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Download the Paper (295 K, PDF file) - February 1, 2006 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing.

ABSTRACT:
This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated intomechanismdesign analysis. Two classes of models are compared: (a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of their types. Conditions are provided under which versions of these models are equivalent. The paper also addresses whether dynamic mechanisms are required for Nash implementation in settings with hard evidence. The paper shows that static mechanisms suffice in the setting of “evidentiary normality” and that, in a more general environment, one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Joel Watson and Jesse Bull, "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design" (February 1, 2006). Department of Economics, UCSD. Paper 2002-16R.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucsdecon/2002-16R