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## CLASS FORMATION AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA

by

Kipkorir Aly Azad Rana

### *Introduction*

The underlying purpose of this paper is the usefulness of analysing class formation and intra-class conflict by a historical study of a less developed social formation. Such a perspective can provide a basis for a more vigorous analysis of fundamental problems such as imperialism, classes in developing countries, the nature of social conflict, ethnic rivalries, political personalities and class politics, and whether the impact of particular ruling class alliances in the state is characteristically repressive, hegemonic or both. The conceptual framework will be developed in the course of a critical analysis of some of the recent literature which has contributed toward theory formation and its empirical verification. The theoretical assumptions thus developed will be tested by a study of a concrete social formation: Kenya. The choice of the social formation has had some influence in reviewing theoretical literature directly or otherwise related to the particular society. It is hoped that this would eliminate the unnecessary preoccupation with empiricism.

Proponents of the "underdevelopment" perspective and/or "dependency" theory have provided a theoretical framework for a study of the fundamental problems mentioned earlier. Two such studies, offering an interpretation of the political economy of Kenya will be used (for their important contributions within the problematic) as a starting point: Colin Leys' *Underdevelopment in Kenya*<sup>1</sup> and Steve Langdon's essay on *The Political Economy of Dependence: Note Towards Analysis of the Political Economy of Kenya*.<sup>2</sup> The subject of their study is "underdevelopment." This is analysed by the conceptual usage of the notion of economic surplus, and the manner by which this surplus is appropriated and utilized. It is argued that the indigenously appropriated surplus by the Western imperialist capital is externally used as a result of the internal class structures of the developing countries. This appropriated surplus in the developing countries would have a greater potential for development if it was utilized 'rationally' to meet local needs. This 'irrational' utilization of the indigenously appropriated surplus form the basis of the whole notion of underdevelopment. Their conceptual framework to a large extent is based on the discourses of Andre Gunder Frank<sup>3</sup> and Paul Baran.<sup>4</sup>

The notion of economic surplus and the manner of its utilization is fundamental in Frank and Baran's thesis of "underdevelopment." The nature of the ruling classes in the developing countries is such that it is either unable and/or against developing autonomous bourgeoisie capable of carrying out the industrial revolution. This state of affairs was reached after the victory of the commercial-capitalists and big landowners over the emerging industrial capitalists. Frank reaches these conclusions via empirical studies of Latin America. He felt underdevelopment was assured by the 'unequal relationship' between the metropole and periphery; and the classes in periphery which won politically (commercial-capitalists and big landowners) benefited from the existing nature of metropole-periphery relations. It was further felt that any structural transformation would lead to a shift in political power detrimental to the interests of the commercial and landowning classes. As a result these classes become part of the structure that continues to transfer the indigenously accumulated surplus: the remaining surplus is either diverted towards infrastructural development or is in the hands of classes least interested in internal transformation.

Frank's conclusions lead him to suggest that exogenous factors become decisive in shaping the patterns of growth in the developing countries. Consequently, the structure of metropole-periphery relations throttle the development of the productive forces, with the social relations of production remaining overshadowed by the relations of exchange. Langdon criticizes Frank on the grounds that "he ignores any sense of dialectics."<sup>5</sup> Here he meant the overemphasis on exogenous factors "neglects the way contradictions in the periphery political economy, shaped by the metropolis-satellite exchange relationship, can generate socio-economic forces that subvert and change that structure of exchange."<sup>6</sup> Langdon's model does not deviate from stressing the exchange relationship with world capitalism in analysing class dynamics of the developing countries. However, he provides this class dynamics with a certain level of autonomy which retains the potential for reshaping the peripheral political economy and its commercial-capitalist relationship with the capitalist world.<sup>7</sup>

Leys has acknowledged the limitations of the underdevelopment theory for not furnishing convincing grounds of lack in the future of capitalist development in the developing countries.<sup>8</sup> He feels what the theory does is to "try to explain the actual patterns of development--capitalist development of a kind--which have occurred and are occurring throughout most of the third world."<sup>9</sup> It is suggested that the weakness of the term 'underdevelopment' which refers to different stages of development introduces problems. Leys' major criticism is on the role of social classes: The economic deterministic nature of the underdevelopment theory relegates abstract and passive roles to social classes. This underemphasis on classes and class struggle in a



way influences analysis of the state and political power. This critic remains passive in his (Leys) concrete analysis of Kenya. What he calls for is a theory of underdevelopment, which presently remains a "perspective" and its liquidation. Such a theory ought to be one of "world history from the standpoint of the underdeveloped countries, a theory of oppression and liberation of these countries..."<sup>10</sup>

Leys and to some extent Langdon felt that industrialization based on import-substitution has certain positive aspects. However, Leys stresses that "the progressive sequence of industrial investment" leading towards self-sustaining full-scale industrialization has failed to materialize.<sup>11</sup> His reasons for the failure are: (1) Opportunities for profitable investments are narrow because of the nature of the national boundaries, and the existing pattern of demand. By the latter he meant only a small group in the developing countries can afford the products manufactured by the foreign-owned import-substituting industries. (2) The character of ownership (foreign) of the industries further contributes towards export of surplus. Due to existing currency regulations and the fear they may soon be nationalized, investors tend to over-invoice (when importing inputs from subsidiaries) and seek high profits. (3) The metropolitan countries' monopoly over technology and know-how enhances dependence of landed or other classes who provide alternative to foreign investors for industrialization. The above reasons and the nature of classes in power contribute rather than check the further consolidation of "underdevelopment." Finally, it was felt that the increase in working class population is affected negatively by the capital-intensive nature of investments. This small working force is coopted into the status-quo through high wages and development of apolitical trade union movement. A critical analysis of Leys' and Langdon's theoretical framework necessitates a re-evaluation of Frank and Baran's model.

Baran's notion of "underdevelopment" is based on appropriation of economic surplus by imperialist capital for its external use. This form of argument indicates very broadly the type of economic structure that could exist in the absence of imperialist penetration. By overextending the explanatory value in the concept of economic surplus, the basis for the analysis of the existence of the present itself and the future possible direction of change remain insufficiently developed.<sup>12</sup> John Taylor offers constructive criticism of Baran's conceptual usage which prevent a more in-depth analysis of the less developed social formations.<sup>13</sup> Taylor felt that Baran reached an erroneous conclusion that all non-capitalist modes of production in the periphery were feudal because the manner of utilization of their surplus was similar to the English feudalism. This conclusion limits the usefulness of Baran's concepts towards "constructing those very modes of production that existed within peripheral social formations



prior to capitalist penetration."<sup>14</sup> This is essential for studying the pre-capitalist socio-political institutions and the nature of social stratification in order to eliminate economic deterministic explanations. Taylor criticises this aspect of Baran's analysis which explains changes within social, political and ideological institutions (superstructure) as "simply" reflecting those occurring at the economic level. He continues:

*Such economic premises cannot provide us with any adequate basis for analysing why such superstructural phenomena as ideologies, kinship structures, etc. 'survive' when their 'economic foundation' is effectively destroyed by transformations occurring within the structure of production itself (particularly when this is transformed by capitalist penetration).*<sup>15</sup> (author's emphasis)

Frank, by his very definition of capitalism as "a system in which the surplus product is appropriated by non-producers in a process which produces commodities for the market," creates a real barrier to any analysis of the concrete situation.<sup>16</sup> This, as Taylor has pointed out, results in reducing all determinants of the concrete situation to "capitalism" and the definition leads to the false conclusion that Latin America has been "capitalist not only from its birth but from its conception."<sup>17</sup> Taylor illustrates, through an example, how such a simple conclusion acts as a real barrier to any analysis of a contemporary concrete situation. The process of capitalization of agriculture in certain Latin American countries is restricted by land tenure relations which in most instances are non-capitalist. Any analysis of the phenomena requires a study of the reasons for the existence and "survival" of these non-capitalist relations of production in land. Thus Taylor is correct in suggesting that "Frank's thesis that Latin America has been capitalist since the sixteenth century really prevents us from posing such a question."<sup>18</sup> (author's emphasis) Now, if we return to Leys and Langdon's conceptual framework and concrete analysis we can locate limitations of working within this conceptual framework.

Leys suggests an analytical separation between the capitalist mode and the "peasant" mode of production. He defines the latter form of production as one where the direct producers are not fully separated from the means of production (land, livestock, etc.) and production is based on household labour.<sup>19</sup> Migratory wage-labour represents a link with the dominant capitalist form of production. The continued survival of the "peasant" mode of production subsidizes the capitalist mode by supplementing the wages for labour, and supplying commodities cheaply. Whereas Leys sees the trend towards dominance of this mode of capitalism, he emphasizes the continued distinction between the two modes.<sup>20</sup> The theoretical and political impli-

cations of modes of production thus characterised suggest that the social conflict in the social formation is caused by transition between the two modes. Secondly, the definitions of social classes remain ambiguous as a result of relegating "autonomy" to the household form of production (the means for reproducing its relations of production). This ambiguity can only be removed by transcending the "underdevelopment" model.

Taylor has suggested an historical study of different forms of capitalist penetration and the effects on the periphery.<sup>21</sup> Such a study would require a need to establish a particular mode (or modes) of production that existed prior to the advent of capitalism: the manager in which the relations and forces of production were reproduced and how this 'structured' the elements of the superstructure in the overall social formation. Thus Mike Cowen is able to show how internal classes of capital emerge from the non-capitalist mode of production.<sup>22</sup> He demonstrates that by pinpointing the role of colonial state in transforming the class position of non-capitalist "primitive accumulators" and at the same time restricting any *increased* production by the class. This was done by the state, not merely for racist reasons, but in the interest of estate capital which required labour and could not compete with the indigenous class. The first phase of capitalist penetration under dominance by merchant and/or "competitive" capitalism was characterised by: (a) commodity export, (b) the non-separation from the means of production, and (c) appropriation through unequal exchange.<sup>23</sup> In Kenya this stage was further characterised by dominance of estate capital where increase in value was achieved by increasing the number of workers to reduce the proportionate productive capacity of the households.<sup>24</sup> The fundamental contradiction during this initial stage of capitalism was between estate capital and the indigenous dominant class, rather than between the two modes of production. Consequently, the Mau Mau rebellion has to be viewed as a conflict organised by the dominant indigenous class against the state and the estate capital.<sup>25</sup>

The Mau Mau rebellion contributed towards the transformation of merchant capital into productive capital. The transformation required political intervention against both the estate and internal capital, and the insertion of finance capital into apparatuses of the colonial state.<sup>26</sup> This phase of penetration under finance capital (unity of banking and industrial capital) was characterised by the existence of monopolies.<sup>27</sup> The dominance of this form of production required *control* over production and/or separation of direct producers over means of production. In Kenya the penetration of this advance form of capital led to the *deflection* of the formation of the indigenous bourgeoisie as a result of expanded household production closely supervised by monopoly capital.<sup>28</sup> The characteristics of this mode of production dominated by finance capital was oriented



towards increasing the production and value of labour, suppressing the reproduction of non-capitalist relations of production and lowering the value of labour power. This advanced form of capital in the contemporary period, represented by the subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNC) is the *dominant* mode of production.

In Kenya, as in any concrete society, "any set of relations of production must correspond to only one set of mode of production."<sup>29</sup> The relations of production (or the social and political organization to produce goods) assigns and distributes agents into social classes as a result of the productive process which creates this distinction. Nicos Poulantzas emphasizes that social classes "are groups of social agents, of men defined principally but not exclusively by their place in the *productive process*, i.e. by their place in the economic sphere."<sup>30</sup> (author's emphasis) He elaborated this definition by stressing that: whereas economic considerations play the principal role in the distribution of agents into social classes, political and ideological considerations have to be given importance for the concept to be useful. This significance for political and ideological criteria is especially important (for defining classes) in the developing countries because of the recent history of colonialism and implanted capitalism where the institutions of state, education, political parties, "self-help" ethnic welfare organizations and to some extent missions played a significant role in the structural determination of class divisions.

For example, Cowen, in his study of a social formation in Kenya, demonstrates the dramatic transformation of the class of pre-capitalist accumulators into a *reformed* class through the institutions of mission, school and fleeting periods of skilled labour.<sup>31</sup> This social group (reformed) is not a class by itself but represents various social agents who at a particular point in history were recruited into the capitalist form of production. This social 'group' gained from the shift in political and economic power from the non-capitalist dominant classes towards the capitalist created and supported classes. The usefulness of the concept "reformed" is evident in its explanatory value of illustrating the effects on an internal class by a change in the mode of production. The transformation of the dominant non-capitalist classes was achieved through the processes of 'training' and 'subjection' by the capitalist apparatuses. For the purposes of this study, the concept will be used to explain the particular period in Kenya's history. This is due to the apparent limitations of its broader application.

In societies like Kenya, where the dominant mode of production is capitalist, the two fundamental classes are the bourgeoisie and the working class. However, there are more than two classes because a concrete society is "composed of various



modes and forms of production."32 The bourgeoisie has been defined as "people who own particular means of production and exploit the labour of others, and who act to defend this relationship and advantages it gives them..."33 The terminology also applies to an alliance between various *fractions* of the class sharing political domination. Fractions are distinctions different from economic ones and "as such can even take on an important role as social forces."34 This distinction is important in interpreting the political conflicts and struggles between various social forces of the bourgeoisie aimed towards achieving *hegemonic* position. This is particularly significant because the "power alliance" involves several classes and fractions; and since it can only "function regularly under the leadership of one of those classes and fractions. This is the *hegemonic fraction* which unifies the power alliance under its leadership. The hegemonic fraction is the one which guarantees the general interest of the alliance and whose specific interests are particularly guaranteed by the state."35 The political and ideological criteria which give the fractions a certain level of *autonomy* to act as social forces, make it analytically easier to differentiate between estate capital and indigenous bourgeoisie during colonialism. Another important distinction emerged after independence in Kenya between *comprador* bourgeoisie and the *national* bourgeoisie which is not located only at the economic level.

