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# **US Agri-Environmental Programs and their Potential Implications for Agricultural Trade**

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# U.S. Agri-Environmental Programs and their Potential Implications for Agricultural Trade

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The views presented herein are those of the author and not necessarily of the Economic Research Service nor the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

# Introduction

- Many OECD countries have a strong interest in developing and extending agri-environmental payment programs.
- •These programs pay farmers to adopt environmentally sound practices or to retire environmentally sensitive land from production.
- Agri-environmental payment programs can improve the environmental performance of agriculture.
- •In addition, they may provide an alternative source of farm income.

### **Introduction - Continued**

- •The WTO does not limit expenditures on agri-environmental programs meeting the design criteria for the WTO's green box
- •However, the inclusion of an agri-environmental payment program into the "green box" could be challenged by WTO member countries.
- ▶ This challenge could be made on the basis that it has more than "minimal" trade-distorting impacts on production.
- ▶ This challenge could be of increased concern given the expiration of the "peace clause" (Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture) at the end of 2003.

# **Overview**

- I. A brief review of US agri-environmental programs
- II. Qualitative discussion of their potential trade impacts
- III. Utilizing stylized examples of agri-environmental payment programs, discuss *ex ante* analysis of the trade impacts of these programs.

## **US Federal Environmental Expenditures**


- •Agri-environmental programs are part of a greater set federal environmental programs.
- •These program address conservation issues that include agriculture, but also wild species, recreational services, and pollution control.
- •Overall federal natural resources expenditures for 2004 were approximately \$33 billion.
- •Agricultural conservation programs represented around 15% of total environmental expenditures in 2004.


# U.S agri-environmental policy has wide-ranging objectives


- Improving water quality
- Maintaining soil quality
- Improving air quality
- Increasing wildlife habitat
- Increasing carbon sequestration
- Maintaining open space and other rural amenities


# U.S. policy relies on voluntary subsidies and compliance mechanisms

- · Land Retirement
  - Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
  - Wetland Reserve Program (WRP)
- Working Land
  - Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)
     Conservation Security Program (CSP)
- Land Preservation
  - Farm and Ranchland Protection Program (FRPP)
  - Grassland Reserve Program (GRP)
- · Compliance Mechanisms









### Land Retirement: Mostly CRP

### •Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)

- -35 million acres enrolled,
- 10-15 year enrollment
- Average rental payment of about \$45/acreVast majority of acres are in "general signup" (farmers compete for acceptance based on their EBI score).

### •Wetland Reserve Program (WRP)

- -1.6 million acres enrolled
- -Average cost of about \$1,400/acre
- -Mostly permanent, but also 30 year easements

# EQIP: Emphasis on livestock

- 60 percent of funding is earmarked for livestock producers; up from 50 percent in 1996 Act.
- Livestock operation size limit of 1,000 animal units is eliminated.
- Single operation limited to a total of \$450,000 for 2002-07.
- Participating livestock operations to develop comprehensive nutrient management plans.

# EQIP: More money...less targeting?

Some details of EQIP changed with the 2002 Farm Bill:

- · Priority areas are eliminated
- Maximization of environmental benefits per dollar of program expenditure is no longer required
- "Bidding down" is eliminated
- Priority can be given to producers who:
  - use cost-effective conservation practices
  - address national conservation priorities
- Money earmarked for water conservation

# Conservation Security Program: Conservation for everyone?

- Wide ranging objectives; focus on land-based practices, livestock waste management facilities excluded
- Entitlement funding (but funding is limited)
- Existing practices can be enrolled
- Three "tiers" for participation; higher tiers require greater conservation effort and offer larger payments
- Must use practices that meet standard at least cost
- No environmental benefit-cost targeting
- Cropland eligible only if farmed 4 of 6 years prior to 2002

# Increased emphasis on farmland protection

- Farm and Ranchland Protection Program (FRPP)
  - 10-fold increase in funding: \$597 million is mandated for 2002-07
  - Acreage cap removed
  - Land with historical or archaeological resources is eligible
- Grassland Reserve Program (GRP)
  - Up to 2 million acres of grassland will be protected from conversion to other uses
  - Up to \$254 million available for 2002-07
  - Long term (10 years or more) rental agreements and both 30 year and permanent easements are offered.

