistics and coding of all variables see table A in the appendix.

Analysis

I use cross-sectional hierarchical models where level-one units are citizens and level-two units are countries. As most of my dependent variables - citizens' expectations from democracy - are continuous on a scale from 0 to 10, the models are linear[7]. After excluding non-citizens and respondents below 18 years (not able to participate in national elections), I have a sample of 47.000 respondents[8] from 27 countries.

In addition, political sophistication is an important factor in determining individual patterns of support. The literature on sophistication suggest that factual knowledge about politics is the best single indicator of sophistication (cf. Zaller 2006). However, the ESS does not offer such knowledge measures. Authors such as Gabriel and Keil 2013: 167-169ff) have argued that political interest (as measured in the ESS) differs considerably across European countries and can be seen as an adequate proxy for political sophistication. Therefore, I also use political interest to measure sophistication at the individual level. The individuals are assigned to two groups: Low political sophistication = no/little interest in politics and high political sophistication = high/very high interest in politics. As a robustness check, I test my models in both groups to see whether sophistication changes the outcomes.

Results

Democratic Culture

In a first step, I test my hypotheses 1 and 2, who deal with the effect of democratic culture on citizens expectations. To do so, I test the impact of the country-level context on two dependent variables: Liberal and social expectations from democracy. Figure 1 shows the effects of democratic culture. For the full model, see table 5 in the appendix. As for the expectations towards liberal democracy (Model 1), there is a positive, but not significant effect of democratic quality on the importance citizens attribute to this dimension for a democracy in general. The age of democracy shows no effect. Living in a post-communist country however has a significant

and negative effect on support for liberal democratic norms, confirming H2. When it comes to communist exposure, the effects are comparatively small: We see a negative effect of adult exposure, and surprisingly a positive effect for early exposure. Looking at model 2, we can see that the main effects are inversed: Democratic quality shows a negative (yet again not significant) effect on support for social democratic principles, while living in a post-communist democracy significantly increases support. Communist exposure effects remain small, with a negative effect of adult exposure and a positive effect for early exposure.

In a next step, I include dummies for the type of authoritarian regime to better understand the effects of communist socialization. Figure 2 shows the results, for the full model see table 6 in the appendix. We can see that the effects remain largely the same as in the first analysis - democratic quality is positively related to liberal values, and negatively to social democratic values, yet never significant. (Post)communist socialization decreases citizens' liberal democratic expectations, and increases social democratic expectations, again confirming H2. However, the results for different types of communism are rather surprising: While all three types show the same direction, the effects are strongest (and significant only) for bureaucratic-authoritarian communism. Even though this type of communism, according to Kitschelt (1999), is the most open form of communist rule, and hence should have led to less strong socialization.

Figure 1: The Effects of Democratic Culture (Coefficient Plots)

Model 1: DV Expectations Liberal Democracy

Model 2: DV Expectations Social Democracy

Figure 2: The Effects of Democratic Culture, including Types of Authoritarianism (Coefficient Plots)

Model 1: DV Expectations Liberal Democracy

**Model 2: DV Expectations Social Democracy**

Democratic Models

In a next step, I test hypotheses 3 and 4, which refer to different models of democracy. Generally, I find support for the both hypotheses regarding socialization and participation for direct participation and the type of government. Figure 3 shows the results for these two dimensions. For the full models, see table 8 in the appendix. As for the question of referenda (Model 1), there seem to be no direct socialization effects of living in a country with direct democratic institutions on the importance citizens attribute to this dimension for a democracy in general, rejecting hypothesis H3. Yet, there are significant interaction effects both for voting and for non-electoral participation. Participating in democratic processes thus seems to have a positive effect on the likelihood of citizens living in a country with direct democratic institutions to value this dimension more for a democracy in general, supporting hypothesis 4. When it comes to the preferred form of government (Model 2), we see a significant direct effect of the national democratic structure on citizens' preferences for a coalition government in comparison to a single-party government. Citizens living in a country with high shares of coalition governments are thus overall more likely to find a coalition government better for democracy in general. Additionally, there is also a significant interaction effect for voting and the type of government. As with direct democracy, participating in democratic structures through electoral means seems to increase the likelihood of valuing coalition governments higher than single party governments if someone lives in a coalition-led country. However, this only applies for electoral participation; non-electoral participation does not seem to increase the likelihood of individuals to favor the type of government they experience. This supports hypotheses H3 and H4.[9]