The necessary differentiation of the two fractions of the bourgeoisie is realised by the intense debate the concept's usage has generated. Leys termed the capitalist class in independent Kenya as *comprador* or "auxiliary" bourgeois, and defines it as "the social strata which the neo-colonial state represents and has its interest in sustaining colonial economic relations."36 Nicola Swainson, in a study appropriately titled *Against the Notion of a Comprador Class* criticizes Leys on the conceptual usage of the terminology on the assumption that the "bourgeoisie will never develop to become fully fledged due to dependence on foreign capital and monopolies."37 On the contrary Swainson argues that the indigenous bourgeoisie is developing, and demonstrates through two examples how the class, by the alliance with international capital, has accumulated economic property via *mutual* advantage which each group derives from such a relationship. She eschews Leys' conceptual framework of "underdevelopment" because it has "placed far too much stress on *external* causation in capitalist development and (has) almost completely ignored the significance of internal class struggles in developing countries."38 Leys underemphasized internal class formation and class conflict, and for that the criticism is very valid. Swainson has demonstrated by her empirical study the role of the indigenous bourgeoisie in limiting the expansion of international capital in certain sectors by its control of the state apparatuses. The competition between the different capitals of the advanced countries often presents the developing countries with

opportunities "to play off one against the other to their own advantage."<sup>39</sup> Swainson feels Leys conceptual model of portraying metropolitan capitals as *one*, prevents us from analysing internal political limitations placed on foreign enterprise.

Issa Shivji interprets the notion of "competing foreign capitals" as a move by indigenous bourgeois to *multiateralize* the 'imperialist domination' and an incorporation of the domestic economy into the "world capitalist system."<sup>40</sup> Shivji has attempted an analysis of internal class formation and class conflict within the "underdevelopment" model. As a result he has reached similar conclusions about the national bourgeoisie as Leys. He felt the class was neither national nor bourgeois:

*They lacked both the historical maturity of their metropolitan counterpart and the latter's objective economic base. The natural process of the development of the authentic national bourgeoisies and the national capitalism in Africa was irreversibly arrested by these countries coming into contact with advanced capitalism. Thus African structures and classes developed in the shadow of formal or informal colonialism. One can therefore hardly talk about a classical type of 'national bourgeoisie' in Africa.<sup>41</sup>*

Shivji questions the continued usage of the terminology to refer to the African ruling classes, particularly since they were not "able to develop strong bourgeois democratic institutions" and have been involved in "petty bourgeois squabbles" and used "ethnicism as their ideological smokescreen." Roger van Zwanenberg observes that "Marxist scholars in Tanzania and elsewhere have underestimated the development potential of Kenya's political economy. Underdevelopment theorists have concluded that Kenya is a mere appendage of international capital."<sup>42</sup> This reference must have applied to Shivji also. Zwanenberg sees both the potential and the limitation of the bourgeoisie, and opposes castigation of the class for reasons of characteristic differences with their foreign counterparts:

*They originated from both the colonial and peasant society and under the umbrella of the multinational corporation. They have had to come to terms with these historical conditions. It would be foolish to suppose that any such bourgeoisie automatically had the option or political power or manoeuvrability to smash international capitalism in order to bring a national industrial revolution...The historical mission of Kenya's new national bourgeoisie has been to open up the forces of production at all levels, to remove the old restrictions on the productive forces, based on race, and to introduce*



*commodity relations in every part of their territory.*<sup>43</sup>

At the same time he foresees a potential conflict between the class and the dominant foreign capital if "international monopoly capital does not appear able to industrialise the society."<sup>44</sup>

The theoretical exchange on the problem of a terminology for the ruling class in Africa has centered around the dominant role of the international capital in the developing countries. Leys and Shivji *overestimate* the political impact of foreign capital. Swainson, on the other hand, *underestimates* the role of international capital in internal politics of African countries. Zwanenberg sees the potential for autonomous development by the bourgeoisie limited by the international capital in the long run. In Kenya he felt the armed forces would be utilized "to reinforce the relations of the new bourgeoisie with international capital."<sup>45</sup> The need to make distinctions between social forces opposed to foreign capital and those allied to it, and the historical basis for this difference, is paramount for eliminating certain theoretical flaws in the above mentioned writers' analyses of the bourgeoisie. Cowen successfully applies the concept of *fractions* to demonstrate the conflict between indigenous bourgeoisie and estate capital in a particular historical period. This concept will be used to explain the distinction within the bourgeoisie.

In Kenya, the two fractions of the bourgeoisie (the comprador and the national bourgeoisie) have distinct political histories, ideologies, socialization, and economic base for accumulation. The ideological and political differences between the fractions of the bourgeoisie emerge on problems of economic development, role of political parties, foreign policy and at times land ownership. The comprador bourgeoisie is *not* a mere appendage or "sub-committee" of the foreign capital. During the colonial period, as members of the *reformed* class, they were socialized and exposed to a new and different lifestyle, intellectual tradition, religion, and an economic system. Their roles forced them to experience racial indignities and also challenge colonial barriers. The quest for more knowledge led many to European metropolises. Ideologically they became 'cultural nationalists' and intellectually obsessed with Africa's 'communal-traditional' past which colonialism had 'corrupted.' After independence they introduced ideas of 'African socialism' and initiated cultural revival in academics, social attire, music and the like. During the nationalist struggle against colonial rule, the comprador bourgeoisie emphasized legal and constitutional means for achieving the goal. Since independence, the core of the fraction is represented by the african executives and businessmen who act as agents and intermediaries of the foreign capital. This group is enforced by leading bureaucrats,



professionals, army, police and trade union officials. They all have a common historical experience, share similar political and philosophical orientation, and lack an independent base for accumulation. The Kenyan immigrant businessmen are allied with this fraction of capital inspite of their conflicting economic interests with foreign enterprise.

Consequently, the economic distinction between foreign and local capital exists but does not *always* coincide with the fractions of the bourgeoisie. The traditional national bourgeois interest in the nation's economic development, land reform restrictions on expansion by international capital give the fraction a "populist" characteristic. The genesis of this class is among the "primitive accumulators" within the non-capitalist mode of production. They unsuccessfully competed with estate capital, were suppressed but not extinguished. They were the most dominant social force behind the Mau Mau uprising against the colonial system. The historical experience of colonialism brought them politically closer to the dominated classes. Today, the national bourgeois is comprised of large estates and plantation owners, big wholesalers, and produce merchants, successful industrialists, transporters, and large operators in the tourist industry. The increasing importance of the tourist and service related industries has promoted the development of significant number of indigenous entrepreneurs who own large hotels and transportation businesses. This fraction of the bourgeoisie in most instances has its own independent base of accumulation.

Unlike the concept of the bourgeoisie, the definitions for the petty bourgeois and the working class have not generated as much debate. Shivji defines the petty bourgeois as the social strata that constitute the middle ranks between the bourgeoisie and the proletarians.<sup>46</sup> In this study the terminology is used in reference to small property owners, traders, craftsmen and middle ranks of intellectuals, professionals and bureaucrats. Similar political and ideological differences tend to distinguish two fractions within the petty bourgeoisie. The first is the "traditional" petty bourgeoisie:

*These are small scale producers and small traders (small property). They include forms of artisan work and small family business in which one and the same agent is both the owner of means of production and of labour and is the direct worker... Labour is principally provided by the real owner of the members of the family... Secondly there is the "new" petty bourgeoisie which tend to increase under monopoly capitalism. It consists of non-productive wage earning workers mentioned above; we should add to it civil servants employed by the state and its various apparatuses. (author's emphasis)<sup>47</sup>*

Poulantzas preceding definition and distinction within the class are helpful in understanding the nature of alliances sought and formed in political conflicts involving classes. The "traditional" petty bourgeoisie has benefited by the post-independent Kenyan government policy of Africanisation of that economic sector. It is traditionally a conservative class and has been socially and politically closer to the rich peasantry who remain the strongest allies of the comprador bourgeoisie. This socio-political bond between the "traditional" petty bourgeoisie and the rich peasantry is supplemented by the former's economic role in the rural business centres as the supplier and distributor of marketable commodities. Many rich peasants in Kenya invest their surplus in such traditional businesses.

On the other hand the "new" petty bourgeoisie is politically and ideologically closer to both the national bourgeoisie and the workers. The class historically has supported populist regimes and participated in the mass mobilization against colonialism. The concept of petty bourgeois has been *over-used, misused and/or abused* in various ways by writers like Shivji, Swainson, Langdon in either identifying movements, political parties or states as characteristically petty bourgeois as a result of the class composition or origins of their leadership. Any form of populist or non-socialist opposition to the regime (Kenya) is comfortably dubbed "petty bourgeois."<sup>48</sup> Shivji *incorrectly* argues that "the most important characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie in this case is that at no time did it hold the reigns of state power... (the) petty bourgeoisie in Africa, on the other hand, led the independence struggle and came to control the state apparatus, thus becoming a *ruling* class, albeit in a subordinate place to the international bourgeoisie."<sup>49</sup> (author's emphasis) His first error is the assertion that the petty bourgeois class has never held "reigns of state power." The lack of distinction between the *hegemonic* fraction and the *reigning* fraction partly contributed to this and the latter error.

Poulantzas has given examples of the petty bourgeois class in the past *holding state powers* under the hegemony of the dominant capital: Fascist Germany and Bonapartist France.<sup>50</sup> The distinction between the hegemonic and the reigning fraction has to be understood on the presumption of the existence of relative autonomy of the state vis-a-vis the hegemonic fraction or class.<sup>51</sup> This autonomy also exists between the various apparatuses of the state. For example in Kenya there are two general divisions within the state: (a) the repressive apparatus which ensures the enforcement of the dominant mode of production's (capitalism) laws of social distribution of relations of production. This involves coercion and is enforced by the army, police, paramilitary forces, the administration, and the judiciary. (b) The role of the second element of the apparatus is the "elaboration and



inculcation" of the dominant class ideology and includes the churches, the educational system, the political parties, the press, radio and television, the publishing industry. Poulantzas' earlier argument of the sharing of political domination between dominant classes and fractions is essential in explaining how the contradictory relations between these social forces is expressed in competition for the control of the various apparatuses of the state by the "power alliance."<sup>52</sup> In most developing countries this alliance involves the bourgeoisie and other classes. For instance in Kenya under the hegemony of the comprador fraction, the rich peasantry is strongly represented in the Parliament.

Kenya has an embryonic proletariat. This class had been defined as workers who "owning no means of production have nothing to sell but their labour power."<sup>53</sup> They have to be committed to wage labour on a long-term basis.<sup>54</sup> When compared to the peasantry, the percentage of the long-term wage earners is small. However, since independence in Kenya, the problems of landlessness, unemployment and rising costs has forced long-term employment which has promoted the development and expansion of the working class. The Kenyan emerging proletariat is mostly located in industry, commerce, farming, transportation and public sector. They are the lowest paid. Although workers in industry and commerce are better paid than the agricultural workers, this and other reasons are not important enough for discussion of the problem of "labour aristocracy." Distinction between unionized labour and non-unionized workers will be introduced for differentiation between long-term workers and short-term wage earners who originate from the peasantry.

More than eighty percent of Kenya's population is rural-based, of which the majority constitute the peasantry. The rural population was peasantized as a result of structural transformation which resulted from the "primitive accumulation" both indigenous and colonial. According to Rodolfo Stavenhagen "peasant societies (do) form part of wider economic, social and political units with which they engage in special kinds of relationships.. Peasant economics tend towards self-sufficiency, and the household is the main unit of production and consumption, based on intensive use of family labour."<sup>55</sup> Within the class, differences emerge as a result of participation in the wider political economy. Langdon gives three reasons for the differences; firstly, as a result of regional variations, and in particular the variations in rainfall and fertility; secondly, the closeness to urban centres, more developed infrastructure and the growth of cashcrops contributed to the differences, and finally, he felt the accessibility to parastatals and/or membership of local or national cooperatives has contributed to the growing social stratification among the peasantry.<sup>56</sup> Whereas it is indisputable that the above reasons have contributed towards the



differences among the peasantry, the central role of international capital in encouraging household production of cash-crops has been very instrumental in this respect.<sup>57</sup> Three levels of social stratification can be identified which are different from the overall social structure of rural Kenya. These are the poor, medium and rich peasants. The poor supplement their income by selling their labour, while the medium peasantry has some surplus besides their labour power. The rich supplements its family labour by occasionally employing poor peasants.

