# UC Santa Barbara

## UC Santa Barbara Electronic Theses and Dissertations

### Title

Worlds Within Worlds: Allomythic Worldviews & Worldmaking in Fantastika — Their Nature & Genesis, Analyzing the Works of J.R.R. Tolkien, Stephen King, Philip Pullman, Madeline L'Engle, Ayn Rand, & William Luther Pierce, with Supporting Ap...

### Permalink

https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0sh7h0bv

### Author

Fredrickson, Nathan

### Publication Date

2025

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Santa Barbara

**Worlds Within Worlds:**

Allomythic Worldviews & Worldmaking in Fantastika –

Their Nature & Genesis,

Analyzing the Works of J.R.R. Tolkien, Stephen King, Philip Pullman, Madeline L'Engle,

Ayn Rand, & William Luther Pierce,

with Supporting Appendices & Excurses; or,

**Kairology:**

The Making of Meaningful Situations –

Understanding Fictional Worldviews & Ways of Life

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Religious Studies

by

Nathan Ray Fredrickson

Committee in charge:

Professor Ann Taves, Chair

Professor Jan Nederveen Pieterse

Associate Professor Rudy Busto

Associate Professor David Walker

Assistant Professor Sowon Park

March 2025

The dissertation of Nathan Ray Fredrickson is approved.

Rudy Busto

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

Sowon Park

David Walker

Ann Taves, Committee Chair

March 2025

Worlds Within Worlds: Allomythic Worldviews & Worldmaking in Fantastika – Their Nature & Genesis, Analyzing the Works of J.R.R. Tolkien, Stephen King, Philip Pullman, Madeline L'Engle, Ayn Rand, & William Luther Pierce, with Supporting Appendices & Excurses; or, Kairology: The Making of Meaningful Situations – Understanding Fictional Worldviews & Ways of Life

Copyright © 2025
by
Nathan Ray Fredrickson

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Having arrived at the end of this story and degree, I am conscious of my many debts, including, of course, student loans that now slouch towards Bethlehem. I try to say this in good humor—I try to be cheerful and optimistic whenever I can. But really, the value of one's dissertation must be acknowledged and assessed highly because the costs, just and unjust, are so high: *e.g.*, debt, low income, and thus diminished savings and investments (while as a graduate laborer earning huge sums for a university); precious years of one's life; steep demands on one's mental and physical health; and the labor of the work itself. The decision costs in undertaking a project like this are inevitably high, and graduate students who struggle with conditions like anxiety and PTSD, both from stressors before and then during grad school, may find that they are left without the necessary structures and scaffolds to support the high executive function demands, leading to amplified anxiety and trauma, insecurity, defensive perfectionism, and avoidance. The costs should be acknowledged.

So the negative costs and debts are high, but I must acknowledge too, and happily, my indebtedness to a host of wonderful people, with whom I have had the pleasure of thinking and who stimulated my curiosity and improved the quality of my life and work.

Certainly, my committee must be acknowledged and thanked. I could not have done this without you.

And my indebtedness to many other brilliant scholars will be evident in some of my citations and references. However, many wonderful teachers over the years must remain unmentioned but nonetheless deeply appreciated. I wrote using words and thoughts they gifted me; as Durkheim might say – whose work implicitly has so much to do with the thematic of the gift and which work his nephew Mauss would take up and explicitly extend through the intimate exchange of familial sociality and scholarship – I received from others the best parts of myself. All that seems an original creation and special contribution in my work comes from decomposing, breaking, rejecting, reevaluating, reconfiguring, ordering, bending, inverting, and otherwise conceptually manipulating the materials and tools of others to whom I am ever beholden.

Foundationally, certain teachers and librarians in middle school, high school, and undergrad saved and transformed my life. Later, friends like Professor Rae-Anne Montague and Professor Anya Foxen have been not only excellent scholars who have encouraged my intellectual development, but also been endlessly supportive as I have attempted to make my way in this challenging world. And I would like to thank Sally Lombrozo, Andrea Johnson, and Professor Karen Lunsford for all their help navigating the challenges of graduate school, University bureaucracy, and life in general. Thank you, too, to Martin Carranza and other members of UCSB's financial crisis support team and to Dean Lauren Berger for help in hard times.

This effort would have been impossible without the love and support of my friends and family. In Santa Barbara, I was sustained over many years, in body and mind, by weekly dinners and invented holidays (our two annual "Hobbit Days," "Yule" and "Lithe," and, generally occurring after Yule, the "War on Christmas Party," which is a parody holiday focusing on the darker aspects of the year and thus giving expression to the more Samhain- or Halloween-like features generally neglected in our hobbit Yule) enjoyed with Doctors Anya & Brooks Foxen, who have been especially dear and generous chosen family to my husband and me for many years now. Other dear friends from Santa Barbara include Dr.

Shelby King, Dr. Christine Murphy, no-doubt-soon-to-be-Dr. Victoria Ballmes, Dr. Brent Goodlet, and many, many others. Early in my time in Santa Barbara, I had the pleasure of enjoying the regular company of my housemates Al Silva and Dr. Aaron Sokoll, and friends like Professor Nikita Carney and her partner Laura and Eileen Goddard and her partner Nick were special gifts later in my time at UCSB. I was sustained too by the friendship, wit, and goodness of my medical doctor friends, Dr. Travis Curtis, Dr. John Cotoia, and Dr. Sam Harding-Forrester. Other dear friends who have been blessings in my life include, Rebecca Sokoll, Esq., Dr. Jim Antonaglia, Scott Patterson, Brandon Pruett, Brian Gougherty, Meredith Edwards, Dr. Ben Clegg, Dr. Bryce Lobdell, Heather and Matthew Gault, Mike Hilton, Therese Lilli, Autumn Maloney, Chris and Sarah Grazul, Roy Saldana, Sean Clarke, Kevin McLoughlin, William Reed, and others. All such friends – truly, chosen family – I count among the most precious gifts in my life. One's jobs, interests, and even the questions and answers that organize much of one's activity may shift throughout life, but friends are anchors in its shifting waters.

Foremost among my chosen family, of course, is my husband, Austin, whose artistic genius and insights into his own worldmaking processes have enriched my thinking while working on this project, and through him I have been gifted with first-rate parents-in-law, Dan and Yolanda, whose kindness, generosity, and company I cherish.

My sister, Michelle, has helped me through many difficult times, grad school being by no means the least of them; she is my longest and best friend, and I am forever thankful for her. Her deep love for nature and embodied existence, her discipline and determination in pursuit of health and happiness, her boundless love for her children, husband, and others, and her resilience in spite of hardships and commitment to her values combined with adaptability in the face of new situations and information, these and other qualities are why I so admire and respect her. I just mentioned them; now let me truly acknowledge them: through my amazing sister, I have also been gifted with an extraodinary brother, Jake, whose conversation by fireside and on winter nights in a hot tub with snow falling enriched me and pushed my thinking in new directions, and from Michelle and Jake I received two of the greatest blessings of my life, my beloved niece and nephew, Jade and Jasper, who have filled my heart with more than the net of language could ever hold.

My mother, who no doubt would like her full self-designation written here, "Mom Grandma Karen Lynn Fredrickson Swanson," is a being of astonishingly pure love, and her love has empowered me throughout my life. My maternal grandparents passed away many years ago: Nancy and August Swanson, who were truly co-parents of my sister and me, while also caring for my disabled mother and my great-grandma, Hilda Lundgren. They cannot read this, but their sacrifices, their example of love and responsibility, and their respect for the value of education, even in a religion that historically forbade it and remains quite hostile to it, decisively shaped my life and character. My paternal grandfather, Howard, passed away almost three years ago, as did my paternal grandma, Vilyn, with whom until her passing last year I would converse weekly to our mutual delight. My father, Peter, died the year before last. I miss him and my grandparents very much, but I like to think they would be proud in this moment. I also have cousins with whom I was raised like siblings, and they are like a brother and sisters to my soul: Billee, Kristy, and Kim, thank you. Indeed, to all my cousins, aunts, and uncles on both sides, I also must say, I love you; thank you for your constant love and support.

We are all, like novels and nations, worlds within worlds, nourishing each other and being sustained by each other in a grand, reciprocal, complimentary ecology, and fiction is just one place we find the elements of our self-fashioning. Our teachers and family and friends are vital characters in our stories, with and through whom our stories are told and our characters created. How priceless is the gift of those who bind their precious, irreplaceable story to ours, who let us glimpse inside the armillary sphere of their worlds and permit their evolution and history to become entangled in our own.

But to become entangled with such worlds, both fictional and personal, is to make oneself vulnerable to them, and even those who love us most or those powerful stories that move us most, may, being worlds unto themselves with their own internal movements, at times surprise, disappoint, or hurt us. Perhaps we must acknowledge these dark and painful mysteries, too, as gifts for the urgent self-creative work of our forms, and recreation in our ways, of life. I do not question or doubt the worth of striving for compassion for each other as we each take up the awesome creative and destructive work of telling, interpreting, and acknowledging each other's stories.

# VITA OF NATHAN FREDRICKSON

2025

## EDUCATION

***Doctor***

Exp. May 2025 ***Juris Doctor* (J.D.)**
University of New Hampshire Franklin Pierce School of Law
- Daniel Webster Scholar (DWS) Honors Program

2025 ***Philosophiæ Doctor* (Ph.D.) in Religious Studies**
University of California, Santa Barbara
- *Field of Study:* Religion in North America
- *Dissertation:* **"**Worlds Within Worlds: Allomythic Worldviews & Worldmaking in Fantastika – Their Nature & Genesis, Analyzing the Works of J.R.R. Tolkien, Stephen King, Philip Pullman, Madeline L'Engle, Ayn Rand, & William Luther Pierce, with Supporting Appendices & Excurses; or, Kairology: The Making of Meaningful Situations – Understanding Fictional Worldviews & Ways of Life"
- *Committee:* Ann Taves (Chair), Rudy Busto, Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sowon Park, David Walker
- *PhD Emphases:*
  - Writing Studies
  - Translation Studies
  - Cognitive Science
  - Global Studies
  - Ancient Mediterranean Studies
- *Certificate in College and University Teaching* (CCUT)
- *Qualifying Exams (2014):*
  - Thomas Carlson – Contemporary Philosophy and History of Christian Thought
  - W. Randall Garr – Hebrew Bible
  - Ann Taves – Religion, Experience, and Mind (Cognitive Science of Religion)
  - Christine Thomas – Early Christianity
  - David Walker – American Religious History

***Magister***

2013 ***Magister Artium* (M.A.) in Religious Studies**
University of California, Santa Barbara
- *M.A. Thesis:* "The *Gospel of Judas*, the Subversion of Royal Ideology, and the Generation of a Sovereign Self"
- *Thesis Committee:* Christine Thomas (Chair), Ann Taves, and W. Randall Garr

2011 ***Magister Scientiæ* (M.S.) in Library and Information Science (*a.k.a.*, MSLIS)**
School of Information Sciences, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana
- Joseph Rediger Librarian as Humanist Award

2009 ***Magister Artium* (M.A.) in Classics**
University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana
- Graduate Teacher Certificate

***Scholaris***

2006 ***Baccalaureus Artium, curriculo insigni peracto* (Honors B.A.) in Classics**
Saint Anselm College
- *magna cum laude*
- Father Richard F. Clavell, O.S.B Award in Classics
- Asian Studies Certificate & Russian Studies Certificate
- *Honors Thesis:* "'The Unbelievers Think We're Odd': An Examination of Jehovah's Witnesses' Faith and Practice"

**PUBLICATIONS**

***Book chapters***

2021 "Comparative Worldview Studies and *A Song of Ice and Fire*: World Religions, Comparison, and Fictional Worlds" in Matthew Brake, Ed., *Theology and* Game of Thrones (Lexington Books/Fortress Academic)

2018 "Designing a Course Integrating Critical, Genre-based Pedagogy, Horror Literature, and Religious Studies" in Mark Fabrizi, Ed., *Horror Literature: Challenging Genres* (Boston: Sense Publishers)

2016 "Designing a Course Integrating Critical Pedagogy, Fantasy Literature, and Religious Studies" in Mark Fabrizi, Ed., *Fantasy Literature: Challenging Genres* (Boston: Sense Publishers)

***Peer-reviewed article***

2017 "Queer Composition, Fantasizing Phlebotinum, and Worldmaking with the Whedonverse: A Course in Religious Studies Using Critical, Genre-based, and Technology-supplemented Pedagogical Methods" in *Queering the Whedonverses*, a special issue of *Slayage: The Journal of Whedon Studies* (Murfreesboro, TN: Middle Tennessee State University)

***Encyclopedia articles***

2016 "Russell, Charles Taze" in Mark Lamport and George Kurian, *Encyclopedia of Christianity in the United States* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016)

2016 "Fiction, Christianity and Speculative" in Mark Lamport and George Kurian, *Encyclopedia of Christianity in the United States* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016)

2016 "Devil's Horn, The" in Jeff Webb and Christopher Fee, eds., *American Myths, Legends, and Tall Tales: An Encyclopedia of American Folklore* (Santa Barbara, California : ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2016)

2016 "Sacred Name Movement" in Mark Lamport and George Kurian, *Encyclopedia of Christianity in the United States* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016)

2016 "Two-Headed Snake" in Jeff Webb and Christopher Fee, eds., *American Myths, Legends, and Tall Tales: An Encyclopedia of American Folklore* (Santa Barbara, California : ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2016)

2014 "Harvest, Harvesting. Christianity. New Christian Churches and Movements" in Hans-Josef Klauck, Dale C. Allison, Volker Leppin, C L. Seow, Hermann Spieckermann, Barry Walfish, Eric J. Ziolkowski, and Christine Helmer, eds., *Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2014)

***Book reviews***

2020 Markus Altena Davidsen, Ed. *Narrative and Belief: The Religious Affordance of Supernatural Fiction* (London: Routledge, 2018) in *International Journal for the Study of New Religions*

2020 Richard Grigg. *Science Fiction and the Imitation of the Sacred* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018) in *Science-fiction Studies*.

2020 Djoymi Baker. *To Boldly Go: Marketing the Myth of* Star Trek (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2018) in *Journal of Popular Film and Television*

2017 Matthew Edwards, Ed. *The Atomic Bomb in Japanese Cinema: Critical Essays* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2015) in *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 45.3 (2017): 176-177

2016 Peter W. Lee, Ed. *A Galaxy Here and Now: Historical and Cultural Readings of* Star Wars (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2016) in "Lee's Historical and Cultural Readings of *Star Wars*," *Science-fiction Studies*, 43.3 (2016): 584-585

2016 John Corrigan, *Emptiness: Feeling Christian in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015) in *Religion* (2016): 1-3

2016 François-Emmanuël Boucher, Sylvain David, and Maxime Prévost, Eds. *Mythologies du superhéros: histoire, physiologie, géographie, interme´dialités* (Liège: Presses universitaires de Liège, 2014) in *Journal of Graphic Novels & Comics* 8.1 (2016): 106-109

2016 Second author with Ann Taves. Stephen S. Bush, *Visions of Religion: Experience, Meaning, and Power* (New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2014) in *Religion* 47.1 (2016): 132-135

2016 Daniel Boscaljon, Ed. *Hope and the Longing for Utopia: Future and Illusions in Theology and Narrative* (Cambridge : James Clarke & Co., 2015) in *Literature and Theology* 30.4 (2016): 503-505

***Bibliographies and LibGuide***

2017 Religious Studies & Writing Studies – A Bibliographic Guide

2015 Pedagogy and Professionalization in Religious Studies – Bibliography and Seminar Syllabus

2011 LibGuide to the University of Illinois' collection of British parliamentary papers

2009 Zoroastrian Influence on Post-Exilic Jewish Belief and Practice

2009 Religion in Russia, 1917-2009 – A Bibliographic Essay

***Public writing***

2016 "Sugar in Lemonade: Beyoncé, the Religion of Love, and the Challenge of Redeeming History" (*Huffington Post*)

2016 "X-Men: Apocalypse and the Vital Conflict of Multiple Norms" (*Huffington Post*)

2015 "The Paradox and Promise of Christian Science." Invited essay for *Patheos*.

## FELLOWSHIPS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND AWARDS

***Graduate***

| | |
|---|---|
| 2022–5 | Dean's Scholarship, UNH Franklin Pierce School of Law ($37,000/year) |
| 2024 | Rudman Center Summer Public Service Fellowship ($4,800) |
| 2023 | Opportunity Scholarship Award, UNH Franklin Pierce School of Law ($4,250) |
| 2023 | Rudman Center Summer Public Service Fellowship ($4,800) |
| 2018 | Center for Mind and Culture (CMAC) Scholarship to attend the 2018 International Association for the Cognitive Science of Religion (IACSR) conference ($1,000+) |
| 2018 | Academic Senate Doctoral Student Travel Grant (UCSB) ($1,350) |
| 2017 | Graduate Division Dissertation Fellowship (UCSB) ($15,000) |
| 2017 | Graduate Center for Literary Research (GCLR) Travel Grant (UCSB) |
| 2016 | Graduate Student Association (GSA) Travel Grant (UCSB) |
| 2014–5 | Crossroads Fellow (UCSB) ($20,000+ personally; $80,000+ overall) |
| 2011 | Joseph Rediger Librarian as Humanist Award (UIUC) |
| 2009 | Mildred M. Luther and Kathryn Luther Henderson Fellowship (UIUC) ($15,000) |

***Undergradutate***

| | |
|---|---|
| 2006 | Father Richard F. Clavell, O.S.B Award in Classics |
| 2002–6 | Saint Anselm College Presidential Scholar |

List of 18 other local area and undergraduate awards, scholarships, and grants (totaling about $95,000) available on request.

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

***Instructor of Record***

| | |
|---|---|
| 2018, Summer | Academic Writing (WRIT 2), University of California, Santa Barbara<br>and<br>Introduction to Buddhism (RG ST 4), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2017, Summer | Introduction to Native American Religious Studies (RG ST 14), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2016, Summer | Introduction to American Religion (RG ST 7), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2015, Summer | Religion and Psychology (RG ST 15), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2015, Spring | World Making: Religious, Fictional, Virtual (RG ST 190 NF), University of California, Santa Barbara |

| | |
|---|---|
| 2013, Summer | Introduction to the Study of Religion (RG ST 1), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2007, Summer | Mythology of Greece and Rome (ClCiv 115), University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana |

***Teaching Assistant***

| | |
|---|---|
| 2025, Spring | DWS Dispute Resolution (LDWS 904), University of New Hampshire Franklin Pierce School of Law |
| 2022, Winter<br>2012, Summer<br>2012, Spring | Greek Mythology (CLASS 40), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2019, Spring<br>2019, Winter<br>2018, Fall<br>2018, Spring<br>2018, Winter<br>2017, Spring<br>2017, Winter<br>2016, Fall | Academic Writing (WRIT 2), University of California, Santa Barbara<br>• sole course designer, instructor, and grader |
| 2016, Spring | Introduction to Caribbean Studies (BL ST 7), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2016, Winter | Introduction to Jewish Mysticism (RG ST 26), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2015, Fall | Introduction to Native American Religious Studies (RG ST 14), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2014, Spring<br>2013, Spring | Introduction to the Study of Religion (RG ST 1), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2014, Winter | Religion and Western Civilization II: Medieval (RG ST 80B), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2013, Fall | Religious Approaches to Death (RG ST 12), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2011, Spring | Social Aspects of Information Systems (LIS 202), Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana |

| | |
|---|---|
| 2010, Fall<br>2007, Fall | Introduction to Greek Civilization (ClCiv 114), grader, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana |
| 2010, Spring<br>2009, Fall<br>2007, Spring<br>2006, Fall | Mythology of Greece and Rome (ClCiv 115), University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana |
| 2009, Spring<br>2008, Spring | The Roman Achievement (ClCiv 116), grader, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana |
| 2008, Fall | The Classical Tradition (ClCiv 120), grader, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana |
| 2008, Fall | Grimms' Fairy Tales in Context (GER 250), University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana |

**SERVICE, SKILLS, AND EXPERIENCES**

***Service***

2023–5 Board Member, Manchester City Library Foundation, Manchester, NH

2024–5 University System Student Board (USSB) Representative for the University of New Hampshire Franklin Pierce School of Law to the University System of New Hampshire (USNH) Board of Trustees Educational Excellence Committee Member

2024–5 Justice of Kenison Chapter, Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity

2022–5 President, American Constitution Society (ACS) Student Chapter, UNH Franklin Pierce School of Law

***Selected Events Organized***

- Discussion with Professor Jordan Budd on comparative constitutional law
- Debate with President of the Federalist Society Student Chapter on Constitutional interpretation – "Originalism v. Pragmatism"
- Discussion with ACS President, Sen. Feingold, and with Peter Prindiville, Esq. regarding danger of Article-V convention
- Discussion with Judge Gajarsa and NH Abenaki leaders regarding Native local and national legal issues

2023–4 Volunteer, NH State Law Library

- Responding to prisoners' legal research questions

| | |
|---|---|
| 2023 | Moderator, "Non-Western Philosophies of 'Religion'" panel, American Academy of Religion – Western Region (AAR-WR), Philosophy of Religion Unit |
| 2022–3 | Unit Co-Chair, Philosophy of Religion Unit, American Academy of Religion – Western Region (AAR-WR) |
| 2020–3 | Steering Committee Member, Religion and Science Fiction Unit, American Academy of Religion (AAR) |
| 2016–9 | Unit Co-Chair, American Religions Unit, American Academy of Religion – Western Region (AAR-WR) |
| 2017–9 | Volunteer for UCSB Family Student Housing (FSH) community events (diversity and cultural awareness events, serving the homeless, etc.) |
| 2019 | Moderator, "Resisting 'Religion': Ad Hoc Session on Worldview Studies" panel, American Academy of Religion – Western Region (AAR-WR), American Religions Section, Tempe, Arizona |
| 2018 | Moderator, "Are Reality and Fiction Really Worlds Apart? Fictionality, Ontology, and Narrative Text-Worlds" panel, 2018 International Conference on Narrative, McGill University, Montreal, Canada |
| 2018 | Moderator, "Missionizing and Kindness – At Home and Abroad" panel, American Academy of Religion – Western Region (AAR-WR), American Religions, Berkeley, California |
| 2017 | Moderator, "Literature, Myth, and Invented Religion" panel, American Academy of Religion – Western Region (AAR-WR), American Religions Section, Rosemead, California |
| 2016 | Seminar Co-Organizer with Rhona Trauvitch, "From Fiction to Faith and Fandom: Fictional Worlds, Participatory Culture, and Novel Social Formations," 2016 American Comparative Literature Association (ACLA), Cambridge, Massachusetts |
| 2014–6 | Treasurer for Religion, Experience, and Mind (REM) Lab Group |
| 2014–5 | Lead Teaching Assistant, Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara<br>***Pedagogical Workshops Conducted While Lead TA***<br>2015 "Women and Minorities as Grad Students, Professionals, and Educators" |

2015 "Advice from Experienced TAs"
2015 "Fair, Instructive, and Efficient Grading"
2015 "Developing Students' Critical Thinking"
2014 "Dealing with Common TA Problems"
2014 "Teaching Issues Specific to Religious Studies"
2014 "Returning TA Orientation"
2014 "New Graduate Students Orientation"

2015 Planning committee member and funds solicitor for REM's guest talk by Adrian Hermann

2014 Planning committee member and funds solicitor for the 4th Biennial Ancient Borderlands International Graduate Student Conference, "Innovation in Borderland Regions"

2013 Planning committee member and funds solicitor for UCSB Department of Religious Studies graduate student conference, "Personhood, Possession, and Place: Embodiment and Emplacement in Special Contexts"

2012— Ordained Rev. Nathan Fredrickson by Universal Life Church, Modesto, California (December 5, 2012)

2012 Facilitated large donation of materials published by the Jehovah's Witnesses and Bible Students to the American Religions Collection (ARC) of the UCSB Library

2011 Writing Consultant:
Takamura, Mineo. "Tactility and Modernity: The Sense of Touch in D. H. Lawrence, Alfred Stieglitz, Walter Benjamin, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty." Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011.

***Skills and training***

2018 Dissertation Write-In, co-sponsored by Graduate Division and Summer Sessions, University of California, Santa Barbara

2016–7 Academic Writing Instruction Theory and Practice, Writing Program, University of California, Santa Barbara

2013 International Spatial Cognition Summer Institute (ISCSI), University of California, Santa Barbara

2008 Writing Across the Curriculum (WAC) Summer Training, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

**OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE**

Summer 2024— Seven Rivers Law Office, PLLC, Barrington, NH
- Law Clerk

Summer 2024 New Hampshire Complex Trust Docket, N.H. Circuit Court, Probate Division, Concord, NH (Hon. King)
- Intern

Summer 2023 New Hampshire Circuit Court, Laconia and Ossipee, NH (Hon. Countway); Conway, NH (Hon. Greenhalgh); and Franklin, NH (Hon. Mace)
- Intern (observed trials, prepared legal memoranda and briefs on judges' questions, drafted orders, and provided other assistance to then-Judge Countway (now 110th Associate Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court) and Judge Greenhalgh; produced large research project on potential constitutional issue for Judge Mace)

2022 Law Library, UNH Franklin Pierce School of Law
- Law Library Assistant

2013, 2014 The Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies
- Assistant Conference Organizer for large (500+) international conferences

2011 Philosophy, History & Newspaper Library, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Library Assistant – Practicum

2010–1 Writers Workshop, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Writing Tutor

2009–10 LIS Access Midwest Program (LAMP)
- Program Assistant

2002–6 Saint Anselm College
- Library Assistant – Work Study

2004–6 Brooks Pharmacy
- Certified Pharmacy Technician

2003–4 H & R Block
- Certified Tax Preparer, Associate

1998–2 Wadleigh Memorial Library
- Library Page

**PRESENTATIONS**

***International***

| | |
|---|---|
| 2018 | "Thinking and Teaching Spatially: Worldviews & Spatial Cognition, Theory & Pedagogy." 7th Biennial Meeting of the International Association for the Cognitive Science of Religion (IACSR). Boston, Massachusetts |
| 2018 | "Invented Language and Invented Religion: Tolkien's Innovative Symbolic Systems and New Religious Movements." International Medieval Congress. Session title: "'New' Tolkien: Expanding the Canon." Leeds, England |
| 2015 | "SPFX: Animation as a Signal of Estrangement." Fantasy/Animation: A Conference on Media, Medium, and Genre. London, England |
| 2015 | "When Scholars Christen New Religions: A Critical, Consilient Response." XXI International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR) World Congress. Panel convener and session chair: "The Power of Perspective at the Fringe of 'Religion.'" Erfurt, Germany |
| 2011 | Co-authored and co-presented with Rae-Anne Montague. "Deweyan Humanism and Modern Pedagogy." International Seminar on Humanistic Language and Literature Teaching. Chennai, India |

***National***

| | |
|---|---|
| 2022 | "'New Fetishism' and the Defense of Indigenous 'Intellectual Property' Rights: What Legal Fiction Best Serves Compensatory Justice Relative to Native IP Appropriation and Dislocation?" as part of Roundtable on Intellectual Property Law and Branding. 2022 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion/Society of Biblical Literature (AAR/SBL), Law, Religion, and Culture Unit |
| 2022 | "Erysichthon and the Suppression of Human Monstrosity Relative to Ecological Devastation in Greco-Roman Myth." 2022 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion/Society of Biblical Literature (AAR/SBL), Greco-Roman Religions Unit |
| 2022 | "The Competing 'Rights' of Esoteric Indigenous 'Intellectual Property' and Information in the Worldview of Kopimism: 'New Fetishism,' Legal Fictions, and the Defense of Minorities' Understandings of Knowledge." "Unsettling Law": The |

| | |
|---|---|
| | 24th Conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities, "Rethinking Property" |
| 2020 | "Myth, History, and Canon: Canon Creation in Ancient and Contemporary Texts and Contexts." 2020 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion/Society of Biblical Literature (AAR/SBL), Bible, Myth, and Myth Theory Unit |
| 2020 | "Religious Studies as Part of a General Education (GE) Curriculum: Aligning Threshold Concepts in Information Literacy, Writing Studies, and Religious Studies." 2020 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion/Society of Biblical Literature (AAR/SBL), Student Lounge Roundtable |
| 2019 | "Making a Livable History: Contemporary Mythmaking in Fantastika." 2019 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion/Society of Biblical Literature (AAR/SBL), Bible, Myth, and Myth Theory Unit |
| 2019 | "Native American Self (Trans)Formation Through Composition Practices." 2019 Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC) Annual Convention, Standing Group on Rhetoric and Religious Traditions. Session title: "Religious Literacies and (Re)Formation of the Self" |
| 2019 | "Transformation for Digital Media." 2019 Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC) Annual Convention, Teacher to Teacher Forum |
| 2018 | "How SF Takes (Religion's) Place: Trans-position and Sovereignty in the Secularizing Effects of SF Worldbuilding." 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion/Society of Biblical Literature, Religion and Science Fiction Unit |
| 2018 | "Controversial Comparisons: The Promise and Peril of Foregrounding Identity Categories in Religions and Other Worldviews." 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion/Society of Biblical Literature, Student Lounge Roundtable |
| 2017 | "The Potential Value of Genre-Based Pedagogy in Religious Studies." 2017 American Academy of Religion/Society of Biblical Literature (AAR/SBL) Annual Meeting, Student Lounge Roundtable Series |
| 2017 | "A Cognitive Account of World- and Worldview-making in Fantastika." 2017 Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) Annual Meeting |

2017 "Horror Vacui, *The Mist,* and Stephen King's Lovecraftian Mythos: Grotesque Emblems of Nothing as Provocations to Religio-secular Authenticity and Inauthenticity." 2017 Popular Culture Association/American Culture Association (PCA/ACA) National Conference, Stephen King Area

2016 "Genres and the Ordinary/Non-Ordinary Distinction." 2016 Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) Annual Meeting

2016 "Inklings of Other Lands: Religious Tourism in Eddings and Hobb." 2016 Popular Culture Association/American Culture Association (PCA/ACA) National Conference, Travel and Tourism Area

2016 "Cognitive Constraints on Novelty in Speculative Fiction Religions." 2016 American Comparative Literature Association (ACLA), Seminar organizer with co-organizer, Rhona Trauvitch: "From Fiction to Faith and Fandom: Fictional Worlds, Participatory Culture, and Novel Social Formations"

2015 "(Eternal) Re-Turn of the Axis Mundi: Reconciling Religion's Spatial Turn and Cognitive Turn." 2015 American Academy of Religion/Society of Biblical Literature (AAR/SBL) Annual Meeting, International Association for the Cognitive Science of Religion (IACSR) Session, "Current Approaches to Religious Cognition"

2015 "Genre-based Constraints on Plausibility Structures." Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) Annual Meeting

2010 "LAMP and the Promotion of Diversity." 2010 American Library Association (ALA) Annual Conference

2010 "Censorship, Diversity, and Democracy." 2010 American Library Association (ALA) Midwinter Conference

2010 LAMP Poster Presentation. 2010 Association for Library and Information Science Education Annual Conference

***Regional***

2023 "Philosophy of Kairology: The Philosophical Study of Fictional Worldviews." 2023 American Academy of Religion – Western Region (AAR-WR), Philosophy of Religion Unit

2022 "Entertaining a Rhetorically Persuasive Philosophy of Religion." 2022 American Academy of Religion, Western Region (AARWR)

Annual Meeting, Philosophy of Religion Unit – virtual conference due to COVID

2022 "Ethical Permanence in Impermanent Ontologies." 2022 American Academy of Religion, Western Region (AARWR) Annual Meeting, Buddhist Studies Unit – virtual conference due to COVID

2020 "*Atlas Shrugged* and the Fictional State of Emergency: Ayn Rand and the Conservative Apocalyptic Holy War." 2020 Midwest American Academy of Religion Regional Conference, Literature and Sacred Texts in the Study of Religion – accepted but not delivered due to COVID conference cancellation

2019 "The Embodied and Rhetorical Situation: World-making, Worldviews, and Essentialization." 2019 American Academy of Religion, Western Region (AARWR) Annual Meeting, Religion in America Unit

2018 "Recreational Re-creation: Decoupling and the (Un)Kindness of Satirical, Allegorical, and Mythopoeic Worldmaking." 2018 American Academy of Religion, Western Region (AARWR) Annual Meeting, Religion in America Unit

2017 "Native Americans, Homosexuals, and Women in the Making of Mormon Heroes: Identity Formation and Border Management in Orson Scott Card." 2017 AAR Western Region (AARWR) Annual Meeting, Indigenous Religions Unit

2017 "A Course Design for Critical Pedagogy in Religious Studies." 2017 AAR Western Region (AARWR) Annual Meeting, Graduate Student Professional Development

2016 "The Sovereign's Red Shadow: A Critical Reading of Royal Ideology in Literary Depictions of Native Americans." 2016 American Academy of Religion Western Region (AARWR) Annual Meeting, Indigenous Religions Unit

2015 "Alien(ated): Seeing SF with Insect Eyes: The SF Genre, Possible World Semantics, and Neuroeconomics." Pacific Ancient and Modern Language Association (PAMLA) Annual Conference

***Graduate and campus***

2018 "Technoscience in Tolkien: How Fictional Worldviews Facilitate Reflection on the Big Questions of Globalized Modernity." Religion and Technology: Boston University Graduate Program in Religion Conference 2018. Boston, Massachusetts.

| | |
|---|---|
| 2018 | "The Fantastic Quality in Racial Fantasies: How the Genres of Estrangement both Serve and Stigmatize the Marginalized." Graduate Center for Literary Research (GCLR) 5th Annual Conference: "Borderlines," University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2017 | "Resonances of Consilience Between Worldviews: An Information- and Translation-Theoretic Assessment of the Building Block Approach in Religious Studies." Graduate Center for Literary Research (GCLR) 4th Annual Conference: "Resonance," University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2016 | "World Making and Border Management in Orson Scott Card: Fictional Religion, American Religious Historiography, and Cognitive Narratology." Graduate Center for Literary Research (GCLR) Spring Roundtable, University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2016 | "Forging Fictional Religious Worlds: American Religious Border Making and Contestation." The 5th Biennial Borderlands International Graduate Student Conference: "Forging Faith(s) in Global Borderlands," University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2015 | "Fantasies of Transformation: Conversion and Essentialized Roles in Online User-Generated Fiction and Folksonomies." 2015 Queer Graduate Student Conference, "Curing" the Queer: From Pathology to Resistance, UCLA |
| 2012 | "Cult v. Pop Culture: Jehovah's Witnesses' Doctrine of Separation from the World." Religions in Conversation Conference, Claremont Graduate University |
| 2011 | "LAMP and LGBT Diversity in Library and Information Science." Midwestern Bisexual Lesbian Gay Transgender Ally College Conference, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor |
| 2010 | "Censorship of LGBT Youth Materials in Libraries." Midwestern Bisexual Lesbian Gay Transgender Ally College Conference, University of Wisconsin, Madison |
| 2008 | "Homosexuality in the Classical and Medieval Periods." Midwestern Bisexual Lesbian Gay Transgender Ally College Conference, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign |

***Guest lectures and invited presentations***

| | |
|---|---|
| 2020 | "Alternate Worlds & Afterworlds: Death and Afterlife in Fiction and Popular Culture." Religious Approaches to Death (RG ST 12), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2017 | On spatial cognition and religion. Foundations of Cognitive Science C (INT 200C), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2017 | "This Is Your Letter from Hogwarts: Reading and Composing in Genres and Media in Religious Studies," Proseminar in Writing Studies (Writing 502C), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2016 | On spatial cognition and religion. Religion, Experience and Mind Lab Group, University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2015 | On Amos. Literature and Religion of the Hebrew Bible (RG ST 115A), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2014, 2015 | On Crossroads Fellowship-based pedagogy experiences and findings, Religion, Experience and Mind Lab Group, University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2013 | On Scientology. Religion in American History (RG ST 151A), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2013 | On spatial cognition and religion. International Spatial Cognition Summer Institute (ISCSI), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2013 | On spatial cognition and religion. Foundations of Cognitive Science C (INT 200C), University of California, Santa Barbara |
| 2012 | On Jehovah's Witnesses. New Religious Movements (RG ST 101), University of California, Santa Barbara |

**LANGUAGES**

Latin – Advanced – Read, Write
Classical Greek – Advanced – Read, Write
Biblical Hebrew – Intermediate – Read
French – Intermediate – Read

**INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES**

Camping, Sailing & Kayaking, Yoga, Swimming, Travel, Creative Writing, Crocheting & Knitting, Cooking & Hosting Dinner Parties

*Hobby Languages (beginner):* Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Spanish, Italian, Hindi, Russian, Modern Greek, German, Yiddish, Modern Hebrew, Arabic, Korean, Japanese, Old English

**PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS**

American Academy of Religion (AAR); American Bar Association (ABA); American Comparative Literature Association (ACLA); American Constitution Society (ACS); American Library Association (ALA); American Theological Library Association (ATLA); Cognitive Science Society; Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC); International Association for the Cognitive Science of Religion (IACSR); International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR); International Society for the Study of Narrative; Law Librarians of New England (LLNE); Modern Language Association (MLA); Pacific Ancient and Modern Language Association (PAMLA); Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity; Popular Culture Association/American Culture Association (PCA/ACA); Society of Biblical Literature (SBL); Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR); The Tolkien Society

# ABSTRACT

Worlds Within Worlds:

Allomythic Worldviews & Worldmaking in Fantastika –

Their Nature & Genesis,

Analyzing the Works of J.R.R. Tolkien, Stephen King, Philip Pullman, Madeline L'Engle,

Ayn Rand, & William Luther Pierce,

with Supporting Appendices & Excurses; or,

Kairology:

The Making of Meaningful Situations –

Understanding Fictional Worldviews & Ways of Life

by

Nathan Ray Fredrickson

What framework may one use to make sense of the nature and conditions of genesis of fictional worldviews and ways of life, which tend to be found in works of fantastika (an umbrella term for genres like science fiction and fantasy)?

The diversity of such worldviews requires a comparative, multi-level approach, drawing on the methods and findings of disciplines such as cognitive narratology and worldview studies, while using the theoretical resources of disciplines like translation studies and global studies to remain critically attentive to the historically contingent issues

and categories relevant to the study of the phenomenon and to the limits of any worldview analysis.

Fictional worldviews and ways of life extend cognition to generate novel worlds-and-selves. Neologisms and allomythoi – and the novums they signify – thus may enable features of novel identities, both individual and collective. This process is inherently spatial and temporal, and deeply linked to the embodied narrative self. Based on this embodied, evolutionary perspective, I supply a novel typology for organizing and understanding fictional worldviews and ways of life.

This work finds that worldview studies, in particular, supplies general comparative categories that help evade some of the problems ubiquitous in religious studies and that permit comparative analysis of the full range of diverse worldviews in fantastika. But though cognitive narratology and worldview studies, recently placed anew on an evolutionary foundation, supply a powerful explanatory framework, the phenomenon of the emergence of allomythoi is also historically contingent, rooted in what I call the "borderlands mechanism," especially manifested in particular subgenres, and oriented, in addition to general, panhuman questions, toward uniquely contemporary concerns.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

*ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS* ..... *iv*

*VITA OF NATHAN FREDRICKSON* ..... *vii*

*ABSTRACT* ..... *xxiv*

*TABLE OF CONTENTS* ..... *xxvi*

*BOOK ONE: MAIN TEXT* ..... *1*

*INTRODUCTION* ..... *1*

**§ 0.1. Background** ..... **1**

**§ 0.2. Problems** ..... **3**

§ 0.2.1. Religious Studies ..... 3

§0.2.2. Study of American Religions ..... 3

§0.2.3. Literature and Science Fiction (and Other) Genre Studies Relative to Religious Studies ..... 4

§0.2.4. Spatiality ..... 5

**§ 0.3. Question** ..... **5**

**§ 0.4. Thesis** ..... **6**

**§ 0.5. Methods** ..... **6**

**§ 0.6. Significance of Present Study** ..... **7**

§ 0.6.1. Study of American Religion ..... 7

§ 0.6.2. Rhetoric, Situation, and Stasis Theory ..... 8

§ 0.6.3. Cognitive Narratology and Text World Theory (TWT) ..... 8

§ 0.6.4. Worldview Studies, Spatiality, and Spatial Cognition ..... 9

§ 0.6.5. Problem History, Global Studies, and (Post-)Modernity ..... 9

**§ 0.7. Sources** ..... **10**

§ 0.7.1. M-mode Sources (Mythopoeic Mode) ..... 10

§ 0.7.2. N-mode Sources (Naturalized Mode) ..... 12

§ 0.7.3. O-mode Sources (Oppositional Mode) ..... 12

**§ 0.8. Chapter Overviews** ..... **14**

§ 0.8.1. Chapter 1: Nature – Worlds and Worldviews ..... 14

§ 0.8.2. Chapter 2: Nature – Fantastical Worldmaking, Narrative, and Cognition ..... 14

§ 0.8.3. Chapter 3: Genesis – Emergence of Fantastical Allomythoi and Their Modern Forms ..... 14

**§ 0.9. Scope and Limitations** ..... **15**

**Notes** ..... **16**

**Works Cited** ..... **21**

*CHAPTER 1: WORLDS AND WORLDVIEWS* ..... *24*

**§ 1.1. Worldviews and Ways of Life** ..... **24**

**§ 1.2. Writing Studies and Worldview Studies** ..... **27**

§ 1.2.1. Situation ..... 27

**§ 1.3. Boundaries** ..... **30**

**§ 1.4. Modes, Hemispheres, and Space** ..... **32**

**§ 1.5. M-mode Sources** ..... **41**
§ 1.5.1. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings ..... 42
§ 1.5.2. King's Dark Tower Series ..... 43

**§ 1.6. N-mode Sources** ..... **45**
§ 1.6.1. Pullman's His Dark Materials Series ..... 46
§ 1.6.2. L'Engle's Time Quintet Series ..... 47

**§1.7. O-mode Sources** ..... **49**
§ 1.7.1. Rand's Atlas Shrugged ..... 49
§ 1.7.2. Pierce's The Turner Diaries ..... 50

**§ 1.8. Conclusion** ..... **52**

**Notes** ..... **53**

**Works Cited** ..... **65**

***CHAPTER 2: FANTASTICAL WORLDMAKING, NARRATIVE, AND COGNITION*** ..... ***68***

**§ 2.1. Narrative Worldmaking** ..... **68**
§ 2.1.1. Genres ..... 68
§ 2.1.2. Probability Design ..... 69
§ 2.1.3. Text World Theory ..... 73
§ 2.1.4. Ways of Worldmaking ..... 76

**§ 2.2. Allomythic Narrative Worldmaking in Fantastika** ..... **79**
§ 2.2.1. Metaleptic Boundary-Crossing into Other Worlds ..... 79
§ 2.2.2. Fantastical Ways of Worldmaking ..... 81

**§ 2.3. M-mode Allomythic Worldmaking** ..... **83**

**§ 2.4. N-mode Allomythic Worldmaking** ..... **87**

**§ 2.5. O-mode Allomythic Worldmaking** ..... **94**

**§ 2.6. Conclusion** ..... **98**

**Notes** ..... **99**

**Works Cited** ..... **117**

***CHAPTER 3: EMERGENCE OF FANTASTICAL ALLOMYTHOI AND THEIR MODERN FORMS*** ..... ***119***

**§ 3.1. Contemporary Combinatory Borderlands** ..... **119**
§ 3.1.1. Metaphor and Translation ..... 120

**§ 3.2. The Critique of Eurocentrism and Presentism** ..... **120**
§ 3.2.1. Fantastical Representations in Ancient Borderlands Situations ..... 121
§ 3.2.2. Plausibility Crises and Making New Mythistories ..... 122

**§ 3.3. Emergence of Fantastika and Allomythoi** ..... **123**
§ 3.3.1. The New Genre System and Ironic-Realist Fantastika ..... 123
§ 3.3.2. Virtual, Ludic Homelands ..... 124

**§ 3.4. Responses to Big Problems (BPs)** ..... **125**

§ 3.4.1. Criticism ..... 126
§ 3.4.2. Exploitation ..... 133
§ 3.4.3. Virtuality ..... 139
§ 3.4.4. Globalization ..... 143
**§ 3.5. Little Problem-Questions and Microgenres ..... 149**
**§ 3.6. A Secular Conclusion ..... 150**
**Notes ..... 152**
**Works Cited ..... 176**
***CONCLUSION ..... 181***
***BOOK TWO: APPENDICES ..... 184***
***Appendix 1: On the Term "Allomythos" ..... 185***
***Appendix 2: Bibliography of Religions and Other Worldviews in Fiction and Popular Culture ..... 192***
***Appendix 3: An Excursus on the Problems ..... 216***
***Appendix 4: Bibliography of Major Influences in Fictional Religion and Religion in Fiction ..... 218***
***Appendix 5: An Excursus on Method ..... 241***
***Appendix 6: On "Ontology" in the Study of Worldviews, Translation and Consilience, and the BBA ..... 250***
**Part 1: Nietzsche and Analytic Philosophy—A Caution Against Excess ..... 250**
**Part 2: A Pyrrhonean Pragmatist Perspective on Ontology, Using Chemistry as an Example .. 255**
On PPP, Pluralization, and Polytheism in the (Post-)Secular World ..... 276
**Part 3: Phenomenology – Categorization and Interpretation of Experience ..... 281**
**Part 4: On Translation and the BBA – Resonances of Consilience Between Worldviews ..... 302**
***Appendix 7: Some Brief Examples of Fictional Worldviews ..... 326***
***Appendix 8: Future Areas of Research ..... 331***
***Appendix 9: On Spatial Cognition, "Religion," and Other Worldviews ..... 344***
**Introduction: Eternal Re-Turn of the Axis Mundi – Integrating Religious Studies' Spatial Turn and Cognitive Turn ..... 346**
**1. Cognitive Turn ..... 347**
**2. Spatial Turn ..... 349**
**2a. Eliade ..... 352**
**2b. Hertz ..... 353**
**2c. Wyatt ..... 353**
**3a. Eliade and the Logic of Centering ..... 356**

**A Brief Excursus Drawing on William James ..... 357**
**3b. Apache Place Names and Comparison—Deloria and Basso ..... 361**
**3c. Orientation Systems in Cognition and Languages—Levinson ..... 366**
**3d. Lateralization ..... 371**
**3e. Worldview Studies and Laterialization—McGilchrist and Siegel ..... 373**
**4a. Trajectories: Cognitive Archaeology—Renfrew and Mithen ..... 377**
**4b. Other Trajectories ..... 385**
**I. Event ..... 385**
**II. Aesthetic feelings and Emotion ..... 387**
**III. Virtuosos and Difference ..... 388**
**IV. Power—Heidegger, Tweed, and Knott ..... 389**
**An Excursus on the Missing Body in Heidegger ..... 393**
**A Secondary Excursus ..... 399**
***Appendix 10: A Critical Review of Selected Worldview Studies Categories (Big Questions) ..... 422***
***Appendix 11: The Rhetorical "Situation" – Staseis and Memoria ..... 433***
***Appendix 12: Boundaries in Fantastika ..... 440***
***Appendix 13: Boundaries in Religious Studies ..... 444***
***Appendix 14: Boundaries in Play, Mental Time Travel, Mind Wandering, and Sleep ..... 447***
***Appendix 15: My Modes Relative to Center and Boundaries ..... 456***
***Appendix 16: Kairological Charts for Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings ..... 461***
***Appendix 17: Kairological Charts for King's Dark Tower Series ..... 573***
***Appendix 18: Kairological Charts for Pullman's His Dark Materials Series ..... 650***
***Appendix 19: Kairological Charts for L'Engle's Time Quintet Series ..... 728***
***Appendix 20: How the O-mode May Inform the Others – Parody Religion and Shakespeare, with Some Reference to The Book of Mormon (Musical) ..... 802***
**World-making, Metareflection, and the Critical Power of Humor ..... 802**
**A Midsummer Night's Dream ..... 804**
**The Tempest ..... 810**
**The Book of Mormon (Musical) ..... 816**
**An Excursus: Latin Elegist as Magician-Priest ..... 818**
***Appendix 21: Bibliography of Humor, Satire, and Parody Religion Literature ..... 828***
**anti-Catholic ..... 831**

**anti-Puritan** ..... **831**
**Carroll** ..... **831**
**liberal** ..... **831**
**Lovecraft** ..... **831**
**Milton** ..... **832**
**Shaw** ..... **832**
**Simpsons** ..... **833**
**South Park** ..... **833**
**Swift** ..... **833**
**Tolstoy** ..... **833**
**Twain** ..... **834**
**Vonnegut** ..... **836**
**Parody Religions** ..... **838**
***Appendix 22: Kairological Charts for Rand's Atlas Shrugged*** ..... ***839***
***Appendix 23: Kairological Charts for Pierce's The Turner Diaries*** ..... ***868***
***Appendix 24: On Allomythoi in Martin's A Song of Ice and Fire*** ..... ***913***
***Appendix 25: SPFX – Animation as a Signal of Estrangement*** ..... ***948***
***Appendix 26: On the Evolution of Language and Worldviews as Rhetorical*** ..... ***954***
***Appendix 27: What are genres, and how does this help us to understand fantastika?*** .. ***985***
**Genres—What Are They?** ..... **985**
**Fantastika—What Is It?** ..... **995**
***Appendix 28: What evolved human cognitive capacity does the genre of fantastika exploit?*** ..... ***998***
**Probabilistic World Model** ..... **999**
**How does fantastika exploit the PWM?** ..... **1002**
**What are the implications of the above understanding of fantastika?** ..... **1007**
An Excursus on the Pragmatic Reality of Individual and Social Agents and the Hard Problem of Consciousness ..... 1009
***Appendix 29: On Probability Design*** ..... ***1020***
***Appendix 30: On Text World Theory*** ..... ***1027***
An Excursus on Dewey's Aesthetic Theory ..... 1031
***Appendix 31: General Ways of Worldmaking*** ..... ***1036***
***Appendix 32: Worldmaking Metaphors and Fractal Patterns of Recursive Self-Similarity*** ..... ***1041***

*Appendix 33: Fantastical Ways of Worldmaking* ..... *1043*

*Appendix 34: A Note on the Liminal-Liminoid Distinction* ..... *1050*

*Appendix 35: Diasporic Mythistory-Making – Its Value and Peril* ..... *1051*

*Appendix 36: Allomythoi as Metaphors and Translations* ..... *1055*

*Appendix 37: Fantastical Representations in Ancient Borderlands Situations* ..... *1057*

*Appendix 38: On the Reality of Myth and the Fictionality of History* ..... *1063*

**I. The Mythic** ..... **1063**

**II. The Poetic** ..... **1071**

**III. The Reality of Myth and History as Story** ..... **1079**

*Appendix 39: Two Tensions – Realism/Fictionality and Generality/Particularity* ..... *1088*

*Appendix 40: Myth, a Category of Continuity or Rupture?* ..... *1089*

*Appendix 41: Dominant Narratives of Fantastika* ..... *1091*

*Appendix 42: New Narratives and Narrative Forms in a Context of Mixture, Multimedia, and Money* ..... *1097*

*Appendix 43: The Call to Canonization* ..... *1107*

*Appendix 44: Virtual, Ludic Homelands and Telling Their History* ..... *1111*

*Appendix 45: Secular Stories?* ..... *1118*

*Appendix 46: Technoscience in Tolkien* ..... *1129*

*Appendix 47: Concluding by Way of Some Philosophical Investigations in Kairology* ... *1136*

**§ 4.1. Relating to Introduction and Chapter 1** ..... **1136**

§ 4.1.1. Kairology seeks to replace the old, atomic ("categorematic"—see § 1.2 below) paradigm with one that, being relational, co-dependent, and comparative, intentionally selects categories of sufficient generality and abstraction to clarify and not efface contradiction in assimilative or reductive-eliminative treatment of allomythic particularity (as O-mode allomythoi seek to do in accord with their characteristic sinistral diathesis), maintaining the productively boundary-making, oppositional (i.e., dialogical, dialectical, polyvocalic, and polysemous) aspect of all worldmaking without satisfying that impulse in the service of a particular worldview (other than that of the kairological framework itself which intentionally holds that impulse in abeyance as much as possible in order to disclose allomythic nature within a hospitable frame). ..... 1136

§ 4.1.2. Concerning the governing grammatical-syntactic category-metaphor structuring inquiry, kairology might improve the study of allomythopoesis and allomythonostos by exploratorily shifting attention from the verbal mood (i.e., the subjunctive in contrast with the indicative) and the comparative-subordinating conjunction that invokes the hypothetical and its mood(s) (the as-if) by generalizing aspects of that prior inquiry—the attention to certain marks of relation—and turning from the subjunctive to the syncategorematic. ..... 1140

§ 4.1.3. Any responsible kairological inquiry should be aware of the potential of allomythoi to be dangerous and harmful, that is, of allomythoi as a contemporary BP. (See also §§ 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 below.) ..... 1143

**§ 4.2. Relating to Chapter 2** ..... **1148**

§ 4.2.1. Nuttall's absence in this text might be conspicuous to some; Nuttall (2018) is an important compliment to this work and a vital text for future kairological inquiry at the level of individual characters' private allomythoi and sustained close-reading of texts for allomythic qualia that could not be elaborated above, but it seemed best to direct those whose kairological questions are of Nuttall's sort (e.g., what is the individual-allomythic "mind style" of Samwise Gamgee or John Galt? how do the nuances of an allomythos arise from specific syntactic decisions?) to Nuttall and await from someone else's hand a future Nuttall-Fredrickson critical synthesis, which unfortunately must be postponed for now. ....1148
§ 4.2.2. A substantial gap in this work, simply because it is beyond my expertise, is fantastical worldmaking, including the making of allomythoi, in video games. ....1152

**§ 4.3. Relating to Chapter 3 .... 1153**
§ 4.3.1. Taking allomythoi seriously as a BP, metareflecting on this framework to make its WWL explicit, a "philosophy of kairology" may be articulated, and it may tentatively be summarized as follows: (1) kairology is fundamentally oriented toward the allomythoi-BP but situated within worldview studies, taking its concern with BQs as fundamental to its own practice; (2) kairology is a conceptual blend drawing on diverse explanatory research and hermeneutic methods to supply a framework for understanding allomythoi; (3) kairology is deeply dialogical and dialectical, reflecting the natures of the relevant constitutive elements that produce allomythoi; and (4) a philosophy of kairology should be critical and adopt a high level of generality, but individual kairological inquires, even if philosophical, need not. ....1153

**§ 4.4. Relating to Kairological Pedagogy and Worldview Education.... 1174**
§ 4.4.1 Just as religious studies (RS) is complimented and informed by religious education (RE), kairology, as the academic study of allomythoi, should attend to kairological education, a subset of worldview education; moreover, due to allomythoi being comparable to the WWL-formative narratives traditionally addressed by religious studies, i.e., because allomythoi can teach people to develop novel selves and social formations, and because kairology lends itself to a "pedagogy of estrangement," harnessing the power of allomythoi presents a distinctive, novel option for intervention in and integration with other evidence-based pedagogical methods from disciplines like writing studies and information literacy and, more broadly, teaching all the subdisciplines of worldview studies (WvS) within a General Education paradigm. ....1174

**Notes .... 1179**

***Appendix 48: Designing a Course Integrating Critical Pedagogy, Fantasy Literature, and Religious Studies....1191***

**Justification.... 1191**

**1. Defining "Religion," "Magic," and "Fantasy" .... 1193**
Bibliography 1....1193

**2. Colonialism.... 1194**
Bibliography 2....1195

**3. Capitalism.... 1196**
Bibliography 3....1197

**4. Perspectivism and Pragmatism .... 1198**
Bibliography 4....1199

**5. Feminism and Queer Theory.... 1200**
Bibliography 5....1201

**6. Interrogating the Self.... 1202**
Bibliography 6....1204

**7. Royal Ideology and the Monomyth ..... 1205**
Bibliography 7 ..... 1206

**8. Critical Pedagogy and Reflexivity ..... 1206**
Bibliography 8 ..... 1207

**Works Cited in the Pre-thematic Sections ..... 1207**

***Appendix 49: Designing a Course Integrating Critical, Genre-based Pedagogy, Horror Literature, and Religious Studies ..... 1209***

**The Core Argument ..... 1211**
N.B. ..... 1213

**The Fictional Texts ..... 1214**

**The Course ..... 1214**

**Additional Suggested Texts ..... 1230**
The Satanic Opposite and the Animal Monster ..... 1230
The Catholic and Jewish Other ..... 1231
The Feminine Other ..... 1232
The Black, Indian, or Pagan Other ..... 1233

**Works Cited ..... 1234**

***Appendix 50: Queer Composition, Fantasizing Phlebotinum, and Worldmaking with the Whedonverse – A Course in Religious Studies Using Critical, Genre-based, and Technology-Supplemented Pedagogical Methods ..... 1240***

**Table 1: Summary of Course Reading and Viewing Suggestions ..... 1243**

**Genre-based pedagogy: ..... 1244**

**Critical (genre-based) pedagogy ..... 1245**
Queer characters ..... 1246
Queer families ..... 1247
Queer genres ..... 1248

**Technology-supplemented (critical, genre-based) pedagogy ..... 1249**

**Appendix 1: Fantasizing Phlebotinum – Worldview-making Worksheet ..... 1251**

**References ..... 1252**

# BOOK ONE: MAIN TEXT

# INTRODUCTION

## § 0.1. Background

There are many fictional works (generally from the genres of speculative fiction) that contain a robust[1] kind of world-building that involves the creation of consciously fictional worldviews and ways of life, which I (with Anthony, 2014) call "allomythic" *worldviews*[2] or "allomythoi."[3] These fictional worldviews often have features that some scholars view as "religious" or "spiritual." As an example of finding the religious or spiritual in science fiction, one might think of Jeffrey Kripal's accounts of science fiction and superhero comics (2010, 2011), in which he finds a "Super-Story" reflecting humanity's evolving relationship with a really-real but culturally-filtered transcendence. Similarly, Gabriel McKee's *The Gospel According to Science Fiction: From the Twilight Zone to the Final Frontier* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007) exemplifies this line of thought of religion as science fiction (SF) or the finding of "religion" therein—that SF is inherently "theological." There are numerous works of this sort (*e.g.*, Kreuziger 1986; McGrath, 2011) that find in science fiction a "religion" ranging from mainstream Christianity to, at the very least, a spirituality compatible with a secular, scientific world (and fantasy and horror with a re-enchanted occulture).

Just as scholars have found the religious and theological in the realm of popular culture (from figures like Tillich (1964) on), including speculative fiction, so too they have found the fictional, the imaginative, and the subjunctive (Turner, 1982; Taylor, 2007; Asiedu, 2013) in the religious.[4] The theological project of excavating "real" "religious"

themes from fictional works has expanded beyond the Christian tradition.[5] Tillich's project engaged in interesting ways with the idea of secularization, and many works have explored how the locating of religion in or transformation of religion into popular culture may be part of processes of dis- and re-enchantment.[6] The back-and-forth between religion in entertainment and imaginatively entertaining religion – the sort of playful, imaginative religious experiencing alluded to above, found in religions that claim to be history-based – is also exhibited in a related class of recently studied New Religious Movements (NRMs) that Markus Davidsen has designated "fiction-based religion" (Davidsen 2014).[7]

This interesting trend in the study of NRMs constitutes a significant background for this project, which is addressed to making sense of the wider milieu of fictional worldviews, most of which do not become actualized as "real" NRMs and other novel worldviews. The fiction-based worldviews that have begun to be studied by such scholars are primarily but not exclusively those that self-designate as "religions" or "spiritualities" and those that have led to significant real-world consequences, such as political and economic influence and terrorism.

There is a broad scholarly consensus that the emergence of these phenomena have to do with conditions of modernity and post-modernity—for example, that these are new myths to re-enchant, escape from, or otherwise transform the world and human subjectivity. Possamai's term for fiction-based religions, "hyper-real religions," marks them as unique products of postmodernity. Likewise, Cusack's (2010) treatment of "invented religions" devotes a lot of space to exploring how the phenomenon of invented religions may relate to processes of secularization and re-enchantment. Kripal's focus on the paranormal, esoteric, or occult, for example, is consistent with other recent theories of fiction-based religions that

make them a feature of an occult re-enchantment of the West (Partridge 2005; McAvan, 2012; Kirby 2013; cf. Nelson 2001, 2012).

## § 0.2. Problems

### *§ 0.2.1. Religious Studies*

One of the foundational problems confronted by this work is the problem of categorization for purpose of comparison. The category of "religion" has been critiqued as a historically-contingent, unstable concept (e.g., McCutcheon, 1997; Saler, 2000; Masuzawa, 2005; Asad, 2009; Nongbri, 2013; Barton and Boyarin, 2016). Such critiques include problems of cross-cultural and cross-temporal comparison, highlighting scholarship's perspectival character (i.e., tensions between insider and outsider perspectives, descriptions, and explanations), studying non-"religious" religion-like phenomena, and religion's epistemic privilege as a naturalized and universal institution.[8] Scholars of "religion" – like those of "art" – often seek to intentionally shield their subjects of study from ("reductive") comparison with supposedly lesser aspects of life and experience.[9]

### *§0.2.2. Study of American Religions*

American religious historiography is aware to varying degrees, depending on the researcher involved, of its fictionality (more typically admitted in terms of things like "positionality"), that is, of what might be called the mythic dimension, rhetorical aim, or perspectival character of any narrative that makes sense of the traces of the past. Bringing the fictional into American religious historiography continues the work of vastly expanding the multiplicity of American worldviews (e.g., NRMs, secularity studies, identity studies), the understanding of Americans as multicultural, and the disciplinary need for collaborative work; it also emphasizes certain American problems relative to "religion" and related

phenomena, such as worldviews-as-entertainment, especially in a context wherein "globalization" of mass media entertainment is often a synonym for Americanization,[10] and how the "imagination" relates to religious, spiritual, and related experiences.[11]

### *§0.2.3. Literature and Science Fiction (and Other) Genre Studies Relative to Religious Studies*

The study of literature in general and American literature specifically has often been biased against "religious" ways of life and worldviews.[12] ("Worldviews" should generally be understood to mean "worldviews and ways of life" (WWL), though relevant distinctions can and should be made between the two elements of the expression.) Moreover, the study of "literature and religion" tends to focus on respectable "realist" genres and detection of influence of "real" religions, and even "religion and science fiction" studies generally and understandably neglect non-SF (often including the distained works of "sci-fi" as well as the) subgenres of fantastika and non-religious worldviews. Scholarly works on particular pop culture texts are intensely focused – again, understandably – on a small subset of highly popular literary and multimedia texts by major authors.[13] Broadly, these literatures are interested in close reflection on works that reflect the WWL of the powerful or works that, due to their market success, exert powerful social effects. Though frequently critical in their analyses of narrative representations, they do not display an interest in a project of (self-)critical *comparison* that attempts to keep in view the great variety of human worldviews and ways of life represented in numerous genres and media.

And, as with "religion," the definitions of what counts as "literature" (i.e., canon-making projects; cf. debates about what "art" is) and the endless debates about stipulated definitions of "science fiction" and other subgenres of fantastika are characteristic of such

studies. The stipulated definitions are inevitably structured to favor the examples the scholars want to examine.

### *§0.2.4. Spatiality*

A persistent Protestant bias[14] and an insistence on fantastika as "escapist" have tended to stress disembodied, dislocated interpretations of both human worldviews (neglecting their entanglement with ways of life) and the kinds of narratives I am interested in; this has favored colonialist, racist, misogynistic, patriarchal, Eurocentrist, anti-Catholic, anti-queer, and related projects that, both **(a)** by pretending a blindness to the particularities of body and place and an understanding of human nature and rights as "spiritual" and "universal" and **(b)** by simultaneously engaging in regulative schemes that attended carefully to the particularities of body and place and attributed to them all-too-many pernicious meanings, were able to narrate the normative and exclude the abnormal. This is a cognitive-historical problem; it is cognitive in that it ignores what we know about human cognition (the so-called 4E-paradigm: cognition as *embodied*, *embedded*, *enacted*, and *extended*), and it is historically contingent and contextual, rooted in the contestation of power.

## § 0.3. Question

What sort of framework is sufficiently generic to encompass and make even-handed, comparative sense of the nature (4E cognitive and rhetorical) and genesis (cognitive, rhetorical-narratological, historical) of the potency and vast diversity of fantastical narrative WWL ("allomythoi") that have in particular emerged in this "global" age of capitalist productivity, in a manner that is both theoretically robust, responding to the concerns of scholarship, and practically applicable?

## § 0.4. Thesis

An evolutionary-cognitive "WWL studies" framework (with "worldviews" defined in terms of fundamental "big questions" (BQs)) that adopts "fantastika" as its genre umbrella and that draws on relevant interdisciplinary the tools (see below) is sufficient to the challenge, finding that novel WWL are made from elements of received WWL, that as text-worlds they are generated like "realist" texts using familiar techniques for narrative worldmaking, and that they emerged quite naturally in this historical context of global "borderlands situations" of combinatory-creative abundance. Framed in this way, we can understand

- **(a)** the *nature* of allomythoi as secondary (i.e., fictional, non-"real"-world) *WWL*, that may be understood in terms of their responses to the BQs, with their *secondary*, narrativized nature being understood using the tools of rhetoric, writing studies, cognitive narratology, and text world theory and
- **(b)** their *genesis* as having to do with the context of global capitalism and the problems of (post)modernity, to which their distinctive responses to the BQs are often oriented; in this, one must draw on insights from translation studies, borderlands theory, and global studies, as well as history more broadly and American religious history more narrowly.[15]

## § 0.5. Methods

My primary method is interdisciplinary, comparative textual analysis; in addition to drawing on the tools of a number of disciplines, I provide a novel, spatiality- and evolution-based typology. For each of the primary allomythic modes in my new typology (M, N, and O) I return to two examples of each, drawing upon works that illustrate particular points I

wish to highlight (such as, e.g., WWL diversity) and that resonate well with each other.[16] The examples, thus, are not just novel "religious" WWL—for example, I look at anti-religious Philip Pullman; moreover, examples are not just "benevolent" ones, for example, a work by white-supremacist, neo-Nazi terrorist William Luther Pierce, a.k.a. Andrew Macdonald, is considered.

## § 0.6. Significance of Present Study

My study uses much broader categories than is typical, attempting to produce more flexible framework than one limited to just one speculative fiction genre (e.g., "science fiction," however defined) and one family or style of WWL (e.g., those concerned with the supernatural, or however one wants to define "religion"). I intend to bring together many tools from many disciplines to make a new kind of toolkit (or, as I tend to call it, *framework*) for understanding previously neglected material.[17] Regarding some aspects of the interdisciplinary significance of the framework described herein, see the five sections that follow.

### *§ 0.6.1. Study of American Religion*

As suggested above, my intervention in American religious studies expands the historiographic terrain by stressing how much Americans' imagination of the "religious," "spiritual," "philosophical," "political," "economic," and so on (i.e., of the range of WWL options) has been influenced by fiction. It highlights, too, how American "religion" has always played with imagination. Many have pushed back on the so-called consensus model of American religious history, and this work would affirm the manyness of Americans' WWLs, particularly at a lower level of analysis than typically addressed. If, as has been said since Anaxagoras, we are what we eat, the novels, comics, movies, and TV shows people

"consume" constitute the materials of narrative self-formation, and, if these materials are more eclectic and lived, folk, vernacular WWLs are similarly more heterogeneous and hodgepodge ("everything-in-everything") than many authorities on such matters might claim, then they present a challenge to future scholarship that I hope my framework can aid scholars in navigating.

### *§ 0.6.2. Rhetoric, Situation, and Stasis Theory*

By building links between rhetorical/writing studies categories, such as "exigence" and "situation," with worldview studies, I hope to advance the interdisciplinary project of consilience. The categories of stasis theory – and ancient rhetoric's broadly embodied and spatial character more generally, as in the fourth of the traditional parts of rhetoric, *memoria* (see Lynne, 2019) – may be brought into comparative relation with BQ categories of worldview studies, and this brings the spatial aspect of world-making to the fore. By reflecting on the sorts of questions authors as world-makers have to think about in order to engage in worldmaking and the text-internal BQs one may observe individuals and groups implicitly and explicitly answering, one is able to shed light on what it means for people to dwell or stand in a shared standpoint (*stasis*) and place (*topos*), closely tied in ancient rhetoric to the *issue* and its fitting *argument*, respectively – in short, to share a world.

### *§ 0.6.3. Cognitive Narratology and Text World Theory (TWT)*

Text worlds, as analyzed using Text World Theory (TWT), and their secondary WWLs must be understood as affordances — in fact, as extensions of individual imagination (see Moore and Hills, 2022) and collective cognition. These are sites where people can externally store and access alternative self-and-world(view) models: what might be likened to a kind of external Default Mode Network or REM dream experimentation.

Fantastika externalizes our capacity to creatively, playfully entertain novel possibilities, and the generation of them is not a new feature of the contemporary world. Any "novelty" is relative; creativity is conservative. Fantastika, when examined narratologically in terms of TWT, is not radically different from realism, and the traditional uses of externalized worldview representations are comparable to the function fantastical allomythoi play today. These conclusions reject and reform many past claims.

### *§ 0.6.4. Worldview Studies, Spatiality, and Spatial Cognition*

The Building Blocks Approach ("BBA"; cf. Larsson, Svensson, & Nordin, 2020; Taves, 2009) and "Worldview Studies" reformed along cognitive and evolutionary lines (e.g., Taves and Asprem, 2018; Taves, Asprem, and Ihm, 2018; cf. Smart, 1981) are intended to provide for broader applications the sort of framework this project is intended to offer for the narrower study of new WWLs in fiction. On the *Building Blocks of Human Experience* website, the BBA is defined as follows:

> The building block approach (BBA) is a framework for studying the complex relationship between human cognition on the one hand, and socio-cultural formations and practices on the other. The aim is to provide a common language that allows scholars in the humanities and social sciences to bring psychological and neuroscientific research to bear on the phenomena they are studying. (https://bbhe.ucsb.edu/)

To the BBA "framework" and "common language,"[18] this study contributes not only insights from cognitive narratology and other disciplines, but my distinctly "spatial" perspective on the BQs also helps counteract the disembodied, dislocated biases mentioned above (§0.2.4).

### *§ 0.6.5. Problem History, Global Studies, and (Post-)Modernity*

Continuing my engagement with genre theory (for example, the umbrella genre "fantastika"), I make novel arguments about the nature of "history" and "myth" relative to the novel allomythic WWLs being generated today. As a mythographical and (American

religious and global) historiographical intervention, this project endeavors to stress both the utility of these categories and their fraught genealogy, deeply entangled with the category of "religion" itself; they are tools of power, shaped by perspective, and inevitably unfaithful to the phenomena even when attempting to serve truth. I draw on problem history and borderlands theory (and, at the cognitive level, conceptual blending) to argue that combinatory situations produce, via what I call the "borderlands mechanism," both (a) much of the novelty that places new stressors on people today and (b) the allomythic narrative attempts to respond to the problems[19] of modernity and postmodernity.

The virtuality and fictionality so characteristic of postmodernity and this work's focus on language and narrative do not negate embodiment and spatiality. The theme of the "problem," the "question," or the provocative situation (both enduring and contingent & contemporary) runs through this work, but there is an intimate, co-constitutive dialectic between the empirical (and conceptual) situation that a worldview is developed in response to and the (concrete, materialized) narrative world and worldview. A focus on textual representation does threaten to dematerialize and dislocate the body into a deconstructed play of signifiers, but only if it forgets that the symbolic tools of simulation emerge from and are instruments and actions in the service of life in our bodies in our environments.

## § 0.7. Sources

### *§ 0.7.1. M-mode Sources (Mythopoeic Mode)*

I selected Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings* as one of my primary M-mode sources because it is foundational to the fantasy genre, and Tolkien scholarship has noted the importance of the problems of modernity in shaping Tolkien's worldmaking process (e.g., Wood, 2015). The existence of Tolkien-based spiritualities makes his work particularly

useful for this study, linking up with scholarship a level above this on fiction-based NRMs (cf. Davidsen, 2014, 2019). Most importantly, Tolkien's efforts to create a fantastical secondary world[20] with a sense of profoundly realist, living sense of depth (cf. Shippey, 2005, pp. 259–261) constitute the defining characteristic of what I call herein the M-mode (the *mythopoeic mode*).

Stephen King's oeuvre[21] has been foundational to the formation of the contemporary horror genre, and his *Dark Tower Series* about the last "Gunslinger" of the line of Arthur Eld and his "ka-tet" is his foremost mythopoeic work, his *magnum opus* (Vincent, 2004), and the most explicit expression of the cosmos or multiverse in which his stories are located and of the WWLs they express. He, like Tolkien, combines a great variety of genres and narrative influences to wrestle with the big questions of modernity, but he, unlike Tolkien, does not offer a single overarching (Catholic) WWL that encompasses the diversity of sub-WWLs. Rather, the *Dark Tower*'s post-apocalyptic, postmodern cosmos is so dizzyingly (sometime comically and frequently horrifically) recursive and metaleptic – given the series conclusion's revelation concerning Gan's incarnation and Roland's reincarnation, one might attempt to coin the expression, "metempsychotic" – that one leaves King's *Dark Tower* storyworld with, yes, a sense of epic wonder at a monumental product of skilled worldmaking, but also with the sense of having opened Pandora's jar of dooms to find a sort of Sisyphean hope that might be the most frightening curse of all. That said, the work is truly one in the M-mode, a marvelous indulgence by King in sheer worldmaking for its own sake.

### *§ 0.7.2. N-mode Sources (Naturalized Mode)*

L'Engle's *Time Quintet* series dwells comfortably in her own default, *naturalized mode* of life and seeing, in a "spiritual" world of liberal, universalist Christianity, combined with a reverence for science and a sympathy with metaphysical religion. Hers is a hybrid genre of young adult SF-and-fantasy representing an omnivorous occulture that regards science and mysticism as united in an alchemical romance and that treats all WWLs in terms of a Manichaean battle between Good and Evil, in which all good WWLs are really the same.

