eScholarship Repository eScholarship Repository California Digital Library
eScholarship > UCSCECON > Paper 560

UCSC Econ Papers

UCSC Econ Website

Search UCSC Econ

Notify me of new papers

institute_logo

Department of Economics, UCSC
University of California, Santa Cruz

UCSC Econ Papers  •  UCSC Econ Website  •  Search UCSC Econ

Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes
Daniel Friedman, University of California Santa Cruz Dept. of Economics
Nirvikar Singh, University of California, Santa Cruz

Download the Paper (314 K, PDF file) - December 1, 2003 Tell a colleague about it.
Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing.

ABSTRACT:
A preference for negative reciprocity is an important part of the human emotional repertoire. We model its role in sustaining cooperative behavior but highlight an intrinsic free-rider problem: the fitness benefits of negative reciprocity are dispersed throughout the entire group, but the fitness costs are borne personally. Evolutionary forces tend to unravel people’s willingness to bear the personal cost of punishing culprits. In our model, the countervailing force that sustains negative reciprocity is a meme consisting of a group norm together with low-powered (and low-cost) group enforcement of the norm. The main result is that such memes coevolve with personal tastes and capacities so as to produce the optimal level of negative reciprocity.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Daniel Friedman and Nirvikar Singh, "Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes" (December 1, 2003). Department of Economics, UCSC. Paper 560.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucscecon/560

 
bar
Open Archives Initiative eScholarship is a service of the California Digital Library bepress