The remaining social groups can be all constituted within the category of sub-proletariat. The often used concept of "lumpen-proletariat" can be misleading if used in similar circumstances due to the social connotations associated with it. The conceptual usage of the sub-proletariat is useful in two ways. The social agents in the class are aggressively seeking employment and by association and socialization they identify with the working class. Secondly, due to resettlement of the landless or proletarianisation through short-term rural employment, the social agents are closer to the rural working class. The concept has an added explanatory value in analysing class formation which is resulting from the social and structural disintegration of the peasantry. The composition of this class (the sub-proletariat) includes the urban unemployed, the rural landless squatters and a small minority commonly associated with the "lumpen-proletariat," i.e. the prostitutes, pick-pockets, robbers and other criminal elements.

The Kenya government's attempts at the incorporation of the sub-proletariat into the mainstream of the country's economy have been mildly successful. In 1964, an agreement between the employers, the trade unions and the government was expected to create 40,000 new jobs and reduce by half the numbers of the unemployed.<sup>58</sup> Since then the government has relied more on industrial and economic development for resolving the problem. In the rural areas, the official policy makers have depended upon the increasing numbers of commercial farmers to increase employment. The political stability of the country remains threatened by the problems of unemployment and landlessness. At the same time, Kenya's scarce resources, including land, remain concentrated and unevenly distributed as a result of official policy. The resolution of the dilemma has been central to the evolution of post-independent Kenya politics.

A few final comments are pertinent on the conceptual framework which has been developed in relation to the studies which have been quoted. Cowen's work was based on a particular social formation in Kenya (i.e. a sub-location of Nyeri District), studying the role of international capital in household production and consequently the deflection of the formation of the indigenous bourgeoisie. The study has theoretically

contributed towards a better understanding of the nature of politics in predominantly rural Kenya. The reaction of the developing indigenous bourgeois to the trend set by the intervention of internal capital cannot be grasped without analysing the role of parastatals and the state apparatuses. Swainson concludes that the bourgeoisie have strong influence over the former institutions and have effectively utilized them to further their own interests and limit the amount of landholdings of the foreign capital. It should be emphasized that this role of the international capital vis-a-vis the indigenous bourgeois does *not* extend to the tourist, commercial, and small scale manufacturing sectors. This will be demonstrated later in the study and we shall find that the stride made by this rising class in these sectors since independence have been monumental.

The theoretical concepts to be utilized are based on the conclusion reached that the dominant relations of production in Kenya are capitalist. In such societies the principal contradiction is between the two dominant classes: the bourgeois and the proletariat. However, the nature of Kenya's political economy has necessitated a re-evaluation of the causes of social conflict. Langdon has analysed this contradiction as one between the "insiders" composed of the Political-Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie and the MNCs and the "outsiders" based among the small-scale peasants, the urban poor, petty traders and craftsmen.<sup>59</sup> In this study the nature of the ruling "power alliance" will be analysed in terms of its class composition and competition for hegemony. The emphasis on competition between fractions is not directed towards under-rating the class struggle. It is felt that the strength of theory lies as much in interpreting social phenomena (e.g. social conflict) and predicting the possible directions of change within the concrete formation as in analysing the present itself. Class conflict exists and is expanding, but has been manipulated in the past by the fractions of the bourgeoisie to their own advantage. For the present the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has been seconded to one between the fractions of capital. At the same time the struggle between the classes, although secondary, has influenced the intra-class conflict of the bourgeois.

### *Background to Independent Kenya*

British protectorate was declared over Kenya in 1895 and before that there was no such territorial unit, but a number of ethnic groups having their own small nations. After suppressing the resistance of the African people, the colonialists consolidated their position with a policy of land alienation and white settlement in Kenya. This was done by designating the highland agricultural land in Central and Rift Valley areas for European



only. To legitimize the move, the colonial government created twenty-four African units or "native reserves" for the various ethnic groups. The Kikuyu, Masai and the Kalenjin were the main ethnic groups to have lost land to the white settlers.

The creation of the "native units" in the country by the colonialists imposed a legal boundary on the Africans, which restricted rural to rural migration in the form of land expansion. Migration was an important factor in the distribution of means of production within the African non-capitalist mode of production. Discussing the pre-colonial period within the Kikuyu economy, Mike Cowen correctly analysed that: "Rights to land ownership were ensured by rights to first clearance of land. The private appropriation of socialized labour by a class of primitive accumulators was set in motion by and limited by migration."<sup>60</sup> Within the cultivators in the "native reserves," particularly among the Kikuyu, some form of primitive accumulation was also in motion. The colonial intervention against migration (by imposing limited 'reserve' boundaries) initiated an evolution in the indigenous form of production towards the capitalist mode of production.

To ensure the success of settler agriculture, political and economic measures were taken to guarantee cheap and dependable labor force, and minimum competition from the African farmers. By reducing the agricultural land (for Africans) and increasing their tax burdens, the Africans were forced to work for the settlers. Where the economic measures failed, coercion was applied.<sup>61</sup> The labour market for the colonial economy became fully organized with the consolidation of the "reserves" and further restrictions in the form of "prohibiting cash crops, and failing to provide essential infrastructure although Africans were being heavily taxed."<sup>62</sup>

The settler economic dominance in agriculture was not established until the latter part of the Second World War. This was due to the increased prices of primary products, and their high war time demand. The intervention of the colonial government to help establish semi-official and parastatal marketing and finance organizations helped the settlers in stabilizing prices. Such organizations also offered settler farmers technical and other services. The intervention of the colonial government was a result of the near collapse of the settler agricultural economy during the depression years of the 1930s when "400 out of 2,000 odd settlers abandoned their farms, and many more would have ceased operations but for the outdoor relief of £1,000,000 provided by the Imperial Government."<sup>63</sup> Roger von Zwanenburg, writing on the subject, felt the colonial government's intervention to sustain the settler agriculture resulted from war time metropolitan demand for their products.<sup>64</sup> By 1945, the colonial government "offered credit facilities in order to

allow the white farmers to buy his essential requirements; they provided specialist aid to show the farmers the best method of farming; they provided minimum guaranteed prices; they provided fertilizer and farm machinery and they provided guaranteed markets, through the mechanism of marketing boards."<sup>65</sup>

In the African "reserves," fixed boundaries badly "disturbed the equilibrium between pattern of land use and the availability of land, a balance which had been maintained through the system of shifting cultivation or nomadic pastoralism."<sup>66</sup> Fragmentation, overstocking and soil erosion seriously deteriorated land use which led to migration by numerous Africans to work for settler farmers. The traditional social and cultural institutions related to land use virtually lost their authority as landlessness increased. The colonial policy of fixed boundaries influenced the development and exclusive use of land based on the family even in areas which had no history of primitive accumulation. Thus in areas suffering from land pressures land expansion took place within the reserve at the expense of others.<sup>67</sup>

At the time of the depression (1930s), the financial dependence of the settlers on the colonial government weakened the political influence over the Imperial Government. The incapability of the settlers to satisfy alone the colony's agricultural and food demands necessitated African participation in agricultural production.<sup>68</sup> For the success of increased agricultural production, colonial officials felt that "adequate steps had to be taken to deal with the problems of social conservation, water supplies, afforestation, the reclamation of land infested with tsetse flies, overcrowding by man and beast, the resting and reconditioning of eroded and worn out areas and the improvement of farming methods."<sup>69</sup> This form of colonial response to inherent socio-economic problems in the African reserves failed to impress the peasantry and was in itself unsuccessful.

The problem of landlessness and rural unemployment could not be resolved by urban employment because the colonial government discouraged industrialization.<sup>70</sup> The few industries which existed were overprotected and oriented towards the European and Asian population. By 1939 Kenya had small scale industries producing beer, cigarettes, soap, cement, canned food and vegetables. Infrastructural development and maintenance in the form of roads and railways, and private exploitation of minerals and food resources accounted for most of the industrial and economic development until the beginning of the Second World War. During the war, some enterprising European settlers and Asian businessmen developed import substituting industries to offset shortages of imported goods.<sup>71</sup> After the war, colonial policy towards industrial development changed as industrialists in Britain found export of capital to the colonies brought higher returns. Where:



in 1946, there were only 280 private firms (involved in industry manufacture) with a total value of \$320 million; by 1958 the companies had increased by 3,380 with a total value of \$960 million.<sup>72</sup> Of the increase in the new companies, the Asians owned a third.

The beginning of small scale industrial development expanded the urban population. Until the beginning of the Second World War, most urban areas were commercial and administrative centers with very few permanent African residents. Colonialism did not create an industrial class among the Africans; nor an urbanized proletariat of any significance during its rule before the war. In 1920 when the British Colonial Development Commission was appointed to promote commerce and industry, it favored firstly Europeans and then Indians and other non-African minorities and "the few African businessmen who were allowed to emerge were at the bottom of the ladder and cannot be considered capitalists in the true sense."<sup>73</sup> Besides, the colonial discrimination against African participation in commerce and industry, "the arrival of minority groups who had no local family ties which could stand in the way of ruthless primary accumulation which capitalism requires" forestalled and limited such development."<sup>74</sup>

The need for African participation in the colonial system was very crucial for a number of reasons. Shortage of European manpower to occupy all administrative, technical and other positions required some African participation. The class position of primitive accumulators (indigenous bourgeoisie) "was transformed by reformation of the class places through the institution of mission, school and fleeting periods of skilled wage labour."<sup>75</sup> The reformation of the dominant members of the class of indigenous primitive accumulators through the institutions of school and mission by early 1930s created a class in conflict both with the indigenous bourgeoisie (pre-colonial primitive accumulators) and the predominant fraction of the estate capital (colonial primitive accumulators);<sup>76</sup> In spite of the opposition of the settler estate capital to the reformed class, "by the mid 1950s, the reformed class was supported by apparatuses of the state... All subsequent political forces and organization of the indigenous class were directed at shifting the balance of class forces away from the tilt held by the dominant fraction of estate capital."<sup>77</sup>

Urbanization and colonial capitalist development fostered the formation of a reformed class which assumed the leadership of the protest movements which originated to channel grievances of the people against the colonial system. Some of the agents of this class worked within the colonial system, and in Central Province, organized themselves into Kikuyu Loyal Patriots (1932). Another organization with a wider popular base among the Kikuyu was the Kikuyu Central Association. In 1938, when the first colonial projects to increase agricultural productivity in

African reserves were started, the popularity of the protest movements increased. The KCA and the Akamba Members Association were banned for agitating against the land reforms. The colonial government appointed Eliud Mathu, a moderate member of the KCA to become the first African member of the Legislative Council in 1944. To advise him, the first nationwide political organization was formed. Jomo Kenyatta assumed the leadership of the organization called Kenya African Union (KAU) in 1946 on his return from Britain.

The contradiction between estate capital and the social classes generated by capitalism (among the Africans) manifested itself in the form of various political activities. Principal among them were the political activities of KAU and the trade union movement which contributed significantly towards displacing the estate capital. Kenyatta's leadership and the return of war veterans increased and enhanced the popular support of KAU. Although the party had a popular base, the leadership reflected the interests of the reformed class. Dissatisfaction with the leadership forced numerous nationalists to participate in the activities of the more radical East African Trade Union Congress (EATUC).<sup>78</sup> The EATUC and its other affiliated workers organizations had successfully initiated strike action in April 1935 against Asian and European building contractors in demand for improving the African workers' socio-economic conditions.<sup>79</sup> When industrial based trade union strikes were realized to be ineffective, the workers in 1947 organized successful general strikes in Mombasa and Kisumu; and later on May Day 1950, a rally and a procession in Nairobi.<sup>80</sup> At the rally, the workers' leaders pledged that the movement was committed to the complete freedom and independence of the country from colonial rule.<sup>81</sup> The reaction of the colonial authorities to the increasing effectiveness and influence of the EATUC among urban African population was to detain the leadership (Makhan Singh and Fred Kubai) and increase its harassment of the movement.

The social nature of KAU's leadership underwent change as trade union activists began replacing the moderates of the reformed class at the district level.<sup>82</sup> At the same time in some critical constituencies, the political representatives of the transformed indigenous bourgeoisie began reasserting their leadership by organizing militant traditional organizations, and infiltrating into the regional branches of KAU. The influence of the trade union activists and the indigenous bourgeoisie forced KAU to change its policy and call for independence of the country from colonial rule. The political confrontation with colonial authorities was pre-empted by an outbreak of an armed revolt in Central Province against the colonial rule. The revolt, popularly known as the Mau Mau was later supported by radical trade union activists, but initially was supported and later sustained by the peasantry and "set in motion by the political organization of the indigenous bourgeoisie."<sup>83</sup>



The national leadership of KAU was detained by the colonial authorities and additional British troops intervened to suppress the revolt. During the period of emergency African political organizations were banned and their active members detained.<sup>84</sup> In one such operation, involving 25,000 soldiers, just over 100,000 African residents in and around Nairobi were detained.<sup>85</sup> Besides the coercive measures, the Imperial government by assuming direct control over the colony began political and economic reforms which attacked the center of settler interests in Kenya.<sup>86</sup> Three major recommendations in 1954 called for a free market in land (East African Royal Commission), consolidation of all African land holdings and rapid introduction of all land holdings and rapid introduction of all suitable cash crops (Swynnerton plan), and rapid increase in cash wages to a family minimum level (Carpenter report).<sup>87</sup> The reversal in orientation of the colonial policy was a result of the increasing support the metropolitan capital (both industrial and financial) extended to the reform class at the expense of estate capital. Although the conflict between the metropolitan capital and the estate capital preceded the Mau Mau revolt, the insurgency demonstrated the political inappropriateness of continued settler political and economic dominance. According to Gary Wasserman, by 1955 the value of manufactured goods produced in Kenya was greater than the total yields from European agriculture.<sup>88</sup>

By the end of 1958, the economic reforms initiated by the colonial government strengthened the economic base of the reformed class. Those Africans who sided with the colonialists during the "Mau Mau" gained more and were rewarded through the programs of land consolidation and registration. The Swynnerton plan which had initiated the land reform had envisioned "the creation of landed African middle class for whom near landless labourers would provide a work force."<sup>89</sup> The program succeeded in creation of a small African landed gentry but further worsened the problem of landlessness and rural unemployment. It was hoped that the increase in agricultural production (for export) would increase the income of the successful farmers from \$15 million to about \$180 million over a couple of years.