Pullman's liberal, atheist, anti-religious, but still quite fantastical and earnestly imaginative[22] WWL is also quite evident, in N-mode fashion, in his fictional world.[23] In his work, the N-mode bleeds into the M-mode. His open atheism and opposition to organized religion, its combination with political power in theocracy, and other aspects of authoritarianism played a significant role in his work's contentious reception. But his perspective is complex, certainly not a simple materialist rejection of the "supernatural" – he does not approve of radical skepticism and rationalism and depicts humans as having composite souls, including both ghosts that go to the underworld and inner selves that are externalized from their bodies as sentient, speaking "dæmon" companion animals; consciousness[24] producing and being acted on by Dust, which collectively is aware and may reveal the truth through chaotic, divinatory means and which may "condense" as independent sentient beings ("angels"); and, other supernatural beings, objects, and places.

### *§ 0.7.3. O-mode Sources (Oppositional Mode)*

If for no other reason, *Atlas Shrugged* rewards study due to its popularity with major figures in the Republican party and the political right, without the racial orientation of

Turner's work. Rand's Objectivist storyworld, which attacks and some would say parodies Socialist, liberal Christian, Democratic and related worldviews, has itself been intensely parodied. Her egoistic understanding of the "hero" is quite Campbellian though she did not write under the influence of his so-called monomyth. Rather, the same egoism that makes Campbell think one can master the archetypal forces within oneself is embodied, in her own way, in Rand's individualist creators of cold, disciplined rationality, her deeply anti-social Prime Movers. Rand's godlessness is a natural outworking of her having no room for any other god but the self-constituting entrepreneurial man, independent of and certainly in no way constituted by community, history, the idiosyncrasies of embodiment, save perhaps as negative goads to further self-perfection (and in the case of higher, self-aware women, the will to be dominated by such a man). Rand's apocalyptic holy war[25] against the useless parasites who deserve annihilation is a fine example of the *oppositional mode* of worldmaking.

Pierce's *The Turner Diaries* may be the least widely known of my examples, but it, like Rand's work, expresses the worldview of a significant portion of the contemporary American right: the so-called alt-right, especially that portion of it that embraces white supremacy and the dream of an ethnostate, without Christian Identity-style (e.g., serpent seed, true Israel) mythology.[26] As a realist fantasy – but with a racist, physicist-engineer's delight in a specific, racially-oriented technologiade, including the use of atomic weaponry: one might say, a Techno-Robinsonade where all the projects are focused on killing non-Whites and establishing White Supremacy. Its fantastical realism is the successor of Dunning School historiography and Thomas Dixon Jr. & D. W. Griffith mythography.[27]

## § 0.8. Chapter Overviews

### *§ 0.8.1. Chapter 1: Nature – Worlds and Worldviews*

If one considers both ostensibly religious and nonreligious allomythoi (defined briefly here (e.g., §0.1) but in more detail relative to historical context (e.g., global, critical awareness) in Chapter 3) under the wider rubric of WWLs, always rooted in an evolved, spatial-cognitive (4E: Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, and Extended) understanding of *world*-views, one can use the BQs of worldview studies to compare allomythoi and can further classify them into three primary modes or "styles" based on their relationship to spatial (especially boundary-making) problems and fundamental hemispheric differences in perceiving and approaching relevant problems in the world.

### *§ 0.8.2. Chapter 2: Nature – Fantastical Worldmaking, Narrative, and Cognition*

Although worldmaking within narrative worlds is very common in literature (section 1), the three modes of allomythoi, which are particularly common in fantastica, all use the tools of fictional worldmaking to robustly modify people's probabilistic world models (section 2) but do so in somewhat different ways (section 3).

### *§ 0.8.3. Chapter 3: Genesis – Emergence of Fantastical Allomythoi and Their Modern Forms*

Rejecting presentist and Eurocentrist accounts of sharp rupture and contemporary uniqueness, this chapter notes the recurrence of a combinatory borderlands situation that promotes translation and creativity, but on a newly global scale and with distinctive capitalist pressures promoting such translation and creativity.[28] The transformation of the genre system and development of the fantastical genres in which allomythoi typically occur are responses to contemporary situations but are comparable to ancient ones. The notion of

the as-if and the mode/mood of the subjunctive has been invoked as a unique characteristic of this age. Although I argue against its being unique to our era, I do not deny its prominence in contemporary life and thinking. I argue that the being-as manner and method of composition that so well suits the as-if mode and mood of knowing found especially in fantastika has generated a universe of fictional worlds containing allomythoi that people today may draw on for the self-composition of individual and collective identities, thereby creating a livable history for themselves that responds to pressing problems.

## § 0.9. Scope and Limitations

Due to this work representing my solitary efforts, I had to place necessary limits on the number of sources I could consider. Likewise, due to my finite knowledge, my methods and tools are derived from and limited by my areas of disciplinary expertise. I would call for future collaboration, and I would here like to express the hope of, in the future, linking my work on the nature and genesis of allomythoi up with existing studies of impact (e.g., ethnographic studies fiction-based religions and related worldviews).[29]

## Notes

[1] The senses in which this kind of worldmaking is "robust" will become increasingly clear as one progresses through the main text and appendices, but I do not mean to privilege works containing allomythoi over others as if other texts, lacking allomythoi, do not involve "robust" worldmaking. One might reflect on how even the realist narrative genres that, in at least a pretense of occupying the indicative, transport one to other possible situations consistent with our present or even our own world at some point along the past–present timeline, the worldmaking evidenced may be quite robust: rich characterization, evocation of atmosphere, care in tracking historical details, and so on. And even in such realist efforts, anyone who examines such texts will easily find instances of counterfactuals, hypotheticals, and related modal shifts; efforts to be faithful to reality could hardly do otherwise.

[2] Regarding the meaning of "worldviews and ways of life" in this work, see § 0.6.4; § 1.1; § 1.2.1; § 1.4; Ch. 1, n. 3, n. 4., n. 8; Appendix 10; *et passim*. In the spirit of "worlds-within-worlds," it is a feature of this work that many statements that in the main text that necessarily appear to be conclusory and in need of support or clarification are treated in more depth in footnotes, appendices, or a later chapter.

[3] See p. 25. For extended discussion of "allomythos," see "Appendix 1: On the Term 'Allomythos.'"

[4] In the second paragraph of her "Introduction" to her textbook, Albanese (2007, p. 1) asks, "Do symbolic practices—like some neopagan rituals—in which participants acknowledge no objective existence for the Goddess count [as religion], too?" Tanya Luhrmann has been at the forefront of asking this and related questions. In her work on neopagans (Luhrmann, 1989) and, more recently, on charismatic Evangelicals, she has examined what might be called the phenomenon of "as-if religions." She observes, "There is an entire stream of thought in evangelical Christianity that encourages this light, fanciful, not-real-but-more-than-real quality to the experience of God" (Luhrmann, 2012) It should be noted that although some (especially studies of fandom) would suggest this manner of engaging with a sacred reality is uniquely contemporary, a large body of literature has developed exploring, for example, the fictional and the fantastic in biblical literature (apocalyptic, parables), rabbinic thought (midrash), allegory, and so on.

[5] See Appendix 2 for a bibliographic survey of some examples of scholarly texts finding their religions of interest (especially "religion" in its primary sense as Christianity) in fictional works or interpreting fictional works in harmony with specific religious traditions.

[6] Cf. Ostwalt, 2003.

[7] This small class of NRMs, which are closely comparable to and sometimes coincident with the category of intense fandom, has received a variety of names such as "invented religion" (Cusack 2010), "hyper-real religion" (Possamai, 2012) and "fiction-based religion" (Davidsen, 2014). All such studies labor to establish their objects of study as doing "authentic religious work," to use Chidester's phrase (2005, p. vii). Perhaps for this reason, parody and satire religions are often considered as a separate phenomenon. I cite Chidester here as well to point out that this class of literature, in which popular, vernacular, civil culture is interpreted as religious (e.g., Schmidt, 1997; Lofton, 2011; Prebish, 1993; Erzen, 2012; Jewett and Lawrence, 2003; Bellah, 1992), is within the broad Tillichian theology of culture/religion in popular culture tradition.

[8] I have dwelt at an advanced level in the academic discipline for over a decade, coordinating interdepartmental projects, academic conferences at every level, publishing efforts, departmental teaching assistants' pedagogical and professional training, and so on, and I mean no disrespect when I observe this trend: religious studies (RS) is experiencing noticeable isolation and fragmentation due to factors such as funding, the problematic nature of defining "religion" and of articulating a coherent RS perspective (e.g., the well-established problems with comparative projects like the "world religions paradigm"), disciplinary and economic pressures (e.g., donors' endowments) pushing RS, as a "department," to fragment into area studies (terms like "Balkanization" (a problematic expression), "siloing," and others are common in some critical circles), and some RS scholars' adherence to entrenched theories and methodologies, a problem hardly unique to RS. I note, again consulting

personal international experience, variation between global regions—for example, trends in the U.S. are very different from those in Europe.

[9] See "Appendix 3: An Excursus on the Problems."

[10] Because this project derives its fictional examples and non-fictional interlocutors from English-language fantastika and scholarship, it applies to the Anglophone world in general. Thus, again, the phenomenon it studies has important implications on a global level, not merely for American or Anglo-American religious history.

[11] For more on these issues, see Appendix 42.

[12] Both the academic study of American literature and of American history (outside of religious studies) have generally neglected the topic of religion, perhaps reflecting "secular" or even anti-religious biases of scholars or the domination of materialist theories and interests. Scholars of American religion are well aware that religion often plays a minor and neglected role in most standard narratives of American history. It has been proposed that secular scholars of American history neglect religion because it does not interest *them*, distorting their narrative to conform to their own naturalist-materialist biases (Schultz and Harvey, 2010; see also, Butler, 2004). Whatever the reason, a similar problem has been noted in the study of American literature. Two representative works on religion in American literature, for example, both edited by Robert Lundin (2007, 2009), begin with reference an essay by Jenny Franchot (1995) arguing that the study of American literature neglects religion and proposing some reasons why this might be the case.

[13] For a sample bibliography of studies on some of these, see "Appendix 4: Bibliography of Major Influences in Fictional Religion and Religion in Fiction."

[14] Though it puts me in some apparent tension (but he too attends to this very tension!) with the fruitful contrasts Gunn (2019) identifies between the *spiritual imaginaries* of religious and Enlightenment thinking in American literature, with Karl Barth, I would be rather comfortable characterizing the Protestant family of worldviews as "modernistic" and "Cartesian"; that is, under the heavy influence of the Enlightenment.

[15] The raw materials for making fictional non-ordinary phenomena come from, among other things, "real world" religions and ideas about religion, and their representations relate to real world historical contexts. Thus, there instances of non-ordinary worlds within speculative fictional worlds that are modeled on established traditional religions and other established WWLs (some of which have been previously overlooked), that, on the one hand, mix and match components that can be derived from classical definitions of religion, features of which are being studied in the cognitive science of religion, and that, on the other hand, are based on personal, historically contextual experiences. But it is not clear yet, in spite of numerous "novums" in speculative fictional works (Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., 2008; Suvin, 1978), that any truly *new*, maximally counterintuitive components of religion have emerged. Successful representations of the non-ordinary within representations of the non-ordinary tend to cluster around attractor points that are cognitively compelling because they take advantage of evolved predispositions and historically compelling because of configurations of power.

[16] See "Appendix 5: An Excursus on Method."

[17] Throughout, I make contributions to creativity studies, the study of "secularity," the generic nature of "history," "myth," and "fantastika," and other areas.

Efforts are being made in religious studies to identify "building blocks" that could facilitate comparison and interdisciplinary conversation (i.a., Taves, 2015) – that is to say, "consilience." One example of this consilient translation effort in this study is the attempt to engage different concepts of blending and transgression (narratology's metalepsis, cognitive science's conceptual blending and cultural attractors, and humanities and social science's borderlands, hybridity, and hyper-reality). This study expands the concept of what phenomena

are appropriate objects of study in religious studies and helps disengage from theology-like disputes about the "real" or "true" nature of religion by attending to "religion-like" phenomena that may be understood in terms of more general processes not marked off as "sacred" or *sui generis*.

[18] See "Appendix 6: On 'Ontology' in the Study of Worldviews, Translation and Consilience, and the BBA."

[19] "Hopkins and Lillard (2021) suggest that problem solving can be enhanced through fantasy. The authors propose that it is not engagement with surface fantasy – a world superficially dissimilar to ours – that leads to these effects, but engagement with deep fantasy – a world dissimilar to ours where impossible things can happen, not unlike the settings of fictions with imaginary worlds" (Nissel and Woolley, 2022, p. 36).

[20] Cf. Stableford's (2016) discussion of the *heterocosm*.

[21] King draws strongly on Tolkien and Lovecraft's mythopoeic worldbuilding—concerning whom, cf. Saler, 2012—as well as Arthurian legend, tarot as a divinatory method, and American spaghetti Westerns.

[22] Though I primarily use his *His Dark Material* series, Pullman's sequel series, *The Book of Dust*, elaborates on the nature of Dust and on big questions about the nature of a coherently materialist account of consciousness, but, for example, another large contemporary question that becomes more evident in *The Book of Dust* is the role of corporations in our world—Pullman addresses this issue through the activity of corporations using mercenaries to control the supply of rose oil, which allows one to see Dust. One might compare Pullman's perspective with this text by one of Google's quantum physicists and his co-authors: Neven, H., Read, P., & Rees, T. (2021). Do robots powered by a quantum processor have the freedom to swerve? https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2104.11591

[23] It extends the Tolkienian fantasy genre, draws on Blake's mythopoeic worldbuilding and other works of the Western canon like *Paradise Lost* and the *Aeneid*, and is, like the *Time Quintet* series a genre hybrid.

[24] In an interview with *The Guardian*, Pullman states, "It's the question of consciousness, perhaps the oldest philosophical question of all: are we matter? Or are we spirit and matter? What is consciousness if there is no spirit? Questions like that are of perennial fascination and they haven't been solved yet, thank goodness" (qtd. in Flood, 2017).

[25] Again, the potent influence of Ayn Rand's (1957) novel, *Atlas Shrugged*, on conservative American politics, culture, and religion is hard to overstate. Rand's gospel of selfishness and individualism – praised by powerful capitalists from Silicon Valley to Wall Street – has also been endorsed by powerful political figures, such as former Chair of the Federal Reserve of the United States (from 1987 to 2006), Alan Greenspan, and former Speaker of the United States House of Representatives (from October 2015 to January 2019) and 2012 vice presidential nominee of the Republican Party, Paul Ryan, who famously gave every new intern a copy of the novel, and former-and-current President Donald Trump, who has expressed admiration for Rand's writing and whose cabinet contained many Objectivists. Although Rand was a committed atheist, her novel's WWL is heavily shaped by what might be called a secularized Christian logic. For example, Ayn Rand's conception of the radical freedom and isolated individualism of the perfect "man" as "prime mover" – as well as his forceful violence in his relations with women and others he regards as lesser – reflects a particular conception the divine sovereign as self-existing, free, creative, eternal, self-defined, impassible. In fact, Rand's intense opposition to sociality and professions like teaching and her self-understanding of her reason for writing works like *Atlas Shrugged* – to write a discursive work of philosophy would be to diminish herself, to engage in the immoral act of trying to teach people, rather than engaging in the creation of a world that expresses her worldview and her understanding of human perfection in order to satisfy herself – are all linked to this understanding of the perfect "man." But one may observe another aspect of Rand's dependence on a certain kind of Christianity – for all her rejection of it as the "mysticism" of parasites – in her violent evocation of apocalypse (as withdrawal of the prime movers from the world), paradise (as isolation from the looters), and martyrdom (i.e., Galt's torture and the misery of all the great capitalists depicted throughout the novel). All of this works to create a sense of crisis and emergency in her readers. Some have noted that the polarized political

situation in the U.S. has caused many people to vote for the political figures they think will fight for them against their enemies. And many now see the world much as Ayn Rand intended her readers to see it. Such readers inhabit her dystopian socialist End Time, witness the tribulation of her capitalist-objectivist saints and Christ figure, and are, in a sense, radicalized to understand themselves as being locked in a final, holy war with non-objectivists. If they embrace their own interests, they will inherit the paradisiac world of "Atlantis" (one of the names for Galt's Gulch), but if they are traitors to the individualistic ideal, they, like Dr. Robert Stadler, will be annihilated.

[26] Given the recent rise in white-supremacist extremist violence and murder in the U.S. (https://www.adl.org/resources/report/murder-and-extremism-united-states-2022), we should all pay more attention to the stories that motivate such people. For a sampling of other examples of analyses of allomythoi, see "Appendix 7: Some Brief Examples of Fictional Worldviews" and Appendices 16–20, 22–24.

[27] One might ask whether the O-mode is inherently right-wing or hospitable to right-wing perspectives, but, as will hopefully become clearer in Chapter 1 and its supporting appendices, the M-, N-, and O-modes are meant, not to organize fictional worldviews along political or economic lines, but to categorize allomythoi based on worldmaking properties, rooted ultimately in how one is disposed to attend to and structure experience.

The left-right political spectrum does seem to have some underlying cognitive affiliation differences (see, for example, Mendez, 2017). People whose left hemispheres are overactive or whose right hemispheres' activity is diminished possess many qualities typically associated with the excesses of conservatives, and people with hyperactive right hemispheric activity or hypoactive left hemispheric activity have qualities generally associated with the flaws of liberals. But liberals and progressives sometimes make O-mode works or, more likely, N-mode works with O-mode scenes, and conservative, right-wing folks certainly make worlds in the N-mode, with some even possessing M-mode moments. To be able to perform such a complex worldmaking task as making an allomythos, any such poet would need access to most of the full range of basic worldmaking abilities. See Chapter 1, §1.7 and nn. 41-2; Appendices 10, 28, 30, 33.

[28] One of the major structural forces compelling this is the law of copyright, with, for example, the doctrine of "substantial similarity," which is ideally intended to promote innovation that leapfrogs beyond minor, incremental change (that said, the level of creativity demanded is actually relatively low, and similarity is easily attributed to accident). Even the contrary, defensive doctrine of "fair use" is intended also to promote creativity when copyright might get in the way. Copyright law forbids "misappropriation," including protecting creators' rights to similar works like performances, straightforward "translations," and other obviously "derivative" works, while at the same time encouraging appropriative activities of consumption and intellectual possession, with the instructive aim of creators' learning from each other, precisely in order for them to attempt *translation* or *derivation* in the robustly creative sense. The practice and culture of news, as fresh, new, immediate, is another major force, and the subgenre of tabloid journalism (let alone fake news and cynically manufactured disinformation, particularly of certain conspiratorial varieties) contains no small measure of fantastika. Video killed the radio stars; social media, especially given its specialization, fragmentation, and self-reinforcing audience selectivity, may be killing its ancestors like traditional journalism, particularly its values of evenhandedness, thoroughness, care, but it is enflaming the desire for novelty that journalism played no small role in fostering.

[29] My choice of individual representative works from speculative fiction, though selected to illustrate my typology, which is rooted in evolutionary and spatial concerns, aims to be a mixture of works that both have and have not turned into "real" movements and to be relatively popular with their relevant audiences. This is in part based on my own interests—works that raised issues that I felt were central to the phenomenon of fictional WWLs and that opened up theoretical analysis of them. Though I would not agree, one might reject my selection criteria as too arbitrary. I have given thought to this and have proposed a solution that would demand collaborative efforts beyond my individual range of experience and finite time and energy. See "Appendix 8: Future Areas of Research."

Apart from the limitations on scope defined by my sources, it is worth mentioning that allomythoi occur

outside of (as well as before—see chapters 1 and 3) speculative or fantastical fiction. This genre or these genres (i.e., science fiction, fantasy, horror, and so on) are especially rich in allomythoi, which also occur in "ordinary" fiction (and other, non-textual media) as well. Furthermore, any interpretation is limited, so all of my case studies represent partial treatments of works that, from other perspectives, might generate more and other knowledge. Penultimately, the *relative* character of the "free space" offered by speculative fiction must be seriously acknowledged (see Appendix 3): the normative forces of class, race, sex, and other prejudices are operative not only within the fictional worlds that are produced but also in determining which fictional works end up being created and published. A cultural site unconstrained by power is impossible. Language, as a medium of intersubjective relation, necessarily constrains. Indeed, the replication within speculative fiction of sometimes sharp distinctions between things like "religion" and "magic" is reflective of this. Finally, it might be claimed that any attempt at a "consilient" account of religious or religion-like phenomena, even when broadly understood as "allomythoi" and "WWLs," cannot claim to be new, but rather a return to "functional" and reductive accounts of religion, but with new knowledge of things like evolutionary psychology and the traits of information processing and representational systems. To some degree, this is true. I do not advocate eliminative reductionism, but I believe any account of these phenomena must ultimately be constrained by and consistent with our evolved cognitive structures, the determinate characteristics of the relevant media in which the storyworlds are represented, as well as more general historical and political contexts. I endeavor to present the various fields and literatures I engage with fairly and responsibly, always recognizing my limitations and finitude.

## Works Cited


Albanese, C. L. (2007). *America, religions, and religion* (4th ed.). Thomson/Wadsworth.

Anthony, J. (2014). Dreidels to Dante's Inferno: Toward a Typology of Religious Games. In H. Campbell & G. P. Grieve (Eds.), *Playing with religion in digital games*. Indiana University Press.

Asad, T. (1993). *Genealogies of religion: Discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Asad, T. (2003). *Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity*. Stanford University Press.

Asad, T., Brown, W., Butler, J., & Mahmood, S. (2009). *Is critique secular?: Blasphemy, injury, and free speech*. Townsend Center for the Humanities, University of California.

Asiedu, F. B. A. (2013). Theology in a Subjunctive Mood: Reflections on Charles Taylor's A Secular Age. *Scottish Journal of Theology*, *66*(2), 230–240. https://doi.org/10.1017/S003693061300001X

Barton, C. A., & Boyarin, D. (2016). *Imagine no religion: How modern abstractions hide ancient realities* (First edition). Fordham University Press.

Bellah, R. N. (1992). *The broken covenant: American civil religion in time of trial* (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press.

Butler, J. (2004). Jack-in-the-Box Faith: The Religion Problem in Modern American History. *The Journal of American History (Bloomington, Ind.)*, *90*(4), 1357–1378. https://doi.org/10.2307/3660356

Chidester, D. (2005). *Authentic fakes: Religion and American popular culture*. University of California Press.

Csicsery-Ronay, I. (2008). *The seven beauties of science fiction*. Wesleyan University Press.

Cusack, C. M. (2010). *Invented religions: Imagination, fiction and faith*. Ashgate.

Davidsen, M. A. (2014). *The spiritual Tolkien milieu: A study of fiction-based religion* [Leiden University]. https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/research/research-output/humanities/the-spiritual-tolkien-milieu-a-study-of-fiction%E2%80%90based-religion

Davidsen, M. A. (2018). *Narrative and belief: The religious affordance of supernatural fiction*. Routledge.

Erzen, T. (2012). *Fanpire: The Twilight saga and the women who love it*. Beacon Press.

Flood, A. (2017, October 18). *Philip Pullman launches La Belle Sauvage and says sequel is finished*. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/oct/19/philip-pullman-launches-la-belle-sauvage-sequel-the-book-of-dust-his-dark-materials

Franchot, J. (1995). Invisible Domain: Religion and American Literary Studies. *American Literature*, *67*(4), 833–842. https://doi.org/10.2307/2927901

Gunn, G. B. (2017). *The pragmatist turn: Religion, the Enlightenment, and the formation of American literature*. University of Virginia Press.

Jewett, R. (2003). *Captain America and the crusade against evil: The dilemma of zealous nationalism*. W.B. Eerdmans.

Kelly, L. (2019). *Memory craft: Improve your memory with the most powerful methods in history* (First Pegasus books hardcover edition). Pegasus Books, Ltd.

Kirby, D. (2014). *Fantasy and belief: Alternative religions, popular narratives and digital cultures*.
Kreuziger, F. A. (1986). *The religion of science fiction*. Bowling Green State University Popular Press.
Kripal, J. J. (2010). *Authors of the impossible: The paranormal and the sacred*. University of Chicago Press.
Kripal, J. J. (2011). *Mutants & mystics: Science fiction, superhero comics, and the paranormal*. University of Chicago Press.
Larsson, G., Svensson, J., & Nordin, A. (2020). *Building blocks of religion: Critical applications and future prospects*. Equinox Publishing Ltd.
Lofton, K. (2011). *Oprah: The gospel of an icon* (1st ed., 1, pp. xiii–xiii). University of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/j.ctt1pp68p
Luhrmann, T. M. (1989). *Persuasions of the witch's craft: Ritual magic in contemporary England*. Harvard University Press.
Luhrmann, T. M. (2012). *When God talks back: Understanding the American evangelical relationship with God* (First edition.). Alfred A. Knopf.
Lundin, R. (2007). *There before us: Religion, literature, and culture from Emerson to Wendell Berry*. William B. Eerdmans Pub.
Lundin, R. (2009). *Invisible conversations: Religion in the literature of America*. Baylor University Press.
Masuzawa, T. (2005). *The invention of world religions, or, How European universalism was preserved in the language of pluralism*. University of Chicago Press.
McAvan, E. (2012). *The postmodern sacred: Popular culture spirituality in the science fiction, fantasy and urban fantasy genres*. McFarland & Company. http://www.myilibrary.com?id=396915
McCutcheon, R. T. (1997). *Manufacturing religion: The discourse on sui generis religion and the politics of nostalgia*. Oxford University Press.
McGrath, J. F. (2011). *Religion and science fiction*. Pickwick Publications.
Mckee, G. (2007). *The Gospel according to science fiction: From The twilight zone to the final frontier* (First edition.). Westminster John Knox Press.
Mendez, M. F. (2017). A Neurology of the Conservative-Liberal Dimension of Political Ideology. *The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences*, 29(2), 86–94. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.neuropsych.16030051
Nelson, V. (2001). *The secret life of puppets*. Harvard University Press.
Nelson, V. (2012). *Gothicka: Vampire heroes, human gods, and the new supernatural*. Harvard University Press.
Neven, H., Read, P., & Rees, T. (2021). *Do Robots powered by a Quantum Processor have the Freedom to swerve?* https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.11591
Nongbri, B. (2013). *Before religion: A history of a modern concept*. Yale University Press.
Ostwalt, C. E. (2003). *Secular steeples: Popular culture and the religious imagination*. Trinity Press International.
Partridge, C. H. (2004). *The re-enchantment of the West: Alternative spiritualities, sacralization, popular culture, and occulture*. T & T Clark International; /z-wcorg/.
Partridge, C. H., & Partridge, C. (2006). *The Re-Enchantment of the West: Vol. 2: Alternative Spiritualities, Sacralization, Popular Culture, and Occulture.* Continuum International Publishing Group, Limited ; National Book Network [distributor.

https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=378548
Possamai, A. (2012). *Handbook of hyper-real religions*. Brill.
Prebish, C. S. (1993). *Religion and sport: The meeting of sacred and profane*. Greenwood Press.
Rand, A. (1957). *Atlas shrugged*. Random House.
Saler, B. (2000). *Conceptualizing religion: Immanent anthropologists, transcendent natives, and unbounded categories*. Berghahn Books.
Saler, M. T. (2012). *As if: Modern enchantment and the literary pre-history of virtual reality*. Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, L. E. (1995). *Consumer rites: The buying & selling of American holidays*. Princeton University Press.
Schultz, K. M., & Harvey, P. (2010). Everywhere and Nowhere: Recent Trends in American Religious History and Historiography. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, *78*(1), 139–.
Shippey, T. A. (2005). *The road to Middle-earth* (Rev. ed). HarperCollins.
Smart, N. (1981). The Philosophy of Worldviews—That is, the Philosophy of Religion Transformed. *Neue Zeitschrift Für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie*, *23*(1), 212–224. https://doi.org/10.1515/nzst.1981.23.1.212
Suvin, D. (1978). *Metamorphoses of science fiction: Studies in the poetics and history of cognitive estrangement in fiction.* Yale University Press.
Taves, A. (2009). *Religious experience reconsidered: A building block approach to the study of religion and other special things* (1st edition). Princeton University Press.
Taves, A. (2015). Reverse Engineering Complex Cultural Concepts: Identifying Building Blocks of 'Religion.' *Journal of Cognition and Culture*, *15*(1–2), 191–216. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12342146
Taves, A., & Asprem, E. (2018). Explanation and the study of religion. In B. Stoddard, *Method today: Redescribing approaches to the study of religion*. Equinox Publishing, Ltd.
Taves, A., Asprem, E., & Ihm, E. (2018). *Psychology, Meaning Making, and the Study of Worldviews: Beyond Religion and Non-Religion*. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9d46h3sq
Taylor, C. (2007). *A secular age*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Tillich, P. (1964). *Theology of culture*. Oxford University Press.
Turner, V. W. (1982). *From ritual to theatre: The human seriousness of play*. Performing Arts Journal Publications.
Vincent, B. (2004). *The road to The dark tower: Exploring Stephen King's magnum opus*. New American Library.
Wood, R. C. (2015). *Tolkien among the moderns*. University of Notre Dame Press.

# CHAPTER 1: WORLDS AND WORLDVIEWS

## § 1.1. Worldviews and Ways of Life

Even in ordinary language, the expression *worldview* is often appealed to when people seek a general term that encompasses both religious and non-religious or secular and non-secular beliefs and practices of great value and importance. *Worldview* should, in this work, be understood as a shorthand for the larger expression *worldviews and ways of life* (WWL), in part to avoid the overly abstract and "cerebral" notion that a worldview is primarily a matter of faith or belief. Furthermore, drawing on the work of Ann Taves and others, *worldview* as I use it should be understood as resting on evolutionary-cognitive assumptions, in which the basic categories of analysis are rooted in fundamental cognitive processes (Bayesian probabilistic modeling of event-and-self) closely tied to biological survival.

"Worldview" is often hyphenated as "world-view," and I was tempted to follow that convention here. But I ultimately decided that promoting the unhyphenated form is worth a brief explanatory digression regarding the essentially spatial character of my framework.[1] I would thus stress that a worldview is a *world*-view, that it is a distinct way of living (caring, worrying, knowing, acting, and so on) that is fundamentally *world*-ed or *emplaced* – embedded in a dynamic *environment* or *situation* in which a particular embodied animal (human or non-) enacts it and, in fact, frequently uses the *world*'s affordances as part of an extended cognitive process (this truth is sometimes abbreviated by cognitive scientists as the "4Es"). My framework adapts and expands worldview studies to encompass the many explicitly fictional worldviews humans inhabit through narrative – though of course all worldviews, however naturalized they appear and how necessary they are, are fictional.

"Allomythic worldviews" or "allomythoi" is the expression I use to designate the *consciously fictional* worldviews and ways of life found in make-believe narratives. An allomythos is a powerful (due to being memorable and rhetorically persuasive, a *supernormal stimulus* or *superstimulus* (Tinbergen, 1969; Nettle, 2005a, 2005b), though only some make claims to authoritativeness), temporospatial, translation and transformation (conceptual blend) of prior narrative worlds or "mythistories," which are the very stuff of personal identity and are also intimately spatiotemporal because narrative cues evoke and modulate the evolved self-and-world modelling system. "Myth" and "history" are both fraught terms (like "religion," which arose together with "myth" as part of a collection of modern-romantic cultural projects), between which important distinctions may be made, but one function of my use of the concept *mythistory* above is to point out their deep kinship.[2] To stress the fact that allomythic narratives, as *worlds within worlds*, that is, as containing multitudes (of interrelated or networked characters, settings, and other text-world switches) must be understood as never achieving total systematicity and perspicuity – a universe, yes, and often one that seeks to appear universal, but still always ambivalent, liminal-liminoid, fragmented – I propose the expression *allomythology*.[3]

In every discussion of worldviews, the basic categories or Big Questions (BQs) that are identified reflect the orientation and goals (i.e., the worldview) of the allomythoi, and they should not be expected to be explicitly identified, answered, or reflected on, often remaining implicit. My BQs for studying allomythoi ("kairology"), which reflect my naturalist, cognitive-evolutionary, and narratological perspective and aims, are as follows (the kairological tables that follow are basic tools for kairological analysis: copy the blank

tables provided; read, watch, or play a story; and fill out the tables—see Appendices 16–19, 22–23 and, for an earlier example, Appendix 24):[4]

| Kairological Categories | | | Big Questions (BQs) | General Cognition | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation confronting me, and what is appropriate in this situation? | Overall self-and-world model with inherent dispositions and affordances | The self-and-world situation (similar to Taves's Gunning Lecture II prioritization of "situation" under the category of Ethology—I might call it "Cosmo-Ethology,"[5] that is, the study of worldview-and-way-of-life), but as reflecting affordances for goal-directed action in the context of my rhetorical-narratological-cognitive focus |
| *Cosmology*[6] *(World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? | World-model, temporal-modal aspect predominating | Might be identified as "Cosmology 1" |
| | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? | Explanation | Model-of mode predominant, but of course may be justification for a model-for; might be called "Cosmology 3") |
| | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What ought to happen? | Prediction | Alternative names: "Cosmology 4," "Futurology," "Futuristics," "Prognostics," or "Prophecy"; model-for mode predominant |
| | *Ontology* | | What exists? | Self-and-world model; priors checked against sensory input | Primarily embodied-spatial aspect of situation; model-of[7] mode predominant; might also be called "Cosmology 2"[8] |
| | | *Œcology* (also a subset of ontology and cosmology) | Where am I? Who are these others? | World-model, spatial aspect predominating | Might also be named "Cosmology 5" – has a strong allological aspect, which can give it an ethological cast |
| *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? What should I do? How do I know? | Self-model and sensory input; goal-directed way of life based on salience and significance | |
| | | *Autology* (situationally | Who am I? In what manner am I? | Self-model and way of life | For humans, this includes "Psychology" and |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | subordinate to cosmology (and ontology) and to ethology, with a bias toward ethology) | | | "Anthropology"; might also be designated "Ethology 1" |
| | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? How do I know? | Priors, sensory input | Might be understood as "Ethology 5" |
| | *Axiology* | | What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Basic values and motivations – both pleasures and things to be avoided – rooted in evolutionary survival and reproduction and appear in self-and-world model | Might be called "Ethology 3" |
| | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? | Goal-directed (axiological) action based on ontological-cosmological appraisal of what is known (epistemology) | Way of life; might be designated "Ethology 2" |
| *Lateral Diathesis* | | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? Does a particular hemisphere's distinctive worldview predominate, lending its particular cast to the other BQs? | Lateralization is common but not a pan-species universal, and typically the two hemispheres should work together to produce coherent perception and action. That said, hemispheric biases often stand out. See below. | Might be named "Ethology 4"; future work drawing on research into the core emotions and how moods affect perspective might help provide additional specificity to fuzzier attitudinal, dispositional, and aesthetic aspects of worldview orientation |

**Figure 1: Kairological Categories**

One should note that these questions and their fundamental underlying cognitive processes are interconnected and sometimes hard to distinguish from each other, and so the answers that one might be able to surface from explicit narrative exposition and narrated behavior are sometimes repetitive.

## § 1.2. Writing Studies and Worldview Studies

### *§ 1.2.1. Situation*

From the table that concluded the previous section, it is evident that I regard "situation" as a primary category in worldview studies as applied to allomythoi.[9] This is *kairology* (*cf.* "subcreation studies" (Wolf, 2017)). To summarize findings from rhetoric and

writing studies as well as cognitive narratology, the rhetorical worldmaking[10] one finds in a fictional text responds to a situation (a world) by generating a new, persuasive situation (bringing people into a new space, a new world) through the effective selection and arrangement of events (situations) that each offer specific affordances.[11]

Simone de Beauvoir's deployment of the concept of "situation" is useful for appropriating the concept as bridge category for writing studies and worldview studies in my cognitively-informed framework. Beauvoir's goal in *The Second Sex* is in part to avoid the traps of deterministically essentializing female "nature" and of accepting a completely constructivist perspective.[12] The Beauvoirian "situation" is especially appropriate relative to formation of a worldview because she sees womanhood as a situation, a situation in which womanhood – the feminine worldview and way of life, or, in *The Coming of Age*, the shared situation and diverse situations of the aged – both appears naturalized as a destiny and, in a determinate way, constrains the range and manner of one's agency. Authors and percipients of storyworlds, like members of worldviews, are thus "situated," always drawing on determinate, given resources to achieve their projected ends—the projected possibilities themselves being constrained by available resources (past stories, genre conventions, vocabulary, social roles, routine behaviors, etc.). In cognitive terms, "situation" and "event," as understood in the event cognition literature, are roughly equivalent; the self-and-world are equiprimordial aspects of the situation, and the events that constitute experiences out of the flow of "experience" are maintained or updated prior events. The category therefore effectively bridges the primary disciplines my framework aims to embrace.

Within rhetoric, contemporary stasis theory,[13] with its roots in classical rhetoric,[14] foregrounds the embodied-emplaced situation where worldviews and ways of life intersect

and come into conflict (at the very least in a comparative sense), and it is thus useful to re-evaluate the BQs of kairology through the stasis-theory lens:

| Kairological Categories | BQs | Stasis Theory | Cognition and Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| ***Kairology*** | What is the situation confronting me, and what is appropriate in this situation? | What is the situation, standpoint, or (common) ground? What world (worldview and way of life) am I inhabiting? | Those who share a worldview and way of life share common *staseis*. They have achieved stasis.[15] A worldview is always, to its participants, timely and generative. |
| *Cosmology (World)* | What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? | Fact, Definition, & Cause-Effect (Explanation-Prediction) – Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | Conjectural assessment and prediction of the properties of a situation naturally leads to a judgment of appropriate action. |
| Ætiology | What happened? *Why* is this happening? | Cause (Fact 3) – What *caused* this situation? | |
| Mellonology | What will happen? What ought to happen? | Effect (Policy 2) – What will likely happen with or without intervention? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| Ontology | What exists? | Fact 1 – What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | *Status conjecturalis* has a happy association with inference, reminding us of the cognitive truth that what is presented and known as fact is really always the result of an inferential system. |
| Œcology | Where am I? Who are these others? | Definition 2 – How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | This reminds one of how stasis theory relates to the classical rhetorical concept of *topoi* or *loci* – yes, the ancient commonplaces (*koinoi topoi*) and discipline-specific "places" (*idioi topoi*), but more broadly the predictable topics, formulas, schemata, etc. that genre-literate members of a shared way of life understand and practice. |
| *Ethology (Way of Life)* | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? What should I do? How do I know? | Quality, Translation, & Method – What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? | |
| Autology | Who am I? In what manner am I? | Definition 1 – How do I relate to this situation? What is my nature in this context? | The two primary aspects of the *status definitiva* (or, *proprietas*) conceptually divide the self-and-world that mutually constitute each other. |
| Epistemology | What are valid sources of knowledge? How do I know? | Fact 2 – How did I come to understand the situation as I do? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? | Note that this is a sort of metareflection primarily on the fact stasis and, to a lesser degree, other stases as well. At the basic level of Bayesian inferential processing, this kind of dynamic, critical double-checking is constant, a fundamental feature of the system.[16] |
| Axiology | What is special ("sacred")? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Quality 1 – What is at stake in this situation? Is this situation positive or negative? What is of value, | The evaluative stasis emphasizes the cognitive fact that we are always engaged in an affective, embodied manner. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | and what are the costs? How serious is this situation? | |
| Praxeology | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? | Policy 1 – What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | The ancient forensic question of *jurisdiction* reminds us that *how* to act flows out of first identifying *where and by whom* action is fitting.[17] |
| Lateral Diathesis | Left or right? Does a particular hemisphere's distinctive worldview predominate, lending its particular cast to the other BQs? | Do the BQ answers suggest that one hemisphere is being dominant or neglected? This is fundamentally an issue of *qualitas* – Quality 2. | See §1.4 below. |

**Figure 2: Stasis Theory Applied to Kairological Categories**

I have modified and applied stasis theory categories to kairology in part because stasis theory is fundamentally forensic in nature, as is scientific discourse; it is thus a valuable theoretical tool for integrating rhetorical and scientific analyses,[18] promoting a spatial, embodied focus on the ontological-cosmological facts that are understood to be the case, which are, as BQs, fundamental loci of concern and sites of contestation.[19]

## § 1.3. Boundaries

In the preceding section, "situation" was offered as a bridge category for the cognitive-narratological study of allomythoi, and the situated character of all worldviews led to translation of worldview studies BQs in terms of stasis theory. Another important bridge category is that of "boundaries." Relative to rhetorical situations, boundaries are obviously central to the eloquent and compelling selection, arrangement, and modification of one's rhetorical resources to participate in the conversation of a discourse community and generate audiences and perspectives.[20]

In the study of fantastika, boundaries are similarly central. One might immediately think of examples like the magical walls in Neil Gaiman's *Stardust* or Garth Nix's *Abhorsen* (in North America, elsewhere *The Old Kingdom*) series or the eponymous *Stargate* of the sci-fi franchise, but boundary-making, -defending, -crossing, -testing, -thinning, and so on

are not just features of what Mendlesohn (2008) calls *portal-quest fantasy* (boundaries are important in her other three categories too).[21] The estrangements, the norm-violating novums, that characterize fantastika make it and its various subgenres essentially boundary-crossing genres wherein one breaks from consensus reality by violating its boundaries; at the same time, all such narratives erect new boundaries: both the conditions of possibility in new possible worlds, including novel answers to the BQs, and the necessary narrative obstacles the enliven plot. There is a primary world shift (narratological metalepsis) from the *habitus* of our consensus (extradiegetic) world into the fantastical storyworld, and then there is a secondary, iterative moving from subworld to subworld as narrative problem-questions are answered through the narrative process that generates the storyworld in its determinacy. Clute (2011) stresses the centrality of horror to fantastika, and I would argue for the relevance of terror management theory (TMT) and activation of mortality salience (as well as varying degrees of the disgust response) to understanding one of the reasons so many find fantastical stories so compelling: destabilizing the boundaries of consensus reality cues a stimulating, usually defensive and worldview-affirming, response (see Fredrickson, 2018[22]).

Finally, in many of the most compelling contemporary theories of religious studies, boundaries play a central role. Scholars like Albanese and Tweed provide locative theories of religion wherein boundaries "assume monumental importance" (Albanese, 2007, p. xiii).[23] Kim Knott's (2005) work makes the point that all spaces are relevant to a locative religious studies methodology because they are all sites of contestation; similarly, Tweed (1997) demonstrates at a local level how religious people make, map, and contest spaces, using their stories and other cultural tools to imaginatively and artistically provide

themselves with dwelling places. More generally, Tweed helpfully reminds one that secular, systematic-theoretic worldviews such as scholars of religion use to interpret and even explain religious phenomena are themselves *situated sightings*. Thus, although religious studies scholarship attends primarily to the subset of worldviews that either practitioners or at least the scholars themselves identify as "religious," some scholars (especially those most interested in pluralistic environments like the comparative study of American religious diversity) significantly affirm the locative and dislocative core of human worldviews, that they create boundaries and relax, play with, and transgress them. One might draw on findings from the cognitive science of art, narrative, and religion to note that, on a cognitive level, these boundary-related phenomena of interest (in rhetoric and narratology, in the study of fantastika specifically, and in religions and other worldviews) seem to draw on fundamental abilities to shift into alternative mental spaces and states such as play, mental time travel, mind wandering, and sleep.[24]

### § 1.4. Modes, Hemispheres, and Space

The periphery matters, but so too does the center. World-making erects boundaries, yes, but within them there is a sense of centeredness and identity, a dwelling place. In narratological terms, the expression "focalization" (Genette, 1972) refers to the point of view or perspective that arises due to the amount and kind of information that is permitted and restricted. I sometimes think of it in terms of the character of an organism given the selective porosity of its membrane. Each storyworld, I submit, is not only focalized (i.e., as *zero*, indicating a narrator who possesses more knowledge than the characters ("omniscience"), *internal*, meaning the narrator sees with the character or characters, knowing what they know, and *external*, denoting a storyworld wherein the narrator has

access to the actions of the character(s) but not to their inner life and knowledge), but also its overall allomythos (the allomythos of the storyworld, however many allomythoi it might encompass) is centered and identifiable at a basic level relating strongly to its center-boundary orientation. I designate this using my three *modes* (M, N, and O).

The creation of space – that is, the powerful mapping of significance (values, goals, threats, tools, relationships, etc.) onto space – depends on the same worldmaking processes used for other acts of human creativity (e.g., blending, breaking, bending (Brandt and Eagleman, 2017)). Briefly,[25] in the *mythopoeic* M-mode, one finds an exuberant, playful creativity, a robust blending and synthesis of diverse elements, an exploratory and experimental (*translocative*) projection away from the central categories of the ordinary world to the non-ordinary with an intended effect of an escape that is a renewal; the M-mode is centered in the sense that, having decentered or decoupled from this world with its conventional categories, it rests in its escape into a novel allomythic worldview. Taking the broadest view that gazes outward, even within the fantastical storyworld, to the periphery and boundaries, the M-mode exhibits the most novelty and delight therein. The *naturalized* mode also often has an apologetic *naturalizing* aspect. In the *naturalized* N-mode, one may observe both a different kind of (*locative*) resting or dwelling in the extradiegetic worldview of the author as it is bent into fantastical form and a more obvious (*allegorical*) movement between storyworld and home world; an N-mode allomythos is, thus, both centered and liminal in that the two bleed together far more than in the M- or O-mode. In the *oppositional* O-mode, the boundaries become fortifications in a (satiric, parodic) battle of the worldviews; it is a *supralocative* mode, not just because it is world-poor, though this tends to be the case due to a common underdevelopment of storyworld elements (including

embodiment, spatiality, and personality) in the service of attacking the despised enemy worldviews and establishing the firm boundaries of the favored worldview's stable central values, but also because its focus on defending and extending the frontline and the purity or identity of the center means it is boundary-oriented to a degree that can be very "disorienting" (in a sense that is both utopian and dystopian). Put differently, the center is so real and true that outside the boundary, which participates in the reality and truth of the center and is thus to be fiercely protected, there is an appalling chaos.

In addition to stasis theory, one may reconsider and translate the kairological BQs and modes relative to findings from contemporary research on spatial cognition and the spatial turn in the humanities; again, a great merit of these categories is that one has good reason to think that, if they are identified, they are actually present:[26]

| **Kairological Categories** | **Meaning** | **Lateral Diatheses**<br>(aspects of the modes relative to center and boundaries discussed in more detail in the main text above) |
|---|---|---|
| M-Mode | Mythopoeic Mode | All modes reflect both authorial intent and the communal context – the full situation in which the poet is imbedded. Loosely, the M-mode possesses a dextral[27] condition and, one might say, a passive voice, the receptive style of the right hemisphere. Its voice tends to be a sad, even horrified one; put musically, the right hemisphere – and this seems to actually be the case – has a preference for the minor key. M-mode allomythoi take the broad view characteristic of the right hemisphere (in this sense, attending more to surrounding boundaries than to central categories), but in order to be successful, they must be healthily integrated with the contributions of the left hemisphere, which among other things is needed to convert its fictional worlds into externalized symbolic representations. This mode will have the most worlds within worlds, with the most voluminousness therein. |
| N-Mode | Naturalized/Naturalizing Mode | N-mode allomythoi reflect the typically integrated emergent consciousness of the hemispheres in cooperation. Reflecting my choice of "diathesis" to talk about this, N-mode allomythoi speak in an integrated, middle voice, with the active contributions of the left (with its distinct categories) and the passive sensitivities of the right (to interconnection, depth, multiplicity). |
| O-Mode | Oppositional Mode | The O-mode is most compelling to the left hemisphere and participates most in its vigorous, direct style, as well as its deficiencies—narrowness, rigidity, inflated self-assessment of worldview and way of life, etc. |
| **Kairological Categories** | **BQs** | **Lateral Diatheses & Spatial Cognition** |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Kairology | What is the situation confronting me, and what is appropriate in this situation? | Assessing the overall situation – ideally after considering the sub-questions of kairology – allows one to specify its allomythic mode. Those who share a worldview and way of life share an inherently spatiotemporal self-and-world model of inferential expectations, goals and values, and related norms.<br><br>*Dextral Disposition:* Overall awareness of a situation is arrived at by the right hemisphere, which takes in the more focused contributions of the left. If the overall situation is represented with a sense of depth and "voluminousness," often even sorrow, with compassionate appreciation for characters and the embodied, spatial sensations of contexts as well as their potential for polysemy, paradox, humor, and metaphor, it may be said to have the dextral disposition characteristic of the M-mode.<br><br>*Integrated:* All allomythoi that are successfully realized require the capacities of and their deployment by both hemispheres working together, and the spatiotemporal assessment and modelling of a situation mobilizes an astonishing number of regions and networks. N-mode allomythoi present fantastical situations that, though estranged from consensus reality, nonetheless obviously conform to the world-maker's worldview.<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* If the overall situation one is confronted with in an allomythos is especially confrontational, even contemptuous, and intensely abstract, detached, absolutist, role- rule-, and goal-oriented, one may rightly identify it as an O-mode allomythos with its typical left-hemispheric bias. |
| *Cosmology (World)* | What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? | *Dextral Disposition:* The right hemisphere, with its dorsal bias, attends to the broad context, the periphery and boundaries, or, put differently, what might be called "de-contextualized super-vision." Relative to the broad questions of cosmology, this disposition will produce allomythoi that respond to them with the greatest range of creativity and departure from consensus reality. Since the temporal is emphasized in this category, an analyst may focus on whether or not the vast, voluminous complexity of an allomthos's (and its internal multiplicity of allomythoi's) history is explored, but in a cosmology with a dextral disposition, one may expect to find qualities like historical resonances and parallels,[28] comparatively rich development of the spatial, sensory aspects of the cosmos, and a sense of the flow of time as an interconnected, narrated path or map of events.<br><br>*Integrated:* In an integrated cosmology, explanations and predictions will pass through critical, reflective monitoring that anchors the estranged storyworld in the authorial worldview.<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* World-*view* in the limited sense reflects the sinistral disposition; the flaw of info-dumping is common in this sort of allomythos. The urgent will-to-narrate an explanation based on salient information is characteristic of the left's action-oriented worldview, but its sense of extended time is impoverished: one deals in this case with punctiliar, momentary events. With hyperactivation of the left producing a corresponding hypoactivation of the right, what appears intensely logical and compelling within the O-mode allomythos's scope of salience and significance often appears shallow and strident to those who take a larger view.<br><br>**Further Commentary:** The intrinsic spatial structure of special existents (axiology) and cosmic metaphors (e.g., the cross, the home/temple, the mountain, the tree, etc.) often structures other spaces and generate inferences (to take Catholic examples again, one might think of the architectural form of cathedrals in the shape of a cross; likewise, the binary gendered understanding of marriage as cosmic union of Jesus and the Church not only makes marriage a sacrament but also makes gay marriage inferentially implausible). Again, as Tweed and others note, it is common for humans to map |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | cosmological space, time, and events onto local spaces (e.g., Catholic cathedrals are filled with things like the rose window, the stations of the cross, and the iconostasis), but one also observes the use of more portable technologies to externalize, anchor, and evoke the cosmological (e.g., the space of the church – filled with its stories – and pilgrimage to the spaces of the Holy Land – also saturated with the stories of the cosmological reality). In Catholicism, awareness of the importance of sacramental space and cultivation of spatial-cognitive abilities is common; for example, one might recall Fr. Benedict Groeschel and Simonetta's popular meditation on the rosary "The Rosary is a Place" or St. Ignatius's *Spiritual Exercises*. Places where cosmological narratives and meanings have been anchored make them repositories of experience and, consequently, of identity and agency. One might reflect on the use of icons by Orthodox and Eastern Catholic Christians and on relics and reliquaries (cf. Stump, 2008, p. 322)—these are emplaced personal connections to the saints and this helps account for their agentive efficacy. As Tweed states, "Spaces do things. We might say playfully: spaces are people[SEP]too. Some scholars have suggested that images perform actions—weep, cajole, and comfort—and, in a similar way, spaces are structures that exert agency. We might re-imagine them as characters—not just settings—in our scholarly narratives." (2011, p. 122). Thus, practices like pilgrimage to locations of martyrdom (cf., e.g., Stump, 2008, p. 339-340) may be understood in terms of the cosmogonic and cosmological experiences and narratives anchored in such locations by using event cognition and linking up fine-grained analysis of such narrated experiences with the rich body of literature on the phenomenology of space. |
| Ætiology | What happened? Why is this happening? | *Dextral Disposition:* An allomythos with this disposition may sometimes bore percipients with "unnecessary" details about background history, geography, customs, personal and psychological details, and so on. The feeling of depth that makes the storyworld convincing to some – part of a great cognitive map – may alienate others because of too many apparent tangents and digressions.<br><br>*Integrated:* The balance of creative, non-ordinary elements, realistic, interdependent details, richly understood characters, and direct, goal- and action-oriented plotting makes for the sort of story most people enjoy.<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* These questions will tend to be quickly, decisively answered, often in the form of contemptuous blame-placing. Reasons may appear arbitrary, strangely isolated and insufficiently justified. |
| Mellonology | What will happen? What ought to happen? | *Dextral Disposition:* What *will* and what *ought* to happen may show a greater discrepancy in allomythoi with the dextral disposition since it tends to be both more sensitive to the social-ethical concerns that project idealized futures in which goods are maximized for as many as possible and more gloomy in its (realistic) acceptance of the difficulties involved. This kind of allomythos will be more cautious and deliberate, showing a tendency to withdrawal—that is, a tendency to avoid intervention and favor future simulations of non-action.<br><br>*Integrated:* What will and what ought to happen in the N-mode will tend to coincide (coinciding, in turn, with the extradiegetic worldview of the poet), but at its best there will be recognition of complexity and doubt. In the integrated mode, one is most likely to find a correspondence between the cosmological model-of and model-for. From awareness of the whole will come a creative, novel solution to the situation or situations of concern.<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* In this disposition, one finds confident assessment of what will and ought to happen; active, decisive |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | responses to situations are favored, and violence is an acceptable and immediate solution. |
| Ontology | What exists? | *Dextral Disposition:* A dextral allomythos may be expected to attend more to the complex borderlands of the interacting embodied-spatial and social-emotional aspects of the situation. What is novel will appear with an aura of wonder. In doing so, there is a danger that the goal-directed activity and vigor of a direct plot may become muddied and scattered.<br><br>*Integrated:* In the integrated mode, an allomythos's ontology will make salient the things, people, places, and so on that matter relative to advancing the pleasurable narrative and the worldview concerns of the creator.<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* The categories will be weighted, in the sinistral disposition, to central values, the landmarks and battle standards of the favored worldview and way of life. Above all, there exist friends and enemies, the latter being displaced and disembodied not only because this is typical of the sinistral disposition but also because it is strategically effective. To those outside the allomythos author's favored worldview and way of life, what exists may tend to feel flat, lifeless, fragmented, arbitrary. |
| Œcology | Where am I? Who are these others? | *Dextral Disposition:* An allomythos with a dextral disposition is rooted in space and body; it knows how it feels to exist, and it engages with the inner life and rich embodiment of *others*, simulating the expectations, goals, and so on of allo- and conspecifics. Its danger is a sort of sleepy self-loss ("self" in the sense of the active *will*) in its world-map and richly-simulated others.<br><br>*Integrated:* Confident and centered, one still should find in an integrated, N-mode allomythos a tolerant willingness to get to know others, to explore novel environments.<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* Allomythoi with the sinistral disposition will answer these questions with comparative impatience and lack of charity. The primary allomythos to which the author's worldview is allied is what matters, and its truth is self-evident but nonetheless worthy of talking about at length. Being in a state of conflict with the oppositional allomythoi, their natures are known in a piecemeal, acontextual, abstracted manner, to be understood only to the degree needed to feel that they have been refuted and abolished. |
| *Ethology (Way of Life)* | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? What should I do? How do I know? | *Dextral Disposition:* In the M-mode, one finds great contemplative attention to novelty and the non-ordinary as salient and awareness of distinctive holistic connections – complex, dynamic, contingent, relational patterns or maps – as constitutive of identity. It is open to new allomythoi. An allomythos with a dextral disposition seeks to supply new experiences and possibilities – metaphorical recombination – within its world (but n.b. the left is actually preferentially disposed toward the non-ordinary and fantastic that are shocking—again, pointing to the role of both (cf. Laeng, Shah, & Kosslyn, 1999; Zaidel & Kasher, 1989; Cutting, 1997, pp. 162–3)), and its cosmos is one of living things, including places possessing a sense of vitality, atmosphere. Allomythoi with this disposition explore the full emotional range, with tendencies such as the pleasure of insight (Parsons & Osherson, 2001; Nichelli, Grafman, Pietrini et al., 1995; Coulson & Wu, 2005), hope, anxiety and depression.[29] Allomythoi of this disposition will be written in a more poetic and musical style, and for likeminded "nerds," "cosplayers," and so on, displays of virtuosity relative to these cognitively-demanding allomythoi may be quite attractive, promoting the development of fiction-based worldviews and ways of life.<br><br>*Integrated:* McGilchrist states, |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | Certainly there is plenty of evidence that the right hemisphere is important for creativity, which given its ability to make more and wider-ranging connections between things, and to think more flexibly, is hardly surprising. But this is only part of the story. Both hemispheres are importantly involved. Creativity depends on the union of things that are also maintained separately – the precise function of the corpus callosum, both to separate and connect; and interestingly division of the corpus callosum does impair creativity.<br>An allomythos with an integrated disposition will supply the mixed pleasures of experiencing the *familiar* in a *novel* world. The compositional style will tend to be a healthy blend of enjoying the music and poetry of composition while still advancing the plot steadily and clearly.<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* The abstracted, virtual-reality, power-oriented, conventionalized, categorized mode of attending to and being in existence that is the disposition of the left hemisphere approaches the "way of life" family of questions in what seems, to the integrated and dextral dispositions, a flattened, fragmented, individualistic, alienated, absolutist, instrumental manner. The left hemisphere codes non-living things, and its world is thus mechanistic and utilitarian. The spotlight of attention in an allomythos with this disposition remains fixed and fixated in an inflexible manner, perseverating and repetitive, that can be frustrating for an unsympathetic reader. An allomythos with this disposition is typically optimistic but also prefers the affective-motivational state of anger and aggression, with its dopaminergic rewards, even intentional malice, and it is apprehensive in situations of lack of control. Allomythoi of this disposition will favor a literal compositional style for their expression. |
| Autology | Who am I? In what manner am I? | *Dextral Disposition:* The autology of this disposition is rooted in rich embodiment (e.g., people *are* their living, dynamic bodies), context, episodic memories, relations to others. First-person narratives preferentially activate the right temporo-parietal junction (Vogeley, Bussfeld, Newen et al., 2001).<br><br>*Integrated:* As a fantastical narrative, an integrated allomythos with its internal allomythoi must have the non-ordinary, fantastic elements generated by the metaphoric capacity of the right hemisphere, but the right hemisphere draws on the abstracted components of this and other worlds supplied by the left hemisphere. But to be compelling, an N-mode allomythos must take such abstracted elements and resurrect them in new forms that have realistic depth. The selves in such an allomythos should have a gravitas that exceeds their roles if they are to be compelling to well-adjusted readers.<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* This disposition is more self-referentially closed off, resting in familiar categories, parts (e.g., people *have* bodies and body parts), solutions, scripts, and so on. This self knows itself through its role or roles. |
| Epistemology | What are valid sources of knowledge? How do I know? | *Dextral Disposition:* The dextral disposition is heavily invested in explicitly epistemological questions, "decontextually" monitoring and assessing whether new things make sense contextually. It thus exhibits comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty. It knows (*kennen*) in the sense of encountering, feeling, coming into contact with the unique, lively reality of the body, space, and others in their depth and details.<br><br>*Integrated:* In the N-mode, one finds the confident denial of the O-mode in favor of one's perspective combined with an openness characteristic of the M-mode that permits critical reflection and experimentation relative to knowledge and truth. An allomythos depicted with this integrated disposition will have a balance of |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | knowledge arrived at through metaphor, descriptions of context, clues of characters' affective states, and so on, and explicit sinistral exposition and dialog. Stabilities and regularities in body and environment, which are known by the right, often lie at the heart of the stable truths that the left enjoys.<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* An allomythos with this disposition rests in its priors, tending not to ask such questions, knowing what it already knows: its signs, its representations, its categories. It confabulates; it insists; it is certain. One finds in allomythoi with this bias astonishing, improbable narrative contortions as proofs of the favored worldview. The *rule* must be proved even if the narrative proof is too exceptional to be believed by a critical reader. Empathetic, moral knowledge comes from the right hemisphere, so a right-hemispheric deficiency (a sinistral disposition) will tend to discount such knowledge, with surprising ethical conclusions represented as perfectly reasonable, and it may even produce a world that is so detached it feels simulated, virtual. It knows in a fixed, familiar way; as with the right hand, it grasps (*wissen*) and manipulates facts.<br><br>**Further Commentary:**<br>The human spatial cognition system draws on many sources of information and integrates such knowledge sources—exteroception, interoception, and proprioception—with specialized regions of the brain processing different aspects of spatial cognition. The three major frames of reference used in human spatial cognition—relative, intrinsic, and absolute—all pertain to different kinds of knowledge. In particular contexts, specific kinds and sources of knowledge will be regarded as more reliable and valid than others. |
| Axiology | What is special (e.g., "sacred" and other charged, culturally contingent kindred terms)? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | *Dextral Disposition:* In the M-mode, an allomythos will value the new as it appears from the periphery, but there may also be a tendency to view the overall situation in a mournful, anxious light. Evaluation will not simply be a matter of (e.g., monetary) calculation—the rich and interconnected worth of everyone in the world will color with seriousness even an allomythos that is playfully constructed with humor and irony. Evaluation will involve *feeling* the affective character of a simulated situation (cf. Damasio, 1999).<br><br>*Integrated:* The N-mode represents the values of an accepted worldview in an allomythos. It will have the humor and creativity contributed by the right hemisphere, but it will tend to have the good cheer and confidence of the left in appraising the overall situation (e.g., Terry Pratchett's *Diskworld* series).<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* Allomythoi of the sinistral disposition will value the familiar, the central value, the rule and the role, the category. The situation, especially relative to the agent's capacity to control it, will be evaluated with fierce optimism. Evaluation will be a much simpler matter, compared to the dextral and integrated dispositions, of calculation.<br><br>**Further Commentary:** What matters, what is meaningful and of value is marked off by boundaries (cf. Anttonen, 1996, 2005); likewise, Sang Ah Lee (2017) synthesizes a number of studies of spatial cognition to argue for a boundary-based view). The human capacity to anchor valuable knowledge in the environment is linked to the need to recall spaces as dangers or problems and as affordances. Basic life functions like nesting, play, and combat involve setting boundaries to make small worlds, setting up relations between boundaries, and moving between and across them. Stump's (2008) categories help identify some kinds of important spaces; these include *cosmological spaces* (to take Catholic instances, e.g., one might think of Jerusalem and the Holy Land), *theocentric spaces* (e.g., altar and tabernacle as receptacles of the Eucharist), *historic spaces and authoritative spaces* (e.g., Rome and the Vatican—relative to authoritative spaces, one may |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | reflect more on their power-laden character: for example, pilgrimage to authoritative spaces enhances credibility and displays fitness by being costly; priests may mark space with bodily orientation (e.g., *versus populum* or *versus apsidem*/*ad orientem*); distinctive dress of clergy and women's head coverings in church), *hierophanic spaces* (e.g., the shrine at Lourdes, France), *hierenergetic spaces* (e.g., the healing properties of the grotto and springs at Lourdes), and *ritual spaces* (n.b. the integrative features of such spaces that involve bodily engagement with space—one might think of communion and, especially, the Catholic last rites with the *viaticum* as food for the final journey, or one might of prayer over the baptismal font, which includes allusive rehearsal of narratives from creation, the Flood, and Jesus baptism, death, and resurrection). |
| Praxeology | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? | *Dextral Disposition:* This disposition's weakness is a difficulty translating values and goals into action; thus, inaction and withdrawal – or at least what may feel like a frustrating slowness to act – may be the favored sort of action.<br><br>*Integrated:* N-mode allomythoi tend to be depicted with the most satisfying balance of plot action and development of story elements that make the action meaningful and compelling.<br><br>*Sinistral Disposition:* Values within the allomythos are clear, and action is decisive, but stereotyped, scripted. (For this reason, O-mode allomythoi are the most comparable to the orderly segmentation of clear route directions, assembly directions, and related "recipes" that facilitate translation into actualized, real-world worldviews and ways of life. Like N-mode allomythoi, they display an evident worldview preference, but with even less of the M-mode "distractions," which give N-mode allomythoi more depth and help make them more convincing to likeminded percipients.) Actions may appear unjustified, shocking, and excessive to those outside the worldview of the author.<br><br>**Further Commentary:** The concept of "praxeology" might make religious studies scholars think of the familiar idea that rituals are often appropriately understood as means for accomplishing the mapping of the macrocosm onto the microcosm, of mythic narrative onto ontic-ontological space. In thinking about action, one might take Taves's lead and reflect on the PATH metaphor – a reassuringly simplified route description. Stump's (2008) notion of "hierenergetic spaces" emphasize that spaces may be affordances for clear, goal-directed actions, with one's path as a way of life being reinforced by sub-paths that reinforce the prototypical PATH model—for example, in the case of Catholic Christians, the model of Christ, as in stations of the cross. In contrast, one might also think of the QUESTING or WANDERING metaphor, which is closer to the messiness of actual wayfinding demanding the full suite of spatial cognitive processes. This way of thinking about life as a way of life expressed as a spatial navigation metaphor makes one think more of ways of life like Indigenous adolescents and Seekers, who are disoriented and open to finding meaningful spaces. The spatial metaphor for such creative mappings, especially of the displaced and disoriented, also gets at themes of migration, diaspora, and globalization and the *power* aspect of contestation of spatial resources, including their cognitive functions. Conflicting mappings will emerge from different praxeological approaches to space, different ideas of how it should be used given what it means to specific people. For example, drawing again on Catholicism, one might think of the Crusades (cf. Stump, 2008, p. 350) or of local shrines vs. authoritative spaces like the Vatican. |

**Figure 3. BQs and Modes of Kairology Relative to Spatial Cognition and Lateral Diatheses**

I hope the above table has helped clarify how the overlapping BQs of kairology relate to the way humans' spatial, embodied worlds are simulated by the integrated nervous system, as well as the biases the two hemispheres are prone to. Let me now make this all more concrete by looking at specific sources, beginning with two M-mode allomythoi.

## § 1.5. M-mode Sources

The M-mode has a dextral disposition, as elaborated above.[30] I selected Tolkien's "legendarium" or "mythology for England," particularly his *The Lord of the Rings*, and King's *Dark Tower* series, which links together almost his entire oeuvre, because both are fine illustrations of M-mode allomythoi. They are incredibly creative, decisively influencing the worldmaking of other creators of fantasy, science fiction, horror, and related genres of fiction. One may note their characteristically sorrowful gaze as they watch the fading and crumbling of the great civilizations and beautiful environments of the past, pasts that have vast depth in worlds of expansive, diverse settings and cultures. Both allomythoi capture truths that are relevant to the extradiegetic world, and in bearing reference to this world they sometimes have qualities of the N- and O-modes. But no work can be made that does not bear reference to the situation(s) of its creator; that is not what distinguishes the M-mode from the N- and O-modes. No, these works stand out by stretching far beyond that characteristic of all art. Their scale of worldmaking, their degree of estrangement, their sheer abandon in, as it were, the music of worlds (characters, histories, places, cultures) beyond ours mark them as M-mode allomythoi.

### *§ 1.5.1. Tolkien's <u>The Lord of the Rings</u>*

Flieger (2002, p. xii) states, "The questions Tolkien raises are the same ones mankind [sic] has always asked: where do we fit in? what do we mean? why are we here? Mythology is as proper a forum for such questions as philosophy." And indeed Tolkien's work indulges in a variety of answers to the important questions, governed by an overarching worldview consistent with his Catholic faith, as is evident in the kairological analysis in Appendix 16, which contains the full kairological BQ charts for Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings* (*LotR*). Here, I will highlight some main takeaways. First, I would point out that the allomythoi of most "evil" beings and animals are uniform, simple, and essentialist, and one only finds internal complexity among beings like the Children of Ilúvatar (Elves and Men [sic] – among the latter, one notably finds a number of allies of Sauron and Saruman), the dwarves, the ents, and the maiar; this complexity is derived by Tolkien from the invented languages of the various peoples and their environments, to which their languages are attuned. Second, one must come away with a sense of appreciation for the scale and fecundity of his worldmaking; the 30+ sub-allomythoi plus the overall *LotR* allomythos named in Appendix 16 do not exhaust his creativity—for example, I analyze two elven and two hobbit allomythoi, but I ignore others that are peripheral in *LotR*, such as the elves of Lindon and Mirkwood and the hobbits of Bree. Third, part of how I structured the order of comparison is intended to point out how worldviews even in a distinctly M-mode text are often constructed through an O-mode style of worldmaking (i.e., dextral opposition to the sinistral).[31]

Tolkien, in a sense, describes this aspect of his worldmaking by having Treebeard describe what Melkor did when he attempted to shape creation, forging as it were "Morgoth's Ring":

> "Will you really break the doors of Isengard?" asked Merry.
> "Ho, hm, well, we could, you know! You do not know, perhaps, how strong we are. Maybe you have heard of Trolls? They are mighty strong. *But Trolls are only counterfeits, made by the Enemy in the Great Darkness, in mockery of Ents, as Orcs were of Elves* [….]"

The ents are also a fine example of this M-mode-internal O-mode worldmaking because they were created by Ilúvatar to bring balance to the world in response to Yavanna's appeal about Aulë's dwarves. More importantly, however, one sees rejection of an unchecked sinistral disposition: Gandalf states, "[H]e that breaks a thing to find out what it is has left the path of wisdom," and Tom Bombadil says, "I've got things to do […] my making and my singing, my talking and my walking, and my watching of the country."

### *§ 1.5.2. King's <u>Dark Tower Series</u>*

To see selected full BQ charts for King's *Dark Tower* series, refer to Appendix 17. Some highlights that emerge are these: (1) as in the case of Tolkien, King is able to generate a plethora – almost, but tragically a defective, plenum – of entities (human and non-, natural and corporate, immaterial and material, etc.) largely through a multiplication of O-mode worldview pairs, and many of the allomythological novums are captured by neologies in the invented language "High Speech";[32] (2) though some "evil" entities are simplistically constructed along essentialist lines, King invests others (e.g., Blaine, the sentient dipolar computer monorail, or the Man in Black) with more internal, psychological, motivational complexity than Tolkien does (or even would consider appropriate); and (3) this gets at the metarepresentational complexity of King's work and the ultimate perspective he seems to have regarding the big ontological and cosmological questions—that is, the "rest" one might

obtain or the ultimate nature of things one might know, Gan as embodied in the Dark Tower, its Beams (e.g., "Stephen King" as a character within the *Dark Tower* storyworld), and the entities that attack them and that they sustain, perhaps exceeds the imagination or comprehension,[33] but encompasses an endlessly dynamic, recurring but not repeating, patterned and even fated[34] but not fixed, play of and movement among contrasting configurations (e.g., stability and chaos, self-possession (e.g., sanity, temperance, etc.) and possession (addiction, madness, and monstrous embodiments[35] thereof), contrasting times (e.g., All-World-that-was, In-World), and dimensions or universes within a multiverse (e.g., Mid-World, End-World), etc.): "Go then, there are other worlds than these."

Burger's comments on the series early in her introduction to *The Quest for the Dark Tower: Genre and Interconnection in the Stephen King Series* have the clear ring of the M-mode (2021, p. 5):

> In addition to its enormous scope, the *Dark Tower* series has two distinctive characteristics: its genre hybridity and its interconnection with the larger canon of King's work [….] [T]he *Dark Tower* series engages a number of distinct and at times dissonant genre traditions, including those of Arthurian romance, fairy tales, the fantasy epic, science fiction, the Western, and horror, playing with established patterns and familiar narratives to create something new through negotiation, subversion, and combination.

Like Tolkien, who blended a great variety of genres in making *LotR*, King combined many, many genres in his *Dark Tower* series. As in Tolkien's world, the legendary Arthurian world of the Gunslinger's youth has "moved on" (King, 1982, p. 3; cf. King, 1991, pp. 489, 570-571), and a sense of loss – including of all Roland's loved ones and especially the members of his two *ka-tets* – pervades the *Dark Tower* series, while still there remains a hope, a promise rooted in ethical fortitude and the social, embodied, emplaced connection represented by Roland's *ka-tet* (cf. King, 1997, p. 675): "*promise that things may be different … that there may yet be rest. Even salvation…. If you stand. If you are true*" (King,

2004, p. 829). More skeptical of groups, especially "religious" ones,[36] and approving of individuals and their friendship affiliations,[37] yet King's overall allomythology accepts incoherence and chance in a way that would distress Tolkien.[38] Though Tolkien in many ways founded the modern fantasy genre, King's allomythology is the more deeply M-mode work, as may be seen from the comparative difficulty a reasonable reader has determining the kairological answers to the "Overall Allomythology" chart in Appendix 17.

