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This paper was published Journal of Economic Perspectives in Spring 2002.

Download the Paper (250 K, PDF file) - March 1, 2002 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing.

ABSTRACT:
How selfish does our evolutionary history suggest that humans will be? We explore models in which groups are formed and dissolved and where reproduction of individuals is determined by their payoffs in a game played within groups. If groups are formed ``randomly'' and reproductive success of group founders is determined by a multi-person prisoners' dilemma game, then selfish behavior will prevail over maximization of group payoffs. However, interesting models exist in which ``group selection'' sustains cooperative behavior. Forces that support cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity, and punishment-based group norms.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Ted Bergstrom, "Evolution and Group Behavior: Individual and Group Selection" (March 1, 2002). Department of Economics, UCSB. Ted Bergstrom. Paper 2002A.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucsbecon/bergstrom/2002A