During this period, the colonial regime encouraged African participation in commerce, transportation and small scale industries. A commercial loan scheme was developed to lend about £1.2 million to 5,000 to 6,000 African traders.<sup>90</sup> At the same time some far sighted local European industrialists and businessmen set up a committee for the development of African entrepreneurship with an initial capital of £75,000.<sup>91</sup> As a result of these and other developments, Africans accounted for 6% of all registered industrial companies by 1958. The large multinational corporations began recruiting prominent Africans into executive positions of their firms. Official and private encouragement for Africans to buy shares in public corporations was now backed

with loans. The rapid expansion of African businessmen could be observed by the steady rise in bank accounts held by Africans. In the sphere of industrial relations, the government took steps to harmonize the worker-employer relations.

To offset increased militancy among the proletariat, the colonial authorities had detained their prominent leaders. At the same time they started encouraging moderates to form staff associations and workers committees as alternative forms of employee representation to trade unions.<sup>93</sup> When this failed, in June 1952, the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions was recognized and given legal authority to organize workers.<sup>94</sup> The trade union which later changed its name to Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL) worked closely with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).<sup>95</sup> The KFL, under the leadership of Tom Mboya, played the leadership role for the African people during the period of emergency. Although the union concentrated on protesting to the colonial authorities about the harassment against the workers during the emergency, they also called for universal adult suffrage, and an end to racial discrimination and "imprisonment without trial."<sup>96</sup>

The years between 1958 to the end of 1963 can be referred to as the period of "political constitutionalism" when the rising African classes negotiated for independence. The 1954 Lyttle plan which provided eight African seats in the Legislative Council was rejected by the Africans. During this period, the colonial authorities initiated the revival of African politics at the district level. The administrative boundaries (districts) were based on the boundaries of the African reserves which represented particular ethnic geographic locations. No nationwide political organizations were allowed and the colonial authorities encouraged formation of district based parties. As a result, sixteen associations were formed, such as Kalenjin Political Alliance, Abaluhya Peoples Party and Somali United Front. These political parties were dominated by members of the reformed middle class. The success in colonial policies of "controlled African participation" led to further increases in the number of African representatives in the Legislative Council.

By the end of 1959, the restrictions on Kikuyu politics and their organizations were lifted. Veteran Kikuyu politicians began resuming their political activities in the trade unions and district political associations. African rejection of the multi-racial national parties forced the colonial government to approve the formation of nationwide African political parties in 1960. Initial attempts to organize one united political party failed due to personality conflicts, different class interests, and the small ethnic groups' fear of being dominated by the Luo, Kikuyu/Luo/ and Akamba groups. By the end of 1960 Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union



(KADU) had been formed. KADU was formed by the leaders of the district associations of the Masai, Somali, Coast, Kalenjin and the Abaluhya. The party had a less dynamic political program. Although KANU was formed out of the district associations of the Luo, Kikuyu, and the Akamba, the party attracted radical members of other tribes and races. The party manifesto was more radical than KADU's. It had a socialist program, and was committed to Pan-Africanism and a militant anti-imperialist foreign policy. KANU also attracted the bulk of the trade union leadership and activists.

The 1963 General Elections was fought principally on the issue of regionalism. KADU emphasized the value of regionalism against a strong central government as a means of controlling allocation of revenues and land. The party program maintained that reallocation of white settler farms ought to be left within the jurisdiction of regional administrations. In this they had the support of the majority of the settler farmers. Initially KANU downplayed the "Regionalism" issue and concentrated on advocating national unity, socialism, East African Federation, Pan-Africanism, and the national control of the economy. KADU was strongly in favor of maintaining close political ties with Britain and the West, and retaining the British military base at Kahawa. They supported this policy on the grounds that the country would earn £10 million in foreign exchange accruing from the base.<sup>97</sup> KANU was opposed to retaining the military base for ideological reasons. During the final phases of the electoral campaign, regionalism became a central issue and KANU came out for a strong central government. The elections were won by KANU, and by December 12, 1964 (a year after Kenya's independence) KADU was voluntarily dissolved and Kenya became a "defacto" one party state.

#### *The Consolidation of the Comprador Bourgeoisie*

Capitalist penetration in Kenya transformed the class position of dominant social groups (pre-capitalist) to satisfy its skilled labour needs. This resulted in the creation of a *reformed* class. Within the class structure in Kenya, the groups monopoly of higher education, land and capital ownership, distributed the agents into the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. The distribution of these social agents into the particular classes was a consequence of the pre-independence policies of removing barriers to greater African participation in the economy.

At independence, the bourgeoisie was experiencing a strong struggle within itself. The fraction of the national bourgeoisie wanted a more nationalistic policy of faster "Africanization" of the private and public sector. They demanded *nationalization*

of banks, key industries, insurance companies, foreign owned plantations and the import-export trade. A fundamental characteristic of the national bourgeoisie is *nationalism*. The class has the ingenuity of manifesting its interests as essential patriotic and beneficial to all the nation's citizens. Nationalization in particular circumstances serves the interests of the bourgeoisie when adapted to their own interests. The proposal of this policy emphatically qualified against the state's appropriation of economic property of indigenous African business

In Kenya, this policy would have served the national bourgeoisie in two ways: control over *dominant* foreign capital and increased sources of accumulation for the class. In the first case, the nationalization of the plantations and international finance capital would have *reduced* the deflection of the bourgeoisie. The "popular" nature of the policy would have cemented the class alliances with the "new" petty-bourgeois, workers, the poor peasants and the sub-proletariat. National banks and industries would provide a new source of accumulation in the form of easier bank loans, control over the import-export business, and distributive trade all in the absence of competition from well established foreign enterprises. Another major source of accumulation would result from replacing the international capital as the main agent for the appropriation of the peasants' surplus. Such a political economy (with reduced foreign investment) would contribute towards the lowering of the value of labour. This would benefit the national bourgeoisie in its accumulation of the surplus value since this class lacks the technology. At independence, the national bourgeoisie-led international class alliance with popular support among the dominated classes was championed by Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia.

The comprador bourgeoisie held the upper hand at independence. They were strongly allied with the rich and medium peasantry. Although conceptually the large African land owners constitute part of the national bourgeoisie, this group allied with the comprador. This was a result of the national bourgeoisie's demand for a ceiling on land ownership. This land alliance involving the comprador bourgeoisie, the "traditional" petty-bourgeois and the peasantry was championed initially by Tom Mboya, Charles Njonjo, Daniel arap Moi and Julius Gikonyo Kiano. Later, Jomo Kenyatta assumed their leadership and played the decisive role in consolidating their class position.

The economic basis for the distinction between the two fractions of the bourgeoisie resulted from the social nature of the economy. The industrial and large commercial sector was monopolized by non-Africans at the time of independence. The national bourgeois felt that the foreign estate was "primitively accumulated" and thus deserved no compensation. Both Odinga and Kaggia insisted on the free distribution of land to the large



and poor peasantry in the form of cooperatives on state farms. The nationalists also pressured the government to fulfill campaign pledges of free health and education services. Political differences on the nature and the role of the party (KANU) and Kenya's foreign policy gave ideological content to the basis of the emergency conflict. Although the struggle between the fractions was for the monopoly of the state apparatus, it also manifested itself in the control of the party, trade union movement and the intelligentsia. After independence, the *ideological* distinctions between the fractions of the bourgeoisie further clarified as the state became more aggressively aligned.

What is ideology? Karl Mannheim gives definitions of particular and total conceptions of ideology, with the usage of the former to mean that "conceptions of ideology when the term denotes that we are skeptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent."<sup>98</sup> To Mannheim these ideas and representations advanced by our opponent.<sup>98</sup> To Mannheim these ideas are either outright disguises of reality or distortions ranging from "conscious lies to half conscious and unwitting disguises, from calculated ways to dupe others to self deception" all in the preservation of their interests.<sup>99</sup> The total conception in ideology, where the role of class and class position to thought is stressed is associated primarily with Marxism. Mannheim refers to it as the ideology of an age or of a concrete historical-social group, e.g. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group."<sup>100</sup>

The concept and function of ideology has been looked at similarly by the social scientists studying the problem in the African context. From ideology meaning to be "an organized set of justifications for the policies and activities of the ruling regime,"<sup>101</sup> to C.B. MacPherson's usage of the concept in a "neutral" sense as: "any more less systematic set of ideas about man's place in nature, in society, and in history which can elicit the commitment of significant number of people to (or against) political change."<sup>102</sup> Karl Marx linked man's material life-process to "ideological reflexes" and felt that ideologies are "distorted" reflections of reality.<sup>103</sup> Here he meant they are simply (or more or less accurate) representations of material interests. Ideologies can and do explain or "distort" class interests and class structure of societies. They are not "commodities" sold by groups or social classes to merely achieve or maintain status-quo at times of social and economic upheavals. The post-independent period in Kenya further clarified the ideological and political positions of the fractions of the dominant class. The political pronouncements and policy statements of the political leadership of various fractions and classes supports the notion of ideologies representing "distorted" material interests.

The need for a historical study of the development of distinct ideologies of the fractions is essential. However, because of the broad nature of the topic, only the fractions relative to different experiences with colonialism will be discussed. The contemporary comprador class was "subjected" to colonial ideological apparatuses more than the national Bourgeoisie. This is because the former fraction had to undergo "qualifications" while the latter fraction required little exposure to "education" for their economic roles.

In most instances the comprador fraction (reformed class) reacted to the inherent racism in the colonial institutions as a result of their role within this structure. Various discourses were written about the non-exploitative, egalitarian classlessness of the pre-colonial Africa, etc. These works remain important nationalist responses to the intellectuals, colonial officials and missionaries who spoke of Africa as a "Dark Continent" without history, composed of semi-primitive people in need of a civilizing mission.<sup>104</sup> This form of struggle at the intellectual level against racism was influenced by ideals of liberal democracy and individual merit.<sup>105</sup>

The national bourgeois struggled against colonialism for different reasons such as land alienation, economic restrictions and competition from well established immigrant groups. This class was fundamentally opposed to the economic privileges enjoyed by the immigrants. The historical experience contributed towards the post-independence call by the class for nationalization of certain foreign enterprises; e.g. banks which discriminated against African businessmen.

The focus of KANU and KADU leadership prior to independence was the formation of mass based popular movements to achieve "majority rule" based on universal suffrage. They believed democracy could be achieved by eliminating privileges for particular social groups. After independence, in reaction to criticism by the nationalist movement and the labour unions, the government issued a policy statement: *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*.<sup>106</sup>

The ideological content of the document reveals the comprador conception of pre-colonial Africa, and the class interests in the form of the nation in the future.<sup>107</sup> It is argued that the traditional African society did not exclude the private ownership of capital. Consequently Kenya should continue to encourage private foreign investment for the country's rapid economic growth. This capital should be used in the interest of the society's general welfare in the spirit of traditional communalism. Such private property should never be nationalized except in certain circumstances. Such expropriated property should be fully compensated. Class formation would be prevented by means



other than changing the form of ownership of capital. Political controls over the use of accumulated wealth for political ambitions, and the implementation of "traditional political democracy" would successfully reintroduce the egalitarian nature of society which had been socially stratified by the colonial interlude. Finally, it was promised that the establishment of Africans in the management of foreign enterprises, in the private sector as entrepreneurs, and in other fields would be pursued by all possible means. Examples given ranged from loans, extension services to "Africanization" and encouragement of Africans to buy shares in foreign companies.

The ideological content in the policy statement reflects the immediate economic interests of the fraction of the bourgeoisie, and proposes particular solutions to the problems of development. Thus it should not be devalued as a mere "distortion of existing reality." The social origin of the comprador was from the peasantry. The colonial economy excluded them from entrepreneurial activities. Just prior to independence, they were recruited into the management of large foreign enterprises and promoted to senior positions in the bureaucracy, army, police and the academia. They composed a high salaried group who had entrepreneurial decisions made for them. Their desire for "African Socialism" was based on attitude of mind, and traditional communal social relations. This form of socialism did not threaten their class interests. The ideology was not, however, a mere justification for the system. It had sociological roots in the class based society; the ideologies of the comprador and the class itself were prisoners of the past. In Kenya, the peasantry which represented the majority on the country still lived by and practiced traditional values. It was a very convenient alliance: the comprador seeking past values, and the peasantry seeking a commercial role in the agricultural sector. The immediate policies of the independent government were to encourage peasant (household) cash crop production. Between 1963 and 1968, the cash inflows to the small holder farming increased by 150%.<sup>108</sup> The alliance between the comprador and the rich and middle peasantry gave the much needed stability to the whole system.

