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OAU: FORCES OF DESTABILIZATION*

by

P. Godfrey Okoth

The Assembly shall be composed of the Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives and it shall meet at least once a year.

-Article 9 of the OAU Charter.

Two-thirds of the total membership of the organization shall form a quorum at any meeting of the assembly.

-Article 10 (iv) of the OAU Charter.

This paper attempts to examine the historical role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the problems it is facing in an effort to fulfil this role. The major contention being that the aims and objectives of the organization have changed over time, and a corresponding changes of purpose and direction within the organization becomes thus urgent.

This continental body -- the largest regional grouping in the world (in terms of constituent members), has been passing through difficult terrain. It must be said from the outset that we conceive the problems of the OAU as being imperialist and neo-colonialist forces at work to choke the progress of African unity. With their divisive and destabilizing plans for Africa, the western powers -- headed by the United States -- have for their own interests, insisted on creating crises within the OAU. They have been able to do this over the years, by trying to plant puppets in the organization.

It is therefore within the framework of the overall effects of external and internal factors that the problems of African unity will be discussed. For the articulation of this point, the events surrounding the nineteenth OAU summit in Tripoli, 1982, make up a case-study.

*An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the MAWAZO inaugural workshop on Instability and Change in Africa, Makerere University, Kampala-Uganda, June 13-15, 1983. I'm grateful to the participants for their comments.

GENESIS

Briefly stated, the OAU is an expression of the concept of Pan-Africanism.¹ The idea of Pan-Africanism was conceived and developed not in Africa itself, but in its diaspora, namely, American and the Caribbean areas. The experience of slavery in that part of the world was perhaps the power-drive behind the movement. The major proponents of the movement during the first half of the twentieth century were Dr. W.E.B. DuBois of America, Dr. Price-Mars of Haiti, and George Padmore of the then West Indies.² Eventually the movement gained momentum and attracted a following in Africa itself. While this contribution of the new world is valid, it is also important to note that ideas about African solidarity, independence, and personality existed in Africa independent of the influences from the new world in the nineteenth century and even much earlier.³ This may partly explain why the movement readily attracted such a following in Africa.

Between 1958 and 1960, as Pan-Africanism began to achieve coherence, there were two major objectives that increasingly gained the attention of independent African states. First, the need to consolidate cooperation among African states so as to achieve unity; second, the need to find ways and means of liberating the rest of Africa still under colonialism.⁴ For this purpose conferences were held in the capital cities of the then independent states, for instance, in Accra, Ghana (1958), and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (1960).

In 1961, however, a rift surfaced, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and Egypt, which had held a conference at Casablanca at the impact of the leadership crisis in the Congo, did not attend a later conference in Monrovia. The two groups -- the Monrovia group and the Casablanca group, attempted to reconcile their differences. These differences represented different approaches to unity. Whereas the Casablanca group advocated a radical approach to unity, the Monrovia group urged a more gradual and functional approach, for which the sanctity and inviolability of the sovereignty of member-states were postulated.⁵

The year 1963 was a landmark in the drive towards African unity. At the Addis Ababa conference of May 25, 1963, African Heads of state and government met to form the OAU.

The major architect of the genesis of the OAU was President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. As Basil Davidson observed: "Much of the drive behind the Addis conference was undoubtedly due to President Nkrumah of Ghana."⁶ Nkrumah was the most ardent advocate of the political unification of Africa. Prior to the convening of the Addis Ababa conference, he dispatched

emissaries to the capitals of all the independent African states of the time.⁷ At the conference, Nkrumah made a strong case why Africa Must Unite.⁸ In brief, his argument was that Africa had two options: Unite or perish.⁹

The agenda for the conference included decolonization, apartheid, racial discrimination, non-alignment, the United Nations, economic problems, general disarmament, etc.¹⁰ The aims of the organization were stated thus: "To promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and independence; to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

The contracting parties also agreed that member-states would coordinate and harmonize their general policies towards "Political and diplomatic cooperation; economic cooperation, including transport and communications; education and cultural cooperation; health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation; scientific and technical cooperation; and cooperation for defence and security."¹²

To make sure that the organization achieved its aims, the following institutions were created: "An Assembly of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers, a General Secretariat, a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration."¹³

But despite these noble aims, the organization has remained divided into two camps. For the purpose of this analysis, these can be described as the African nationalists, on the one hand, and the agents of foreign forces, on the other. Moreover, over the years, the division and contradictions between these camps have assumed a wider dimension, and become sharper. This is true especially in light of the developments in the global situation as reflected by the hegemonistic behavior of the two super-powers.