12

Figure 3: The Effects of Democratic Models (Coefficient Plots)

Model 1: DV Expectations Direct Democracy

Model 2: DV Expectations Coalition Government

Conclusion

Public support has long been known to be highly relevant for the legitimacy of a political system – as Max Weber (1968: 213) has claimed, "every system of domination attempts to instill in its subordinates the belief in its legitimacy". Especially in a democracy, popular support is a vital resource, and finding out why citizens are satisfied or dissatisfied is thus all the more important. But what do citizens expect from a democracy, and how are these expectations formed? Answering these questions is crucial for the analysis of individual support for democracy. In this paper, I tried to make a first step in explaining citizens' expectations from democracy. Based on the notion that democracy is not a unidimensional concept, but can take different forms, I suppose that citizens also conceive of democracy in variable terms, and expect it to fulfill different criteria. Further, I assumed the democratic context in their home country to have an impact on the expectations they have towards democracy. Indeed, my results support the hypothesis that national democratic structures affect citizens' perceptions of how a democracy is supposed to be: As for *democratic culture*, citizens are more likely to value social democracy, and less likely to support liberal democracy when they were socialized in a (post)communist country. Interestingly, however, this effect does not depend significantly on the duration of exposure to a communist regime. Further, effects are strongest for those citizens from countries who, according to Kitschelt (1999) fall in the group of former bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. This could potentially be explained by a stronger repression and cooptation in these types of regimes (*Ibid.*: 26). Similarly, when it comes to *democratic models* such as direct participation and the type of government, citizens are more likely to expect from a democracy what they know and experience in their own country. In the case of direct democracy, only those citizens who participate (in electoral as well as non-electoral forms) actively in democratic processes have a higher likelihood to find referenda important for a democracy in general. As for the type of government, there are also direct socialization effects on all citizens of a country.

How can these results be interpreted? First of all, they show that differences in citizens' expectations from democracy - that is, their conception of how an ideal democracy is supposed to be like - are not only determined by individual-level factors, they also seem to systematically differ between countries. Citizens' views on democracy as a general concept are apparently influenced by the real-world democracy they experience. Both regime-specific socialization and participation in democratic processes shapes what citizens demand from a democracy, supporting the idea that learning effects of participation also apply to individual democracy perceptions. Hence, these findings imply that on the one hand, the democratic ideals citizens hold are influenced by the democratic culture in their home country: In line with the theoretical expectations from the literature on democratic learning, citizens of younger, post-communist democracies have a more performance-based view of legitimacy and tend to conceive of democracy more in social(ist) terms. On the other hand, empirical varieties of democracy also matter for citizens, as they provide them with a 'blueprint' of how a democracy is supposed to function. Hence, citizens ideas of how democratic principles should be implemented are shaped by the democratic setting one experiences: The dimensions of direct participation vs. representation (Vatter 2009), and majoritarian vs. consensual decision-making (Lijphart 1999) are in fact the most fundamental dimensions that distinguish established democracies. It is thus not surprising that they are also the most salient ones for citizens.

What does this imply for research on democratic support? Researchers should keep in mind that when we are asking citizens about "democracy", if they support and how they evaluate it, their conception of democracy might differ systematically across countries. Given that also democracy researchers rarely agree on what a democracy is supposed to be like, these results are hardly surprising. Accordingly, including citizens' ideas of democratic quality as well as the country-level democratic context in analyses of cross-sectional analyses of support for democracy is important to avoid unequal measurements. Of course, as it is usually the case when investigating values and attitudes, theoretical models are rarely complex enough to perfectly capture the reality. This does however not mean that we should not try to analyze them - only that results need to be interpreted with a certain caution. Clearly, further research needs to be done in order to determine which other factors influence individual expectations from democracy, and how these expectations affect patterns of support for democratic institutions.