The dependence on private investment for development in the comprador ideology did not represent (to the comprador) a contradiction of class formation. The economic base of the comprador is foreign enterprise, while the popular support lies among the wealthier peasantry. The resolution for avoiding class formation proposed was to revitalize ideas of "traditional communalism" and social reforms which would maintain private property. Economically and politically the ideology has been tactful. Increased foreign investment and greater cash inflow into the peasant households has been achieved. Well publicized rural "self-help" projects for building infrastructure, schools

and hospitals has added content to traditional-communal spirit of togetherness. Whereas these "harambee" policies have further taxed the peasantry, it has also provided the much needed social services in the rural areas. In the long run it has forged a strong alliance between the wealthier peasantry and the regime. However, the poor peasantry, the proletariat and the sub-proletariat have been alienated. These have been the social classes the national bourgeoisie have tried to mobilize against the regime.

The ideology of the national bourgeoisie is more oriented towards resolving some of the effects of capitalism because of the acceptance of the notion of class cleavages. The primary solution proposed for resolving the problem of inequality and income differentials was the establishment of a form of welfare state. Other particular solutions included: (i) the incorporation of the dislocated peasantry (landless) by the establishment of state farms or cooperatives. Nationalized previously foreign owned plantations and farms should be the basis of such agricultural units, (ii) as a result of the incapability of the foreign enterprise to industrialize the society and increase employment the state should be made the main agent of industrialization. (iii) Financial and technical assistance be provided to African businessmen. (iv) to resolve the problem of landlessness, a ceiling be put on sizes of individual ownership of land. (v) The existing colonial wage structure be transformed to reduce income differentials through increased taxation of the rich and wage increases for the workers. These economic policies later became part of the official manifesto of the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU).<sup>109</sup> They reflect the political ideology of the social classes adversely affected by colonialism. African enterprise (economic) was repressed by colonial laws. When the barriers were removed competition from the non-Africans stifled their progress. The "new" petty-bourgeoisie found similar barriers in their professions, civil service and the private sector. In the country these ideas attracted the poor peasantry, the proletariat and the sub-proletariat (mostly landless). In opposition to the regime's policy on land resettlement, the national bourgeoisie demanded the creation of cooperatives and state farms. They opposed compensation of white settlers' farms but were opposed to expropriation of African-owned land.<sup>110</sup>

The national bourgeoisie and comprador ideologies have sociological roots in the political economy of Kenya. They are both dynamic and undergo changes with new developments in Kenyan politics and economy. The above is the situation when the comprador class was politically consolidating during the first six years of Kenya's independence.

In 1964 Jomo Kenyatta became the first President of Kenya and he appointed Oginga Odinga as the Vice President and Minister



of Home Affairs (internal security). The comprador bourgeoisie had hegemony over the cabinet and the Legislature. This was a result of the preponderance of representatives from rural constituencies. The national bourgeois-led alliance had access to immigration, radio/TV and foreign policy.<sup>111</sup> They were supported by radical trade union leaders controlling vital sectors of the Kenyan economy: the docks, energy (petroleum), plantations, industry and engineering, and transportation. In 1964 after official visits to Moscow and Peking, Odinga returned with a Soviet aid package which among other things included an ideological party school. The school once completed, began teaching regional party leaders the ideology of bourgeois nationalism and proletariat socialism. The graduates of the school (called Lumumba Institute) as leaders of the party's branches and sub-branches were to elect the KANU's national leadership.

Between 1964 and 1966, the comprador fraction of the bourgeoisie successfully consolidated their hold over the state apparatus (as we see in more detail) by: (i) isolating hard-core opposition within Parliament, (ii) gradually stripping all ministerial power from Odinga and Achieng Oneko, (iii) regaining hegemony over the party, KANU, (iv) instituting further economic and fiscal policies. In the Parliament Odinga and Oneko were supported by "Kaggia and Tom-Okello Odongo, both parliamentary secretaries, J.D. Kali the Chief Whip, and a number of mostly Gusii and Luo backbenchers, assisted by Pio Gama Pinto, a Goan M.P. who was subsequently assassinated."<sup>112</sup> By the beginning of 1965, Kenyatta assumed leadership of the comprador fraction, and gradually stripped Odinga of all but ceremonial functions.<sup>113</sup> In the Ministry of Information, Oneko's powers were limited by replacing his top bureaucrats.

By April 1965, Odinga's opponents organized themselves to isolate the hard-core opposition to the government within the Parliament. The Comprador-led group attacked the opponents as "communists" which subsequently led to the fall in Odinga's support within the Parliament.<sup>114</sup> The national KANU elections were postponed. However, through the control of the party headquarters, Mboya was able to install favourable leadership in Muranga, Homa Bay, Kitui, and South Nyanza.<sup>115</sup> In July, 1965 branch officials of KANU who had graduated from Lumumba Institute, physically occupied the KANU headquarters. They expelled all but Kenyatta and Odinga from the party's national leadership. The regime reacted forcefully by expelling all graduates of the Institute from the party.

By the beginning of 1966, the comprador felt strong enough to convene the KANU representatives to elect the new national leadership under the framework of its new constitution. An important change in the Constitution was to be the creation of seven provincial vice presidents in the place of a single post

of the party Vice-President. On February 27, 1966 Mboya announced that the KANU Delegates' Conference would be held in two weeks time. The hastily convened conference was opposed on constitutional grounds by trade unionists and fifty-two parliamentarians.<sup>116</sup> The conference was held with the support of the majority in parliament. At the conference, the ideological and political opponents of the compradors were "purged" from the national leadership of the party. On April 14, 1966 Odinga, Oneko, Kaggia and 28 members of the Parliament resigned from KANU and the government and formed an opposition Kenya Peoples Union (KPU).<sup>117</sup>

Central to the political conflict in Kenya was the plight of the landless squatters joined by 60,000 ex-Mau Mau detainees.<sup>118</sup> The government had initially reacted by allocating 7,298 plots for the resettlement of some under the so-called "Jet schemes."<sup>119</sup> When impatience drove some to occupy settle farms,<sup>120</sup> the regime reacted forcefully to evict them under the pressure from the Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE).<sup>121</sup> The action behind the eviction was legal and constituted part of the property rights guaranteed by the Kenya constitution. These rights were further consolidated by the enactment of Foreign Investment Protection Acts of 1964. Taken together (with the Bill of Rights, Section 19), they protected personal property against illegal entry, and nationalization was made more difficult. Whereas the potential for mobilization against the regime existed, political and bureaucratic harassment was used to check the expansion of the organized opposition. However, the consolidation of the comprador fraction resulted from economic and fiscal policies instituted during the 1963 to 1968 period.

The colonial government after the Second World War had created the parastatals to help the settlers accumulate capital. The Kenya government vastly expanded these institutions in order to provide technical and financial support to African farmers, traders and few industrialists. Through the government's licensing policy, commercial openings were created in urban centers by barring non-citizens from operating in certain areas and goods. The state made effective use of the parastatals in promoting the development of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. Zwanenberg's insight on the subject needs to be quoted at length

*The parastatals include regulatory boards which control entry to various forms of economic activity through licencing; the Transport and the Betting Licencing Boards are two such organizations. The colonial marketing parastatals have been maintained, expanded and nationalized. Marketing apparatus now covers both domestic and export products, and includes the Kenya Meat Commission, the Maize and Produce Boards and the National Trading Corporation*



among others. A third group are the financial parastatals like the Agricultural Finance Corporation, the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation and the Development Finance Corporation of Kenya. These government banking institutions are concerned to provide specialized credit services to Africans, and to support African ownership of land, commerce and industry. The two latter parastatals have been concerned to establish partnerships with international capitalist firms in order to provide the security which many foreign firms demand before they invest in Kenya. Finally, there are the Public Service Commission and the Teacher Service Commission and other similar boards concerned with Kenyanizing the multitude of intermediary posts.<sup>122</sup>

Whereas the parastatals concerned with the "Africanization" of the personnel in the private and public sector (e.g. Teacher Service Commission and Public Service Commission) have been effectively utilized, the regulatory boards have been very selectively used by the regime in licencing of commerce and trade. Over time, with increased competition for technical and financial services, it is not uncommon for the members of board (of the particular parastatal) who in most instances are sitting members of the Parliament to expect a donation to their favorite "harambee" project. The amount of money collected by the member of Parliament for the locally initiated development projects has been very influential in the constituency elections for the Party and the Parliament.

During the 1967 to 1970 period, there was \$41.3 million inflow into Kenya as a result of private foreign investment.<sup>123</sup> Most of the investment was by new multinational firms originating from Western Europe, U.S.A. and Japan. They contributed towards Kenya's excellent economic performance of 7.6% growth rate p.a.<sup>124</sup> However, the capital intensive nature of the investments increased employment by only 2.2% p.a.<sup>125</sup> Also the share of wages relative to profits by these firms was declining. Another stubborn problem faced by the regime's economic planners was been the 3.6% annual population growth rate. The immediate needs in social services for the fast expanding population diverted the government's limited resources. For instance, between 1963 and 1972 the government aided schools have increased from 82 to 364.<sup>126</sup> Whereas the pressure on the government has been increasing for the expansion of social services (schools, clinics, etc.) and infrastructure, the regime has encouraged local initiative and "self-help." Unaided schools increased in Kenya during the same period from 13 to 585.<sup>127</sup> As a result, the problem of unemployment among school graduates has seriously deteriorated after independence.

The comprador bourgeoisie instituted two forms of economic policies. As a reaction to landlessness, soaring unemployment and pressures from "traditional" petty-bourgeoisie; they created land settlement schemes; increased employment by 10%.<sup>128</sup> (through a 1964 agreement with FKE and KFL), and via the parastatals new trade licencing legislation aided and supported middle sectors of commerce and industry. The second form of economic policies were to buttress and stabilize the entire economic system. This was accomplished by achieving successful political alliances with the rich and middle peasantry. The eventual creation of more stable and enterprising traditional petty-bourgeoisie as to this alliance. The economic policies while strengthening economic base of this alliance, further alienated the national bourgeoisie, the "new" petty-bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the sub-proletariat and the poor peasantry. KPU began mobilizing these classes against the government immediately after its formation.

### *The Neutralization of the Proletariat*

At independence, the organized working population comprised of 223,796 members represented by 27 trade unions.<sup>129</sup> All the unions were affiliated with the KFL. Mboya appointed personal nominee to head the KFL in 1962 when he became the Labour Minister. The political stand of the workers' leaders prior to independence was announced in a policy statement which stated: "free and independent of the government and employers Trade unionism must not limit itself strictly to matters concerning the terms and conditions of employment, but also concern itself with such other questions as "human rights legislation matters of economic policy..."<sup>130</sup> Later when the momentum towards independence increased, they "demanded that the government announce its plan for economic development, which should include nationalization of key industries and the creation of collective farms."<sup>131</sup> With the consolidation of a comprador dominated regime, some trade union leaders broke away from the KFL and formed the Kenya Federation of Progressive Trade Unions (KFPTU) in April 1964. Their differences with the remaining leadership were based on: (a) continued KFL affiliation with "western" ICFIA, (b) and the Kenya government's (and Mboya's) conception of socialism.<sup>132</sup> The KFPTU which changed its name to Kenya African Workers Congress (KAWC) was supported in the parliament by the anti-comprador alliance.

Initially the regime attempted at controlling the activities of the radical KAWC by enacting new labour legislation. The government amended the existing legislation which created more stringent conditions under which notice of change of officers was to be accepted by the Registrar of Trade Unions.<sup>133</sup> This particular legislation affected the KAWC because leaders



in the particular unions could be "influenced" to remain within KFL despite rank-and-file opposition. In August, 1965 another amendment (the Trade Disputes Act of 1965) extended the list of essential services by five to cover all the industries and services covered by the KAWC. It also gave the Minister of Labour the right to declare any strike illegal if he felt that the union leaders had not "fully exhausted all the channels for negotiations with the employers." This prerogative was used by the Labour Minister to declare the 1967 Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) strike illegal after it had been in progress for 24 hours. The new trade union legislation prohibited any strikes of solidarity.

The legislation was not effective in winning control of the unions. As a result in the middle of 1965, Kenyatta appointed a ministerial committee to resolve the problem. What resulted was a compromise resolution: the creation of a single Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) to replace both KAWC and KFL. Elections were held for the new office holders for the COTU. Clement Lubeme of the KFL, Dennis Akumu of KAWC and Stephen Kioni of KNUT got the highest votes in running order. The new COTU constitution gave the President, Kenyatta, the authority to appoint the officials. He appointed Lubembe the secretary-general, and Akumu the assistant secretary. The COTU constitution also forbade it from affiliating with international trade union. This reconciliation of the union leadership was short-lived. When the KPU was formed in 1966, 13 trade union leaders joined the party. These included "Akumu, Ochola Mak'Anyengo (Oil and Petroleum Workers Union), Mr. Onudi (Sugar Workers), Mrs. Akama (Engineering Workers), Mr. Awounda (Quarry and Mine Workers), Mr. Wachira (Safari Workers), Mr. Awich (Shoe and Leather Workers) and Mr. Ooko (Common Services)."<sup>134</sup> They were all immediately expelled from COTU.