CRISIS IN PERSPECTIVE

It is true that the organization has achieved some of its aims. Unfortunately, owing to the constraints of space it is beyond the scope of this analysis to assess these achievements. Suffice it here to highlight only a few of them as an indication of the historical tendency and contemporary contradictions in the pursuit of African unity.

First and foremost, the organization has continued to

exist even if only as the residual symbol of the ethos of African unity. Despite widely varying regimes and ideologies, African states have continued to speak to each other.¹⁴ And as Akin-yemi has observed: ". . . the very existence of the OAU has concretized -- has infused a more certain meaning into the concept of African identity. Because of OAU decisions and pronouncements, it is possible to talk of an African point of view on this subject or that subject."¹⁵ The other areas of success have been summarized in the economic series as follows:

The OAU has done quite a lot in its twenty years, mostly in terms of quarrels defused, boundaries maintained and secessions discouraged (notably in Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea and Southern Sudan). It has spawned sixteen sub-organizations to deal with such things as communications, agricultural research and trade unions. In recent years it has ventured into economic matters, with the Lagos 'plan of action' in 1980, and into human rights with a charter pending which may one day help the victims of African tyrants.¹⁶

In the field of the liberation struggle, a lot of progress has been registered. The OAU has offered material and logistical support to liberation movements through its liberation committee whose Headquarters are based in Dar es Salaam, the Tanzania capital.

Nevertheless, in trying to fulfil its cardinal aims -- strengthening unity and solidarity of member-states, and in struggling to wipe out the remnants of colonialism in the continent, the OAU has faced numerous problems. These problems are the results of colonialism. These can be summarised as a difficult heritage, an underdeveloped economy, a backward raw-materials structure and a growing need for food imports. These factors bring a large number of African countries into a state of over-dependence expressed in a chronic trade deficit, cultural backwardness, illiteracy, and a very low level of health protection leading to high mortality of the population, etc.¹⁷ The colonial powers defined the frontiers of all holdings (now the African states), according to their own requirements and arrangements, as Brawnlie has demonstrated.¹⁸ This in essence means that in many cases, from the ethnic and geographic point of view, these so-called states are unnatural and therefore artificial -- factors inculcating nationalism and revanchism, and representing a cause for disputes, or even occasional conflicts (Somalia-Ethiopia, Somalia-Kenya, Uganda-Tanzania, Morocco-Algeria, Libya-Chad, etc.).¹⁹ In this respect, the OAU has met with some difficulty in solving this problem. This is so because the OAU has partly been circumscribed by its own principle on non-interference in the internal affairs of member-

states. This principle does not specify the extent to which the internal affairs of a member-state are also those of Pan-African arbitration.

The racist minority regime in Pretoria -- a product of colonialism -- has held and continues to hold the people of South Africa (Azania) under the yoke of inhuman subjection congealed in the racist philosophy of apartheid. This the regime does with the assistance and support of some western reactionary forces and their collaborators inside Africa. In this way, they divide the rank and file of the OAU.

This highly intricate reality is further ramified by neo-colonialism and imperialism. Over the years, there has been an increase in power-bloc confrontation, and big powers' struggle to secure markets, sources of raw materials, military strategic positions and political domination on the continent. The cases of Zaire, Egypt, Kenya and Sudan will suffice. There has been therefore, a re-scramble for the African countries following the achievement of flag-independence.²⁰ In a bid to secure influence and domination, the west uses its most effective means for the purpose, i.e., its economic might. Through this means, western powers create economic dependence, thereby establishing ideological and political monopolies in the countries they control.²¹ The existence of the OAU goes against the aims of these countries because it makes it difficult for them to create obedient servants of neo-colonialism.

As the leading political, economic and military power of the west, the U.S. has increasingly made its presence felt in Africa. In this direction, it has long-term economic and military strategic interests, hence the need to "suppress" Soviet influence. In order to understand the reasons behind this behavior, let us look at the trend of events in the last decade. Since 1973, the U.S. has had cause to be disturbed and scared. In that year, the world witnessed the successful use of oil by the Third World as a weapon against the west. This move was initiated by one of the militant African nationalist leaders, Col. Qaddafi of Libya.²² Simultaneously, the U.S. almost lost its sponsored Israeli-Arab war of aggression.

