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Download the Paper (255 K, PDF file) - May 15, 2003 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing.

ABSTRACT:
While the behavior of judges clearly affects the success of judicial reform efforts, it is not clear how judges might influence the selection of judicial institutions aimed at building healthier courts. In this paper, I suggest that judges might play an important role in defining the judicial reform agenda by both directly lobbying important policy makers and by going public. I develop these claims through a discussion of the Mexican Supreme Court’s recent efforts to induce further judicial reform. I consider the Court’s important successes and failures and discuss important constraints on the ability of judges to influence the reform process through lobbying.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Jeffrey K. Staton, "Lobbying for Judicial Reform: The Role of the Mexican Supreme Court in Institutional Selection" (May 15, 2003). Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies. Project on Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico. Paper staton.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/usmex/prajm/staton