#### *The Demise of the Parliament*

Political developments have affected constitutional changes in post independence Kenya. Before 1966, constitutional changes were a reaction to KADU's dissolution and, therefore, a need for a re-arrangement of power. The "regionalistic" constitution was changed by restoration of full legislative power to the Parliament. The redirection of political power from KANU to the President (and thus weakening of the political party) contributed "directly to the emergence of a survival complex in politics."<sup>135</sup> This was a result of emergence of KPU as an opposition party. The government's response was to enact further legislation in an attempt to resolve the crisis "constitution ally." Three major legislations were passed to discourage other M.P.s to join KPU and to control the effectiveness of the party. The first one required M.P.s resigning from KANU to seek

re-election to their parliamentary seats.<sup>136</sup> This amendment was "published, tabled, debated, passed through all its stages, and given presidential assent in less than 48 hours."<sup>137</sup> The second constitutional change was an amendment to the 1960 Preservation of Public Security Act. It enlarged the government emergency powers and eliminated parliamentary controls over the emergency legislation.<sup>138</sup> Executive power was tremendously expanded. The final legislation dissolved the Senate.<sup>139</sup>

The regime's reactive legislation motivated by political survival taken together gave the executive excessive power: to detain or exile people in the name of national security, control over censorship, processions and meetings, nomination of twelve members to the parliament and others. The Kenyatta government used the new legislation to detain "nearly all the trade union leadership who had joined the KPU."<sup>140</sup> Party branch and youth leadership were similarly detained. In the "Little General Elections" which followed the detentions, KANU won 22 seats and thus reduced KPU to a parliamentary opposition of 9. In spite of the parliamentary loss, KPU polled a majority of the votes.

#### *The State Apparatus of Force*

The dominance of the comprador bourgeoisie over other social classes was enforced by the state. The reliability of the coercive elements within the state apparatuses was achieved with British assistance. As a result of the 1964 mutiny in the armed forces, the comprador were very worried over a military *coup d'etat*. The discontent then was a result of the continuation of pre-independence wage structure and the slow rate of Africanization of the officer corps.<sup>142</sup> The government asked for British assistance to suppress the mutiny; and requested for British officers to replace the mutineers. Brigadier John Hardy was made the Commander of the Army and he organized a smooth Africanization of the Officer corps. Very few rank-and-file soldiers were promoted. Recruitment into the officer corps was based on high levels of education and training. Almost all the recruits usually spent part of their training in Britain. Within the whole bureaucracy, the armed forces were the most overt remnants of colonialism in Kenya. They have undergone minimum socio-political transformation. Contact with the former imperial power has been retained through a defense pact which allows for "joint military exercises" and training programs. As a result, even after independence Britain has continued to play an important role in its development. Zwanenberg had therefore been right to conclude that for some time the armed forces would continue to reinforce the relations of the new bourgeoisie with international capital.

The police force was expanded during the outbreak of the



Mau Mau, from 6,057 in 1957, to 12,232 by 1962/63.<sup>143</sup> At the same time the General Service Unit (GSU) consisting of a strong police striking force (with military training) was created. The GSU has been effectively used in controlling students, civilian demonstrations, eviction of squatters and has the capability of moving quickly to any part of the country. Politically the GSU has been used to reduce the dependency of the army as a political arbitrator.<sup>144</sup>

*The Banning of the Opposition: KPU*

In spite of political and administrative harassment, KPU continued to have fairly widespread support in the country. The redirection of the political power from KANU to the executive weakened and disorganized the governing party. Whereas the consolidation of the class had been achieved, the succession of the leadership was not assured. In case of parliamentary elections, a new law entrusting political parties to nominate candidates was enacted. This law was tested during the Gem continuency by-election in which the opposition KPU won by 90% of the votes.<sup>145</sup> The KPU victory in Gem was not necessarily a reflection of public opinion in the country. The constituency is in Central Nyanza, then a stronghold of Odinga's. Also the KANU candidate was personally unpopular. However, the election generated controversy within KANU which exposed internal conflicts within the regime's alliance. The conflict was based on the problem of succession.

By April 1969 KANU backbenchers began openly demanding for primary elections for party's candidates.<sup>146</sup> The Gem by-election prompted some M.P.s to disassociate from top leadership while some "began to fear that they might be denied the renomination at the forthcoming general elections."<sup>147</sup> This initiated legislation which to date remains the basis for election and succession of the presidency and the M.P.s. The role of political parties was elevated. Independent candidates were eliminated from electoral competition. Political parties henceforth had to sponsor a single presidential candidate. The candidate who received the greatest number of district electoral, and was himself elected as a constituency member was to be declared President.<sup>147</sup> The new legislation also allowed for primary elections to precede the general elections. In the event of only one party contesting the elections, the decision on the presidential candidate was to be decided by the party (usually its executive committee). The KANU Executive Committee is composed of the party chairman, secretary-general and the seven provincial vice-presidents.<sup>149</sup>

Kenyatta had promised for national elections by 1970. KANU was undergoing reorganization and members of its executive committee became partisan in regional party conflicts. During the Gem by-election Mboya avoided campaigning for the official KANU candidate. At the same time his supporters within KANU

had the upper hand in party elections in Nyanza, the Coast, and parts of the Rift Valley. On July 5, 1969 Mooya was assassinated in Nairobi. The assassin who was later arrested and convicted, turned out to be a Kikuyu. The whole country was shocked. The crisis led to a rearrangement of popular support between KANU and KPU. Majority of the Luo people now allied behind the KPU. KANU began to be associated with the Kikuyu. All over the country anti-Kikuyu feelings were aroused. The Kikuyu people living in Rift Valley, Nyanza and the Coast were harassed and their property damaged. The KPU leadership exploited the crisis to increase support for the party. The anti-Kikuyu demonstration around the country resulted in uniting the Kikuyu leadership. They reacted by initiating a mass oath-taking programme among the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru and part of the neighboring Kamba. Whereas the crisis contributed towards uniting the Kikuyu leadership, the oath-taking which followed was not "capable of papering over the growing cleavages in Kikuyu society."<sup>150</sup> However, the polarization in the country forced Kagga and majority of KPU leaders in Central Province to give up the party.

On October 27, 1969 Kenyatta visited Kisumu for the opening ceremony of a Russian built hospital. He was concluding a KANU campaign tour around the country. In Kisumu, the KPU leadership mobilized their supporters to "welcome" Kenyatta. Odinga used populism and Kenyatta's tact. Kenyatta infuriated the KPU supporters by launching a "bitter and offensive attack on Odinga."<sup>151</sup> The hostile crowd pressed towards Kenyatta's departing motorcade. His bodyguards fired into the crowd, "killing ten and wounding seventy" people.<sup>152</sup> Emergency was declared over Kisumu and Central Nyanza. A strict dusk to dawn curfew was imposed and supervised by the GSU. Five days later the KPU was banned. All the national and parliamentary leaders were detained.

In spite of the banning of the KPU, Kenyatta went ahead with the holding of the General Elections on December 6, 1969. Without any opposition, the constitution allowed for only primaries within KANU. These turned out to be enthusiastically contested; and 615 candidates fought over 158 parliamentary seats. The elections held were very democratic, although individuals who had been KPU members six months prior to the elections were excluded from contesting.<sup>153</sup> In the elections 5 cabinet members, 13 Assistant Ministers and more than 50% of the M.P.s lost their seats. The past policies were continued with some changes. Kenyatta and the leadership felt the elections represented "fresh mandate by the people."

#### *Class Formation: The Politics of Transition*

Capitalist development since independence has structural



transformed Kenya. Rapid development of the productive forces has contributed towards discarding some backward forms of colonial and pre-colonial organizations. The bourgeoisie has played a vital role in the "institutionalization of commodity relations throughout the rural society."<sup>154</sup> The comprador bourgeoisie has further developed its relationship with international capital by emphasizing *mutual* advantages.<sup>155</sup> As a result, some members of this class have used their association with international firms to accumulate (for themselves) economic property. At the same time the bourgeois led assault on colonial institutions and policies has been instrumental in "releasing the creative energies of large numbers of Kenya people."<sup>156</sup> The economic policies and the political propaganda of the regime has raised the expectations of many who have not yet gained materially.

The pattern of land ownership has undergone some changes since independence. Although there are still as many private estates as in 1954 (3,175 in 1970 as against 3,164 in 1954), more than a third are now owned by Kenyan Africans.<sup>157</sup> The few European settlers who remained are closely allied with African capitalist farmers.<sup>158</sup> There are about 1,500 estates owned by multinational corporations (MNCs) whose further land expansion has been limited by the bourgeoisie. Nicola Swainson saw similar evidence in a study of two MNCs and their relationship to the Kenyan bourgeoisie.<sup>159</sup> Her study of the tea industry in Kenya reveals the contradictions existing between the national bourgeoisie and the foreign private estate capital. A brief summary of the historical development of the industry is important in the explanation of the present conflict.

The colonial policy of encouraging peasant (household) production of tea led to an alliance between the foreign companies and the small holders. Brooke Bond Tea Company was the largest corporation producing the bulk of the tea for export it had a monopoly of the internal East African market and owned most of the processing factories in the country. Through the financial assistance of the Commonwealth Development Corporation small holder production rapidly increased between 1963 and 1973. The Brooke Bond acted with other estate companies as the managing agents for the small holder tea growing schemes and sun drying factories under construction. This relationship between the MNCs and the small holders strengthened the hold of the MNCs over the overall industry as they were able to eliminate "illegal" sun drying of tea and directly control the conditions of production.<sup>160</sup> The Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) was formed to represent interests of Kenyan tea farmers. This parastatal has effectively become a tool of the capitalist farmers who while encouraging household production, have been restricting the expansion and control of Brooke Bond Tea and other companies. KTDA has built 22 new factories, invested in 15 more and set up training facilities to provide management and labour

to run the factories.<sup>161</sup> Another means of restricting the expansion of the Brooks Bond has been to organize an unofficial bourgeois block to further land purchases by the company.<sup>162</sup> On April 25, 1975 some leading members of the bourgeoisie acquired 60% ownership and control of another MNC (Inchcape) with wide ranging investments in industry and agriculture.<sup>165</sup> The control of agricultural parastatals has enabled the national bourgeoisie to extend their hegemony over the production and control of sugar, coffee, sisal, pyrethrum, wheat, maize, etc. The strategy has been the same: (i) accumulation of land, (ii) restriction of further land expansion by the foreign companies, (iii) political pressure on the foreign companies to go public and (iv) control over the processing factories.

In the commercial and industrial sector, the national bourgeoisie's success has been limited. Kenyan businessmen have virtually replaced non-citizens in the intermediary sectors of transportation and distribution.<sup>164</sup> But in manufacturing, construction, finance and import-export trade, foreign private companies continue to control the characteristics of growth. It is in the industrial sector that the national bourgeoisie's path towards an independent ruling class is blocked. Between 1964 and 1974 the government partnership with new foreign capital averaged 9% of the equity.<sup>165</sup> There was complete reliance on foreign private and public assistance for industrialization. The Kenyan bourgeoisie has continued to invest in real estate and service industries. The thriving tourist industry has been attractive to local capital. The share of African citizens in this industry has been increasing. Non-African residents in partnership with Africans (closely associated with the state) have succeeded in minimizing the role of the large MNCs active in tourism in other parts of the world.<sup>166</sup>

The Kenyan bourgeoisie used state power successfully to restrict the expansion of MNCs in agriculture. In industry, their strategy has been to acquire controlling equity in the regional branches of the MNCs, and to use their association with the foreign companies to accumulate for themselves economic property. Whereas the former means has not been that successful, there is some evidence of individuals accumulating via the MNCs.<sup>167</sup> A good example of the latter process is Mr. Udi Gecchaga, the chairman of the London Rhodesia Company (Lonrho):

*From a 1974 list of the top 50 directors in Kenya, (he) comes 15th with a total of 37 directorships. Of these 37 companies, 7 are his own and acquired since he became chairman of Lonrho in 1973. The remaining 30 are Lonrho subsidiaries. We are concerned here with his own 7 companies; of these 2 are investment companies with a wide scope of interest but largely property and land. Two are sole*



*distributors of manufactured goods, one is a transporting company in which he has an equity share-holding with Lonrho. (author's emphasis)168*

Whereas this form of accumulation in no way presents a barrier to foreign investors; in the long run it will contribute towards the expansion of the material base of the national bourgeoisie.

The Kenyan regime continues to offer very profitable conditions to foreign investors in industry and manufacturing. At the same time the State's populist opposition (KPU) to foreign private investment forced the government in cooperation with interests concerned, to undertake the nationalization (with compensation) of oil refining, power supplies, and the banks.<sup>169</sup> These nationalizations were not aimed at political control or economic restrictions on foreign companies. The motive was economic: more revenue for the regime to invest in industrial projects not attractive to local or foreign enterprise.

In industry, the bourgeoisie's absolute form of accumulation remains small. The class is dependent on the MNCs and the parastatals on investments in successful industrial projects. However small their investments are, they are politically very significant in the Kenyan context. The increasing importance of the national bourgeoisie in this sector is bound to influence the national policy. We can see certain deviations in the country's policy towards investments in the motor industry. The changes in no way represent restrictions on foreign private capital, but are important in resolving certain problems associated with that form of accumulation; i.e. repatriation of capital and importation of expensive technology. President Kenyatta recently opened the country's first modern vehicle plant, the Kenya Leylands, owned jointly by the government and the British Leyland. Two more such assembly plants are also being established in the country. What is important about the new projects is that capital for the investment was raised locally and the government has passed legislation stating that 40% of the input has to be provided locally.<sup>170</sup> In other words, besides the creation of new jobs, local suppliers are providing all "wind-screens and glass, batteries, tyres, tubes, soft trim and upholstery, and greases, fuels and adhesives. By 1977 local content will be expanded to include radiators, exhaust pipes, silencers, leaf springs, seat frames and brake linings."<sup>171</sup> The regime hopes to save maximum amount of foreign exchange, and to stimulate local industry. The disadvantages of such investments for import-substitution are the same as in other developing countries: local products are more expensive than the mass produced items from abroad. This new policy has provided for significant amount of local enterprise.

