Memory and perfect recall in extensive games

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Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
Giacomo Bonanno, University of California, Davis

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ABSTRACT:

The notion of perfect recall in extensive games was introduced by Kuhn [in: Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. 2, 1953, p. 193], who interpreted it as "equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves." We provide a syntactic and semantic characterization of perfect recall based on two independent notions of memory: (1) memory of past knowledge and (2) memory of past actions. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Giacomo Bonanno, "Memory and perfect recall in extensive games" (2004). Games and Economic Behavior. 47 (2), pp. 237-256. Postprint available free at: http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/26

REQUIRED PUBLISHER STATEMENT:
The original publication is available in Games and Economic Behavior.

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