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Download the Paper (351 K, PDF file) - September 1, 2005 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing.

ABSTRACT:
Add an opening stage of signal acquisition to a canonical portfolio choice model and let investors have rational expectations about the ensuing Walrasian equilibrium. The expected marginal utility of a signal (its action value) falls in the number of signals and turns strictly negative at a finite number because signals diminish the asset's excess return. There is a natural transparency limit at which rational investors pay to inhibit information disclosure. Prior to the limit, Financial information is a public good and justifies intervention. To instill more transparency, cutting costs of information acquisition is superior to disclosure because disclosure crowds out private information acquisition and risks a violation of the transparency limit.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Marc-Andreas Muendler, "The Action Value of Information and the Natural Transparency Limit¤" (September 1, 2005). Department of Economics, UCSD. Paper 2005-09.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucsdecon/2005-09