Appendix

Table 1: Summary Statistics of All Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Expectations from democracy (individual- level)					
Representative-direct	45697	8.257807	2.058109	0	10
Consensus-majoritarian	39901	.7694293	.4212034	0	1
Liberal	44345	8.666806	1.410708	0	10
Social	45934	8.458669	1.852573	0	10
Democratic context (country-level)					
Representative-direct	27	28.33003	29.42688	0	100
Consensus-majoritarian	27	.7453324	.2852961	0	1
Democratic quality	27	58.3816	6.905862	48.76	73.04
Age of democracy (years)	27	53.75382	34.79947	21	164
Communist exposure, in years					
Early communist exposure (age 6-17)	47328	3.189042	4.781059	0	11
Adult communist exposure (from age 18)	47328	5.173703	10.49898	0	45
Total communist exposure (from age 6)	47328	8.362745	14.04338	0	45
Control variables					
Population	27	2.14e+07	2.48e+07	319000	8.17e+07
GDP per capita	27	26243.63	9572.182	6365.21	46981.56
Gender (1=male)	47311	.457251	.4981744	0	1
Age	47203	49.87367	18.00908	18	103
Unemployment (1=yes)	47036	.3014712	.4589017	0	1
Political sophistication (1=high)	47138	.4578047	.4982217	0	1
Voted last election (1=yes)	45599	.7822759	.4127033	0	1
Non-electoral participation[10]	46648	.8198208	1.273318	0	7
Left-Right scale (0 = left, 10=right)	41151	5.211975	2.341998	0	10
Born in other country (1=yes)	47302	.063676	.2441774	0	1

Table 2: Operationalization of Democratic Expectations

Variable	Items (ESS)
Liberal	…that national elections are free and fair?
	...that opposition parties are free to criticize the government?
	…that the media are free to criticize the government?
	...that the media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government?
	...that the rights of minority groups are protected?
	...that the courts treat everyone the same?
Social	...that the government protects all citizens against poverty?
	...that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels?
Majoritarian-consensus	The government in some countries is formed by a single party; in other countries by two or more parties in coalition. (Which is best?)
Representative-direct	...that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums?

Table 3: Operationalization of the Democratic Context

Variable	Items
Democratic culture	
Age of democracy	Years of democracy (Marshall et al. 2014 and own coding)
Quality of democracy	Democratic quality (Democracy Barometer)
Communist past	Post-communist country (own coding)
Authoritarian past	Post-authoritarian country (own coding)
Democratic models	
Representative-direct	Constitutional provisions for direct democracy (Democracy Barometer)
Majoritarian-consensus	Percentage of coalition governments (Democracy Barometer)

Table 4: Communist and Authoritarian Legacies

Country	*Period*	*Type of authoritarianism*[11]
Former communist		
Albania	1945-1992	Patrimonial communism
Bulgaria	1945-1990	Patrimonial communism
Czech Republic	1945-1990	Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism
East Germany	1945-1990	Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism
Estonia	1945-1990	Patrimonial communism
Hungary	1945-1990	National accommodative communism
Lithuania	1945-1990	Patrimonial communism
Poland	1945-1990	National accommodative communism
Slovakia	1945-1990	Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism
Slovenia	1945-1990	National accommodative communism
Ukraine	1945-1991	Patrimonial communism
Former dictatorship		
Spain	1939-1977	Military dictatorship
Portugal	1926-1975	Military dictatorship

Table 5: Communist Exposure Effects (Full Tables to Figure 1)

	Model 1: Expectations liberal b/se	Model 2: Expectations social b/se
Democratic quality	0.241	-0.113
	(0.150)	(0.236)
Age of democracy	-0.00252	-0.000647
	(0.00272)	(0.00428)
Former communist country	-0.352***	0.409***
	(0.0594)	(0.0797)
Early communist exposure	0.0141***	0.00938*
	(0.00312)	(0.00413)
Adult communist exposure	-0.00284*	-0.000489
	(0.00114)	(0.00150)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000202	0.00000418
	(0.0000153)	(0.0000241)
Population size	2.49e-10	2.60e-09
	(2.96e-09)	(4.66e-09)
Gender (male)	0.143***	-0.215***
	(0.0138)	(0.0184)
Age	0.00559***	0.00652***
	(0.000488)	(0.000648)
Education (years)	0.0746***	-0.0232***
	(0.00197)	(0.00263)
Unemployed	0.0412*	0.223***
	(0.0157)	(0.0209)
Left-right placement	-0.0333***	-0.100***
	(0.00309)	(0.00411)
Born in other country	-0.0237	0.102*
	(0.0291)	(0.0386)
Constant	6.938***	9.336***
	(0.684)	(1.073)
Var (Constant)	-1.144***	-0.689***
	(0.146)	(0.148)
Var (Residual)	0.263***	0.559***
	(0.00375)	(0.00371)
N Level 1	35609	36324
N Level 2	27	27
AIC	119924.4	143852.5
BIC	120060.1	143988.5
Chi2	1733.2	1284.7
ICC	0.05654	0.07605

Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: ESS 2012, Democracy Barometer.

