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Download the Paper (369 K, PDF file) - September 21, 2004 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing.

ABSTRACT:
In many principal-agent relations, objective measures of the agents' performance are not available. In those cases, the principals have to rely on subjective performance measures for designing incentive schemes. Incentive schemes based on subjective performance measures open the possibilities for in influencing activities by the agents. This paper extends Lazear and Rosen's (1981) model of rank-order tournaments by considering further competition between the agents in a bribery game after production but before selection of the winner. The paper studies how the bribery game affects the principal's design of the rank-order tournament and how the anticipation of the bribery game affects the agents' effort choices.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Son Ku Kim, Cheng-Zhong Qin, and Yan Yu, "Bribery in Rank-Order Tournaments" (September 21, 2004). Department of Economics, UCSB. Departmental Working Papers. Paper wp1-03.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucsbecon/dwp/wp1-03