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This paper was published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics in 1983. I have scanned it and obtained permission from the publisher to post a copy. The publisher asks me to post the homepage of the journal and of Science Direct. These are http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco and http://www.sciencedirect.com.

Download the Paper (1.4 MB, PDF file) - February 1, 1983 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing.

ABSTRACT:
A Nash equilibria of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism is Pareto optimal. But this may not be much use if there are many distinct Nash equilibria, since it is not clear that the mechanism would converge on any one of them. This paper shows that if preferences are quasi-linear, the Groves-Ledyard mechanism has a unique Nash equilibrium, but even in the simplest class of preferences in which demands for public goods are affected by incomes, the number of equilibria increases exponentially with the number of consumers. The paper makes use of some pretty mathematics and even sports a drawing of Whitney's umbrella.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Ted Bergstrom, Carl Simon, and Charles Titus, "Counting Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Via Degree Theory" (February 1, 1983). Department of Economics, UCSB. Ted Bergstrom. Paper 1983A.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucsbecon/bergstrom/1983A