Table 6: Communist Exposure Effects (Communist Countries Only)

	Model 1: Expectations liberal b/se	Model 2: Expectations social b/se
Democratic quality	0.488	1.428**
	(0.358)	(0.456)
Age of democracy	-0.00576	-0.00178
	(0.0156)	(0.0198)
Early communist exposure	0.00248	0.00783
	(0.00668)	(0.00893)
Adult communist exposure	-0.0163*	-0.00336
	(0.00630)	(0.00850)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000577*	-0.000104**
	(0.0000274)	(0.0000348)
Population size	1.24e-08+	9.06e-09
	(7.16e-09)	(9.11e-09)
Gender (male)	0.0573*	-0.135***
	(0.0267)	(0.0362)
Age	0.0165**	0.00832
	(0.00534)	(0.00718)
Education (years)	0.0577***	-0.0381***
	(0.00446)	(0.00603)
Unemployed	0.0675*	0.213***
	(0.0304)	(0.0412)
Left-right placement	-0.00911	-0.0763***
	(0.00583)	(0.00788)
Born in other country	0.252**	0.282*
	(0.0850)	(0.116)
Constant	5.736***	3.197
	(1.613)	(2.054)
Var (Constant)	-1.505***	-1.266***
	(0.258)	(0.259)
Var (Residual)	0.329***	0.647***
	(0.00677)	(0.00667)
N Level 1	10933	11256
N Level 2	11	11
AIC	38269.1	46575.9
BIC	38378.6	46685.8
Chi2	255.1	300.3
ICC	0.02493	0.02133

Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: ESS 2012, Democracy Barometer.

Table 7: Types of Authoritarianism (Full Tables to Figure 2)

	Model 1: Expectations liberal b/se	Model 2: Expectations social b/se
Democratic quality	0.222	-0.149
	(0.149)	(0.220)
Age of democracy	-0.00243	0.000438
	(0.00274)	(0.00405)
Patrimonial communism	-0.266	-0.456
	(0.266)	(0.393)
Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism	-0.284***	0.487***
	(0.0532)	(0.0712)
National accommodative communism	-0.219	0.214
	(0.248)	(0.367)
Military dictatorship	-0.000142	0.314
	(0.261)	(0.386)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000196	-0.0000193
	(0.0000173)	(0.0000256)
Population size	-1.10e-10	-6.84e-10
	(3.02e-09)	(4.45e-09)
Gender (male)	0.144***	-0.214***
	(0.0138)	(0.0184)
Age	0.00559***	0.00682***
	(0.000417)	(0.000554)
Education (years)	0.0752***	-0.0227***
	(0.00197)	(0.00262)
Unemployed	0.0485**	0.227***
	(0.0156)	(0.0208)
Left-right placement	-0.0330***	-0.101***
	(0.00308)	(0.00409)
Born in other country	-0.0246	0.102*
	(0.0291)	(0.0386)
Constant	7.024***	10.31***
	(0.753)	(1.111)
Var (Constant)	-1.176***	-0.786***
	(0.146)	(0.147)
Var (Residual)	0.263***	0.559***
	(0.00375)	(0.00371)
N Level 1	35609	36324
N Level 2	27	27
AIC	119948.4	143854.9
BIC	120092.5	143999.4
Chi2	1710.5	1284.5
ICC	0.05654	0.07605

Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: ESS 2012, Democracy Barometer.