### § 1.6. N-mode Sources

N-mode sources are by far the most common type of fantastika, and selecting two example sources is, thus, challenging and inevitably rather arbitrary.[39] L'Engle and Pullman's works rest comfortably in their own perspectives while still being able to simulate others and move among worlds in a manner that, extended further, shifts into the M-mode (Pullman is, *e.g.*, closer to the M-mode); they enjoy both the pleasure of escaping to other worlds and of direct, realistic development of the plot and the characters' unfolding responses to their situations. L'Engle represents the more allegorical, C. S. Lewis-like style of N-mode writing, and I selected her work as a representative of what is sometimes called "spirituality"—liberal, somewhat-metaphysical Christianity. Pullman represents a different sort of "spirituality," one that is more emphatically "anti-religious" and "atheist" relative to "religion" as prototypically Christian and relative to the assumed God of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and related worldview families. Pullman's O-mode qualities (see Oliver's (2012) "Mocking God and Celebrating Satan: Parodies and Profanities in Philip Pullman's *His Dark Materials*"; Hatlen, 2005) in relation to, for example, the Christian-apologist fiction of C. S. Lewis (*cf.* Lev Grossman's *Magicians* allomythos) and the Catholic WWL makes him a fine transitional figure between the M- and O-modes, but he is centered far

more than bounded, not so lost in his opposition to "religion" that he neglects to draw on his robust dextral abilities to create a balanced, N-mode work. The N-mode is not necessarily "spiritual," but "spirituality" tends to reflect an omnivorous,[40] middle-of-the-road style characteristic of the N-mode.

### *§ 1.6.1. Pullman's <u>His Dark Materials Series</u>*

To see the full BQ charts for Pullman's *His Dark Materials* series, see Appendix 18. A central theme of the work is stated by Mary Malone, physicist and ex-nun: "The Christian religion is a very powerful and convincing mistake, that's all" (Pullman, 2000, p. 464); it is a false story that should be allowed to evaporate like the God whom the children, Lyra and Will, set free to dissolve with a sigh of profound relief (Pullman, 2000, p. 432). But this apparently O-mode disposition toward authoritarian theocracy does not capture the full picture. Pullman's cosmology is as Miltonic and biblical as it is Nietzschean; it may be heretical, it may be Gnostic, but its abundant, resistant intertextual allusions situate it squarely in the conversation of Western, Christian literature, both high and low. Pullman's allomythic categorization as an N-mode work is in many respects attributable to heavy and pervasive influence of his source texts, especially John Milton's *Paradise Lost* put through a decisively Blakean lens. His self-confessed affinity for Gnosticism should thus come as no surprise. Some of Pullman's most important novums—Dust and dæmons—are designed to make an exuberant, N-mode, creative truth-telling (one might say, "alethiometric"—see Colás, 2005, pp. 36-43) argument for a specific Romantic-atheological[41] reconceptualization of traditional Christian categories like sin, gnosis/knowledge, death and resurrection, and redemption of material Nature.

Mary Malone most explicitly seeks the answers to the BQs of Pullman's overall allomythology, and she learns the answers through "anthropological" interaction with the *mulefa* and what might be called, in the language of Lyra's world, "experimental theology." In the allomythos of the *mulefa*, Pullman offers his N-mode immanentist vision of people who are in harmony with their environment and with each other precisely because they are "fallen" in that Dust (which expresses matter's will to know and love itself, the unity of matter and mind (*cf.* Pullman, 1997, pp. 28, 221; 2000, pp. 402–404)) is a welcome and intimate part of their lives. Consider his Gnostic myth of their Fall, not as a tragedy of lost innocence, but as the marvelous, playful beginning of desire itself, of the will-to-life that motivates all knowing:

> *One day a creature with no name discovered a seedpod and began to play . . . . She saw a snake coiling itself though the hole in a seedpod . . . . The story tells that the snake said, "What do you know? What do you remember? What do you see ahead?" And she said, "Nothing, nothing, nothing." So the snake said, "Put your foot through the hole in the seedpod where I was playing, and you will become wise." So she put a foot in where the snake had been. And the oil entered her blood and helped her see more clearly than before, and the first thing she saw was the sraf. It was so strange and pleasant that she wanted to share it at once with her kindred. So she and her mate took the seedpods, and they discovered that they knew who they were, they knew they were mulefa and not grazers. They gave each other names. They called themselves mulefa. They named the seed tree, and all the creatures and plants*. (Pullman, 2000, p. 200)

An angel (a concentration of Dust) opposed to the Authority, in snake form, tempted the *mulefa* to "see" and articulate the answers to some of the core BQs, and those answers, in typical N-mode fashion, are ultimately those Pullman would endorse.

### *§ 1.6.2. L'Engle's Time Quintet Series*

To see the full BQ charts for L'Engle's *Time Quintet* series, see Appendix 19. L'Engle may be situated firmly in what has been called "the MacDonald tradition" of Christian mythopoesis (Oziewicz, 2006). But L'Engle's perspective as a universalist

Christian is in many ways comparable to Pullman's spiritual atheism. In fact, precisely because her Christianity is universalist and gnostic, many conservative Christians have denounced L'Engle's work. Both of their storyworlds contain strong science fiction elements because they genuinely appreciate the marvels revealed by moral, responsible scientific inquiry, and they seek to show how the material and the spiritual are compatible, even complimentary. Because of this, L'Engle's imaginary worlds within her storyworld are all "real": outer space, microbiological space, and history.[42] Oziewicz summarizes L'Engle's worldview as follows:

> In this [narrative] theology, life in all its forms is seen as continuous, joyous evolution toward greater fulfillment which progresses by unpredictable quantum jumps rather than foreseeable linear development; the universe is seen as a multidimensional, organic whole without any fixed cen- ter and composed of billions of galaxies rather than a three-dimensional, mechanical, and human-scaled artifact; and reality is seen as unified, not split into matter and spirit, but contiguous with consciousness itself. This blending of a comprehensive view of the continually evolving universe offered by mod- ern science with spirituality understood as an intellectual, emotional, and moral orientation toward a so-conceived universe allows us to see L'Engle's narrative theology as perhaps the greatest source of the continuing appeal of her Time Quartet. (2006, pp. 229–230)

This passage certainly captures L'Engle's values. It is worth noting, too, that her positive worldview is yet also one of oppositional conflict between good and evil (*e.g.*, the *Echthroi*), light and dark, and that, for her, evil is narcissism (rather than love), separation (in contrast to what she calls Naming), cold and impersonal empiricism, and despair (the negation of hope). This integrated, healthy attitude is characteristic of the N-mode. In contrast, O-mode texts feel both stridently inflated like a chest-thumping primate and yet flat as *South Park* characters.[43]

## §1.7. O-mode Sources

Fantastika itself should not be construed as itself having a worldview bias; I assert this against a large body of authorities who would claim its inherently critical, subversive, prosocial, diverse, progressive, liberal orientation.[44] Specific subgenres, however, might favor certain cognitive styles.[45] But part of why I chose Rand's[46] *Atlas Shrugged* and Pierce's *The Turner Diaries* is to engage with influential fantastical works that reflect conservative and white supremacist views. Rand and Pierce are both at war with a world that disgusts them, and they invoke a creeping, lurching, oozing, lunging, venomous plague of text worlds to inspire the disgust response in their readers. Not all O-mode texts are quite as humorless as theirs, so in that regard they should not be considered representative.[47] But they both well illustrate the core qualities of O-mode allomythoi.

### *§ 1.7.1. Rand's Atlas Shrugged*

To see the full BQ charts for Rand's *Atlas Shrugged* series, see Appendix 22. John Gault's worldview is one with Rand's, and his long monologue when he takes over the national radio reiterates the themes of her novel: "Who is John Gait? This is John Gait speaking. I am the man who loves his life. I am the man who does not sacrifice his love or his values. I am the man who has deprived you of victims and thus has destroyed your world" (Rand, 1999, p. 1009). Love, for Rand, does not draw one outward, to others, but is directed to the self and one's selfish ends. The looters and moochers (*e.g.*, Wesley "Mouch") in charge of the U.S. government in Rand's allomythology, who have infested the businesses, academic institutions, arts, and other worlds in which prime movers or men of the mind should be able to work, have out of jealousy and resentment made things so intolerable that the prime movers are compelled to become strikers, shrugging off the

burdens of sacrifice to and victimization by the herd to embrace the virtues of selfishness and pursuit of wealth under the sacred symbol: $ (Rand, 1999, p. 1168). They reject the communism of the U.S. and the People's States and make their own commune in Colorado, Atlantis; and, in the figure of Gault, which Rand anoints with numerous Christ-symbols, the true victims of those who call for self-sacrifice are held up as ethical heroes by virtue of their refusal to share, sacrifice, or commune in any way that compromises their selfish pursuit of their individual ends. The highly sinistral disposition of Rand's work is characteristic of the O-mode. Just as a Prime Mover is sufficient unto themselves, not dissipated out into the world, not lost in or compromised by entanglements with the needs of others, *Atlas Shrugged* is itself an end unto itself, rejecting any "irrelevancies and accidents" (Younkins, 2014, p. 125) of plot, characterization, or any other element that does not contribute to the systematically unified defense of its core idea, the pure rationality of selfish individualism. Indeed, Rand opposed the racial collectivism of white supremacists like Pierce, below, precisely because all collectivisms are assaults on the smallest minority, the individual.

### *§ 1.7.2. Pierce's <u>The Turner Diaries</u>*

To see the full BQ charts for Pierce's *The Turner Diaries* series, see Appendix 23. Just as Rand's O-mode work would reject the collectivism of racism, Pierce would condemn her individualism (specifically condemning libertarians and conservatives) as willfully blind to the supreme value of the white race and its destiny, as racial treachery.[48] The hero of Pierce's race-war Edisonade, Earl Turner, one whose name is inscribed in the Record of Martyrs, accepts the decision of the Order (the esoteric core of the Organization, whose guidance parallels the diabolical leadership of the System – the U.S. government – by

Satan's Seed, the Jews) that his life is forfeit after he is unwillingly captured and interrogated, a debt to the race that he ultimately pays in a suicide mission at the conclusion of the text. Gault would never make such a sacrifice. However, Pierce and Rand do share a conviction, rooted in the O-mode way of seeing, that when the real, worthy people who keep civilization running separate themselves, forcing the inferior types (moochers, non-whites) to fend for themselves, chaos will inevitably overtake those outside as they collapse under the weight of their incompetence and viciousness. At this far extreme from the M-mode, one notes how few and simple their allomythoi are compared, say, to Tolkien's subcreative "effoliation and multiple enrichment of the creation" (1947, p. 73).

Note how central the disgust response is when Pierce describes moments of insight, such as when Katherine,

> learned the truth about the System's "equality" hoax. She gained an understanding of the unique historical role of the Jews as the ferment of decomposition of races and civilizations. Most important, she began acquiring a sense of racial identity, overcoming a lifetime of brainwashing aimed at reducing her to an isolated human atom in a cosmopolitan chaos.

or when Turner himself expresses the realization that,

> more than our freedom is at stake. If the Organization fails in its task now, everything will be lost—our history, our heritage, all the blood and sacrifices and upward striving of countless thousands of years. The Enemy we are fighting fully intends to destroy the racial basis of our existence. No excuse for our failure will have any meaning, for there will be only a swarming horde of indifferent, mulatto zombies to hear it. There will be no White men to remember us—either to blame us for our weakness or to forgive us for our folly. If we fail, God's great Experiment will come to an end, and this planet will once again, as it did millions of years ago, move through the ether devoid of higher man.

Not just decomposition and chaos or swarming hoards of zombies, the Enemy being opposed is a threat to health, masculinity, and maturity:

> But there is no way we can destroy the System without hurting many thousands of innocent [*i.e.*, white] people—no way. It is a cancer too deeply rooted in our flesh. And if we don't destroy the System before it destroys

> us—if we don't cut this cancer out of our living flesh—our whole race will die. We have gone over this before, and we are all completely convinced that what we did is justified, but it is still very hard to see our own people suffering so intensely because of our acts. It is because Americans have for so many years been unwilling to make unpleasant decisions that we are forced to make decisions now which are stern indeed. And is that not a key to the whole problem? The corruption of our people by the Jewish-liberal-democratic-equalitarian plague which afflicts us is more clearly manifested in our soft-mindedness, our unwillingness to recognize the harder realities of life, than in anything else. Liberalism is an essentially feminine, submissive world view. Perhaps a better adjective than feminine is infantile. It is the world view of men who do not have the moral toughness, the spiritual strength to stand up and do single combat with life, who cannot adjust to the reality that the world is not a huge, pink-and-blue, padded nursery in which the lions lie down with the lambs and everyone lives happily ever after. Nor should spiritually healthy men of our race even want the world to be like that, if it could be so. That is an alien, essentially Oriental approach to life, the world view of slaves rather than of free men of the West.[49]

Pierce uses the metaphor of cancer to render lethal violence inevitable, a regrettable necessity, in answer to which his engineer-hero can offer readers detailed instructions regarding the effective logistics and tools they might use to sternly and effectively cure humanity. After instructing readers regarding the appropriate perspective from which to see the violence, Pierce is able to describe it in pornographic detail.

## § 1.8. Conclusion

Having examined major categories that may be used to understand allomythic worldviews and ways of life, the next chapter will explore the techniques and ways of world- and worldview-making, and I will move from this chapter's examination of rhetorical categories relative to kairology to surfacing some of the insights cognitive narratology offers into how fantastical worlds and worldviews are made.

## Notes

[1] See "Appendix 9: On Spatial Cognition, 'Religion,' and Other Worldviews," which discusses the spatial turn in the humanities, especially religious studies, in light of research on spatial cognition. From this research, I derive the following conclusions that pertain to kairology:

1. From Eliade, I would stress the importance of the center and boundaries as basic features of spatial cognition and human worldmaking. Cognitively, we give special weight to central values. I would also join with Eliade in combining interest in the mapping of cosmic order and in escaping into mythic reality. In my own framework, I assert that allomythoi are novel cognitive maps of linked events (on the flexible human use of cognitive maps beyond spatial problems, see, *e.g.*, Behrens et al., 2018; Epstein, Patai, Julian, & Spiers, 2017; Jacobs, 2003).

   I also find it significant that Eliade's interest in myth and mythmaking coincided with detailed study of shamanism (1951/1964); a "shaman" uses the "technique of ecstasy" to enter and journey within non-ordinary, simulated, spirit worlds and thence, with spirit allies and servants, supply their people with meaningful solutions and healing.

2. From Hertz, I emphasize the lateralized character of the human brain and the fundamentally dual worldviews in us all. In my framework, I address this under the kairological category of "Lateral Diathesis."

3. From Wyatt, I would again note the importance of lateralization and an awareness, characteristic of the spatial turn in the humanities, of how culture builds on basic cognitive tendencies to meaningfully construct space.

4. By William James, I am reminded that we as we move through life we experience the spatialized worlds of our bodies and environments and of our more general worldview orientations with varying degrees of "voluminousness"; that is, we know the world to be a cosmos of little worlds, and we situationally shift attentionally between more or less voluminous comprehension thereof.

5. Drawing on Deloria and Basso, I would submit that events are primarily spatial, though all events have a dynamic (person-action-object) duration and are thus also temporal, and they may secondarily be tagged temporally in relation to other events; it is chains or maps of spatially anchored events that relationally constitute the general sense of a temporal flow. Contemplating such a narrative map or cosmos of story-events gives one a sense of escape, refuge, and wisdom. And insofar as persons are constituted by narrative, meaningful spaces – spaces with anchored events – are persons and vice versa.

6. From Levinson, I have learned that linguistically selected primary frames of reference shape all sorts of other cognitive inferences, memory formations, and other things, meaning that humans' spatial reasoning is unusually plastic and dependent on language. Thus, although humans lack the fully determined innate modules for sophisticated spatial orientation that other animals possess, culture rebuilds them through language and other cultural cues.

7. From McGilchrist, Siegel, and others who have studied closely the two consciousnesses with their characteristic worldviews and ways of life, which are to greater or lesser degrees integrated in neurotypical human cognition, I take several lessons. First, their findings lead me to always pause and reflect on whether there is a hemispheric bias evident in a given allomythos ("Lateral Diathesis"), and their findings influenced my formulations of the allomythic modes (M-mode drawing more on the capacities of the right-hemisphere, N-mode reflecting a typically integrated consciousness, and O-mode displaying predominantly left-hemispheric traits). More generally, my framework attempts to correct an increasing left-hemisphere bias and overdevelopment in our civilization that disregards the holism, expansive memory, embodiment, and spatiality of the right-hemisphere.

8. From cognitive archeology (e.g., Renfrew and Mithen), I understand fantastical narratives as meaningful sites that capture and direct attention, embodiments of value and minds, markers and origins of boundaries between this world and another, non-ordinary, estranged, counterintuitive, with which they offer communion. Whether or not they are simply enjoyed or, as social, intersubjective realities, inspire action and change, they all contain this potential.

9. Relative to event cognition research as it pertains to spatial cognition, I would emphasize that allomythic narratives are made by representing hierarchically salient events that are linked together like journeys and conceptual maps, and I would posit that the translation and transformation of allomythoi into fiction-based worldviews is comparable to – and perhaps more likely if more like – the orderly segmentation of clear route directions, assembly directions, and related "recipes."

10. Research on emotions and spatial cognition proposes a number of evolutionary possibilities for why given spaces have characteristic "atmospheres" that evoke predictable responses in humans. This is obviously relevant to how allomythoi are constructed—certain worldviews, with their affective dispositions, are better suited to certain environments ("worlds"). I note all of this, but primarily as an area for future research.

11. Spatial cognition studies on differences in ability, particularly reflection on how displays of spatial-cognitive virtuosity may relate to sexual selection, may help explain some of the appeal of immersion in allomythoi—such simulations of alien worlds cultivates spatial capabilities (as well as, e.g., affective, theory-of-mind, etc.) that, when shown off among likeminded others, can be very charming.

12. From the negative and positive example of Heidegger and the consistently excellent thinking of Tweed and Knott, the latter two of whom benefit from the full range of insights that have emerged during the "spatial turn" in the humanities, profound insights into how space is related to power and meaning-making, I have concluded that disembodiment and displacement are two of the most awful weapons of human disempowerment, and their oppositional orientation means that an analyst does well to look for the presence of such absences especially in O-mode allomythoi. Power is always implicated in the meaningful production and contestation of meaningful worlds; indeed, Heidegger's rejection of dalliance with alien worlds in contrast to one's hereditary worldview and way of life is part of his defense of traditional Western culture and rejection of others. In his later work, Heidegger is right to stress that humans are poetic world-formers who, in order to be such, need play-room. As I have tried to make evident in my formulation and discussion of my modes and how they relate to the production, defense, and attack of boundaries, power is always involved in the production of space, including an allomythos.

[2] See also my introduction of the term *mythistoriography* in this work; see especially, appendices 1, 35, 38, 40, 43–5.

[3] Analogously to how an entire worldview family, like Christianity (or even Abrahamic covenantal monotheism), could be subjected to a worldview analysis as a "worldview" that also contains countless sub-worldviews, like Catholicism, Methodism, or Jehovah's Witnesses, which themselves can be analyzed as "worldviews" and contain countless sub-worldviews like Brazilian Catholicism, down to the level of the vernacular, personal worldview of an individual Brazilian Catholic, I tend to also regard the overall allomythos of, say, Tolkien's Legendarium as the ideal level for referring to it as Tolkien's "allomythology," composed of the allomythoi of his various peoples and individuals, whose worldviews tend to be sub-allomythoi of the allomythic family (allomythology) of their race—though there are cases of individuals whose personal worldviews participate in multiple "racial" allomythologies/allomythoi.

The heart of the apparently shifting nature of an allomythos has to do with "worlds" as cognitive probability spaces (though always keeping in mind the non-Cartesian, non-dualist character of cognition in cognitive science), as in text world theory discussed in Chapter 2. Such projections of states of affairs or "events," though not having identical meanings from researcher to researcher, are broadly comparable: *e.g.*, "possible worlds" (Ryan, 1991), "frames" (Emmott, 1997), "text-worlds" (Werth, 1999), "storyworlds"

(Herman, 2002), "mental spaces" (Fauconnier and Turner, 2003), and "narrative worlds" (Gerrig, 1993). To preview Chapter Two a bit, even at the textual level, where authors build individual fictional characters' and fictional social formations' allomythoi and where kairological analysts find the elements of their mythopoesis, one finds in a single sentence a demand (rather dizzying when unpacked) to simulate and move among multiple conceptual spaces (text worlds). These instances of characterization build and feed into another conceptual space, a world, for the probabilistic simulation of a given character's perspectival worldview and way of life (WWL/allomythos) and that character's social group's WWL/allomythos. A work's overall allomythos, the level I typically reserve the expression "allomythology" for, if I bother to use it at all, is the culmination of this sophisticated cognitive task of authorial worldbuilding and percipients' re-creational re-worldmaking—truly, *worlds within worlds*. See also Appendix 1.

[4] See "Appendix 10: A Critical Review of Selected Worldview Studies Categories (Big Questions)," which gives further background on the study of worldviews, the range of BQs proposed, and how I arrived at the ones presented here. The primary aim is to arrive at a level of generality that evades the distinctive categories of a particular worldview or worldview family (*e.g.*, Christianity) while preserving enough particularity to capture the major concerns of living beings. One might argue for supplying the bare minimum of categories in order to economize one's analysis (particularly if a given work contains a multitude of allomythoi), but I have elected to err on the side of supplying finer BQ gradations, recognizing that not all BQs need to be answered for a given worldview and that sometimes the same answer may respond to multiple BQs.

[5] I propose *kairology* as a specific way of designating the rhetorical-cognitive study of individual allomythoi and allomythological systems – that is, explicitly fictional worldviews and ways of life (cosmo-ethologies); it is more obviously rhetorical than the alternative I considered, which would also be appropriate: *allomythography*. (Regarding "kairology," see also this work's Conclusion.) In emphasizing the importance of ethology, I call upon the full range of associations one might think of in the word *ethos*, particularly the rhetorical and musical. In rhetoric, which is likely more familiar, *ethos* conveys the persuasive power of – the ethical appeal to – one's character, broadly understood (an authoritative character might be persuasive because of their beauty, charisma, title, and so on while not being an example of admirable "ethics"); in music, *ethos* is the character or distinctive mode/mood, often associated with the presumed moods of particular peoples (i.e., ethnicities), produced by the *harmoniai* or *tonoi*. That is, ancient Greek music (cf. the classical Indian concepts of *raga*) was subdivided into characteristic parameters that had conventionalized cognitive (especially affective) associations. Each mode, each musical work possesses its own *ethos*. Each worldview, likewise, has its own distinctive character.

[6] I debated placing the superordinate categories *cosmology* and *ethology* after their respective subordinate categories, and this would have had two merits: (1) practically, one must answer the subordinate BQs first and (2) on a more theoretical level the more abstract superordinate BQs – cosmology, ethology, and kairology itself – arise out of the subordinate BQs. But I preferred this presentation for aesthetic reasons.

[7] The Geertzian choice of terminology here is used advisedly, for Geertz identified "religions" as cultural systems as having a worldview aspect and an ethos aspect—a cosmology and an ethology, as I would say. The ethos of an individual or a people – the *mood and motivations* that characterize their way of life – is an important aspect of worldview studies that is, also, one of the hardest to analyze. Like Tweed's "intensify joy and confront suffering," the dispositional and attitudinal aspect of a worldview is properly emphasized in Geertz's theory.

[8] *Worldview* and *way of life* are deeply entangled categories, but generally (but not universally) they may be conceptually distinguished; I see their study and their related BQs as falling under the fields or attributes of *cosmology* and *ethology*, respectively. Figure 1 is presented as a table, and it is, mostly. However, it is an unusual sort of meta-table, being a kind of relational database of tables with commentary. Unlike a true table, the ordering of the rows is in some cases not arbitrary—some of the categories are subordinate to or subsets of others as noted in parenthetical comments in specific cells of the first column (and in the cases of the self and of others as part of the family of things in one's environment, the subordination fluctuates between COSMOLOGY and ETHOLOGY). The first two values of each tuple identify an attribute, providing as it were

the name of another table (e.g., ONTOLOGY, AUTOLOGY, etc.) and its attribute (the BQs) that would itself be the field governing a specific worldview analysis. For human worldviews and the allomythoi of humans and non-humans one may generally identify as a key a worldview name like "Catholicism" or "Objectivism," with which one might organize a relational database of worldview analyses to do comparative work. However, such terms typically function at a low level of granularity (a high level of abstraction); if researchers were to attempt such a database, I suggest scholars assign a primary key to each identified worldview and way of life and each agent, leaving room for analyses from the level *of particular individuals in particular situations* (remember, individuals activate different self-and-world schemas in different settings) to *worldview families* (broadly this is what one is dealing with in the analysis of non-human animals based on their observed behavior), many of which will not have self-assigned keys. The relations between identified (fictional) agents, from the sub-personal to the individual to the communal, and worldviews and ways of life (allomythoi) must be permitted to be many-to-many, since agents may be members of multiple communities of understanding, discourse, and practice, and such worldviews and ways of life may belong to many agents.

[9] Taves also notes the bridge-making function of the "situation" category, in her case relative to integrating broad trends in the study of worldviews: "The addition of the situation question makes it possible to view the BQs from both a systemic and an agent-based perspective" (Taves, 2022, p. 9). And she too sees it as primary, with her focus being on the evolutionary perspective: "From an agent-based perspective, the answers to the BQs appear as a framework for goal-directed action. From this perspective, BQ4—the agent's characterization of the situation in which they find themselves—is central" (Taves, 2022, p. 9). My framework seeks to facilitate integration with the cognitive-evolutionary and socio-cultural approaches, but the merits I find in "situation" as a category derived first from the rhetorical literature – see "Appendix 11: The Rhetorical 'Situation' – *Staseis* and *Memoria.*"

For a consideration of the situated reality of what I regard as more logico-poetic aspects of language, such as particles, syncategorematic words, and HTML, see Appendix 38, subsection II.

[10] "Worldmaking" as I understand it is a basic property of living matter. It is an insight to realize that self-domesticating behavior, as when beavers make dams, is not unique to humans. Other living things modify their selective environment. But cases where a living thing acts on its external environment, while a very real advance in complexity, are extensions of a fundamental property of life, an externalization or extension of it as a self-organizing information and information-processing system. It is essential to the feedback loop of a living system that its very constitutive organism—the arrangement of "dead" matter that maintains and reproduces itself with variation over time through interaction with its environments—is a self that is itself a world, a home, a technical nexus, that constitutes or makes itself. Just as one may find implicit in the behavior of a living thing (its way of life) responses to the Big Questions that are ultimately reflected on and articulated in human worldviews, so too in human rhetorical worldmaking one finds an advanced, intentional expression of the worldmaking (or home-making or fictional or poetic or technical or artificial—each expression is suggestive) capacity that is inherent in all life. I return repeatedly in this work to the idea of "worlds within worlds" (see, e.g., n. 3 above); "worldmaking within worldmaking" might also express a complementary theme that runs throughout this framework. In both cases, there is a very natural, recurring fractal pattern of manifestation that I also highlight in Appendix 32.

But when I write, above, that "cases where a living thing acts on its external environment" are "a very real advance in complexity," one might, on reflection, come to worry about the problem of artifice and alienation. As one departs from the immediacy of (a) the self's self-constitution to (b) the self's direct activity on others and on its environment to (c) the mediated activity of tool use to (d) the building of novel environments, one observes a scale or Axis of Artifice, in which two of the most prominent factors are the degree of immediacy-mediation and the degree of information-density embodied in the artifice. At what point of independent informational density and estrangement from the immediacy of self-help does an instrument become sufficiently agentive to be reckoned with on its own terms? The question is, of course, perspectival and contextual. But the problem, again, that I called, above, that of "artifice and alienation" exists in germ in the nature of life itself. By this I mean that the issue of technology and technique—so evident in our civilization and so entangled with problems of power, exploitation, estrangement—seems to be inherent to life. Any self is

a modification of the world and a little world unto itself. Any extension of the self—and by this I do not mean some magical contagion or infusion of personality into other things by virtue of labor that converts them into "property" over which one has "rights" (one thinks here of Locke); I mean, rather, an ordered system that engages in ordering activity resulting in another system becoming differently ordered along lines more in harmony with the activity of the ordered system—again, any extension of the self produces a relation or relationship in which power is necessarily involved. Whether intentional and goal-oriented or more random and wandering (which itself has a higher-order target of a potential unknown), such extensive, intentional action is both an extension of the self and a movement of self-alienation, whereby the new world will act back on it. Of course, however basic, the artificial or technical—"technology"—becomes a highly worldview-dependent problem. See Chapter 3.

[11] For more detail, see "Appendix 11: The Rhetorical 'Situation' – *Staseis* and *Memoria*."

[12] Beauvoir's position is staked out in relation to Sartre, Hegel, Heidegger, and others, avoiding an apolitical individualism that posits unrealistic freedom and responsibility for individuals, an essentialist individualism that constrains someone to a fixed natural-moral destiny, a social-structural determinism that fatalistically construes individuals as outputs of a communal machine, and a social constructivism that – like some forms of individualism – suggests an unreasonable latitude for self-creation and liberty.

[13] For a simple introduction, see Keith Grant Davie, "Stasis Theory." White paper. N.D. www.coursehero.com/file/27255076/Stasis-Theory-KGDpdf/. One should note that the categories and applications of stasis theory are much more flexible now than when used by thinkers like Aristotle, Hermagoras, Cicero, and Quintilian to think about issues of invention in forensic rhetoric; however, shifting to other situations than the courtroom requires modification of the basic categories and questions – cf., e.g., Hoppmann, 2014; Northcut, 2007; Gross, 2004.

[14] See, e.g., "Chapter Five" of George A. Kennedy's (2011) *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*.

[15] Worldview studies returns one to the questions, reminding one that specific *claims* of fact, definition, quality, and policy are situated responses to questions. My use of the problem history method also has to do with this situated approach, as Asprem (2014, p. 5) states, "In recent years […] problem history has been reinvented to form a methodology for intellectual and cultural history that emphasizes the contextual, situated, and embodied nature of intellectual questioning." An important aspect of the arguments in the following chapters and many of their corresponding appendices is that fantastika and its subgenres have emerged from and in response to particular situations – such as a culture of consumerist, leisure-time entertainment and an environment of ironic awareness of the constructed, power-inflected character of cultural productions – as typified responses to recurring problems of modernity and secularity, postmodernity and postsecularity—for example, in Chapter 3, I focus on the problems of criticism, exploitation, virtuality, and globalization.

[16] Asking whence and whether one's knowledge of the situation, one's evaluation of it and determination of its nature, and one's sense of appropriate response come and are valid are, in humans, highly reflexive activities.

[17] See Gross (2004).

[18] Compare, in particular, Northcut (2007), who draws on Prelli's (1989) modification of stasis theory categories specifically for scientific discourse, which generates a matrix of "superior *staseis*" that are discipline-specific to the sciences and "subordinate *staseis*" of general applicability (i.e., the traditional classical categories).

[19] It is also a domain-general analytical tool that has broad pedagogical applications, so it is useful both for integrative, interdisciplinary research and for education. See "Conclusion."

[20] One may analyze this process using the five canons of rhetoric: i.e., invention (*inventio*), arrangement (*dispositio*), style (*elocutio*), memory (*memoria*), and delivery (*pronuntiatio*). The invention or discovery of the

fitting rhetorical place or places a rhetor should bring their auditor to is also a boundary-making of that place or places again, a re-erecting of familiar boundaries; the genre-literate organization and manipulation of discourse is likewise a *placing*, an ordering, a forming of boundaries; the stylistic deployment of symbolic elements affirms boundaries by being suited to the simulated and predicted expectations of an audience; as I discuss in detail elsewhere, a narrative – though this is also true of other texts – is a mapping of events, a chain of memory, whereby situated events are linked together in ordered relations, the cognitive essence of *memoria*, as becomes obvious when one studies ancient and indigenous memory techniques and the cognitive literature on memory; and the manner in which information is conveyed and enacted is both appropriate to a situation and constitutively boundary-making and -affirming.

[21] See "Appendix 12: Boundaries in Fantastika."

[22] See Appendix 49 for an earlier, unpublished draft of this work.

[23] See "Appendix 13: Boundaries in Religious Studies"; cf. Appendix 9.

[24] See "Appendix 14: Boundaries in Play, Mental Time Travel, Mind Wandering, and Sleep." One might compare Slingerland's (2021) case for alcohol as being useful because, by disrupting the functions of the prefrontal cortex, it promotes creativity by facilitating novel associations and because it promotes social bonding by contributing to a relaxed and festive environment.

[25] For a more extended treatment, see "Appendix 15: My Modes Relative to Center and Boundaries."

[26] On conclusions from the study of spatial cognition, see n. 1 in this chapter and the full discussion in Appendix 9. Regarding the use of categories that are likely to be in the art, not simply projected onto it through the lens (i.e., the big questions, problems, concerns) of some other tradition, faith, philosophy, etc., Dewey helpfully observes,

> The unity the critic traces must be in the work of art as its characteristic [….] There are many [unifying ideas or forms in a work of art], in proportion to the richness of the object in question. What is meant is that the critic shall seize upon some strain or strand that is actually there, and bring it forth with such clearness that the reader has a new clue and guide in his own experience. (1934, p. 314)

[27] With Marcel Kinsbourne, one may regard the mind as resulting from a system of "opponent processors," of which the left-right is but one of the important ones (e.g., the remarkable development of the frontal lobe in our species sets up a sharp contrast between the human ability to, as it were, float above the immediate world in which all, or at least most, other animals dwell—cf. much of what Nietzsche identified in *The Birth of Tragedy*). I stress it because in it is most clearly apparent a power struggle between fundamentally different modes and styles of existence.

[28] For example, one may think of the stories of Beren and Lúthien and Aragorn and Arwen or Ungoliant and Shelob in Tolkien, just to take two examples, and this quality is most beautifully achieved in the eighth volume of King's *Dark Tower* series, *The Wind Through the Keyhole*, with its story-within-a-story structure creating fascinating parallels between Roland as a youth and in the narrative present and Tim Ross in the legendary past of Mid-World.

[29] In the following chapter, this should be kept in mind if "probability design" starts to feel overly dry and calculative. When we model our self-and-world and use that model to simulate other possibilities, we do it with all of our affective and sensory abilities:

> In suspense, the connections between probability calculus and the emotional involvement of readers are particularly evident, even though the immersive, empathetic dimension of suspense is often seen as irreconcilable with its cognitive, problem-solving dimension (see

> Beecher 2007 for an overview of the debate). For a Bayesian perspective on narrative, however, the emotional implications of probability are crucial because they reflect the stake which particular characters (and readers) have in a particular possibility. [...] At this point, I should briefly address how Bayesian probability calculus and the recent interest in emotions in cognitive narratology might fit together. Patrick Colm Hogan, in *Affective Narratology* (2011), distinguishes between different ways in which emotional perceptions and appraisals play out in narrative [....] As gut-feelings, emotions are constantly experienced (LeDoux 1999) and contribute to our decision-making processes (Damasio 2006). The 'concern-based' nature of emotions (Frijda 2007) leads from immediate, unreflective responses to long-term, considered emotional appraisals. Long-term, goal-based emotional appraisal is also important for the ways in which readers evaluate potential ways in which the story might develop (Oatley 1992). [...] The probabilistic and the emotional go hand in hand. For analytical purposes, it makes sense to distinguish between the ways in which these two aspects can be combined: On the one hand, possibilities get weighted with the predictive causal probability of what, given our grasp of the fictional world and previous observations, is most likely to happen. [...] At the same time, possibilities get weighted with the emotional appraisal of what readers want to happen. (Kukkonen, 2014, p. 729, 730, 731)

[30] For more on the M-mode, see also Appendix 15.

[31] The oppositional move is often foundational to the creation of novelty; indeed, Wood (2008) notes how it helped produce the novel itself:

> As Mandelstam suggested, the novel probably has its origins in a secular response to the religious lives and biographies of saints and holy men, and in the tradition inaugurated by the Greek writer Theophrastus, who offered a series of sketches of types—the miser, the hypocrite, the fond and foolish lover, and so on. (Don Quixote belongs to the modern novel in part because Cervantes is so determined to discredit the "holy," chivalric tales of Arthur and Amadis of Gaul.) Since these were discrete portraits, you could not contrast one with the other. The Theophrastan and religious tendency remained strong in the novel throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and is still visible in cinema and in various kinds of pulp fiction: villains are villains, heroes are heroes, and the good and the bad are clearly separated and delineated—think of Fielding, Goldsmith, Scott, Dickens, Waugh. Character is essentially stable, has fixed attributes, in such writers. But at the same time, another kind of novel was developing, in which good and bad wars within a single character, and the self refuses to stay still. What the novel powerfully began to do was to explore characterological relativity.

Why is the O-mode so useful for all fictional worldmakers, whatever the final character of their work? I make much of metaphor in this work, and thus I was delighted when I read in Wood, "[O]ften the leap toward the counterintuitive, toward the very opposite of the thing you are seeking to compare, is the secret of powerful metaphor." See also the argument I offer in Appendix 20.

[32] Regarding King's neologies, see "Appendix 1: Mid-World Dialects" in Furth (2012).

[33] Here is a characteristic example:

> The greatest mystery the universe offers is not life but size. Size encompasses life, and the Tower encompasses size. The child, who is most at home with wonder, says: Daddy, what is above the sky? And the father says: The darkness of space. The child: What is beyond space? The father: The galaxy. The child: Beyond the galaxy? The father: Another galaxy. The child: Beyond the other galaxies? The father: No one knows.
>
> You see? Size defeats us. For the fish, the lake in which he lives is the universe. What does

> `the fish think when he is jerked up by the mouth through the silver limits of existence and into a new universe where the air drowns him and the light is blue madness? Where huge bipeds with no gills stuff it into a suffocating box and cover it with wet weeds to die?
>
> Or one might take the tip of the pencil and magnify it. One reaches the point where a stunning realization strikes home: The pencil tip is not solid; it is composed of atoms which whirl and revolve like a trillion demon planets. What seems solid to us is actually only a loose net held together by gravity. Viewed at their actual size, the distances between these atoms might become league, gulfs, aeons. The atoms themselves are composed of nuclei and revolving protons and electrons. One may step down further to subatomic particles. And then to what? Tachyons? Nothing? Of course not. Everything in the universe denies nothing; to suggest an ending is the one absurdity.
>
> If you fell outward to the limit of the universe, would you find a board fence and signs reading DEAD END? No. You might find something hard and rounded, as the chick must see the egg from the inside. And if you should peck through the shell (or find a door), what great and torrential light might shine through your opening at the end of space? Might you look through and discover our entire universe is but part of one atom on a blade of grass? Might you be forced to think that by burning a twig you incinerate an eternity of eternities? That existence rises not to one infinite but to an infinity of them? (King, 1982/2003, p.)

[34] "If it's ka it'll come like a wind, and your plans will stand before it no more than a barn before a cyclone" (King, 1997, p. ).

[35] One thinks of what King writes in his 2001 introduction to *The Shining*: "Monsters are real, and ghosts are real too. They live inside us, and sometimes, they win" (p. ).

[36] For example, the Pubes in the city of Lud (cite) are constructed in so as to represent the idea, expressed well in texts like *The Stand* and *The Mist*, that irrational tribalism emerges inevitably in groups.

[37] *E.g.*,

> Time flies, knells call, life passes, so hear my prayer.
> Birth is nothing but death begun, so hear my prayer.
> Death is speechless, so hear my speech.
> *This is Jake, who served his ka and his tet.* Say true.
> May the forgiving glance of S'mana heal his heart. Say please.
> May the arms of Gan raise him from the darkness of this earth. Say please.
> Surround him, Gan, with light.
> Fill him, Chloe, with strength.
> If he is thirsty, give him water in the clearing.
> If he is hungry, give him food in the clearing.
> May his life on this earth and the pain of his passing become as a dream to his waking soul, and let his eyes fall upon every lovely sight; *let him find the friends that were lost to him, and let every one whose name he calls call his in return.*
> *This is Jake, who lived well, loved his own, and died as ka would have it.*
> Each man owes a death. This is Jake. Give him peace. (emphasis added, King, 2004, p. )

[38] "For every mother who ever cursed God for her child dead in the road, for every father who ever cursed the man who sent him away from the factory with no job, for every child who was ever born to pain and asked why, this is the answer. Our lives are like these things I build. Sometimes they fall down for a reason, sometimes they fall down for no reason at all" (King, 1987, p. ).

[39] For example, I came very close to replacing either L'Engle or Pullman with a series of novels from romantic or erotic fantasy, science fiction romance, erotic horror, monster erotica, paranormal romance, or a similar subgenre, all of which are widely enjoyed by women and queer readers and reflect gender- and sexuality-based worldviews—an area within worldview studies of great importance. The Japanese distinction between *yaoi* and *bara* is helpful in identifying the fact that apparently-queer fantasy – in the case of fantastical *yaoi*, depictions of love between two males – often is made by heterosexual women for consumption by

other women, often women who find common depictions (and realities) of heterosexual romantic-erotic relations offensive and objectionable for various reasons. And of course storyworlds reflecting their authors' generally straight, white, male, theist worldviews in N-mode style, such as, say, Raymond Feist's stories set in the rather Neoplatonic-Christian (to identify one of its affiliate non-fictional worldview families) cosmos of Midkemia and Kelewan are quite common in popular fantasy.

[40] I regard this metaphor of consumption as an apt way of characterizing seekers in the culture industry, in a society where the abundance of worldviews challenges the plausibility of all worldviews, under a broader regime of capitalist consumption and identity shopping.

[41] Mrs. Coulter's "coolly delivered call for the mercy killing of a senescent and impotent God is framed as an act of religious adoration ('the truest proof of our love for God') and echoes the 'death of God' theologies of the 1960s. It also echoes nineteenth-century anxieties – indeed, anger – about the *deus absconditus* and, in particular, the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche" (Bradley and Tate, 2010, p. 74).

[42] Many would find her historical claims questionable – L'Engle treats the biblical Flood narrative and legends of white Druid Native Americans as historical. But since she draws on relativity and quantum mechanics to call into doubt Newtonian intuitions about time, space, and size, in particular, relative to her apparent historical claims, writing of many possible "whens" (L'Engle, 1978, p. 53), there is not a single, stable history in her storyworld.

[43] This reference to *South Park* is an invitation to read "Appendix 20: How the O-mode May Inform the Others – Parody Religion and Shakespeare, with Some Reference to *The Book of Mormon* (Musical)." As this work transitions, in the main text above, from consideration of the N-mode to the O-mode, Appendix 20 may supplement it. The appendix consists of two primary parts. In part one, the fictional worldview of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* is considered—an inversion or carnivalesque parody of the medieval courtly "religion" of love – which was itself at first a parody religion – as well as a creative adaptation of myth, legend, folklore, magic, and both Protestant and Catholic Christianity. In part two, *The Tempest* is discussed relative to Prospero's sovereign mastery of magic and language and manipulation of romantic love and in relation to his supernatural shadows, Sycorax, her monstrous, slave-son Caliban, and the spirit-servant Ariel. Both *The Tempest* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream* give Shakespeare the opportunity, through the non-mimetic decoupling from consensus reality permitted by the fantastical (*sensu* Kelleghan, 2002), to reflect on the sovereign act of creation itself, the art and magic of world-making. These works and their various fictional religions, such as Caliban's devotion to Setebos and Titania's devotion to ass-headed Bottom, may compared to a contemporary musical play with a similar function – as well as similarities in structure and content – namely, Parker, Lopez, and Stone's musical, *The Book of Mormon*. In each, parody religion calls for a reformed faith.

The appendix reflects an earlier stage in my thinking before I shifted away from what I now consider a presentist and Eurocentrist trap. Shakepeare is a still a significant figure and so this project benefits from including him, but what is now Chapter 3 tells a very different story compared to earlier formulations. The chapter also memorializes an important personal experience that set this whole project in motion; my sister kindly gave me a ticket to *The Book of Mormon* for my birthday while we were travelling to introduce my newborn niece to our family and friends, and it had a powerful impact on my thinking.

[44] For example, Dubourg & Baumard (2022, p. 9) state:

> People high in Openness to experience are indeed more likely to be tolerant of diversity, liberal, opened to new lifestyles, and opposed to right-wing political orientations (Butler, 2000; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). We, thus, predict that people who like imaginary worlds should be, overall, more politically tolerant, and socially liberal. This reasoning also predicts
>
> that people who enjoy imaginary worlds should prefer fictions exploring new social roles (Mar, 2018; Mar & Oatley, 2008). In line with such predictions, recent research has observed that fans of fictions with imaginary worlds are more politically progressive and committed

against prejudice (Besson, 2021).

Some people enter imaginary worlds to learn about other ways of seeing, such as the ambisexual Gethenians in Le Guin's *The Left Hand of Darkness*, but many go there to be horrified by abnormal, alien, inferior monsters and outsiders. Novel stimuli arrest the attention; supernormal stimuli do so more powerfully. But I am intuitively skeptical that enjoying the creation and perceptual-imaginative recreation of fictions that emphasize supernormal stimuli is uniquely appealing to people of specific political or economic persuasions, gender identities, neuroatypicality, or whatever; that said, the work of Christopher T. Burris on how certain embodied and lived experiences render specific kinds of fictions intuitively compelling suggests my intuition could be wrong. And see also the compelling argument Zunshine makes, cited in Appendix 33, about how texts that make use of "strange concepts" inherently challenge the human disposition to think in an essentialist manner, which is obviously at play when people think in racist, sexist, heterosexist, classist, ageist, ableist, and related ways.

[45] Grodal, 2017; see Browning and Veit, 2022, pp. 21–22, on the empathizing-systematizing scale and the possibility that Autism-spectrum people have an affinity for imaginary worlds as world-dominant fiction (*contra* character-dominant).

[46] Alice O'Connor was born Alisa Zinovyevna Rosenbaum, but in the main text I use her pen name, Ayn Rand.

[47] See Appendix 21: Bibliography of Humor, Satire, and Parody Religion Literature.

[48] An example of this would be Turner's execution of Powell:

> October 28. Last night I had to do the most unpleasant thing that I have been called to do since joining the Organization four years ago. I participated in the execution of a mutineer.
>
> Harry Powell was Unit 5's leader. Last week, when Washington Field Command gave his unit the assignment of assassinating two of the most obnoxious and outspoken advocates of racial mixing in this area—a priest and a rabbi, coauthors of a widely publicized petition to Congress requesting special tax advantages for racially mixed married couples – Powell refused the assignment [....]
>
> His basic complaint was that all our acts of terror against the System were only making things worse by "provoking" the System into taking more and more repressive measures.
>
> Well, of course, we all understood that! Or, at least, I thought we all understood it. Apparently Powell didn't. That is, he didn't understand that one of the major purposes of political terror, always and everywhere, is to force the authorities to take reprisals and to become more repressive, thus alienating a portion of the population and generating sympathy for the terrorists. And the other purpose is to create unrest by destroying the population's sense of security and their belief in the invincibility of the government.
>
> As Powell continued talking, it became clearer and clearer that he was a conservative, not a revolutionary. He talked as if the whole purpose of the Organization were to force the System to institute certain reforms, rather than to destroy the System, root and branch, and build something radically and fundamentally different in its place.
>
> He was opposed to the System because it taxed his business too heavily. (He had owned a hardware store before we were forced underground.) He was opposed to the System's permissiveness with Blacks, because crime and rioting were bad for business. He was
>
> opposed to the System's confiscation of firearms, because he felt he needed a gun for personal security. His were the motivations of a libertarian, the sort of self-centered

> individual who sees the basic evil in government as a limitation on free enterprise. Someone asked him whether he had forgotten what the Organization has repeated over and over, namely, that our struggle is to secure the future of our race, and that the issue of individual freedom is subordinate to that one, overwhelming purpose [....]
>
> Powell was the epitome of economic man.
>
> Ideologies, ultimate purposes, the fundamental contradiction between the System's world view and ours-all these things had no meaning for him. He regarded the Organization's philosophy as just so much ideological flypaper designed to catch recruits for us. He saw our struggle against the System as a contest for power and nothing more. If we could not whip them, then we should try to force them to compromise with us.
>
> I wondered how many others in the Organization thought the way Powell did, and I shuddered. We have been forced to grow too quickly. There has not been sufficient time to develop in all our people the essentially religious attitude toward our purpose and our doctrines which would have prevented the Powell incident by screening him out early.
>
> As it was, we had no real choice in deciding Powell's fate. (cite)

[49] The characterization of feminism and effeminacy (especially male homosexuality) as inherently Jewish ("Oriental") was common in post-WWI Germany and was pandered to by the Nazis (leading to, e.g., the crackdown on the *Wissenschaftlich-humanitäres Komitee*, the eradication of the world's first homosexual movement, etc.). The rejection of democracy and feminism went hand in hand with *Judenhaas*; indeed, Nazism's appropriation of and appeal to a Nietzschean legacy cannot be understood apart from his Bonapartism, misogyny, and aristocratic elitism (see Losurdo, 2024, 2021), and those attempting to understand the Trumpian ascendence in the present would do well to attend to the appeal of such things in the past. Given the statistics indicating the rightward swing of young American males (Gen Z), fueled by resentments and offenses ranging from those with the incel WWL to believers in traditional "Christian" male supremacy (many surprisingly willing to praise radical Islamist WWLs relative to women (and queer people)) to broader concern with policing the gender binary against, e.g., transgender, non-binary, intersex, and related identities, worldview studies should devote intense effort to masculinity studies, including a kairological inquiry into the construction of allomythoi that valorize masculinity. MAGA as a return to the time of male supremacy, Trump as an embodiment of a certain masculine ideal, the constellation of other male celebrities (e.g., Musk, podcasters popular with young men, etc.) as ratifying such ideals and an oppositional relation to "wokeness," and other contemporary trends illustrate why the study of works like Pierce's is urgent and far from "academic."

Here is another characteristic passage:

> November 30. In thinking over Saturday's events, what surprises me is that I feel no remorse or regret for killing those two White whores. Six months ago I couldn't imagine myself calmly butchering a teen-aged White girl, no matter what she had done. But I have become much more realistic about life recently. [This is shortly after Turner is initiated ("born again") into the Order, passing the test of the Word and test of the Deed, reading its Book, learning the secret Sign by which the members of the Faith can recognize each other, and swearing its mighty, moving Oath.] I understand that the two girls were with the Blacks only because they had been infected with the disease of liberalism by the schools and the churches and the plastic popculture the System churns out for young people these days. Presumably, if they had been raised in a healthy society they would have had some racial pride.
>
> But such considerations are irrelevant to the present phase of our struggle. Until we have in our hands the means for bringing about a general cure for the disease, we must deal with it by other means, just as one must ruthlessly weed out and dispose of diseased animals in any

flock, unless one wants to lose the whole flock. This is no time for womanly handwringing. (cite)

**Works Cited**


Albanese, C. L. (2007). *America, religions, and religion* (4th ed.). Thomson/Wadsworth.

Anttonen, V. (1996). Rethinking the Sacred: The Notions of "Human Body" and "Territory" in Conceptualizing Religion. In T. A. Idinopulos & E. A. Yonan (Eds.), *The sacred and its scholars: Comparative methodologies for the study of primary religious data*. E.J. Brill.

Anttonen, V. (2005). Space, Body, and the Notion of Boundary: A Category-Theoretical Approach to Religion. *Temenos*, *41*(2), 185–201. https://doi.org/10.33356/temenos.4779

Asprem, E. (2014). *The problem of disenchantment: Scientific naturalism and esoteric discourse, 1900–1939*. Brill.

Beauvoir, S. de. (1953). *The second sex* ([1st American ed.].). Knopf.

Beauvoir, S. de. (1972). *The coming of age* ([1st American ed.].). Putnam.

Behrens, T. E. J., Muller, T. H., Whittington, J. C. R., Mark, S., Baram, A. B., Stachenfeld, K. L., & Kurth-Nelson, Z. (2018). What Is a Cognitive Map? Organizing Knowledge for Flexible Behavior. *Neuron*, *100*(2), 490–509. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2018.10.002

Bradley, A. (2010). *The New Atheist Novel: Philosophy, Fiction and Polemic After 9/11.* (1st ed.). Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.

Brandt, A. K. (2017). *The runaway species: How human creativity remakes the world*. Catapult.

Browning, H., & Veit, W. (2022). Autism and the preference for imaginary worlds. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *45*, e279. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X21002211

Burger, A. (2021). *The quest for The dark tower: Genre and interconnection in the Stephen King series*. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers.

Clute, J. (2011). *Pardon this intrusion: Fantastika in the world storm*. Beccon Publications.

Colás, S. (2005). Telling True Stories, or The Immanent Ethics of Material Spirit (and Spiritual Matter) in Philip Pullman"s His Dark Materials. *Discourse (Berkeley, Calif.)*, *27*(1), 34–66. https://doi.org/10.1353/dis.2006.0004

Coulson, S., & Wu, Y. C. (2005). Right Hemisphere Activation of Joke-related Information: An Event-related Brain Potential Study. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, *17*(3), 494–506. https://doi.org/10.1162/0898929053279568

Cutting, J. (1997). *Principles of psychopathology: Two worlds, two minds, two hemispheres*. Oxford University Press.

Damasio, A. R. (1999). *The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness* (First edition.). Harcourt Brace.

Dewey, J. (1934). *Art as experience*. Minton, Balch & Company.

Dubourg, E., & Baumard, N. (2022). Why imaginary worlds? The psychological foundations and cultural evolution of fictions with imaginary worlds. *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *45*, e276–e276. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X21000923

Eliade, M. (1964). *Shamanism: Archaic techniques of ecstasy* (Rev. and enl.). Bollingen Foundation; distributed by Pantheon Books.

Epstein, R. A., Patai, E. Z., Julian, J. B., & Spiers, H. J. (2017). The cognitive map in humans: Spatial navigation and beyond. *Nature Neuroscience*, *20*(11), 1504–1513. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.4656

Flieger, V. (2002). *Splintered light: Logos and language in Tolkien's world* (2nd ed). Kent State University Press.

Fredrickson, N. (2018). Designing a Course Integrating Critical, Genre-Based Pedagogy, Horror Literature, and Religious Studies. In M. A. Fabrizi (Ed.), *Horror literature and dark fantasy: Challenging genres*. Brill Sense.

Genette, G. (1972). *Figures III.* Editions du Seuil.

Grodal, T. (2017). How film genres are a product of biology, evolution and culture—An embodied approach. *Palgrave Communications*, *3*(1), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2017.79

Gross, A. G. (2004). Why Hermagoras Still Matters: The Fourth Stasis and Interdisciplinarity. *Rhetoric Review*, *23*(2), 141–155. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327981rr2302_3

Hatlen, B. (2005). Pullman's Enigmatic Ontology: Revamping Old Traditions in His Dark Materials. In M. Lenz & C. Scott (Eds.), *His dark materials illuminated: Critical essays on Philip Pullman's trilogy*. Wayne State University Press.

Hoppmann, M. J. (2014). A Modern Theory of Stasis. *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, *47*(3), 273–296. https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.47.3.0273

Jacobs, L. F. (2003). The evolution of the cognitive map. *Brain, Behavior and Evolution*, *62*(2), 128–139. https://doi.org/10.1159/000072443

Kelleghan, F. (2002). *Classics of science fiction and fantasy literature*. Salem Press.

Kennedy, G. A. (2011). *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*. University Press.

King, S. (1988). *The gunslinger*. New American Library.

King, S. (1991). *The waste lands* (1st ed.). Donald M. Grant Publisher.

King, S. (1997). *Wizard and glass*. Plume.

King, S. (2001). *The shining*. Pocket Books.

King, S. (2003). *Wolves of the Calla* (1st trade ed.). Donald M. Grant, Publisher.

King, S. (2004). *Song of Susannah* (1st trade ed.). Donald M. Grant, Publisher.

Knott, K. (2005). *The location of religion: A spatial analysis*. Equinox Pub.

Laeng, B., Shah, J., & Kosslyn, S. (1999). Identifying objects in conventional and contorted poses: Contributions of hemisphere-specific mechanisms. *Cognition*, *70*(1), 53–85. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(98)00077-8

Lee, S. A. (2017). The boundary-based view of spatial cognition: A synthesis. *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences*, *16*, 58–65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.03.006

L'Engle, M. (1978). *A swiftly tilting planet*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

MCGILCHRIST, I. (2019). *MASTER AND HIS EMISSARY: The divided brain and the making of the western world.* YALE University Press.

Mendlesohn, F. (2008). *Rhetorics of fantasy*. Wesleyan University Press.

Nettle, D. (2005a). Exploring the psychological foundations of drama. In J. Gottschall & D. S. Wilson (Eds.), *The literary animal: Evolution and the nature of narrative*. Northwestern University Press. http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0645/2005004290-t.html

Nettle, D. (2005b). The Wheel of Fire and the Mating Game: Explaining the Origins of Tragedy and Comedy. *Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology*, *3*, 39–56. https://doi.org/10.1556/JCEP.3.2005.1.3

Nichelli, P., Grafman, J., Pietrini, P., Clark, K., Lee, K. Y., & Miletich, R. (1995). Where the brain appreciates the moral of a story. *Neuroreport*, *6*(17), 2309–2313. https://doi.org/10.1097/00001756-199511270-00010

Northcut, K. M. (2007). Stasis Theory and Paleontology Discourse. *The Writing Instructor*, *4*.

Oliver, C. (2012). Mocking God and Celebrating Satan: Parodies and Profanities in Philip Pullman's His Dark Materials. *Children's Literature in Education*, *43*(4), 293–302. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10583-012-9165-4

Oziewicz, M. (2006). The Time Quartet as Madeleine L'Engle's Theology. *Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts*, *17*(3 (67)), 211–236.

Parsons, L. M., & Osherson, D. (2001). New Evidence for Distinct Right and Left Brain Systems for Deductive versus Probabilistic Reasoning. *Cerebral Cortex (New York, N.Y. 1991)*, *11*(10), 954–965. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/11.10.954

Prelli, L. J. (1989). *A rhetoric of science: Inventing scientific discourse* (1st ed.). University of South Carolina Press.

Pullman, P. (1997). *The subtle knife*. Alfred A. Knopf.

Pullman, P. (2000). *The amber spyglass* (1st American ed.). Alfred A. Knopf.

Rand, A. (1999). *Atlas shrugged* ([35th anniversary edition]). Plume.

Slingerland, E. (2021). *Drunk: How we sipped, danced, and stumbled our way to civilization* (First edition.). Little, Brown Spark.

Stump, R. W. (2008). *The geography of religion: Faith, place, and space*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Taves, A. (2022). Worldview Analysis as a Tool for Conflict Resolution. *Negotiation Journal*, *38*(3), 363–381. https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12403

Tinbergen, N. (1969). *The study of instinct* (1st ed. 2nd impression). Clarendon P. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/61269.html

Tweed, T. A. (1997). *Our Lady of the exile: Diasporic religion at a Cuban Catholic shrine in Miami*. Oxford University Press.

Tweed, T. A. (2011). Space. *Material Religion*, *7*(1), 116–123. https://doi.org/10.2752/175183411X12968355482295

Vogeley, K., Bussfeld, P., Newen, A., Herrmann, S., Happé, F., Falkai, P., Maier, W., Shah, N. J., Fink, G. R., & Zilles, K. (2001). Mind Reading: Neural Mechanisms of Theory of Mind and Self-Perspective. *NeuroImage (Orlando, Fla.)*, *14*(1), 170–181. https://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2001.0789

W. Younkins, E. (2014). Philosophical and Literary Integration in Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged. *The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies*, *14*(2), 124–147. https://doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.14.2.0124

Wolf, M. J. P. (2017). *Revisiting imaginary worlds: A subcreation studies anthology*. Routledge, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group.

Zaidel, D. W., & Kasher, A. (1989). Hemispheric Memory for Surrealistic Versus Realistic Paintings. *Cortex*, *25*(4), 617–641. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-9452(89)80023-1

# CHAPTER 2: FANTASTICAL WORLDMAKING, NARRATIVE, AND COGNITION

## § 2.1. Narrative Worldmaking

### *§ 2.1.1. Genres*

With the findings and emergent themes[1] of the previous chapter in mind, let's now shift from the high-level abstractions of kairological analysis to develop and apply a cognitive-narratological framework to the phenomenon. Although genres are sometimes defined in terms of *fixed* or regular symbolic forms or structures (compare Severi's (2015) "parallelism"), they are better understood as symbolic forms that emerge from a dynamic, recursive relationship between symbolic expression and ways of life. In doing so, they may construct other, virtual worlds where difference and otherness is cultivated (*heterotopoi*), and in the form of allomythoi, they are externalized cognitive tools for persuasive worldmaking uniquely suited to foregrounding the Big Questions.

In this, they may be compared both to "niches" in the evolutionary sense and to the biological structures that evolve in adaptive response to the determinate conditions of specific niches. Generic regularities – the type of worlds genres construct – reflect experiential regularities; they answer certain needs and questions. Fantastika is an umbrella genre that encompasses such subgenres as science fiction, fantasy, and horror. Its chief feature is its non-mimetic break with consensus reality, highlighting the disquieting constructedness of experience and the contingency of human worlds. As theorists have acknowledged, this estrangement means that it stands out as particularly reflective of and as a medium for reflecting on the questions that structure worldviews and ways of life—for engaging in "thought experiments."

All genres are intimately related to worldviews and ways of life since as specific "language games" they respond, reflect, and contribute to particular "forms of life." When one encounters a given genre, one is cued to model a host of conventionalized expectations regarding normative values, behaviors, environments, forms of selfhood, and so on.[2] In constructing worlds, fantastika – like other narrative genres – exploits specific human cognitive abilities. I identify fantastika's primary cognitive trait as a robust modification of one's *probabilistic world model*, which I shall discuss further below.[3]

But first, let me give an example. At one point in *The Lord of the Rings* the Steward of Gondor, Denethor II, asks the hobbit Pippin to sing a song from the Shire. Pippin's inner thoughts show genre competence—recognition of how certain genres are appropriate in specific situations and not others: "Pippin's heart sank. He did not relish the idea of singing any song of the Shire to the Lord of Minas Tirith, certainly not the comic ones that he knew best; they were too, well, rustic for such an occasion." The drinking songs a hobbit might delight in while giving mathoms, feasting on their sixth meal of the day, drinking, and smoking pipe-weed would reflect their worldview and way of life—far from the Shadow and the battles against it, far from the great city of Minas Tirith, and unsuited to such a setting.

### *§ 2.1.2. Probability Design*

What do I mean in asserting that fantastika's primary cognitive trait is robust modification of one's probabilistic self-and-world model? First, let me try to explain briefly what a probabilistic self-and-world model is. Most people know, even if they avoid thinking about it most of the time, that the self and world we "experience" is simulated, that "we" are a story our nervous system is telling itself "inside" the bounds (an unhappily dualistic

metaphor) of our finite bodies. During childhood, through trial-and-error experimentation, social conditioning, and so on, humans build up a probabilistic world model (PWM) of event schemata by means of which priors they are able to infer what should happen next. This default model dominates the brain's consumption of calories, and as long as one can rest in the top-down inferential model, one experiences a sensation of floating along in the event model.[4] This inferential "predictive coding" is happening at many levels; if a sensed discrepancy cannot be explained away ("error monitoring") by one's model at a lower level, the novel input rises to a higher level of the hierarchical predictive coding (HPC) cascade, until executive attention is required to step in, make sense of things by developing a transformed event model, and take action.[5]

"Event cognition" (mentioned already in Chapter 1, Appendix 6, and Appendix 9 (especially §4b.I)) analyzes such noteworthy moments. Humans segment the flow of experience into perceptual breaks, chunking it into meaningful units that can be easily recalled and narrated for others' recall. By *meaningful units*, I mean changes in the PWM relative to prior assumed probabilities; these tend to have the consequent characteristics of elevated affect – since interoceptive states of high arousal are signals of importance in HPC – and action. A person with reasons for and goals of action, which provoke an inherently affective, embodied response,[6] by means of action responds to and transforms an initial situation into one (or, in some multiverse fiction for example, several) of a possible range of situations.[7]

All genres and narratives necessarily have what has been termed "probability design" (Kukkonen, 2014; 2020; see also, Chandra, Li, Tenenbaum & Ragan-Kelley, 2023). By this is designated the way the makers of storyworlds manipulate and incite curious (i.e.,

possibility-seeking) percipients to modify their PWMs to produce targeted effects by hijacking the evolved reward-avoidance system. Readers seek to explain away novel inputs and stabilize their evolving storyworld PWM, and authors therefore unsettle the very predictions they invite while thereby evoking suspense as predictions seem to be increasingly confirmed (Kukkonen, 2014). What worldmakers often do intuitively[8] – using their understanding of their own world-and-self modeling capacity to develop new, convincing models – has been described and analyzed, with varying levels of cynicism and earnestness, by thinkers ranging from (manipulative, Neoliberally-inclined) "neuroeconomists" to the helpful authors of writing guides. Rather than any substantive definition of any subgenre of fantastika, based on the varying probabilistic weighting of different building blocks, I would encourage identifying textual clusters through study of the way such elements (governing metaphors,[9] schemas, prototypes, exemplars, themes, character types, styles, and so on, but especially the kairological categories[10]) are weighted and creatively combined to make new fantastical narratives.[11]

Let's first think about an example rooted in character (a, if not the, major interest of those who study "literature"). Early in *Lord of the Rings*, when readers model Frodo's powers and character, how do they model the likely possibilities? Readers' predictions and the ways their attention is allocated will be based on genre expertise and other factors, including the cover art, knowing of the author's previous work or reviews and recommendations, as well as their personal worldviews, interests, and fund of experiences. Readers usually pick up LotR after having read *The Hobbit*, so they would expect that the hobbit protagonist's odds are good. And more generically, the happy ending is quite conventional. But countless passages in the text invite readers to feel Frodo's growing

addiction to the ring, his compulsive desire to hold and gaze upon it. And the power of Sauron, the true Lord of the Ring, makes the likelihood of his victory, by any objective measure of probability, quite high. But every step of the Fellowship, and then of Sam, Gollum, and Frodo adjusts those odds, making Frodo's anticipated victory more and more possible – as do things like the gifts of Galadriel and Aragorn's bold move to distract Sauron with the apparent return of Gondor's king.[12]

To take a second example, let's consider plot, more often associated with genre fiction like SF and mystery. Plots generally involve embodied movement through space. *Lord of the Rings*, *Atlas Shrugged*, and *The Turner Diaries* all involve movement through relatively conventional spaces. But the *Dark Tower* series, the *His Dark Materials* series, and the *Time Quintet* series move among dimensions, parallel and virtual universes, different parts of the timeline, and different embodied sizes and forms. Verbs and adjectives tied to bodily states and movements gradually aid one in predicting accurately what a character will feel or do as the probability design progressively enables the reader to build an accurate model, reducing prediction errors relative to a character's intentional, goal-directed actions in spaces. In L'Engle's (1978) *A Swiftly Tilting Planet*, Charles Wallace uses the power of kything (telepathically uniting with others) and a time-travelling unicorn named Gaudior to transform the character Mad Dog Branzillo from a dictator initiating nuclear war into a global peace advocate. Branzillo's character development is accomplished through Charles Wallace's time-travelling journey without Branzillo himself ever appearing. This story, which is set in Charles Wallace's time at Thanksgiving, is about the transtemporal interdependence of family. Charles Wallace travels through time while staying in the same place, by the star watching rock that also plays a prominent role in *An*

*Acceptable Time*, and the bodily states and movements he experiences are, not his own, but those of the Madoc family line as he kythes with members of it—literally experiencing what they experience—and intervenes in it. (Here is a characteristic passage: "Gedder is after Gwen. Stop him. The baby must come from Madoc. Gwydyr's line is tainted. There is nothing left but pride and greed for power and revenge. Stop him, Matthew."), and reunites it. Along the way, he not only experiences their struggles, but he is also at one point "blown into a Projection, a possible future, a future the Echthroi want to make real." When Gaudior with these words explains when they are, the text states, "His breath came in gasping gulps; his flanks heaved wildly under Charles Wallace's legs." The threat of this possible future, the struggle to follow the temporal path of healing is made palpable through such verbs and adjectives describing bodily states.

### *§ 2.1.3. Text World Theory*

The motivated exploration of possibilities described in "probability design" is, in Text World Theory (TWT), understood as the movement among and negotiation of possible worlds. Metaphors are a potent example of this and are "world-switches," so readers who are already familiar with metaphor and conceptual blending theory (*i.e.*, mapping from source domains or input spaces through a generic space where commonalities are abstracted to a target domain or blended space) may find TWT more quickly comprehensible. TWT theorists have described a number of ways one might shift into another world in a text: negation, metaphor, direct speech (or thought), flashback or forward, modal world-switches (the *boulomaic* or W-world (wishes and fantasies), the *deontic* or O-world (obligations and allowances), and the *epistemic* or K-world (degrees of knowledge—these encompass a variety of other world-switches: focalization, indirect speech or thought, hypotheticals,

conditionals)), and a Fantasy Universe, which is a robust metaleptic shift into another storyworld, a dream, hallucination, or vision, or something similar.[13]

Let's take up the same example with which I ended the last section because the alternate possible world of the Echthroi is just such a Fantasy Universe. At the beginning of Chapter 4 of *A Swiftly Tilting Planet*, L'Engle describes Charles Wallace and the unicorn Gaudior again travelling through time, but instead of traveling along the actual timeline to a historical past (a "when"), they are knocked off course by the evil Echthroi into a possible future in which a nuclear holocaust has blighted the world. Here is a larger excerpt we can use to understand the context of the TWT analysis in Figure 4 below:

> The great unicorn flung himself into the wind and they were soaring among the stars, part of the dance, part of the harmony. [...] The blending of melody and harmony was so perfect that it almost made Charles Wallace relax his hold on the unicorn's mane.
>
> "No!" Meg [who is telepathically "kything" with him] cried aloud. "Hold on, Charles! Don't let go!"
>
> A blast of icy cold cut across the beauty of the flight, a cold which carried a stench of death and decay.
>
> Retching, Charles Wallace buried his face in Gaudior's mane, his fingers clenching the silver strands as the Echthroi wind tried to drag him from the unicorn's back. The stench was so abominable that it would have made him loosen his grasp had not the pungent scent of Gaudior's living flesh saved him as he pressed his face against the silver hide, breathing the strangeness of unicorn sweat. [...]
>
> "Hold on tightly, don't let go," he warned. "We've been blown into a Projection."
>
> Charles Wallace could hardly be clutching the mane with more intensity. "A what?"
>
> <u>"We've been blown into a Projection, a possible future, a future the Echthroi want to make real."</u> His breath came in gasping gulps; his flanks heaved wildly under Charles Wallace's legs.
>
> The boy shivered as he remembered those darkly flailing wings and the nauseous odor. Whatever the Echthroi wanted to make real would be something fearful.
>
> They were on a flat plain of what appeared to be solidified lava, although it had a faint luminosity alien to lava. The sky was covered with flickering pink cloud. The air was acrid, making them cough. (emphasis added)





**Figure 4. Text World Theory and Example of World-Switches**

The preceding TWT diagram illustrated how, in just one typical sentence, a reader is called on to maintain a shift, from the actual diegetic text world, into a fantasy universe, a living vision of possible future that Charles Wallace and Gaudior are to labor to prevent and, thence, into the direct speech of Gaudior, whose speech invites one to enter the Wish-world of the Echthroi. Even a short sentence can occasion a cognitive shift between multiple text worlds; the varying complexity (recall William James' "voluminousness") of the worlds within worlds one simulates and metaleptically moves among in the chained links of narrative mapping, even in a short text, is rather astounding.

### *§ 2.1.4. Ways of Worldmaking*

One might have noted above that TWT identifies world-building elements as part of its analysis of each world, and one might now ask how this relates to more general ways of worldmaking.[14] Making fictional storyworlds, irrespective of genre, involves applying the general processes of worldmaking—which Goodman (1978) identifies as *composition* and *decomposition*,[15] *weighting*,[16] *ordering*,[17] *deletion* and *supplementation*,[18] and *deformation*[19]—to the selection and arrangement of narrative events (i.e., emplotment) that constitute the situations that evoke actions from characters. Such situations have the property of "situatedness" (Nünning, 2010, p. 223), *i.e.*, that fictional narratives are located within time, space, and cultural context, including social norms and values (Nünning, 2010, p. 230). Fictional worldmakers must make worlds, yes, but then they must be populated by individuals; Nünning calls this fictional way of worldmaking "[p]erspectivisation and experientiality" (Nünning, 2010, p. 234). Finally, conventions are themselves powerful tools in the toolkit: character tropes and genres, familiar scripts and story elements—all of these are ways of worldmaking, though at a more particular level of generality than the broad

level of, say, ordering or weighting, or the intermediate level of making decisions about spatiotemporal location.

Consider how *Atlas Shrugged* begins. “Who is John Galt?” Eddie Willers is confronted by this question-statement by a “bum” (with a face “cut by lines of weariness and cynical resignation; the eyes were intelligent”) who has asked him for a dime, and Eddie feels “as if the question had been addressed to the causeless uneasiness within him.” He feels as if the intelligent but mooching “bum” asked that question knowing the reason for the sense of dread he feels but cannot explain. Eddie then identifies the feeling with the time of day: “I hate the twilight.” Then this description of a skyscraper:

> The clouds and the shafts of skyscrapers against them were turning brown, like an old painting in oil, the color of a fading masterpiece. Long streaks of grime ran from under the pinnacles down the slender, soot-eaten walls. High on the side of a tower there was a crack in the shape of a motionless lightning, the length of ten stories. A jagged object cut the sky above the roofs; it was half a spire, still holding the glow of the sunset; the gold leaf had long since peeled off the other half. The glow was red and still, like the reflection of a fire: not an active fire, but a dying one which it is too late to stop.

And then this passage, soon after:

> Eddie Willers shifted his glance down to the street, to a vegetable pushcart at the stoop of a brownstone house. He saw a pile of bright gold carrots and the fresh green of onions. He saw a clean white curtain blowing at an open window. He saw a bus turning a corner, expertly steered. He wondered why he felt reassured—and then, why he felt the sudden, inexplicable wish that these things were not left in the open, unprotected against the empty space above.
>
> When he came to Fifth Avenue, he kept his eyes on the windows of the stores he passed. There was nothing he needed or wished to buy; but he liked to see the display of goods, any goods, objects made by men, to be used by men. He enjoyed the sight of a prosperous street; not more than every fourth one of the stores was out of business, its windows dark and empty.
>
> He did not know why he suddenly thought of the oak tree. Nothing had recalled it. But he thought of it and of his childhood summers on the Taggart estate. He had spent most of his childhood with the Taggart children, and now he worked for them, as his father and grandfather had worked for their father and grandfather.

