Notify me of new papers
via Email or RSS

ABSTRACT:
In Clark (2000), Austen Clark argues convincingly that a widespread view of perception as a complicated kind of feature-extraction is incomplete. He argues that perception has another crucial representational ingredient.- it must also involve the representation of "sensory individuals" that exemplify sensorily extracted features. Moreover, he contends, the best way of understanding sensory individuals takes them to be places in space surrounding the perceiver. In this paper, I'll agree with Clark's case for sensory individuals (S1). However, I shall argue against his view of sensory individuals as places (S2). Instead, I'll propose and defend an alternative account of sensory individuals that construes the latter as (visual) objects (S3-5).

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Jonathan Cohen, "Objects, places, and perception" (2004). Philosophical Psychology. 17 (4), pp. 471-495. Postprint available free at: http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/646

REQUIRED PUBLISHER STATEMENT:
This is an early or unrevised version, and is not definitive, and therefore should not be cited.