This was not all. In 1975, the U.S. empire crumpled in Indo-China where U.S. troops were defeated and humiliated in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.²³ In Africa, the armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies, combined with the anti-fascist struggle of the Portuguese people, caused the demise of fascist Salazar in Portugal.²⁴ In Ethiopia -- the seat of the OAU, the monarchist regime of Haile Selassie (a long time friend of the U.S.) was toppled by a group of revolutionary soldiers.²⁵ During this same period, Third World countries -- including OAU member-states, intensified their struggle at international

forums for the New International Economic Order (NIEO).²⁶

To counter all this, the U.S. aims at "moderating" this Third World struggle for economic independence, lest the so-called "extremists" like Qaddafi take the advantage. One way of implementing this sabotage has been to try as much as possible to control, or even to destroy such Third World political forums as the OAU.

The U.S. therefore, has taken as a challenge to frustrate the efforts of Pan-African militant nationalists to steer the OAU to an independent path. In retaliation, it has used as tools, retrogressive Arab regimes with their petro-dollars. But more importantly, it has used certain African regimes as a fifth column. Herein lies the explanation for its show of military force in Chad, Zaire, Central African Republic (CAR), and Western Sahara.²⁷ Herein also lies the reason for the U.S. through the so-called "contact group" on Namibia trying to find a compromise with the racist regime of Botha. On the real motives of the U.S. and South Africa in delaying Namibia's independence, Pomeroy has written:

The fake issue of Cuban troops in Angola has been seized upon by both the U.S. and South Africa to gain the dual ends of apartheid and imperialism in Southern Africa. It is an issue that has been rejected and denounced by all of independent Africa and by virtually all the rest of the world. It marks one more unsavoury stage in the ever-more desperate effort to prolong the apartheid system and an imperialist foothold in Africa, a stage that can be overcome by united and determined resistance by anti-apartheid and anti-imperialist forces.²⁸

Additionally, contrary to OAU principles, the U.S. has dragged certain member-states -- including Kenya, Somalia and Egypt into its military fold.²⁹ In these countries, the U.S. so-called Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) have military bases in Southern Africa, the U.S. uses the Botha regime to carry out military actions and destabilizing activities against neighboring independent states that are sympathetic to the nationalist struggle.

The Reagan administration has given a go-ahead to all-round cooperation, including the military field with the Botha regime. Its purpose is to help the regime break out of its isolation.³⁰ Featuring high in this aggressive Reagan Africa policy is Zionist Israel. A traditional conduit for U.S. interests in both the Middle East and Africa, Zionist Israel and racist South Africa are therefore allies in the struggle to

control Africa and the OAU.³¹

Thus to the west, any evidence of OAU strength stands in inverse proportion to their own interests in Africa. Nkrumah observed at the opening of the OAU summit conference in Accra, October 21, 1965, that:

It is an old imperialist tactic to try to use superficial differences to divide peoples they wish to continue to oppress and exploit. But they are up against a fundamental unifying factor which they cannot destroy, and that is the common experience of oppressed and exploited peoples, which binds them together and ignores differences of language, culture and traditions.³²

THE TRIPOLI SUMMIT

On both occasions (August and November 1982), the nineteenth annual summit of the OAU aborted due to lack of quorum. In Tripoli I, it was over the admission of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as the fifty-first member of the organization. In Tripoli II, the failure centered on a disagreement over the seating of the Chad delegation led by Hissen Habre.

The question of the SADR has been on the crisis log-book of the OAU ever since the Mauritius summit in 1976. It however gained its momentum in Freetown (Sierra Leone) in 1980, following its recognition by twenty-six member-states.³³ But Morocco argued that the charter provided for the admission of an "independent African state," and therefore rejected the representation of SADR at the Tripoli summit.