# Compliance mechanisms

- Basic environmental compliance required to receive farm program payments
  - Sodbuster/Conservation Compliance: Apply conservation systems on highly erodible cropland
  - Swampbuster: Refrain from draining wetland
- Only minor, technical changes in the 2002 farm bill over 1996 farm bill



### CRP: biggest production impacts

Of course, direct impact of land retirement is to decrease production, *but*:

- •"Slippage", or the reallocation of non-cropland outside CRP to crop use may occur.
  - •Wu (2000) argues that 21 acres of land are brought into production for every 100 acres retired into CRP.
  - •Roberts and Bucholtz (2004), using the same data, found no evidence of slippage in the CRP.
- •Some land enrolled in CRP might have left production even if not enrolled in CRP (8% according to Lubowski *et al.*)

# EQIP: small production impacts

No quantitative assessment available, but

- •Only newly installed practices can be funded, suggesting limited impacts on production *if* the farmer has no intention to adopt practice otherwise.
- •However, emphasis is on assisting livestock operators to comply with the new Clean Water Act regulation.
  - ✓ Hence, exits of livestock operators could fall relative to a situation without EQIP payments but with CWA.
- •EQIP would be more likely to reduce potential declines in production rather than increase production.

# CSP: small production impacts

Eligibility of existing practices for stewardship payments could promote expansion of production, *but*:

- •CSP is available in a limited number of watersheds (for now).
- •Annual payment limitations per tier.
- •Cropland must have been cropped in 4 of last 6 years to be eligible for any cropland payment component of CSP.
- •Except perhaps for Tier 3 payments, per acre payments may not be high enough to sway decision between producing and not producing.
- •CSP funding limitations

# Farmland Preservation Programs: small production impacts

- Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program (FRPP)
- Grasslands Reserve Program (GRP)


In principle, programs that help to keep land in farming could maintain production relative to a state without these programs.

- •Through 2003, around 300,000 acres have been protected through FRPP.
- •But the US has around 450 million acres of cropland, of which 340 million acres are harvested.
- •Even including State preservation programs, production impacts are small.

# Empirical Analysis of Potential Trade Impacts

Claassen, Cooper, and Peters (2005) utilize stylized examples of agri-environmental payment programs to conduct:

- Ex ante analysis of the trade impacts of these programs
- •Sensitivity analysis of production to changes in agrienvironmental payments





### **Program Scenarios - Good Performance**

- •The *good performance* base requires the farmer to use a "low rainfall erosion" production system.
- •Payment per acre is soil conserved (tons per acre) times a payment rate (\$1 to \$4) per ton of soil conserved.
- •Soil conserved is the difference between:
- (a) maximum erosion rate observed for any production system for a given soil in a given region; and
- (b) the estimated rate of erosion for the "low rainfall erosion" system in use on the same soil in the same region.


### **Program Scenarios - Good Performance**

The *good performance* base is further broken down into two policy scenarios – *sodbuster* and *no sodbuster* 


- with the *sodbuster* scenario: farmers in the program who bring previously uncropped HEL into production lose other farm program benefits.
- with the *no sodbuster* scenario, farmers in the program who bring previously uncropped HEL into production do not lose other farm program benefits.


#### **Program Scenarios - Improved Performance**


- •The *improved performance* base requires the farmer to reduce erosion from pre-program levels.
- •Payments are based on "ACTUAL" erosion reduction from preprogram levels (rather than erosion relative to a reference level.)
- •Payments per acre are equal to erosion reduction (tons per acre) multiplied by payment rate per ton of erosion reduction.
- •Payment rates used in the analysis range from \$4 to \$14 per ton of erosion reduction




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# **Discussion and Conclusions**

- Expiration of the "peace clause" at the end of 2003 provides one motivation for this study.
- In any case, the concept of the "green box" is an economic concept, and policy instruments that fall into this category are supposed to be minimally tradedistorting (Josling, 2000).
- •Stewardship payments that have the potential to increase farm income could increase production.

### **Discussion and Conclusions**

- •Current USDA conservation programs do not appear to have much potential to increase production.
- •However, some of them could have the potential to slow decreases in production, ceteris paribus.
- •Production decreasing impacts of land retirement programs are most likely greater than potential increases associated with working lands programs.
- •The net impact of U.S. agri-environmental programs on production is likely negative.

#### **Discussion and Conclusions**

- For the three agri-environmental payment scenarios evaluated, the maximum change in exports ranges from a
- 7 percent decrease (wheat) to a
- 1 percent increase (soybeans).
- Programs that decrease U.S. production are unlikely to be challenged before the WTO.
- While "minimal" is not defined and is open to interpretation, 1 percent is probably small.