Table 8: The Effect of Democratic Models (Full Tables to Figure 3)

	Model 1: Expectations direct democracy b/se		Model 1: Expectations coalition government b/se
Direct democracy in country	0.0104 (0.0313)	Coalition gov. in country	2.129*** (0.472)
Voting*Direct democracy	0.0294*** (0.00871)	Voting*Government	0.331* (0.120)
Non-elec. part*Direct democracy	0.00566* (0.00259)	Non-elec. part*Government	-0.0717* (0.0341)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000199* (0.00000929)	GDP per Capita	0.0000292* (0.0000131)
Population size	2.56e-09 (3.80e-09)	Population size	-9.89e-09+ (5.46e-09)
Gender (male)	-0.130*** (0.0205)	Gender (male)	-0.121*** (0.0282)
Age	-0.00119+ (0.000651)	Age	0.00362*** (0.000905)
Education (years)	-0.0165*** (0.00304)	Education	0.0416*** (0.00417)
Experience unemployment	0.117*** (0.0230)	Experienced unemployment	0.00923 (0.0315)
Voted last election	0.0252 (0.0387)	Voted last election	-0.225* (0.0897)
Non-electoral participation	0.0300* (0.0108)	Non-electoral participation	0.0984*** (0.0247)
Placement on left right scale	-0.0128** (0.00445)	Placement on left right scale	-0.0226*** (0.00596)
Born in other country	0.0787+ (0.0446)	Born in other country	-0.0361 (0.0616)
Constant	8.962*** (0.314)	Constant	-1.365* (0.533)
Var (Constant)	-0.795*** (0.150)	Var (Constant)	-0.434** (0.141)
Var (Residual)	0.692*** (0.00362)		
N Level 1	38258	N Level 1	34260
N Level 2	27	N Level 2	27
AIC	161781.5	*AIC*	31555.7
BIC	161918.4	*BIC*	31682.3
Chi2	170.8	Chi2	236.2
ICC	0.04868	ICC	0.1245

Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression (Model 1), Logistic Hierarchical Random-Intercept model (Model 2). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: ESS 2012, Democracy Barometer.

Tables 9-12: Robustness Tests with High and Low Sophistication Separately

Table 9: Democratic Culture

	Sophistication high		Sophistication low	
	Model 1 **Expectations liberal** b/se	**Model 2** **Expectations social** b/se	**Model 1** **Expectations liberal** b/se	**Model 2** **Expectations social** b/se
Democratic quality	0.177 (0.121)	-0.227 (0.222)	0.211 (0.171)	0.0358 (0.231)
Age of democracy	-0.00252 (0.00219)	-0.000796 (0.00402)	-0.00385 (0.00312)	-0.00119 (0.00421)
Former communist country	-0.222*** (0.0544)	0.491*** (0.0837)	-0.328*** (0.0956)	0.268* (0.118)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000113 (0.0000124)	0.00000795 (0.0000227)	-0.0000255 (0.0000176)	-0.00000935 (0.0000238)
Population size	8.37e-10 (2.39e-09)	1.11e-09 (4.39e-09)	-1.28e-09 (3.39e-09)	3.55e-09 (4.57e-09)
Gender (male)	0.0860*** (0.0168)	-0.263*** (0.0254)	0.103*** (0.0222)	-0.188*** (0.0271)
Age	0.00209*** (0.000516)	0.00821*** (0.000780)	0.00426*** (0.000672)	0.00491*** (0.000818)
Education (years)	0.0573*** (0.00235)	-0.0428*** (0.00357)	0.0653*** (0.00334)	-0.00931* (0.00408)
Unemployed	0.0534* (0.0193)	0.215*** (0.0292)	0.0568* (0.0242)	0.242*** (0.0295)
Left-right placement	-0.0476*** (0.00353)	-0.132*** (0.00532)	-0.0117* (0.00522)	-0.0624*** (0.00636)
Born in other country	-0.0603+ (0.0341)	0.104* (0.0515)	0.0484 (0.0473)	0.0954+ (0.0578)
Constant	7.738*** (0.554)	10.37*** (1.013)	7.250*** (0.789)	8.582*** (1.062)
Var (Constant)	-1.368*** (0.149)	-0.756*** (0.153)	-1.018*** (0.148)	-0.715*** (0.152)
Var (Residual)	0.119*** (0.00522)	0.538*** (0.00520)	0.357*** (0.00540)	0.573*** (0.00531)
N Level 1	18355	18498	17181	17747
N Level 2	27	27	27	27
AIC	56576.0	72513.6	61136.4	70821.4
BIC	56685.5	72623.1	61244.9	70930.3
Chi2	857.5	1216.8	418.7	284.5
ICC	0.04856	0.07000	0.06014	0.07069

Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.
Source: ESS 2012, Democracy Barometer.