The SADR is the state-in-exile in Western Sahara founded in February 1976. Its liberation movement has been championed by the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagua el Hamra y Río de Oro (POLISARIO).³⁴ Spain ruled this territory since 1884 when it claimed its coast as a protectorate. The year 1965 marked a turning point in the history of Western Sahara. Some of the richest deposits of phosphates in the world were discovered there.³⁵ In 1968, the movement for the liberation of the Sahara was formed. 1973 saw the birth of the militant nationalist POLISARIO, which stood for the total and genuine independence of Western Sahara. To achieve this, POLISARIO prepared for a protracted liberation struggle. Behind it, were the masses of the Saharawi people. This was acknowledged by a United Nations fact finding mission in 1975. The mission reported that:

The POLISARIO, although considered a clandestine

movement before the mission's arrival, appeared to be the dominant political force in the country. . . . The population was categorically for independence and against territorial claims of Morocco and Mauritania.³⁶

The Madrid accords of November 14, 1975 made it possible for Spain to hand over its colony to Morocco and Mauritania.³⁷ However, Mauritania was a weaker partner, and was therefore unable to sustain the economic and political cost of waging a war of aggression. Instability rocked Mauritania, culminating in a double coup in 1979. POLISARIO also concentrated its forces on Mauritania to the extent that they even carried out raids on its capital.³⁸ Mauritania had no choice but to give up its share of Western Sahara. POLISARIO took control over this part, and prepared to face Morocco.

In spite of massive military support Morocco gets from the U.S. and France, POLISARIO has continued to defeat King Hassan's estimated 40,000 or so forces of occupation.³⁹ Today, POLISARIO controls the largest part of Western Sahara, and that is why independence for the territory is inevitable as was further reported by the U.N. visiting mission there:

From all these it became evident to the Mission that there was an overwhelming consensus among the Saharans within the Territory in favor of independence and opposing integration with any neighboring country.⁴⁰

This is why its government, SADR, has been recognized by more than half of OAU member-states, to the disgust of the U.S. and France. It is this fact that makes the U.S. and its African reactionary regimes question SADR's membership to OAU and raise bogus issues of legality.

THE CHAD ISSUE

The militant nationalist camp was aware that reactionary forces from both within and without were as usual all-out to wreck the OAU over vain pretexts as was the case in 1965. In that year, Nkrumah observed that:

As soon as the decision was taken to hold the 1965 OAU summit conference in Accra, enemies of the African Revolution set to work to try to prevent the conference taking place in Ghana. Imperialist and neo-colonialist agents did all they could to split the OAU, and whipped up vicious press campaigns.⁴¹

Therefore aware of this imperialist tactic, the militant nationalists (including SADR), tactically agreed to have the SADR out of the Tripoli I summit.⁴² This was a pre-emptive strike against the forces of domination. Not to be overwhelmed, they next raised the question of Chad's representation. This was no surprise because Chad, covering both part of Arab north and Sub-Saharan south, is strategic for the U.S., in the more important sense that that country is of great economic potential.⁴³ Chad's economic resources used to be confined to cotton in the south during the colonial period. France (the colonial power), playing the game of "divide and rule" wanted these resources confined to the south only.

However, after independence, uranium was discovered in the north. The north was already under U.S. patronage, and chief among the groups that were there, was the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), led by Hissen Habré.⁴⁴ FAN was given sanctuary by the U.S. in Sudan, on the eastern border of Chad, when Habré fell out with the then President -- Goukouni Woddei, and started a guerrilla war. FAN was also trained and equipped by Washington. Desiring to see the Libyans out of Chad, the U.S. got its clients in the OAU to call for an OAU force in Chad to replace the Libyans.⁴⁵

The OAU however, did not have money to sponsor the so-called peace-keeping force comprising Zairean, Nigerian, Senegalese and Kenyan troops. So the U.S. and France financed them.⁴⁶ Libyan troops left in November 1981, and Habré immediately started a new battle. The so-called "OAU troops" were supposedly there to safeguard the legitimate government of Chad. But the day they landed and the Libyans left, Habré forces began their invasion from western Sudan into eastern Chad, taking town after town until they reached Ndjamena, the capital. OAU troops refused to stop Habré, claiming that they did not want to interfere in the internal Chadian politics, and that they were there only to protect foreign nationals. And indeed, the day Goukouni was overthrown and Habré installed, OAU troops left because the U.S. and France cut off their financial support.⁴⁷

So then, the question of Tripoli II was the legitimacy of Hissen Habré's government. For the first time in OAU's history, the U.S. had trained, equipped and installed a regime in a blatant fashion. Loyal to their masters, a group of nineteen reactionary African Leaders* supported the seating of the puppet Habré delegation as the legitimate representative of Chad. They remained adamant on this point, and gave it as a condition for holding the summit.⁴⁸

*See Third World Quarterly, 5 (1) Jan. 1983, pp. 182-185.

