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ABSTRACT:
This essay approaches Derrida through a consideration of his writings on Saussure and Husserl. Derrida is right to insist, following Saussure, on a relational theory of meaning: words do not have a one to one correspondence with their referents. But he is wrong to insist on a purely differential theory of meaning: words can refer to reality within the context of a body of knowledge. Similarly, Derrida is right to reject Husserl's idea of presence: no truths are simply given to consciousness. But he is wrong to reject the very idea of objective knowledge: we can defend a notion of objective knowledge couched in terms of a comparison of rival bodies of theories. The essay concludes by considering the implications of the preceding arguments for the enterprise of phenomenology.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Mark Bevir, "Meaning, Truth, and Phenomenology" (2000). Metaphilosophy. 31, pp. 412-426. Postprint available free at: http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/2595

REQUIRED PUBLISHER STATEMENT:
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9973.00158?journalCode=meta The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com