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Download the Paper (297 K, PDF file) - March 2, 2004 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing.

ABSTRACT:
We consider when and to what extent a country will unilaterally protect intellectual property when it does no patentable innovation of its own. Framing the strength of an intellectual property regime in terms of the scope of patents, our model analyzes incentives of developing countries to manufacture generic versions of patented goods. The model provides insights into where problems arise in negotiating intellectual property treaties, when multinationals want to license intellectual property for local manufacture, and how changes in wealth and technology affect a country’s intellectual property regime.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Anita Charuworn and Linda R. Cohen, "Patented Drugs, Generic Alternatives and Intellectual Property Regimes in Developing Countries" (March 2, 2004). Center for the Study of Democracy. Paper 04-07.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-07