> The great oak tree had stood on a hill over the Hudson, in a lonely spot of the Taggart estate. Eddie Willers, aged seven, liked to come and look at that tree. It had stood there for hundreds of years, and he thought it would always stand there. Its roots clutched the hill like a fist with fingers sunk into the soil, and he thought that if a giant were to seize it by the top, he would not be able to uproot it, but would swing the hill and the whole of the earth with it, like a ball at the end of a string. He felt safe in the oak tree's presence; it was a thing that nothing could change or threaten; it was his greatest symbol of strength.
>
> One night, lightning struck the oak tree. Eddie saw it the next morning. It lay broken in half, and he looked into its trunk as into the mouth of a black tunnel. The trunk was only an empty shell; its heart had rotted away long ago; there was nothing inside—just a thin gray dust that was being dispersed by the whim of the faintest wind. The living power had gone, and the shape it left had not been able to stand without it.

I have described and quoted Rand's introduction at length here to illustrate a number of points. Rand is not subtle, but in a way that helps one see the ways of worldmaking more starkly. From the metaphors and patterns thereof,[20] from the weighting Rand gives to specific aspects of the urban setting, it's clear that this is the twilight of the world; elements are selected, weighted, ordered to communicate that this civilization is faded, crumbling, rotten. An intuitive person should be uneasy. Smart people who should be workers, sellers of goods, are beggars; the shops are closing, and the remaining examples of expertise and industry are threatened. The passage culminates in the metaphor of the apparently mighty tree that is but an empty shell. In all of this, Rand is not only locating her readers in space and time, but she is supplying a vision of the storyworld's increasingly corrupt and doomed culture and of Eddie's fine, capitalist character, which is at odds with the rotten, socialist spirit of his age. These general ways of worldmaking so far considered pertain to all fictional worldmaking; before addressing the specifically fantastical ways of worldmaking, let me explain *fantastika* in a little more detail.

## § 2.2. Allomythic Narrative Worldmaking in Fantastika

### *§ 2.2.1. Metaleptic Boundary-Crossing into Other Worlds*

At the end of Appendix 27, I summarize the meaning of *fantastika* as follows[21]:

> "Fantastika," therefore, may be thought of as an umbrella genre (1) that emerged in contrast with realist, mimetic literature as part of a historical shift into global, Anthropocene modernity and post-modernity, (2) that is created and consumed by a broad discourse community under the influence of economic forces, and (3) that is characterized by a robust break with or estrangement from this world or consensus reality.

The framework offered here uses more general categories, such as "worldview" and "fantastika," in order to avoid as much as possible the narrow concerns and categories of specific subgroups, such as those that self-identify with "religion" as opposed to "spirituality" or "science fiction" as opposed to "fantasy." Rather than pumping texts through a particular lens, like Freudian psychoanalysis, queer theory, or Derridean deconstruction, tools like probability design, ways of worldmaking, and TWT help one attend to basic cognitive-narratological processes. Although it is not possible for a text to "speak for itself," kairological categories, rooted in disciplinary insights from, e.g., evolutionary-cognitive worldview studies and spatial cognition research, seek, not to approach a fantastical text with answers in mind (e.g., *for a text to be in a specific genre, it must have* such-and-such *qualities to qualify* OR *the sacred, according to stipulated definition x, obviously manifests itself in this text* here *and* here), but rather to remain as open as possible to study a text with broad questions of general concern so as to provide a hospitable setting in which the distinctive qualities of allomythoi may be surfaced.

Because fantastika generates new possible worlds by exploiting humans' evolved capacity for generating probabilistic self-and-world models, its texts may, thus, function as useful externalized cognitive tools for reflection on worldview questions. Particularly in the

area of science fiction, Appendices 27 and 30 elaborate how some SF scholars have emphasized how SF stories function as "thought experiments,"[22] and this is true of fantastika more generally as a demiurgic, world-making art.

This subheading invokes the concept of "metalepsis," but kairological metalepsis should be distinguished from simple narratological metalepsis and still more so from rhetorical metalepsis. The world-switches discussed above in the context of TWT are broad, general instances of a special kind of world shift sometimes referred to in narratology as "metalepsis," which refers to diegetic boundary-crossing. In the context of kairological analysis, I think disposing of the narratological constraint that limits "metalepsis" to the crossing ("intrusion," "transgression") of the extradiegetic "telling" world (usually, the narrator or narratee or something from the extradiegetic world) into the diegetic world that is "told" (or *vice versa*) is productive. In kairology, "metalepsis" and "metaleptic" should refer, rather, to

(a) at the world-making stage, the movement of real-world WWL elements or elements of prior allomythoi into a storyworld;

(b) as part of recreational perception, the diegetic boundary-crossing and shifting into and among allomythoi within a storyworld; or,

(c) at the enacted, social level, the transferal of allomythoi into lived practice by those who make fiction-based WWLs.[23]

Though these forms of metalepsis are instances of "transgression," they may also be thought of in terms of boundary-making: they explore possibility spaces and establish their bounds; indeed, Jameson (1982), writing about science fiction, argues that far more than offering simulated versions of possible futures, sf explores present imaginative limits (see Jameson,

1982, pp. 151, 153).[24] Attending to processes of singularization (*i.e.*, making special/non-ordinary relative to the already non-ordinary storyworld; *e.g.*, addressing BQs or invoking potent, core concerns, often through metaphors invoking basic things like the body, the home, food, special relational bonds, predation, &c.) and attribution (*i.e.*, use of recognized worldview terms; *e.g.*, characters within a storyworld or the narrator designating something a "religion") may help one determine when kairological metalepsis is happening. But the easiest way is to identify agents (individuals and collectives) and ask the kairological BQs.

### *§ 2.2.2. Fantastical Ways of Worldmaking*

Appendices 29 and 30 already introduced and engaged a bit with the concept of the generic *megatext*, how many aspects of the fantastical genres write themselves by virtue of generic inertia.[25] The megatexts of SF, fantasy, and other subgenres of fantastika are those genre-specific tropes, conventions, images, archetypes, and rhetorical moves that have become familiar to initiated readers and writers of the genres.[26] Participants in the fantastical genres must be socialized into their conventions, which have a way of replicating themselves. So, among other things, SF has aliens and space ships, galactic imperialism, surprising technologies, and novel biological threats; fantasy invokes harrowing quests during which protagonists confront strange, new cultures; horror shines its light on the unspeakable that crawls out of the cracks in the foundations of the world. Think, for example, of what would happen if one were to command ChatGPT: "Tell a science fiction story of a boy who unknowingly has superpowers living under an evil galactic empire"; the megatext, "internalized" by the AI that was trained on a corpus of SF texts, would basically write the resulting story. The histories of each subgenre help one understand the evolution of each respective megatext.

But, unlike conventionalized megatextual elements, *novums* (see Appendices 28 and 33), which may become conventionalized as megatextual elements, are anti-conventional foundational elements in establishing fantastical worlds, making that *break* with the consensus world and with prior fantastical worlds that is so much at the heart of the phenomenon. The online edition of *The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction* states near the beginning of its article on the "Novum,"

> Such new textual worlds are set off from ours chiefly by means of a drastic disruption, an anomalous breach in accepted verities; in short, an intrusive novelty so strange, and at first inexplicable, that it deserves a category of its own: the novum. Examples of the sf novum include Time Travel, Invasion from space, mutation (see Mutants), Disaster, radical scientific and Conceptual Breakthroughs, Psi Powers, hyperintelligent AI, the Singularity, and many others of a more idiosyncratic kind. (Broderick, 2022, n.p.)

And novums call out for *neologies*.[27] Christine Brooke-Rose, in *A Rhetoric of the Unreal: Studies in Narrative and Structure, Especially of the Fantastic*, wrote of the *The Lord of the Rings* that it,

> like SF but more so, is particularly interesting in that there is such a megatext, not pre-existent but entirely invented, yet treated with the utmost seriousness and in great detail, thus destroying the element of recognition and hence readability which this feature provides in the realistic novel and causing on the contrary a plethora of information and the collapse of the referential code. (Brooke-Rose, 1981, p. 243)

Brooke-Rose had a low opinion of Tolkien's achievement, finding it tedious, childish, and full of redundancy, but it's worth stressing that in order to fashion his own megatext, on which subsequent participants in the fantasy genre have been so dependent—while certainly still drawing on his vast genre literacy in Medieval and contemporary forms—Tolkien had to make up a host of novums: hobbits, ents, mirthril, the palantír, and on and on.[28] Many of the qualities Brooke-Rose finds annoying function, in an information-theoretic sense, to transmit data regarding his novel storyworld as effectively as possible, minimizing distortions and errors. For further discussion of neologies and novums, see Appendix 33.

## § 2.3. M-mode Allomythic Worldmaking

Allomythic worldmaking in the M-mode is the most experimental. Thus, features identified above as characteristic of fantastical worldmaking are especially abundant in this mode: exploration of the Big Questions (BQs) or primary categories of worldview studies/kairology, presence of kairological metalepsis (remember: look for processes of singularization and attribution as possible signs of this), utilization of robust world-switches, deployment of a generic megatext, and use of neologies denoting novums (the novums themselves having been made by application of general ways of worldmaking).

Tolkien's *LotR* exemplifies this. Let's return to Brooke-Rose's critique of Tolkien for a moment:

> Apart from the 'hypertrophic' redundancy in the text itself, the recapitulations and repetitions, there are long appendices, not only on the history and genealogy but on the language of elves, dwarves, wizards and other powers, together with their philological development, appendices which though ostensibly given to create belief in the "reality" of these societies, in fact and even frankly playfully reflect the author's private professional interest in this particular slice of knowledge, rather than narrative necessity, since all of the examples of runic and other messages inside the narrative are both given in the original and translated. Nor are the histories and genealogies in the least necessary to the narrative, but they have given infantile happiness to the Tolkien clubs and societies, whose members apparently write to each other in Elvish. (Brooke-Rose, 1981, p. 247).

Now consider this reply:

> The element in sf which Brooke-Rose appears to have slighted, at severe cost to her analysis, is the extensive generic mega-text built up over fifty years, even a century, of mutually imbricated sf texts. When novelties like hyper-space and cyberspace, memex and AI (Artificial Intelligence), nanotech and plug-in personality agents are very quickly taken up as the common property of a number of independent stories and authors, we have the beginnings of a new mega-text. (Broderick, 1995, p. 59)

Tolkien devoted much of his life to singlehandedly crafting a fantasy megatext, something typically generated as the cumulative, collaborative effort of many artists working within a subgenre. He sought to produce a sense of "reality," yes, but his redundancies and

apparently-superfluous, scholarly supplements were offered as resources for immersion in and nuanced comprehension of a new mythology gifted to England and a new generic megatext for humanity.

Tolkien's work displays large-scale kairological metalepsis (with singularization processes in *LotR* being tied to metaphors like kingship/servitude, health/sickness, and light/darkness—see Appendix 16 *passim*) and complex exploration of his different peoples' and characters' responses to the BQs. He took elements of ancient worldviews like Norse myth and Medieval English culture to make allomythoi like the Rohirrim, for example. However, he studiously avoided using words like "religion" to refer to the beliefs and practices of the peoples of Middle-earth, so the direct attributional cues of worldview terms like "religion" or "philosophy" are not as helpful—though terms like "people" and "race" are used and are somewhat useful.[29] One must draw on broader worldview literacy to detect, for example, the presence of real-world WWL elements, like Catholic "grace," in Tolkien's construction of his storyworld, as in the gifts of Galadriel. At the recreational-perceptional level of kairological metalepsis, as the hobbits and other members of the Fellowship travel through Middle-earth, they move among a variety of allomythoi and, due to their relative ignorance of the wider world, gradually introduce readers to the unfamiliar allomythoi.

The new languages—systemized and interconnected neologies—Tolkien created that give "infantile happiness to the Tolkien clubs" and sacred languages for Tolkien-based WWLs and that formed the bases of his worldmaking activity in countless subgenres embedded within the *LotR* narrative (songs, prophecies, proverbs, riddles, laws, legends, jokes, and so on), are reflective of a staggering number of novums, some of which are listed in the "constrain[ed]" and "selective" (Tolkien, 2009, p. 1139) Index to the 50th anniversary

edition of *LotR*, from pages 1141 to 1178. And over the course of the narrative text containing countless metaphors, dreams and fears, and other possible worlds simulated during Tolkien's characters' journeys through Middle-earth, readers are called on to engage in innumerably many world-switches.

King's *Dark Tower* series is also a fine example of M-mode allomythic worldmaking.[30] To illustrate its M-mode character, I will focus here on the many world-switches one encounters. The example from L'Engle in this chapter illustrates how common world-switches are even in a brief chunk of text, but if one zooms out a bit and looks at the *Dark Tower* series at the coarser granularity of plot-level analysis, one still finds an unusual degree of world-switches. Throughout much of the second and third novels, *The Drawing of the Three* and *The Waste Lands*, there is a great deal of spatiotemporal movement between our world, Keystone Earth, and Mid-World, the world of the Gunslinger, Roland, while also moving through Mid-World. Roland travels, first, into the mind of Eddie Dean and eventually draws him into Mid-World; next, he inhabits the different era and split personality of Odetta Holmes/Detta Walker, who, when integrated, becomes Susannah Dean, while still having access to Odetta and Detta; finally, he enters sociopathic serial killer Jack Mort and disrupts his murder of Jake Chambers, whose first death brought him to Mid-World in the first book. This produces a maddening dissonance in the outer (historical) and inner (psychological) worlds of Roland and Jake; Eddie and Susannah have no memory of Roland ever having known Jake, but Jake and Roland simultaneously recall the historical world in which Jake never died and the previous, alternate world in which he did. Only by drawing Jake into Mid-World again can the dissonance be resolved. The scene of this resolution contains a high concentration of world shifts: Eddie must overcome his fearful,

addicted persona and adopt the mantle of his gunslinger self in order to complete the mystic key that will open the door between worlds, and Susannah has to adopt the persona of Detta in order to fight the sex demon of the stone-circle thinny, which at its other end, in Keystone Earth, is guarded by a house/monstrous doorkeeper, that Roland must help Jake escape from and through. The fourth and eighth books (the eighth lying chronologically between the fourth and fifth) both contain extended stories-within-the-primary-story: first, Roland telling some of the story of his past in the age of the Affiliation's doomed conflict with John Farson and, second, a continuation of Roland's backstory as well as his telling, within that, an instructive Mid-World tale from his youth. In the fifth and sixth books, there is much travel, mental and physical, between Mid-World and Keystone Earth, and it is revealed that Susannah (who, again, contains Detta and Odetta) is also inhabited by Mia, the demon who impregnated her and, much earlier, had had sex with and preserved the seed of Roland. Father Callahan, from King's novel *'Salem's Lot*, plays a prominent role in these books (and the beginning of the seventh), moving between both worlds, and, in the sixth book, *Song of Susannah*, the primary threats to the Dark Tower are the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the character Stephen King's loss of motivation to continue writing the *Dark Tower* series (Roland hypnotizes him to compel him to finish). One might argue that the King-as-character diary entries King includes function as a sort of "paratextual world-shift," much like Tolkien's Introductions and Appendices. And of course in the (chronologically) last, seventh book Patrick Danville's role relative to the conflict between the Red and the White, the Crimson King's fate, and, ultimately, the fate of the Dark Tower, as foretold in *Insomnia*, comes to fruition. These are just some of the large-scale world-switches in the series.

Regarding the vast *mise-en-abîme* of the *Dark Tower* storyworld and the Dark Tower itself, Besson writes (2015, p. 117):

> *D'un narcissisme parfois gênant (comme lorsqu'un comité d'experts se lance à la recherche d'indices dans les œuvres complètes de King), cette vaste mise en abyme ne fait en réalité que concrétiser une image effectivement très ancienne chez King, celle de l'auteur hanté, pour qui la création entraîne une possession* par *la fiction, et une dépossession de soi*.[31]

Besson regards King's narrative metalepses as narcissistic, but at the same time, her evocation of haunting and possession captures a real insight that is central to King's project: every human personality,[32] every social formation in making itself finds itself building its big-world-of-little-worlds, its *mise-en-abîme*, by mapping together worlds it has received (albeit with modifications using the general ways of worldmaking), thereby being displaced and possessed by them in the very act of creating itself. One must "remember the face of" one's ancestors and "be true" to them if one would attempt to create novelty on anything approaching the M-mode scale. King's lifelong meditation of the complexities of his characters'—and his own—inner worlds serves him well. And the fact that all of the characters in all of King's stories, not only those in the narrowly-construed *Dark Tower* canon, are part of the multiverse encompassed and sustained by the Dark Tower means that all their WWLs are ultimately part of the heteroglossic bounty of his M-mode allomythology.

### § 2.4. N-mode Allomythic Worldmaking

N-mode allomythic worldmaking likewise has the elements identified in this chapter: kairological metalepsis and BQ exploration—though not as much as in the M-mode but far more than in the O-mode and almost always in service of the controlling perspective; neologies and novums—though with more resting in megatexual convention than in the M-mode; and robust world-switches—indeed, far more than are typical in the O-mode. The

discipline and balance that are typical of the N-mode give its allomythic worldmaking a narrative efficiency and, indeed, sense of "necessity" that many find satisfying.

Let's first consider kairological metalepsis and BQ exploration in Pullman's *His Dark Materials*. Lee Scoresby, the New-Danish/Texan aëronaut, and Serafina Pekkala, the witch queen, have the follow conversation in *Northern Lights/The Golden Compass*, after Pekkala informs Scoresby he has no choice in the matter of having been drafted by fate into serving as a soldier on Lyra's behalf:

> "Well, that seems kinda precipitate. Seems to me a man should have a choice whether to take up arms or not."
>
> "We have no more choice in that than in whether or not to be born."
>
> "Oh, I like choice, though," he said. "I like choosing the jobs I take and the places I go and the food I eat and the companions I sit and yarn with. Don't you wish for a choice once in a while?"
>
> Serafina Pekkala considered, and then said, "Perhaps we don't mean the same thing by choice, Mr. Scoresby. Witches own nothing, so we're not interested in preserving value or making profits, and as for the choice between one thing and another, when you live for many hundreds of years, you know that every opportunity will come again. We have different needs. You have to repair your balloon and keep it in good condition, and that takes time and trouble, I see that; but for us to fly, all we have to do is tear off a branch of cloud-pine; any will do, and there are plenty more. We don't feel cold, so we need no warm clothes. We have no means of exchange apart from mutual aid. If a witch needs something, another witch will give it to her. If there is a war to be fought, we don't consider cost one of the factors in deciding whether or not it is right to fight. Nor do we have any notion of honor, as bears do, for instance. An insult to a bear is a deadly thing. To us... inconceivable. How could you insult a witch? What would it matter if you did?"
>
> "Well, I'm kinda with you on that. Sticks and stones, I'll break yer bones, but names ain't worth a quarrel. But ma'am, you see my dilemma, I hope. I'm a simple aeronaut, and I'd like to end my days in comfort. Buy a little farm, a few head of cattle, some horses...Nothing grand, you notice. No palace or slaves or heaps of gold. Just the evening wind over the sage, and a ceegar, and a glass of bourbon whiskey. Now the trouble is, that costs money. So I do my flying in exchange for cash, and after every job I send some gold back to the Wells Fargo Bank, and when I've got enough, ma'am, I'm "gonna sell this balloon and book me a passage on a steamer to Port Galveston, and I'll never leave the ground again."

> "There's another difference between us, Mr. Scoresby. A witch would no sooner give up flying than give up breathing. To fly is to be perfectly ourselves."
>
> "I see that, ma'am, and I envy you; but I ain't got your sources of satisfaction. Flying is just a job to me, and I'm just a technician. I might as well be adjusting valves in a gas engine or wiring up anbaric circuits. But I chose it, you see. It was my own free choice. Which is why I find this notion of a war I ain't been told nothing about kinda troubling."
>
> "Iorek Byrnison's quarrel with his king is part of it too," said the witch. "This child is destined to play a part in that."
>
> "You speak of destiny," he said, "as if it was fixed. And I ain't sure I like that any more than a war I'm enlisted in without knowing about it. Where's my free will, if you please? And this child seems to me to have more free will than anyone I ever met. Are you telling me that she's just some kind of clockwork toy wound up and set going on a course she can't change?"
>
> "We are all subject to the fates. But we must all act as if we are not," said the witch, "or die of despair. There is a curious prophecy about this child: she is destined to bring about the end of destiny. But she must do so without knowing what she is doing, as if it were her nature and not her destiny to do it. If she's told what she must do, it will all fail; death will sweep through all the worlds; it will be the triumph of despair, forever. The universes will all become nothing more than interlocking machines, blind and empty of thought, feeling, life...."

Here one observes allomythic responses to the BQs being played off each other—for example, the witch vs. the aëronaut's evaluation of flying, the witch and the aëronaut's differing assessment of the gravity of honor and insults in contrast to the panserbjørne, and most of all, a tense exploration of problems like fatalism, choice, and materialism. And the statement that all must act as if not subject to fate or die of despair could very well be a kairological-metaleptic importation, into the witch queen's mouth, of William James' will-to-believe. Pullman's naturalistic but panpsychist perspective naturally governs the exchange.

Many were scandalized at the depiction of the death of God in *His Dark Materials*, as the angel who set himself up as the Authority is mercifully scattered to the winds in "exhausted relief." The deaths of the gay-male, angelic lovers, Baruch and Balthamos, are

similarly structured in accord with Pullman's O-mode style relative to conservative, organized Christianity, though his overall work is N-mode:

> Then the snowleopard daemon got to her feet in one swift movement and leapt to the door, but it was too late: the orderly who had knocked had opened without waiting. That was the way things were done; it was no one's fault; but seeing the expression on the soldier's face as he looked past him, Lord Asriel turned back to see Baruch straining and quivering to hold his wounded form together. The effort was too much. A draft from the open door sent an eddy of air across the bed, and the particles of the angel's form, loosened by the waning of his strength, swirled upward into randomness and vanished. "Balthamos!" came a whisper from the air.
>
> Balthamos felt the death of Baruch the moment it happened. He cried aloud and soared into the night air over the tundra, flailing his wings and sobbing his anguish into the clouds; and it was some time before he could compose himself and go back to Will, who was wide awake, knife in hand, peering up into the damp and chilly murk. They were back in Lyra's world.
>
> "What is it?" said Will as the angel appeared trembling beside him. "Is it danger? Get behind me…"
>
> "Baruch is dead," cried Balthamos, "my dear Baruch is dead…"
>
> "When? Where?"
>
> But Balthamos couldn't tell; he only knew that half his heart had been extinguished. He couldn't keep still: he flew up again, scouring the sky as if to seek out Baruch in this cloud or that, calling, crying, calling; and then he'd be overcome with guilt, and fly down to urge Will to hide and keep quiet, and promise to watch over him tirelessly; and then the pressure of his grief would crush him to the ground, and he'd remember every instance of kindness and courage that Baruch had ever shown, and there were thousands, and he'd forgotten none of them; and he'd cry that a nature so gracious could never be snuffed out, and he'd soar into the skies again, casting about in every direction, reckless and wild and stricken, cursing the very air, the clouds, the stars.
>
> Then Balthamos stood up, sick and weary and full of pain.
>
> "Baruch," he said, "oh, Baruch, my dear, I can do no more. Will and the girl are safe, and everything will be well, but this is the end for me, though truly I died when you did, Baruch, my beloved.
>
> A moment later, he was gone.

I quote this series of passages to illustrate several things about Pullman's allomythic worldmaking. One is how deeply informed by and allusive of classical Western canonical texts it is; Pullman could not resist invoking the tradition of the one male warrior lamenting

the death of the other—from Gilgamesh and Enkidu to David and Jonathan to Achilles and Patroclus, etc.—and asserting that these were *lovers*, not merely "close male friends." These angelic heroes are gay, and they resist to their deaths the evil of the religious system that would condemn their relationship and, along the same lines, equate Dust with original sin, abuse minors through the practice of intercision, and violently censor knowledge deemed heretical by the Magisterium that governed the Church after Pope John Calvin died. Pullman encourages BQ exploration of what values one might celebrate and what way of life one might pursue, but he also, in typical N-mode style, is very clear about what range of BQ answers are appropriate.

Turning to neologies and novums, Scoresby's reference to "anbaric circuits," from the Arabic word for "amber," which is the etymological root of "electric" (the Greek word for amber, which has notable electrostatic properties, is ἤλεκτρον), is a pretty typical example of a neology,[33] as are the "cloud-pine" branches witches fly on.

Pullman's characters, like Tolkien's, journey great distances and encounter many peoples, giving readers the opportunity to engage in kairological-metaleptic movement among such allomythoi as those of the Gyptians and the witches, and, like King's characters, the characters frequently jump between parallel worlds—including Lyra's world with its predominate steampunk-style civilization, Will's home world, the world of Cittàgazze, the world of the mulefa, and the world of the dead. However, though Pullman's text and narrative contains many world-switches, it does not engage in the frequent use of F-Universe and modal world-switches found in King or what I have called paratextual world-switches in Tolkien and King.

Turning to L'Engle, let's begin with a characteristic passage. It comes from *A Wind in the Door*, in which Meg must again save her little brother, Charles Wallace, whose fate is ultimately tied to the destiny of the cosmos. He is sick. And rather than travelling through the vastness of outer space to save him, as she did in *A Wrinkle in Time*, instead, Meg must travel (with help) into the inner world, the "galaxy," of Charles Wallace's own body, because he has fallen ill due to the Echthroi (the enemies of light, life, truth, and reality) having persuaded his "farandolae"—fictional proto-symbiotes that (after Deepening to become "farae") may choose to sustain a mitochondrion just as our mitochondria symbiotically sustain our whole body—to reject "Deepening," the process of giving up independent organic existence to enter into symbiotic union with their world, the mitochondrion Yadah, just as mitochondria once surrendered independent prokaryotic existence to live with and within our cells:

> [Meg] began calling urgently, "Sporos! Farandolae! Come away from the Echthroi. You will dance yourselves to death. Come to Senex and Deepen. This is what you were born to do. Come!"
>
> Some of the farandolae faltered. Others whirled the faster, crying, "We don't need to Deepen. That's only an old superstition. It's a stupid song they sing, all this Glory, glory, glory. We are the ones who are glorious."
>
> "The stars—" Meg called desperately.
>
> "Another superstition. There are no stars. We are the greatest beings in the universe."
>
> Ugliness seeped past Meg and to Sporos. "Why do you *want* to Deepen?"
>
> Sporos's twingling was slightly dissonant. "Farandolae are born to Deepen."
>
> "Fool. Once you Deepen and put down roots you won't be able to romp around as you do now."
>
> "But—"
>
> "You'll be stuck in one place forever with those fuddy-duddy farae, and you won't be able to run or move, ever again."
>
> "But—"
>
> The strength and calm of Senex cut through the ugliness. "It is only when we are fully rooted that we are really able to move."
>
> Indecision quivered throughout Sporos.

> Senex continued, "It is true, small offspring. Now that I am rooted I am no longer limited by motion. Now I may move anywhere in the universe. I sing with the stars. I dance with the galaxies. I share in the joy—and in the grief. We farae must have our part in the rhythm of the mitochondria, or we cannot be. If we cannot be, then we are not."
>
> "You mean, you die?" Meg asked.
>
> "Is that what you call it? Perhaps. I am not sure. But the song of Yadah is no longer full and rich. It is flaccid, its harmonies meager. By our arrogance we make Yadah suffer."

L'Engle's respect for traditional wisdom—giving up a measure of the independence of youth and to become rooted and part of the greater unity of things—is embodied in Senex ("old man"), whom the Echthros dismisses as a "fuddy-duddy" and whose wisdom is derided as superstition. When farandolae Deepen as farae, they join the same cosmic song that the stars sing together, "Glory, glory, glory"; L'Engle is here engaged in kairological metalepsis of the Christian doctrine of the *musica universalis*, such as one might find, for example, in Kepler's *Mysterium Cosmographicum* (1596) and *Harmonices Mundi* (1619). The whole cosmos, from the smallest fara (a novum introduced by L'Engle, together with "Deepening" and the "farandola") to the stars, is part of the same worshipful, loving song to the Creator—and part of the same war to preserve creation:

> Oh, earthling, earthling, why do you think Blajeny called for you? There is war in heaven, and we need all the help we can get. The Echthroi are spreading through the universe. Every time a star goes out another Echthros has won a battle. A star or a child or a farandola—size doesn't matter, Meg. The Echthroi are after Charles Wallace and the balance of the entire universe can be altered by the outcome.

Each soul is precious and Named (a central category in L'Engle's allomythology); every person matters in the cosmic family of things.

In the first L'Engle passage above, communication is made possible, as noted earlier in this chapter, by a telepathic meeting of souls L'Engle calls "kything." Other novums, as already noted in this subsection, are identified by the neologies "Deepening," "farandola," and "fara." The Echthroi, in "Xing" (negating, annihilating) Charles Wallace's farandolae

before they Deepen, know that as his mitochondria, like Yadah, are Xed, so too will he be doomed, and the universe with him. L'Engle's use of neologies is not as robust as, say, Pullman, and certainly not as rich and developed as King and Tolkien. But in making her storyworld and its allomythoi, she develops her own lexicon of people, places, processes, things.

Finally, world-switches occur very frequently at the textual level in L'Engle, which is not unusual in literary texts in general, but robust world-switches, as in the case of journeying down to the tiny world of Yadah to meet the farandolae and the fara Senex, also occur with relative frequency, which is likely more characteristic of fantastical texts than of realist fiction. Modal world-switches are common, but L'Engle does not engage in the kind of paratextual world-switches one finds in Tolkien and King (and even in Pullman's (2003) *Lyra's Oxford*).

### § 2.5. O-mode Allomythic Worldmaking

While M-mode allomythic worldmaking can, for many readers, feel excessive or tedious and if N-mode worldmaking may strike some as simplistic or clichéd, O-mode allomythic worldmaking, to one without a dog in its fight or, worse, a dog being savaged by its dog, is likely to feel strident and redundant in a way that's quite distinguishable from the M-mode's fractal efflorescence. Its texts still contain novums and perhaps neologies—but only the bare minimum to serve their ends. A text in which this mode predominates will engage in kairological metalepsis and BQ exploration, but, again, only enough to set up the outlines of its enemies to murder them and then engage in detailed construction of a monument to itself on their graves. And world-switches tend to be of less variety and less robust in the O-mode.

Rand deploys her scientific novums with the force and function of an atheistic *deus ex machina*, generally to illustrate the absolute mastery of men of the mind over matter and the wickedness of those using technical expertise in the service of the looters (examples include Rearden Metal, the Gulch mirage (refractor rays), Galt's motor and his voice- and palm-activated door locks, Project X (sonic death ray), and the Ferris Persuader (torture machine used on Galt). To illustrate, when Rand decides it is time for John Galt to interrupt the radio address of Mr. Thompson, the Head of State, and replace it with his own, the reader learns that Galt has the technical expertise to use radio waves "of a frequency never produced before, never observed anywhere, never discovered by anybody." His 60-page speech is an intense example of kairological metalepsis, in which an ordinary reader may wonder if Rand's gavage of Objectivist doctrine will ever relent.

But to give an example of her O-mode style, its form of kairological metalepsis, and some characteristic world-switches, let's consider a portion of another passage, in which a train has derailed due to the laziness and greed of the looters in charge of the railways:

> It is said that catastrophes are a matter of pure chance, and there were those who would have said that the passengers of the Comet were not guilty or responsible for the thing that happened to them.
>
> The man in Bedroom A, Car No. 1, was a professor of sociology who taught that individual ability is of no consequence, that individual effort is futile, that an individual conscience is a useless luxury, that there is no individual mind or character or achievement, that everything is achieved collectively, and that it's masses that count, not men [....]
>
> The woman in Roomette 10, Car No. 3, was an elderly school-teacher who had spent her life turning class after class of helpless children into miserable cowards, by teaching them that the will of the majority is the only standard of good and evil, that a majority may do anything it pleases, that they must not assert their own personalities, but must do as others were doing [....]
>
> The man in Bedroom H, Car No. 5, was a businessman who had acquired his business, an ore mine, with the help of a government loan, under the Equalization of Opportunity Bill [....]

> The man in Seat 5, Car No. 7, was a worker who believed that he had "a right" to a job, whether his employer wanted him or not.
>
> The woman in Roomette 6, Car No. 8, was a lecturer who believed that, as a consumer, she had "a right" to transportation, whether the railroad people wished to provide it or not [....]
>
> The woman in Bedroom D, Car No. 10, was a mother who had put her two children to sleep in the berth above her, carefully tucking them in, protecting them from drafts and jolts; a mother whose husband held a government job enforcing directives, which she defended by saying, "I don't care, it's only the rich that they hurt. After all, I must think of my children."
>
> The man in Roomette 3, Car No. 11, was a sniveling little neurotic who wrote cheap little plays into which, as a social message, he inserted cowardly little obscenities to the effect that all businessmen were scoundrels.
>
> The woman in Roomette 9, Car No. 12, was a housewife who believed that she had the right to elect politicians, of whom she knew nothing, to control giant industries, of which she had no knowledge.
>
> The man in Bedroom F, Car No. 13, was a lawyer who had said, "Me? I'll find a way to get along under any political system."
>
> The man in Bedroom A, Car No. 14, was a professor of philosophy who taught that there is no mind—*how do you know that the tunnel is dangerous?*—no reality—*how can you prove that the tunnel exists?*—no logic—*why do you claim that trains cannot move without motive power?*—no principles—*why should you be bound by the law of cause-and-effect?* —no rights—*why shouldn't you attach men to their jobs by force?*—no morality—*what's moral about running a railroad?*—no absolutes —*what difference does it make to you whether you live or die, anyway?* He taught that we know nothing—*why oppose the orders of your superiors?*—that we can never be certain of anything—*how do you know you're right?*—that we must act on the expediency of the moment—*you don't want to risk your job, do you?*
>
> The man in Drawing Room B, Car No. 15, was an heir who had inherited his fortune, and who had kept repeating, "Why should Rearden be the only one permitted to manufacture Rearden Metal?"
>
> The man in Bedroom A, Car No. 16, was a humanitarian who had said, "The men of ability? I do not care what or if they are made to suffer. They must be penalized in order to support the incompetent. Frankly, I do not care whether this is just or not. I take pride in not caring to grant any justice to the able, where mercy to the needy is concerned."
>
> These passengers were awake; there was not a man aboard the train who did not share one or more of their ideas. As the train went into the tunnel, the flame of Wyatt's Torch was the last thing they saw on earth.

By means of a series of world-switches, from car to car and, within them, through direct and indirect speech and thought world-switches giving one access to the briefly-contextualized allomythoi of a number of characters, each standing in for a real-world WWL that she

opposes, Rand establishes, to her evident satisfaction, the guilt—whether in terms of actions or merely in terms of thought crimes—of those who die in the crash and the justice of their fates. One might note with particular interest the way Rand herself leaps into sarcastic, interrogative dialog with the doomed professor of philosophy, putting to him targeted, mocking variations on questions he might have asked students.

Whittaker Chambers, in the *National Review*, once wrote, "From almost any page of *Atlas Shrugged*, a voice can be heard, from painful necessity, commanding: 'To a gas chamber—go'" (1957, p. 21). Pierce's text, similarly, engages in kairological metalepsis of political ideologies and racial stereotypes in order to attack his enemies, the foes of the white race, and justify their apocalyptic doom.[34] And in Pierce (and, in a less religious but rather distinctly philosophical register, in Rand), the attributional cues of terms that designate core religious and philosophical categories openly signal kairological metalepsis.[35]

Some of Pierce's novums involve novel methods for domination and state surveillance.[36] And Turner also, rather in the manner of an SF "Edisonade," as I suggest in passing in Chapter 1, uses technoscientific expertise in the service of his holy war.[37] But Pierce also posits fantastical historical, social, and legal developments.[38]

To return to the opening concepts, genre and probability design, Pierce uses generic expectations and metaphors and embodied or visceral descriptive passages to adjust his readers' priors to persuade them to regard certain events as credible or likely, certain behaviors—especially from disapproved groups and characters—as disturbingly, appallingly, frightfully probable, and certain events as thrilling. He frames the diary entries[39] that constitute the majority of his text with an academic-seeming "Forward" written 100 years after the events described in the diaries of this "Martyr," whose name all children

memorize in the "sacred" "Record of Martyrs" and "whose struggle and sacrifice saved our race." This paratextual element, like editorial comments throughout[40] and the "Epilog," lends an air of realism and objectivity to the text. Within the "Forward," the text argues for the diaries' value in depicting with first-hand immediacy—"free of the distortion which often afflicts hindsight"—the "historical" events of the "Great Revolution."[41] The narrative itself is lurid with potent metaphors of contagion (already illustrated above—pp. 54–55), violation,[42] and visceral embodiments of violence, pain, and shame, as well as adventure, exhilarating combat, and victory.[43]

## § 2.6. Conclusion

The previous chapter considered proposed categories for understanding some of the central or foremost concerns or BQs ("Big Questions") addressed by allomythoi—as well as their modal dispositions—that aid in characterizing their individual natures, and then this chapter has considered some of the ways such novel, fantastical allomythoi are created by authors and recreationally re-created by participatory percipients. Because novel concepts involve making new connections, situations of high and varied connectivity may be expected to be generative of such concepts. In other words, allomythoi are generated by individual creativity and re-creativity, but their genesis, too, has a historical and social dimension. This shall be the primary theme taken up in the following chapter, which explores some of the historically-contingent problems to which fantastika, as an umbrella genre, as well as, of course, the allomythoi in its constituent texts and their storyworlds, respond. In other words, where the first chapter offers some Big Questions (BQs) to help organize kairology, the third chapter proposes some candidates for Big Problems (BPs).

## Notes

[1] See p. 13. And some more subtle themes that could here be made explicit, put briefly, include the following:

a. **Problems & Questions, Worlds & Worldviews:** One might set up a simple distinction by arguing that M-mode allomythoi have as their provocations the big (and little) **questions** of their lifeworlds while N- and O-mode allomythoi, though responding to the big and little questions that animate them, tend to know and supply the correct and *incorrect* **answers**. Lev Grossman, for example, like Pullman, reacts against C. S. Lewis, J. K. Rowling, and others with O-mode stimuli that nonetheless turn into an N-mode allomythos as he allows himself to relax into worldmaking. George R. R. Martin, on the other hand, might appear to have made an M-mode work of Tolkien-like scale, but close analysis of his allomythoi reveals an O-mode disposition (in this case, to the genre of Tolkienian fantasy itself) and a consequently essentialist manner of worldmaking that he stylizes as reflecting Westerosi biases. See "Appendix 24: On Allomythoi in Martin's *A Song of Ice and Fire*."

b. **Estrangement and Dislocation:** By erecting new boundaries and violating the ordinary boundaries of consensus reality, fantastika estranges through dislocation. This insight is rooted in the spatial, embodied perspective that is one of the core features of the framework supplied in this work; at the same time, it points to a problem of disembodiment, inauthenticity, mediation, and virtuality. The escape into alien situations in estranged worlds may alienate one from genuine experiences in real, lived situations *here*. But estrangement has a transformative, not merely narcotic, potential: by addressing the big questions of one's world in the estranged mirror of another, one may be thrown back on one's world in such a way that its possibilities shine out with fresh energy.

c. **Location and the Rhetorical Concept of *Memoria*:** The main text of Chapter 1 directs readers to Appendix 11, and n. 16 in Chapter 1 expresses some key insights succinctly. Here, I would make explicit the point that, although the techniques of *memoria* have been neglected since we developed mass media for external storage of information and although rhetoric and composition studies have tended to focus on the other rhetorical categories and techniques, worldviews as "chains of memory" and allomythoi as mappings of events affect and endure only if they successfully deploy rhetorical techniques that support relatively uncorrupted encoding, storage, and retrieval of information. The hippocampal entanglement of spatial and declarative learning further endorses this framework's spatial orientation; the role of the amygdala in enhancing the clarity and detail of emotional events and, like the hippocampus, in promoting memory consolidation helps drive home why narratives, with their constant appeals to *pathos*, are so effective in affecting percipients; and, to take a third example, attending to the frontal lobes' active role in declarative memory brings home the fact that retrieval is always *creative reconstruction*. Allomythic mappings of salient events, when reenacted on the stage of consciousness, are novel constructions of the reader or other perciepient, not simply passively-retrieved "files." Such mental spaces are loci of significant intention and affect, but these latter two elements are in some tension with each other, as the following discussion of "spectacle" as characteristic of fantastical worlds hopefully helps clarify.

d. **Fantastika and Rhetorical *Spectacle*:** The main text notes the "monumental" importance of boundaries in both religious studies and fantastika: from the novums that violate boundaries and simultaneously fabricate new ones (to the point of inaugurating new worlds, new worldviews) to the special things and spaces of ordinary and extraordinary "religion." Another way of characterizing this would be to attend to the importance of the miraculous or magical as *spectacular* – spectacle being an important rhetorical category (which Aristotle nonetheless relegates to being far less important than μῦθος καὶ ἤθη and the rest (Aristot. *Poet*. 1450b) – alas, George Lucas (un)tragically forgot this when he made his *Star Wars* prequel trilogy). I would use "spectacle" to refer both to the rhetorical concept of ὄψις as Aristotle seems to have broadly intended it (*mise-en-scène*, costumes, acting) and to *spectāculum* (with its implications of monumental, public display). In Hent De Vries's article, "Of Miracles and Special Effects," De Vries reflects philosophically on miracles and special effects (drawing on concepts like the "exception" and the singularity of the "event") to complicate and destabilize simplistic oppositional thinking that would treat the religious and the secular as distinct;

that is, as Jean-Luc Marion notes relative to the icon and the idol, there has always been an analytically undecidable element of technicity or artificiality in the miraculous. Spectacle is persuasive and may alienate, objectify, enthrall, subjugate, mystify, or overwhelm (*cf., e.g.*, Debord, 1967/2014; Baudrillard, 1994, p. 16), but it may also, through startlement, awaken and even liberate, and through magnitude and intensity, ennoble and memorialize. Fantastical stage devices and special effects, like narrated scenes of the non-ordinary in written texts, materially manifest and expose one to the improbable, making the unlikely actual. And what is made physically, intersubjectively "visible" as spectacle has a communal potential and may be more vividly recalled. Certain media prime percipients by their very nature to expect more fantastical content; see Appendix 25, "SPFX – Animation as a Signal of Estrangement."

e. **Rhetorical Persuasion and *Pistis*:** Another expression sometimes used to speak of one's worldview or perspective is one's "persuasion" or even "faith," captured in Greek by a word of fundamental rhetorical import: *pistis*. I submit that worldviews are through and through *rhetorical* and *persuasive*. To be meaningful, they must be systems of relations among representations whose meanings emerge from their systemic relations (*i.e.*, "languages" in a loose sense), and the goal-oriented modulation of representations modifies and in fact generates experiences. A strong argument can be made from a number of converging studies suggesting that sophisticated modulation of sound and bodily movements (music and dance), which are obviously more affectively charged representations though far less conceptually precise (lots of *pathos*, little *logos*), long preceded language as we think of it today, but language is an inherently social medium of intersubjective coordination and influence that was developed under robust social pressures. Accounts of the evolution of language's subcomponents propose a variety of theories and pathways, and the story is not settled. But some of the most relevant capacities include the following: mutually-reinforced increased command over social (hierarchical) and physical (sequential) space, depending on increased spatial reasoning, hand and tool use, and vocalization. All of these novel combinatory skills (for tools, for mental maps, for arrangements of sounds and movements of the body, and so on) involve a fantastic openness or indeterminacy. This metaphoric, transformative combinatoriness lies at the core of the phenomenon examined in this work and the analytic framework here supplied. See Appendix 26, "On the Evolution of Language and Worldviews as Rhetorical," for extended treatment of these and related issues; there, I also make a number of passing gestures at directions future research might take in this area.

[2] Dewey writes,

> For each great [artistic] tradition [or "school"] is itself an organized habit of vision and of methods of ordering and conveying material. As this habit enters into native temperament and constitution it becomes an essential ingredient of the mind of an artist. (1934, p. 265)

For a more detailed treatment of the above, see "Appendix 27: What are genres, and how does this help us to understand fantastika?"

[3] In saying this, it is important to recognize that fantastika differs in degree, but not in kind, from other forms of narrative, all of which, as noted in text world theory (TWT), introduce new possibilities, new possible worlds. In modifying one's probabilistic world model, it may be likened, as an externalized cognitive tool, to other human cognitive capacities like sleep, play, and mental time travel on which it depends. See Appendix 14.

[4] Dewey puts it this way:

> There is always a gap between the here and now of direct interaction and the past interactions [of self and world] whose funded result constitutes the meanings with which we grasp and understand what is now occurring. Because of this gap, all conscious perception involves a risk; it is a venture into the unknown, for as it assimilates the present to the past it also brings about some reconstruction of that past. When past and present fit exactly into one another,

> when there is only recurrence, complete uniformity, the resulting experience is routine and mechanical; it does not come to consciousness in perception. The inertia of habit overrides adaptation of the meaning of the here and now with that of experiences, without which there is no consciousness, the imaginative phase of experience. (1934, p. 272)

[5] See, for example, Zacks, 2020; Taves & Asprem, 2017; Schjoedt & Andersen 2017; van Elk & Aleman 2017; Schjoedt et al., 2013; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2013; Andersen et al., 2014. Researchers in the various disciplines are engaged in a similar process, an externalized, socially-distributed cognitive system wherein the current model for some phenomenon or aspect of reality is probed by experiment for discrepancies. Disciplinary advances occur when discrepancies are found and when the model, as embodied in the disciplinary literature, is effectively updated to explain away such predictive errors—that is, when a new "threshold concept" is encountered and overcome.

[6] Hogan (2013; 2017) calls such simulations "semi-perceptual and pseudo-motor."

[7] For more detail, see "Appendix 28: What evolved human cognitive capacity does the genre of fantastika exploit?"

[8] Hills (2018) explains this in terms of a panhuman "shamanism," *shamans* being those humans who develop the skill to enter a trance state, often in response to environmental uncertainty (problems), to engage in a simulated search through possible mental spaces and beings for intuitively compelling associations that supply the coherence and meaning vital to individual wellbeing (Park, Park & Peterson, 2010) and collective coordination. See my discussion of "threshold concepts" in Chapter 4 and its associated appendices. (Because an effective response to uncertainty can be arbitrary randomness, unusual "shamanic" members of a community who think in atypical, even apparently irrational ways may supply the solution to an unprecedented, unusual situation (see Graeber and Wengrow, 2021).)

[9] See n. 14.

[10] The kairological BQs identify key aspects of fictional WWLs. When these are markedly different from a reader or other percipient's familiar repertoire of WWLs, their initial incoherence and implausibility may be used as part of plausibility design to produce narrative effects such as tension, surprise, mystery, and so on. For example, the implausible, puzzling epistemology, ontology, and praxeology of an alien species, slowly revealed to the reader through narrative events, might eventually be explained as being rooted in their bodies being very different from that of humans, having evolved in a hostile environment markedly different from earth, as in Liu Cixin's trilogy, *Remembrance of Earth's Past*.

In Robin Hobb's *Liveship Traders* trilogy, to give another example along the same lines, the distinctive allomythoi of her sentient ships, sea serpents, and dragons are individually puzzling to the reader, and the narrative resolves the mystery by revealing that the ships are made from the magical cocoons sea serpents make to store their memories while the metamorphize into dragons, who then eat their cocoons to restore their memories. The dark secret of the liveship traders is that they kill dragons to steal their cocoons to make their liveships. The reader encounters the allomythic BQs as "threshold concepts" – intuitive predictions are repeatedly unsettled and overturned because the allomythoi of the liveships, sea serpents, dragons, and liveship traders are different from those of the human WWLs familiar to the reader, but, gradually, the reader adapts their allomythic models to new narrative input until the satisfying *aha!* moment when their allomythic models explain away the narrative events.

[11] For more references, expanded explanation, and examples, see "Appendix 29: On Probability Design." I would urge the reader to keep in mind that almost all cognitive narratological studies have to pick simple texts, where, for example, pared-down plot event sequences, motion verbs, body-related adjectives, and so on evoke specific responses. Complex narrative texts necessarily combine things in ways that challenge any simplistic or reductive analysis. But is it not a marvel that such a low-bandwidth thing as a stream of signs can be the occasion of such complicated simulation, focused attention, metacognition, contrafactual exploration?

[12] Though not using Kukkonen's language, Zunshine (2008, p. 54) offers a probability-design style of analysis, interacting at the same time with research on evolved cognitive predispositions for essentialist and functionalist thinking, when she writes,

> Science fiction narratives that develop the theme of a "rebellious creature" will foreground functionalist rhetoric, that is rhetoric emphasizing that a given protagonist—a robot, a cyborg, an android—was put together artifact-like, that is, it was *made*, or *custom-tailored*, or *designed* with a specific function in mind. I suggest that by cultivating such functionalist rhetoric to describe an entity that we at the same time cannot help but perceive as a living being, such stories tacitly render the motif of its subsequent rebellion particularly *cognitively plausible* or *cognitively satisfying*. [...] So fictional stories of rebellious robots indeed touch—sometimes intentionally, sometimes not—certain cultural nerves (e.g., an anxiety about encroaching technology, an unhappiness of being thought of as replaceable and replicable), but the very reason that they can touch these nerves is that they have first "grabbed" us cognitively, that is, they have created a zone of cognitive uncertainty and possibility.

And she goes on to illustrate this with Asimov's "The Bicentennial Man," about which she comments in part as follows:

> I see Andrew's rebellion as "cognitively satisfying" for us, the readers, because its outcome—the erstwhile robot's official admission to the ranks of humanity eases the cognitive tension built up by the story. Andrew is a narrative construct that activates inferences from two different conceptual domains: the domain of living beings and the domain of artifacts. By making Andrew go through his life as a half-man and a half-machine—a hybrid state reflected in the fact that he has complex emotions but "man-made" features—Asimov forces his readers to straddle these domains. By bringing his rebellion to fruition and showing Andrew die "as a man," he finally allows us to conceptualize him as a human being, or, if not really and truly human, then at least, as more human than before.
>
> [...] If a writer wants to portray a robot/android/Al program as more human and less mechanical, he or she should make relatively vague both the story of the robot's origins and the description of its function. The broader the function, the easier it might be for us, multifunctional beings that we are, to identify with such a creature. Moreover, a strong emphasis on the obvious mechanical origins of the artificial being ("I built it from scratch right here in my garage with my Erector Set!") may eventually help the narrator to get away with a murder, for who really cares about the demolition of even the most gussied-up toaster oven? (Zunshine, 2008, pp. 79, 100)

[13] For an extended treatment of TWT, see "Appendix 30: On Text World Theory."

[14] For a more detailed explanation than that provided in the main text, see "Appendix 31: General Ways of Worldmaking."

[15] That creation of a new world is compositional appears rather obvious, though there are depths to compositionality that reward study (metaphor, connectionism, blending, hybridization…), but decomposition – attending to the parts that make up the whole, allowing previously neglected parts to manifest in their particularity, lifting them by the power of abstraction from their previous context into the workspace of the mind – is, I think, the first step for the would-be worldmaker.

[16] A new world can be made by changing the salience and significance of a part or parts of a world. A shift in relevance, emphasis, importance, or value (including making something irrelevant, unimportant, or worthless) makes a new world.

[17] Parts of a world exist in determinate relations; changing these founds a new world. Another way of thinking about this, which I note elsewhere, is that to order, taxonomize, and categorize implies evaluation and hierarchy, all of which are world-despising-destroying-celebrating-establishing acts.

[18] Put simply, killing one's darling worlds (e.g., *Avengers: Infinity Stones*; the "red wedding," the Crucifixion, the Flood, the Rapture, Armageddon) or resurrecting worlds anew (*Avengers: End War*, Paradise, the claiming of the promised land).

[19] The deformation of a received world or worlds opens space for new ones.

[20] See "Appendix 32: Worldmaking Metaphors and Fractal Patterns of Recursive Self-Similarity."

[21] Appendix 28 follows with a more detailed treatment of what is explained in the first part of this subheading.

[22] Coming from the other direction, Marletto (2021) is a charming and smart book on the value of counterfactuals in physics.

[23] See Appendix 7, n. 1.

[24] This is beyond fantastika's capacity to adjust the Overton window and what is called the *åsiktskorridor*

("opinion corridor") in Sweden.

[25] Each individual solution achieved by prior artists that had success within the subgenres of fantastika exhibits what is sometimes called an "intentional stance," and the accumulated force of these effective solutions in the fantastical megatext and its constituent megatexts (SF, fantasy, horror, &c.) is a compelling tide that draws worldmakers along the channels of its stream: recall, the selective forces in our world are not especially gene-prioritizing; the stabilities and regularities of social learning are themselves potent. *On peut donc dire, en toute rigueur, que c'est la mer elle-même qui façonne les bateaux, choisit ceux qui conviennent et détruit les autres* (Alain, 1908, p. 42). ["One could then say, with complete rigor, that it is the sea herself who fashions the boats, chooses those that are suitable, and destroys the others.") But this is a social sea of living, responsive, creative people, with varying concerns. The elements of the megatextual lexicon may be deployed in endlessly novel ways in response to those concerns—some of which are widely shared in our civilization. See the following chapter.

[26] The online *Encyclopedia of Science Fiction* begins its article on the "SF Megatext" as follows:

> Science fiction is written in a kind of code, a difficult vernacular learned through an apprenticeship. Its decoding depends importantly on access to a megatext – the huge body of established moves or reading protocols that the reader learns through immersion in many hundreds of sf short stories and novels (and, with significantly less sophistication, from movies, television episodes, and games). The sf megatext comprises a virtual encyclopedia and specialized dictionary. For a story to be effective sf, it is insufficient that it invoke futuristic or extraterrestrial locales in ignorance of those narrative constraints or opportunities that already exist. These are embodied in science fiction's century and more of imagined worlds and their inhabitants, created via specific rhetorical moves, tools and lexicons.

[27] Neologisms facilitate the "leap of faith" needed to entertain and be entertained by another world; this fideistic challenge lies at the heart of the concept of "suspending disbelief."

[28] I find it helpful to think about the function novums play in allomythoi by analogy to totems and trademarks. Taking trademarks (and the related phenomena of service marks, certification marks, and collective marks)

first, one might, first that terms that are already generic or obviously descriptive are not legally enforceable as trademarks; they must be sufficiently alienated or estranged from the product they designate to require interpretation. The weakest permitted trademark is *suggestive* of the product it signals, while still requiring some creative thought to understand, and the easiest sort of worldmaking does this. For example, in Eason's (2019) *How Rory Thorne Destroyed the Multiverse*, instead of *computers*, *computer terminals*, and the *Internet*, one reads of *turings*, *turing terminals*, and *turing networks* (based on Alan Turing's role in founding computer science and information science). But trademarks are far more enforceable if they are *arbitrary* or *fanciful*, either giving a familiar symbol a completely novel meaning or, better yet, creating an altogether new mark to signal the new product, service, business, etc. Durkheim's discussion of how a totem helps stabilize or anchor the communal abstraction is illuminating in this regard as well. Baptizing the new ideas called *novums* with *neologies* gives them, in a sense, a secure space of their own in the family of concepts.

I have mentioned Turing above, and in this context it's worth noting again that another brilliant gay man, Wittgenstein, pointed to the deep connection between distinctive *forms of life* and *language games*. I do not know off hand and I don't presently have time to investigate, to what degree other scholars have looked into the affinities between Wittgenstein's philosophy, inevitably reflecting his hard experiences as a homosexual, and queer theory, but I will say it is very amenable to worldview studies, with obvious applications in subfields like queer studies and kairology.

[29] For example:

> Hobbits are an unobtrusive but very ancient people, more numerous formerly than they are
>
> today; for they love peace and quiet and good tilled earth: a well-ordered and well-farmed countryside was their favourite haunt. They do not and did not understand or like machines more complicated than a forge-bellows, a water-mill, or a hand-loom, though they were skilful with tools [....] Hobbits have never, in fact, studied magic of any kind, and their elusiveness is due solely to a professional skill that heredity and practice, and a close friendship with the earth, have rendered inimitable by bigger and clumsier races. (Tolkien, 2009, p. 1)

[30] See Chapter 1, n. 30.

[31] "With a sometimes embarrassing narcissism (as when a committee of experts launches out in search of clues in the complete works of King), this vast *mise en abyme* actually only concretizes an image that is indeed very old in King, that of the haunted author, for whom creation entails a possession *through* fiction, and a dispossession of oneself."

[32] One must keep in mind that although only some practitioners of worldview studies and its kairological subdiscipline might be inclined to engage in the microanalysis of an individual or individual character's worldview and way of life or allomythos, each one is a little collection of worlds within a world, worthy of study. For individual characters, each personal allomythos must be crafted—either through casual appropriation of a stereotype or through careful, self-reflective effort. And King excels at this allomythopoeic art of characterization.

[33] *Cf.* n. 21 above.

[34] Others have noticed this too; Goehring and Dionisopoulos (2013), drawing on Burke (1973), call it "identification by antithesis."

In this note and the notes that follow, I will quote the *Diaries* rather extensively because I assume most readers have never had anything to do with the text. Let's start with this passage:

> Of all the segments of the population from which we had hoped to draw new members, the "conservatives" and "right wingers" have been the biggest disappointment. They are the

> world's worst conspiracy-mongers—and also the world's greatest cowards. In fact, their cowardice is exceeded only by their stupidity. The current conspiracy theory being circulated among conservatives is that the Organization is actually in the pay of the System. We are hired provocateurs whose job is to raise enough hell to justify the repressive counterrevolutionary and anti-racist measures the System is taking. If we would just stop rocking the boat, things would be easier on everyone. Whether they believe that theory or not, it gives them an excuse for not joining us. At the other extreme, the knee-jerk liberals have forgotten all about their "radical chic" enthusiasm of a few years ago, now that we are the radicals. They take their ideological cues from the "smart" magazines and columnists, and the "in" thing at the moment is to be solidly pro-System. In their own way, the liberals, despite their pretensions to sophistication, are as mindless and as easily manipulated as the conservatives. The Christians are a mixed bag. Some of them are among our most devoted and courageous members. Their hatred of the System is based on—in addition to the reasons the rest of us have—their recognition of the System's role in undermining and perverting Christendom. But all the ones who are still affiliated with major churches are against us. The Jewish takeover of the Christian churches and corruption of the ministry are now virtually complete. The pulpit prostitutes preach the System's party line to their flocks every Sunday, and they collect their 30 pieces of silver in the form of government "study" grants, "brotherhood" awards, fees for speaking engagements, and a good press. The libertarians are another group which is divided. About half of them support the System and half are against it. They are all against us, however. The ones who are against the System just happen to see the System as a bigger threat than the Organization. As our credibility grows, more and more libertarians will support the System. There is probably no way we can use this group. (cite)

Opposing groups—and see how all but a few white-supremacist Christians are opponents of the Organization—are engaged with superficially, only to be dismissed as foolish, irrational, deluded by self-interest and the pressure of the herd, or simply reflexively contrarian. No group or member thereof is fleshed out in anything like realistic depth.

Turning to early in the novel, Pierce invites his readers to imagine the brutal horrors "cells full of Blacks" inflicted on lone white people:

> We already knew from the papers that nine of our members had been arrested in Chicago last week, and apparently they had had a rough time in the Cook County Jail, where one of them had died. It was impossible to be sure exactly what had happened from what the TV announcer said, but if the System had behaved true to form the authorities had stuck our people individually into cells full of Blacks and then shut their eyes and ears to what ensued. That has long been the System's extra-legal way of punishing our people when they can't pin anything on them that will "stick" in the courts. It's a more ghastly and dreadful punishment than anything which ever took place in a medieval torture chamber or in the cellars of the KGB. And they can get away with it because the news media usually won't even admit that it happens. After all, if you're trying to convince the public that the races are really equal, how can you admit that it's worse to be locked in a cell full of Black criminals than in a cell full of White ones? (cite)

Later, he asserts that most white Americans do not merit salvation from their servile fate of subjection to the Jews:

> If the freedom of the American people were the only thing at stake, the existence of the Organization would hardly be justified. Americans have lost their right to be free. Slavery is the just and proper state for a people who have grown as soft, self-indulgent, careless, credulous, and befuddled as we have. Indeed, we are already slaves. We have allowed a diabolically clever, alien minority to put chains on our souls and our minds. These spiritual chains are a truer mark of slavery than the iron chains which are yet to come. Why didn't we rebel 35 years ago, when they took our schools away from us and began converting them into

> racially mixed jungles? Why didn't we throw them all out of the country 50 years ago, instead of letting them use us as cannon fodder in their war to subjugate Europe? More to the point, why didn't we rise up three years ago, when they started taking our guns away? Why didn't we rise up in righteous fury and drag these arrogant aliens into the streets and cut their throats then? Why didn't we roast them over bonfires at every street-corner in America? Why didn't we make a final end to this obnoxious and eternally pushy clan, this pestilence from the sewers of the East, instead of meekly allowing ourselves to be disarmed? (cite)

Through Turner, Pierce reasons with his reader, urging that the difficult but mature and necessary answer (race war and, ultimately, genocide) be accepted:

> All the liberals and the Jews had to do was begin screeching about “inhumanity” or “injustice” or “genocide,” and most of our people who had been beating around the edges of a solution took to their heels like frightened rabbits. Because there was never a way to solve the race problem which would be "fair for everybody or which everyone concerned could be politely persuaded into accepting without any fuss or unpleasantness, they kept trying to evade it, hoping that it would go away by itself. And the same has been true of the Jewish problem and the immigration problem and the overpopulation problem and the eugenics problem and a thousand related problems. (cite)

And so justice is dispensed by the Organization, first to small groups and individuals, such as a Jewish newspaper editor:

> After looking over the newspaper, we settled on the editorialpage [sic] editor, who had written a particularly vicious editorial against us. His words dripped with Talmudic hatred. Racists like us, he said, deserve no consideration from the police or any decent citizen. We should be shot down on sight like mad dogs. Quite a contrast with his usual solicitude for Black rapists and murderers and his tirades against “police brutality” and “overreaction”! Since his editorial was an incitement to murder, it seemed to us only appropriate that he be given a taste of his own remedy. Henry and I rode a bus downtown and then waved down a taxi with a Black driver. By the time we pulled up in the editor's driveway in Silver Spring, the Black was in the trunk—dead. [They go on to murder the editor.] (cite)

[35] For example, we have seen how Turner is a “Martyr” in the “sacred Record.” Likewise, Turner states early in his diaries, “Only by making our beliefs into a *living faith* which guides us from day to day can we maintain the moral strength to overcome the obstacles and hardships which lie ahead” (cite, emphasis added). When Turner is initiated into the esoteric “Order,” the attributional language becomes even more explicit:

> Major Williams must have sensed my thoughts, because he put his hand on my shoulder, smiled, and assured me that my test had gone very well. So well, in fact, that I was to be initiated into a select, inner structure within the Organization. Reading the book I had just finished was the first step in that initiation. The next step took place about an hour later. Six of us were gathered in a loose semi-circle in the shop upstairs. It was after business hours, and the blinds were tightly drawn. The only light came from two large candles toward the back of the shop. I was the next to the last to enter the room. At the top of the stairs the same girl who had brought my sandwiches stopped me and handed me a robe of some coarse, grey material with a hood attached-something like a monk's robe. After I had put on the robe she showed me where to stand and cautioned me to be silent. Their features shadowed by their hoods, I could not make out the faces of any of my companions in that strange, little gathering. As the sixth participant reached “the doorway at the top of the stairs, however, I turned and was startled to glimpse a tall, burly man in the uniform of a sergeant of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police slipping into a robe. Finally, from another door, at the back, Major Williams entered. He also wore one of the grey robes, but his hood was

> thrown back so that the two candles, one on either side, illuminated his face. He spoke to us in a quiet voice, explaining that *each of us who had been selected for membership in the Order had passed the test of the Word and the test of the Deed. That is, we have all proved ourselves, not only through a correct attitude toward the Cause, but also through our acts in the struggle for the realization of the Cause. As members of the Order we are to be the bearers of the Faith.* Only from our ranks will the future leaders of the Organization come. He told us many other things too, reiterating some of the ideas I had just read. The Order, he explained, will remain secret, even within the Organization, until the successful completion of the first phase of our task: the destruction of the System. *And he showed us the Sign by which we might recognize one another. And then we swore the Oath—a mighty Oath, a moving Oath that shook me to my bones and raised the hair on the back of my neck*. (cite, emphasis added)

Finally, right before his suicidal martyrdom, Turner is admitted into full Union with the Order:

> Knowing fully what was demanded in character and commitment of each man who stood before me, my chest swelled with pride. These were no soft-bellied, conservative businessmen assembled for some Masonic mumbodumbo; no loudmouthed, beery red-necks letting off a little ritualized steam about "the goddam niggers"; no pious, frightened churchgoers whining for the guidance or protection of an anthropomorphic deity. These were real men, White men, men who were now one with me in spirit and consciousness as well as in blood. Then I made my brief declaration: "Brothers! Two years ago, when I entered your ranks for the first time, I consecrated my life to our Order and to the purpose for which it exists. But then I faltered in the fulfillment of my obligation to you. Now I am ready to meet
>
> my obligation fully. I offer you my life. Do you accept it?" In a rumbling unison their reply came back: "Brother! We accept your life. In return we offer you everlasting life in us. Your deed shall not be in vain, nor shall it be forgotten, until the end of time. To this commitment we pledge our lives." I know, as certainly as it is possible for a man to know anything, that the Order will not fail me if I do not fail it. The Order has a life which is more than the sum of the lives of its members. When it speaks collectively, as it did Monday, something deeper and older and wiser than any of us speaks—something which cannot die. Of that deeper life I am now about to partake. (cite)

[36] These include "gasoline ration cards [...] magnetically coded with our social security numbers [that] show blocked quotas—and instantaneously tell the Feds monitoring the central computer where we were" (cite), and this is to be followed up by a more sophisticated version of the same kind of system:

> One thing on which they are working is a computerized, universal, internal passport system. Every person 12 years or more of age will he issued a passport and will be required, under threat of severe penalties, to carry it at all times. Not only can a person be stopped on the street by any police agent and asked to show his passport, but they have worked out a plan to make the passports necessary for many everyday operations, such as purchasing an airline, bus, or train ticket, registering in a motel or hotel, and receiving any medical service in a hospital or clinic. All ticket counters, motels, physician's offices, and the like will be equipped with computer terminals linked by telephone lines to a huge, national data bank and computer center. A customer's magnetically coded passport number will routinely be fed into the computer whenever he buys a ticket, pays a bill, or registers for a service. If there is any irregularity, a warning light will go on in the nearest police precinct station, showing the location of the offending computer terminal—and the unfortunate customer [....] [N]ow the System is sure it can override the resistance of the libertarians by using us as an excuse. Anything is permitted in the fight against "racism"! (cite)

[37] For example, early in the story, the Organization coordinates its actions using a memorized numeric code corresponding to specific messages, together with a simple communicator to transmit the numeric signals;

Turner writes in his diary, “My major contribution to the Organization so far has been the development of this communications equipment-and, in fact, the actual manufacture of a good bit of it” (cite). His next project is making “the detonating mechanism for the bomb we'll use against the FBI building. The trigger mechanism itself was quite easy, but I was held up on the booster until yesterday, because I didn't know what sort of explosives we would be using” (cite). Pierce used his own technical expertise to give readers accurate advice regarding the manufacture of tools to accomplish mass-murder and terrorism, advice used by terrorists such as Timothy McVeigh, whose role in the Oklahoma City bombing is a terrible example of kairological metalepsis of the FBI building attack in the novel. Turner continues helping with realistic technical cleverness until his suicidal martyrdom; for example,

> I finished designing three different bomb mechanisms that should pass an X-ray examination without arousing suspicion. One of them fits into an umbrella handle-batteries, timer, and all. The main shaft of the umbrella can be filled with thermite if one wants an incendiary device, or the handle can be detached and used as a detonator. Another timer-detonator combination will be built into a pocket transistor radio (that one can also be fired by a tone-coded radio signal), and the third will be an electric wristwatch, with the detonator and booster molded into the wrist band and fired by the watch's built-in battery. In each case, of course, the bulk explosives must be brought into an area separately, but they can be disguised in many different ways—cast like plaster, for example, into the shape of any familiar object, even painted the right color. (cite)

[38] The (formerly) white, wealthy area of Georgetown is described in his storyworld as follows:

> Most of the high-priced shops have given way to “gay” bars, massage parlors, porn stalls,
>
> liquor stores, and similar capitalist ventures. Garbage litters the sidewalks, and Blacks, who used to be pretty scarce there, are swarming all over. But there are still many Whites living in Georgetown—after a fashion. The once-fashionable townhouses have their windows boarded up now, but many are occupied by colonies of squatters, mostly young dropouts and runaways. They lead a marginal, brutal existence, begging for handouts in the streets, rummaging through trash bins for leftovers, occasionally stealing. Some of the girls engage in casual prostitution. Virtually all of them—or so I thought until today—keep themselves in a permanently drugged condition. Since the System stopped enforcing the drug laws last year, heroin has been about as cheap and easy to get as cigarettes. The cops generally leave them alone, although some of the stories about what goes on among these kids are horrifying. Inside their strongholds, the boarded-up buildings in which they cook and eat and sleep and make love and give birth and pump dope into their veins and die, they seem to have reverted to a pre-civilized life style. Kooky religious cults, involving lots of incense and incantations, flourish among them. Various brands of Satan-worship, reminiscent of the ancient Semitic cults, are especially prevalent. Ritual torture and ritual murder are rumored to take place, as well as ritual cannibalism, ritual sex orgies, and other non-Western practices. (cite)

But the glorious and inspiring vision of the Organization and its inner Order, as embodied in its holy text (a fictionalized textual expression of Pierce’s personal religion, Cosmotheism, which teaches that the divine spark of Godhood dwells in the white race and must be preserved and cultivated—see Whitsel, 1998), is offered as an alternative:

> What I had read—it amounted to a book of about 400 typed pages—had lifted me out of this world, out of my day-to-day existence as an underground fighter for the Organization, and it had taken me to the top of a high mountain from which I could see the whole world, with all its nations and tribes and races, spread out before me. And I could see the ages spread out before me too, from the steaming, primordial swamps of a hundred million years ago to the unlimited possibilities which the centuries and the millennia ahead hold for us. The book placed our present struggle—the Organization and its goals and what is at stake—in a much larger context than I have ever really considered before. That is, I had thought about many of

> the things in the book before, but I had never put them all together into a single, coherent pattern. I had never seen the whole picture so clearly. (Note to the reader: It is obvious that Turner is referring to the Book [....) ....] For the first time I understand the deepest meaning of what we are doing. I understand now why we cannot fail, no matter what we must do to win and no matter how many of us must perish in doing it. Everything that has been and everything that is yet to be depend on us. We are truly the instruments of God in the fulfillment of His Grand Design. These may seem like strange words to be coming from me, who has never been religious, but they are utterly sincere words. (cite)

The text is somewhat inconsistent at this point because some of Turner's earlier entries suggest awareness of God's "Grand Design" for the white race. But the main point is that this hidden, special knowledge justifies any violence needed to bring about the divine plan. As Turner states,

> But we are doing something else which is really more important than our campaign against the System. In the long run, it will be infinitely more important. We are forging the nucleus of a new society, a whole new civilization, which will rise from the ashes of the old. And it is because our new civilization will be based on an entirely different world view than the present one that it can only replace the other in a revolutionary manner. There is no way a society based on Aryan values and an Aryan outlook can evolve peacefully from a society which has succumbed to Jewish spiritual corruption. (cite)

[39] See Goehring & Dionisopoulos, 2013, pp. 371-373. The utility of this genre choice cannot be overstated.