But then, the militants, perhaps acting in the interests of unity in the OAU, recognized the Habré regime on condition that his delegation does not attend the summit. But the reactionaries with their American masters could not tolerate this. Indeed, some of these reactionary leaders withdrew to leisure resorts in Paris from where they carried out negotiations on phone.

IMPERIALIST FORCES AGAINST QADDAFI

Qaddafi himself has admitted some of his past mistakes in dealing with African politics: "We believed that what we did at the time was right. Now we think some of what we did was wrong."⁴⁹ In a more specific tone, he admitted that it was wrong for him to have supported Idi Amin against Milton Obote. Of Amin, he said, "In the last analysis he was a fascist, he had no plan to make Uganda a progressive country."⁵⁰ Of Obote, he said, "As he is a socialist and progressive personality, he should have been our ally and we should have been his ally."⁵¹ Of Nyerere, he said, "We were wrong to have attacked Nyerere."⁵²

Otherwise, the anti-Qaddafi feelings that preceded the summit were of U.S. making. These feelings were being impressed within the OAU by U.S. puppet regimes such as Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya and Zaire.⁵³ Despite his mistake over fascist Idi Amin, Qaddafi remains a serious militant Pan-Africanist.

On the international front, Qaddafi has pursued a relentless anti-imperialist stand. To this end, he has used petrodollars to aid anti-U.S. liberation movements. In North Africa and the Middle East, Qaddafi's Libya stands for and is a symbol of resistance to U.S. interests. This is why the U.S. manoeuvred Libya out of Chad. Like Nkrumah, Qaddafi is a threat to the interests of imperialist and neo-colonial powers in Africa.⁵⁴ The west feared that if Qaddafi were allowed to be OAU chairman, he would take advantage of this vantage position to further "obstruct and subvert" imperialist forces in Africa.⁵⁵ Qaddafi is also opposed to the so-called RDF and to French interests especially in Chad. If he were to become chairman, the U.S. feared that he would have broadened this opposition in the name of Africa.⁵⁶ He is opposed to RDF because the objective of RDF is to facilitate the deployment of U.S. marines in Africa or the Middle East to suppress popular uprisings deemed to be against the vital interests of the U.S. That is why when the U.S. State Department learnt that the summit was to take place in Tripoli, it issued the following statement:

The OAU meeting in Nairobi decided to hold its 1982 summit at Tripoli, Libya. We note that it is traditional for the OAU to select the host Head of State or Government as its Chair-

man. If that tradition were followed in 1982 we would look upon it with deep regret, since we believe Libya to be a most inappropriate spokesman for the principles of peace and regional stability for which the OAU stands and which we wholeheartedly support.⁵⁷

The hypocrisy and deception contained in this utterance has long been elevated to the level of U.S. foreign policy. As DuBois once observed:

Yet the United States is the loudest to proclaim the principle that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of Africa by any outside powers and that African problems need an African solution. Masquerading under these false colours U.S. imperialism hopes, of course, to clear the path for its own intervention in the affairs of Africa on behalf of the multinational corporations whose interest in the continent is motivated solely by the desire to extract maximum profits without regard for the welfare and living conditions of the vast majority of the African peoples.⁵⁸

Dancing to the tune of their masters, reactionary African leaders decided to act accordingly. They took cover in the SADR and Chad issues to wreck the OAU. Despite this, as DuBois further observed, imperialism failed to achieve its ultimate goal:

But the United States and its allies whilst succeeding in preventing the official holding of the summit, failed to secure their main objective: to split the organization and so weaken it in the face of imperialism.⁵⁹

Qaddafi also stands for the economic independence of Third World countries. This is the more reason why he led in the 1973 OPEC-oil weapon war. In this war, he shocked and indeed briefly paralyzed the U.S. and its European allies.

The U.S. and its allies also feared that Qaddafi's charisma and egalitarian philosophy might attract many in Africa. The Reagan administration and certain reactionary regimes in Africa feared that he might influence the socio-economic and political order in Africa to the detriment of their own economic and political interests. The U.S. therefore procured the help of some influential bourgeois ruling circles in Africa who persisted in sounding "the Qaddafi threat."⁶⁰ Thus because the U.S. considered Qaddafi its arch-enemy in Africa, it could

not allow him to head the OAU.

