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Institute of Business and Economic Research
Competition Policy Center
University of California, Berkeley
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Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable
Federico Echenique, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la Republica
Aaron S. Edlin, School of Law and Economics Dept., University of California, Berkeley

Download the Paper (450 K, PDF file) - May 1, 2002 Tell a colleague about it.
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ABSTRACT:
In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Federico Echenique and Aaron S. Edlin, "Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable" (May 1, 2002). Competition Policy Center. Paper CPC02-027.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC02-027

 
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