Turner simply considers matters to himself—the reader being invited by the diary genre to listen in on his non-confrontational, internal mediations. Turner's problems, the Organization's problems, become the reader's concerns:

> We have talked this problem over among ourselves many times, and we always come back to the same stumbling block: a revolutionary attitude is virtually non-existent in America, outside the Organization, and all our activities to date don't seem to have changed this fact. The masses of people certainly aren't in love with the System—in fact, their grumbling has increased steadily over the past six or seven years as living conditions have deteriorated—but they are still far too comfortable and complacent to entertain the idea of revolt. On top of this is the enormous disadvantage we suffer from having the System controlling the image of us which reaches the public. We receive a continuous feedback from our "legals" on what the public is thinking, and most people have accepted without hesitation the System's portrayal of us as "gangsters" and "murderers." Without some sort of empathy between us and the general public we can never find enough new recruits to make up for our losses. And with the System controlling virtually every channel of communication with the public, it's hard to see how we're going to develop that empathy. (cite)

[40] Here are four examples, with some adjacent text for a contextual sense of how Pierce uses his comments to, among other things, emphasize the reality of a world without Black or Jewish people, propagandize anti-Semitic propaganda as academic facts, and defamiliarize and recontextualize racial vocabulary:

> We were all under a bit of tension following the big bombing, and Katherine came across a bit shrill-almost like a women's fibber. (Note to the reader: "Women's lib" was a form of mass psychosis which broke out during the last three decades of the Old Era. Women affected by it denied their femininity and insisted that they were "people," not "women." This aberration was promoted and encouraged by the System as a means of dividing our race against itself.) (cite)

> (Note to the reader: "Afro" refers to the Negro or African race, which, until its sudden disappearance during the Great Revolution, exerted an increasingly degenerative influence on the culture and life styles of the inhabitants of North America.) I grabbed him ["a greasy-

> looking youth—approximately White, but with the 'Afro' hair style popular among young degenerates"] by the shoulder, spun him around, and hit him in the face as hard as I could. As he went down I had the deep, primitive satisfaction of seeing four or five of his teeth come washing out of his shattered mouth on a copious flow of dark-red blood." (cite)
>
> We are in a war to the death with the Jew, who now feels himself so close to his final victory that he can safely drop his mask and treat his enemies as the "cattle" his religion tells him they are. Our retribution against the sheriff here should serve as a warning to the Jew's Gentile henchmen, at least, that if they adopt the Jew's attitude toward our women and children, then they cannot expect their own families to be safe. (Note to the reader: Several sets of books containing the Jewish religious doctrine, which was called "Judaism," are still extant today. These books, the Talmud and the Torah, do, indeed, refer to non-Jews as, "cattle." Especially horrifying to us is the attitude the Jews had toward non-Jewish women. The word they used to designate a girl of our race was "shiksa," which was derived from the Hebrew word meaning both "abomination" and "non-kosher meat" or "unclean meat.") (cite)
>
> The rally was addressed by all the usual political prostitutes and pulpit prostitutes, who issued pious calls for "brotherhood" and "equality." Then the system trotted out one of their local Toms, who gave a rousing speech about stamping out "the evil of White racism" once and for all. (Note to the reader: A "Tom" was a Negro front man for the authorities or for Jewish interests. Experts at manipulating the masses of their own race, they were paid well for their services. Some "Toms" were even employed briefly by the Organization during the
>
> final stages of the Revolution, when it was desired to flush millions of Negroes out of certain urban areas into holding camps with a minimum loss of White lives.) After that, the skilled agitators of the Human Relations Council worked various sections of the crowd up into a real brotherhood frenzy. These swarthy, kinky-haired little Jewboys with transistorized megaphones really knew their business. They had the mob screaming with real blood lust for any "White racist" who might be unfortunate enough to fall into their hands. (cite)

Regarding the last example, which introduces the racial epithet "Tom," racist terms slowly become more common in the text after first being introduced. The reader's "ear" is slowly acclimated to the derogatory hate speech until passages like this become common:

> There were angry accusations and counteraccusations, which culminated Saturday in the Jews' number-one house nigger, the nominal "chairman" of the National Association of Human Relations Councils, giving a press interview at which he denounced his Jewish masters. From now on, he said, the Human Relations Councils will not recognize the Jewish claim to minority status. They will be treated just like the White majority and will no longer be exempt from investigation and punishment for "racism." He was out on his ear before he knew what happened, of course, and his place has been taken by a better-housebroken Black, but the fat is already in the fire. On the streets the roving bands of Black "deputies" have gotten the word, and woe betide any member of the self-chosen tribe who falls into their hands. Several have already died while being "questioned," just in the last two days. The "Toms" will eventually get their more militant and ' resentful brethren back into line, but meanwhile Izzy and Sambo are really at one another's throats, tooth and nail, and it is a joy to behold. (cite)

[41] The educational, instructive tone of the *Diaries* is reinforced by Earl Turner himself taking on the role of teacher within the narrative, resonating with the garage-inventor, do-it-yourself culture of the early SF magazines:

> I have taught the people here virtually everything I know. We started by learning how to build improvised detonators, timers, igniters, and other gadgets from scratch. Then we studied the structure, properties, and performance characteristics of currently available

> military devices which can be adapted for various purposes. All my students can now disassemble and reassemble every type of fuse and delay device we studied, blindfolded. After that we examined a large number of hypothetical targets and worked out detailed plans for attacking them. We considered reservoirs, pipelines, fuel depots, rail lines, air terminals and aircraft, telephone exchanges, oil refineries, power transmission lines, generating stations, highway interchanges, grain elevators, warehouses, and various types of machinery and other manufacturing equipment. Finally, we picked a real target and destroyed it: Dallas's central telephone exchange. That was yesterday. Today we held a post-mortem and criticized the operation in detail. Actually, everything went extraordinarily well; my students all passed their final examination with flying colors. (cite)

[42] Consider what happens to Elsa and Mary Jane:

> Elsa had developed early. Her natural warmth and open, uninhibited nature combined with her outstanding physical charms to produce a girl who had been extraordinarily attractive sexually even at 15. The result was that the Black males, who also continually badgered the one other White girl at the school, gave Elsa no peace. The Black girls, seeing this, hated Elsa with special passion and tormented her in every way they could. Elsa dared not go into the restroom or even let herself out of the sight of a teacher for a moment while she was at school. She soon found that the teachers offered no real protection, when a Black assistant principal cornered her in his office one day and tried to put his hand inside her dress. Each day Elsa came home from school in tears and begged her parents to send her to another
>
> school. Her mother's response was to scream at her, slap her face, and call her a "racist." [....] [Elsa ends up running away and joining a commune.] Mary Jane, meanwhile, had gotten on the wrong side of another of the girls in the group, and Elsa pressed this advantage by issuing an ultimatum: either Mary Jane must go or she, Elsa, would leave permanently. Mary Jane had responded by threatening Elsa with a knife. "So, what happened?" I asked. "We sold her," was Elsa's simple reply. "You sold her? What do you mean?" I exclaimed. Elsa explained: "Mary Jane refused to leave after everyone sided with me, so we sold her to Kappy the Kike. He gave us the TV and two hundred dollars for her." "Kappy the Kike," it turned out, is a Jew named Kaplan who makes his living in the White slave trade [....] What happens to the girls after that no one can say with certainty, but it is thought that most are confined in certain exclusive clubs in New York where the wealthy go to satisfy strange and perverted appetites. Some, it is rumored, are eventually sold to a Satanist club and painfully dismembered in gruesome rituals [....] I had thought I was unshockable, but I was horrified by Elsa's story of Mary Jane's fate. "How," I asked in a tone of outrage, "could you sell a White girl to a Jew?" Elsa was embarrassed by my obvious displeasure [....] "What can anyone do?" [another commune member] asked, not really expecting an answer. "Kappy the Kike's been arrested at least a dozen times, but the cops always turn him loose. He's got political connections. Some of the big Jews in New York are his customers. And I've heard that two or three Congressmen go up there regularly to visit some of the clubs he supplies." "Then someone should blow up the Congress," I answered. (cite)

Compare Waltman & Davis, 2005, on the *Turner Diaries*' construction of a Racial Holy War Myth of combat between the Moral Aryan Myth, the Vigilant Aryan Myth, the Dispassionate Aryan Myth, and the Martyr Hero Myth with a collective Other constituted by the myths, among others, of the Black Predator and Savage and the Jew as Vampire and Pornographer.

At one point, Turner himself is captured and intimately brutalized:

> During the torture sessions the two FBI agents who were always present as spectators sometimes turned a bit pale-and when Rubin had his two Black assistants thrust a long, blunt rod up into my rectum, so that I was screaming and wriggling like a skewered pig, one looked as if he were going to be sick-but they never raised an objection. I guess it was much the same after World War II, when American officers of German descent calmly watched

> Jewish torturers work over their racial brothers who had been in the German army and likewise saw nothing amiss when Negro G.I.'s raped and brutalized German girls. Is it that they have been so brainwashed by the Jews that they hate their own race, or is it that they are just insensitive bastards who will do whatever they're told as long as they keep drawing their salaries? (cite)

[43] The first entry contains a backflash describing Turner's imprisonment and abuse during the Gun Raids after the passing of the Cohen Act. (This reflects ideas in Pierce's (1994) *Gun Control in National Socialist Germany, 1928–1945*.) Turner is innocent and unsuspecting, in the peace of his private home, when suddenly he is shoved and menaced with weapons. *Robbers*, he thinks. And indeed they are, come to take his guns and leave him defenseless. Then one learns of the physical abuse he suffers—imprisoned with hundreds in outdoor, barbed-wire concentration camps with hundreds of others, fed almost nothing and not permitted sleep. Another flashback, later in the text after readers are more likely to be sympathetic to Pierce's white-supremacist allomythology, discusses a fantastical historical event in his world: the abolition of rape as a legal cause of action and the social ramifications of this new legal order:

> Although unmarried female members are theoretically "equal" to male members, in that they are subject to the same discipline, our women are actually cherished and protected to a much larger degree than women in the general society are. Consider rape, for example, which has become such an omnipresent pestilence these days. It had already been increasing at a rate of 20 to 25 per cent per year since the early 1970's until last year, when the Supreme Court ruled that all laws making rape a crime are unconstitutional, because they presume a legal difference between the sexes. Rape, the judges ruled, can only be prosecuted under the
>
> statutes covering nonsexual assaults. In other words, rape has been reduced to the status of a punch in the nose. In cases where no physical injury can be proved, it is now virtually impossible to obtain a prosecution or even an arrest. The result of this judicial mischief has been that the incidence of rape has zoomed to the point that the legal statisticians have recently estimated that one out of every two American women can expect to be raped at least once in her lifetime. In many of our big cities, of course, the statistics are much worse. The women's-lib groups have greeted this development with dismay. It isn't exactly what they had in mind when they began agitating for "equality" two decades ago. At least, there's dismay among the rank and file of such groups; I have a suspicion that their leaders, most of whom are Jewesses, had this outcome in mind from the beginning. Black civil rights spokesmen, on the other hand, have had only praise for the Supreme Court's decision. Rape laws, they said, are "racist," because a disproportionately large number of Blacks have been charged under them. Nowadays gangs of Black thugs hang around parking lots and school playgrounds and roam the corridors of office buildings and apartment complexes, looking for any attractive, unescorted White girl and knowing that punishment, either from the disarmed citizenry or the handcuffed police, is extremely unlikely. Gang rapes in school classrooms have become an especially popular new sport. Some particularly liberal women may find that this situation provides a certain amount of satisfaction for their masochism, a way of atoning for their feelings of racial "guilt." But for normal White women it is a daily nightmare. One of the sickest aspects of the whole thing is that many young Whites, instead of opposing this new threat to their race, have apparently decided to join it. White rapists have become more common, and there have even been instances of integrated rape-gangs recently [....] There have even been cases recently where women who used their tear gas to fend off would-be rapists have been charged with armed assault! The world has become so crazy that nothing really comes as a surprise any more. In contrast to the situation outside, rape inside the Organization is almost unthinkable. (cite)

This shocking world is revealed incrementally, however, so that it does not come as too much of a surprise nor seem too crazy to the reader.

Because Turner is forced into hiding, and in order to survive, he and his Organization companions must steal; violence is necessary—and its vivid description calls forth one's survival instincts so that, while at this early stage in the narrative even a sympathetic reader might have doubts about the merits of terrorism and seeking out violence against non-white people, the charged scenes motivate fascination and continued reading:

> Henry looks at everything in terms of our ideology. If something doesn't fit, he'll have nothing to do with it [....] Anyway, he convinced me that if we are going to rob liquor stores we have to do it in a socially conscious way. If we are going to cave in people's heads with bricks, they must be people who deserve it. By comparing the liquor store listings in the Yellow Pages of the telephone directory with a list of supporting members of the Northern Virginia Human Relations Council which had been filched for us by the girl we sent over there to do volunteer work for them, we finally settled on Berman's Liquors and Wines, Saul I. Berman, proprietor. There were no bricks handy, so we equipped ourselves with blackjacks consisting of good-sized bars of Ivory soap inside long, strong ski socks. Henry also tucked a sheath knife into his belt. We parked about a block and a half from Berman's Liquors, around the corner. When we went in there were no customers in the store. A Black was at the cash register, tending the store. Henry asked him for a bottle of vodka on a high shelf behind the counter. When he turned around I let him have it at the base of the skull with my "Ivory special." He dropped silently to the floor and remained motionless [....] Three stores down Henry suddenly stopped and pointed out the sign on the door: "Berman's Deli." Without a moment's hesitation he pushed open the door and walked in. Spurred on by a sudden, reckless impulse I followed him instead of trying to stop him. Berman himself was behind the counter, at the back. Henry lured him out by asking the price of an item near the front of the store which Berman couldn't see clearly from behind the counter. As he passed me, I let him have it in the back of the head as hard as I could. I felt the bar of soap shatter from the force of the blow. Berman went down yelling at the top of his lungs. Then he started crawling rapidly toward the back of the store, screaming loudly enough to wake the dead. I was completely unnerved by the racket and stood frozen. Not Henry though. He leaped onto Berman's back, seized him by the hair, and cut his throat from ear to ear in one, swift motion.
>
> The silence lasted about one second. Then a fat, grotesque-looking woman of about 60—probably Berman's wife—came charging out of the back room waving a meat cleaver and emitting an ear-piercing shriek. Henry let fly at her with a large jar of kosher pickles and scored a direct hit. She went down in a spray of pickles and broken glass. (cite)

After all this, Turner is depicted in an embodied state that is likely to reflect that of the reader at this early point in the story: "I was terrified. It was more than an hour before I had stopped shaking and gotten enough of a grip on myself to talk without stuttering. Some terrorist!" (cite). (Later, as the violence becomes more extreme, Pierce repeatedly uses Turner's embodied response sympathetically, to console the reader that their feelings are natural but must, sternly and for the higher good, be overcome: "Nevertheless, every time the TV camera focuses on the pitiful, mutilated corpse of some poor girl—or even an FBI agent—being pulled from the wreckage, my stomach becomes tied in knots and I cannot breathe. It is a terrible, terrible task we have before us" (cite).)

As the reader becomes more desensitized and, perhaps, more aligned with Pierce's priors, things progressively escalate. Members of the Organization are tortured and murdered by black agents of the System, under the direction of the sheriff of Cook County, who is "a political bigwig, a front-rank shabbos goy" (cite), so,

> Well, early this morning the responsible conservative lost both his legs and suffered severe internal injuries when a bomb wired to the ignition of his car exploded. The Jewish spokesman was even less fortunate. Someone walked up to him while he was waiting for an elevator in the lobby of his office building, pulled a hatchet from under his coat, cleaved the good Jew's head from crown to shoulder blades, then disappeared in the rush-hour crowd. The Organization immediately claimed responsibility for both acts. (cite)

And through Katherine, one is introduced to how one might come to join the Organization:

> Four years ago, before the Gun Raids, [Katherine] was a Congressman's secretary. She lived in a Washington apartment with another girl who also worked on Capitol Hill. One evening when Katherine came home from work she found her apartment mate's body lying in a pool of blood on the floor. She had been raped and killed by a Negro intruder. That's why Katherine bought a pistol and kept it even after the Cohen Act made gun ownership illegal. Then, along with nearly a million others, she was swept up in the Gun Raids of 1989. Although she had never had any previous contact with the Organization, she met George in

> the detention center they were both held in after being arrested. Katherine had been apolitical. If anyone had asked her, during the time she was working for the government or, before that, when she was a college student, she would have probably said she was a "liberal." But she was liberal only in the mindless, automatic way that most people are. Without really thinking about it or trying to analyze it, she superficially accepted the unnatural ideology peddled by the mass media and the government. She had none of the bigotry, none of the guilt and self-hatred that it takes to make a really committed, full-time liberal. After the police released them, George gave her some books on race and history and some Organization publications to read. *For the first time in her life she began thinking seriously about the important racial, social, and political issues at the root of the day's problems.* (cite, emphasis added)

This is neither the first nor the last evocation of the image of black men raping and murdering white women, but note how it makes Katherine's gun ownership profoundly reasonable and her deprivation of protection so unreasonable. Especially noteworthy is that fact that her new experiences open her up, for the first time, to recognizing the important issues underlying the central problems of her age (to paraphrase: the truth of the racial inferiority of non-whites, especially black people, the Jews' role in mystifying and subjugating the world, and the white racial identity that is her birthright).

The war starts taking on a larger scale—they attack the Capitol in Washington, D.C. and then Tel Aviv in Israel:

> We saw beautiful blossoms of flame and steel sprouting everywhere, dancing across the asphalt, thundering in the midst of splintered masonry and burning vehicles, erupting now inside and now outside the Capitol, wreaking their bloody toll in the ranks of tyranny and treason. It was all over in about three minutes, but while it lasted it was the most magnificent spectacle I have ever seen. What an impression it must have made on the general public
>
> watching it on TV! And there was more excitement today, both in California and New York. The Los Angeles City Council was convened for the sake of watching a telecast of the President's address to Congress before voting on several "anti-racist" ordinances of their own. Just about the time the fireworks started here, four of our men, using phony police identification, walked into the council meeting there and began throwing grenades. Eight council members were killed outright, and our men made a clean getaway. An hour earlier, in New York, the Organization used a bazooka to shoot down an airliner which had just taken off for Tel Aviv with a load of vacationing dignitaries, mostly Jews. There were no survivors. (Note to reader: [....] Tel Aviv was the largest city in Palestine during the period of Jewish occupation of that unfortunate country in the Old Era. The ruins of the city are still too radioactive for human habitation.) (cite)

This last parenthetical comment alludes to events that will occur later in the narrative—as, indeed, does the reference in the "Forward" to Turner's name being among the Record of Martyrs as part of the nuclear war between the Jews and the white race, with which the novel culminates. Because he gave up information while being drugged and tortured, he must commit suicide on behalf of the Order:

> We have carefully looked into the circumstances of your capture, and we are aware of the interrogation techniques the political police now use against our people. If you were merely a soldier in any other army in the world, you would be held blameless. But the Order is not like any other army. We have claimed for ourselves the right to decide the fate of all our people and, eventually, to rule the world in accord with our principles. If we are to be worthy of this right, then we must be willing to accept the responsibility which goes with it. Each day we make decisions and carry out actions which result in the deaths of White persons, many of them innocent of any offense which we consider punishable. We are willing to take the lives of these innocent persons, because a much greater harm will ultimately befall our people if we fail to act now. Our criterion is the ultimate good of our race. We can apply no lesser criterion to ourselves. Indeed, we must be much sterner with ourselves than with others [....] But others of us have argued that, because you had not yet achieved full membership in this Order at the time in question—because you had not yet participated in the rite of Union—your conduct can be reasonably judged by a different standard than would be applied to someone who had completed his probationary period and achieved Union. Our decision has

> not been easy, but now you must hear it and you must abide by it. First, you must satisfactorily complete your extended period of probation. Then, at some time after the end of that period, you will be permitted Union—but only on a conditional basis, something we have never allowed before. The condition will be that you undertake a mission whose successful completion can reasonably be expected to result in your death. Unfortunately, we are all too often presented with the painful task of assigning such 'suicide missions' to our members, when we can find no other way to achieve a necessary goal. (cite)

Some of the subsequent events include Houston being bombed on September 11th with weapons meant to arm Israel (cite) and other large-scale attacks that eventually produce the sought-for race war, especially among the military, that sets the stage for the nuclear war of the concluding chapters:

> In other units our enlisted personnel simply began shooting any Blacks they saw in uniform and then deserted to units commanded by our sympathizers. The Blacks, naturally enough, reacted in such a way as to make the story about a Black mutiny come true. Even in those units commanded by pro-System officers heavy fighting between Blacks and Whites broke out. And, since some of these units are nearly half Black, the fighting has been bloody and prolonged. The result has been that, although the units commanded by our sympathizers initially had only about five per cent of the strength of the pro-System units, most of the latter have been paralyzed by internal fighting between Blacks and Whites. And now Whites are coming over in increasing numbers to our units because of this. Our broadcasts have helped this process along greatly. We have exaggerated our own strength, of course, and have told White servicemen who want to join our units where to go. And to help convince them-as well as to keep the niggers spooked and doing their thing-we have turned one of our transmitters into a phony "soul" station and been broadcasting a call for a Black revolution, telling the Blacks to shoot their White officers and non-coms before the Whites can disarm
>
> them [....] In units with a high quota of non-Whites, our people shot down Blacks at random, shouting slogans such as "White power!," with the deliberate intention of provoking a Black reaction. This was followed up by the same tactic which we used here so successfully: seizing radio stations and broadcasting spurious calls for Blacks to turn their guns against their White officers. (cite)

Civilization deteriorates:

> We also found gruesome evidence of one way in which the Blacks have solved their food shortage: cannibalism. They began by setting up barricades in one main street to stop cars driven by Whites, apparently as early as Tuesday of last week. The unfortunate Whites were dragged from their cars, taken into a nearby Black restaurant, butchered, cooked, and eaten. Later the Blacks organized hunting parties and made raids into White areas. In the cellar of one Black apartment building we found a scene of indescribable horror attesting to the success of these raids [....] [Turner evokes the image of vomiting and a horrible smell.] The cellar, which was illuminated by two kerosene lanterns hanging from steam pipes, had been converted into a human slaughterhouse by the Blacks in the apartment building. The floor was slippery with half-congealed blood. There were washtubs full of stinking entrails, and others filled with severed heads. Four tiny, human haunches dangled overhead from wires. On a wooden workbench beneath one of the lanterns I saw the most terrible thing I have ever seen. It was the butchered and partially dismembered body of a teenaged girl. Her blue eyes stared emptily at the ceiling, and her long, golden hair was matted with the blood which had rushed from the gaping wound in her throat. I retched and stumbled back up the stairs and out into the light again. I could not make myself go back into that awful cellar, but I sent two of my crew with cameras and lights down there to make a thorough photographic record. The photos will be useful for troop indoctrination. From one of the GI's outside the building I learned that parts of at least 30 children, all White, had been found in the cellar, along with the two who were still alive. They had been tied to a pipe in one corner. In the rear courtyard of the building was an improvised barbecue grill and a large pile of small, human bones – thoroughly gnawed. We took photographs of the courtyard too. I have been working in mostly Black areas, but I have also heard some pretty bad stories from our people who have been in White and Chicano areas. No cases of cannibalism by Whites or Chicanos

> have been reported-the Blacks are a race apart in this respect—but there's been a lot of killing in fights over food. (cite)

But the Organization works to bring about order—most urgently, racialized order:

> Another big problem in trying to achieve racial separation is that so many people in this area cannot easily be classified as White or non-White. The process of mongrelization has gone so far in this country and there are so many swarthy, frizzy-haired characters of all sizes and shapes running around that one doesn't know where to draw the line. Nevertheless, we've got to draw the line somewhere, and soon! (cite)

In "Chapter XXII," a forced mass exodus of non-white people is described: "a new form of warfare: demographic war," in which the System is forced to take on the "burden" of caring for all the non-white people of California. However, only the clearly non-white people are sent abroad:

> I remember now something which puzzled me a few days ago: the separation of the very light Blacks—the almost Whites, the octoroons and quadroons, the unclassifiable mongrels from various Asian and southern climes—from the others during the concentration and evacuation operations. And I think I now understand. The clearly distinguishable nonwhite are the ones we want to increase the racial pressure on the Whites outside California. The presence of more almost-White mongrels would merely confuse the issue—and there is always the danger that they will later "pass" as White. Better to deal with them now, as soon as we get our hands on them. I have a suspicion their trip into that canyon north of here will be a one-way affair! (cite)

But with both categories of non-whites gone, the first signs of the coming Aryan utopia can begin to appear:

> [W]e're now bringing almost enough food into the metropolitan area to keep the people from starving. I got some insight into how we're managing that during the Santa Barbara trip. In the countryside I passed literally hundreds of organized groups of White youngsters, some working in the orchards and fruit groves, others marching along the road singing, with fruit baskets slung across their shoulders. They all looked tanned and happy and healthy [....] I made a brief inspection tour, and it was heartwarming to see pretty, White children playing quietly where previously hordes of screaming, young Blacks had swarmed [....] Fresh flowers are on sills formerly occupied only by empty liquor bottles [....] [E]ven the tiny beginning we have already made fills me with joy and pride. What a miracle it is to walk streets which only a few weeks ago were filled with non-Whites lounging at every street corner and in every doorway and to see only White faces-clean, happy, enthusiastic White faces, determined and hopeful for the future! No sacrifice is too great to successfully complete our revolution and secure that future for them—and for the girls of the 128th Los Angeles Food Brigade and for millions of others like them throughout our land! (cite)

However, not all white people can be preserved. Next comes the "unavoidable" "Day of the Rope" (cite), on which day Turner is, as one would expect, concerned with logistics:

> There are many thousands of hanging female corpses like that in this city tonight, all wearing identical placards around their necks. They are the White women who were married to or living with Blacks, with Jews, or with other non-White males. There are also a number of men wearing the I-defiled-my-race placard, but the women easily outnumber them seven or eight to one. On the other hand, about ninety per cent of the corpses with the I-betrayed-my-race placards are men, and overall the sexes seem to be roughly balanced. Those wearing the latter placards are the politicians, the lawyers, the businessmen, the TV newscasters, the newspaper reporters and editors, the judges, the teachers, the school officials, the "civic leaders," the bureaucrats, the preachers, and all the others who, for reasons of career or status or votes or whatever, helped promote or implement the System's racial program. The System had already paid them their 30 pieces of silver. Today we paid them [....] I and my men were in the thick of things all day, mostly handling logistics. When the execution squads began running out of rope, we stripped several miles of wire from power poles to use in its place. We also rounded up hundreds of ladders.

**Works Cited**


Alain, Chartier. (1908). *Propos d'un Normand*.

Andersen, M., Schjoedt, U., Nielbo, K. L., & Sørensen, J. (2014). Mystical experience in the lab. *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion*, 26, 217–245.

Baudrillard, J. (1994). *Simulacra and Simulation*. University of Michigan Press.

Besson, A. (2015). *Constellations: Des mondes fictionnels dans l'imaginaire contemporain*. CNRS éditions.

Broderick, D. (1995). *Reading by starlight: Postmodern science fiction*. London ; New York : Routledge. http://archive.org/details/readingbystarlig0000brod

Broderick, Damien. (2020). SF Megatext. *The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction*.

Broderick, Damien. (2022). Novum. *The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction*.

Brooke-Rose, C. (1981). *A Rhetoric of the Unreal: Studies in Narrative and Structure, Especially of the Fantastic*. CUP Archive.

Burke , K. ( 1973b ). The rhetorical situation . In L. Thayer (Ed.), *Communication: Ethical and moral issues* (pp. 263 – 276 ). New York , NY: Gordon & Breach.

Chambers, Whittaker. (1957). Big Sister Is Watching You. *National Review*.

Chandra, K. (2023). *Storytelling as Inverse Inverse Planning Chandra, Kartik; Li, Tzu-Mao; Tenenbaum, Josh; Ragan-Kelley, Jonathan*. eScholarship, University of California.

De Vries, H. (2001). Of miracles and special effects: Issues in contemporary philosophy of religion. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, *50*(1–3), 41–56. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012006217910

Debord, G. (2014). *The Society of the Spectacle*. Bureau of Public Secrets.

Dewey, J. (1934). *Art as Experience*. Minton, Balch.

Eason, K. (2019). *How Rory Thorne Destroyed the Multiverse: Book One of the Thorne Chronicles*. Astra Publishing House.

Goehring, C., & Dionisopoulos, G. N. (2013). Identification by Antithesis: The Turner Diaries as Constitutive Rhetoric. *Southern Communication Journal*, *78*(5), 369–386. https://doi.org/10.1080/1041794X.2013.823456

Goodman, N. (1978). *Ways of Worldmaking*. Hackett Publishing.

Hills, T. T. (2018). Masters of reality: Why did shamanism evolve around the globe? *Aeon*.

Hogan, P. (2013). *How authors' minds make stories*. Cambridge University Press.

Hogan, P. (2017). The paradox of tragedy and emotional response to simulation. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 40, 31–32.

Jameson, F. (1981). *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203820292

Kukkonen, K. (2014). Bayesian Narrative: Probability, Plot and the Shape of the Fictional World. *Anglia (Tübingen)*, *132*(4), 720–739. https://doi.org/10.1515/ang-2014-0075

Kukkonen, K. (2020). *Probability Designs: Literature and Predictive Processing*. Oxford University Press.

Marletto, C. (2021). *The science of can and can't: A physicist's journey through the land of counterfactuals*. Viking, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC.

Nielbo, K. L., & Sørensen, J. (2013). Prediction error during functional and non-functional action sequences: A computational exploration of ritual and ritualized event processing. *Journal of Cognition and Culture*, *13*(3–4), 347–365. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12342098

Nielbo, K.L., & Sørensen, J. (2011). Spontaneous processing of functional and non-functional action sequences. *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, 1(1), 18–30.
Nünning, V. (2010). The Making of Fictional Worlds: Processes, Features, and Functions. In *Cultural Ways of Worldmaking* (Vol. 1, pp. 215–244). De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110227567.215
Park, N., Park, M., & Peterson, C. (2010). When is the search for meaning related to life satisfaction? *Applied Psychology: Health and Well-Being*, *2*(1), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-0854.2009.01024.x
Schjoedt, U., Sørensen, J., Nielbo, K. L., Xygalatas, D., Mitkidis, P., Bulbulia, J. (2013). Cognitive resource depletion in religious interactions. *Religion, Brain, & Behavior*, 3.1, 29–86.
van Elk, M., & Aleman, A. (2017). Brain mechanisms in religion and spirituality: An integrative predictive processing framework. *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews*, *73*, 359–378. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.12.031
Waltman, M. S., & Davis, M. J. (2005). How to be a proper racist: Mythic representations in *The Turner Diaries*. *Journal of Intergroup Relations*, 32, 19–39.
Zacks, J. M. (2020). Event perception and memory. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *71*, 165–191. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051101
Zunshine, L. (2008). *Strange concepts and the stories they make possible: Cognition, culture, narrative*. Johns Hopkins University Press. http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip085/2007047748.html

# CHAPTER 3: EMERGENCE OF FANTASTICAL ALLOMYTHOI AND THEIR MODERN FORMS

## § 3.1. Contemporary Combinatory Borderlands

Why are allomythoi being so abundantly produced in our era in fantastika? We live in a global borderlands, an age of "complex connectivity" (Tomlinson, 1999, p. 2). Liminoid/liminal[1] and diasporic[2] experiences are increasingly facilitated by the presence of mass media, the Internet, vast cities, and advanced technologies of travel. The interconnectedness of our globalized world, enabled by mass media's ability to disseminate information rapidly and broadly, offers the potential for a shared cultural landscape transcending traditional boundaries, but also the possibility of countless fragmented pocket universes—time and space are being organized, experienced, and understood in novel and contested ways. This dynamic, generative (and often combative) interaction is further enhanced by sprawling urban centers, linked by rapid transportation, that serve as melting pots of diverse cultures, enabling ceaseless mingling and interaction among individuals from different WWLs. These interconnected elements converge to shape an evolving global society characterized by fluidity, hybridity, and a constant interplay between diverse cultural identities and elements.

This situation, so full of things that never existed before in human history, produces new cultural expressions, yes, but for all that it presents us with new things to study, we should resist a narrative of rupture that obscures the processes of connectivity and complexity that render this moment continuous with the past world and the cosmos as a whole (see Spier, 2010). This global, combinatory borderlands[3] serves as a powerful,

externalized-cognitive "mechanism" for generating novel allomythoi and WWLs. The *borderlands mechanism* cross-pollinates cultural and narrative elements from all levels of society and all over the world, though with certain classes and countries representing the vast majority of the output and representation. Conventional norms are affirmed, troubled, and reaffirmed. In the realm of fantasy and science fiction literature, creators, such as the artists behind works from *Star Trek: Strange New Worlds* to the latest Marvel movie to a growing host of individual creators online, draw inspiration from these borderlands to craft new, hybrid myths[4] and diverse characters and societies that reflect—including, sometimes, in the form of rejection of—the complexity and diversity of our interconnected reality and even offer provocative alternatives. How might this creative work be characterized?

### *§ 3.1.1. Metaphor and Translation*

I have already invoked metaphor and conceptual blending theory several times in this work to help understand how allomythoi are made (*e.g.*, how they relate to TWT and world-switches) as well as the cognitive capacities that enable their genesis and how they may serve as cues for recognizing allomythoi.[5] It is helpful to realize that, in cognitive terms, "translation" is understood as an example of conceptual blending. Bringing things together, I would argue that, just as the forces of globalization necessitate acts of translation, the borderlands mechanism produces novel metaphors, conceptual blends, cultural translations, "chimeras" (Severi, 2015). Indeed, allomythoi may be productively understood *as* metaphors or translations, and this is the heart of their estranged nature.[6]

## § 3.2. The Critique of Eurocentrism and Presentism

Is the borderlands mechanism unique to the Internet age, the age of rapid global travel, the age of global capitalism? Again, I reject the narrative of rupture, and I would

encourage skepticism regarding all talk of "ages" that assumes a progressive, stadial evolutionary teleology. Influenced by Jan Nederveen Pieterse's (2012) critique of (i) presentist and (ii) Eurocentrist biases[7] in most "evolutionary" periodizations of "globalization,"[8] although I agree that the genres of genre fiction (mystery, thriller, sci-fi, high fantasy, and so on, including the umbrella category of "fantastika" as encompassing some of these genre-fiction subgenres) are creatures of the contemporary, capitalist world, I do not regard allomythoi nor fantastika[9] as unique (i) to our present Internet age of intensified cultural circulations and coagulations, nor (ii)(a) to the late Victorian and Edwardian time of "New Romance" (see Saler, 2012), nor (b) to the rise of Modernity and Enlightenment, nor (c) to the 1500s colonialist-capitalist annexation of the global market (see Pask, 2013). Let me provide an example.

### *§ 3.2.1. Fantastical Representations in Ancient Borderlands Situations*

Against the weight of scholarly authorities that would make fantastical storytelling (and, thus, the allomythoi within such stories) a unique feature of our age—for example, an expression of re-enchantment in response to disenchantment,[10] I would draw attention to allomythoi in ancient cultural contexts.[11] Think of Basilides, a character whom Pullman resurrects as a divinatory figure.[12] In his book, *Lost Christianities*, Ehrman notes two ways what I am calling the "combinatory" character of "Gnostic" allomythoi was regarded by proto-orthodox Christians, who themselves also engaged in allomythic creativity using a vast array of cultural elements, as *contaminated*; first, such heresiologists denounced the obvious influence of Greek philosophy on "Gnostic" allomythoi; second, they observed how, within the creative milieu of the heretics, they progressively use their imaginations to creatively amplify and extend the fictions of those before them (Ehrman, 2005, p. 192).

Appendix 37 goes into more detail regarding ancient "Gnostic" mythopoesis or myth-making and some of its broader context. But I would here emphasize that it emerged in a complex borderlands situation of imperial-colonized connectivity and that "Gnostic" mythopoesis, heavily influenced by Platonic mythopoesis, was achieved in specific genres and addressed to big problems of that time and region, such as domination (by empire, by the stars, by Law and the sacrificial system, by the Demiurge—Yaldabaoth, Saklas, Elohim, etc.—and the Archons, by the body and materiality, and even, one might argue, by the perfection of the Pleroma before one of its Aeons, Sophia, acted independently) & liberation and ignorance & enlightenment (*e.g.*, regarding the origin, nature, and destiny of humans and the world, the composition and nature of the divine, and the true meaning of the Hebrew Scriptures). The allomythoi of "Gnostics" responded critically to traditional myths and provided new answers to the Big Questions that all WWLs concern themselves with as well as to the Big Problems of the day.

### *§ 3.2.2. Plausibility Crises and Making New Mythistories*

In Appendix 36 and in subsection III of Appendix 38, I note Ricoeur's point that the relationship between historical events and history-as-narrated in some form, usually in one offered by culture as a familiar genre, is *being-as*, that is, it is metaphorical and, in a quite literal but also meaningful sense, fictional.[13] This in itself is not a special cause for doubt or skepticism. But the external storage of our important being-as stories in media, the resulting ability to metareflect on them, and the superabundance of competing being-as narratives (*e.g.*, biographies, histories) promotes criticism, both as a genre—as Emerson states—and as a mode of relating to such narratives: there is a "plausibility crisis."[14] Myths give us meaning as peoples (e.g., Robertson, 1980) and even as isolated individuals having "faux

relationships" with stories they reread (Ministero et al., 2022; Derrick, Gabriel, & Tippin, 2008). Faced with a plausibility crisis, the need for a new myth, for a "livable history,"[15] becomes urgent, and a meaning-making and/or meaning-seeking process is executed.[16]

## § 3.3. Emergence of Fantastika and Allomythoi

I favor a theory of "myth" that takes a position of continuity rather than rupture—see Appendix 40. But I seek to avoid the contentions and implications associated with "myth" and identify what I mean by adopting the kairological term of art, *allomythos*. Allomythoi tend to emerge in situations characterized by the *borderlands mechanism*, but different situations tend to call forth different genres for allomythic expression. They tend to be fantastical, in that they break with the bare, material reality of anxious, day-to-day concern, and in this sense all such genres fall under the heading of *fantastika*. However, I am here using "fantastika" differently than it is used in mainstream scholarship,[17] but only in the sense that I reject the thesis of contemporary rupture. I still readily acknowledge that our era expresses itself with a distinctive (if polyphonic, dialogic, polysemous) voice in new genres. But basic features of some fantastical subgenres (*e.g.*, descriptions of journeys to strange and special worlds) reflect experiential and situational recurrences and regularities – as well as mere cultural inertia – that have led to their being used by many different groups over long periods of time.

### *§ 3.3.1. The New Genre System and Ironic-Realist Fantastika*

In "Appendix 42: New Narratives and Narrative Forms in a Context of Mixture, Multimedia, and Money," I write at length on the subject of how, under capitalist pressures, Americans came to accept leisure and indulgence in imaginative fiction, including fantastika, as acceptable, even ennobling activities, how they grew to enjoy consumption of

WWLs as entertainment in a context of constant creative novelty, and how a stern commitment to reality came to enrich fantasy. One of the noteworthy aspects of Dubourg and Baumard's (2022) article that attempts to explain the appeal of imaginary worlds is that they advocate an *entertainment hypothesis*; one may take issue with many aspects of their account, but it reflects well the emergent and dominant cultural spirit in the West described in this chapter and in Appendix 42.[18] The iconic, rhetorical, kairological-metaleptic call "to believe it and to believe in it" Lofton finds in "any product" in our world may be granted[19] – in the context of allomythoi it might well be called the *call to canonization*,[20] which lends realist power to genres from hard SF to high fantasy – as long as we also note that the iconic relation is often ironic[21] or ludic—a quality that is also not unique to this age but is reflective of BPs like criticism and virtuality. What is new is the new mass cultural genre system, with all its particularities,[22] in which genres "operate as signifiers not so much of a category of fiction as of an imaginary realm, a domain of possibilities, a collective fantasy. Genres become worlds, [...] in a sense cognate with the utopianism of the commercial" (Rieder, 2017, p. 56). The new fantastical genres with their megatexts offer novel domains of possibilities.

### *§ 3.3.2. Virtual, Ludic Homelands*

Kairology thus invites a new realm of historiography, sighting history from a site that takes the play of allomythoi in fictional storyworlds seriously, respectfully attending to the virtual, ludic "livable histories" people spend so much time dwelling in.[23] In studying and telling the story of such worlds, which C. S. Lewis tellingly describes as *the third world of romantic longing* and as *the marvelous-known-to-be-fiction*, the desire to romanticize, to trade in Romantic assumptions, evokes with special vigor the familiar problem of

romanticism in the categories of "myth" and "religion."[24] These allomythic homelands offer people identities, meaningful spaces in which to dwell and make sense of BQs and BPs.

### § 3.4. Responses to Big Problems (BPs)

Egil Asprem (2018), in *The Problem of Disenchantment: Scientific Naturalism and Esoteric Discourse 1900–1939*, applied the approach known as *Problemgeschichte* (problem history[25]) to reconceptualize the "process" of disenchantment as, instead, a set of problems that confronted modern historical actors,[26] to which different people and groups responded in a variety of ways.[27] The complex situation faced by people today – I will here attend to the intersecting BPs of exploitation, globalization, criticism, and virtuality – is reflected and addressed in fiction, and fantastical fiction in particular has provided a useful arena in which to respond creatively to these problems due to its capacity both to break off from the ideal or illusion of mimetic representation and, under an imperative to exhibit novelty, to create robustly estranged, alienated worlds. Through these alienated representations, (post-)(post)modern authors and readers are able to see the problems of their age anew.

The problems of criticism, exploitation, and globalization all relate to the BP of secularization and the so-called secular; the secular project,[28] which gives rise to the *secular*-BP*,[29] includes a number of other projects, some now discarded or discredited (e.g., racial projects, colonizing projects, and other projects of classificatory subordination-domination and exploitation), that were and are bound up with the global problem of exploitation and critical will-to-mastery of self and world. On the use of the entwined concepts of secularity/disenchantment and postmodernity/disenchantment and related narratives regarding "religion," fiction-based WWLs, and allomythoi, see "Appendix 45: Secular Stories?"

Humans in many regions of the world live in, and are increasingly aware that they live in, highly artificial, fictional worlds, and increasing fictionality, arising naturally from the "project" of self-and-world-making,[30] has intensified what might be called preoccupation with the *fictionality-BP* in contemporary culture.[31] What I call the "problem of virtuality" is closely related to the problem(s) of fictionality so it need not be explored in great depth now; however, if it is indeed the case that the drive to explore is adaptive and, in fact, propensity for spatial exploration correlates with goal-directed action abilities and cognitive exploration in problem-solving (see Hills & Stroup, 2004; Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 2010), finding the big problems of our age explored in and through fictively fashioning and virtually exploring novel simulated-imaginary environments makes sense precisely because those who are inclined to be interested in such problems would be dispositionally motivated to explore fantastical worlds. Again, four such BPs are those of *criticism*, of *exploitation*, of *virtuality*, and of *globalization*.

### *§ 3.4.1. Criticism*

"Criticism" as a BP refers to reflexive questioning of one's received world(s), using the critical tools of logic and evidence, rooted in awareness of a host of questions raised by and from the numerous WWLs and allomythoi that have come into contact in this age—ranging from those rooted in the many traditional WWLs throughout the globe and history, as well as racial-, ethnic-, class-, gender-, and sexuality-based WWLs, for example, to allomythoi in fictional worlds, to perspectives taking seriously the agency and intentionality of non-human animals and living systems and, even, inanimate things and systems.[32] I would first distinguish between criticism as a kairological BP (*criticism-BP*) and particular responses to the criticism-BP, such as Romanticism and Pragmatism. And Pragmatism in

particular—and particularly as a truly *American* product[33]—helps one identify the primary historical and WWL-based root of some of the major contributors to criticism as a live BP in our age[34] (see Graeber & Wengrow, 2021). The BPs that actually emerged from the borderlands mechanism(s) of the 15th century on were not foreordained outputs; they depended on the specific WWL families that came into relation with each other.

And, again, a BP is not to be reduced to a particular stance with regard to it. It is just as much a response to the criticism-BP to, like Nietzsche or Keats, celebrate the smashing of idols and the Negative Capability of accepting uncertainty, as to respond to heresy, analytical inquiry, and doubt with a reactionary embrace of traditional answers. The invitation to question and innovate provokes others to preserve and defend—indeed, claimed preservation, including reformation as a claimed return to primordial purity, is often innovation and imagination in disguise. European contact and interaction with indigenous American intellectuals and their indigenous critique of the European WWL (as well as sophisticated Asian and African interlocutors) in the global borderlands that arose in the early 1500s and later, with such alternative WWLs being communicated among the masses of Europe by means of the printing press, naturally had as a significant output critical metareflection on the received truths of the European WWL, now estranged or alienated through the gaze of these Others; genealogically, to gaze upon Christianity and Christendom with alienated, even "secularizing," eyes[35] is the gift of such aliens. And the BP of criticism that flowered in the Enlightenment and throughout Modernity and that, one might say, fruited in Postmodernity's criticism of any stable narrative or fixed truth has become virtually unavoidable for contemporary storytellers.

*§ 3.4.1.1 Typical M-mode Response*

How might one expect an M-mode worldmaker to respond to the criticism-BP as it pervades our age? No specific answer or response to the BP is foreordained by the M-mode, but whatever the response, one may expect it in a characteristic style. This is easier to see in contrast to the O-mode, which tends to reactionary doubling-down on a criticized "truth" or mimicry of critical language to attack the opposed WWL(s). Worldmaking in the M-mode, actuated by the criticism BP, may be expected to exhibit great combinatory freedom to explore the problem without anxious or antagonistic fixation on an answer. Indeed, those who argue for fantastical literature as being inherently critical may in this regard be correct, in that the M-mode liberty to experiment with all sorts of political forms and kinds of personhood sets up the precondition for the criticism-BP.

Tolkien's M-mode allomythology responds to the BP of criticism critically, comfortably and confidently deploying critical insights when it suits Tolkien's creative purposes, especially what might be called his premodern critique[36] of modernity. His is certainly not, for example, an aggressively feminist or anti-racist work and it, insofar as his writing falls into N-mode replication of the white, upper-class, homosocial environments that predominated in his life, confirms a blandly classist, white, male chauvinism. But when a prophecy foretells that "no man" may defeat the witch-king of Angmar, Tolkien cannot resist drawing both on his historical knowledge of Scandinavian women's valor and an ambient cultural acceptance of women's equality to have Éowyn's gender be the solution to the riddle of his own devising. Criticism is permitted to open up novel possibilities and even to attack Tolkien's enemies, but it is not allowed to apply to everything. Tolkien embraces the criticism of those aspects of the world that offend his soul and, with a calm eclecticism,

takes up and recombines those elements of various WWLs that appeal to his sensibilities. For example, in the chapter entitled "The Scouring of the Shire," Tolkien deploys an environmentalist criticism of industrial pollution and a royalist critique of contemporary political corruption, and the Shire is restored to Tolkien's ideal: a rustic, traditional English way of life with a good king reigning far off. Tolkien's work challenges both characters and readers to engage in critical analysis and consider the broader implications of their choices and beliefs, but core truths, such as the ultimate victory of good and defeat of evil, are never in doubt. But criticism need not be only oppositional or deconstructive; it is inherently creative in that the critical stance opens the potential possibility of divergence or difference, and the actual generation of novelty is consummately critical. Tolkien's ability to imagine such a multitude of allomythoi, then, depends on and reflects the ubiquitous criticism-BP.

King's work allows the criticism-BP to shape his worldmaking more explicitly – and in a more explicitly postmodern style – than in Tolkien, but, as one would expect from an M-mode work, the BP is confronted as a problem, not simply answered in one way or another, as is more likely in the N- and O-modes. Recall the medical intern's perception of Odetta/Detta in the passage in *The Drawing of the Three*, soon after Jack Mort, who dropped a brick on five-year-old Odetta's head causing her to split into Detta and Odetta, pushes her in front of the train, severing her legs.[37] King is well aware of the fact the Detta is an exaggerated caricature of an angry Black lady, commenting through the mind of the intern, "It was crazy. She talked like a cartoon black woman, Butterfly McQueen gone Loony Tunes," though it is hard to say whether King ever thought critically about his own worldmaking decisions to make her Black body such a spectacle of mutilation, rape, impregnation, possession, and, ultimately, devotion to white men like Eddie and Roland

over the course of the series. In any case, I would note that, much like Tolkien, King draws on critical questions, such as how racism effects Odetta's self-formation or how John Farson provokes rebellion and destabilizes the Affiliation by critiquing the inherited power and unequal status of the gunslingers, not to resolve such problems as racial inequality or aristocratic domination, but to use the BP of criticism as yet another tool in exploratory worldmaking. Characters and readers are invited to think critically about the world of the *Dark Tower* series and about our own world—what dark, conspiratorial forces lie behind the events in the news?—but the Crimson King, the demonic forces of the Prim, and the monsters of Todash Space, not hegemonic structures of domination, are the creatures behind the curtain.

*§ 3.4.1.2. Typical N-mode Response*

Fantastical narratives tend toward conspiratorial, even "reductive," accounts of what's "really" going on; that is, they satisfy the critical stance and generally welcome the hermeneutic of suspicion evoked by the cultural ubiquity of the criticism BP. In the M-mode works above, one uncovers the scheme of Sauron and Saruman to use the power of the One Ring to dominate Middle-earth and the plot to use the Breakers' psychic abilities to eat away at the Beams of the Dark Tower to restore the chaos of the Prim. One may note Tolkien's critical concern with power and, in the corruption of innocence and the addictive pleasure of Breaking, some of King's critical interests, but, in N-mode works like Pullman's and L'Engle's, the authorial WWLs are more evident in the conspiracies themselves.

In *His Dark Materials*, the great threats to happiness are the anti-life rejection of Dust and its properties—*e.g.*, curiosity, creativity, sexuality, independence—by groups like the Magisterium and entities like Metatron and the Guild's willingness to use

technoscientific ability to cut apart the fabric of the multiverse, releasing the Spectres, merely in order to parasitically live on the stolen spoils of the other worlds. In the *Time Quintet*, the Echthroi ("Enemies") who and the Darkness that would un-Name, X, and un-make creation and Light are resisted by the cosmic Namers and Teachers, with humble children—notably, in *A Wrinkle in Time* and *A Wind in the Door*, a mathematically and scientifically talented *girl*—playing central supportive roles in overcoming fear, selfishness, and hate with love and even with the particularities of their "faults." The N-mode works of Pullman and L'Engle reflect the values of their respective WWLs (one might say, respectively, panpsychist naturalistic humanism and universalist metaphysical Christian spirituality), but these include the value of representing protagonists as wrestling with – thinking critically about and in dialog with – some variety of BQ answers, arriving at their own, and adhering to them. Pullman's treatment of Mrs. Coulter illustrates the N-mode's balanced incorporation of dextral and sinistral responses to the criticism-BP: she is treated negatively because she largely represents allomythoi that are contrary to Pullman's WWL, but Pullman is self-reflexive enough and sufficiently comfortable with complexity and change to give her a redemptive and salvific function defeating Metatron.

*§ 3.4.1.3. Typical O-mode Response*

In the O-mode, much like the N-mode, the correct BQ answers are known, but, more than this, they should not be questioned—any alternatives are enemies. Criticism, at its core, arises from the play of perspectives and ways of being with and against each other, so how does a worldmaker in the O-mode relate to the criticism-BP? The paranoid style of allomythic worldmaking is most on display in the O-mode. The knives and acids forged and derived from criticism cut and scorch any alternatives, and the logics of criticisms that might

be directed at the authorial WWL are often mirrored back or projected upon its foes. In section 3.1.1 I emphasize the dextral, metaphorical aspect of allomythos-generation, but it must also be recalled that the dextral comprehends the sinistral, while the sinistral knows only itself; definition is a characteristically sinistral concern, and as Mauss writes, "Societies are, in a sense, immersed in a bath of civilization. They live indebted to each other [or, "by borrowing"], but they define themselves, rather, by the refusal of borrowing than by the possibility of borrowing."[38] Like an organism, an allomythos lives and is structured and constituted by refusal, no less than by its intake.

Consider when Rand uses narratorial omniscience to give readers insight into the mind of Jim Taggart as, unable to shatter Galt's will by means of pain and compel him to become economic dictator, Taggart realizes he wants to torture John Galt to death (this is right after Galt tells his torturers how to repair the very machine being used to torture him).[39] The passage nicely contrasts the emptiness, in Rand's view, of the "pseudo-words" and "fraudulent sounds" of "soul," "love," or "social duty" with Galt's "reality" and "objectivity" as her idealized representation of the critical values of rationality and independence. The preceding chapter quoted at some length Rand's depiction of the justified doom of all those who die in her novel's train wreck. One might raise the critique that Objectivism, by celebrating money, machines, and individual greed even if the vindication of these requires the collapse of civilization and mass suffering and death, seems to exhibit a "lust to destroy whatever [is] living, for the sake of whatever [is] not." But Rand's ghoulish, sadistic representation of James Taggert gives the lie to any socialist or collectivist who speaks of sacrifice for the "greater good": such people really are really motivated by a lust to destroy greatness and a will to defy reality. This is what their motives reduce to; this is the

heart of the conspiracy of the "second-handers," who are actually motivated only by the selfish, parasitic desire to mooch, against the Prime Movers, like Henry Reardon and Dagny Taggart, who are misguidedly self-sacrificing and need to be awakened to the virtue of selfishness. By going on strike, the previously exploited creators, in Rand's view, provide a critique in reality itself that unveils the inner logic of the "mystics" of altruism.

Whereas Rand's O-mode work exalts the atomistic individual, Pierce embraces a race-based communal vision,[40] but the O-mode response to the criticism-BP is just as evident. It is not a provocation to creativity for its own sake, nor even to reflect on the WWL one adheres to, but to attack.[41] Consider a passage early in *The Turner Diaries*, regarding the gun raids, in which Pierce invites his reader to enter into his critical perspective regarding the hypocrisy and inconsistency evidenced in the gun raid's uneven implementation and, in the public's response, the decadence, gullibility, and materialism that would cause white Americans to allow themselves to be disarmed and effectively tyrannized under this flimsy pretext. He invokes a notion of fairness and equality to encourage critical thinking ("why would only white people's guns be taken and not those of black people?"), but he does so rhetorically or instrumentally.[42] The tools of critical thinking serve his larger aim: cultivating violent, revolutionary racial animus.

### *§ 3.4.2. Exploitation*

Turning to the exploitation-BP,[43] it's worth noting that, whereas the M- and N-modes benefit from the dextral capacity for appreciating self-reflexivity, dynamism and instability, and other aspects of the world made salient by the criticism-BP, the O-mode, with its sinistral disposition, proves to be far more aligned with exploitation, but as a project and achievement,[44] not as a problem. M- and N-mode allomythoi *respond* to the

exploitation-BP in varied ways, but O-mode allomythoi tend to *align themselves* with projects of exploitation that they work to valorize. Fantastika offers people storyworlds and allomythoi that contribute to, theorize, challenge and otherwise represent global powers of exploitation—economic, social, political, environmental, and so on.

*§ 3.4.2.1. Typical M-mode Response*

Allomythoi in the M-mode have a dextral tendency to gloomy reflection on the dangers of the capacities and technologies that allow humans to exploit, dominate, consume the world and each other. Tolkien appreciates the human role, as "subcreators," to engage in technical creativity, perhaps most sublimely represented in the works of the elves, but his allomythology regularly encourages reflection on how often and quickly this turns into domination and exploitation. The One Ring offers itself as an obvious embodiment of a tool expressive of the will to dominate—note for instance how Saruman's efforts to understand the Ring and find it using his palantír leads to his fall from being a protector of Middle-earth to the splintering of his white color, treachery and manipulation, industrialization and deforestation, inciting warfare and terrorism, forced labor to build weapons, and bioengineering of the monstrous Uruk-hai—but for more on what might be called the "technoscientific" aspect of exploitation in Tolkien, see "Appendix 46: Technoscience in Tolkien."

In King's *Dark Tower* allomythology, one might set up a contrast between exploitative power as used and promoted by Maerlyn and by Arthur Eld. Maerlyn taught the Old Ones of the Imperium how to cut holes in space and time—contrary to the separation maintained by the Dark Tower—and how to combine technology and magic. The Old Ones followed the path Maerlyn set them on and sought to gain ultimate mastery of the universe

by remaking the Dark Tower itself, but to rebuild the body of Gan they first had to break it. And this, of course, led to their doom and significant environmental decay. In contrast, Arthur Eld used the technology of the gun, not to unleash the chaos of the Prim, but to build and enforce order; in fact, the Affiliation he led even built dams that held back the waters of the Prim. The fall of the Affiliation coincided with the world "moving on," leading to barren landscapes, ruined cities, and scarcity of natural resources. The wastelands and desolate areas Roland and his ka-tet travel through reflect the consequences of humanity's unsustainable exploitation of the environment, other conscious beings, and the cosmos. And perhaps the best example of exploitation in the *Dark Tower* series is the Crimson King's use of the Breakers, children gathered by the Trans Corporation and given pills, derived from the abuse of other children by the Wolves, to enhance their psychic abilities. King's depiction of the exploitative instrumentalization of psychic children[45] produces a sharp sense of such exploitation as a *problem*. Roland must learn, over the course of the novel's to stop exploiting people as tools, but King's allomythology, like Tolkien's, though it frequently evokes the exploitation-BP, does not adopt a simple, straightforward answer to the BP.

*§ 3.4.2.2. Typical N-mode Response*

Whereas in the M-mode BPs like exploitation arise as narrative provocations but tend to remain problems, in the N-mode the manifestations of the exploitation-BP tend have clearer solutions and are solved over the course of N-mode stories. More than this, the N-mode exhibits a balanced appreciation of sinistral capacities for "exploitation" of the environment, others, and one's self—linguistically and actually cutting the world apart and manipulating it, for example, are not inherently tragic.

Pullman offers a potent metaphor for exploitation—like King, using children to amplify its horror—in the practice of "intercision,"[46] cutting the bond between a child and their dæmon, the third, generally-adorable, animal-form aspect of his humans' tripartite, body-ghost-dæmon[47] beings. That intercision produces zombie-like slaves[48] and does such violence to animal-form souls symbolizes well the technoscientific exploitation of people and the natural world. Further, Lord Asriel's use of the power of intercision to build his bridge between worlds sets off global climate change,[49] and the blades used for intercision are akin to the subtle knife, each cut of both releasing the spectres from the void between the parallel universes. Finally, the DNA-intercision bomb made by the Magisterium raises the problem of the exploitation of the atom and the threat of nuclear annihilation—rending a rift in the multiverse through which Dust/dark matter pours into the Abyss, potentially leading to the extinction of consciousness and existence. These exploitative technologies are solved, ultimately, by the essence of Dust: matter's love for itself, its coming to know itself. And Pullman's narrative throughout stresses that control of knowledge and information is one of the main ways the Magisterium and other exploitative forces of the Kingdom of Heaven have maintained tyranny. But, one might also note the great value of the cut Lyra and Will allow to remain in the world: the one that finally permits the ghosts to escape their eternal prison in the realm of the dead; some cuts are worth making.

In L'Engle's *A Wrinkle in Time*, one observes a similar resistance, grounded in L'Engle's worldview, to the mindless crushing of individuality and enforcing of conformity that readers witness on Camazotz, where its inhabitants are reduced to mechanical uniformity. Meg saves the hypnotized Charles Wallace from IT by drawing on her individuality and her love from him in his singularity. Similarly, in *A Wind in the Door*, the

Echthroi, the enemies of existence, seek to "X" all things, in this case disrupting the communal unity of the stars and the farandolae, tiny organelles within Charles Wallace's mitochondria. The sinistral gift of naming is, for L'Engle, not a tool for cutting the world apart, but a giving of something to itself, an act of love and knowledge, grounding and situating it (dextrally) in its place in the whole. Her heroes are scientists, and technoscientific techniques for understanding and altering the world are not inherently bad in L'Engle's allomythology; indeed, they can be very good. But L'Engle exhibits an integrated concern for sinistral excess. Her version of the Noah myth, in *Many Waters*, contrasts sharply with the biblical form of the story. Whereas in Genesis the Flood myth fits into a pattern of YHWH intervening to put humans back in their place when their "exploitative" powers become too great (e.g., Genesis 11:6–7), in *Many Waters* the Flood is sent by 'El to save humans from domination by the his sons and their children, the Nephilim. Like Pullman, L'Engle is concerned about the human power to exploit the atom and potentially destroy ourselves and our world with that capacity—she analogizes to this danger in her treatment of the Flood. And she addressed it directly in *A Swiftly Tilting Planet*, in which the solution to nuclear holocaust is, not something like eliminating knowledge of the atom from human civilization, but redemption of the Madoc family line. In this novel and in *An Acceptable Time*, contemporary readers face the critical challenge of figuring out what to do with her narrative exploitation of fictional Native Americans to address the exploitation-BP. Throughout the series, characters often overcome challenges by balancing sinistral abilities with dextral values like holistic interconnectedness. Concepts the tesseract and virtual unicorns, modes of travel that transcend space and time, bring worlds

together and reflect the potential for humans to draw on the power of nature while respecting its complexity.

*§ 3.4.2.3. Typical O-mode Response*

In the O-mode, with its sinistral disposition, the exploitation-BP tends not to be as problematized. Its essence is affirmed as natural and right. However, authors make their storyworlds and allomythoi in a context, in an age that is keenly aware of exploitation as a BP. So even O-mode authors may engage with it as a BP, but if so, with a distinctively O-mode hostility to others.

Rand is a fine example of this. Exploitation of capitalist Prime Movers by the herd or mob of moochers is, truly, a serious problem.[50] But this is not because exploitation itself is in any way bad or wrong. Those with strong wills and inventive ideas should force the world to conform to their intentions; they should exploit the natural world and those workers who, possessing inherently servile natures, are unsuited to being industrialists themselves. But when workers do not accept their place, when they resent their betters and, lacking the capacity for creation, invert the proper order of things, the creators must rebel. False, crony "capitalists" like James Taggart and Orren Boyle exploit their connections and influence, using political power to secure government contracts and suppress competition. Collectivists, bureaucrats, and similar looters only hasten the fall of the civilization.

Similarly, in *The Turner Diaries*, the old White Supremacist order of exploitation of non-white races, such as chattel slavery[51] of Black people, was in harmony with the divine order.[52] Too, the exploitation of individual whites, like himself, by the racial collective is fitting and even sacred: his suicide mission is his martyrdom, and he is honored to have his technical abilities, energy, and very life exploited in the service of his race. Pierce is

offended that the racial system of exploitation was ever called into question,[53] but if the non-white races seek to rebel, they have ceased to have a function and genocide is the only solution. One may also observe how Pierce depicts white people working together happily in a non-exploitative way. Just as Rand with rather vindictive relief describes the fall of a civilization that did not honor its capitalist Prime Movers, in noteworthy contrast to Pullman's and L'Engle's concerns about our ability to break the atom, Pierce relates to nuclear weapons as solutions—rapid means to cleanse vast swaths of the earth of racial pollution. This cheerful, even celebratory, embrace of a decisive end to an irritant conforms to the sinistral disposition so familiar in the O-mode. Let's turn to the virtuality-BP.

### *§ 3.4.3. Virtuality*

This problem is strongly associated with what is often understood by "post-modernity."[54] But insofar as exploitation is sustained by stories that naturalize it, virtuality, by calling attention to the constructedness of the exploitative order, may be said to be a postmodern return to a premodern political consciousness.[55] Fantastika is a natural home for thinking with the virtuality-BP, whether one thinks about enchantment and illusion, magic, and dreams in fantasy; simulations and virtual reality in science fiction; or madness, the uncertainty of identity in possession, or other unsettling ontological and epistemological questions that are so salient in horror.[56]

#### *§ 3.4.3.1. Typical M-mode Response*

The M-mode well knows that dreams and illusions are the stuff of life. Its constitutive agency is not, in that sense, a problem. Because in the M-mode there is a tendency to see things as provisional, uncertain, open-ended, there is a (perhaps regretful)

mature willingness to accept that one never gets to rest on the solid ground of an unmediated, certain reality.

For Tolkien, fictionality is not nearly as problematic as virtuality. He celebrates the subcreative ability to make worlds: hobbits make hobbit holes, which are synonymous with comfort; elves seek to preserve eternally the light of past ages within their realms; dwarves fashion great stone kingdoms under the earth. But Sauron, exploiting tools like the palantíri, uses illusion to corrupt and deceive Saruman and Denethor II, drawing them into a virtual or simulated world where his power is invincible and his victory inevitable. Saruman, in turn, uses the hypnotic power of his voice and other persuasive abilities to deceive the wise, foment war, and despoil the Shire. Aragorn rightly takes up the palantír and uses it, with sovereign authority, to deceive the deceiver, projecting an illusory world that draws Sauron's eye away from Frodo and Sam's quest. The ring distorts the perceptions of all around it, and throughout Tolkien's work the variety of competing sources of information—from ancient prophecies to present rumors to visions—establish a reality always subject to interpretation. The elven will-to-eternity is a beautiful but mistaken dream; the song of Ilúvatar will always have new movements and will never be fully known to any but he.

In King, the virtuality-BP is used to great horrific effect. Thinnies appear: weak points in the world, where the boundaries between things and the stability of time itself are called into question. Characters, possessed and multiple, call into doubt the the stability of identity. The series concludes in a manner suggesting the influence of Asian WWLs on King's worldmaking; the entire *Dark Tower* series that readers have witnessed, that was written by Stephen King the character, whose writing was ensured and protected by Roland's ka-tet, is but one instance in a series of incarnations, real but not permanent. The

fictionality of the world is emphasized by King, as the characters learn they are being written and come from multiple, fragmented worlds, both no doubt because of the disturbing quality that ontological uncertainty invites readers to enjoy, and because, King seems to say, a mature person must, in the end, not recoil from the virtuality-BP. However unsettling, it must be confronted and accepted as part of the complexity of understanding the big picture.

*§ 3.4.3.2. Typical N-mode Response*

In the N-mode, one may expect a "healthy-minded" acceptance of fictionality inasmuch as it affirms creative agency, but a strong tendency to recoil from the virtuality-BP when it calls its core truth or reality into doubt. It draws on sinistral certainty and stability to rest in its authorial WWL as translated into allomythic form. There is solid ground to rest on, but it also has that mature comprehension of the fact that the worlds are made, which is a source of freedom because new worlds are possible. In Pullman, the illusion that holds everyone in bondage and humiliation was made by the Authority and perpetuated by agencies like the Magisterium. Those deluded by it cling to the simulation even in the world of the dead, when every evidence of their senses tells them their "heaven" is a gloomy Hades.[57] Pullman's devotion to the truth and dislike for lies is well illustrated by the harpies' angry response to Lyra's false story, calling her, in a play on her name, LIAR, and their willingness to guide the dead if they will tell them true stories—as well as by what happens when a spectre consumes one's dæmon.[58] In place of the Kingdom of Heaven, Lord Asriel seeks to make a Republic, and Dust is closely tied to creativity . . . while at the same time, in a manner that integrates the sinistral, maturity involves settling down, becoming steady and focused: one's dæmon takes on a fixed form.[59]

L'Engle's N-mode works similarly reflect her WWL-guided response to the virtuality-BP. The claim that reality is empty, a simulation, is for her a demonic lie; the only response is to fill it with the reality of love, to X oneself in the mystery of loving self-sacrifice.[60] Sandy and Dennys, in *Many Waters*, have to believe in order for the virtual unicorns to appear and save them from the Flood; history may potentially take very different branching paths in *A Swiftly Tilting Planet*. Because L'Engle is a sensitive, N-mode author who engages with popular reflection on interpretations of quantum mechanics, her response to the virtuality-BP is to refuse to call everything into question, to anchor herself in her WWL, but also to accept that there are competing imaginative "simulations" that require earnest creative effort in order to realize the one in which goodness and reason triumph.

*§ 3.4.3.3. Typical O-mode Response*

The O-mode with its hostile certainty rejects the full force of the virtuality-BP; it is silly and yet dangerous. Rand hates politics; her sinistral disposition, in crafting a persuasive storyworld, must draw on a number of dextral capacities to create it, but it must be *true* and *real*. Newspapers and politicians and philosophical academics attempt to delude people into believing a simulated, hyperreal version of things,[61] but Galt takes up the tools of deceit, the very media of deception, to speak the truth directly in his lengthy address. Like Galt, using mass media and the deceptive illusion that conceals his utopian valley where individualists can escape to reality from the manipulated and distorted simulation of the outside world, Rand uses the lying tool of the enemy to speak the truth. She uses the techniques of simulation in the service of an accurate representation of reality as it really is, to show the real truth of the nature of things, and to evade, for example, the lie that money is fictional.

But Rand takes up, to some extent, a conspiratorial or suspicious logic (O-mode) that recognizes the value of questioning the accepted, received narrative.

Pierce is similarly allergic to the virtuality-BP. Race is not a fiction for him; it is an elemental truth. He tells a livable history, from his racist, white-supremacist stance. Pierce uses Turner's *diaries* as a genre to communicate this—these diaries of direct confession, where Turner is being most honest with himself, together with authoritative interjections from historians. The fictionality of history is a rejected premise; history is treated as giving direct access to truth. However, although the diaries may give direct access to truth Turner admits somewhat the virtuality-BP in, for example, the Jewish use of deceptions to manipulate Black people, gullible white people, and others. In *The Turner Diaries*, *The Washington Post* is blown up, with great narrative satisfaction; it and its agents are liars. In the face of the complexities and ambiguities of contemporary existence, individuals may find solace in clinging to simplified narratives that provide a sense of stability and certainty. Racist ideologies exploit this vulnerability by offering a simplistic framework that attributes societal problems to particular racial groups. By assigning blame and constructing a clear "other," these ideologies use fallacious, stereotypic, narrative alleviation of the anxieties arising from epistemic, ontological uncertainty to ground their WWLs in a seemingly concrete reality.

### *§ 3.4.4. Globalization*

Holban asserts that globalization[62] functions as a heuristic, "a shift in attention paid to questions of knowledge, communication flows, actor-network relations, interconnections, spatiality, mediality, agency, etc." "Globalization" has been defined in a variety of ways that resonate with recurring themes in this work – the reconfiguration of space, the crossing of

previously stable borders, the flows and transfers of things, new narratives responding to such situations, and so on. But rather than offer a specific definition, once again, I would point to "globalization" as being better thought of in terms of the weighty problems it encompasses and the urgent questions it, whatever it is, induces people to ask. New and increased modes of travel (from the steamship and the steam locomotive to the airship, jet engine, and space shuttle) have facilitated new and increased kinds of trade, migration, tourism—as well as movement and transfer of other things like information, pollution, instruments and agents of violence and charity . . . and most living things on this planet now face a global extinction event, with their innocent, engaged senses perceiving a human-domesticated world, an Anthropocence age posing questions to which their evolved, instinctual fund of answers responds primarily with deadly bafflement. And humans find themselves similarly placed, by human activity, in a new, artificial world, as naked as ever and with the traditional garments bequeathed by local cultures generally ill-suited to the changed global climate. But humans may look upon this global, fictional, self-made, exploitative situation critically, with the full range of possible worldviews to choose among and ways of worldmaking to adapt and exploit them. It is a small comfort that humanity is not utterly, mortally baffled yet, and would that humanity could act decisively now to preserve the rich biodiversity and local cultural plurality – containing many answers to many questions yet unasked – from the deadly, homogenizing forces of globalization, the theme of which is "loud, and vain, and endlessly repeated" with "little harmony, but rather a clamorous unison as of many trumpets braying upon a few notes" that would drown out all "other music by the violence of its voice." Globality, globalization, and related concepts and processes invite kairological consideration of the global*-BP.[63]

*§ 3.4.4.1. Typical M-mode Response*

Exploitation, as an answer, is more sinistral; virtuality, as deployment of the fictive for manipulative aims, is more sinistral; criticism, as a logical weapon, is more sinistral. But awareness of the exploitation-BP, of the virtuality-BP, of the criticism-BP, of the global*-BP is, in terms of its orientation, dextral. M-mode allomythoi tend are both at home with global*-based insights and with the global*-BP as a BP. Sinistral capabilities, following McGilchrist (2009), have much to do with the nexus of global*-phenomena that have arisen, but it is a vital contribution of the right hemisphere that we see the *global* and, more importantly, problematize it.

Tolkien presents a global threat; the One Ring is a tool that will "rule them all," and its global dimension means that not just one people will be dominated and exploited, not merely a few will be lost in the illusion of despair. All of Middle-earth is implicated, and the interconnectedness of things is an essential fact that accounts both for their potential doom and their hope of salvation. The global claim of Ilúvatar, of Aragorn, and of Sauron is consistent both with the Christian WWL's catholic ambition and, also, with Tolkien's awareness of the global*-BP. The destruction of Fangorn Forest and the Shire stand for a global project of universal exploitation and domination; Tolkien is aware of the perils of transportation of huge numbers using tools for mass transmission coordinated by tools of mass communication. However, the Eagles are also agents of (emergency) rapid travel just as the palantíri may be used (cautiously) to communicate rapidly and over great distance, and Aragorn's global kingship—with local particularity preserved and celebrated—is the solution, not a problem. His M-mode work illustrates both an inclination to desire global

integration and to criticize the sinistral techniques (homogenizing, instrumentalizing, etc.) that might achieve it.

King depicts the failure, not merely of one global civilization, but a globalization of the multiverse; the Old Ones attempted to control of the Dark Tower, to use the exploitative powers of technoscience and of magic to dominate everything, and yet for King the essence of his evil antagonists is the wish to break civilization, to cut the ties that hold the cosmos together and, also, apart in their distinctiveness. The Crimson King wants to destroy the universal structure of the global, universal, civilized order, the interconnected cosmos—and he uses, not merely a multinational, but a multidimensional corporation, the Sombra Corporation, to pursue this goal. As one might expect, Kings allomythology, overall, is critical of the sinistral excesses it diagnoses in the global*-BP, but because its M-mode bias is to be global, it doesn't subject the global to a thoroughgoing critique. Rather, it needs to be done by the wise people with a balanced perspective (the Sombra Corporation is opposed by the Tet Corporation). Roland has been too atomistic, too focused on his goal, and the whole point of the *Dark Tower* is to situate him in the larger context, to teach him the big lesson that he needs to be part of his community. The Dark Tower, the global whole, is saved, in the end, but Roland is not, or at least not yet. But his salvation, if it is to be won, lies in allowing himself to be bound by his ties to the world.

*§ 3.4.4.2. Typical N-mode Response*

The N-mode participates fully in the contributions of the right hemisphere, just not in its excesses, so the M- and N-modes are far more akin to each other than the O-mode, which stands alone more starkly and stridently. But while the M-mode knows the global to be both

a reality, a temptation, and a *problem*, the N-mode, while seeing the problems, has more of a sinistral optimism that all problems have solutions.

As in Tolkien and King, the threat of Metatron and the Magisterium in Pullman is universal, yet Pullman views many of the aims and tools of a global order (a Republic of Heaven) favorably: for example, Lee Scoresby's balloon, the witches' cloud-pine branches, Lord Astriel's intention craft—all are tools of rapid transportation. There is, certainly, a critique of globalization: (*e.g.*) the crashing of individuality, the danger conformity, the breaking down of all barriers (via the subtle knife); as in King, the worlds should properly retain their separate identities (the Dark Tower holds them apart while also linking them together; the good angels must close the rifts between Pullman's worlds). Likewise, Pullman depicts the Church's goal to be universal and its willingness to control and censor information, use surveillance and police powers to inquire, track, and terrorize, and engage in other negative features of the contemporary global systems of domination. And yet, how happily too he depicts the touristic pleasure of encountering different allomythoi and the value and, really, soteriological necessity of encounter and communion with others (*e.g.*, Mary Malone and her interaction with the mulefa allomythos).