CONCLUSION

From a concept in the form of Pan-Africanism, the imperatives of continental unity materialised in the OAU. The progress towards this ideal has not been easy, as we have tried to show in this paper. Constituting obstacles of frustration against the effort, imperialist and neo-colonial forces have been active within the organisation. Chief among the patrons of these forces, the U.S. has arrogated itself the right to meddle in the affairs of African countries, defining and setting limits beyond which the OAU has no effective power.

The very fact that imperialist forces have been able to paralyse the OAU presuppose either that the organisation comprises active elements of weakness, or that the cardinal aims and objectives as initially laid down have been rendered unachievable under the conditions of neo-colonialism. Time may then have arrived to revise the body's charter to reflect the reality of clamped circumstances. In the process, new ways and means could be devised for the realisation of specifically delineated goals. The particularities of these goals have to be worked out by a committee appointed for the purpose, such as that already in existence.⁶¹ But one way of redefining the aims and objectives of the OAU is to divide them into two categories: The first category could list immediate goals on the basis of which the second, consisting of long-term aims, reposes and takes shape. Corresponding to each category, definite rules and regulations should be specified to guard against imperialist interferences. The obligations and responsibilities of member states should be stated in such a way as to wean out potential local agents of neo-colonialism. One policy which the organisation could adopt in drawing up the obligations of member-states is to demand that each member commit quantifiable material assistance for the liberation of Namibia and South Africa. Those countries which, for reasons other than the inability to pay, abrogate this obligation, can then be identified accordingly.

In its present form, the OAU is a fragile body, existing without any positive philosophy. The organisation has taken no moral stand on any issue. It was silent over the massacres in Burundi, the genocide in Idi Amin's Uganda, Bokassa's Central African "Empire", and Nguema's Equatorial Guinea. The OAU did this on the basis of its neutrality principle. There can be no neutrality between life and death.

The OAU was reluctant to intervene in the Nigerian civil war, in the Uganda-Tanzania war, and in local wars, again taking cover in its policy of non-interference in the internal

affairs of member-states. But in 1982, it intervened in the imperialist-sponsored Chad civil war.

The task at hand now is to make OAU serve the interests of African peoples, rather than those of foreign and reactionary African leaders.

These are some of the suggestions that require OAU attention to make it a dynamic organization that will cater for the unity of the continent.

It must be pointed out finally, that to revise the charter of the OAU in order to reflect the immediate and long-term goals, means in effect to declare Africa a liberation zone. In this concept, the ultimate goal should be to liberate our continent from the root-cause of our afflictions: we mean capitalism.

NOTES

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2. On their role in the Pan-African movement, see especially: G. Padmore, Pan Africanism or Communism. Anchor Books, New York, 1972.
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3. For details of African origin of Pan-Africanism, see: Ukpabi, S.C. "The OAU and the Problems of African Unity." Africa Quarterly, Vol. 15, no. 4, 1976, pp. 26-31.
4. V.B. Thompson. Africa and Unity, Longman, London, 1960, p. 165.
5. Rivkin, A. "The Organization of African Unity." Current History, Philadelphia, Vol. 48.
6. B. Davidson, Which Way Africa? Penguin African Library, 1964, p. 66.
7. For details, see: V.B. Thompson, "Pan-Africanism -- Past and Present." Africa and the World, No. 12 September 1965.
8. K. Nkrumah. Africa Must Unite. London, Heinemann, 1963.
9. Ibid, p. xvii; also p. 189.

10. V.B. Thompson, op. cit., p. 183.
11. Ibid, p. 184.
12. Article II of the OAU charter adopted at Addis Ababa, May 25, 1963.
13. Article VII of the OAU charter. The first Secretary-General however, was not appointed until the Cairo summit of June 1964. He was Diallo Telli, a Guinean national.
14. Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), August 15, 1982, p. 6513.
15. Akinyemi, A.B. "The Organization of African Unity and African Identity." Africa Quarterly, Vol. 22, nos. 3-4, 1980/81, p. 16. For further information on African Identity, see: A. Mazrui, Towards a Pan-Africana. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967.
16. See Economic Series, p. 5519.
17. Okoth, P.G. "The OAU on Trial." Unpublished seminar paper, History Dept., University of Waterloo (Canada), 1980.
18. For details, see I. Braunlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia. Hurst/University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1979.
19. The following are useful references on African boundary problems: S. Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa. Cambridge, Mass., 1972, especially chapters 2-3. C.G. Widstrand, ed. African Boundary Problems (Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies). Allott, A.N. "The Changing legal status of boundaries in Africa: A diachronic view." Colston Papers 1974, pp. 111-128.
20. For details, see: A. Gavshon, Crisis in Africa: Battle Ground of East and West. Penguin Books, 1981. Also see: Nicol, D. "The United States and Africa." African Affairs, vol. 82, no. 327, April 1983, pp. 165-166.
21. Ibid.
22. Shihata, IFI, "The OPEC Fund and the North-South Dialogue," Third World Quarterly (1) 4 October 1979, republished as chapter 6 in IFI Shihata, The Other Face of OPEC. London: Longman, 1982.
23. On the loss of U.S. empire in S.E. Asia, see: Freidel, F. and Brinkley, "Vietnam, Race and the Crisis of Liberalism,"