Table 10: Democratic Models (Direct-Representative)

	Model 1: High sophistication only b/se	Model 2: Low sophistication only b/se
Direct democracy in country	-0.000000750 (0.000431)	0.000355 (0.000374)
Voting*Direct democracy	0.000490* (0.000174)	0.000162 (0.000138)
Non-elec. part*Direct democracy	0.0000839* (0.0000382)	0.00000625 (0.0000641)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000232* (0.00000996)	-0.0000222* (0.00000895)
Population size	3.71e-09 (4.14e-09)	1.43e-09 (3.73e-09)
Gender (male)	-0.219*** (0.0294)	-0.0562+ (0.0290)
Age	-0.000465 (0.000945)	-0.00158+ (0.000922)
Education (years)	-0.0487*** (0.00425)	0.0155*** (0.00448)
Experience unemployment	0.167*** (0.0336)	0.0783* (0.0314)
Voted last election	-0.141* (0.0618)	0.112* (0.0417)
Non-electoral participation	0.00915 (0.0125)	0.0846*** (0.0186)
Placement on left right scale	-0.0214*** (0.00605)	-0.00343 (0.00661)
Born in other country	0.104+ (0.0619)	0.0381 (0.0640)
Constant	9.760*** (0.315)	8.520*** (0.283)
Var (Constant)	-0.715*** (0.152)	-0.825*** (0.153)
Var (Residual)	0.706*** (0.00509)	0.667*** (0.00516)
N Level 1	19321	18842
N Level 2	27	27
AIC	82409.4	78899.0
BIC	82535.3	79024.5
Chi2	262.9	105.9
ICC	0.05503	0.04815

Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$. Source: ESS 2012, Democracy Barometer.

Table 11: Democratic Models (Majoritarian - Consensus)

	Model 1: High sophistication only b/se	Model 2: Low sophistication only b/se
Coalition gov. in country	2.063***	2.127***
	(0.540)	(0.441)
Voting*Government	0.478*	0.253+
	(0.216)	(0.149)
Non-elec. part*Government	-0.0469	-0.128*
	(0.0434)	(0.0625)
GDP per Capita	0.0000308*	0.0000253*
	(0.0000143)	(0.0000122)
Population size	-1.02e-08+	-9.39e-09+
	(5.94e-09)	(5.05e-09)
Gender (male)	-0.203***	-0.0243
	(0.0410)	(0.0401)
Age	0.00457***	0.00298*
	(0.00132)	(0.00129)
Education	0.0324***	0.0502***
	(0.00587)	(0.00616)
Experienced unemployment	0.0367	-0.0300
	(0.0463)	(0.0433)
Voted last election	-0.350*	-0.151
	(0.161)	(0.111)
Non-electoral participation	0.0846*	0.149***
	(0.0318)	(0.0444)
Placement on left right scale	-0.0276***	-0.0186*
	(0.00809)	(0.00897)
Born in other country	-0.141+	0.0995
	(0.0849)	(0.0902)
Constant	-1.188*	-1.449**
	(0.599)	(0.504)
Var (Constant)	-0.354*	-0.524***
	(0.143)	(0.149)
N Level 1	17737	16453
N Level 2	27	27
AIC	15457.0	16028.0
BIC	15573.8	16143.7
Chi2	142.5	147.5
ICC	0.13033	0.09639

Notes: Logistic Hierarchical Random-Intercept model. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: ESS 2012, Democracy Barometer.

References

Aarts, K., & Thomassen, J. (2008). Satisfaction with democracy: Do institutions matter? *Electoral Studies*, doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2007.11.005.

Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Anderson, C. J. (1998). Political satisfaction in old and new democracies. *Institute for European Studies Working Paper, 98*.

Anderson, C. J., & Guillory, C. A. (1997). Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems. *The American Political Science Review*, doi: 10.2307/2952259.

Anderson, C. J., & Tverdova, Y. V. (2001). Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government in Contemporary Democracies. *International Political Science Review*, doi: 10.1177/0192512101022004003.