In L'Engle, too, the threats to Charles Wallace, for example, are cosmic; he has a universal role play. But the global*-BP is answerable; L'Engle stresses his value as an individual, Meg's value as an individual, with all her flaws. The answer is not global homogeneity under the Central Intelligence of Camazotz, but the glory of individuals singing together in mutual love and thanksgiving, in which each retains their particularity while contributing to the same song. So, in the N-mode, one finds some sympathy for the projects of global*, definite pleasure in touring and tasting the vastness of the global (with

far, far less ethical hand-wringing about impact, appropriation, etc.) , awareness of some of the problems of the global*-BP qua BP, yes, but more confidence than in the M-mode that the global*-BP qua BP is answerable and less meditation on it as a BP.

*§ 3.4.4.3. Typical O-mode Response*

In the O-mode, global* matters tend not to surface and, if so, not to the level concern with the global*-BP, save as an inimical overreaching of enemy allomythoi that stand, ultimately, for the foes of the authorial WWL. Rand shows very little awareness of the global—a sea of socialist, non-American states appear on occasion, but Rand's narrative attention is focused on the United States. In her O-mode text, one finds oneself not in a global, cosmic world, but in a hyper-individualistic universe where individuals stand for whole companies, states, and nations. The train—a tool for global commerce—is a heady, entrancing symbol for her, but not because of the people who travel on it. Her cities don't really have inhabitants, much less multicultural inhabitants, who dwell and *live*, *together*. All should know and share in the universal truth of Objectivism, which gospel Galt announces via mass media. The global*-BP surfaces as a problem only because and when its tools are misused, not to establish the universal reign of reason, but to delude people with socialist mysticism. Prime Movers as separate sovereigns respect and honor each other—domination of one by another would be an intolerable hubris and seeking to dominate would be a failure; autonomy, equality among equals is appropriate, but the naturally servile should stop oppressing their natural leaders with empty, false "ethical" demands and willingly take their place—freely offered and itself an honor—as workers. Global* issues—such as consideration for other people's states—arise only as marked, explicitly-attributed foolishness.

And in Pierce, one encounters, for all his reverence for racial unity (when it's white people embracing whiteness), an O-mode fragmented, more individualistic, narrative construct (little cell-worlds, pocket fights against lying mass media and national systems). But the global aspiration for homogeneity is evident and, finally, narratively achieved. Pierce's home WWL wills its victory catholicly, but, unlike Tolkien, who for all his Catholic presuppositions, admits that Aragorn's fresh kingdom will fall. Rand does not take the final step Pierce does, of obliterating the opposed, but it is the natural inclination of the O-mode.

### § 3.5. Little Problem-Questions and Microgenres

In striving to decern, as BPs, provocations sufficiently general to be of broad, contemporary pan-human concern, but, unlike BQs, less universally salient than pan-species, a lesser but energizing category remains, the little problem-questions that produce microgenres.[64] These are highly prone to translational difficulties,[65] though from within their situational context they may take on the aura of universality. In "The *Time Quintet* as Madeleine L'Engle's Theology," Oziewicz states, "L'Engle constructs her affirmative theology in relation to tangibly real—American yet universal—modern problems and concerns, such as a missing parent, child abuse, being different, bullying, dangerous disease, nuclear threat, environmental damage, and unintended consequences of scientific experiments" (2006, p. 216). But the microgenre embodied, say, in *The Changeling*'s (2017) exploration of the problem-question of postpartum depression and contemporary struggles of parenthood through the lens of fairy lore or *The Echo Wife*'s (2021) treatment of domestic violence and oppression through the lens of cloning—like a missing parent, child abuse, bullying—is distinguishable from broader concerns, like pandemics, anthropogenic climate change, and the nuclear threat.

## § 3.6. A Secular Conclusion

This chapter has proposed that the global borderlands produced by technologies of mass transit and communication have generated a combinatory *borderlands mechanism*, one of the outputs of which has been a proliferation of storyworlds. This proliferation invites doubt and critique, calling into question received mythistories of traditional WWLs and supplying novel allomythoi that respond more directly to the BPs of this *saeculum*.

In conclusion, one may posit that enjoyment of fantastical storyworlds and the allomythoi within them is a major constitutive element of the "secular" as such.[66] This view, though certainly drawing on translation theory and metaphor theory, would be contrary to the translational understandings of "secularization" like that of Carl Schmitt or Karl Löwith, where this "secular" age is a sort of diluted translation of Christendom. More akin to Jean-François Lyotard's understanding of the postmodern condition as one of incredulity regarding any universal, totalizing, transcendent metanarrative[67] or to Thomas Carlson's (2008, 2019) reception of figures like Berger, Gauchet, and Nancy, I would argue that most who enjoy fantastical storyworlds together, over dinners and movie nights, in shared gaming experiences, and so on, find lively inspiration for conversation and reflection of the pressing problem-questions of the world/age and find themselves enriched and opened by the depth of worlds-within-worlds (*saecula*) they receive and transmit through cultural intercourse, but that this secular WWL-family resists the "fundamentalist" style of many religions and of scientistic New Atheism, with its membership so anxious to avoid mythological or religious contagion.[68] This fantastical receptive-depth and prospective-openness as a distinctive characteristic of many "secular" people today is much like a sense of the "secular" one finds in Emerson (and that Emerson, like me, finds in Shakespeare[69]):

> Far, then, from the self-assertive, scientistic, or even idolatrous arrogance of a closed world system with its buffered selves, the sense of the secular to which Emerson [. . .] appeals is the sense of a natural, temporal immensity and hence of an immeasurable strangeness in which we, living a mortal lifetime, nonetheless participate intimately—through movements, which we ourselves never fully comprehend, of reception and bestowal. Resistant as much to providential fulfillments and world-historical recollections (from Augustine to his "secular" translation in Hegel) as it is to the masterful aspirations of modernity's calculating rationality and technoscience (secularity as science, and vice versa), this thinking of the secular in Emerson is rooted in an experience of our finitude. (Carlson, 2019, p. 173)

Many find in their reading, movie, or game groups, in Netflix-and-chilling with their beloved, and in similar settings, an endlessly revelatory quest for wonders—natural, cultural, and fantastical—consistent with a secular understanding of the human as creatively open-ended, with human worldmaking ever producing a humanity and a cosmos of worlds ever the more incalculable.

## Notes

[1] See “Appendix 34: A Note on the Liminal-Liminoid Distinction.”

[2] See “Appendix 35: Diasporic Mythistory-Making – Its Value and Peril.”

[3] I draw on borderlands theory and point to expressions of mythopoeic creativity, rooted in the capacity for translation, transformation, and (re)connection, that flourished in the borderlands situations of Greco-Roman antiquity as examples suggesting that fantastical writing may be expected to emerge (and, indeed, has historically emerged) in globalized borderlands situations of increased connectivity, which have been multiple throughout history and the world. Stated in terms of the new mechanistic philosophy appealed to by the Building Blocks Approach, a “borderlands mechanism,” with its concomitant production of new WWLs, allomythoi, and other phenomena, may be expected when a number of representations of WWLs and storyworlds containing fictional WWLs come into close relation with each other as components of the system (see Asprem and Taves, 2018). Globalization and the resulting borderlands situation as a mechanism or phenomenon may be understood as one way of thinking, complimented by understanding globalization as a problem—encountered, understood, and confronted in many different ways by various individuals and groups, including authors of allomythoi.

Catholic thinkers like Benedict XVI and Ignacio Carbajosa, who offers the following quote from Benedict XVI as part of his argument running along parallel lines, submit that the translation of the Hebrew Bible into the Greek Septuagint was providential because it prepared Gentiles for the coming of Christianity by making the Hebrew prophecies, legends, poems, and so on available to the entire Greek-speaking world:

> Biblical faith, during the Hellenistic era, met internally with the best of Greek thought, until it reached a reciprocal contact which afterward came out especially in the late sapiential literature. Today we know that the Greek translation of the Old Testament, done in Alexandria—the Bible of the “Seventy”—is more than a mere translation from the Hebrew text (which must perhaps be evaluated less than positively): it is in itself a textual witness, and a specific and important step in the history of Revelation, in which this encounter has come about which had a decisive significance for the birth of Christianity and its spread. At base, it is an encounter between faith and reason, between authentic enlightenment and religion.

The LXX certainly laid the groundwork for the form of Christianity that became historically victorious, catholic in its extent, and regarded as orthodox, but it also set the stage for all sorts of “heresies”—the outputs of and contributors to the borderlands mechanism enabled, in no insignificant way, by the translation of the LXX, which, as Carbajosa notes, “represents the first moment in which a reading tradition of the Hebrew consonantal text becomes Scripture.”

Long before the era I point to above, the substantial library of texts eventually known as the Hebrew Bible, as well as all the other, similar texts that contributed to and radiated from it, themselves reflected many different WWLs within a shared worldview family, and this had a self-and-world generative effect. Cupitt (1997, p. 37) observes an O-mode logic of individuation, for example, in the psalms (compare the beginning of Appendix 45):

> As we see in the Hebrew Bible ... the dispute with God becomes the classic arena in which selfhood is elaborated and human subjectivity is produced. Nowhere else do we find such psychological riches. The psalmist moves from ecstatic adoration to bitter reproach to penitent submission and then to joy and gratitude. Prayer was the classic method of investigating and exercising the self, opening speculative thought and stretching the soul, and

> the relationship to God thus developed became a resource utilized in the construction of many other human relationships.

[4] In his chapter on Matrixism in the *Handbook of Hyper-real Religions*, Morehead states, "Myth […] provides a significant aspect for consideration for those exploring new religions and hyper-religions, a largely neglected aspect with great research potential. Scholars would do well to reconsider this research trajectory" (2012, p. 119). Csapo states,

> Definition is never the innocent first step in a process of empirical discovery that it is sometimes made to seem: it is rather always the final precipitate of an already elaborate theory. To begin with a definition is therefore in an important sense to begin at the end, and to urge acceptance of a position before presenting the arguments or the evidence. If I begin with a discussion of the problems of defining myth, it is to urge suspicion. (2005, p. 1)[4]

Inviting suspicion, I will say at the outset that I think of mythic and historical narratives as akin to each other: rhetorically persuasive, fictional and imaginative, but bearing reference to important realities and concerns. That said, I will not simply define the "mythic" and the "historical." I too, since I would speak of allomythoi as – in their time – new, livable histories, alternative myths, and, indeed, as new worlds one might inhabit, have a responsibility to explain my understanding of the natures of "history" and of "myth." Such an explanation is also responsible to this chapter's argument, which connects back to Occidental antiquity and mythopoeic activity and which itself constructs a historical account.

[5] For example, Chapter 1, Figure 3; Appendix 32;

[6] See "Appendix 36: Allomythoi as Metaphors and Translations."

[7] His text briefly but rewardingly identifies a host of other biases at work in the telling of global history (compare, for example, White, 2021), and it is a marvelous starting place for future lines of kairological inquiry, identifying a large number of times and places where vigorous instances of "globality" have been identified (indeed, though it's true that connectivity breaks down perhaps more easily than it accumulates, the fictions of past cultures as stationary and sequentially segmented should be discarded) and where, therefore, one might look for evidence of allomythic creativity. In the following subsection, I give the example of the Greco-Roman world since I have a strong background in that area, but given present constraints, I am only able to gesture at the kind of research that could be done there. Perhaps someday scholars of the Islamic, South Asian, and East Asian WWLs and worldview families will take up and carry the torch.

[8] He concludes:

> That globalization has been multicentric all along, as histories of globalization show, is relevant also for contemporary trends. Taking into account the ancient globalizations (Mesopotamian, [Greco-Roman,] Afro-Eurasian, oriental), western hegemony is a latecomer. Twenty-first century globalization breaks the two-hundred year pattern of dominant North-South relations with an East-South turn (Nederveen Pieterse 2011), so the era of western hegemony becomes a historical interlude, lasting from approximately 1800 to 2000. Asian dynamics have been the driving force of the world economy during 18 of the past 20 centuries (Maddison 2007), through most of the career of globalization, and present times indicate a return to a historical "normal." (Nederveen Pieterse, 2012, p. 20)

Compare the similar critique of "evolutionary" stages in human cultural development in Graeber & Wengrow, 2021 (*e.g.*, p. , "Still, it's worth pointing out because it exposes the much deeper silliness of the initial assumption: that societies must necessarily progress through a series of evolutionary stages to begin with. You can't speak of an evolution from band to tribe to chiefdom to state if your starting points are groups that move fluidly between them as a matter of habit.")

[9] Some background. The dominant narratives of what conditions produced and are reflected in fantastical writing tend to link the fantastical genres (i.e., "fantastika") to a secularization process that (first) removed the positive aspect of the sacred and only permitted it to continue existing in its diabolical form, as reflected especially in the horror genre (Fredrickson, 2018; Nelson, 2003; Ingebretsen, 2016—cf. Clute, 2011), but that (second) increasingly, as expressed perhaps first in comics, has been transforming into a recovered "spirituality" (Moore, 1994, p. 145) of a (trans)humanist ideal of secular human theosis (see Kripal, 2011a & 2011b; compare Nelson (2012), who calls the genre "gothick" – though she used the term "fantastic" in her earlier work (2001, p. 75)). This optimistic, perennialist ideal of "spirituality" assumes a specific kind of subjectivity—a privileged seeker who freely, autonomously selects among options for her leisure time, options she comprehends, guided, perhaps, by an inner knowledge, comprehension, and mastery of herself. Its representation of this as a normative or ascendant and, if so, of this as a universal or universally positive phenomenon, should be problematized. Moore (1994, p. 119) states,

> The aim of American religious leaders in the early nineteenth century was to contribute to a spiritual awakening of Americans and, in so doing, to build up the moral energies that guided public life. What was pushing them was a determination to cleanse, not to sully […] They did not intend in trying to redeem Americans' commercial culture to become deeply implicated in commercial means of tapping popular enthusiasms. They did not want religion to become a commodity for consumption, advertised as something essential to a happy life, and to transform churches into institutions that supplied peace of mind to the rich and powerful. Yet in their roles as important cultural innovators, which they certainly were, they did all of these things.

To take two examples, the "spiritual" celebration of nature and human divinity that one finds in Emerson goes hand-in-hand, as Moore observes, with what looks very much "like, well, grubby materialism" (ibid., p. 59), and, regarding the health-conscious discipline of many "spiritual" worldviews and ways of life, Moore critiques Western metaphysical religion along the lines of Žižek's critique of contemporary appropriation of Buddhist meditation: "It is the internalization of a disciplined way of life that promises to allow people, men and women, to live long enough to make a financial killing" (ibid., p. 143).

Fantastika, though an umbrella genre term pointing to all imaginative or speculative fiction (e.g., horror, fantasy, sf, fairy stories, etc.), is said by Clute (2011) to be most characteristically embodied in horror and to have emerged around 1800, when people are said to have become aware of non-realist genres as genres and to have developed a global or planetary consciousness. Saler (2012) links it to the "New Romanticism" of the 1880s, which responded to modernity—and modernist responses to modernity—and produced an enchanted disenchantment—a kind of virtuality or fictionalism—that characterizes our age. Rieder (2017) locates it even later and explains how the mass cultural genre system (in contrast to the classical and academic genre system) has emerged from contemporary capitalist modes of multimedia and mass production, distribution, and reception.

I do not disagree with many aspects of this characterization of fantastika – as being newly aware of a real/imaginary divide and desirous of taking pleasure in creativity, as being conscious of the "world" – the global – in a new, expansive sense, and as being newly critical. But I find signs of it much earlier in the West and, more importantly, reject the presentist and Eurocentrist assumptions inherent in previous accounts (cf. Nederveen Pieterse, 2012); it emerged in Asia and other parts of the world earlier and often. Pask (2013) links the emergence of "the fairy way of writing" to the problems of modernity and pushes the timeline back to the 16th century. Extending Pask's line of thought would link the emergence of fantastika (though not a fully realized awareness of many of its features and not expressed yet in distinct genres) to the so-called Renaissance and the problems that emerged in that era. I would certainly agree with this, too.

But by drawing on Nederveen Pieterse's (2012) critique of presentist and Eurocentrist biases in most periodizations of globalization and the many critiques of "secularization" (with which concepts of globalization and modernization are often associated), one may note that even a Pask-derived view would

suggest that fantastika, as an umbrella term for the family of genres that share the property of containing storyworlds that decisively break with consensus reality, is distinctly Western and "modern" (in a broad sense). I think this is a mistake. However, this is not to say that acknowledgement of multiple modernities, globalizations, renaissances, etc. effaces the distinctive particularity of each, including this (or these) recent era(s), which has been shaped by new and multi- media and market forces that have generated and enflamed uniquely contemporary desires for and understandings of entertainment and, one might say, a kind of "renaissance" in "fictional" re-creational escape.

[10] One such recent study is that by E. Dubourg and N. Baumard: "Why Imaginary Worlds? The Psychological Foundations and Cultural Evolution of Fictions with Imaginary Worlds" (2022). I elsewhere mention their theory in support of some of my own conclusions (certainly, exploring new environments is part of the appeal for those who enjoy fantastika, and various factors promoting a culture of novelty, curiosity, exploration and tourism encourage that; however, the primary motive for worldmaking is, I claim, primarily home-making, what might be called the nesting impulse to make cosmos out of chaos and uncertainty, an artificial environment to inhabit imaginatively wherein the provocative BQs and other pressing concerns are resolved to some degree (*cf.* Hills, 2018, "Masters of Reality: Why Did Shamanism Evolve All Around the Globe?")), but here I would note the move they make of, first, excluding ancient religious narratives from identification or comparison with fictions (p. 2) and then remarking, "Why are we captivated by fictions with imaginary worlds, and seemingly more and more so? The timing of their success suggests that we are more predisposed to appreciate such fictions in modern societies, or we would have invented more imaginary worlds much earlier" (p. 3) (respondents Dunk and Mar express the same objection: "the definition for imaginary worlds put forth is inconsistent in its exclusion of religious narratives and the rationale for doing so [...] and appears circular in constraining these narratives to those that fit the hypothesis" (p. 24); Moore and Hills make a similar point, as does Sugiyama; and Norman and Goldstein explicitly note the "unexamined Eurocentrism" of the target article). Dubourg and Baumard describe a large number of studies establishing that the cognitive systems of many species supply rewards for novel stimuli independent of external rewards (2022, pp. 6-7); though there is always variation in a given population and one can easily imagine cultures acting on human plasticity to inhibit or cultivate specific abilities (Ball, 2013, *Curiosity: How Science Became Interested in Everything*; cf. Dubourg & Baumard, 2022, p. 7: "Cues of parental support or even the mere presence of a parental figure enhance exploratory behavior in children"), it is hard to swallow the idea that premodern peoples everywhere had significantly less of a taste for imaginary worlds, living only in the exploitative end of the exploit-explore spectrum, compared to those alive today. (Dubourg & Baumard explain this in terms of prosperity, safety, and comfort, arguing that those in the past never had the safety, affluence, and leisure to turn away from anxious pessimism, intolerance, and religion to indulge in extravagant imaginative exploration.)

[11] See "Appendix 37: Fantastical Representations in Ancient Borderlands Situations."

[12] Of the ancient "Gnostic" teacher Basilides Eusebius writes: "Irenæus explains that Basilides, behind the disguise of ineffable [secrets] strained his creativity past all limits and imagined for himself sinister [stories] of irreverently invented [μυθοποιίας; lit., "making of myths"] heresies."

... ὁ Εἰρηναῖος δηλοῖ, προσχήματι δὲ ἀπορρητοτέρων τὸν Βασιλείδην εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον τεῖναι τὰς ἐπινοίας, δυσσεβοῦς αἱρέσεως ἑαυτῷ τερατώδεις ἀναπλάσαντα μυθοποιίας (Historia Ecclesiastica, 4.7.4).

Irenaeus' account of Basilides' version of the Gnostic mythology is in some respects pretty standard (*Adversus Haereses*, I, 24, 3-7), but it also departs from the Sophia myth: "[Basilides] developed a cosmology and cosmogony quite distinct from the Sophia myth of classical Gnosticism, and also reinterpreted key Christian concepts by way of the popular Stoic philosophy of the era" (Moore, n.d.).

Interestingly, in 1916, Jung wrote a Gnostic-mythopoeic work entitled, *Septem Sermones ad Mortuos: Seven Sermons to the Dead, written by Basilides of Alexandria, the city where East and West meet*, which contains many of the major themes that would emerge in his more mature works.

[13] Emerson writes:

> Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and *criticism*. The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes. *Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe?* Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs? (1836, p. 1, emphasis added).

Whatever one thinks of Emerson's romantic view of past generations, to think in an original way, to enjoy an original relation to what one receives, one must draw on the metaphorical capacity, taking up the elements of experience and tradition in a new way. See "Appendix 39: Two Tensions – Realism/Fictionality and Generality/Particularity."

[14] See Appendix 6, pp. 294–5.

[15] See also, Appendix 35. In *The Rise of Tolkienian Fantasy*, Lobdell (2005) argues, on the solid foundation of Tolkien's own words and works like Hobsbawm and Ranger's (1982) *The Invention of Tradition* (see also, Girouard, 1981; and specifically on the invention of Scottishness, see Brown, 2010) that in creating his "mythology for England" Tolkien was participating in a romantic movement of Celtic (and more broadly, Chivalric) revival and an emergent genre of "feigned history" or "imagined history" (Lobdell, 2005, pp. 21 ff.; cf. Larsen's (2019) "A Mythology for Poland: Andrzej Sapkowski's *Witcher* Fantasy Series as a Tolkienian Subcreation"). Lobdell further states, "*Perhaps the search for a usable past*, whether factual or mythic or both, is *the* distinguishing characteristic of the bounds of the stream of fantasy and feigned history at which we are looking" (emphasis mine, 2005, p. 32), and he argues, in response to the question, "What was the purpose of this invention of tradition?" (2005, p. 29), "It was to provide emotional bonding and community for a people in subjection or diaspora" (ibid.). Berger, Berger, and Kellner, in *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness*, note that the "pluralization of social life-worlds" produces a secularizing, diaspora-like condition:

> The secularizing effect of pluralization has gone hand in hand with other secularizing forces in modern society. The final consequence of all this can be put very simply (though the simplicity is deceptive): *modern man has suffered from a deepening condition of "homelessness."* The correlate of the migratory character of his experience of society and of self has been what might be called a metaphysical loss of "home." It goes without saying that this condition is psychologically hard to bear. (1974, p. 82)

Contemporary mythopoeic, mass-cultural works similarly generate what might be called diasporic fandom communities that help each other bear the condition of homelessness through various means, generally remaining rather loosely networked groups but sometimes able to gather together in acts of virtual and physical tourism or pilgrimage. The resulting distributed culture of fantastical fandom has exercised powerful influence on the mainstream (Roz Kaveney, 2008; Gray, Sandvoss, and Harrington, eds., 2007; Hills, 2002; Bacon-Smith, 2000; Jenkins, 1992; Lewis, ed., 1992).

[16] See Appendix 26, pp. 1024–5. See also, Taves's adaptation of Spilka, Shaver, and Kirkpatrick (1985), summarized in Appendix A of her work (Taves, 2009; see Taves, 2008; compare, *e.g.*, Gould, 1981, p. 6). Rue's (2005) approach in *Religion Is Not About God*, which emphatically falls into the adaptationist camp (like, e.g., Wilson, 2002 and others who frequently enjoy the support of the Templeton Foundation) of regarding "religion" as a prosocial adaptation, rather than simply a by-product (*e.g.*, Boyer, 1994, 2001) or danger (*e.g.*, Dawkins, 2006), is particularly interesting relative to my own position. In Rue's case, religion is an adaptation to promote the realization (Rue uses the language of *telos* with surprising ease in the context of making evolutionary claims) of human potential as buffered, organized, self-controlled, unified agents (see Rue, 2005, p. 26) who, at the same time, are part of similarly coherent and effective groups. Rue's position synthesizes many of the most optimistic theories of psychology of religion and sociology of religion, and this is part of his larger and admirable goal of consilience. What I find most appealing is his identification of all religions with "myths" focused on root metaphors that supply answers to fundamental questions like cosmology and morality (Rue, 2005, pp. 126-127). One might endorse this understanding of the function of

core narratives relative to worldviews without going on to regard myths and religions as necessarily being goal-oriented systems of evolved strategies for producing integrated individuals and groups.

[17] For a survey of the terrain, see "Appendix 41: Dominant Narratives of Fantastika."

[18] And, to cite another example not taken up here or there, evident in Lofton's conclusion to *Oprah: The Gospel of an Icon*:

> I have found that whatever distinguishing marks we make between commodities and religion, they are, for all practical purposes, arbitrary. Our consumption and our religiosity can be described only in their infectious, ritual commingling, both in their distribution and in their consumption. *Oprah: The Gospel of an Icon* demonstrates this through one product, a product that possesses acclaimed omnipotence and proclaimed omniscience. To study any product is to study an icon that will and does tell us, over and over again, not only to buy it but also to believe it and to believe in it. The subject is worthy of many books—from books speaking to the differences between cotton swabs and Angelina Jolie, from Ford sedans to Cheerios, the iconic brand subjects are infinite. Yet any descriptive iconic survey will return to the same point, to the inseparability of consumer choice and religious option in the modern period. (2011, p. 212)

[19] People often use words like "myth" and "history" to refer to narratives that possess authority, usually understood as bearing some special truth-reference (often to universal (psychological, social, moral, etc.) truth in the case of the former and to (bare material, physical, behavioral) reality in the case of the latter). This truth-referential aspect, however, is frequently overemphasized in the case of history just as the falsehood or fictionality of myth is often improperly stressed (compare the contrast between "worldmaking" and "mythopoeia" set up in Izzo's (2019) "Worldbuilding and Mythopoeia in Tolkien and post-Tolkienian Fantasy Literature"). Drawing on the achievements of much great scholarship, I would urge against such an excessive dichotomization, but I would, with Csapo (2005), also warn against overcompensating too far in the other direction:

> The [classic] theories of myth had a paradoxical tendency to imitate the objects of their study and become myths in their own right. But this is not the whole story. Later theorists reacted against the ideological depositions of their predecessors, and in doing so they created a critical and scientific dialog, which, if it did not demystify the ideological contents of earlier theories, at least diluted these ideological contents with a stronger draught of reason [….] The strong oppositions our great-grandfathers made between science and mythology, truths
>
> and myths, themselves and others, was pure wish-fulfillment. This was ideology. The danger now is that we reject any distinction between science and myth in a postmodern orgy of self-effacement and homogenizing relativism. This is also ideology. (p. 316)

In my analysis of allomythoi, I attempt to build on the robust study of myth that has gone before and use this mythology or mythography to give a responsible account of allomythoi that still others may build upon. (For another effort to use myth theory and knowledge of ancient mythic narratives to account for the function of SF in contemporary culture, see Casey Fredericks's (1982) *The Future of Eternity: Mythologies of Science Fiction and Fantasy*.)

[20] See "Appendix 43: The Call to Canonization."

[21] See, *e.g.*, Appendix 42, n. 2. The ironic stance is promoted not only at the level of genre, in and by contemporary generic developments, but also throughout narratives themselves in what is called *free indirect style*, itself a new expressive development in our age. Wood (2008) observes:

> Thanks to free indirect style, we see things through the character's eyes and language but

> also through the author's eyes and language. We inhabit omniscience and partiality at once. A gap opens between author and character, and the bridge—which is free indirect style itself—between them simultaneously closes that gap and draws attention to its distance. This is merely another definition of dramatic irony: to see through a character's eyes while being encouraged to see more than the character can see

[22] See Appendix 42, pp. 1183 ff., drawing heavily on Rieder (2017).

[23] Just as BPs contrast with BQs, so too this chapter's focus on time compliments Chapter One's focus on space. But my interest in and recognition of the importance of the temporal dimension of life should also be evident in my having already discussed allomythic worldmaking as dependent on the human capacity for mental time travel and modal thinking. In any case, I resist the oppositional way of understanding "myth" and "history" in temporal terms (e.g., Lévi-Strauss, 1971, p. 542; Eliade, 2005/1954) One may note that both of the thinkers cited in the preceding parenthetical treat the contemporary novel as different from and inferior to myth (e.g., Lévi-Strauss, 1976, pp. 128, 131; Ziolkowsk, 2014), though less so for Eliade who was himself a novelist. On this topic, von Hendy observes,

> [T]he aspiration of modernist art to reestablish communication with the archaic and to "revolt against historical time" (Eliade 1975, 192). Eliade speculates that the novel as a genre, while it "does not have access to the primordial time of myths," nevertheless creates in its construction of imaginary time analogous escapes from "historical and personal time" (192). This is a species of romantic aesthetic theory we have witnessed inhabiting the work of various modernist writers, but it takes on a keener ideological edge in Eliade's treatises. While literature does not attain the "primordial" time of "the sacred," it evinces, as Eliade puts it in *The Sacred and the Profane*, "at once thirst for the sacred and nostalgia for being" (94). (von Hendy, 2002, p. 186)

The Romantic nostalgic desire to gain mystical access to the pure, archaic world (i.e., "Being" and the "Sacred") and to escape from the cold, mechanized rationality of modernity ("the Terror of History") is operative not only in much of the theoretical construction of "myth" as a category, as von Hendy documents and as others have confirmed, such as Robert Ellwood, who in his study on Eliade, Campbell, and Jung argues that the three mythologists were modern "Gnostics" heavily influenced by Romanticism, but also in the category of "religion" (see, for example, Kippenberg, 2001). I am in a great deal of sympathy with Rue's (2005) understanding of "religions" (and, I would add, other WWLs) as, at their core, "myths" – "narrative traditions or myths, which are formulated and revitalized by a set of ancillary strategies" (Rue, 2005, p. 143) – narratives centered on root metaphors and that meaningfully respond to important questions. Rue's account of religion-as-myth's historical emergence is worth comparing with Bellah's (2011). The fact that "myth," like "religion," is so contested and so burdened with all sorts of problematic associations –

> including reification, epistemological ambiguities, ethnocentric bias, metaphysical and theological presuppositions, implicit Protestant values, orientalist misrepresentations, imperialist and colonialist genealogies and agendas, methodological anachronisms, and its historical conjunction with other, equally problematic terms such as 'the secular' or binaries such as public and private (see e.g. Asad 1993; Dubuisson 1998; Fitzgerald 2000, 2007a,b). (Stausberg, 2009, pp. 12-13)

– leads me, I'll note again, to use the term *allomythos*, rather than myth or even *muthos*, to designate my phenomenon of interest.

[24] For an extended treatment of these ideas, see the preceding footnote and "Appendix 44: Virtual, Ludic Homelands and Telling Their History."

[25] See thinkers such as Otto Oexle (2001) and Riccardo Pozzo and Marco Sgarbi (2011).

[26] This may be regarded as another way of noting that these supposed processes are complex cultural concepts (CCCs), unstable and contested if one focuses on trying to pinpoint stable definitions, but rewarding of analysis if one instead regards them as inherently problematic sites of contestation that nonetheless afford action, discourse, and configurations of power. Humans of other times – before what some call "modernity" or "postmodernity" – exploited their environments and each other; built networks of information, trade, migration, and so on; engaged in critical reflection; and built and inhabited artificial worlds. So the problems of (post)modernity are not altogether new. But in demarcating and designating this (or these) age(s), a claim is made that certain problems are experienced as being of increased relevance, intensity, complexity, contestation, or significance by people of this period.

[27] To illustrate, one might use the problem-history approach to study the WWLs of global Catholicism. Rather than understanding global issues such as postcolonialism, mass media and popular culture, nationalism, capitalism and communism, anthropogenic climate change, postmodernity, or migration as determinate processes and things, posing them as novel problems and provocations (and, thus, also as affordances) helps supply a platform for comparing different Catholic sub-WWLs' responses throughout the world and even for comparing Catholic responses to those of other WWLs. A problem-history approach to global history helps highlight both the coherence of Catholicism's global response as a WWL-family to contemporary problems and the simultaneous diversity of Catholic sub-WWL responses. It also illuminates fascinating resonances between Catholicism and other worldviews, such as those between Calvinist austerity and Jansenism, Wesleyan missions and revivalism and Catholic devotionalism and domestic missions in the nineteenth century, the formation of Protestant circuits of mass communication and missionizing and the Catholic orders' and congregations' transnational production of civil society through schools, hospitals, orphanages, and other philanthropic and missionizing institutions, allomythic representations of global Catholic (especially Jesuit) conspiracy and Catholic allomythic representations of, for example, Judeo-Masonic conspiracy, and so on.

[28] I derive this expression from thinking about Omi and Winant's understanding of "racial formation" as resulting from various "racial projects," some of which projects are properly characterized as "racist." The racial projects of modernity and the subsequent era(s) substantially structure many fictional and fantastical texts, and they are motivated by the racial problem produced by racial formation and its decisive impact on and pervasive implication in the organization of capital, class, space, social and political roles, identity, and power. Projects that constitute problems may inevitably be viewed by some neutrally as processes and even positively as affordances.

[29] The asterisk in this neologism is meant as the wildcard operator, *i.e.*, as a shorthand for *secular-BP/secularity-BP/secularization-BP*. For further discussion of the secular and secularization theory, see Appendices 6, 20, 28, 37, 40–2, and 45.

[30] See Chapter 1, n. 10.

[31] In this regard, Dubourg & Baumard (2022, p. 13) make a very interesting claim about increasing fictionality:

> It is only gradually that the stories will become fictionalized both by the inclusion of completely new characters and intrigues, and by the progressive abandonment of the claim to veracity. Thus, we argue that the important question is not whether people in ancient societies "believed" in their fictions (Veyne, 1988) but to which degree their narratives were truly fictional. We argue that in ancient time, such stories were not "as fictional" as they can be in modern societies. This would explain why, for instance, Chinese people recognized fictions not before the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties, only when they "dehistoricized" narratives (Lu, 1994). Consistently, data-driven studies show that it is only in the seventeenth century in England that fiction makers started to write fictions about "nobodies," that is, characters that are completely unknown to the audience (Paige, 2020). It marked the beginning of the "novel" (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1984; Cave, 1999; Lu, 1994; Paige, 2011). In this perspective, imaginary worlds can be thought as the ultimate step of this fictionalization process that started centuries ago: After having fictionalized the events and the protagonists,

> fiction makers started to fictionalize the settings, giving themselves even more freedom to intensify all stimuli in the fictions.

Likewise, Besson begins her work on contemporary fictional "worlds" as follows:

> *Les indices d'une évolution du rapport contemporain aux fictions sont partout, des strates les plus visibles de la culture populaire mondialisée aux créations des artistes contemporains, des programmes scientifiques aux cibles marketing, de la théorie critique à la participation interactive – tellement foisonnants peut-être que leur multiplication gêne la bonne perception de leur ensemble en tant que tel. Les petits sorciers et leurs pendants adultes néopaïens*[] *New Age, le Moyen Âge fantastique, les jeux en ligne, le partage de fichiers,* Second life *et le Web 2.0, l'autofiction*[] *et le transhumanisme*[]*, les atlas imaginaires et les bibliographies fictives, les synergies médiatiques et la réhabilitation du fan, du* nerd[], *du* geek[], *l'emprise du* storytelling[] *et la réinvention de soi, le « marketing affectif » et les publicités qui font de la ville et de la planète de vastes terrains de jeux ou d'éclosion du merveilleux: chacun de ces vecteurs participe à la construction d'un imaginaire commun propre à l'occident postmoderne. Ensemble, ils disent que le monde est une histoire, que l'œuvre est un monde, et que tout est un jeu à part le jeu lui- même, qui est sérieux* – this is not a game. (2015, p. 9)
>
> ["The signs of an evolution in the contemporary relationship to fictions are everywhere, from the most visible strata of globalized popular culture to the creations of contemporary artists, from scientific programs to marketing goals, from critical theory to interactive participation – so abundant perhaps that their multiplication hinders proper perception of their whole as such. Little wizards and their adult neopagan New Age counterparts, the fantastic Middle Ages, online games, file sharing, Second life and Web 2.0, autofiction and transhumanism, imaginary atlases and fictitious bibliographies, media synergies and the rehabilitation of the fan, the nerd, the geek, the influence of storytelling and self-reinvention, 'affective marketing' and the advertisements that make the city and the planet vast playgrounds or the emergence of the marvelous: each of these vectors contributes to the construction of a common imaginary specific to the postmodern West. Together they say the world is a story, the work is a world, and everything is a game except the game itself, which is serious – *this is not a game*."]

I appreciate Besson's expression, *les ambitions démiurgiques de la fiction* (2015, p. 28), which made Tolkien's idea of human artists as subcreators strike me with new force (see also her brief but suggestive reference to Leibniz on p. 30). And she rightly notes that the cosmogonic drive or demiurgic ambition is a recurring and ancient human impulse, not one uniquely contemporary or Euro-American:

> *Des œuvres conçues et reçues comme des mondes, cela ne date pas d'hier – bien au contraire, il faut sans doute considérer la pulsion cosmogonique comme une modalité fondamentale des expressions de l'imaginaire. L'histoire en reste largement à faire, qui n'est pas notre propos on la ferait remonter au moins au* Cycle épique *greffé par les continuateurs sur Homère, premier grand exemple antique d'ensemble sollicitant, par le prestige du chef-d'œuvre, plusieurs auteurs sur le long terme, autour d'une réinvention de la géographie méditerranéenne par la fiction et d'enjeux de transmissions généalogico-culturelles.* (p. 74)
>
> "Works conceived and received as worlds are not new – on the contrary, the cosmogonic drive must no doubt be considered as a fundamental modality of the imagination's manifestations. The history largely remains to be told, which is not our purpose; we would at least date it back to the *Epic Cycle* grafted by successors onto Homer, the first great ancient example of a soliciting ensemble, by the prestige of the masterwork, several authors over the long term, around a reinvention of Mediterranean geography through fiction and issues of genealogical-cultural transmission."

[32] Note how Pullman, for example, places into the rational mouth of the panserbjørnian king a simple critical argument for the intentionality of objects:

> "I don't like that knife," Iorek said. "I fear what it can do. I have never known anything so dangerous. The most deadly fighting machines are little toys compared to that knife; the harm it can do is unlimited. It would have been infinitely better if it had never been made."
>
> "But with it—" began Will.
>
> Iorek didn't let him finish, but went on, "With it you can do strange things. What you don't know is what the knife does on its own. Your intentions may be good. The knife has intentions, too."
>
> "How can that be?" said Will.
>
> "The intentions of a tool are what it does. A hammer intends to strike, a vise intends to hold fast, a lever intends to lift. They are what it is made for. But sometimes a tool may have other uses that you don't know. Sometimes in doing what you intend, you also do what the knife intends, without knowing. Can you see the sharpest edge of that knife?"
>
> "No," said Will, for it was true: the edge diminished to a thinness so fine that the eye could not reach it.
>
> "Then how can you know everything it does?" (cite)

For an early example, compare Varela, Coutinho, Dupire, and Vaz, 1988, on immune systems as cognitive.

[33] I will not belabor this point, but Pragmatism is authentically *American* in the best sense—that is, an outgrowth of ways of reasoning inherent to the common law system (see Postema, 2002, pp. 588 ff. (noting such characteristics of common law reasoning as attention to and situated reflective judgment on context and learning from practical experience and examples and through discursive interaction)), a style of thinking promoted and enhanced by Black insights (West, 1989; Harris, 1999; Glaude, 2007), a stance favored and also challenged by queer thinkers (e.g., Muñoz, 1999, 2009), and, too, a gift of Native American intellectuals to humanity (Pratt, 2002; Wilshire, 2000; Larson, 1997). Graeber & Wengrow (2021) note (adopting a *Problemgeschichte* approach in fact if not in name: "If we ask, not 'what are the origins of social inequality?' but 'what are the origins of the *question* about the origins of social inequality?' . . . then we are immediately confronted with a long history of Europeans arguing with one another about the nature of faraway societies: in this case, particularly in the Eastern Woodlands of North America. What's more, a lot of those conversations make reference to arguments that took place between Europeans and indigenous Americans about the nature of freedom, equality or for that matter rationality and revealed religion—indeed, most of the themes that would later become central to Enlightenment political thought. Many influential Enlightenment thinkers did in fact claim that some of their ideas on the subject were directly taken from Native American sources") that values like *liberty* and *equality*, that so unsettled the Anglo-European WWL-family, are axiological primitives in many indigenous American WWLs and that European thinkers came into contact with them through debates with Native American intellectuals, through voraciously-consumed narratives such as the *Jesuit Relations of New France* that "were appreciate largely because they contained surprising and unprecedented ideas" like bodily autonomy and sexual freedom – even, to European horror, for *women*.

[34] Not just Pragmatism, but feminism, identity politics, queer rights, socialism, and related critical, activist movements are arguably in some important respects descendants of the indigenous critique. Indeed, one may argue, this is true too of "spirituality's" objection to organized religion in contrast to an individual quest for personal truth and harmony with nature (compare Albanese, 1990, 2007). These critiques of course resonated with and, in sympathetic hands, tapped into strands of thought in the European toolkit: Neoplatonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, so-called Gnosticism, Greek political theory, etc. And they took on still new dimensions when brought into conversation with the WWLs of West, East, and South Asia, Africa, and their diasporas. But in asking why the BP of criticism arose when it did and took the form it has, one must consult the actual worldview families that came into contact in the borderlands mechanism that emerged at the end of the 15th century.

And once one sees this, to take the recent *Dobbs* decision overturning *Roe* as an example, it puts a rather different spin on any traditionalist argument about critical terms like "freedom" or "equality," relative to

women's bodily autonomy and related issues, to point out that invocation of common law norms in England or traditional Christian ideas about the timing of ensoulment/quickening or the legitimacy of "restoring" a woman's "flow," and so on, is a selective, Eurocentrist invocation of only one of the relevant traditions in an always-already-contested American situation—indeed, not the most relevant tradition for understanding those terms, which were alien to pre-contact European thought. The fact that some European colonists, in philosophy and in law, ultimately applied indigenous American values to themselves, but not to their female relatives or even the indigenous people who challenged them with new values, hardly changes the nature of those values as lived and articulated by their originators. Legal aspirationalism, as embodied in *Roe* or *Obergefell*, is not just a looking forward, but in many ways a return to the historic norm for much of this continent, where, for example, same sex people's relationships were acknowledged as valid, women enjoyed bodily autonomy, gender (and even pronoun) diversity was part of a known spectrum of possibility, etc. Any conservative traditionalist argument, it seems to me, then becomes forced to double down on an originalist-Eurocentrist assertion that values derived from indigenous sources should only be extended to those that the men at the Founding and relevant periods of amendment permitted and that, otherwise, only the European worldview and way of life should be consulted to make sense of and set limit to those vital terms.

[35] Even if such eyes perhaps remain unknowingly Christian, as some political-theology critics would say (in a manner that their critics, in turn, might find a tad self-serving, reductive, or willfully blind).

[36] In the ents and hobbits, this approaches the "indigenous critique."

[37] It reads in part as follows:

> George looked back at the young black woman and saw the eyes returning his gaze were awake and aware.
>
> "What has happened to me?" she asked."
>
> George remembered the man who had told another man about what the woman had supposedly said (how she was going to hunt the motherfucker down and kill his ass, etc., etc.). That man had been white. George decided now it had been pure invention, inspired either by that odd human urge to make naturally dramatic situations even more dramatic, or just race prejudice. This was a cultured, intelligent woman.
>
> "You've had an accident," he said. "You were—"
>
> Her eyes slipped shut and he thought she was going to sleep again. Good. Let someone else tell her she had lost her legs. Someone who made more than $7,600 a year. He had shifted a little to the left, wanting to check her b.p. again, when she opened her eyes once more. When she did, George Shavers was looking at a different woman.
>
> "Fuckah cut off mah laigs. I felt 'em go. Dis d'amblance?"
>
> "Y-Y-Yes," George said. Suddenly he needed something to drink. Not necessarily alcohol. Just something wet. His voice was dry. This was like watching Spencer Tracy in *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, only for real.
>
> "Dey get dat honkey mahfah?"
>
> "No," George said, thinking *The guy got it right, goddam, the guy did actually get it right.*
>
> He was vaguely aware that the paramedics, who had been hovering (perhaps hoping he would do something wrong) were now backing off.
>
> "Good. Honky fuzz jus be lettin him off anyway. I be gittin him. I be cuttin his cock off. Sumbitch! I tell you what I goan do t'dat sumbitch! I tell you one thing, you sumbitch honky! I goan tell you . . . tell . . ."
>
> Her eyes fluttered again and George had thought *Yes, go to sleep,* please *go to sleep, I don't get paid for this, I don't understand this, they told us about shock but nobody mentioned schizophrenia as one of the—*
>
> The eyes opened. The first woman was there.
>
> "What sort of accident was it?" she asked. "I remember coming out of the I—"
>
> "Eye?" he said stupidly.
>
> She smiled a little. It was a painful smile. "The *Hungry I*. It's a coffee house."
>
> "Oh. Yeah. Right."

The other one, hurt or not, had made him feel dirty and a little ill. This one made him feel like a knight in an Arthurian tale, a knight who has successfully rescued the Lady Fair from the jaws of the dragon. (cite)

[38] *[L]es sociétés sont en quelque sorte plongées dans un bain de civilisation; elles vivent d'emprunts; elles se définissent plutôt par le refus d'emprunt, que par la possibilité d'emprunts* (1953, p. 49). See also, Mauss, 1930: *On voit ainsi comment se circonscrivent les civilisations, par la capacité d'emprunt et d'expansion, mais aussi par les résistances des sociétés qui les composent*.

[39] And then it was Taggart who screamed. It was a long, sudden, piercing scream, as if at some sudden sight, though his eyes were staring at space and seemed blankly sightless. The sight he was confronting was within him. The protective walls of emotion, of evasion, of pretense, of semi-thinking and pseudo-words, built up by him through all of his years, had crashed in the span of one moment—the moment when he knew that he wanted Galt to die, knowing fully that his own death would follow.

He was suddenly seeing the motive that had directed all the actions of his life. It was not his incommunicable soul or his love for others or his social duty or any of the fraudulent sounds by which he had maintained his self-esteem: it was the lust to destroy whatever was living, for the sake of whatever was not. It was the urge to defy reality by the destruction of every living value, for the sake of proving to himself that he could exist in defiance of reality and would never have to be bound by any solid, immutable facts. A moment ago, he had been able to feel that he hated Galt above all men, that the hatred was proof of Galt's evil, which he need define no further, that he wanted Galt to be destroyed for the sake of his own survival. Now he knew that he had wanted Galt's destruction at the price of his own destruction to follow, he knew that he had never wanted to survive, he knew that it was Galt's *greatness* he had wanted to torture and destroy. . . .

"No ..." he moaned, staring at that vision, shaking his head to escape it. "No ... No ..."

"Yes," said Galt.

He saw Galt's eyes looking straight at his, as if Galt were seeing the things he was seeing.

"I told you that on the radio, didn't I?" said Galt.

This was the stamp James Taggart had dreaded, from which there was no escape: the stamp and proof of objectivity. (cite)

[40] See his condemnation of the selfish libertarian in Ch. 1, n. 45.

[41] Pierce's text perhaps best fits Fredric Jameson's understanding of sf (Vint, 2021, p.):

> For him sf's critical contribution is that it reframes the temporal experience of our contemporary moment, recasting the "present" as the "past" from the point of view of a text about the world to come. The genre's function is not to predict the future, as people sometimes imagine and as popular journalism often implies, but rather "to defamiliarize and restructure our experience of our own present." For Jameson, what sf figurations of the future demonstrate is the atrophied state of our utopian imagination, the difficulty—perhaps impossibility—of envisioning the radically other, which, paradoxically, reignites this capacity by forcing us to confront our failures and thus "becom(e) unexpectedly transformed into a contemplation of our own absolute limits."

[42] I still remember the *Washington Post* headline the next day: "Fascist-Racist Conspiracy Smashed, Illegal Weapons Seized." But not even the brainwashed American public could fully accept the idea that nearly a million of their fellow citizens had been engaged in a secret, armed conspiracy.

As more and more details of the raids leaked out, public restlessness grew. One of the details which bothered people was that the raiders had, for the most part, exempted Black neighborhoods from the searches. The explanation given at first for this was that since

> "racists" were the ones primarily suspected of harboring firearms, there was relatively little need to search Black homes.
>
> The peculiar logic of this explanation broke down when it turned out that a number of persons who could hardly be considered either "racists" or "fascists" had been caught up in the raids. Among them were two prominent liberal newspaper columnists who had earlier been in the forefront of the antigun crusade, four Negro Congressmen (they lived in White neighborhoods), and an embarrassingly large number of government officials. . . .
>
> As soon as the public had been reassured by the media that they were in no danger, that the government was cracking down only on the "racists, fascists, and other anti-social elements" who had kept illegal weapons, most relaxed again and went back to their TV and funny papers.
>
> As we began to realize this, we were more discouraged than ever. We had based all our plans-in fact, the whole rationale of the Organization-on the assumption that Americans were inherently opposed to tyranny, and that when the System became oppressive enough they could be led to overthrow it. We had badly underestimated the degree to which materialism had corrupted our fellow citizens, as well as the extent to which their feelings could be manipulated by the mass media. (cite)

[43] As may also be recalled in consideration of the many ways the globalization-BP may be understood, exploitation may involve, as Graeber and Wengrow (2021) argue, coercive use of power, control over information, or persuasion, which may itself arise from the charisma of power, beauty or some other affective stimuli, or judicious use of information. Graeber and Wengrow state, "As Weber, the great sociologist of bureaucracy, observed long ago, administrative organizations are always based not just on control of information, but also on 'official secrets' of one sort or another. This is why the secret agent has become the mythic symbol of the modern state. James Bond, with his licence to kill, secrecy and the power to use unaccountable violence, underpinned by a great bureaucratic machine." (2021, p. ). Pullman's recent *The Book of Dust* gives a prominent narrative role to the secret organization opposing the Magisterium, Oakley Street (as well as other secret organizations, such as those whose dæmons have left them. Likewise, *The Turner Diaries* is energized by the experience of being agents of an initially secret organization, bureaucratic and violent, that itself has layers of secrecy; Rand's project of course contains the conspiracy of the Men of the Mind; King's storyworld has competing secret organizations—even in Tolkien's allomythology one can find double agents, secret alliances, disguised agents.

[44] On encountering the word "exploitation," one may, especially under the influence of Marxist criticism, tend to think of capitalism as the foremost example. Certainly, capitalist ideology and modes of production (which is to say, WWL) led and have continued to lead to increased and increasingly efficient exploitation of natural resources and human and non-human animal labor—in the not-so-distant past one thinks of the intimate domestic exploitation of child labor, houseslaves, domesticated animals, and wives. But to do this – to respond effectively to the ideals, desires, and methods of capitalism – a host of other technologies and techniques are assumed, some very ancient. For example, the city is an ancient technology – a reordering of space to make an artificial environment organized by specialized human activities serving distinctly human interests, but urbanization has taken on new dimensions in this age. Similarly, the exploitation of colonized peoples and of slaves (often in past societies captives from war) to accomplish intelligent labor beyond the capacities of non-human animals are ancient techniques, but the scale and quality of violent human exploitation and reduction to bare instrumentality confronts (post)moderns, especially in the situation now called "postcoloniality," as a new problem. Other ages and cultures had ideologies of tribal and even racial essence, superiority, and chosenness, but the deployment of Northern-Western-white supremacy to support colonialist, capitalist, and other technologies of exploitation strikes (post)moderns with the force of a new problem. Racial projects and implicit (and even legally codified) racial politico-economic orders were actively constructed and maintained. And the regulation of people by means of and based on their sexuality- and gender-based identities, which is to say, sexualities and genders that are non-heterosexual and non-masculine have, too, been newly appreciated as problems in this era. The biopolitical exploitation and will-to-mastery of individuals and groups – statistics, for example, now amplified in the form of AI operating on huge datasets, offering enhanced powers for dealing with general psychological and sociological patterns – has gone hand-in-hand with new organizational modes of governmentality, such as a concern with "safety" – indeed, the safety of designated identities like people

categorized according to gender, sexuality, race, and religion – and a privatization of previously public government, again pointing to the intersecting forces of global corporate capitalism.

[45] King's (2019) novel, *The Institute*, explores this theme in detail, with the distinction that the Breakers are treated more how one must imagine the tiny group of "precogs" is in the context of *The Institute*. The way the children in *The Institute* are treated is comparable both to the use of the Breakers to destroy the Beams and to how the children of the callas are made "roont." Such roont children are good for physical labor, much as intercised people in Pullman's storyworld make for obedient soldiers.

[46] Intercision is explicitly compared to castration and genital mutilation by critical voices like Lord Asriel and the witch Ruta Skadi.

[47] A person's death is a fourth aspect, and indeed, though the Authority is mortal and other angels are insubstantial compared to embodied beings like humans, God's transcendent and central place in the traditional Christian ontology is, one might argue, displaced and replaced by realities like death (*e.g.*, the boatman and the harpies; compare, Taylor, 1984, 1990; Carlson, 1999, 2008) and truth (*e.g.*, the alethiometer and Dust).

[48] See McAlister, 2012; Koné, 2019.

[49] Consider these passages, early in *The Amber Spyglass*, "Chapter 3: Scavengers":

> The whole of nature was overturned.
>
> It took her most of a day to find the bear-king. She saw him among the rocks off the northern edge of the island, swimming fast after a walrus. It was harder for bears to kill in the water: when the land was covered in ice and the great sea-mammals had to come up to breathe, the bears had the advantage of camouflage and their prey was out of its element. That was how things should be [....]
>
> "How can I get there from here?"
>
> She explained. Iorek Byrnison listened expressionlessly, and then said, "I shall go to Lee Scoresby. And then I must go south."
>
> "South?"
>
> "The ice has gone from these lands. I have been thinking about this, Serafina Pekkala. I have chartered a ship." (cite)

[50] Novelty that is inconsistent with the authorial WWL is rejected in the O-mode; thus, though creativity as constructing or reconstructing the world according to one's will might, in the abstract, be something Rand (focusing on individual will) or Pierce (focusing on racialized collective will) would affirm, those seeking to reconstruct the world along, *e.g.*, socialist or pluralist lines must be opposed.

[51] A telling expression. Affirmation of hierarchical power dynamics, inherent in the racialized social and economic order that in many respects still persists in our day, naturalizes all sorts of other forms of exploitation. It is easy to see that White Supremacy dehumanizes non-white people, but implicit in this move is also the assumption that non-human animals may be exploited without raising any ethical implications, that other conscious beings may be reduced to mere property, tools.

[52] And the novel depicts Black people as still being the brutal but useful tools of the Jews, who also manipulate and exploit gullible white people through the news media. If there is anything wrong with exploitation, Pierce assumes, in conformity with familiar antisemitic stereotypes, that such exploitation is a crafty scheme of the Jews.

[53] One could imagine Pierce himself writing, "[T]he problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line" (Du Bois), but of course such an imagined Pierce would mean something very different from its sense in *Souls of Black Folk*. The BP of racism energizes and actuates his worldmaking efforts, but it is a problem in that it has been criticized—both the conceptual categories sustaining it and the exploitation they justify and naturalize. Pierce's depiction of Black people (and Jewish people, queer people, women, and

others) repeatedly exhibit his lack of any interest in the question, “How does it feel to be a problem?” (Du Bois).

[54] For an unhappy example of people taking seriously the virtuality-BP and drawing on allomythoi to inform their lived WWL, see Possamai’s brief discussion of the Heaven’s Gate group (2012, p. 4).

Besson writes (2015, p. 30),

> *On peut lire ces quelques pages comme un scénario type de notre fascination d'autres vies possibles en autant de choix divergents sans cesse, une infinité d'options, autant de mondes, d'identités et d'intrigues qui seraient encore, déjà et toujours disponibles pour le regard omniscient. Ce vertige-là a fourni la matière d'innombrables fictions, et m'apparaît spécifiquement comme un des carburants d'une «post-modernité» marquée par leur flagrante inflation.*

Our worlds are many and in many ways insubstantial, but along these lines, so too are the periodized ages (*e.g.*, premodernity, modernity, postmodernity) which so easily trick us into thinking about history as a teleological narrative rather than itself multiple and simulated.

[55] Compare Graeber & Wengrow (2021), pp. :

> If human beings, through most of our history, have moved back and forth fluidly between different social arrangements, assembling and dismantling hierarchies on a regular basis, maybe the real question should be ‘how did we get stuck?’ How did we end up in one single mode? How did we lose that political self-consciousness, once so typical of our species? How did we come to treat eminence and subservience not as temporary expedients, or even the pomp and circumstance of some kind of grand seasonal theatre, but as inescapable elements of the human condition? If we started out just playing games, at what point did we forget that we were playing? [. . . .]
>
> Just as with seasonality, there’s no consistent pattern. Ritual occasions can either be much more stiff and formal, or much more wild and playful, than ordinary life [. . . .]
>
> Medieval peasants often found it much easier than medieval intellectuals to imagine a society of equals. Now, perhaps, we begin to understand why. Seasonal festivals may be a pale echo of older patterns of seasonal variation – but, for the last few thousand years of human history at least, they appear to have played much the same role in fostering political self-consciousness, and as laboratories of social possibility. The first kings may well have been play kings. Then they became real kings. Now most (but not all) existing kings have been reduced once again to play kings – as least insofar as they mainly perform ceremonial functions and no longer wield real power. But even if all monarchies, including ceremonial monarchies, were to disappear, some people would still play at being kings.

[56] The conclusion will discuss somewhat the pedagogical dimension of kairology, but I will here note that I have found it quite helpful, both when I taught an introductory course on Buddhisms and an introductory course on Native American religious studies, to foreground their contributions to and comfort with awareness of might be called fictionality and virtuality. “Virtuality” I use to refer to the broader BP category, of which “fictionality” is a sub-BP. “Fictionality” stresses the fact that our worlds are made, constructed, not simply given or known without mediation—they are a creative expression of the same exploitative powers that raise the exploitation-BP, exploiting worlds to make new worlds; “virtuality” is broader because it assumes fictionality and moreover highlights the ontic and ontological doubt—with its intersections with the criticism-BP—arising from meta-awareness of the fictionality-BP. Asian and Native American worldview families, in different but productively comparable ways, push those raised within European assumptions about “reality” and concerns about establishing the “really real” to confront the constructedness and impermanence of things.

[57] I shall quote this passage at some length since it illustrates Pullman's WWL so well:

> No one spoke. Those who had seen how dæmons dissolved were remembering it, and those who hadn't were imagining it, and no one spoke until a young woman came forward. She had died as a martyr centuries before. She looked around and said to the other ghosts:
>
> "When we were alive, they told us that when we died we'd go to Heaven. And they said that Heaven was a place of joy and glory and we would spend eternity in the company of saints and angels praising the Almighty, in a state of bliss. That's what they said. And that's what led some of us to give our lives, and others to spend years in solitary prayer, while all the joy of life was going to waste around us and we never knew.
>
> "Because the land of the dead isn't a place of reward or a place of punishment. It's a place of nothing. The good come here as well as the wicked, and all of us languish in this gloom forever, with no hope of freedom, or joy, or sleep, or rest, or peace.
>
> "But now this child has come offering us a way out and I'm going to follow her. Even if it means oblivion, friends, I'll welcome it, because it won't be nothing. We'll be alive again in a thousand blades of grass, and a million leaves; we'll be falling in the raindrops and blowing in the fresh breeze; we'll be glittering in the dew under the stars and the moon out there in the physical world, which is our true home and always was.
>
> "So I urge you: come with the child out to the sky!"
>
> But her ghost was thrust aside by the ghost of a man who looked like a monk: thin and pale, with dark, zealous eyes even in his death. He crossed himself and murmured a prayer, and then he said:
>
> "This is a bitter message, a sad and cruel joke. Can't you see the truth? This is not a child. This is an agent of the Evil One himself! The world we lived in was a vale of corruption and tears. Nothing there could satisfy us. But the Almighty has granted us this blessed place for all eternity, this paradise, which to the fallen soul seems bleak and barren, but which the eyes of faith see as it is, overflowing with milk and honey and resounding with the sweet hymns of the angels. This is Heaven, truly! What this evil girl promises is nothing but lies. She wants to lead you to Hell! Go with her at your peril. My companions and I of the true faith will remain here in our blessed paradise, and spend eternity singing the praises of the Almighty, who has given us the judgment to tell the false from the true."
>
> Once again he crossed himself, and then he and his companions turned away in horror and loathing.
>
> Lyra felt bewildered. Was she wrong? Was she making some great mistake? She looked around: gloom and desolation on every side. But she'd been wrong before about the appearance of things, trusting Mrs. Coulter because of her beautiful smile and her sweet-scented glamour. It was so easy to get things wrong; and without her dæmon to guide her, maybe she was wrong about this, too.
>
> But Will was shaking her arm. Then he put his hands to her face and held it roughly.
>
> "You *know* that's not true," he said, "just as well as you can feel this. Take no notice! *They* can all see he's lying, too. And they're depending on us. Come on, let's make a start."
>
> She nodded. She had to trust her body and the truth of what her senses told her; she knew Pan would have. (cite)

[58] "And Mrs. Coulter drew herself up, and snapped her fingers to the Specter feeding on the witch's dæmon. The little snow bunting dæmon lay twitching on the rock as the Specter moved toward the witch herself, and then whatever Lena Feldt had undergone before was doubled and trebled and multiplied a hundredfold. She felt a nausea of the soul, a hideous and sickening despair, a melancholy weariness so profound that she was going to die of it. Her last conscious thought was disgust at life; her senses had lied to her. The world was not made of energy and delight but of foulness, betrayal, and lassitude. Living was hateful, and death was no better, and from end to end of the universe this was the first and last and only truth. Thus she stood, bow in hand, indifferent, dead in life." (cite)

[59] Pullman's response to the virtuality-BP is nuanced. I have excluded from the scope of this work detailed engagement with Pullman's sequel series, *The Book of Dust*, which should be completed next year, but clearly it engages more directly with the virtuality-BP. *La Belle Sauvage* does so particularly through its excursions into fairyland, and *The Secret Commonwealth* does so from the very outset and explicitly throughout, for example, engaging with the allomythoi represented the postmodern Simon Talbot and Gottfried Brande (whom Pullman bases on Ayn Rand), which Lyra finds so entrancing and which is opposed by Pantalaimon:

> The best way to think about it would have been by talking with Pan. But he was unreachable. Reading about the separation of the two men from Tashbulak upset him, angered him, frightened him—perhaps all of those things—just as it did her, but then there'd come the distraction of the novel that he hated so much. There were so many things they had to disagree about, and that book was one of the most toxic.
>
> *The Hyperchorasmians*, by a German philosopher called Gottfried Brande, was a novel that was having an extraordinary vogue among clever young people all over Europe and beyond. It was a publishing phenomenon: nine hundred pages long, with an unpronounceable title (at least until Lyra had learnt to pronounce the *ch* as a *k*), an uncompromising sternness of style, and nothing that could remotely pass for a love interest, it had sold in the millions and influenced the thinking of an entire generation. It told the story of a young man who set out to kill God, and succeeded. But the unusual thing about it, the quality that had set it apart from anything else Lyra had ever read, was that in the world Brande described, human beings had no dæmons. They were totally alone.
>
> Like many others, Lyra had been spellbound, hypnotized by the force of the story, and found her head ringing with the hammer blows of the protagonist's denunciation of anything and everything that stood in the way of pure reason. Even his quest to find God and kill him was expressed in terms of the fiercest rationality: it was irrational that such a being should exist, and rational to do away with him. Of figurative language, of metaphor or simile, there was not a trace. At the end of the novel, as the hero looked out from the mountains at a sunrise, which in the hands of another writer might have represented the dawn of a new age of enlightenment, free of superstition and darkness, the narrator turned away from commonplace symbolism of that kind with scorn. The final sentence read, "It was nothing more than what it was."
>
> That phrase was a sort of touchstone of progressive thinking among Lyra's peers. It had become fashionable to disparage any sort of excessive emotional reaction, or any attempt to read other meanings into something that happened, or any argument that couldn't be justified with logic: "It's nothing more than what it is." Lyra herself had used the phrase more than once in conversation, and felt Pan turn away in disdain as she did so.
>
> When they woke up the morning after reading Dr. Strauss's journal, their disagreement about *The Hyperchorasmians* was still alive and bitter. As Lyra dressed, she said, "Pan, what's got into you this past year? You never used to be like this. *We* never used to be like this. We used to disagree about things without this monumental everlasting sulk—"
>
> "Can't you see what it's doing to you, this *attitude* you're affecting?" he burst in. He was standing on top of the bookcase.
>
> "What *attitude*? What are you talking about?"
>
> "That man's influence is baleful. Haven't you seen what's happening to Camilla? Or that boy from Balliol—what's his name, Guy something? Since they started reading *The Hypercolonics* or whatever it's called, they've become arrogant and unpleasant in all kinds of ways. Ignoring their dæmons, as if they didn't exist. And I can see it in you too. A sort of absolutism—"
>
> "*What?* You're not making sense at all. You refuse to know anything about it, but you think you have the right to criticize—"
>
> "Not the *right*, the *responsibility*! Lyra, you're closing your mind. Of course I know about the bloody book. I know exactly what you know. Actually, I probably know more, because I didn't shut down my common sense, or my sense of what's right, or something, while you were reading it."
>
> "You're still fretting because his story does away with dæmons?"

He glared at her and then leapt down to the desk again. She moved back. Sometimes she was very conscious of how sharp his teeth were.

"What are you going to do?" she said. "Bite me till I agree?"

"Can't you *see*?" he said again.

"I can *see* a book I think is extremely powerful and intellectually compelling. I can *understand* the appeal of reason, rationality, logic. No—not the appeal—I'm *persuaded* by them. It's not an emotional spasm. It's entirely a matter of rational—"

"Anything emotional has to be a spasm, has it?"

"The way you're behaving—"

"No, you're not listening to me, Lyra. I don't think we've got anything in common anymore. I just can't stand watching you turn into this rancorous, reductive monster of cold logic. You're *changing*, that's the point. I don't like it. Damn it, we used to warn each other about this sort of—"

"And you think it's all the fault of one novel?"

"No. It's the fault of that Talbot man too. He's just as bad, in a cowardly sort of way."

"Talbot? Simon Talbot? Make your bloody mind up, Pan. There couldn't be two more different thinkers. Complete opposites. According to Talbot, there's no truth at all. Brande—"

"You didn't see that chapter in *The Constant Deceiver*?"

"What chapter?"

"The one I had to suffer you reading through last week. Evidently you didn't take it in, though I had to. The one where he pretends that dæmons are merely—what is it?—psychological projections with no independent reality. That one. All argued very prettily, charming, elegant prose, witty, full of brilliant paradoxes. You know the one I mean."

"But you haven't got any independent reality. You know that. If I died—"

"Neither have you, you stupid cow. If I died, so would you. *Touché*."

She turned away, too angry to speak.

Simon Talbot was an Oxford philosopher whose latest book was much discussed in the university. Whereas *The Hyperchorasmians* was a popular success that was dismissed as tosh by critics and read mainly by the young, *The Constant Deceiver* was a favorite among literary experts, who praised its elegance of style and playful wit. Talbot was a radical skeptic, to whom truth and even reality were rainbow-like epiphenomena with no ultimate meaning. In the silvery charm of his prose, everything solid flowed and ran and broke apart like mercury spilled from a barometer.

"No," said Pan. "They're not different. Two sides of the same coin."

"Just because of what they say about dæmons—or don't say—they don't pay you enough tribute—"

"Lyra, I wish you could hear yourself. Something's happened to you. You're under a spell or something. These men are *dangerous*—"

"Superstition," she said, and she truly felt contempt for Pan just then, and hated herself for it, and couldn't stop. "You can't look at anything calmly and dispassionately. You have to throw insults at it. It's childish, Pan. Attributing some kind of evil or magic to an argument you can't counter—you used to believe in seeing things clearly, and now you're all bound up in fog and superstition and magic. Afraid of something because you can't understand it."

"I understand it perfectly. The trouble is that you don't. You think those two charlatans are profound philosophers. You're hypnotized by them. You read the absolute drivel they write, both of them, and you think it's the latest thing in intellectual achievement. They're lying, Lyra, both lying. Talbot thinks he can make truth disappear by waving his paradoxes around. Brande thinks he can do it just by bullheaded denial. You know what I think's at the bottom of this infatuation of yours?"

"There you go again, describing something that doesn't exist. But go on, say what you want to."

> "It's not just a position you're taking up. You half believe those people, that German philosopher and the other man. That's what it is. You're clever enough on top, but underneath you're so bloody naive that you half believe their lies are true."
>
> She shook her head, spread her hands, baffled. "I don't know what I can say," she said. "But what I believe, or half believe, or don't believe, isn't really anyone else's business. Making windows into people's souls—"
>
> "But I'm not anyone else! I am you!" He twisted around and sprang up onto the bookcase again, from which he looked down at her with blazing eyes. "You're making yourself *forget*," he said with bitter anger.
>
> "Well, now, I don't know what you mean," she said, genuinely lost.
>
> "You're forgetting everything important. And you're trying to believe things that'll kill us."
>
> "No," she said, trying to keep her voice steady. "You've got it wrong, Pan. I'm simply interested in other ways of thinking. It's what you do when you study. One of the things you do. You see ideas, try to see ideas, with someone else's eyes. You see what it feels like to believe the things they do."
>
> "It's contemptible."
>
> "What is? Philosophy?"
>
> "If philosophy says I don't exist, then yes, philosophy is contemptible. " I *do* exist. All of us, we dæmons, and other things too—other *entities*, your philosophers would say—we *exist*. Trying to believe nonsense will kill us." (cite)

Pan's suggestion that Lyra is "under a spell or something" or "hypnotized" is interesting given this earlier passage:

> "Times change, and understandings must change too."
>
> "What's that mean?"
>
> "It means that we've discovered some things about the girl that were not clear before. It seems that she is under certain protections, legal and otherwise. I would like to begin by taking down the network of defense around her, unobtrusively, quietly, one might say invisibly. And when she is vulnerable, that will be the time to take action." (cite)

The attack on Lyra is obvious in the move to dissolve scholastic sanctuary (*stadium* as a distinct domain), but could there be an ongoing "invisible" attack on her relationship with and understanding of the dæmonic aspect of her selfhood, of which her having been brought into contact with certain texts is a manifestation? Pullman's later comparison of the authors' effect on her to the effect of specters is telling ("If there were such things as Specters, this is what it would feel like to be in a Specter's power. The Specters she was thinking of were those dreadful parasites that fed on the inhabitants of Cittàgazze. Now that she was an adult, and Pan's form was fixed, she would be as vulnerable to the Specters as the adults of that world had been." (cite)).

Whatever the case, the virtuality-BP is also evident in *The Secret Commonwealth* in the new method of using the alethiometer, a method that sickens its practitioners and that was developed by the son of the terrible but brilliant villain in *La Belle Sauvage*:

> The classical method required a careful, watchful, but relaxed state of mind, which took a good deal of practice to manage. [Pullman makes use of this special state of mind—which resembles a concentrated form of the mental difference he identifies between children, whose dæmons exist in a state of flux, and adults—also in other parts of *His Dark Materials*, such as to use the subtle knife.] The new method, on the other hand, didn't need the books at all. The reader had to abandon control and enter a state of passive vision where nothing was fixed and everything was equally possible. This was the reason why both Hannah and Lyra had had to stop soon after beginning their experiments with it: they'd felt horribly seasick.
>
> Now, sitting in bed and thinking about it, Lyra felt apprehensive.
>
> "Could it go wrong?" she whispered, and, "I could get lost and never come back…."
>
> Yes, that was a risk. Without a fixed perspective or a solid place to stand, it might be like drowning in a wild sea. (cite)

[60] *E.g.*,

> Hold them, Meg. Hold them all. Put your arms around them, around the Echthroi spreading their gaping, tearing nothingness across creation.
>
> Size does not matter. You can hold them all, Charles and Calvin and Mr. Jenkins and the burning sphere of the newborn star—
>
> She cried out, "I hold you! I love you, I Name you. I Name you, Echthroi. You are not nothing. You are."
>
> A small white feather which was not a feather floated through the cold.
>
> I Name you, Echthroi. I Name you Meg. I Name you Calvin. I Name you Mr. Jenkins. I Name you Proginoskes. I fill you with Naming. Be! Be, butterfly and behemoth, be galaxy and grasshopper, star and sparrow, you matter, you are, be! Be caterpillar and comet, be porcupine and planet, sea sand and solar system, sing with us, dance with us, rejoice with us, for the glory of creation, sea gulls and seraphim, angle worms and angel host, chrysanthemum and cherubim (O cherubim) Be! Sing for the glory of the living and the loving the flaming of creation, sing with us, dance with us, be with us. Be!
>
> They were not her words only. They were the words of Senex, of the Deepening Sporos, of all the singing farae, the laughter of the greening farandolae, Yadah itself, all the mitochondria, all the human hosts, the earth, the sun, the dance of the star whose birthing she had seen, the galaxies, the cherubim and seraphim, wind and fire, the words of the Glory.
>
> Echthroi! You are Named! My arms surround you. You are no longer nothing. You are. You are filled. You are me. (cite)

See also this characteristic passage representing the demonic lie:

> The Echthros-Mr. Jenkins reached towards them. The horrible, familiar stench assailed Meg. A loathsome kything came to her in Mr. Jenkins's tones superimposed on the whine of metal rubbing against metal. "Nonsense. Of course the Echthroi haven't got me. I am Mr. Jenkins, and I took the Echthroi into me because they are right. It is not the Echthroi who are empty; it was I. They have filled me with the pleasure of the abyss of nothingness. Come let me X you, come to me, come…" (cite)

[61] She does not confront the deeper issue of whether they urge one, not to embrace a particular version of things, but to examine the implications of being a being who simulates worlds based on uncertain cues.