- in America in the Twentieth Century, 5th Edition, 1982, pp. 449-472.
24. On this subject, see: Suslov, M.S. "The Communist Movement in the Vanguard of the Struggle for Peace and Social International Liberation." Kommunist, September 11, 1975.
 25. See for instance, Markakis, J., and Ayele, N. Class and Revolution in Ethiopia. Published for The Review of African Political Economy, Nottingham, 1978, p. 114.
 26. Shihata, I.F.I., op. cit.
 27. Over the years, the U.S. has spent a substantial amount of money military-wise in these countries including Kenya, Sudan, Egypt, Morocco and Somalia. For details, see The Military Balance: 1979-1980, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.
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 29. A. Gavshon, op. cit., p. 73.
 30. Ibid.
 31. DuBois*, "The OAU-Reaction Continues its Wrecking tactics," The African Communist, No. 93, Second Quarter, 1983, pp. 61-63.
 32. K. Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path, Panaf, 1973, p. 298.
 33. This is the simple majority stipulated by the OAU charter for membership.
 34. See Abdullah, M. "Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic." Ufahamu, Vol. 10, nos. 1-2, 1980-81, p. 145.
 35. For details on the discovery of phosphates in Western Sahara, see: Hodges, T., "The origins of Saharawi Nationalism," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 5, no. 1, January 1983, especially sub-title: "The Mineral Bonanza and Social Change," pp. 32-35.
 36. Quoted from Africa Now (A/N), August 1982, p. 18.

*This writer should not be confused with the renown W.E.B. Du-Bois, one of the founders of Pan-Africanism.

37. Hodges, T., op. cit., p. 28.
38. A/N, op. cit.
39. Hodges, T., op. cit.
40. See Report of the U.N. Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, 1975, in General Assembly Official Records: 30th session, supplement no. 23, U.N. Document A/10023/Rev. 1, p. 59. Also see Franck, T.M., "The stealing of the Sahara." American Journal of International Law 70 (4), October 1976, p. 702.
41. K. Nkrumah, op. cit.
42. Sunday Times, Kampala, August 8, 1982. For the composition of OAU militant nationalists and reactionary forces in Africa, see: Third World Quarterly 5 (1), Jan. 1983, pp. 182-185.
43. See A/N, December 1982, and January 1983.
44. A/N, July 1982, p. 5.
45. Libyan troops left, and were replaced by OAU troops. For details, see for instance, ARB, Vol. 19, no. 1, February 1982, p. 6302.
46. Ibid, p. 6303.
47. Ibid.
48. Uganda Times, November 26, 1982.
49. A/N, February, 1983, p. 38.
50. Ibid, p. 39.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. 600 Libyan soldiers were killed in the war between Amin and Tanzania. See A/N, July 1982, p. 22.
53. These are the regimes the U.S. and other Western countries designate as "moderate", "democratic", etc.
54. For an interesting treatment of Qaddafi as a threat to the U.S. and U.S. puppets in Africa, see: DuBois, "The OAU: Dollar Blackmail." The African Communist, No. 92, First Quarter, 1983, pp. 68-70.

55. A/N, August 1982, p. 16.
56. A/N, December, 1982, p. 79.
57. Ibid.
58. DuBois, op. cit., No. 93, Second Quarter, 1983, p. 57.
59. Ibid.
60. DuBois, op. cit., No. 92, First Quarter, 1983.
61. Beri, H.M.L. "The Monrovia OAU summit." Africa Quarterly, Vol. 19, no. 2, 1979, p. 214.