The economic success in agriculture and industry has not

resolved the acute problems of unemployment and landlessness. The bourgeoisie today has economically consolidated itself in the system. It has a vested interest in perpetuating the status quo. Its opposition to foreign enterprise will deepen if it appears that international capital is incapable of industrializing the society. The regime has not allowed organized opposition which would threaten the capitalist system. For the present, the primary contradiction remains between the fractions of the bourgeoisie. Land holdings have become a central issue. The political crisis generated by the assassination of Josiah Mwangi Kariuki (JM) have pushed the capitalist farmers closer to the national bourgeoisie. The "united" national bourgeois fraction today represents the biggest threat to the comprador regime.

The incorporation of the capitalist farmers into the national bourgeoisie resulted from the Kenyan Parliament's attempt to put restrictions on the capitalist system in the wake of JM's assassination. JM was killed on March 2, 1975 under circumstances which cast strong suspicion on the regime. His death was preceded by instances of bombings in the country.<sup>172</sup> After the banning of the KPU in 1969, the late JM became the spokesman of the national bourgeoisie, the "new" petty-bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the poor peasantry and particularly the landless. He was supported in parliament by the political representatives of the classes he defended.<sup>173</sup> He opposed foreign private capital because they repatriated profits, borrowed locally (thus restricting loans for local enterprises), and practiced racism against Africans in their salary structure. In the case of Lonrho, he felt besides those reasons the firm was guilty of buying out local companies.<sup>174</sup>

JM published a personal election manifesto when he encountered restrictions to address his and other supporters constituency members. The political and ideological content of the document represents an updated version of the KPU's "Wananchi Declaration." He advocated: (i) free health and education, (ii) attacked inequalities in opportunities for upward social mobility (iii) gave corruption as a reason for economic inequalities (iv) nationalization of foreign enterprise, (v) ceiling on land ownership and principle of land use as opposed to land ownership, and (vi) national unity. The nature of his opposition was not new. What made JM a dangerous critic of the regime was his changing political and ideological orientation towards the capitalist system which increased his popularity in the country. Unlike his predecessors, he began distributing his *economic* property, particularly land to the dispossessed.<sup>175</sup> Other members of the Kenyan bourgeoisie traditionally share part of the *profits* with the poor by contributing towards "harambee" projects. JM subdivided his farms to the peasants. He was in the process of disowning his class through his actions. It is



purely speculative to suggest that he would have disowned all his economic property. However, the process he initiated contributed towards his elimination.

The regime remains repressive towards opposition to the system while allowing for some internal criticism. JM's assassination united all opponents of the regime; and for the first time Kenyatta's government lost the upper hand in the national parliament. The M.P.s began asserting themselves by forming various select committees to probe JM's death, and corruption in the country. The Kenyatta government was rescued by the political mobilization organized against the parliamentarians by the bourgeoisie based mostly on land. The group was led by Mr. Kihika Kimani.<sup>176</sup> The regime characteristically resisted from deploying the army (instead made extensive use of the GSU) during the emotionally charged period against demonstrations by its opponents.<sup>177</sup>

The Kenyatta government regained the upper hand in the Parliament by detaining the ringleaders of its opponents in the house. Technically two of the members were sentenced to imprisonment for unrelated reasons.<sup>178</sup> By July 1975, a new KANU constitution was approved and steps were undertaken to give new life to the party. The amended party constitution reintroduced the post of one party vice-president to replace the former eight. The party's executive committee's regional composition was maintained, and so was its crucial role as the decision maker for succession to the presidency. For the first time since the Limuru Conference (1966), the President's directives to reactivate KANU and organize its elections are being enthusiastically implemented. The competition between the classes and within the bourgeoisie has been very intensive. The revitalization of the party deflected politics from the parliament as most opponents and supporters of the regime got immersed in their constituencies.

The crisis following JM's assassination was averted. Admitted the political environment forced certain individuals and groups to support the parliamentary "rebellion" against the executive. However, in the aftermath of the crisis, the nature of alliances being sought and formed reveal very similar class identifications. The comprador bourgeoisie continues to enjoy the support of the rich peasantry and the "traditional" petty-bourgeois. What has changed is the increased relative strength of the national bourgeoisie which is beginning to reassert itself politically.

Although the competition between the two fractions will concur with the past class alliances, the realignment of some political personalities will take place. This can be explained by changes in the class positions of some politicians who effec-

tively utilized the institutions of the state and/or the MNCs for their own accumulation. This aspect will be discussed in the concluding remarks in the form of political personalities and their impact on political and ideological mobilization for certain class positions. The problem of *ethnicity and class* in relation to political and economic consolidation and/or social conflict has been explained well elsewhere. Henry Bienen's recent study based on Kenya has emphasized ethnic cleavages as important indicators for analyzing social conflict. The nature of this study necessitates some comments on his conclusions. A less studied topic is repression in the developing countries within the context of their political economy. As a final conclusion, the nature of alliances within the ruling classes and its relationship to repression or liberalization will be introduced for testing any merits in the assumption. The discussion of the problem will be limited to those apparatuses of the state commonly associated with force.

#### *Personalities and Politics*

The KPU was organized to strive for the class position of the national bourgeoisie and classes allied to it. Odinga Kaggia and Oneko were openly associated in this political movement. However, KPU had many ideological sympathizers who remained in KANU for reasons of political expediency. Prominent among them were the late JM, Mark Mithwaga and Wariuhu Kanja whose opposition to the government's land policies was similar to that of the KPU. Then there were the non-KPU trade union activists, loyal to KANU but critical of the compradors.<sup>179</sup> The regime closely allied with international capital was able to perpetuate its control of the state via the political alliances of Kenyatta, Mboya, Njonjo, Moi, Mungai and Ngei. Certain groups within the comprador bourgeoisie accumulated economic property for themselves through their control of the state and by their association with the MNCs. The removal from the political arena of the regime's open critics (during the post-KPU era) eliminated the political element out of the conflict between the fractions. This was achieved by the political detention of individuals opposed to the regime. Also by opening further economic opportunities for members of the rising classes, this conflict was reduced.

The rapid economic growth and increased accumulation by the foreign and local capital has introduced new political leaders in the continuing rivalry between the fractions of capital. As a result the present struggle between fractions led by Moi and Njonjo against the Mungai, Kimani and Ngei group is not merely a personality struggle for succession to the presidency. Some political analysts are bound to interpret it as a re-emergence of old big ethnic groups (Kikuyu/Luo/Kamba) versus small



ethnic groups (Kalenjin/Masai/Luhya) alliances which preceded political independence from Britain. Moi and Njonjo today represent the interests of the comprador led alliance which is strongly supported by the traditional petty-bourgeoisie and the rich peasantry. The present conflict has manifested itself on the nature of the constitution of the country relating to the role of the parliament vis-a-vis the executive, and the succession laws of the presidency. Mungai, Kimani and Ngei have called for an amendment to the presidency which would allow for early elections with a "lame-duck" acting President. Their motion has been to thwart the chances of Moi assuming the office in case of Kenyatta's death or resignation. Moi and his supporters oppose the amendment and are presently attempting to consolidate their control over KANU's executive committee.<sup>180</sup>

The polarization of the political personalities at present is not surprising. Odinga and his supporters are politically aligning themselves with the Mungai group. As the conflict becomes more intense, this group is bound to openly embrace the political and ideological philosophy of the national bourgeoisie. The interpretation of this ideology will have minor differences from that of their predecessors. This can be expected. The political economy has fundamentally changed and been transformed. The difference between the present and the past struggles illustrates that. Most political personalities have had their mass support eroded or changed. Odinga can no longer command the loyalty of all the Luo people. Whereas he remains popular in his home district of Siaya, he has found opposition from members of the rising classes who are seeking an alliance with Moi and the international capital.

Moi is assured of political support from areas where indigenous accumulation has been comparatively small: e.g. Machakos, Kajiado, Kericho, Baringo, Kilifi, etc. The Mugai group's support is based among the capitalist farmers and businessmen. The rich agricultural areas of Central and Rift Valley and the commercial/Industrial centers of Nairobi, Mombasa, Thika, Nakuru and Kisumu are bound to rally behind the national bourgeoisie led alliance. Two political issues in the future will influence the allegiance of the lower classes to either fraction. The accumulation of property by some members of the bourgeoisie through corruption and destruction of the national resources is one. The demand for democratic rights by the dispossessed classes will gain momentum as rearrangement of class alliances takes place. These and other developments will promote the development of a socialist movement independent of the bourgeoisie.

The potential for (or primacy of) ethnic or tribal conflict in Kenya still exists in literature of writers on the country. Henry Bienen still maintains that "communal solidarities have not been breached as yet in Kenya."<sup>181</sup> He concedes that ethnic conflict can be based on economic rather than "traditional social forces. He felt that as a result of economic disparities between ethnic groups, the conflict has a material manifestation. Also he insists that one should take into account the fact that groups may put race and tribe over economic interests.

Such outmoded conceptions have been vigorously attacked elsewhere. Colin Leys has amply discussed the role of colonialism in fostering ethnic consciousness.<sup>182</sup> He has further linked the role of colonialism with the uneven development of capitalism for contributing towards the problem. In fact one can go further and condemn colonialism for allowing only ethnic based political parties (district associations) until the eve of independence in Kenya. The debate on the issue is bound to continue. In this essay, the writer wishes to challenge certain conceptual themes in Bienen's study.

Bienen reached his conclusions after asserting that when social cleavages have been created (through capitalist development), the resultant class conflict or mobilization in rural and urban areas did not take place. He based his hypothesis on the failure of KPU's appeal to the poor farmers and the landless; and the lack of revolutionary action by the trade unions. One is tempted to simply reject his conclusions on the basis of his empirical flaws. KPU was never challenged nationwide by the KANU government. In the Little General Elections the party lost to the government, but polled majority of the votes. The struggle of the trade unions for their legality and autonomy has been long. During the 1966 to 1969 period when KPU was an opposition party, the most prominent political detainees were trade union

The thesis of KPU being a vanguard party of the dispossessed groups has been challenged in this essay. The party was primarily formed to restrict the role of private foreign capital and distribute more evenly the national resources to regions and classes. Lack of inter-party competition (after 1969) due to the existence of a "de facto" one party, KANU, should have directed Bienen to test his conceptual framework in the constituency elections of areas with sharp economic cleavages. Politicians who have espoused the cause of poor peasants, workers and the landless have won convincingly in Central Province, Coast, Rift Valley and Nyanza.<sup>183</sup> Whereas their elections have not resolved the problem; these representatives have stood fast on the campaign promises even to the detriment of some going to jail.



The comprador bourgeoisie needs tribalism. Richard Sklar has suggested that "tribal movements may be created and instigated to action by the new men in power in furtherance of their own special interests, which are, time and again constitutive interests of emerging social classes. Tribalism then becomes a mask for class privilege."<sup>184</sup> The ideology of "tribalism" serves the interest of the comprador bourgeoisie in two ways: (i) it deflects the development of class consciousness, and (ii) it limits the expansion of the class of local accumulators. In Kenya, the regime has openly encouraged the activities of ethnic cultural organizations. These organizations representing all the important ethnic groups are active in the "harambee" projects, and thus relieve the government of certain responsibilities.

The sub-cultural nationalist activities which they promote are divisive and further tax the people. In 1974, Kenyatta appointed the leaders of the prominent ethnic organization to the parliament. Critics of the organizations such as the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA) have stated that they are led by the bourgeoisie who wish to use the masses for their own private gain.<sup>185</sup>

The ideology of "tribalism" has failed to maintain communal solidarity because class formation has been rapid. At the same time, the immediate geographical boundaries of the ethnic groups has become a barrier to the national bourgeoisie. This class out of patriotism and economic motivation has been promoting national unity. The accumulation of land, real estate, and other forms of capital by the group outside of their ethnic area has been increasing. As a result it is paramount for them to fight against local parochial biases. This problem does not exist for the compradors. The MNCs distribute their agencies on the basis of ethnicity. Where local branches of the regional firms operate, the foreign enterprise portrays itself as "neutral" in an "inter-tribal" conflict.

The issue of ethnicity cannot be removed from the intra-class struggle of the bourgeoisie. The comprador ideology promotes traditional values and organizations of the ethnic groups for resolving effects of capitalist development. Politically and economically, it has been mutually beneficial to the compradors and the rich peasantry. But the nationalist response from the classes opposed to it has successfully breached the communal solidarities. The failure of Kenyatta's regime to "unify" the Kikuyu in the aftermath of the JM crisis is one such example. The alliance of the Kalenjin capitalist farmers led by Mr. Kibowen Komen with the Kikuyu and other farmers (Kihika Kimani group) against Moi in the Kalenjin populated Rift Valley is also demonstrative of the fact.<sup>186</sup> Today the political alliances being sought and formed further define the class structure of the present society.