[62] Elsewhere (Appendix 45), while explaining my differences from McAvan, I point to the strong influence of Baudrillard on her thinking. Baudrillard makes many excellent points regarding modernity and postmodernity but, I think, presses the case for rupture too far. (It is in terms of this rupture and the contemporary condition of "reality" being largely a simulacrum produced by popular culture signs and symbols that Possamai intends the use of the expression "hyper-real religions" to describe contemporary NRMs based on fictional works; a similar argument is persuasively made in Jane Iwamura's (2010) *Virtual Orientalism: Asian Religions and American Popular Culture*, but this is an important aspect of the danger involved in the use of the term "hyper-real" to describe these worldviews. Reinforcing Baudrillard's periodization is just as problematic as using the term "hyper-real" in a manner inconsistent with Baudrillard's intent (cf. Geoffroy, 2012; Davidsen, 2012).) Similarly, Baudrillard's contrast of the global and the universal (i.e., globalization as a violent process of homogenization and universalization as the push for liberty, human rights, and multicultural democracy) again goes too far. The forces identified with globalization do crush a number of attempts to maintain local difference and particularity and impose all sorts of standardizing, virtualizing, police-state systems, but the global and the universal, to use Baudrillard's dichotomization, like the "religious" and the "secular," are not so easily distinguished. In response to the problems and enabling conditions of globalization, countless novel storyworlds are being created, exported, and consumed (cf. Jameson and Miyoshi, Eds., 1998), many of them expressing worldviews of previously repressed or voiceless groups (including both violent fundamentalisms and minorities seeking self-representation and empowerment) and of new hybrids.

As I noted relative to secularity and secularization, Bould, in the December 2017 issue of *Fantastika Journal*, devoted to the topic of global fantastika, observes the following: "Thanks to sf's global perspectives

and its commitment to building coherent imaginary worlds, it frequently maps out, responds to, critiques, and/or champions the world-system" (2017, p. 18); likewise, in the same issue, Elder uses Jim Butcher's *Codex Alera* series to point out how the fantasy subgenre may be used to critique issues connected to globalization, and still others, on the same theme, use examples from subgenres such as weird fiction (Punter, 2017) and Lovecraftian horror (Paccosi, 2017).

Globalization may be narrated in a positive, triumphalist, supersessionist mode (typical of neoliberal theorists) or an anti-globalization mode (as in Baudrillard) or one that attempts neutrality. In part, this seems to be shaped by fantastical authors' locations (e.g., center vs. periphery). The consensus of Eric D. Smith's (2012) edited volume, *Globalization, Utopia, and Postcolonial Science Fiction: New Maps of Hope*, is that postcolonial sf authors are decidedly committed to anti-globalization, working to make new, hopeful maps of alternative possibilities (on specifically Mexican and Chican@ postcolonial sf, compare Lopez, 2007).

One of the great challenges "global*" presents relative to the study of allomythoi is the question of how to address the global diversity of allomythic creativity rather than simply privileging the Anglo-American English-language texts that tend to be promoted by mass cultural globalizing systems. Scholarly attention is also, though to a lesser degree, focused on European works, Japanese genres and texts (e.g., anime and manga), and so on. For example, one might think of all the scholarship on Shirow Masamune's *Ghost in the Shell*, which anticipated many contemporary global issues. My work has not been able to properly address the scope, complexity, and challenge of global diversity, but I think the best approach would be to work collaboratively with a global team of colleagues, as in the rare case of Wong Kin Yuen, Gary Westfahl, and Amy Kit-sze Chan's (2005) edited collection, *World Weavers: Globalization, Science Fiction, and the Cybernetic Revolution*, which importantly illustrates how scholars from non-European sites of reference may put globalization and sf through different interpretive lenses and apply different methodologies.

Jameson (1991), Baudrillard, McAvan and others have noted that a feature of postmodernism is the collapse of stable subjects and master narratives (and, one might add, of genre categories) and a coincident playful engagement in pastiche and recombination of traditional cultural resources; similarly and simultaneously, globalization has enabled such hybridity and mixture, establishing a global *borderlands mechanism*.

[63] See §3.4, n. 28.

[64] In an article in *The Atlantic*, published online January 2, 2014, Alexis Madrigal reported on the "microgenre" system used by Netflix to categorize films and TV shows. Netflix employs a small army of people trained to tag every work of entertainment with distinctive metadata that uniquely characterize its narrative DNA to interact with users' viewing habits to predict customers' potential interest in existing and possible stories. As of the date of publication, Madrigal found that Netflix had 76,897 microgenres,

> Sarah Pavis, a writer and engineer, pointed out to me that Netflix's genre URLs were sequentially numbered. One could pull up more and more genres by simply changing the number at the end of the web address. That is to say, http://movies.netflix.com/WiAltGenre?agid=1 linked to "African-American Crime Documentaries" and then http://movies.netflix.com/WiAltGenre?agid=2 linked to "Scary Cult Movies from the 1980s." And so on. (2014, n.p.)

Borderlands-mechanism combinatory creativity helps produce the vast abundance of new genres, which some interpret as the dissolution of older genres, together with their novel WWL correlates. As but one example, take the song "Jesus Was an Emo" in *Emo: The Musical*—it exhibits a fascinating novel blend of genres (regarding the musical as a fantastical genre, see Dvoskin (2006, 2010)) and worldviews; similarly, many scholars have noted how *Star Wars* blends genres like the cowboy western, epic fantasy, science fiction, producing a new allomythology containing allomythoi like Jediism and Sithism. If new modes and kinds of representation both reflect and enable new ways of thinking and living, what does this world of multimedia mixture under the rule of money signify? Having thought about the conditions of emergence of fantastika, for what new world, in turn, is the present situation the condition emergence? It seems to me that this abundance

of fictional worlds – both fantastical and otherwise – permits people to find ones that respond to the questions and situations that matter to them. But it also may raise for many people questions and problems of or to which they were previously unaware or indifferent.

Online communities use tools like tagging and subcultural (often neologism-based) folksonomies to produce, identify, and give access to microgenres responsive to the problems that matter most to them—from the fandom-based satisfaction of having a beloved character behave more like oneself or experiencing the resolution of an irritating plot gap to the erotic satisfaction of kinks and fantasies. It has been a recurring theme of this work that any given entity, individual or group, should be able to inhabit multiple WWLs or allomythoi. As Graeber and Wengrow (2021) note, ancient peoples (and many still today) enjoyed, as part of a basic and carefully protected freedom, shifting social arrangements and identities—even to the point of having different names in different situations. Good contemporary examples come from kink and queer cultures, which may be observed in spaces and times like bars and festivals, where individuals may, for example, playfully-yet-earnestly take on a nonhuman persona (e.g., pup play), a hierarchical social role (Master/slave, Dom/sub, Daddy/boy (boi) or girl), a different gender identity. When such people engage in storytelling play online, producing the constitutive boundaries of erotic microgenres, they recover and exercise, imaginatively, an age-old human liberty.

[65] "According to Pierre Macherey (1966), the object of an ideological analysis of literary texts is to discover the significant silences," states Csapo (2005, p. 294). The silences in translation are often the points of greatest divergence between a source text and source culture and its target. Csapo later continues,

> Macherey [1966] himself proposes a "symptomatic" reading of literary texts in imitation of Freudian psychoanalysis. The dynamic of repression closely resembles the function of ideology, especially when it works simultaneously to resolve and to conceal at the level of superstructure the conflicts and divisions at the level of infrastructure [….] Just as the dreams and delusions of a neurotic are effective because they leave their relation to the patient's true desires hidden in the psychic unconscious, so ideology is effective because its relation to power remains buried in what might be described as a "political unconscious" (cf. Jameson 1981). Moreover, ideology is legible in much the same way that neurotic symptoms are legible. Even when repression is total, when the manifest content is silence, ideology, like the symptoms of a neurosis, can be read in the displaced tensions created by contradictory forces, because ideology's reassuring narratives speak compulsively *around* the very contradictions which they conceal in silence. (2005, p. 297).

This all points to one of the great challenges of a comparative mythology that understands allomythoi as being *problem*- or *question-oriented*, known-to-be-fictional worlds that are creative recombinations (translations) of other worlds: the primary problems or important questions addressed by an allomythos may not be explicitly identified and may be hard to specify. Panhuman (indeed, panspecies) concerns provide a solid foundation, but humans, as world-making creatures, have generated a number of virtual values and concerns as part of their fictional worlds that bear a sometimes tenuous relation to the evolutionary problems of the other living things with whom they share the material world. The invention of money (i.e., value itself as a reified abstraction—tied to the axiological concerns of other living things, but also deeply alienated) results in a host of economic worldviews; the nation-state and even larger inventions leads to competing political worldviews; comparative analysis of different understandings of the "self" leads to autologies, psychologies, and anthropologies far more various and sophisticated than the implicit ones one might derive from observation of other animals ways of life (ethologies); the creation of deities begets pantheons of theologies; and so on. And the concerns of a given allomythos are often highly specific and contextual, related to source worldviews (e.g., 1960s American politics), historically novel problems (such as anthropogenic climate change or the anthropogenic global extinction event or new technologies like atomic weaponry, the Internet, or virtual reality), autobiographical particularities (the author's relationship to her father, for example), and so on. For example, Jennifer Simkins (2016), in *The Science Fiction Mythmakers: Religion, Science and Philosophy in Wells, Clarke, Dick and Herbert*, argues that each of these authors created new myths to provide new, scientific responses to humanity's place in the universe by drawing on the worldviews of other original thinkers and philosophers (Wells, drawing on Huxley; Clarke, drawing on Haldane; Dick, drawing more generally on the Western

philosophical tradition but especially on Heidegger and Marcuse; Herbert, drawing on Heidegger).

The worldview studies framework that I find useful inasmuch as it supplies some clues regarding questions that are deeply important to all mobile organisms must also submit, humbly, to the translation-theoretic conclusion that there are fundamental limits to and uncertainties inherent in translation, information transferal, and knowledge representation. As Csapo states, "It would be an ideological delusion to suppose that ideology works in precisely the same way in all eras and all societies. Certainly, myths [and one might add, religions, political systems, economic systems, historical narratives, notions of the self, notions of the human (relative to other animals, spirits, etc.), and so on] do not have the same function or character everywhere and at all times" (2005, p. 300). My desire for a comparative framework is thus in tension with my awareness of the particularity of each allomythic storyworld and worldview.

[66] Again, for further discussion of the secular and secularization theory, see Appendices 6, 20, 28, 37, 40–2, and 45.

[67] See what I call "PPP polytheism" in Appendix 6, which formulation reflects a reading of Weber and Nietzsche, through which I see our age as, rather than resting in scientistic buffered selves of a closed world system, as in Charles Taylor's thinking, or in the stability of God's eternity, as in Augustine (see Carlson, 2019), one in which competing traditional and new WWLs and allomythoi in fictional storyworlds compete and are pragmatically, situationally appealed to.

[68] See Roberts (2013) and Blankholm (2022). To clarify, this secular identity is less a "re-enchantment of the secular" such as is more appropriately identified in fiction-based WWLs, and it is certainly not anxious to avoid enjoying "myth," "spirituality," or even "religion" as somehow compromising a nonreligious identity, any more than it is anxious to reject the "lie of evolution" while enjoying a nature show about biological and environmental wonders (or a sci-fi movie that draws on evolution as a plot device) in the manner some consciously-religious people might. It is curious and open, absorbing worlds-within-worlds within itself and absorbed, in turn, in them, playing with and within them, in a liminal playground it enjoys together with likeminded others. This form of the secular is, to be sure, indulged in by the devoutly nonreligious, who might deem themselves more properly Secular, as well as by the religious, but both of these with more or less guilty consciences. Blankholm, for example, in a recent talk at a conference in honor of Mark C. Taylor, entitled "Recovering Poetic World-Making for the Secular Tradition," found Taylor's *Hiding* (1997) to be a singular example of a work of poetic world-making that would be acceptable to the tradition he studies and dwells within, precisely because it does not lose itself in the crafty, odyssean lie of a fictional world.

I would argue that the community he studies and evidently represents has a narrow, almost fundamentalist concern with purity from religious pollution and fictional or mythic "nonsense" that would seem to cut it off from the very tradition Blankholm seeks to identify. In his chapter in an edited volume on *politeia* in Greek and Roman philosophy, "The Atheist Underground," David Sedley (2013, pp. 335–6) notes that Plato claims that atheism was a commonly held perspective and then seeks to explain why so few names are associated with it:

> [D]espite Plato's clear evidence for the existence of an established atheist movement, we cannot name its protagonists and authorities. In classical Athens, and no doubt well beyond, atheism was a risky stance for public intellectuals to avow openly…. There therefore seem to be very good grounds for assuming that theorists of atheism, even where they existed, were likely to think twice before coming out. If atheism was explored through the speeches of characters in drama, rather than defended by any philosopher in his own voice, that should not surprise us at all. This in turn calls for a revised attitude to the atheist narrative of the Sisyphus fragment. The fact that it earned its supposed author Critias inclusion in the list of atheists is a sign less of desperation or incompetence on the part of the list's compiler than of the fact that the voices of dramatic characters were indeed the medium through which atheistic ideas were most safely explored in the ancient world. There may have been few if any self-identified theorists of atheism, but there was, it seems, a sort of atheist underground.

Fiction was the safest place for the atheist underground to surface its ideas publicly. Again, Blankholm states, "I have found that a secular tradition is this book's most controversial claim" (218). But, however controversial and "unsettling," "if we define the secular discursive tradition broadly, its subterranean current courses through almost everyone" (218), he argues, though it's often concealed by what Blankholm regards as its constitutive "paradox." In a paragraph beginning with the statement that, "Including critical theory in the secular [discursive] tradition paves the way for other significant inclusions" (207), he goes on to gesture in a number of directions, including Octavia Butler's "secular Afro-futurism," Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, and Viet Thanh Nguyen's "literary a/theology" in *The Sympathizer* and in "the novel to which it pays homage, Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man*" (208). A footnote about Butler points to a brief online article where, among other things, Blankholm points out texts like Fanny Wright's Epicurean dialogue, *A Few Days in Athens*, and states, "Immanentism that builds myths, creates worlds, and speaks in symbols runs counter to strains within the immanentist tradition that call for plain description and positivist explanation" (2017). Pullman's work is certainly illustrative of such an immanentism.

[69] See Appendix 20. Carlson (2019, pp. 170–1) notes of Emerson's Shakespeare,

> [T]he poetic genius exemplified by Shakespeare is for Emerson far more the function of openness and reception than of grasping or imposition. A marked lack of egoism makes for creative expression that proves singular—because so seemingly universal. "Great genial power, one would almost say, consists in not being original at all," Emerson writes in "Shakespeare, or the Poet"; it consists "in being altogether receptive; in letting the world do all, and suffering the spirit of the hour to pass unobstructed through the mind." [. . . .] Emerson's Shakespeare "wrote the text of modern life," for he "drew the man and described the day, and what is done in it, " and from this angle we might say that his writing constitutes a secular power—not so much, however, because it turns in notable ways from church to world, but more because it is attuned both to modern life in its transience and everydayness and to the indeterminate temporal depths and human masses that yield such life. In this, the poetic genius of a Shakespeare resembles, in the register of culture, the nature in which all human creation already participates, the nature whose creative immensity Emerson figures explicitly in terms of the secular.

## Works Cited


Albanese, C. L. (1990). *Nature religion in America: From the Algonkian Indians to the New Age*. University of Chicago Press.

Albanese, C. L. (2007). *A republic of mind and spirit: A cultural history of American metaphysical religion*. Yale University Press.

Asprem, E. (2018). *The Problem of Disenchantment: Scientific Naturalism and Esoteric Discourse, 1900-1939*. SUNY Press.

Asprem, E., & Taves, A. (2018). Explanation and the Study of Religion. In B. Stoddard (Ed.), *Method Today: Redescribing Approaches to the Study of Religion*. Equinox Publishing, Limited.

Bacon-Smith, C. (2000). *Science fiction culture*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Ball, P. (2013). *Curiosity: How Science Became Interested in Everything*. University of Chicago Press.

Berger, P. L., Berger, B., & Kellner, H. (1974). *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness*. Vintage Books.

Besson, A. (2015). *Constellations: Des mondes fictionnels dans l'imaginaire contemporain*. CNRS éditions.

Blankholm, J. (2022). *The secular paradox: On the religiosity of the not religious*. University Press.

Bould, M. (2017). From world sf (via, if we must, World Sf) to world-sf: An introduction. *Fantastika Journal*, 1(2), 12–25.

Boyer, P. (1994). *The naturalness of religious ideas: A cognitive theory of religion* (1st ed.). University of California Press.

Boyer, P. (2001). *Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought*. Basic Books.

Brown, I. F. 28-. (2010). *From tartan to tartanry: Scottish culture, history and myth*. University Press.

Carlson, T. A. (1999). *Indiscretion: Finitude and the naming of God*. University of Chicago Press.

Carlson, T. A. (2008). *The indiscrete image: Infinitude & creation of the human*. University of Chicago Press.

Carlson, T. A. (2019). *With the world at heart: Studies in the secular today*. The University of Chicago Press.

Clute, J. (2011). *Pardon this Intrusion: Fantastika in the World Storm*. Beccon Publications.

Csapo, E. (2005). *Theories of mythology*. Blackwell Pub.

Davidsen, M. A. (2012). Spiritual milieu based on J.R.R. Tolkien's literary mythology in A. Possamai, Ed. *Handbook of hyper-real religions*. Brill.

Dawkins, R. (2006). *The God delusion*. Houghton Mifflin Company.

Derrick, J. L., Gabriel, S., & Tippin, B. (2008). Parasocial relationships and self-discrepancies: Faux relationships have benefits for low self-esteem individuals. *Personal Relationships*, *15*(2), 261–280. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6811.2008.00197.x

Du Bois, W. E. B. (with Gates, H. L.). (1989). *The souls of Black folk* (Bantam classic edition.). Bantam Books.

Dubourg, E., & Baumard, N. (2022). Why imaginary worlds? The psychological foundations and cultural evolution of fictions with imaginary worlds. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *45*, e276. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X21000923

Dunk, R., & Mar, R. A. (2022). Cognitive exploration drives engagement and re-engagement with imaginary worlds, but not spatial exploration as predicted by evolutionary theory. *Behavioral & Brain Sciences*, *45*, 1–72. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X21002168

Dvoskin, M. G. (2010). *"Listen to the stories, hear it in the songs": Musical theatre as queer historiography* [Ph.D., The University of Texas at Austin]. https://www.proquest.com/docview/748312425/abstract/9A7BE88883474385PQ/1

Ehrman, B. D. (2005). *Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew*. Oxford University Press.

Elder, M. J. (2017). Decentring an isolated culture: Exploring magic and contact zones in Jim Butcher's The codex Alera. *Fantastika Journal*, 1(2), 78–91.

Eliade, M. (2005). *The myth of the eternal return: Cosmos and history* (2nd pbk. ed.). Princeton University Press.

Ellwood, R. S. (1999). *The politics of myth: A study of C.G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell*. State University of New York Press.

Emerson, R. W. (1836). *Nature: 1836 Edition*. Cosimo Classics.

Foxen, A. P. (2020). *Inhaling spirit: Harmonialism, orientalism, and the western roots of modern yoga*. Oxford University Press.

Fredericks, C. (1982). *The future of eternity: Mythologies of science fiction and fantasy*. Indiana University Press.

Fredrickson, N. (2018). Designing a Course Integrating Critical, Genre-Based Pedagogy, Horror Literature, and Religious Studies. In M. A. Fabrizi (Ed.), *Horror Literature and Dark Fantasy: Challenging Genres* (pp. 171–187). Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004366251_013

Geoffroy, M. (2012). Hyper-real religion performing in Baudrillard's integral reality in A. Possamai, Ed. *Handbook of hyper-real religions*. Brill.

Girouard, M. (1981). *The return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English gentleman*. Yale University Press.

Graeber, D. (with Wengrow, D.). (2021). *The dawn of everything: A new history of humanity* (First American edition.). Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Gray, J., Sandvoss, C., & Harrington, C. L. (2007). *Fandom: Identities and communities in a mediated world*. University Press.

Hills, T. T. (n.d.). *Why did shamanism evolve in societies all around the globe? | Aeon Essays*. Aeon. Retrieved August 28, 2023, from https://aeon.co/essays/why-did-shamanism-evolve-in-societies-all-around-the-globe

Hills, T. T., & Stroup, W. (2004). Cognitive exploration and search behavior in the development of endogenous representations. San Diego: American Educational Research Association.

Hills, T. T., Todd, P. M., & Goldstone, R. L. (2010). The central executive as a search process: Priming exploration and exploitation across domains. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 139(4), 590–609. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020666.

Hobsbawm, E. J., & Ranger, T. O. (with Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T.). (2012). *The Invention of Tradition* (Canto edition., Vol. 15). Univ. Pr. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295636
Ingebretsen, E. (2016). *Maps of Heaven, Maps of Hell: Religious Terror as Memory from the Puritans to Stephen King*. Routledge.
Iwamura, J. N. (with elibro, C.). (2010). *Virtual orientalism: Asian religions and American popular culture*. Oxford University Press.
Izzo, M. (2019). Worldbuilding and mythopoeia in Tolkien and post-Tolkienian fantasy literature, in D. Fimi, & Honneger, T. *Sub-creating Arda: World-building in J.R.R. Tolkien's work, its precursors and its legacies*. Walking Tree Publishers.
Jameson, F. (1991). *Postmodernism, or, The cultural logic of late capitalism*. Duke University Press.
Jameson, F., & Miyoshi, M. (1998). *The cultures of globalization*. Duke University Press.
Jenkins, H. (1992). *Textual poachers: Television fans & participatory culture*. Routledge.
Kaveney, R. (2008). *Superheroes!: Capes and crusaders in comics and films*. I.B. Tauris.
Koné, M. (2019). Black Zombie: Capture, Slavery and Freedom. *National Political Science Review*, *20*(3), 150–164.
Kripal, J. J. (2011a). *Authors of the Impossible: The Paranormal and the Sacred*. University of Chicago Press.
Kripal, J. J. (2011b). *Mutants and Mystics: Science Fiction, Superhero Comics, and the Paranormal*. University of Chicago Press.
Larsen, K. (2019). A Mythology for Poland: Andrzej Sapkowski's Witcher Fantasy Series as a Tolkienian Subcreation. In D. Fimi & T. Honneger (Eds.), *Sub-creating Arda: World-building in J.R.R. Tolkien's Work, Its Precursors and Its Legacies*. Walking Tree Publishers.
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1971). Le temps du mythe. *Annales : histoire, sciences sociales (French ed.)*, *26*(3/4), 533–540. https://doi.org/10.3406/ahess.1971.422428
Lévi-Strauss, C. (with Jacobson, C., & Schoepf, B. G.). (1963). *Structural anthropology*. Basic Books.
Lewis, L. A. (1992). *The Adoring audience: Fan culture and popular media*. Routledge.
Lobdell, J. (2005). *The Rise of Tolkienian Fantasy*. Open Court.
Lofton, K. (2011). *Oprah: The gospel of an icon*. University of California Press.
M. Mauss, 1930, 'Les civilisations. Elements et formes', in Fondation pour la Science—Centre international de synthese (ed.), *Civilisation. Le mot et l'idee*, Ire Semaine internationale de synthese, fasc. 2. Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, pp. 81-108.
Madrigal, A. C. (2014, January 2). How Netflix Reverse-Engineered Hollywood. *The Atlantic*. https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/01/how-netflix-reverse-engineered-hollywood/282679/
Mauss, M. 1953, 'La nation', *Annee sociologique* (third series) 3: 7-68.
McAlister, E. (2012). Slaves, Cannibals, and Infected Hyper-Whites: The Race and Religion of Zombies. *Anthropological Quarterly*, *85*(2), 457–486. https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.2012.0021
Ministero, L. M., Green, M. C., Gabriel, S., & Valenti, J. (2022). Back where I belong: Rereading as a risk-free pathway to social connection. *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts*, *16*(1), 97–109. https://doi.org/10.1037/aca0000375

Moore, E. (n.d.). Gnosticism. *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. ISSN 2161-0002, https://iep.utm.edu/gnostic/, August 20, 2023.
Moore, R. L. (1994). *Selling God: American religion in the marketplace of culture*. Oxford University Press.
Morehead, J. (2012). 'World without rules and controls, without borders or boundaries': Matrixism, new mythologies, and symbolic pilgrimages in A. Possamai, Ed. *Handbook of hyper-real religions*. Brill.
Nederveen Pieterse, J. P. (2012). Periodizing Globalization: Histories of Globalization. *New Global Studies*, *6*(2). https://doi.org/10.1515/1940-0004.1174
Nelson, V. (2003). *The Secret Life of Puppets*. Harvard University Press.
Nelson, V. (2012). *Gothicka*. Harvard University Press.
Oexle, O. (2001). *Das Problem der Problemgeschichte, 1880-1932*. Göttinger Gespräch zur Geschichtswissenschaft (12th: Göttingen, Germany).
Oziewicz, M. (2006). The Time Quartet as Madeleine L'Engle's Theology. *Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts*, *17*(3 (67)), 211–236.
Paccosi, V. (2017). From Lovecraft to Hellboy: The carnivalesque face of the Lovecraftian. *Fantastika Journal*, 1(2), 51–63.
Pask, K. (2013). *The Fairy Way of Writing: Shakespeare to Tolkien*. JHU Press.
Possamai, A. (2012). *Handbook of hyper-real religions*. Brill.
Pozzo, R., & Sgarbi, M. (2011). *Begriffs-, Ideen- und Problemgeschichte im 21. Jahrhundert*.
Punter, D. (2017). Weird or what? – The nautical and the hauntological. *Fantastika Journal*, 1(2), 26–31.
Reynolds, R. (1994). *Super Heroes: A Modern Mythology*. Univ. Press of Mississippi.
Rieder, J. (2017). *Science Fiction and the Mass Cultural Genre System*. Wesleyan University Press.
Robertson, J. O. (1980). *American myth, American reality*. Hill & Wang.
Rue, L. D. (2005). *Religion is not about God: How spiritual traditions nurture our biological nature and what to expect when they fail*. Rutgers University Press.
Saler, M. (2012). *As If: Modern Enchantment and the Literary Prehistory of Virtual Reality*. Oxford University Press.
Severi, C. (with Lloyd, J.). (2015). *The chimera principle: An anthropology of memory and imagination*. Hau Books.
Simkins, J. (2016). *The science fiction mythmakers: Religion, science and philosophy in Wells, Clarke, Dick and Herbert*. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers.
Smith, E. D. (2012). *Globalization, utopia, and postcolonial science fiction: New maps of hope*. Palgrave Macmillan.
Spier, F. (2010). *Big history and the future of humanity*. Wiley-Blackwell.
Spilka, B., Shaver, P., & Kirkpatrick, L. A. (1985). A General Attribution Theory for the Psychology of Religion. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, *24*(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.2307/1386272
Taves, A. (2008). Ascription, attribution, and cognition in the study of experiences deemed religious. *Religion (London. 1971)*, *38*(2), 125–140. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.religion.2008.01.005
Taves, A. (2009). *Religious experience reconsidered: A building block approach to the study of religion and other special things* (1st edition). Princeton University Press.

Taylor, M. C. (1984). *Erring: A postmodern a/theology*. University of Chicago Press.
Taylor, M. C. (1990). *Tears*. State University of New York Press.
Taylor, M. C. (1997). *Hiding*. University of Chicago Press.
Tomlinson, J. (1999). *Globalization and Culture*. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/G/bo3634299.html
Von Hendy, A. (2002). *The modern construction of myth*. Indiana University Press.
White, D. G. (2021). *Dæmons are forever: Contacts and exchanges in the Eurasian pandemonium* (1st ed.). The University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, D. S. (2002). *Darwin's cathedral: Evolution, religion, and the nature of society*. University of Chicago Press.
Wong, K., Westfahl, G., & Chan, A. K. (2005). *World weavers: Globalization, science fiction, and the cybernetic revolution*. University Press.
Ziolkowsk, E. (2014). The place of literature in Eliade's "rediscovery" of the archaic world in N. Babuts, Ed. *Mircea Eliade: Myth, religion, and history*. Transaction Publishers.

# CONCLUSION

In the spirit of "worlds within worlds," I offer some parting considerations, not in the form of a single, sustained argument, but rather a series of gestural inquiries in directions I think potentially productive for those who might continue the kairological quest as researchers and teachers. Since they are, again, not an organic whole governed by a single thesis, but a collection of proposals and considerations with summary headings—what I think of as my "Seven Valedictory Theses in Kairology" or my "Conclusory Kairological Conclusion"—I list them as conclusory assertions here and invite you, Gentle Reader, to consult "Appendix 47: Concluding by Way of Some Philosophical Investigations in Kairology" to read in full any of my leave-taking reflections that might be of interest. They are as follows:

1. Kairology seeks to replace the old, atomic ("categorematic"—see #2 below) paradigm with one that, being relational, co-dependent, and comparative, intentionally selects categories of sufficient generality and abstraction to clarify and not efface contradiction in assimilative or reductive-eliminative treatment of allomythic particularity (as O-mode allomythoi seek to do in accord with their characteristic sinistral diathesis), maintaining the productively boundary-making, oppositional (i.e., dialogical, dialectical, polyvocalic, and polysemous) aspect of all worldmaking without satisfying that impulse in the service of a particular worldview (other than that of the kairological framework itself which intentionally holds that impulse in abeyance as much as possible in order to disclose allomythic nature within a hospitable frame).

2. Concerning the governing grammatical-syntactic category-metaphor structuring inquiry, kairology might improve the study of allomythopoesis and allomythonostos by exploratorily shifting attention from the verbal mood (i.e., the subjunctive in contrast with the indicative) and the comparative-subordinating conjunction that invokes the hypothetical and its mood(s) (the as-if) by generalizing aspects of that prior inquiry—the attention to certain marks of relation—and turning from the subjunctive to the syncategorematic.
3. Any responsible kairological inquiry should be aware of the potential of allomythoi to be dangerous and harmful, that is, of allomythoi as a contemporary BP.
4. Nuttall's absence in this text might be conspicuous to some; Nuttall (2018) is an important compliment to this work and a vital text for future kairological inquiry at the level of individual characters' private allomythoi and sustained close-reading of texts for allomythic qualia that could not be elaborated above, but it seemed best to direct those whose kairological questions are of Nuttall's sort (e.g., what is the individual-allomythic "mind style" of Samwise Gamgee or John Galt? how do the nuances of an allomythos arise from specific syntactic decisions?) to Nuttall and await from someone else's hand a future Nuttall-Fredrickson critical synthesis, which unfortunately must be deferred for now.
5. A substantial gap in this work, simply because it is utterly beyond my expertise and experience, is fantastical worldmaking, including the making of allomythoi, in video games.
6. Taking allomythoi seriously as a BP, metareflecting on this framework to make its WWL explicit, a "philosophy of kairology" may be articulated, and it may

tentatively be summarized as follows: (1) kairology is fundamentally oriented toward the allomythoi-BP but situated within worldview studies, taking its concern with BQs as fundamental to its own practice; (2) kairology is a conceptual blend drawing on diverse explanatory research and hermeneutic methods to supply a framework for understanding allomythoi; (3) kairology is deeply dialogical and dialectical, reflecting the natures of the relevant constitutive elements that produce allomythoi; and (4) a philosophy of kairology should be critical and adopt a high level of generality, but individual kairological inquires, even if philosophical, need not.

7. Just as religious studies (RS) is complimented and informed by religious education (RE), kairology, as the academic study of allomythoi, should attend to kairological education, a subset of worldview education; moreover, due to allomythoi being comparable to the WWL-formative narratives traditionally addressed by religious studies, i.e., because allomythoi can teach people to develop novel selves and social formations, and because kairology lends itself to a "pedagogy of estrangement," harnessing the power of allomythoi presents a distinctive, novel option for intervention in and integration with other evidence-based pedagogical methods from disciplines like writing studies and information literacy and, more broadly, teaching all the subdisciplines of worldview studies (WvS) within a General Education paradigm.

# BOOK TWO: APPENDICES

NB Each of the following appendices reflects different stages in the development of the argument and style of the main text of the dissertation, provided to give added depth, nuance, support, and examples. Therefore, there are inevitable irregularities and imperfections of style and argument that had to remain due to time, energy, and other resource limitations. Please accept these aids in the spirit of Mark Twain's apology: "I didn't have time to write a short letter, so I wrote a long one instead."

# Appendix 1: On the Term "Allomythos"

I designate new narratives, worlds, selves, or, in short, worldviews and ways of life (WWLs) marked as secondary and non-ordinary within narratives (secondary worlds) from the genres of the non-ordinary "allomythoi" rather than fictional *religions* because, first, they are not religions but at most narrative representations of novel, possible religions and, in many instances not, from the emic perspective of their storyworlds, religions at all. Jason Anthony's term *allomythic* – from the Greek *allos*, "other," and *muthos*, "story" – offers a more generic label and, as an invented term, one that is free of prior associations (Anthony 2014, p. 39). If one views a *muthos* as a special sort of narrative and the *allos* as marking something thus doubly set apart, *allomythos* aptly captures the generic phenomenon of interest without imposing undue etic implications on the phenomenon one wants to understand. Allomythoi (the emic non-ordinary within speculative fiction) would not (at least initially or generally) be regarded as real religions by their authors or readers in the extradiegetic world, and they will be characterized as such in the diegetic world only if emically designated in that way. And these fictional WWLs, which I have joined Jason Anthony in calling allomythoi, are seldom regarded as fictional WWLs within the storyworld itself.

As an effective synonym for "non-ordinary," I use the expression "secondary," which Tolkien used and which is very influential and ubiquitous, but I do not use it in the sense of a storyworld's being a "subcreation." The situation to which human worldviews respond, Tolkien would regard as created, and a storyworld would be for him a subcreation; thus, his expressions, "primary" and "secondary," are meant to reflect a hierarchical chain of being and creative reality, authority, and excellence. The framework offered in this work does not assume that the extradiegetic world, the so-called primary world, is a creation; however, this framework explicitly identifies storyworlds and worldviews as creations, as fictions, as recreated "non-ordinary" modifications of elements of consensus reality. The overall allomythos of a storyworld will be *secondary* relative to that of its creator; there is a metaleptic crossing and rupture when one makes a separate work of art (some point to this concept with the idea of the "death of the author"). Likewise, within the secondary world (which has an overall allomythos), various allomythoi may be studied. These are the sorts of representations I am looking for when I point out works that are excluded or marginalized by present scholarship. Let's consider the elements of an allomythos. It is a powerful, world-making representation characterized (as fantastika) by a non-ordinary ("estranged") quality:

1. **Powerful.** This refers, both to the emotionally provocative aspect of narrative (*cf.* Geertz 1973, Tweed 2006) and to the fact that these representations are intended as efficacious expressions of authorial will. They are intended as interventions in the world. They are rhetorical, even manipulative (Aiken 1998a,b; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1988; Scalise-Sugiyama 1996).
2. **World-making.** Concerning the concept of world in narratology, Ryan (2015:12) notes,

As the Czech narratologist Jirí Koten (2010) observes, the narratological concept of world can be traced back to two lines of ancestry. When we speak of *storyworld* the influence comes mainly from cognitive approaches to narrative (Herman 2009), while when we speak of fictional world the influence comes from schools and disciplines interested in

the ontological status of imaginary entities: philosophy of language, formal semantics, and more particularly possible world theory (Pavel 1986; Doležel 1998; Ryan 1991).

Goodman, in *Ways of Worldmaking* (1978), understands worlds as produced by human symbolic, ordering activity, and Bruner (1990; 1986) likewise uses "world" to refer to the totality of human environmental interpretation. Such interpretive understandings are more focused on the cognitive than on the ontological. Dissanayake, elaborating on Carroll's (2004:159) notion that humans have a universal "need to create cognitive order" (*cf.* Geertz's (1973) "general order of existence"), suggests "that the operations of making special" or non-ordinary "not only help to create cognitive order (meaningfulness) but give it added emotional salience" (2008:15). Thus, for example, ceremonial practices that draw on aesthetic operations "provide to individuals a sense of meaningfulness or cognitive order and individual competence insofar as they give emotional force to explanations of how the world came to be as it is and what is required to maintain it (see also Carroll 2005)" (2008:22). Thus, we can see how the special is powerful.

Non-ordinary agents, tools, and processes are non-ordinary relative to the base world, but they are still determinate, functioning according to their own logics and laws. Thus, they bear within them the logics and laws of another world, an allomythos, whether its features are elaborated or not. Curiously, by confronting an alternate uncertain world, humans are able to cope with uncertainty in their own world. This is part of the pleasure of reading and signals my partial agreement with the "sf is religion" school of thought (*e.g.*, Clark 2005, Kreuziger 1986), such that an operational understanding of religion as a world-making and experiential world-visiting process might be a fruitful point of analogy between fiction, art, and phenomena designated by some as religious. Like Tweed (2006), I would stress that people not only seek worlds in which to dwell but also do so in a dynamic fashion, shifting among different worlds (*cf.* Bellah 2011; Taves 2011; Harris 2000; Schutz 1945/2013). "Religion" as both dwelling and crossing suggests that it is both fictive or constructive (*cf.* Vaihinger 1911/1924) and touristic or experimental (*cf.* Dewey 1934—see my discussion of his aesthetic theory in Appendix 6 and Appendix 30). Regarding the exploratory, experimental, touristic pleasure of fiction that foregrounds new worlds, see, for example, Etchells, 2019; Dubourg & Baumard, 2022. Fiction itself is religion-like, and this helps to explain how fictional non-ordinary phenomena might transfer into the "real" world, becoming fandoms and religions.

3. **Representation.** These are fictions, publicly accessible constructions reflecting determinate authorial perspectives that readers seek to re-construct or re-present to themselves. This is again affirmed by the concluding qualifying phrase *within the storyworld*.
4. **Non-ordinary agents, institutions, tools, or processes.** Although some scholars link religions with agents, institutions, and worlds and magic with tools and processes, this project deliberately seeks to avoid imposing these modern divisions in order to better understand the emic categories utilized in the fictional worlds.





**Figure I. Granularity and Boundary Issues in Worldview Studies and Kairology**

To return to and clarify some of the points made above, the preceding figure illustrates some of the granularity, boundary-crossing, and overlapping-membership issues faced in the study of worldviews and allomythoi (Taves (2022, pp. 10-12) considers some of

these issues relative to worldview studies in terms of "Scale" and "Scope"). One might take the comparative study of the great legal traditions or legal worldview families of the world as an example of what is being depicted in the upper region of the figure. Note that the situation is already vastly simplified in this depiction because there are not even in the West just two legal families, say, the Romano-Germanic civil law tradition and the Anglo-American common law tradition, interacting with each other; even these two legal worldview families, in addition to informing, influencing, and impacting each other, have themselves been impacted by, for example, Jewish law[1] (which itself is a worldview family with internal diversity, like Muslim law, socialist law, and so on), among the others of the world.

Comparative law rests on key insights that parallel those that are central to the comparative worldview studies framework applied herein to allomythoi. The foundation was laid by Ernst Rabel (though subsequent comparative work has of necessity generally been a collaborative effort, not the herculean work of solitary scholars), whose function-context methodology has one, first, *situate* laws in their context (historical, economic, political, legal, cultural, etc., each of which characterize a legal tradition's style and *mentalité* (*cf.* Legrand, 1996)), from which one may, second, come to appreciate how legal systems, institutions, principles, and rules function—the *problems* such norms address, the social needs they answer (for a solid overview, see K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, *An Introduction to Comparative Law* (Clarendon Press, 1988); for a treatment that resonates with many of the arguments I make in this text regarding translation, see S. Glanert (Ed.), *Comparative Law – Engaging Translation* ( Routledge, 2014)). It should be noted that some have, fairly or not, criticized the dominant context-function comparative methodology for improperly giving a sense of impossible and colonialist "neutrality" (*e.g.*, Frankenberg, 1985). I do not regard such criticism as entirely fair since practitioners of the function-context methodology have repeatedly demonstrated awareness, from Rabel on, that different legal systems tell different stories: they characterize the perception of the ontological facts of situations (including the goods a people pursues and the evils it avoids) and the rules and norms that may be invented and applied in response to the situation. Similar rules applied in different situations produce different results; Roman law as applied in ancient Rome, for example, and as applied in the civil law of specific European countries results in very different outcomes due to vastly different contexts. And responsible legal comparatists are well aware of the profound difficulties of translating between legal worldviews and of the fact that engagement with another's legal worldview does not give one mastery of it; its primary use may be to help denaturalize one's own legal worldview in order to better appreciate the problems it responds to and the merits or deficiencies in its responses.

So in the "Worldview Studies" region of the figure, one may see depicted the concept that an individual's worldview (usually not the primary focus of worldview studies but vital for ethnographic work to produce a more general understanding of a group of worldview-related individuals) may be the synthesis or serial activation given different

[1] See, for example, Jacob J. Rabinowitz's (1956) *Jewish Law, Its Influence on the Development of Legal Institutions* and "The Influence of Jewish Law on the Development of the Common Law" in *The Jews, Their Role in Civilization* (Louis Finkelstein, Ed., 1971), Nathan Isaacs's (1927) "The Influence of Judaism on Western Law" in *The Legacy of Israel* (George Adam Sir Smith, Edwyn Robert Bevan, and Charles Singer, Eds.), and Victor Aptowitzer's "The Influence of Jewish Law on the Development of Jurisprudence in the Christian Orient" (1:2 *Jewish Quarterly Review* 217 (Oct. 1910)).

situational cues of different worldviews. One may also observe that a specific group's worldview may itself draw from multiple worldviews and ways of life. And one sees that "worldview" may be applied at all of these levels of analysis. Thus, an individual girl might live within the overlapping legal norms of a Catholic country governed by a form of civil law that long interacted with canon law. Though she might commit what her society broadly considers a *sin*, she and those with whom she shares a worldview and way of life would be offended if the state were to overstep its jurisdiction and seek to punish or soften a punishment properly met out by local, non-state institutions: the Church, community elders, her family's head, etc. The different communities of discourse and practice that she dwells within and among are regulated by varying norms that impact and influence each other but respond to a specific situation in different ways. And she, in the act of living within her worldviews, will inevitably creatively activate, suppress, and synthesize aspects of them.

In the lower half of the figure is depicted the similar situation in "Kairology." "Allomythos" may be applied at different levels of generality and abstraction, but the level that is usually in view is that of groups of characters (ranging from humans to dragons to robots) with shared ways of responding to situations with characteristic styles of knowing, valuing, doing, and so on. A reader, moviegoer, or other narrative percipient metaleptically crosses over from the consensus reality – the extradiegetic world – that we inhabit into the secondary, diegetic storyworld, from which one my abstract an allomythos that I broadly characterize using the modes, and such a percipient then accompanies individuals and groups as they switch among the different situations and allomythoi, worlds and worldviews, imaginative re-creating the worlds and worldviews first invented by the artist(s). A specific character's allomythos is generally not the focus of kairology, but their personal allomythos does (or, if the author is appropriately skillful and successful, should) exhibit an allmythological multiplicity that is comparable to individuals' worldviews—situationally shifting among and blending allomythoi in the storyworld.

Again, as one thinks about shifting among the many worlds, from the extradiegetic "real" world we live in (itself, for each person, a mapped, localized, narrative selection, guided by attention, of events from the vast potential story-space of "experience") to the storyworld, with its allomythology composed of its many allomythoi, to the little text worlds of a given sentence, it's worth keeping in mind that there is no "outside" to all of this. I don't see any reason to go into the vast literatures of the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment or about the truth-value or ontological status of fiction, but, just as our nervous system takes informational cues from the senses to simulate the inner worlds of our bodies and the external worlds of our many physical environments, so too texts in all media cue us to simulate and move among the worlds of fiction. We only have the one evolved set of self-and-world-modeling, narrative-mapping tools with which to do it all. An information-theoretic, cognitive understanding admits a realist interpretation that "everything is a simulation" (perhaps equally distressing to some magicians, who, whether they think about it this way or not, practice the arts of cultivating imagination and attention to alter the simulation, and to some scientists, whose models of reality, however instrumentally effective for specific purposes, remain just that, models—in both groups, the people who tend to become upset are those who want to know that they know what's really-real), but whatever is noumenally "really-real" (and I personally refuse to make big metaphysical commitments regarding the question—so much is mysterious that attributional humility seems prudent), the model of understanding the cognitive process involved in processing all

these various stimuli in terms of probabilistic conceptual spaces or worlds (which appropriately brackets the ultimate question of the really-real) is powerful in terms of the range of phenomena it can embrace and give a coherent if partial account of.

Using the tools offered by this work's framework does not demand acceptance of, say, the mass-energy-information equivalence principle, but the principle may be compelling in its light (provided we recall that all "information," as a pattern, is a pattern-of, inescapably bound up with energetic materiality). Heidegger would have us think of the human being as temporally and spatially ecstatic, as always standing-out in past-present-future in-the-world with-others. But even he does not capture the complete density of the entanglement. The possible worlds we call the temporal are just a few of the modal worlds into which we, as information-processing beings—always taking information "in" and "producing" new information—dwell and have our being.

One way of thinking about some of the distinctions at work above might be to think about the idea/expression distinction in copyright. An author's original "expression" is copyrightable, but the "idea" is not. Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, were it written today, would fall under copyright protection, but the idea, which Shakespeare himself took from a tradition of similar stories and which one finds all over the place in stories nowadays, would not. The bare text, which provides the cues for a percipient to recreationally re-create an experience using their self-and-world modelling system, is the expression, and in its totality it amounts to the storyworld as a whole, which, although an "abstraction" because never experienced all-at-once, would also qualify as the expression for the purpose of copyright protection. (Note that even within the bare text and the overall storyworld, generic conventions, *scènes à faire*, derivative and allusive elements, and related materials are not copyrightable (under the abstraction test discussed below, in its application to computer programs, (1) elements taken from the public domain (compare genre conventions and allusions), (2) elements required by factors external to the program (compare *scènes à faire* and genre conventions), and (3) elements that constitute or merge with the idea are eliminated to determine the remainder, the copyrightable expression. see *Computer Associates Internat., Inc. v. Altai, Inc.*, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) and subsequent cases.); the elements I abstract when I identify the allomythic family or families to which a given allomythos seems related are analogous to such noncopyrightable elements.)

As mentioned parenthetically above, courts frequently use an abstraction test to distinguish between ideas in a work (unprotectable) and their expression. This test works by iteratively restating a work, progressively abstracting or eliminating more and more at each stage until one arrives at a very general description of the work. The court then uses its experienced judgment, perhaps depending on experts, to identify the point in the progression of abstractions where what is expressive and subject to protection parts from what is the idea. In the realm of studying organisms' ways of life and humans' worldviews, specialists may sometimes forget that they are abstracting—paying attention to and isolating—some behaviors, some symbolic expressions, &c., and not others. To paraphrase William James's discussion of experience and attention in *The Priniciples of Psychology, Vol. I*, they are not immediately experiencing the direct presence of reality but, rather, paying attention to cropped snapshots ("[f]ocalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence") of the virtually immeasurable flow of data (see James, 1890, pp. 402-404). Kairological analysis too operates at a high level of abstraction. The bare text may be distinguished from the storyworld it generates (or "universe" or franchise "world" generated by many texts in

many media—Besson, 2015), and the overall allomythos in a given storyworld may be distinguished, on the one hand, from the bare text and the storyworld itself and, on the other, from the many allomythoi of individuals, species, and social formations relying on some form of intersubjective symbolic expression (not to mention the countless text-world shifts one encounters even in the space of a few paragraphs of text or moments of film or stages of a level of a video game). Does this mean that fans who appropriate an author's protected expression are distinguishable from fiction-based worldview practitioners who take up an allomythos? Unfortunately, things are not so simple; for example, rituals drawn from a given allomythos might be tied to specific details of expression that would ordinarily be understood as falling under copyright.

## Appendix 2: Bibliography of Religions and Other Worldviews in Fiction and Popular Culture


Allen, Moira. "On Religion in Science Fiction and Fantasy: An Interview with Orson Scott Card" 2, no. 2 (2000).

Alsford, Mike. *What If?: Religious Themes in Science Fiction*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2000.

Ambrosiano, Jason Benjamin. "Glasses Brilliant: Religion in the American Postmodern Novel." Ph.D., University of California, Riverside, 2002.

Bald, Margaret, and Ken Wachsberger. *Literature Suppressed on Religious Grounds*. New York: Facts On File, 2006.

Baldock, Charles Nicholas Martin. "The Religious Imagination in British Popular Fiction and Society, 1900--1945." Ph.D., Yale University, 2009.

Barbee, Clifford Ocie. "Prophetic and Apocalyptic Motifs in Science Fiction," 1990.

Beaver, Libby. "Religion and Mysticism in Science Fiction: a Senior Honors Thesis," 1988.

Berman, Ruth. "'Spirituous Consolation': Alcott's Jokes on Drinking and Religion." *CLE Children's Literature in Education: An International Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (2008): 169–186.

Blish, James. "The Tale That Wags the God: The Function of Science Fiction." *American Libraries* 1, no. 11 (December 1, 1970): 1029–1033.

Blizek, William L. *The Continuum Companion to Religion and Film*. London; New York, NY: Continuum, 2009.

Boyd, George N, and Lois A Boyd. *Religion in Contemporary Fiction; Criticism from 1945 to the Present.* San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1973.

Brode, Douglas, and Leah Deyneka. *Sex, Politics, and Religion in Star Wars: An Anthology*. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2012.

Brunner, Brendan. "God, Religion, Science, Humanity: Critical Studies in Science Fiction." St. Bonaventure University, 2004.

Buechner, Frederick. *Speak What We Feel (not What We Ought to Say): Reflections on Literature and Faith*. [San Francisco]: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001.

Butler, Ivan. *Religion in the Cinema.* New York: A.S. Barnes, 1969.

Carey, Ralph Allison. “Best Selling Religion: A History of Popular Religious Thought in America as Reflected in Religious Best Sellers, 1850-1960.” Ph.D., Michigan State University, 1971.

Carruthers, Jo, and Andrew Tate. *Spiritual Identities: Literature and the Post-secular Imagination*. Oxford; New York: Peter Lang, 2010.

Clark, Terry Ray, and Dan W Clanton. *Understanding Religion and Popular Culture: Theories, Themes, Products and Practices*. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2012.

Cobb, Kelton. *The Blackwell Guide to Theology and Popular Culture*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005.

Coleman, James W. *Faithful Vision: Treatments of the Sacred, Spiritual, and Supernatural in Twentieth-century African American Fiction*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006.

Coughlin, John. *Comic Books and American Civil Religion: Holy Correlation, Batman?*, 1997.

Cowan, Douglas E. *Sacred Space: The Quest for Transcendence in Science Fiction Film and Television*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010.

———. *Sacred Terror: Religion and Horror on the Silver Screen*. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2008.

Crome, Andrew, and James McGrath. *Time and Relative Dimensions in Faith: Religion and Doctor Who*. 2013.

Cusack, Carole M. *Invented Religions: Imagination, Fiction and Faith*. Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010.

Dark, David. *Everyday Apocalypse: The Sacred Revealed in Radiohead, the Simpsons, and Other Pop Culture Icons*. Brazos Press, 2002.

Davies, Horton. *Catching the Conscience: Essays in Religion and Literature*. Cambridge: Cowley, 1984.

Detweiler, Robert, IUPUI (Campus), and Center for the Study of Religion and American Culture. *Uncivil Rites: American Fiction, Religion, and the Public Sphere*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996.

Dube, Christopher. *Leaping Without Words: Cultivating and Exploring the Sacred through Writing and Reading*. Surrey, B.C.: Urban Mystic Books, 2007.

Ebert, John David. *Celluloid Heroes & Mechanical Dragons: Film as the Mythology of Electronic Society*. Christchurch, New Zealand: Cybereditions, 2005.

Edwards, Chris. *Spiritual Snake Oil: Fads & Fallacies in Pop Culture*. Tucson, Az.: See Sharp Press, 2011.

Fessenden, Tracy. *Culture and Redemption: Religion, the Secular, and American Literature*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007.

"Fiction and Religion." *ECF Eighteenth-Century Fiction* 15, no. 3–4 (2003): 339–668.

Flaherty, Gloria. "The Performing Artist as the Shaman of Higher Civilization." *MLN* 103, no. 3 (1988): 519–39.

Forbes, Bruce David, and Jeffrey H Mahan. *Religion and Popular Culture in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

Frederick, John T. *The Darkened Sky: Nineteenth-century American Novelists and Religion*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.

Gass, William H, and Cuoco. *The Writer and Religion*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000.

Geertz, Armin W. and Jeppe Sinding Jensen. *Religious Narrative, Cognition and Culture: Image and Word in the Mind of Narrative* (Religion, Cognition and Culture). Sheffield: Equinox, 2011.

Gillam, Victoria A. "Religion in Contemporary American Television," 1995.

Goffart, Ellen. "Does SF Hold a Creative Methodology for This Post-Christian Age?" 1975.

Gooch, Stan, and Christopher Riche Evans. *Science Fiction as Religion*. [Frome, Somerset]: Bran's Head Books, 1981.

Guite, Malcolm. *Faith, Hope and Poetry: Theology and the Poetic Imagination*. Farnham [etc.]: Ashgate, 2010.

Hamner, M. Gail. *Imaging Religion in Film: The Politics of Nostalgia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Handman, Gary, Calif.) Moffitt Library (Berkeley, and Media Resources Center. *Religious Themes in the Movies and Television: An Annotated Videography of Holdings in the Media Resources Center, University of California, Berkeley*, 2002.

Hansen, Regina. *Roman Catholicism in Fantastic Film: Essays on Belief, Spectacle, Ritual and Imagery*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2011.

Harper, John C. "Visions of a Future God: Religion in the Science Fiction Film: Kubrick's '2001, a Space Odyssey'," 2003.

Hungerford, Amy. *Postmodern Belief: American Literature and Religion Since 1960*. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Hyers, Conrad. *The Spirituality of Comedy: Comic Heroism in a Tragic World*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007.

James, William C. *Locations of the Sacred: Essays on Religion, Literature, and Canadian Culture*. Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998.

Johnston, Robert K, Detweiler, and Barry Taylor. *Don't Stop Believin': Pop Culture and Religion from Ben-Hur to Zombies*. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2012.

Kavetsky, Jennifer. "Religion and SF." *Science Fiction Studies* 38, no. 2 (July 1, 2011): 347–348.

Kelso, Sylvia. "The God in the Pentagram: Religion and Spirituality in Modern Fantasy." *Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts* 18, no. 1 [69] (2007): 61–82.

Knafle, June D. "Religions in Fiction for Junior and Senior High Students." *Reading Improvement* 38, no. 1 (2001): 12–21.

Kneis, Philipp. *The Emancipation of the Soul: Memes of Destiny in American Mythological Television*. Frankfurt am Main; New York: Peter Lang, 2010.

Kreuziger, Frederick A. *Apocalypse and Science Fiction: A Dialectic of Religious and Secular Soteriologies*. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982.

———. *The Religion of Science Fiction*. Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1986.

Lane, Belden C. "Fantasy and the Geography of Faith." *Theology Today* 50, no. 3 (October 1993): 397.

Lewis, A. David, and Christine Hoff Kraemer. *Graven Images: Religion in Comic Books and Graphic Novels*. New York: Continuum, 2010.

Lyden, John. *The Routledge Companion to Religion and Film*. London; New York: Routledge, 2009.

Lynn Schofield Clark, Jill Dierberg. “Late-Night Comedy as a Source of Religion News” (2012).

Martínez, Javier A. “Technology and Theology (or Lack Thereof).” *Science Fiction Studies* 31, no. 1 [92] (2004): 132–37.

May, John R, and Michael S Bird. *Religion in Film*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982.

Mazur, Eric Michael. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Film*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2011.

McDannell, Colleen. *Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in America*. Yale University Press, 1998.

McGrath, James F. *Religion and Science Fiction*. Eugene, Or.: Pickwick Publications, 2011.

McKenna, Andrew J. “Book Review: The Sacred Game: The Role of the Sacred in the Genesis of Modern Literary Fiction.” *Philosophy and Literature* 19, no. 1 (1995): 189–191.

Miles, Margaret R. *Seeing and Believing: Religion and Values in the Movies*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1996.

Milner, Joseph O. “Hard Religious Questions in ‘Knee-Knock Rise’ and ‘Tuck Everlasting.’” *ALAN Review* 22, no. 2 (1995): 18–19.

Moore, R. Laurence. *Selling God: American Religion in the Marketplace of Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Moore, Rachel O. *Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern Magic*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.

Morefield, Kenneth R. *Faith and Spirituality in Masters of World Cinema*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2008.

Mueller, William Randolph. *The Prophetic Voice in Modern Fiction.* New York: Association Press, 1959.

Nadis, Fred. *Wonder Shows: Performing Science, Magic, and Religion in America*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005.

Neary, John. *Like and Unlike God: Religious Imaginations in Modern and Contemporary Fiction*. Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1999.

Nolan, Steve. *Film, Lacan and the Subject of Religion: A Psychoanalytic Approach to Religious Film Analysis*. London; New York: Continuum, 2009.

Ostwalt, Conrad Eugene. *Secular Steeples: Popular Culture and the Religious Imagination*. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.

Paietta, Ann Catherine. *Saints, Clergy, and Other Religious Figures on Film and Television, 1895-2003*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2005.

Parks, John G. "The Terrors of Freedom: Religious Crisis in Recent American Fiction." *SWR Southwest Review* 67, no. 2 (1982): 182–191.

Penzoldt, Peter. *The Supernatural in Fiction.* New York: Humanities Press, 1965.

Petersen, Line Nybro. "American Television Fiction Transforming Danish Teenagers' Religious Imaginations." *Communications* 35, no. 3 (2010): 229–247.

Phillips, D. Z. *From Fantasy to Faith: Morality, Religion and Twentieth-century Literature*. London: SCM Press, 2006.

Piercy, Marge, and National Foundation for Jewish Culture (U.S.). *On Jewish Sci-fi ...* New York: National Foundation for Jewish Culture, 2000.

Pizzino, Christopher J. *Religion in Postmodern Science Fiction: a Case Study in Secularity*, 2008.

Plate, S. Brent. *Religion and Film: Cinema and the Re-creation of the World*. London: Wallflower, 2008.

———. *Representing Religion in World Cinema: Filmmaking, Mythmaking, Culture Making*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Redondo, Juan Carlos Toledao. "The Many Names of God: Christianity in Hispanic Caribbean Science Fiction." *Chasqui* 36, no. 1 (May 1, 2007): 33–47.

Reilly, Robert. *The Transcendent Adventure: Studies of Religion in Science Fiction/fantasy*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985.

*Religion and Science Fiction.* Wipf & Stock Pub, 2011.

Reynolds, David Spencer. "Polishing God's Altar: The Emergence of Religious Fiction in America, 1785-1850." Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1979.

Robson, Geo*ff*. "Killing God? Secular and Spiritual Elements in Some Recent Literature for Children." *British Journal of Religious Education* 35, no. 1 (January 2013): 87–97.

Salomone, Ronald E. “The Venture Towards God: Various Patterns of Religious Consciousness in Modern British Fiction,” 1976.

Sammons, Martha C. *“A Better Country”: The Worlds of Religious Fantasy and Science Fiction*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988.

———. *War of the Fantasy Worlds: C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien on Art and Imagination*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010.

Sanders, Theresa. *Celluloid Saints: Images of Sanctity in Film*. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2002.

Santana, Richard W, and Gregory Erickson. *Religion and Popular Culture: Rescripting the Sacred*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2008.

Small, Elizabeth. “Religious Institutions in Spanish Science Fiction.” *Science Fiction Studies* 28, no. 1 (March 2001): 33–48.

Smart, Michael. “Author Says Science Fiction Is the Last Bastian of Religious Storytelling ...” *Salt Lake Tribune (Salt Lake City, Utah : 1890),* (1997).

Tautkus, Marjorie Roberts. “Salvation at the Cinema: Religious References in American Science Fiction Films of the 1980’s,” 1992.

Thomas, Sally. “Fantasy and Faith.” *First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion & Public Life* no. 177 (November 2007): 15–16.

Thurs, Daniel Patrick. “Science in Popular Culture: Contested Meanings and Cultural Authority in America, 1832--1994.” Ph.D., The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2004.

Tippens, Darryl L, Jeanne Murray Walker, and Stephen Weathers. *Shadow & Light: Literature and the Life of Faith*. Abilene, TX: ACU Press, 2005.

Trousdale, Ann M. “Intersections of Spirituality, Religion and Gender in Children’s Literature.” *International Journal of Children’s Spirituality* 10, no. 1 (2005): 61–79.

Ulreich, John C. “Prophets, Priests, and Poets: Toward a Definition of Religious Fiction.” *Cithara* 22, no. 2 (May 1, 1983).

Urang, Gunnar. *Shadows of Heaven; Religion and Fantasy in the Writing of C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and J.R.R. Tolkien.* Philadelphia: [Pilgrim Press, 1971.

Usin, Lea Valve. “From Scatology to Eschatology: Religious Elements in the Works of Michel De Ghelderode.” Ph.D., University of Toronto (Canada), 1980.

Vetter, Lara Elizabeth. *Modernist Writings and Religio-scientific Discourse: H.D., Loy, and Toomer*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Warrick, Patricia S, and Greenberg. *The New Awareness: Religion through Science Fiction*. New York: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Wells, Bradley M. "The Religious Significance of Gandalf in J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings," 1992.

Welsh, Patrice A. "The Interdependence of Theology and Literature as Reflected in the Writings of Paul Tillich and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.," 1975.

Wright, Melanie Jane. *Religion and Film: An Introduction*. London; New York; New York: I.B. Tauris ; Distributed in the U.S. by Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Wright, Wendy M. "Babette's Feast: A Religious Film." *Journal of Religion and Film* 1, no. 2 (1997): 29 paragraphs.

Yeffeth, Glenn. *Taking the Red Pill: Science, Philosophy and Religion in The Matrix*. Chichester: Summersdale, 2003.

Zimmermann, Rachel E. "Bridging the Gap Between the Secular and the Sacred: Finding Theological Themes and Moral Values through an Exegesis of Science Fiction/fantasy Film and Television," 2012.

### *African American*

Weisenfeld, Judith. *Hollywood Be Thy Name: African American Religion in American Film, 1929-1949*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.

Zauditu-Selassie, K. *African Spiritual Traditions in the Novels of Toni Morrison*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009.

### *Atheism, Skepticism, Humanism, Freethinker, etc.*

Claudia Puig. "Cynicism Lurks in 'The Mist'." *USA Today*. Accessed October 28, 2013.

Lockerbie, D. Bruce. *Dismissing God: Modern Writers' Struggle Against Religion*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 1998.

Martínez, Javier A. "Technology and Theology (or Lack Thereof)." *Science Fiction Studies* 31, no. 1 [92] (2004): 132–37.

Miller, Laura. *The Magician's Book: a Skeptic's Adventures in Narnia*. New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2008.

### *Civil & Popular*

Berger, Arthur Asa. *Manufacturing Desire: Media, Popular Culture, and Everyday Life*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008.

Dierberg, Jill Elizabeth. "America and the Ring: a Theological Approach to American Civil Religion and The Lord of the Rings Post 9/11," 2008.

Hill, Annette. *Paranormal Media: Audiences, Spirits, and Magic in Popular Culture*. London; New York: Routledge, 2011.

Hinds, Harold E, Marilyn Ferris Motz, and Angela M. S Nelson. *Popular Culture Theory and Methodology: a Basic Introduction*. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press/Popular Press, 2006.

Lofton, Kathryn. *Oprah: The Gospel of an Icon*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.

Wagner, Jon G, and Jan Lundeen. *Deep Space and Sacred Time: Star Trek in the American Mythos*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998.

### *Vernacular*

De Vos, Gail. *What Happens Next?: Contemporary Urban Legends and Popular Culture*, 2012.

Kinsella, Michael. *Legend-tripping Online: Supernatural Folklore and the Search for Ong's Hat*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011.

Kirby, Danielle. *Fantasy and Belief: Alternative Religions, Popular Narratives and Digital Cultures*. Bristol, CT: Acumen Publishing, 2013.

Laderman, Gary. *Sacred Matters: Celebrity Worship, Sexual Ecstasies, the Living Dead and Other Signs of Religious Life in the United States*. New York: New Press, 2010.

Winston, Diane H. *Small Screen, Big Picture: Television and Lived Religion*. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2009.

Winston, Diane, ed. *Small Screen, Big Picture: Television and Lived Religion*. Baylor University Press, 2009.

### *Spirituality*

Adams, Ann J. *Sisters of the Light: The Importance of Spirituality in the Afra-American Novel*. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1989.

Bowen, John P. *The Spirituality of Narnia: The Deeper Magic of C.S. Lewis*. Vancouver: Regent College Pub., 2007.

Bridger, Francis. *A Charmed Life: The Spirituality of Potterworld*. New York: Image Books, 2002.

Coleman, James W. *Faithful Vision: Treatments of the Sacred, Spiritual, and Supernatural in Twentieth-century African American Fiction*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006.

Caldecott, Stratford. *Secret Fire: The Spiritual Vision of J.R.R. Tolkien*. London: Darton Longman & Todd, 2003.

———. *The Power of the Ring: The Spiritual Vision Behind the Lord of the Rings and The Hobbit.* Chicago: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2012.

Carnell, Corbin Scott. *Bright Shadow of Reality: Spiritual Longing in C.S. Lewis*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999.

Carruthers, Jo, and Andrew Tate. *Spiritual Identities: Literature and the Post-secular Imagination*. Oxford; New York: Peter Lang, 2010.

Chase, Carole F. *Madeleine L'Engle, Suncatcher: Spiritual Vision of a Storyteller*. San Diego, CA: LuraMedia, 1995.

Crosby, Janice C. *Cauldron of Changes: Feminist Spirituality in Fantastic Fiction*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2000.

Drewermann, Eugen. *Discovering the Royal Child Within: A Spiritual Psychology of "The Little Prince."* New York: Crossroad, 1993.

———. *L'Essentiel est invisible: une lecture psychanalytique du "Petit Prince."* Paris: les Editions du Cerf, 1992.

Dube, Christopher. *Leaping Without Words: Cultivating and Exploring the Sacred through Writing and Reading*. Surrey, B.C.: Urban Mystic Books, 2007.

Fiddes, Paul S. *The Novel, Spirituality and Modern Culture*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000.

Freitas, Donna, and Jason E King. *Killing the Imposter God: Philip Pullman's Spiritual Imagination in His Dark Materials*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007.

Garbowski, Christopher. *Recovery and Transcendence for the Contemporary Mythmaker: The Spiritual Dimension in the Works of J.R.R. Tolkien*. Zurich: Walking Tree Publishers, 2004.

Green, Joey. *The Zen of Oz: Ten Spiritual Lessons from over the Rainbow*. Los Angeles, Calif.; [New York]: Renaissance Books ; Distributed by St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Groover, Kristina K. *Things of the Spirit: Women Writers Constructing Spirituality*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004.

Jobling, J'annine. *Fantastic Spiritualities: Monsters, Heroes and the Contemporary Religious Imagination*. London; New York: T & T Clark, 2010.

Kern, Edmund M. *The Wisdom of Harry Potter: What Our Favorite Hero Teaches Us About Moral Choices*. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2003.

Kerry, Paul E, and Sandra Miesel. *Light Beyond All Shadow: Religious Experience in Tolkien's Work*. Madison [N.J.]; Lanham, Md.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press ; Rowman & Littlefield, 2011.

Lawler, James M. *The God Tube: Uncovering the Hidden Spiritual Message in Pop Culture*. Chicago: Open Court, 2010.

Manson, Cynthia. *The Fairy-tale Literature of Charles Dickens, Christina Rossetti, and George MacDonald: Antidotes to the Victorian Spiritual Crisis*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008.

McAvan, Emily. *The Postmodern Sacred: Popular Culture Spirituality in the Science Fiction, Fantasy and Urban Fantasy Genres*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2012.

McClay, Adam. "Mark Twain's Hidden Religion: Evidence and Effects of the Latent Spirituality in Mark Twain's Works," 2003.

McDonald, Beth E. *The Vampire as Numinous Experience: Spiritual Journeys with the Undead in British and American Literature*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., Publishers, 2004.

Neary, John. *Shadows and Illuminations: Literature as Spiritual Journey*. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2011.

Porter, J. S. *Spirit Book Word: An Inquiry into Literature & Spirituality*. Ottawa, Ont.: Novalis, 2001.

*Roaring Lions and Freezing Ice Queens: Spirituality in C.S. Lewis' The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*. Wellington [N.Z.]: St Andrew's Trust for the Study of Religion & Society, 2006.

Robson, Geoff. "Killing God? Secular and Spiritual Elements in Some Recent Literature for Children." *British Journal of Religious Education* 35, no. 1 (January 2013): 87–97.

Saunders, Ben. *Do the Gods Wear Capes?: Spirituality, Fantasy, and Superheroes*. London; New York: Continuum, 2011.

Schwartz, Alvin. *A Gathering of Selves: The Spiritual Journey of the Legendary Writer of Superman and Batman*. Rochester, Vt.: Destiny Books, 2007.

Smith, Mark Eddy. *Aslan's Call: Finding Our Way to Narnia*. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2005.

———. *Tolkien's Ordinary Virtues: Exploring the Spiritual Themes of The Lord of the Rings*. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2002.

Stewart, Jesse. *Secrets of the Yellow Brick Road: a Map for the Modern Spiritual Journey Based on the Wizard of Oz*. Hygiene, CO: SunShine Press Publications, 1997.

Trousdale, Ann M. "Intersections of Spirituality, Religion and Gender in Children's Literature." *International Journal of Children's Spirituality* 10, no. 1 (2005): 61–79.

Veith, Gene Edward. *The Soul of Prince Caspian: Exploring Spiritual Truth in the Land of Narnia*. Colorado Springs, CO: David C. Cook, 2008.

Webb, Kenneth Earl. "Quest for an American Spirituality an Analysis of the Sacred Thematic Content in the American Science Fiction Novel, 1980-1989," 1992.

### *Ethics*

Bell, Shawn. "Robo-Ethics." *Alternatives Journal* 33, no. 2/3 (July 2007): 6–6.

Gelhaus, Petra. "Robot Decisions: On the Importance of Virtuous Judgment in Clinical Decision Making." *Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice* 17, no. 5 (October 2011): 883–887.

Hirose, Shigeo. "A Code of Conduct for Robots Coexisting with Human Beings." *Robotics & Autonomous Systems* 18, no. 1/2 (July 1996): 101.

Jenks, Darrell Allan. "Ethics in Science Fiction: Butler, Wells, and Stapledon." Ph.D., Salve Regina University, 2000.

Miller, J. Joseph. "The Greatest Good for Humanity: Isaac Asimov's Future History and Utilitarian Calculation Problems." *Science Fiction Studies* 31, no. 2 (July 2004): 189–206.

Merrill, Lee. “Writing and the Values of the Young.” *College English* 38, no. 5 (January 1, 1977): 487–488.

### *Philosophy*

Auxier, Randall E, and Seng. *The Wizard of Oz and Philosophy: Wicked Wisdom of the West*. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court, 2008.

Baggett, David, and Shawn Klein. *Harry Potter and Philosophy: If Aristotle Ran Hogwarts*. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court, 2004.

Dark, David. *Everyday Apocalypse: The Sacred Revealed in Radiohead, the Simpsons, and Other Pop Culture Icons*. Brazos Press, 2002.

Decker, Kevin S. *Who Is Who? The Philosophy of Doctor Who*. I B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2013.

Harman, Graham. *Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy*. Winchester, UK; Washington: Zero Books, 2012.

Morris, Thomas V, and Matt Morris. *Superheroes and Philosophy: Truth, Justice, and the Socratic Way*. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court, 2005.

Rowlands, Mark. *The Philosopher at the End of the Universe: Philosophy Explained through Science Fiction Films*. New York: T. Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2004.

Sanders, Steven. *The Philosophy of Science Fiction Film*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2008.

### *Environmentalism*

Baratta, Chris. *Environmentalism in the Realm of Science Fiction and Fantasy Literature*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2012.

Bigger, Stephen, and Jean Webb. “Developing Environmental Agency and Engagement through Young People’s Fiction.” *Environmental Education Research* 16, no. 3/4 (June 2010): 401–414.

Bouson, J. Brooks. “‘We’re Using Up the Earth. It’s Almost Gone’: A Return to the Post-Apocalyptic Future in Margaret Atwood’s The Year of the Flood.” *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 46, no. 1 (03/01/2011 2011): 9–26.

Canavan, Gerry. “Hope, But Not for Us: Ecological Science Fiction and the End of the World in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood.” *LIT: Literature Interpretation Theory* 23, no. 2 (April 2012): 138–159.

Crichton, Michael. “Environmentalism as Religion Run Amok.” *USA Today Magazine* 132, no. 2706 (2004).

Haslam, Gerald. “Who Speaks for the Earth?” *The English Journal* 62, no. 1 (January 1, 1973): 42–48.

Meyer, Uwe. "Selling an 'ecological religion'. Strategies of Persuasion in Ernest Callenbach's *Ecotopia*" in: M. Lotz, M. van der Minde, D. Weidmann (Hrsg.): *Von Platon bis zur Global Governance. Entwürfe für menschliches Zusammenleben*. Marburg 2010, pp. 253–280.

Siewers, Alfred K. “Stories of the Land: Nature and Religion in Early British and Irish Literary Landscapes.” Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001.

Yanarella, Ernest J. *The Cross, the Plow and the Skyline: Contemporary Science Fiction and the Ecological Imagination*. Parkland, Fla.: Brown Walker Press, 2001.

### *Capitalism*

Fitting, Peter. “The Modern Anglo-American SF Novel: Utopian Longing and Capitalist Cooptation (Le Roman Anglo-américain: Désir Utopique et Récupération Idéologique Dans La SF Moderne).” *Science Fiction Studies* 6, no. 1 (March 1, 1979): 59–76.

### *Communism*

Bould, Mark, and China Miéville. *Red Planets: Marxism and Science Fiction*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2009.