Barber, B. R. (1984). *Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age*. Berkeley, Calif: Univ. of California Press.

Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. Garden City NY: Doubleday.

Bernauer, J., & Vatter, A. (2012). Can't get no satisfaction with the Westminster model? Winners, losers and the effects of consensual and direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy. *European Journal of Political Research, 51*(4), 435–468.

Bochsler, D., & Kriesi, H. (2013). Varieties of democracy. In H. Kriesi, D. Bochsler, J. Matthes, S. Lavenex, M. Bühlmann, & F. Esser (Eds.), *Democracy in the age of globalization and mediatization* (pp. 69–104, Challenges to democracy in the 21st century). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bühlmann, M., Merkel, W., Müller, L., & Wessels, B. (2012). The democracy barometer: A new instrument to measure the quality of democracy and its potential for comparative research. 11 (2012), H. 4, 519-536. *European political science*.

Campbell, R. (2013). Winners, losers and the Grand Coalition: Political satisfaction in the Federal Republic of Germany. *International Political Science Review*, doi: 10.1177/0192512113505246.

Canache, D. (2012). Citizens' Conceptualizations of Democracy: Structural Complexity, Substantive Content, and Political Significance. *Comparative Political Studies*, doi: 10.1177/0010414011434009.

Clarke, H. D., Dutt, N., & Kornberg, A. (1993). The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies. *The Journal of Politics*, doi: 10.2307/2131945.

Curini, L., Jou, W., & Memoli, V. (2012). Satisfaction with Democracy and the Winner/Loser Debate: The Role of Policy Preferences and Past Experience. *British Journal of Political Science*, doi: 10.1017/S0007123411000275.

Dahl, R. A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. New Haven Conn. u.a: Yale Univ. Press.

Dalton, R. J., Shin, D. C., & Jou, W. (2007). Understanding Democracy: Data from unlikely places. *Journal of Democracy, 18*(4), 142–156.

Easton, D. (1957). An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. *World Politics*, doi: 10.2307/2008920.

Easton, D. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*. New York NY u.a: Wiley.

Ferrín Pereira, M. (2013). How satisfied are different types of democrats with their country's democracy overall? In H. Kriesi (Ed.), *Workshop "How Europeans view and evaluate democracy", European University Institute, Florence, 12-13 June* .

Finkel, S. E., Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1989). Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica. *British Journal of Political Science*, doi: 10.2307/193845.

Fuchs, D. (1999). The Democratic Culture of Unified Germany. In P. Norris (Ed.), *Critical Citizens*: *Global Support for Democratic Government* (pp. 123–145): Oxford University Press.

Fuchs, D., & Roller, E. (2006). Learned Democracy? Support of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. *International journal of sociology, 36*(3), 70–96.

Gabriel, O. W., & Keil, S. I. (Eds.) (2013). *Society and democracy in Europe* (Routledge advances in European politics, Vol. 89). London, New York: Routledge.

Held, D. (1987). *Models of democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Pr.

Huang, M.-h., Chang, Y.-t., & Chu, Y.-h. (2008). Identifying sources of democratic legitimacy: A multilevel analysis. *Electoral Studies*, doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2007.11.002.

Kitschelt, H. (1999). *Post-communist party systems: Competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation* (Cambridge studies in comparative politics). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Kornberg, A., & Clarke, H. D. (1994). Beliefs about Democracy and Satisfaction with Democratic Government: The Canadian Case. *Political Research Quarterly*, doi: 10.2307/448843.

Kriesi, H. (Ed.) (2013) *Workshop "How Europeans view and evaluate democracy", European University Institute, Florence, 12-13 June* .

Lijphart, A. (1984). *Democracies: Patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries*. New Haven (Conn.): Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Mansbridge, J. J. (1999). On the idea that participation makes better citizens. In S. L. Elkin & K. E. Sołtan (Eds.), *Citizen competence and democratic institutions* (pp. 291–317). University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (1996). Trajectories of Fear and Hope: "Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe". *Comparative Political Studies, 28*(4), 553–581.

Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2002). Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of post-communist regimes. *European Journal of Political Research, 41*(1), 5.