*Class Alliances and Political Repression*

The modern state has a monopoly of organized physical repression. In Kenya, the coercive elements of the state are represented by the armed forces, police and paramilitary force (GS). The functioning of the coercive elements of the state is assigned by the political system. Through constitutional amendments, the control over this force was incorporated into the executive branch of the government. Since the comprador branch is the hegemonic fraction; theoretically the class controls the elements of force in society. The state's legitimacy and class character extends to the elements of force. Since the functioning of the state is political (one of class domination), its coercion is solely political. Hence repression presents itself as "constitutionalized violence."<sup>187</sup>

The anti-colonial struggle was organized by a popular alliance of all social classes opposed to foreign domination. The nature of the transfer of political power from the colonizer to the colonized retained intact the political characteristics of the colonial state. That state was based on force more than hegemony. The centralization and consolidation of the state after the political demise of "regionalism" in Kenya tightened the control of the state in favor of the comprador fraction. The rapid development of the productive forces, and the general assault on backward forms of colonial and pre-colonial organizations limited the applications of repression in the economic mode. The legitimization of the social relations of production required ideology, class alliances and maintaining a democratic character of the political institutions of the state.

The ideology of the dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie contributed towards stabilizing of the political system. This was made possible by the legitimization of the polity and formation of alliances with other social classes. Ideology and class alliances alone could not assure the hegemony of the comprador class. Consequently, after the formation of the KPU in 1966, "a marked shift towards reliance on coercion and suppression of dissent had been occurring."<sup>188</sup> This reliance on coercion for resolving political conflict has disturbed the equilibrium of stability. The House of Representatives lost most semblances of democratic character essential for "legitimizing" the use of force by the state.<sup>189</sup> The consolidation of political power in the executive has created a dilemma for the bourgeoisie in terms of perpetuating the status quo. The regime will either increase repression or reinstall certain powers back in the Parliament and party. The nature of the new class alliances formed will have some influence over the general trend towards repression or parliamentary democracy.



The political alliance led by the comprador bourgeoisie cannot withstand a long term struggle with the "popular" alliance led by the national bourgeoisie without becoming increasingly repressive. Further increase in coercion will lead the regime to rely on the armed forces: opening possibilities of any form of army rule. On the other hand, the redistribution of power to the party and the legislature will not necessarily replace the hegemonic fraction. The dominance by the national bourgeoisie and its allied classes within the party and the parliament will lead to the realignment of the class forces in the country. The contradiction between capitalism and socialism would then become primary. The ability of the political system to entertain a socialist opposition party would depend on the country's political economy at that time.

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#### Footnotes

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20. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
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64. *Ibid.*
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67. *Ibid.*, pp. 156-58.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
69. *Ibid.*
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71. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-27.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
73. Rodney, Walter, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), p. 236.



74. *Ibid.*
75. Cowen, "Notes on Capital Class and Household Production" p. 7.
76. *Ibid.*
77. *Ibid.* My usage of *reformed* class is not as a separate, distinct class. It conceptually helps in explaining the weakening of the pre-capitalist mode of productions and the subsequent dominance of capitalist productive processes. At that stage members of the reformed group became distributed into the petty-bourgeoisie class.
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79. Sandbrook, Richard. *Proletarians and African Capitalism: The Kenyan Case*, p. 30.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
81. *Ibid.*
82. Kaggia, *Roots of Freedom*, p. 79.
83. Cowen, "Notes on Capital Class and Household Production," p. 9.
84. The prominent leaders of KAU detained were: Jomo Kenyatta, Paul Ngei, Bildad Kaggia and Achieng Oneko. Other political detainees included J. Mwangi Kariuki, Pio Gama Pinto, Kariuki Chotara and Wariuhu Itote (General China).
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88. Wasseman, Gary, "Continuity and Counter-Insurgency: The Role of Land Reform in Decolonising Kenya, 1962-70," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 7, 1 (1973), p. 134.
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94. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
97. C. Sanger and J. Nottingham, "Kenyan General Elections of 1963,"
98. Mannheim, Karl, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harvest Books, 1936), p. 55.
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103. Ashcraft, Richard, "Marx and Weber on Liberalism as Bourgeois Ideology," *Comparative Study in Sociology and History* 14 (1972).
104. Kenyatta wrote some of these ideas in a dissertation for his M.A. in Anthropology at the London School of Oriental Studies. It was an important cultural nationalist response to Europeans who had intellectually abused African customs and traditions.
105. Tom Mboya was active in affiliating the Kenyan trade union movement with ICFTU and the British labour movement. Various union activists from Kenya, including Mboya, went to England to study trade unionism. Charles Njonjo was one of the first members of the Federation of Kenya Employers. He was also educated abroad. Other leaders like Njoroge



Mungai, Mbuiya Koinaige, Julius Kiano studied in universities in America (USA).

106. Kenya Government, *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya* (Nairobi: Republic of Kenya Publications, 1965), pp. 1-56.
107. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 222.
108. Zwanenburg, "Neo-Colonialism and the Origins of the National Bourgeoisie in Kenya," p. 173.
109. The KPU Manifesto and the Wananchi Declaration. Also reference in Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, pp. 224-27.
110. *Ibid.*
111. Individuals holding the ministeries referred to are Odinga (Home Affairs), Achieng Oneko (Information) and Joseph Murumbi (Foreign Affairs).
112. Lamb, Geoff *Peasant Politics* (Sussex, England: Julian Friedmann Publishers Limited, 1974), p. 20.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
114. *Ibid.*
115. *Ibid.*
116. Gertzel, Cherry. *The Politics of Independent Kenya* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970), p. 71.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
118. Wasseman, "Continuity and Counter-Insurgency: The Role of Land Reform in Decolonising Kenya," p. 136.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
120. In 1963/65 tension arose between landless ex-Mau Mau and the government in Kenya over the issue of land.
121. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 219.
122. Zwanenburg, "Neo-Colonialism and the Origins of the National Bourgeoisie in Kenya," p. 179.
123. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 118.

124. Zwanenburg, "Neo-Colonialism and the Origins of the National Bourgeoisie in Kenya," p. 172.
125. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 139.
126. Zwanenburg, "Neo-Colonialism and the Origins of the National Bourgeoisie in Kenya," p. 173.
127. *Ibid.*
128. A tripartite agreement between labour (KFL) government, and employers (FKE) in 1964 resolved to increase employment by 10% on condition of a general wage freeze.
129. Sandbrook, *Proletarians and African Capitalism: The Kenyan Case*, p. 132.
130. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
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133. The Charter of Trader Disputes, October, 1962. The new amendment to the existing constitution was the 1964 Trade Union (Amendment) Act.
134. Amsden, Alice H. *International Firms and Labour in Kenya 1945-70* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1971), p. 112.
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136. Acts No. 17 (1966) and No. 4 of 1967 Sec. 40 of Constitution of Kenya.
137. Okoth-Ogendo, "The Politics of Constitutional Change in Kenya Since Independence," p. 25.
138. The Preservation of Public Security Act, Amendment No. 3, Act 18 (1966).
139. Act No. 40 of 1966.
140. Okoth-Ogendo, "The Politics of Constitutional Change in Kenya Since Independence," p. 28.
141. *East African Standard* (Nairobi: Kenya) 28 June 1966. The total popular vote for the two parties was: KPU: 164, 621 and KANU: 130, 400.



142. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 238.
143. Gertzel, *Politics of Independent Kenya*, pp. 22-23.
144. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 239.
145. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
146. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
147. *Ibid.*
148. Okoth-Ogendo, "The Politics of Constitutional Change in Kenya," p. 31.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
150. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*
151. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
152. *Ibid.*
153. This particular requirement was lifted by the regime in the case of the former deputy leader of KPU, Bildad Kaggia and the ex-KPU Mayor of Kisumu, Mrs. Grace Anyango.
154. Zwanenburg, "Neo-Colonialism and the Origins of the National Bourgeoisie in Kenya," p. 161.
155. Swainson, "Against the Notion of a 'Comprador Class'--Two Kenyan Case Studies."
156. Zwanenburg, "Neo-Colonialism and the Origins of the National Bourgeoisie in Kenya," p. 172.
157. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
158. Most remaining British settler farmers are naturalized Kenya citizens.
159. Swainson, "Against the Notion of a 'Comprador Class'--Two Kenyan Case Studies."
160. *Ibid.*
161. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
162. *Ibid.*
163. *Sunday Times* (London) August 17, 1975.

164. This is also mentioned by Colin Leys in his study on *Kenya Underdevelopment in Kenya*. African businessmen have been very successful in this economic sector. Very few non-citizens remain in the sector.
165. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 119.
166. Two local non-African companies with significant investments are the Block Hotels (Kenya) Ltd. and the Industrial Promotion Services (IPS). The latter, with ties to the Aga Khan, has in the late 1960's and early 1970's invested in more hotels and lodges in the name of Serena Hotels in Tsavo, Mombasa and Nairobi. The *Sunday Times* of London special reports on Kenya (August 10, 17, 24, 1975) also mentions the increasing involvement and investments by President Kenyatta and members of his family in tourist oriented hotels. Thus the traditional MNC's in the business e.g., Hilton, Pan-Am, Holiday Inn, Intercontinental, all around, do not dominate the tourist industry. This is significant since the industry is fast becoming the leading foreign exchange earner in the country.
167. Mawamu Holdings Ltd. is a locally-based African-run company formed by individuals closely associated to the state. In Lonrho, the firm has been accumulating like certain MNCs by buying out existing companies. On April 25, 1975 the firm bought a greater part of the holdings of the London based Inchcape group in Kenya. This company has widely based interests in agriculture and industry.
168. Swainson, "Against the Notion of a 'Comprador Class'—T Kenyan Case Studies," p. 12.
169. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 238.
170. *New African Development*, London (Feb. 1977), p. 152.
171. *Ibid.*
172. *Sunday Times* (London) August 10, 1975.
173. JM was supported by the anti-comprador M.P.s with diverse interests: Martin Shikuku, Mark Mwithaga, Chelagat Muta W. Kanja, etc.
174. Swainson, "Against the Notion of a 'Comprador Class'—T Kenyan Case Studies," pp. 10-11
175. "J.M. Speaks his Mind." A political manifesto published by him.



176. Mr. Kihika Kimani is a successful businessman and farmer. He is the chairman of Nakuru Branch of KANU, and also the founding Chairman of Ngwatiniro Co. Ltd. with landholdings exceeding 100,000 acres. The company has more than 20,000 shareholders. Incidentally, neither Mr. Kimani nor his company has received any financial assistance from the state in the successful business ventures he runs. He has emerged as a strong political figure out to thwart the political ambitions of Moi, the present Vice-President. It is also claimed that he supports the return to active politics of Mr. Odinga and Achieng Oneko.
177. *The Weekly Review* (Nairobi), May 19, 1975, pp. 4-10.
178. Mark Mwithaga, the only anti-establishment M.P. in the rich agricultural district of Nakuru was imprisoned for 18 months for allegedly having beaten his wife prior to the day police charged him. He was under arrest, but had not yet been sentenced at the time of a by-election in his constituency, which he won overwhelmingly. Another M.P., Chelagat Mufai, was 'found guilty' of inciting agricultural workers to sabotage and uproot sisal plants in a western Kenyan estate. Both M.P.s had pleaded "not guilty."
179. C.K. Lubembe for a time the Secretary General of COTU was the most prominent of the group. In a house debate on activities of Ionrho he was critical of the African management of the MNC. *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), January 10, 1969.
180. The Kenyan Attorney-General, Mr. Charles Njonjo, warned the group advocating constitutional amendment in the Presidential succession law by reminding them that it was a 'crime punishable by death to imagine, devise, or intend the death or deposition of the President. *African Report* 22 (Jan-Feb, 1977), p. 24. Others (M.P. members) opposed to any change in the present laws signed a petition organized by Mr. Olipiptip. He claimed that as many as 100 M.P.s (out of 142) signed this petition. *Weekly Review* (Nairobi), January 10, 1977.
181. Bienen, Henry, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 131.
182. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, pp. 198-206.
183. The political cause of the landless and workers has been supported consistently by a number of M.P.s. On the resettlement of the landless, J.M., Mark Mwithaga, W. Kanja, have been prominent. Midika, a new M.P. began his political career by siding with plantation and sugar factory workers

at a time when he was employed as a managerial official (in a worker/management conflict). Although he was fired by the management, the workers elected him as their constituency representative in the 1974 Parliamentary Elections. Other M.P.s who have defeated opponents through support of members of the dispossessed classes include: Juma Boy and Chelagat Mutai.

184. Sklar, Richard L., "Political Science and National Interjection—A Radical Approach," *Journal of African Studies* 5,
185. University students have been cited for criticism. *Weekly Review*, May 19, 1975, p. 5.
186. The opposition by members of rising classes of the Kalenjin against Moi is very significant. Mr. Komen is a former leader of the Kalenjin Peoples Alliance and retains an independent following. Of recent, Mr. Taita Towett has joined Mr. Komen in opposing Moi. This suggests that the traditional practice of voting in solidarity by representatives of an ethnic group (least affected by capitalist development) has also been breached: The polarization of fractions of capital even amongst groups less affected by capitalism.
187. Nico Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: NLB and Sheed and Ward, 1973), pp. 226-228.
188. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, p. 238.
189. The transfer of political decision-making roles from the parliament and party (KANU) weakened the institutions. The administrative and political harassment of the KPU discouraged formation of any other political parties. Parliamentary debates are lively and mildly critical of the regime, but have usually passed and accepted all government legislation.

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