Norris, P. (1999). *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norris, P. (2011). *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oskarsson, S. (2010). Generalized trust and political support: A cross-national investigation. *Acta Politica*, doi: 10.1057/ap.2010.3.

Pop-Eleches, G., & Tucker, J. A. (2014). Communist socialization and post-communist economic and political attitudes. *Electoral Studies*, doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.008.

Quintelier, E., & van Deth, Jan W. (2014). Supporting Democracy: Political Participation and Political Attitudes. Exploring Causality Using Panel Data. *Political Studies*, doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12097.

Schäfer, A. (2012). Consequences of social inequality for democracy in Western Europe. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, doi: 10.1007/s12286-010-0086-6.

Schedler, A., & Sarsfield, R. (2007). Democrats with adjectives: Linking direct and indirect measures of democratic support. *European Journal of Political Research, 46*(5), 637–659.

Schumpeter, J. A. (1943). *Capitalism, socialism and democracy*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Stadelmann-Steffen, I., & Vatter, A. (2012). Does Satisfaction with Democracy Really Increase Happiness? Direct Democracy and Individual Satisfaction in Switzerland. *Political Behavior*, doi: 10.1007/s11109-011-9164-y.

Vatter, A. (2009). Lijphart expanded: three dimensions of democracy in advanced OECD countries? *European Political Science Review*, doi: 10.1017/S1755773909000071.

Wagner, A. F., Schneider, F., & Halla, M. (2009). The quality of institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe — A panel analysis. *European Journal of Political Economy*, doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.08.001.

Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*. New York: Bedminster press.

Wells, J. M., & Krieckhaus, J. (2006). Does National Context Influence Democratic Satisfaction? A Multi-Level Analysis. *Political Research Quarterly, 59*(4), 569–578.

Wessels, B. (2013). How do different types of democrats evaluate democracy? In H. Kriesi (Ed.), *Workshop "How Europeans view and evaluate democracy", European University Institute, Florence, 12-13 June* .

Zaller, J. R. (2006). *The nature and origins of mass opinion* (13th edn). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Endnotes

[2] Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom.

[3] For a list of all items and the operationalization, see table B and C in the appendix.

[4] Indeed, an exploratory factor analysis amongst all expectations items confirmed that these two dimensions are the most important ones structuring citizens' preferences.

[5] For each country, I take the mean of each variable over the time period covered by the Democracy Barometer (1990-2012). I use this approach because I want to measure stable institutional structures, as I assume that the perceptions and ideas citizens have about democracy are influenced by the experiences they make over a longer time period.

[6] In my sample, 10 out of 27 countries have a communist legacy: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Further, Eastern Germany is coded as 1 too.

[7] The standard random-intercept model takes the following form: $Y_{ij} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta_1 X_{ij} + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_i$, where i=1,... (for N individuals) and for j=1,... (for J countries). Intercepts (α) vary across countries, whereas the slopes (β) remain constant. The measure for government size however is a binary outcome variable, for which I thus fitted a logistic regression model. It takes the form: $\text{logit}\{\Pr(Exp_{ij} = 1 | x_{ij}, \alpha_i)\} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta_1 X_{ij} + \varepsilon_i$.

[8] After excluding all missings, the number of individuals is further reduced to just under 40.000.

[9] As a robustness check, tables 9-11 in the appendix show separate models for all respondents with high and low sophistication. Generally, effects are stronger and more significant in the group with high sophistication: In table 10, we can see that the procedural effects of direct democracy only take place for sophisticated respondents, as the interaction effects are not significant in the low sophistication group. This result is confirmed in the second dimension, the type of government. As table 11 shows, the interaction effect of voting and government type is also only significant in the group of sophisticated respondents, while the direct effect remains in both groups. These findings are in line with theoretical expectations on the effects of political sophistication. An interesting finding are the effects of democratic culture (table 9), which remain strong also for less sophisticated citizens. Apparently, a (post)communist socialization has similar effects on all citizens, independent of their level of sophistication.

[10] Consists of the following variables: "During the last 12 month, have you (1) contacted a politician, (2) worked in a political party or group, (3) worked in another organization, (4) worn a campaign badge/sticker, (5) signed a petition, (6) taken part in a lawful demonstration, (7) boycotted certain products?"

[11] Source: Kitschelt (1999), p. 39