### *Metaphysical, esoteric, occult, Neoplatonic, etc.*

Culianu, Ioan P. *The Tree of Gnosis: Gnostic Mythology from Early Christianity to Modern Nihilism*. [San Francisco]: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992.

Davis, Erik, and Susan Willmarth. *Nomad Codes: Adventures in Modern Esoterica*. Portland, OR: Yeti/Verse Chorus Press, 2010.

Hadley, Gary. “Occultism in Children’s Literature.” 1973.

Kripal, Jeffrey J. *Authors of the Impossible: The Paranormal and the Sacred*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2010.

———. *Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

———. *Mutants and Mystics: Science Fiction, Superhero Comics, and the Paranormal*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.

Kripal, Jeffrey J, and Glenn W Shuck. “On the Edge of the Future: Esalen and the Evolution of American Culture.” Indiana University Press, 2005.

McCloud, Sean. *Making the American Religious Fringe: Exotics, Subversives, and Journalists, 1955-1993*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

Nelson, Victoria. *The Secret Life of Puppets*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Owen, Alex. *The Place of Enchantment: British Occultism and the Culture of the Modern*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Penzoldt, Peter. *The Supernatural in Fiction.* New York: Humanities Press, 1965.

Partridge, Christopher. *The Re-Enchantment of the West, Vol 2: Alternative Spiritualities, Sacralization, Popular Culture and Occulture*. London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2006.

———. *The Re-Enchantment of the West: Volume 1 Alternative Spiritualities, Sacralization, Popular Culture and Occulture*. 1 edition. London ; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2005.

Shippey, Tom. “New Learning and New Ignorance: Magia, Goeteia, and the Inklings” (2007).

Smith, Elton Edward, and Robert Haas. *The Haunted Mind: The Supernatural in Victorian Literature*. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 1999.

Wilson, Eric. *Secret Cinema: Gnostic Vision in Film*. New York: Continuum, 2006.

***Neopaganism***

Chase, Christopher. “‘Be Pagan Once Again’: Folk Music, Heritage, and Socio-sacred Networks in Contemporary American Paganism.” *Pomegranate* 8, no. 2 (November 2006): 146–160. doi:10.1558/pome.8.2.146.

Luhrmann, T. M. *Persuasions of the Witch’s Craft: Ritual Magic in Contemporary England*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Partridge, Christopher. *The Re-Enchantment of the West, Vol 2: Alternative Spiritualities, Sacralization, Popular Culture and Occulture*. London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2006.

———. *The Re-Enchantment of the West: Volume 1 Alternative Spiritualities, Sacralization, Popular Culture and Occulture*. 1 edition. London ; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2005.

Schlobin, Roger C. “Pagan Survival: Why the Shaman in Modern Fantasy?” *Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies (HJEAS)* 1, no. 1 (January 1, 1995): 5–12.

### *NRMs*

Christensen, Allan Conrad. *Edward Bulwer-Lytton: The Fiction of New Regions*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1976.

McCloud, Sean. *Making the American Religious Fringe: Exotics, Subversives, and Journalists, 1955-1993*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

Neal, Lynn S. “‘They’re Freaks!’: The Cult Stereotype in Fictional Television Shows, 1958–2008.” *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 14, no. 3 (February 1, 2011): 81–107.

Sutcliffe, Steven, and Ingvild Sælid Gilhus. New Age Spirituality: Rethinking Religion, 2013.

### *Asian*

Iwamura, Jane Naomi. *Virtual Orientalism: Asian Religions and American Popular Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

### *Buddhism*

Loy, David, and Linda Goodhew. *The Dharma of Dragons and Daemons: Buddhist Themes in Modern Fantasy*. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004.

### *Taoism*

Hoff, Benjamin. *The Tao of Pooh*. New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1983.

———. *The Te of Piglet*. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Dutton, 1992.

### *Judaism*

Gershom, Yonassan. *Jewish Themes in Star Trek: Where No Rabbi Has Gone Before!* [Raleigh, N.C.?]: Lulu Press, 2009.

Kaplan, Arie. *From Krakow to Krypton: Jews and Comic Books*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2008.

Omer-Sherman, Ranen. “Jewish/Queer: Thresholds of Vulnerable Identities in Tony Kushner’s Angels in America.” *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies* 25, no. 4 (Summer 2007): 78–98.

Piercy, Marge, and National Foundation for Jewish Culture (U.S.). *On Jewish Sci-fi ...* New York: National Foundation for Jewish Culture, 2000.

Stover, Mark. *A Kinder, Gentler Teaching of Contempt?: Jews and Judaism in Contemporary Protestant Evangelical Children's Fiction*. Omaha,NE: Rabbi Myer and Dorothy Kripke Center for the Study of Religion and Society, Creighton University, 2005.

Troen, Saul Bernard. "Science Fiction and Reemergence of Jewish Mythology in a Contemporary Literary Genre," 1995.

Weinstein, Simcha. *Up, up, and Oy Vey!: How Jewish History, Culture, and Values Shaped the Comic Book Superhero*. Fort Lee, NJ: Barricade Books, 2012.

### *Native, Indigenous*

Carsten, Cynthia. "Writing the Cross Culture: Native Fiction on the White Man's Religion (review)." *Wicazo Sa Review* 22, no. 1 (2007): 125–127.

### *Christianity*

Allan, John Robertson. *The Gospel According to Science Fiction*. London: Falcon, 1975.

Arthur, Sarah. *Walking with Frodo: A Devotional Journey through The Lord of the Rings*. Carol Stream, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2003.

Arthur, Sarah, and J. R. R Tolkien. *Walking with Bilbo a Devotional Adventure through the Hobbit*. Carol Stream: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2005.

Bertonneau, Thomas, and Kim Paffenroth. *The Truth Is Out There: Christian Faith and the Classics of TV Science Fiction*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos, 2006.

Birzer, Bradley J. *J.R.R. Tolkien's Sanctifying Myth: Understanding Middle-Earth*. [Wilmington, Del.]: ISI Books, 2002.

Bowen, John P. *The Spirituality of Narnia: The Deeper Magic of C.S. Lewis*. Vancouver: Regent College Pub., 2007.

Bowen, Sarah. *A Light from the Shadows: The Glory of God in the Lord of Rings*. [Longwood, Fla]: Xulon Press, 2005.

Breen, Tom. *The Messiah Formerly Known as Jesus: Dispatches from the Intersection of Christianity and Pop Culture*. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2008.

Bridger, Francis. *A Charmed Life: The Spirituality of Potterworld*. New York: Image Books, 2002.

Brogan, Patricia Louise McLain. “Becoming Fantasy: Christianity in British Fantasy Fiction, 1863-2008.” Ph.D., The University of Iowa, 2009.

Bruner, Kurt D, and Jim Ware. *Finding God in the Land of Narnia*. Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers, 2004.

Bryant, Timothy Joseph. “Ordinary Transcendence: Christianity, Authority, and Crisis in American Literature and Culture, 1865--1990.” Ph.D., State University of New York at Buffalo, 2011.

Brown, Devin. *The Christian World of The Hobbit*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2012.

———. “The Screwtape Letters: Telling the Truth Upside Down” (2007).

Burkart, Gina. *Finding Purpose in Narnia: a Journey with Prince Caspian*. Mahwah, N.J.: HiddenSpring, 2008.

Craig, Susan. “Skin and Redemption: Theology in Silent Films, 1902 to 1927.” Ph.D., City University of New York, 2010.

Christianson, Eric S, Peter Francis, and William Telford. *Cinéma Divinité: Religion, Theology and the Bible in Film*. London: SCM, 2005.

Countryman, Louis William. *The Poetic Imagination: An Anglican Tradition*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1999.

Cusveller, B. S, Maarten Johannes Verkerk, and Marc. J De Vries. *The Matrix Reformed: Science Fiction, Technology, and Christian Philosophy*. Sioux Center, Iowa: Dordt College Press, 2011.

Dalton, Russell W. *Faith Journey through Fantasy Lands: a Christian Dialogue with Harry Potter, Star Wars, and The Lord of the Rings*. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2003.

———. *Marvelous Myths: Marvel Superheroes and Everyday Faith*. Saint Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2011.

Detweiler, Robert. “Theological Trends of Postmodern Fiction.” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 44, no. 2 (June 1, 1976): 225–237.

Fox, Richard Wightman. *Jesus in America: Personal Savior, Cultural Hero, National Obsession*. [San Francisco]: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005.

Fraser, Peter. *Images of the Passion: The Sacramental Mode in Film*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998.

Geraci, Robert M. "Robots and the Sacred in Science and Science Fiction: Theological Implications of Artificial Intelligence." *Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science* 42, no. 4 (December 2007): 961–980.

Gerke, Je*ff. The Art & Craft of Writing Christian Fiction: The Complete Guide to Finding Your Story, Honing Your Skills, & Glorifying God in Your Novel*. Colorado Springs, CO: Marcher Lord Press, 2009.

Gillespie, Natalie Nichols. *Believing in Narnia: a Kid's Guide to Unlocking the Secret Symbols of Faith in C.S. Lewis's The Chronicles of Narnia*. Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 2008.

Grace, Pamela. *The Religious Film: Christianity and the Hagiopic*. Chichester, U.K.; Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

Granger, John. *Looking for God in Harry Potter*. [Wheaton, Ill.]: SaltRiver, 2004.

Guite, Malcolm. *Faith, Hope and Poetry: Theology and the Poetic Imagination*. Farnham [etc.]: Ashgate, 2010.

Hallbäck, Geert, and Annika Hvithamar. *Recent Releases: The Bible in Contemporary Cinema*. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2008.

Hart, Trevor, and Ivan Khovacs. *Tree of Tales: Tolkien, Literature, and Theology*. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2007.

Jewett, Robert. *St. Paul at the Movies: The Apostle's Dialog with American Culture*. Westminster: John Knox Press, 1993.

------. *Saint Paul Returns to the Movies: Triumph over Shame*. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998.

Kendrick, Stephen. *Holy Clues: The Gospel According to Sherlock Holmes*. New York: Vintage Books, 2000.

Kerry, Paul E. *The Ring and the Cross: Christianity and the Writings of J.R.R. Tolkien*. Madison [N.J.]; Lanham, Md.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press ; Rowman & Littlefield, 2011.

Kilby, Clyde S. *Images of Salvation in the Fiction of C.S. Lewis*. Wheaton, Ill.: Harold Shaw Publishers, 1978.

Killinger, John. *God, the Devil, and Harry Potter: A Christian Minister's Defense of the Beloved Novels*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002.

Kirking, Donna M, and Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary. “Messianic Themes of the Old Testament Prophets in Science Fiction,” 1987.

Kluck, Ted A. *The Reason For Sports: A Christian Fanifesto*. New Edition edition. Moody Publishers, 2009.

List, Julia. “Call Me a Protestant‘: Liberal Christianity, Individualism, and the Messiah in ’Stranger in a Strange Land,‘ ’Dune,‘ and ’Lord of Light.” *Science Fiction Studies* 36, no. 1 (March 2009): 21–47.

Lynch, Gordon. *Understanding Theology and Popular Culture*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005.

May, Stephen. *Stardust and Ashes: Science Fiction in Christian Perspective*. London: SPCK, 1998.

McDonnell, Thomas J. *Listening to the Lord in Literature*. Canfield, Ohio: Alba Books, 1977.

Morrow, Jeffrey L. “J.R.R. Tolkien as a Christian for Our Times.” *Evangelical Review of Theology* 29, no. 2 (April 2005): 164–177.

O’Brien, Michael D. *A Landscape with Dragons: Christian and Pagan Imagination in Children’s Literature*. Quyon, Quebec: Northern River Press, 1994.

Paffenroth, Kim, and John W Morehead. *The Undead and Theology*. Eugene, Or.: Pickwick Publications, 2012.

Paietta, Ann Catherine. *Saints, Clergy, and Other Religious Figures on Film and Television, 1895-2003*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2005.

Park, Jerry Z., and Joseph Baker. “What Would Jesus Buy: American Consumption of Religious and Spiritual Material Goods.” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 46, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 501–517.

Redondo, Juan Carlos Toledao. “The Many Names of God: Christianity in Hispanic Caribbean Science Fiction.” *Chasqui* 36, no. 1 (May 1, 2007): 33–47.

Reinhardt, Kurt F. *The Theological Novel of Modern Europe: An Analysis of Masterpieces by Eight Authors*. New York: F. Ungar Pub. Co., 1969.

Roper, Denise. *The Lord of the Hallows: Christian Symbolism and Themes in J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter*. Denver, Colo.: Outskirts Press, Inc., 2009.

Rutledge, Fleming. *The Battle for Middle-Earth: Tolkien’s Divine Design in Lord of the Rings*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2003.

Short, Robert L. *Something to Believe in Is Kurt Vonnegut the Exorcist of Jesus Christ Superstar?* San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978.

———. *The Gospel from Outer Space*. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983.

Smith, Jeffery A. "Hollywood Theology: The Commodification of Religion in Twentieth-Century Films." *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 11, no. 2 (July 1, 2001): 191–231.

Smith, Rob. *Hogwarts, Narnia, and Middle Earth: Places Upon a Time*. Huron, Ohio: Drinian Press, 2007.

Smith, Warren Sylvester. *The Religion of Bernard Shaw: At Least Part of Shaw's Effectiveness Derived from His Ability to Sound Disarmingly Orthodox and Shockingly Radical at the Same Time*. Chicago, Ill.: Christian Century Co., 1963.

Spencer, Jamie. *Fictional Religion: Keeping the New Testament New*. Salem, OR: Polebridge Press, 2011.

Strauss, Ed. *A Hobbit Devotional [Bilbo Baggins and the Bible]*. Uhrichsville, Ohio: Barbour Publishing, Inc., 2012.

Sturch, Richard. *Four Christian Fantasists: a Study of the Fantastic Writings of George MacDonald, Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis, and J.R.R. Tolkien*. Zurich: Walking Tree Publishers, 2001.

Toledano Redondo, Juan Carlos. "The Many Names of God: Christianity in Hispanic Caribbean Science Fiction." *Chasqui* 36, no. 1 (2007): 33–47.

Torres, Michael A. "Communicating the Wholly Other in Christian Popular Fiction: Rhetorical Effects of post-Enlightenment Concepts of God." Ph.D., Regent University, 2005.

Wetmore, Kevin J. *The Theology of Battlestar Galactica: American Christianity in the 2004-2009 Television Series*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2012.

Williams, T. M. *Following Prince Caspian: Further Encounters with the Lion of Narnia*. Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 2008.

———. *The Heart of The Chronicles of Narnia: Knowing God Here by Finding Him There*. Nashville, Tenn.: W Pub. Group, 2005.

Wolff, Richard. *The Church on TV: Portrayals of Priests, Pastors and Nuns on American Television Series*. New York: Continuum, 2010.

Wright, Terry R. *The Genesis of Fiction: Modern Novelists as Biblical Interpreters*. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.

### *Evangelical*

Brown, Candy Gunther. "Salt to the World: A Cultural History of Evangelical Reading, Writing, and Publishing Practices in Mid-nineteenth-century America." Ph.D., Harvard University, 2000.

Donaldson, Amy M. *We Want to Believe: Faith and Gospel in the X-Files*. Eugene, Or.: Cascade Books, 2011.

Foulkes, Simon, and Gary Jenkins. *Laughing at Unbelief: Is There a Place for Satire in Evangelism?* Cambridge: Grove Books, 2004.

Gerke, Je*ff. The Art & Craft of Writing Christian Fiction: The Complete Guide to Finding Your Story, Honing Your Skills, & Glorifying God in Your Novel*. Colorado Springs, CO: Marcher Lord Press, 2009.

Jones, Marnie. "'Spiritual Warfare' and Intolerance in Popular Culture: The 'Left Behind' Franchise, the Commodification of Belief, and the Consequences for Imagination." *Studies in Popular Culture* 32, no. 1 (October 1, 2009): 1–19.

Marsden, George M. *Fundamentalism and American Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Mckee, Gabriel. *The Gospel According to Science Fiction: From The Twilight Zone to the Final Frontier*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007.

Neal, C. W. *The Gospel According to Harry Potter: Spirituality in the Stories of the World's Most Famous Seeker*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002.

Neal, C. W, and Samuel F Parvin. *The Gospel According to Harry Potter: Leader's Guide for Group Study*. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004.

Nibley, Hugh. *Science Fiction and the Gospel*. Provo, Utah: Foundation for Ancient Research and Mormon Studies, 1981.

Oropeza, B. J. *The Gospel According to Superheroes: Religion and Pop Culture*. New York: Peter Lang, 2005.

Wood, Ralph C. *The Gospel According to Tolkien: Visions of the Kingdom in Middle-Earth*. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003.

Weaver, John. "'Jesus Freaks, Freakin' Jesus': Evangelicalism and American Literature." Ph.D., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2010.

*Examples*

Angler, Evan. *Sneak*. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2012.

Berghuis, Donald W. *All Alone*. Baltimore, Md.: PublishAmerica LLLP, 2010.

Gregory, David. *The Last Christian: A Novel*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2010.

***Reformed***

Imbert, Yannick F. "'Who Invented the Stories Anyway?': A Reformed Perspective on Tolkien's Theory of Fantasy," 2010.

***Catholicism***

Gilmour, Peter. "To Boldly Go Where No Jesuit Has Gone Before." *U.S. Catholic* 62, no. 7 (July 1997): 6.

Hansen, Regina. *Roman Catholicism in Fantastic Film: Essays on Belief, Spectacle, Ritual and Imagery*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2011.

Oliverio, Lisa. "'Lines of Spiritual Motion': The Realization of American Catholic Fiction, 1845--1965." Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011.

Smith, Thomas W. "Tolkien's Catholic Imagination: Mediation and Tradition." *Religion & Literature* 38, no. 2 (July 1, 2006): 73–100.

Weinandy, Thomas G. (Thomas Gerard). "Huckleberry Finn and the Adventures of God." *Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture* 6, no. 1 (2003): 41–62.

***Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints***

Roberts, Dave. *The Twilight Gospel: The Spiritual Roots of Stephenie Meyer's Vampire Saga*. Oxford, [UK]: Monarch Books, 2009.

***Islam***

Ahmad, Muhammad A. *Islam and Science Fiction*, 2005.

Ahmad, Muhammad Aurangzeb, and Ahmed A. Khan. *A Mosque Among the Stars*. ZC Books, 2008.

Hankins, Rebecca. *Countering the Master Narrative: Islamic Science Fiction & Fantasy*, 2010.

Hankins, Rebecca. *Fictional Islam: a Literary Review and Comparative Essay on Islam in Science Fiction and Fantasy*. Essex, England : North East London Polytechnic, 2010.

Hankins, Rebecca and Joyce Thornton. “Fantasy, comics, and digital culture. The influence of Muslims and Islam in science fiction, fantasy, and comics” in Iraj Omidvar and Anne R. Richards, *Muslims and American Popular Culture*, 2014

Neely, Sharlotte. "The Anthropology of Dune." (2007).

Olsson, S. "The Islamic Framing in Donald Moffitt's Science Fiction Series the Mechanical Sky." *Journal of Religion and Popular Culture*. 26.1 (2014): 71-92.

Snir, R. "The Emergence of Science Fiction in Arabic Literature." *Islam Berlin*. 77 (2000): 263-285.

### ***Sufism***

Saunders, Julia Elaine. “The Metafictional Alchemy of Doris Lessing: The Fusion of the Rational and the Transcendental in Her Speculative Works in the Light of Reader-response Theory.” M.A., Carleton University (Canada), 2000.

# Appendix 3: An Excursus on the Problems

Religious studies faces a variety of challenges in studying "religion" in a globalizing, multicultural world overflowing with religion-like phenomena propagated by mass communication media abundant in different narrative types and genres. Some of these religion-like phenomena are called "religions" by their in-group adherents, but others reject the "religion" label and even define themselves against it. Religious studies scholars have attempted etic investigation of such things as spiritualities, esoteric systems, philosophies, humanisms, political and economic ideologies, secular formations, therapies and healing arts, fandoms, and so on, while attempting to be faithful to their emic categories. But a major goal, often deferred, has been to develop a platform for comparison among them.

Literature has been an influential locus of religion-like expressions and activity. For example, fictional literature is a locus of both established and novel worldviews, and a small subset of these novel worldviews have even generated a class of New Religious Movements (NRMs) variously identified as "fiction-based" (Davidsen, 2014), "invented" (Cusack, 2010), or "hyperreal" religions (Possamai, 2012), terms pointing to their made and mediated character.

There are two major problems with the present research approaches, which I use methods from content and intertextual analysis to demonstrate and analyze in my dissertation's first chapter. First, due to a literary bias against "escapist" genres (and bias against so-called cults), much of the "religion and literature" scholarship is focused on detecting elements and representations of "real" (*i.e.*, established) religions in realist literature. This means that this literature excludes some of the most robust examples of secondary (or "fictional") creation of religion-like phenomena, which happen to be the primary source of fiction-based NRMs. Second, those who have investigated things like "religion" in more estranged genres, such as science fiction and fantasy, place similar restrictions on their phenomena of interest at the outset of their research. They find and discuss "religion" in "science fiction," for example, or "magic" in "fantasy" based on their etic definitions. They do not attempt to think at a level of generality that might allow them to compare different types of religion-like phenomena across different genres without intervening in on-the-ground, insider debates. Again, this is often because the interests of scholars are generally more specific—the values and concerns of scholars shape their scholarship, largely along the lines of "high" literature as opposed to genre fiction, historical or "world" religions (especially forms of Christianity) as opposed to minority or novel worldviews, and (for scholars of literature) secular as opposed to religious perspectives.

This second problem contains a second aspect, perhaps one robust enough to constitute a third problem in its own right. Religion, like art, has sometimes tried to shield itself from naturalistic analysis by invoking a special, privileged type of "experience." That is, a certain class of stipulated definitions of "religion" constitute it in first-person, experiential terms in order to shield it from third-person, "scientific" analysis. In art, truly *aesthetic* experience, like Otto's "numinous," is sometimes taken to refer to a distinctive, *sui generis* state that cannot be reduced to or correlated with ordinary experiences. Alternatively expressed, religion as a sort of language game – a self-referential world unto itself – has been cast in fideistic terms that make "religion" to some degree, borrowing the language of Wittgenstein, untranslatable to those outside its way or form of life. But rather than cutting

religion and art off from more ordinary human phenomena and cutting religious studies and aesthetics off as incommunicable with and to other fields and levels of analysis, what if one seeks to bring these things into conversation with naturalistic domains and methods of inquiry? Indeed, free indirect discourse in literature is precisely a third-person representation that gives access to first-person experience, as has been noted in recent cognitive science-informed literary scholarship. It is a practical means for making possible, hypothetical, imagined worldviews and ways of life into felt, palpable actualities in the experiential horizon of its percipients.

The quest for consilience, in which this project participates, expresses confidence in the possibility of (admittedly always imperfect) translation. Any conversation between the humanistic and scientific domains necessitates generalization and conceptual deconstruction and reconstruction. Rather than treating religion-like phenomena as irreducible totalities, some of their particularities must be abstracted and analyzed into constituent parts, as in Taves's Building Block Approach (BBA). To confront the difficulties unique to fictional worldviews and ways of life (WWL), we need to develop an approach, an application and extension of the BBA, that supports research on fictional religion-like phenomena across the family of genres that produce the majority of novel religion-like phenomena. In this dissertation, I draw on the BBA to argue that if we construct our categories at a higher level of generality, specifically in terms of "worldviews" and "ways of life" and the distinction between the "ordinary" and "non-ordinary," we can use a broad range of fictional literature to better understand world-making processes, both synchronically and diachronically.

How specifically does this more general approach improve understanding of worldmaking processes? First, it is more likely to detect what sorts of WWLs may be emerging below the level of existing NRMs and established, historical religions. While many religious historians, notably those interested in American religious history, have attempted to give plurality and even innovation its due and have even considered fictional religions, no one has attempted to explore the dynamic of both (1) the social and cognitive capacities that *enable* this innovation and (2) the social and cognitive *constraints* on innovation when given a relatively free rein, and thus the possible limits of the religion-creating imagination even in a relatively unconstrained space such as speculative fiction in the context of the pluralistic, disestablished United States and the globalized network of consumers of English-language fiction. Speculative or fantastical (*sensu* Kelleghan 2002) fiction supplies an especially robust instance of a free space in which creativity is relatively unconstrained, though all fiction, all pretense supplies a free or safe space for exploration and experimentation (see Norman and Goldstein, 2022). As a genre characterized by "estrangement" (Suvin 2000; 1978), by making a break with or a "breakthrough" (Clute & Nicholls) from the "real" world, it may be identified by a variety of facets (*e.g.*, the "beauties" of Csicsery-Ronay (2008)), foremost among which is its embrace of novelty and innovation and its delight in touristic or game-like exposure to and attempt to make sense of the unusual.

Second, although secondary or fictional WWLs may never become either new "religions" or even "movements," they may play a role in the complex, eclectic formation of individual selves and lifeworlds. Due to mass media, the impact of such secondary WWLs may be substantial and even global without ever coalescing into organized groups.

## Appendix 4: Bibliography of Major Influences in Fictional Religion and Religion in Fiction


Abanes, Richard. *Harry Potter, Narnia, and The Lord of the Rings*. Eugene, Or.: Harvest House Publishers, 2005.

Baehr, Theodore, and Thomas Lee Snyder. *Frodo & Harry: Understanding Visual Media and Its Impact on Our Lives*. Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Books, 2003.

Campbell, Richard Brett. "Assisting the Effoliation of Creation: J. R. R. Tolkien's Sub-Creation Theory and C. S. Lewis's Imagination." Ph.D., Union Institute and University, 2010.

Dowie, William John. "Religious Fiction in a Profane Time: Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis, and J.R.R. Tolkien." Ph.D., Brandeis University, 1970.

Facultés catholiques de Lille. *J.R.R. Tolkien et C.S. Lewis: questions d'identité religieuses et littéraires.* Lille: Université Catholique, 2013.

Fuller, Edmund. *Myth, Allegory, and Gospel: An Interpretation of J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, G.K. Chesterton [and] Charles Williams*. Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship, 1974.

Gray, William. *Death and Fantasy: Essays on Philip Pullman, C. S. Lewis, George MacDonald and R. L. Stevenson*. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2008.

———. *Fantasy, Art and Life: Essays on George MacDonald, Robert Louis Stevenson, and Other Fantasy Writers*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2011.

———. *Fantasy, Myth and the Measure of Truth: Tales of Pullman, Lewis, Tolkien, MacDonald and Hoffmann*. Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Kavetsky, Jennifer. "Religion and SF." *Science Fiction Studies* 38, no. 2 (July 1, 2011): 347–348.

Shippey, Tom. "New Learning and New Ignorance: Magia, Goeteia, and the Inklings" (2007).

Alexander

Oziewicz, Marek. *One Earth, One People: The Mythopoeic Fantasy Series of Ursula K. Le Guin, Lloyd Alexander, Madeleine L'Engle and Orson Scott Card*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co, 2008.

*Angels in America*

Lioi, Anthony. "The Great Work Begins: Theater as Theurgy in 'Angels in America.'" *Cross Currents* 54, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 96–117.

Nutu, Ela. "Angels in America and Semiotic Cocktails of Sex, Bible and Politics." *Biblical Interpretation* 14, no. 1/2 (February 2006): 175–186.

Omer-Sherman, Ranen. "Jewish/Queer: Thresholds of Vulnerable Identities in Tony Kushner's Angels in America." *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies* 25, no. 4 (Summer 2007): 78–98.

Asimov

D. M. H. "Skepticism, Belief, and Asimov." *Extrapolation (Kent State University Press)* 40, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 3–4.

Michael Moran. "Three Laws of Robotics and Surgery." *Journal of Endourology* 22, no. 8 (August 2008): 1557–1560.

Miller, J. Joseph. "The Greatest Good for Humanity: Isaac Asimov's Future History and Utilitarian Calculation Problems." *Science Fiction Studies* 31, no. 2 (July 2004): 189–206.

Atwood

Hines, Molly Elaine. "Margaret Atwood's 'The Handmaid's Tale': Fundamentalist Religiosity and the Oppression of Women." M.A., Angelo State University, 2006.

Mercer, Naomi R. "Subversive Feminist Thrusts': Feminist Dystopian Writing and Religious Fundamentalism in Margaret Atwood's 'The Handmaid's Tale', Louise Marley's 'The Terrorists of Irustan', Marge Piercy's 'He, She and It', and Sheri S. Tepper's 'Raising the Stones." Ph.D., The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2013.

Noogheem, Andrew. "Secular Apocalypses: Darwinian Criticism and Atwoodian Floods." *Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature* 45, no. 2 (June 2012): 55–71.

*Battlestar Galactica*

Kaveney, Roz, and Jennifer Stoy. *Battlestar Galactica: Investigating Flesh, Spirit and Steel*. London; New York; New York: I.B. Tauris ; Distributed in the United States and Canada exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Wetmore, Kevin J. *The Theology of Battlestar Galactica: American Christianity in the 2004-2009 Television Series*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2012.

Wolf, Carissa Noel. "Time to Play the Religion Card: Messiah Complexes in Battlestar Galactica," 2010.

Baum

Dighe, Ranjit S. *The Historian's Wizard of Oz: Reading L. Frank Baum's Classic as a Political and Monetary Allegory*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002.

Durand, Kevin K. J, and Mary K Leigh. *The Universe of Oz: Essays on Baum's Series and Its Progeny*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2010.

Earle, Neil. *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz in American Popular Culture: Uneasy in Eden*. Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1993.

Green, Joey. *The Zen of Oz: Ten Spiritual Lessons from over the Rainbow*. Los Angeles, Calif.; [New York]: Renaissance Books ; Distributed by St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Loncraine, Rebecca. *The Real Wizard of Oz: The Life and Times of L. Frank Baum*. New York, N.Y.: Gotham Books, 2009.

Morena, Gita Dorothy. *The Wisdom of Oz: Reflections of a Jungian Sandplay Therapist*. Berkeley, Calif.: Frog : Distributed to the Book trade by Publishers Group West, 2000.

Riley, Michael O'Neal. *Oz and Beyond: The Fantasy World of L. Frank Baum*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997.

Stewart, Jesse. *Secrets of the Yellow Brick Road: a Map for the Modern Spiritual Journey Based on the Wizard of Oz*. Hygiene, CO: SunShine Press Publications, 1997.

Tuerk, Richard Carl. *Oz in Perspective: Magic and Myth in the L. Frank Baum Books*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2007.

Bear

Luckhurst, Roger. "Catastrophism, American Style: The Fiction of Greg Bear." *The Yearbook of English Studies* 37, no. 2 (January 1, 2007): 215–233.

Bradbury

Spencer, S. “The Post-Apocalyptic Library: Oral and Literate Culture in Fahrenheit 451 and A Canticle for Leibowitz.” *Extrapolation (Kent State University Press)* 32, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 331–342.

Touponce, William F. *Lord Dunsany, H.P. Lovecraft, and Ray Bradbury Spectral Journeys*. Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 2013.

———. *Ray Bradbury and the Poetics of Reverie: Fantasy, Science Fiction, and the Reader*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1984.

Brown

Lacy, Norris J. “‘The Da Vinci Code’: Dan Brown and The Grail That Never Was.” *Arthuriana* 14, no. 3 (October 1, 2004): 81–93.

Buffy

Yeffeth, Glenn. *Seven Seasons of Buffy: Science Fiction and Fantasy Authors Discuss Their Favorite Television Show*. Dallas, Tex.; [Chicago]: BenBella Books ; Distributed by Independent Publishers Group, 2003.

Card

Collings, Michael R. *In the Image of God: Theme, Characterization, and Landscape in the Fiction of Orson Scott Card*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Oziewicz, Marek. *One Earth, One People: The Mythopoeic Fantasy Series of Ursula K. Le Guin, Lloyd Alexander, Madeleine L’Engle and Orson Scott Card*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co, 2008.

Chesterton

Milbank, Alison. *Chesterton and Tolkien as Theologians: The Fantasy of the Real*. London; New York: T & T Clark, 2007.

Sundell, Carl. *Shaw Versus Chesterton: Their Last Public Debate*. Worcester, Mass: Sund Pub., 1994.

Clarke, Arthur C.

Rothstein, Edward. “For Clarke, Issues of Faith, But Tackled Scientifically.” *New York Times* (March 20, 2008): 1.

Zebrowksi, George. “The Ideas of Arthur C. Clarke.” *Free Inquiry* 28, no. 4 (July 6, 2008): 29–31.

Clarke, Susanna

Byrne, Deirdre. “The Book and the Spell in Susanna Clarke’s Jonathan Strange & Mr Norrell.” *English Academy Review* 26, no. 2 (2009): 4–15.

Cooper

Lukianowicz, Anna. *Dreams, Duality and Narrative Codes in Susan Cooper’s Fantasy: The Dark Is Rising, Sequence*. La Spezia: Agorà, 2002.

Dick

Best, Steven, and Douglas Kellner. “The Apocalyptic Vision of Philip K. Dick.” *Cultural Studies/Critical Methodologies* 3, no. 2 (May 2003): 186.

Burton J. “Machines Making Gods: Philip K. Dick, Henri Bergson and Saint Paul.” *Theory Cult. Soc. Theory, Culture and Society* 25, no. 7–8 (2008): 262–284.

Lejla, Kucukalic. “Philip K. Dick: Canonical Writer of the Digital Age.” Ph.D., University of Delaware, 2006.

Stevens, Amanda B. “New Gnostic Gospels.” M.A., East Carolina University, 2013.

Vest, Jason Paul. “Interrogating Reality: Philip K. Dick, Science Fiction, and (post)modernism.” Ph.D., Washington University, 2004.

Dick, Philip K, and Lawrence Sutin. *The Shifting Realities of Philip K. Dick: Selected Literary and Philosophical Writings*. New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

DiTommaso, Lorenzo. “Redemption in Philip K. Dick’s *The Man in the High Castle*.” *Science Fiction Studies* 26, no. 1 (March 1999): 91–119.

Hamner, E. L. “Pink Beams of Light from the God in the Gutter: The Science-Fictional Religion of Philip K. Dick.” *Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts* 16, no. 3 (2006): 249–252.

“Illuminating Dick.” *Science Fiction Studies* 31, no. 3 (2004): 460–463.

Krabbenhoft, Kenneth. “Use of Madness in Cervantes and Philip K. Dick.” *Science Fiction Studies* 27, no. 2 (July 2000): 216–233.

Maxwell, Anne. “Eugenics and the Classical Ideal of Beauty in Philip K. Dick’s ‘The Golden Man.’” *Science Fiction Studies* 36, no. 1 (March 2009): 87–100.

McCallum, Andrew Angus, and Philip K Dick. “Redemption through Trash: Addiction in the Science Fiction Novels of Philip K. Dick,” 1991.

Mckee, Gabriel. *Pink Beams of Light from the God in the Gutter: The Science-fictional Religion of Philip K. Dick*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004.

McNamara, Kevin R. “Blade Runner’s Post-individual Worldspace.” *Contemporary Literature* 38, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 422.

Rossi, U. “McKee’s The Science-fictional Religion of Philip K. Dick.” *Science-fiction Studies.* 31 (2004): 460–462.

Tamir, Eyal. “Weird Value: The Cult Literature of Philip K. Dick,” 2005.

## Dickens

Stone, Harry. *Dickens and the Invisible World: Fairy Tales, Fantasy, and Novel-making*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.

## Disch

Swirski, Peter, and R. M. P. “Dystopia or Dischtopia? The Science-Fiction Paradigms of Thomas M. Disch (Dystopie Ou Dischtopie? Les Paradigmes de La Science-fiction de Thomas M. Disch).” *Science Fiction Studies* 18, no. 2 (July 1, 1991): 161–179.

## Donaldson

Barkley, Christine. *Stephen R. Donaldson and the Modern Epic Vision: A Critical Study of the “Chronicles of Thomas Covenant” Novels*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2009.

## *Dr. Who*

Lewis, Courtland, and Paula J Smithka. *Doctor Who and Philosophy: Bigger on the Inside*. Chicago: Open Court, 2010.

## *Dungeons & Dragons*

Mazzanoble, Shelly. *Everything I Need to Know I Learned from Dungeons & Dragons: One Woman’s Quest to Turn Self Help into Elf-help*. Renton, WA: D&D, 2011.

Voorhees, Gerald, Josh Call, and Katie Whitlock. *Dungeons, Dragons, and Digital Denizens: The Digital Role-playing Game*. New York: Continuum, 2012.

Gaiman

Brisbin, Ally, and Paul Booth. “The Sand/wo/man: The Unstable Worlds of Gender in Neil Gaiman’s Sandman Series.” *Journal of Popular Culture* 46, no. 1 (February 2013): 20–37.

Brown, Paula. “‘Stardust’ as Allegorical ‘Bildungsroman’: An Apology for Platonic Idealism.” *Extrapolation (University of Texas at Brownsville)* 51, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 216–234.

Camus, Cyril. “The ‘Outsider’: Neil Gaiman and the Old Testament.” *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies* 29, no. 2 (Winter 2011): 77–99.

Carroll, Siobhan. “Imagined Nation: Place and National Identity in Neil Gaiman’s ‘American Gods.’” *Extrapolation (University of Texas at Brownsville)* 53, no. 3 (December 2012): 307–326.

Castaldo, Annalisa. “No More Yielding Than a Dream‘: The Construction of Shakespeare in ’The Sandman.” *College Literature* 31, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 94–110.

Rudd, David. “An Eye for an I: Neil Gaiman’s Coraline and Questions of Identity.” *Children’s Literature in Education* 39, no. 3 (September 2008): 159–168.

Sanders, Joe. “Of Storytellers and Stories in Gaiman and Vess’s ‘A Midsummer Night’s Dream.’” *Extrapolation (University of Texas at Brownsville)* 45, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 237–248.

Gardner

Merrill, Robert. “John Gardner’s Grendel and the Interpretation of Modern Fables.” *American Literature* 56, no. 2 (May 1, 1984): 162–180.

Heinlein

Kraemer, Christine Ho*ff*. “Contemporary Paganism, Utopian Reading Communities, and Sacred Nonmonogamy: The Religious Impact of Heinlein’s and Starhawk’s Fiction.” *Pomegranate* 13, no. 1 (May 2011): 52–76

Patterson, William H, and Thornton. *The Martian Named Smith: Critical Perspectives on Robert A. Heinlein’s Stranger in a Strange Land*. Sacramento, Calif.: Nitrosyncretic Press, 2001.

Slusser, George. “Heinlein’s Fallen Futures.” *Extrapolation (Kent State University Press)* 36, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 96–112.

Williams, Donna Glee. “The Moons of Le Guin and Heinlein.” *Science Fiction Studies* 21, no. 2 (July 1, 1994): 164–172.

Herbert

Devlin, William J. "Prophesies, Experience, and Proof: Philosophy of Religion in Dune." (2011).

Gill, Charles-Étienne. *Les Révélations D'arrakis: Une Étude Sur L'inscription De La Transcendance Dans Dune De Frank Herbert*. , 2006.

Howard, Kenton Taylor. “Religious Violence in Frank Herbert’s Dune Series,” 2012.

Palumbo, Donald. “The Monomyth as Fractal Pattern in Frank Herbert’s DUNE Novels.” *Science Fiction Studies* 25, no. 3 (November 1998): 433–458.

Parkerson, Ronny. “Semantics, General Semantics, and Ecology in Frank Herbert’s Dune.” *ETC: A Review of General Semantics* 67, no. 4 (October 2010): 403–411.

Schwartz, S.L. "A Teaching Review of Dune: Religion Is the Spice of Life." *Implicit Religion*. 17.4 (2014): 533-538.

Singh, Sanjana. *Messiahs and Martyrs: Religion in Selected Novels of Frank Herbert's Dune Chronicles*. , 2012.

Williams, Kevin C. *The Wisdom of the Sand: Philosophy and Frank Herbert's Dune*. New York: Hampton Press, 2013.

Jordan

Attrill, Heather. *A Web of Words: Patterns and Meaning in Robert Jordan’s the Wheel of Time*. Armidale, N.S.W.: Fastnet Books, 2012.

King

Douthat, Ross. “Stephen King’s American Apocalypse.” *First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion & Public Life* no. 170 (February 2007): 14–19.

McAleer, Patrick. *Inside the Dark Tower Series: Art, Evil, and Intertextuality in the Stephen King Novels*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2009.

Vincent, Bev. *The Road to The Dark Tower: Exploring Stephen King’s Magnum Opus*. New York: New American Library, 2004.

L'Engle

Chase, Carole F. *Madeleine L'Engle, Suncatcher: Spiritual Vision of a Storyteller*. San Diego, CA: LuraMedia, 1995.

Oziewicz, Marek. *One Earth, One People: The Mythopoeic Fantasy Series of Ursula K. Le Guin, Lloyd Alexander, Madeleine L'Engle and Orson Scott Card*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co, 2008.

Le Guin

Adams, Frank S. "A Psychological and Theological Analysis of the Earthsea Trilogy: An Ethical Fantasy," 1982.

Adams, Rebecca. "Narrative Voice and Unimaginability of the Utopian 'Feminine' in Le Guin's The Left Hand of Darkness and 'The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas'." *Utopian Studies* 2, no. 1/2 (January 1, 1991): 35–47.

Bernardo, Susan M, and Graham J Murphy. *Ursula K. Le Guin: a Critical Companion*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006.

Bittner, James W. *Approaches to the Fiction of Ursula K. Le Guin*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1984.

Bittner, James W. "Persuading Us to Rejoice and Teaching Us How to Praise: Le Guin's 'Orsinian Tales'." *Science Fiction Studies* 5, no. 3 (November 1, 1978): 215–242.

Bloom, Harold. *Ursula K. Le Guin*. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986.

Borgmeier, Raimund. "'No Religion? Are We Stones, on Anarres?' Religious Elements in Ursula Le Guin's Fantasy Trilogy and Major Science Fiction Novels." *Inklings Inklings: Jahrbuch Für Literatur Und Ästhetik* 22 (2004): 87–100.

Cadden, Michael. *Ursula K. Le Guin Beyond Genre: Fiction for Children and Adults*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Cummins, Elizabeth. *Understanding Ursula K. Le Guin*. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1993.

Erlich, Richard D. "A Longish Note on Ursula K. Le Guin's 'Lavinia'." *Science Fiction Studies* 35, no. 2 (July 1, 2008): 349–352.

Galbreath, Robert. "Holism, Openness, and the Other: Le Guin's Use of the Occult (Holisme, Ouverture et Altérité: L'usage de L'occulte Dans L'oeuvre de Le Guin)." *Science Fiction Studies* 7, no. 1 (March 1, 1980): 36–48.

Oziewicz, Marek. *One Earth, One People: The Mythopoeic Fantasy Series of Ursula K. Le Guin, Lloyd Alexander, Madeleine L'Engle and Orson Scott Card*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co, 2008.

Scholes, Robert. *The Left Hand of Difference: LeGuin & Derrida*. New Orleans, La.: Graduate School of Tulane University, 1983.

Shamel, Andrew T, Dartmouth College, and Department of English. *Not Glass to Break: The Fictional Religions of Ursula K. Le Guin*, 2005.

White, Donna R. *Dancing with Dragons: Ursula K. Le Guin and the Critics*. Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1999.

Williams, Donna Glee. "The Moons of Le Guin and Heinlein." *Science Fiction Studies* 21, no. 2 (July 1, 1994): 164–172.

Lewis

Burkholder, Rachel. "A Myth Retold: How 'Till We Have Faces' Confirms That a Myth Is Not a Fairytale." M.A., Liberty University, 2011.

Bowen, John P. *The Spirituality of Narnia: The Deeper Magic of C.S. Lewis*. Vancouver: Regent College Pub., 2007.

Brown, Devin. "The Screwtape Letters: Telling the Truth Upside Down" (2007).

Bruner, Kurt D, and Jim Ware. *Finding God in the Land of Narnia*. Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers, 2004.

Burkart, Gina. *Finding Purpose in Narnia: a Journey with Prince Caspian*. Mahwah, N.J.: HiddenSpring, 2008.

Carnell, Corbin Scott. *Bright Shadow of Reality: Spiritual Longing in C.S. Lewis*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999.

———. "The Dialectic of Desire: C.S. Lewis' Interpretation of Sehnsucht," 1960.

Caughey, Shanna. *Revisiting Narnia: Fantasy, Myth, and Religion in C.S. Lewis' Chronicles*. Dallas, Tex.: Benbella Books, 2005.

Colbert, David. *The Magical Worlds of Narnia: a Treasury of Myths and Legends*. Toronto: McArthur & Co., 2005.

Downing, David C. *Planets in Peril: A Critical Study of C.S. Lewis's Ransom Trilogy*. Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995.

Fink, Larry Earl. “Spiritual Perception in C.S. Lewis’ Chronicles of Narnia,” 1982.

Freshwater, Mark Edwards. *C.S. Lewis and the Truth of Myth*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988.

Gillespie, Natalie Nichols. *Believing in Narnia: a Kid’s Guide to Unlocking the Secret Symbols of Faith in C.S. Lewis’s The Chronicles of Narnia*. Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 2008.

Hein, David, and Edward Henderson. *C. S. Lewis and Friends: Faith and the Power of Imagination*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2011.

Hilder, Monika B. *The Gender Dance: Ironic Subversion in C. S. Lewis’s Cosmic Trilogy*, 2013.

Hillegas, Mark R. *Shadows of Imagination: The Fantasies of C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, and Charles Williams*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.

Hollwitz, John C. “The Mythopoeic Art of C.S. Lewis,” 1980.

Kilby, Clyde S. *Images of Salvation in the Fiction of C.S. Lewis*. Wheaton, Ill.: Harold Shaw Publishers, 1978.

Lindskoog, Kathryn Ann. *The Lion of Judah in Never-never Land; the Theology of C.S. Lewis Expressed in His Fantasies for Children.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973.

Lindvall, Terry. *Surprised by Laughter: The Comic World of C.S. Lewis*. Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 2012.

McColman, Carl. *The Lion, the Mouse, and the Dawn Treader: Spiritual Lessons from C.S. Lewis’s Narnia*. Brewster, Mass.: Paraclete Press, 2011.

McInnis, Je*ff. Shadows and Chivalry: C.S. Lewis and George MacDonald on Suffering, Evil, and Goodness*. Milton Keynes, UK; Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster, 2007.

Mills, David. “To See Truly through a Glass Darkly: C. S. Lewis, George Orwell, and the Corruption of Language” (1998).

Mühling-Schlapkohl, Markus. *A Theological Journey into Narnia: An Analysis of the Message Beneath the Text of “The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe” by C. S. Lewis*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006.

O’Hare, Colman. “Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien: Three Approaches to Religion in Modern Fiction,” 1973.

Purtill, Richard L. *Lord of the Elves and Eldils; Fantasy and Philosophy in C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien,*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Pub. House, 1974.

Sammons, Martha C. *War of the Fantasy Worlds: C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien on Art and Imagination*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010.

Sturch, Richard. *Four Christian Fantasists: a Study of the Fantastic Writings of George MacDonald, Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis, and J.R.R. Tolkien*. Zurich: Walking Tree Publishers, 2001.

Urang, Gunnar. *Shadows of Heaven; Religion and Fantasy in the Writing of C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and J.R.R. Tolkien.* Philadelphia: [Pilgrim Press, 1971.

Veith, Gene Edward. *The Soul of Prince Caspian: Exploring Spiritual Truth in the Land of Narnia*. Colorado Springs, CO: David C. Cook, 2008.

Wheat, Leonard F. *Philip Pullman's His Dark Materials—a Multiple Allegory: Attacking Religious Superstition in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe and Paradise Lost*. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2008.

Williams, T. M. *Following Prince Caspian: Further Encounters with the Lion of Narnia*. Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 2008.

———. *The Heart of The Chronicles of Narnia: Knowing God Here by Finding Him There*. Nashville, Tenn.: W Pub. Group, 2005.

Wilson, Douglas. *What I Learned in Narnia*. Moscow, Idaho: Canon Press, 2010.

Wood, Naomi. "Paradise Lost and Found: Obedience, Disobedience, and Storytelling in C. S. Lewis and Philip Pullman." *Children's Literature in Education* 32, no. 4 (December 2001): 237–259.

LOST

Mitchell, Lacey. *Found the Etiology of Character Realization, Within Rhetorical Analysis of the Series LOST, through the Application of Underhill's and Turner's Classic Concepts of the Mystic Journey*. Lynchburg, Va.: Liberty University, 2010.

Lovecraft

Anderson, James A. "Out of the Shadows: a Structuralist Approach to Understanding the Fiction of H.P. Lovecraft," 1992.

Burleson, Donald R. *H.P. Lovecraft, a Critical Study*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983.

———. *Lovecraft: Disturbing the Universe*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990.

Carter, Lin. *Lovecraft: a Look Behind the Cthulhu Mythos : the Background of a Myth That Has Captured a Generation*. San Bernardino, Calif.: R. Reginald, The Borgo Press, 1993.

Harman, Graham. *Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy*. Winchester, UK; Washington: Zero Books, 2012.

Houellebecq, Michel. *H.P. Lovecraft: Against the World, Against Life*. San Francisco, Calif.: Believer Books, 2005.

Joshi, S. T. *H.P. Lovecraft: The Decline of the West*. Berkeley Heights, N.J.: Wildside Press, 1990.

Joshi, S. T, and Joshi. *A Subtler Magick: The Writings and Philosophy of H.P. Lovecraft*. San Bernardino, Calif.: Borgo Press, 1996.

Levenda, Peter. *The Dark Lord: H.P. Lovecraft, Kenneth Grant and the Typhonian Tradition in Magic*. Lake Worth, FL: Ibis Press, 2013.

Lovecraft, H. P. and S. T Joshi. *The Annotated Supernatural Horror in Literature*. New York: Hippocampus Press, 2000.

Lovecraft, H. P, David E Schultz, and Joshi. *An Epicure in the Terrible: a Centennial Anthology of Essays in Honor of H.P. Lovecraft*. Rutherford [N.J.]; London; Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press ; Associated University Presses, 1991.

Lucas

Barron, Matthew. "'@Religion:Jedi': Myth and Metaphysics in SF Film in the Star Wars Era (1977-1997)," 2002.

Brin, David, and Matthew Woodring Stover. *Star Wars on Trial: Science Fiction and Fantasy Writers Debate the Most Popular Science-fiction Films of All Time.* Dallas: BenBella Books, Inc., 2009.

Brode, Douglas. *The Mythology of Star Wars*.

Brode, Douglas, and Leah Deyneka. *Sex, Politics, and Religion in Star Wars: An Anthology*. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2012.

Brooker, Will. *Using the Force: Creativity, Community, and Star Wars Fans*. New York: Continuum, 2002.

Fuller, Arthur F. "The Star Wars Trilogy: Its Religious Significance," 1997.

MacDonald

Dearborn, Kerry. *Baptized Imagination: The Theology of George MacDonald*. Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006.

Hein, Rolland. *The Harmony Within: The Spiritual Vision of George MacDonald*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Christian University Press, 1982.

Manson, Cynthia. *The Fairy-tale Literature of Charles Dickens, Christina Rossetti, and George MacDonald: Antidotes to the Victorian Spiritual Crisis*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008.

McInnis, Je*ff. Shadows and Chivalry: C.S. Lewis and George MacDonald on Suffering, Evil, and Goodness*. Milton Keynes, UK; Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster, 2007.

Sturch, Richard. *Four Christian Fantasists: a Study of the Fantastic Writings of George MacDonald, Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis, and J.R.R. Tolkien*. Zurich: Walking Tree Publishers, 2001.

*The Matrix*

Yeffeth, Glenn. *Taking the Red Pill: Science, Philosophy and Religion in The Matrix*. Chichester: Summersdale, 2003.

Matheson

Wiater, Stan, Matthew R Bradley, and Paul Stuve. *The Twilight and Other Zones: The Dark Worlds of Richard Matheson*. New York: Citadel Press/Kensington Pub., 2009.

McCaffrey

McCaffrey, Todd, Leah Wilson, and Anne McCaffrey. *Dragonwriter: A Tribute to Anne McCaffrey and Pern*, 2013.

Meyer

Roberts, Dave. *The Twilight Gospel: The Spiritual Roots of Stephenie Meyer's Vampire Saga*. Oxford, [UK]: Monarch Books, 2009.

Miller

Bertonneau, Thomas F. “Sacrifice and Sainthood: Walter M. Miller, Jr.’s Short Fiction.” *Science Fiction Studies* 35, no. 3 (November 2008): 404–429.

Hicks, J.e. “A Selective Annotated Bibliography of A Canticle For Leibowitz.” *Extrapolation (Kent State University Press)* 31, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 216–228.

Seed, David. “Recycling the Texts of the Culture: Walter M. Miller’s A Canticle for Leibowitz.” *Extrapolation (Kent State University Press)* 37, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 257–271.

Smith, Cynthia. *Walter Miller’s Canticle for Leibowitz: a Study of Apocalyptic Cycles : a Study of Apocalyptic Cycles, Religion and Science, Religious Ethics and Secular Ethics, Sin and Redemption, and Myth and Preternatural Innocence*. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2009.

Spencer, S. “The Post-Apocalyptic Library: Oral and Literate Culture in Fahrenheit 451 and A Canticle for Leibowitz.” *Extrapolation (Kent State University Press)* 32, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 331–342.

Morrison

Mason, Amanda Louise Gwyn. “Return of the Repressed: Forms of Fantasy in the Novels of Toni Morrison,” 1987.

Mazow, Lauren A. “Religion in the Contemporary American Novel: a Study of Vonnegut, Bellow, and Morrison,” 1988.

Poe

DeShell, Jeffrey. *The Peculiarity of Literature: An Allegorical Approach to Poe’s Fiction*. Madison, NJ; London; Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press ; Associated University Presses, 1997.

Freedman, William. *The Porous Sanctuary: Art and Anxiety in Poe’s Short Fiction*. New York: Peter Lang, 2002.

Haugen, Hayley Mitchell. *Readings on the Short Stories of Edgar Allan Poe*. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 2001.

Howarth, William L. *Twentieth Century Interpretations of Poe’s Tales; a Collection of Critical Essays.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971.

Thompson, Gary Richard. *Poe’s Fiction, Romantic Irony in the Gothic Tales*. [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973.

Werner, James V. *American Flaneur: The Cosmic Physiognomy of Edgar Allan Poe*. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Williams, Michael J. S. *A World of Words: Language and Displacement in the Fiction of Edgar Allan Poe*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1988.

Pullman

Bobby, Susan Redington. *Beyond His Dark Materials Innocence and Experience in the Fiction of Philip Pullman*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2012.

Cantrell, Sarah K. "'Nothing Like Pretend': Difference, Disorder, and Dystopia in The Multiple World Spaces of Philip Pullman's His Dark Materials." *Children's Literature in Education* 41, no. 4 (December 2010): 302–322.

Freitas, Donna, and Jason E King. *Killing the Imposter God: Philip Pullman's Spiritual Imagination in His Dark Materials*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007.

Gooding, Richard. "Clockwork: Philip Pullman's Posthuman Fairy Tale." *Children's Literature in Education* 42, no. 4 (December 2011): 308–324.

Lenz, Millicent, and Carole Scott. *His Dark Materials Illuminated: Critical Essays on Philip Pullman's Trilogy*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005.

Oliver, Chantal. "Mocking God and Celebrating Satan: Parodies and Profanities in Philip Pullman's His Dark Materials." *Children's Literature in Education* 43, no. 4 (December 2012): 293–302.

Padley, Jonathan, and Kenneth Padley. "'A Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven': His Dark Materials, Inverted Theology, and the End of Philip Pullman's Authority." *Children's Literature in Education* 37, no. 4 (December 2006): 325–334.

Reichard, Susan E. *Philip Pullman: Master of Fantasy*. Berkeley Heights, NJ: Enslow Publishers, 2006.

Walsh, Clare. "From 'Capping' to Intercision: Metaphors/metonyms of Mind Control in the Young Adult Fiction of John Christopher and Philip Pullman." *Language & Literature* 12, no. 3 (August 2003): 233.

Wheat, Leonard F. *Philip Pullman's His Dark Materials—a Multiple Allegory: Attacking Religious Superstition in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe and Paradise Lost*. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2008.

Wood, Naomi. “Paradise Lost and Found: Obedience, Disobedience, and Storytelling in C. S. Lewis and Philip Pullman.” *Children’s Literature in Education* 32, no. 4 (December 2001): 237–259.

Pynchon

Zadworna-Fjellestad, Danuta. “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Gravity’s Rainbow: a Study in Duplex Fiction.” Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1986.

Rice

Ramsland, Katherine M. *The Anne Rice Reader*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1997.

Smith, Jennifer. *Anne Rice: A Critical Companion*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996.

Rowling

Anatol, Giselle Liza. *Reading Harry Potter: Critical Essays*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003.

Baggett, David, and Shawn Klein. *Harry Potter and Philosophy: If Aristotle Ran Hogwarts*. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court, 2004.

Beahm, George W. *Muggles and Magic: J.K. Rowling and the Harry Potter Phenomenon*. Charlottesville, VA: Hampton Roads Pub. Co., 2004.

Granger, John. *Looking for God in Harry Potter*. [Wheaton, Ill.]: SaltRiver, 2004.

Kern, Edmund M. *The Wisdom of Harry Potter: What Our Favorite Hero Teaches Us About Moral Choices*. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2003.

Killinger, John. *God, the Devil, and Harry Potter: A Christian Minister’s Defense of the Beloved Novels*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002.

Neal, C. W. *The Gospel According to Harry Potter: Spirituality in the Stories of the World’s Most Famous Seeker*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002.

Neal, C. W, and Samuel F Parvin. *The Gospel According to Harry Potter: Leader’s Guide for Group Study*. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004.

Roper, Denise. *The Lord of the Hallows: Christian Symbolism and Themes in J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter*. Denver, Colo.: Outskirts Press, Inc., 2009.

Royston, Edward John. “Magic and Rhetoric in Harry Potter,” 2013.

Russell

Gilmour, Peter. “To Boldly Go Where No Jesuit Has Gone Before.” *U.S. Catholic* 62, no. 7 (July 1997): 6.

James, Edward. “Jesuits in Space.” *TLS* no. 5005 (March 5, 1999): 24.

———. *Jesuits in Space and Other Absurdities*. Westerville, Ohio: Otterbein College, 2001.

Russell, Mary Doria. “A Hardheaded Faith.” *Sojourners Magazine* 37, no. 10 (November 2008): 34–39.

Shakespeare

Hall, Grace R. W. The Tempest *as Mystery Play: Uncovering Religious Sources of Shakespeare’s Most Spiritual Work*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1999.

Mendl, R. W. S. *Revelation in Shakespeare; a Study of the Supernatural, Religious and Spiritual Elements in His Art,*. London: J. Calder, 1964.

Simmons

Palmer, Christopher. “Galactic Empires and the Contemporary Extravaganza: Dan Simmons and Iain M. Banks.” *Science Fiction Studies* 26, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 73–90.

*Star Trek*

Gershom, Yonassan. *Jewish Themes in Star Trek: Where No Rabbi Has Gone Before!* [Raleigh, N.C.?]: Lulu Press, 2009.

Jindra, Michael. “It’s About Faith in Our Future: Star Trek Fandom as Cultural Religion” (2000).

Kraemer, Ross Shepard, William Cassidy, and Susan L Schwartz. *Religions of Star Trek*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001.

Porter, Jennifer E, and McLaren. *Star Trek and Sacred Ground: Explorations of Star Trek, Religion, and American Culture*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1999.

Wagner, Jon G, and Jan Lundeen. *Deep Space and Sacred Time: Star Trek in the American Mythos*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998.

*Star Wars*

Wetmore, Kevin J. *The Empire Triumphant: Race, Religion and Rebellion in the Star Wars Films*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2005.

Tolkien

Arthur, Sarah. *Walking with Frodo a Devotional Journey through The Lord of the Rings*. Carol Stream, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2003.

Arthur, Sarah, and J. R. R Tolkien. *Walking with Bilbo a Devotional Adventure through the Hobbit*. Carol Stream: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2005.

Birzer, Bradley J. *J.R.R. Tolkien's Sanctifying Myth: Understanding Middle-Earth*. [Wilmington, Del.]: ISI Books, 2002.

Bowen, Sarah. *A Light from the Shadows: The Glory of God in the Lord of Rings*. [Longwood, Fla]: Xulon Press, 2005.

Brown, Devin. *The Christian World of The Hobbit*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2012.

Caldecott, Stratford. *Secret Fire: The Spiritual Vision of J.R.R. Tolkien*. London: Darton Longman & Todd, 2003.

———. *The Power of the Ring: The Spiritual Vision Behind the Lord of the Rings and The Hobbit.* Chicago: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2012.

Caldecott, Stratford, and Ian Boyd. *A Hidden Presence: The Catholic Imagination of J.R.R. Tolkien*. South Orange, NJ: The Chesterton Press, Seton Hall University, 2003.

Caldecott, Stratford, and Thomas Honegger. *Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings: Sources of Inspiration*. Zurich; Jena [Germany]: Walking Tree Publisher, 2008.

Caldecott, Stratford, Didier Rance, and Grégory Solari. *Tolkien: Faërie et christianisme*. Genève: Ad Solem, 2002.

Chance, Jane. *The Lord of the Rings: The Mythology of Power*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001.

Davis, Howard M. "Anagogical Dimensions in Tolkien's Mythopoeia," 1979.

Dierberg, Jill Elizabeth. "America and the Ring: a Theological Approach to American Civil Religion and The Lord of the Rings Post 9/11," 2008.

Flieger, Verlyn. *Splintered Light: Logos and Language in Tolkien's World*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2002.

Garbowski, Christopher. *Recovery and Transcendence for the Contemporary Mythmaker: The Spiritual Dimension in the Works of J.R.R. Tolkien*. Zurich: Walking Tree Publishers, 2004.

Garofalo Neto, Emilio. "The Soccer World Cup 2010 as Sub-creation: An Analysis of Human Play through a Theological Grid of Creation-fall-redemption." Ph.D., Reformed Theological Seminary, 2011.

G.K. Chesterton Society. *J.R.R. Tolkien: Mythos and Modernity in Middle-Earth.* South Orange, N.J.: G.K. Chesterton Institute, 2002.

Green, William H. *The Hobbit: a Journey into Maturity*. New York; Toronto; New York: Twayne Publishers ; Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1995.

Gurney, Shelley Nicole. "Falling from Grace: Creation and Corruption in *The Silmarillion*: A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand," 2006.

Haber, Karen. *Meditations on Middle Earth*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001.

Hart, Trevor, and Ivan Khovacs. *Tree of Tales: Tolkien, Literature, and Theology*. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2007.

Hillegas, Mark R. *Shadows of Imagination: The Fantasies of C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, and Charles Williams*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.

Imbert, Yannick F. "'Who Invented the Stories Anyway?' a Reformed Perspective on Tolkien's Theory of Fantasy." Ph.D., Westminster Theological Seminary, 2010.

Isaacs, Neil David, and Rose A Zimbardo. *Tolkien and the Critics: Essays on J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings*. Notre Dame [Ind.]: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968.

*J.R.R. Tolkien Myth, Morality and Religion*. Tehachapi, CA: Saint Joseph Communications, Inc., 2002.

Johnson, Joy L. "The Theology of Middle-Earth," 1978.

Kerry, Paul E. *The Ring and the Cross: Christianity and the Writings of J.R.R. Tolkien*. Madison [N.J.]; Lanham, Md.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press ; Rowman & Littlefield, 2011.

Kerry, Paul E, and Sandra Miesel. *Light Beyond All Shadow: Religious Experience in Tolkien's Work*. Madison [N.J.]; Lanham, Md.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press ; Rowman & Littlefield, 2011.

Kocher, Paul Harold. *Master of Middle-earth; the Fiction of J.R.R. Tolkien*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

Lee, Stuart D, and Elizabeth Solopova. *The Keys of Middle-earth: Discovering Medieval Literature through the Fiction of J.R.R. Tolkien*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Lindauer, Ruth Elizabeth, and Theological Research Exchange Network. *Small Acts of Faithfulness an Analysis of Selected Works of Tolkien*, 2000.

Lobdell, Jared. *The Rise of Tolkienian Fantasy*. Chicago: Open Court, 2005.

Lobdell, Jared. *The World of the Rings: Language, Religion, and Adventure in Tolkien*. Chicago: Open Court, 2004.

McIntosh, Jonathan S. "The Flame Imperishable: Tolkien, St. Thomas, and the Metaphysics of Faerie." Ph.D., University of Dallas, 2009.

Milbank, Alison. *Chesterton and Tolkien as Theologians: The Fantasy of the Real*. London; New York: T & T Clark, 2007.

Morgan, Alun. "The Lord of the Rings - a Mythos Applicable in Unsustainable Times?" *Environmental Education Research* 16, no. 3/4 (June 2010): 383–399.

Morrow, Jeffrey L. "J.R.R. Tolkien as a Christian for Our Times." *Evangelical Review of Theology* 29, no. 2 (April 2005): 164–177.

Moxon, David. *A Once and Future Myth: An Applied Theology of JRR Tolkien's the Lord of the Rings*. Wellington, N.Z.: Anglican resource Centre, 2004.

Northern Tolkien Festival, Agøy, Arthedain - Norges Tolkienforening, and Arda-sällskapet. "Between faith and fiction: Tolkien and the powers of his world : proceedings of the Arda symposium at the Second Northern Tolkien Festival, Oslo, August 1997." Arda-Society, 1997.

O'Hare, Colman. "Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien: Three Approaches to Religion in Modern Fiction," 1973.

O'Neill, Timothy R. *The Individuated Hobbit: Jung, Tolkien, and the Archetypes of Middle-Earth*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979.

Purtill, Richard L. *J.R.R. Tolkien: Myth, Morality, and Religion*. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984.

———. *Lord of the Elves and Eldils; Fantasy and Philosophy in C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien,*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Pub. House, 1974.

Richards, Darielle Teresa. "The Creative Process of J. R. R. Tolkien and the Tradition of the Magus." Ph.D., Pacifica Graduate Institute, 2005.

Rohloff, Peter, Norwich University, Division of Humanities, Norwich University, and Friends of Norwich University Library. *Of Prophets and Doom: Providence and Predestination in the Works of J. R. R. Tolkien*. Northfield, Vt.: Norwich University, 1998.

Rutledge, Fleming. *The Battle for Middle-Earth: Tolkien's Divine Design in Lord of the Rings*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2003.

Sammons, Martha C. *War of the Fantasy Worlds: C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien on Art and Imagination*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010.

Shippey, T. A. *J.R.R. Tolkien: Author of the Century*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001.

Strauss, Ed. *A Hobbit Devotional [Bilbo Baggins and the Bible]*. Uhrichsville, Ohio: Barbour Publishing, Inc., 2012.

Sturch, Richard. *Four Christian Fantasists: a Study of the Fantastic Writings of George MacDonald, Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis, and J.R.R. Tolkien*. Zurich: Walking Tree Publishers, 2001.

Syme, Margaret Ruth. "Tolkien as gospel writer," 1990.

Trickett, Gregory E. "J.R.R. Tolkein and the God of Angels, Men and Elves," 2003.

Urang, Gunnar. *Shadows of Heaven; Religion and Fantasy in the Writing of C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and J.R.R. Tolkien.* Philadelphia: [Pilgrim Press, 1971.

Vincent, Alana M. *Culture, Communion and Recovery Tolkienian Fairy-story and Inter-religious Exchange*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2012.

Walker, Steve. *The Power of Tolkien's Prose Middle-Earth's Magical Style*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Wells, Bradley M. "The Religious Significance of Gandalf in J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings," 1992.

Wood, Ralph C. *The Gospel According to Tolkien: Visions of the Kingdom in Middle-Earth*. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003.

Zimbardo, Rose A, and Neil David Isaacs. *Understanding The Lord of the Rings: The Best of Tolkien Criticism*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004.

Wells

Huntington, John. *The Logic of Fantasy: H.G. Wells and Science Fiction*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Williams

Hillegas, Mark R. *Shadows of Imagination: The Fantasies of C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, and Charles Williams*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.

O'Hare, Colman. "Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien: Three Approaches to Religion in Modern Fiction," 1973.

Sturch, Richard. *Four Christian Fantasists: a Study of the Fantastic Writings of George MacDonald, Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis, and J.R.R. Tolkien*. Zurich: Walking Tree Publishers, 2001.

Urang, Gunnar. *Shadows of Heaven; Religion and Fantasy in the Writing of C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and J.R.R. Tolkien.* Philadelphia: [Pilgrim Press, 1971.

# Appendix 5: An Excursus on Method

*Theories are simultaneously proposals for a journey,*
*representations of a journey, and the journey itself.* – Tweed, 2006, p. 9

*Interdisciplinarity*

This work attempts to provide a framework for analysis, interpretation, and even explanation of – or, one might also simply say, a "theory" of (see Asprem and Taves, 2018) – the making of novel *world*-views – which is also to say, of new worlds or homelands, new identities or subjects … or, one might more metaphorically say, new landmarks in the mysterious forest or new anchor-holds in the turbulent sea of life – in fantastical fiction. Again, I have attempted to systematically organize knowledge from a variety of relevant disciplines in a manner generally applicable to the phenomenon of world- and worldview-making in fantastika by identifying what I regard as the primary relevant categories or components of the phenomenon and their relations among each other (*i.e.*, by generally adopting the pragmatic-causal orientation of the new mechanistic philosophy of science). The chapter that follows engages with the core problem-questions and categories to which this work is addressed. Here, by way of introduction, I think it is helpful to think about the discourses and disciplines that I seek to engage with and intervene in.

I like to think that there is a harmony of method and argument in this work, that my appeal to interdisciplinarity – indeed, my attempt to make connections between different disciplinary perspectives and theories – and, particularly to methods, approaches, and theories of combination and linkage (*e.g.*, the BBA, translation theory, borderlands theory), is not due to it being a scholarly trend but because it suits and advances my evidence and argument. The problems that motivate it are, yes, internal to specific disciplines (*e.g.*, the problems created by stipulated definitions of categories like "religion" in religious studies, of "science fiction" in literary studies, and of narrow focus on specific "religions" and favored fictional texts), but they are also created by the divisions among the disciplines, often promoted in misguided efforts to defend disciplinary prestige, legitimacy, and even existence by asserted incoherence and division where linkage is possible. In contrast to, for example, figures like Saussure and Chomsky, who seek to shield *langue*, in its eternal, ahistorical, abstract purity, from the contingency and particularity of *parole*, or to the deconstructionists who, conversely, see language as endlessly deferred, a disconnected, free-playing discourse, unable to be systematized and known, or figures like Lévi-Strauss and Eliade, who attempted to protect myth and religion as *sui generis* and autonomous (myth/religion vs. history, paradigmatic vs. syntagmatic, and so on), my project affirms and is rooted in what might be called a pragmatist-immanentist belief (what I call "PPP"—see especially Appendix 6, Part 2) that, though no ultimate totalizing representation of reality is possible, everything is part of "nature" and admits partial, incrementally-improving naturalistic accounts – though certainly ones including unpredictability and complexity. I see the former styles of transcendent thinking as *creationist* (*e.g.*, humanity, *ex nihilo*, transcends and fundamentally breaks with non-human animals; deity incomparably transcends the natural order; etc.) but, therefore, as inherently (and by hidden or open intent) incapable of explaining how symbolic systems, from languages to worldviews, *are created*. I am, as will be seen, in deep sympathy with the later, rather than the early, Wittgenstein.

As signaled by my use of words like "theory" and "explanation" above – the latter in particular being generally avoided in religious studies – this project interacts with religious studies as a discipline directly and broadly and argues for various disciplinary expansions or enrichments that some might regard, more threateningly, as abandonment (see bbhe.ucsb.edu).

My primary areas of interdisciplinary intersection are as follows:

1. *Religion in North America*. Anyone who studies "religion" and other worldviews in the United States is immediately confronted with problem of comparison, attempting to address the abundance of NRMs and traditional worldviews with a framework that does not privilege one worldview or one worldview family over others.
2. *Religious Studies* and *Worldview Studies*. More generally, the discipline of religious studies, by opening itself up to "worldview studies," invites interdisciplinary conversation with other scholars of worldviews, including those in Black studies, Whiteness studies, and other experts on social formations that use racial and ethnic categories to form in-group and out-group concepts, gender and sexuality studies, studies of fandoms, of conspiracies, of pseudosciences, of political and economic worldviews, etc.
3. *Creativity Studies*. These are *novel* worldviews in works of fantastika, so engagement with this research is vital for understanding the phenomenon. As one aspect of this, I draw on insights from *metaphor theory* and *conceptual blending theory*.
4. *Borderlands Theory*. This is particularly useful in understanding the American and global situations that promote the generation of novel worldviews in fantastika.
5. *Translation Theory*. This area of research is not only relevant for understanding how novel worldviews are made (that is, new worldviews are always "translations" or conceptual blends of other mental spaces) but also for articulating the limits of any comparative framework, any ontology. Like postmodern insights more generally, translation theory humbles the rather structuralist interpretive confidence suggested by rhetorical, narratological, and worldview-related categories — this is consistent with the mature perspective promoted by CSR, which in many ways returns to its Idealist roots by perceiving the complexity of what may appropriately be called the "Geiste" in material systems, spatial configurations, social groups, animal bodies, and so on.
6. *Historiography and Mythography* (what I call together "mythistoriography" since they study the creation and development of deeply interrelated genres, technologies of power and rhetoric, and fundamental projects). I make historical arguments in this work (*e.g.*, relative to concepts like *secularization* and *globalization*), but I also explore theories of history, myth, and their functions as genres. As worlds, worldviews and ways of life are synchronic; as narratives and points of view, they express the diachronic quality of history (a livable history, a "myth").
7. *Narratology* and *Cognitive Narratology*. These areas of research provide powerful tools for understanding the nature and function of fantastical narratives and the worlds they cue. *Modal logic* has often appeared at the crossroads of the disciplines I have draw on in developing this framework. I would note that a unity of modal patterns has been found in a variety of application domains, and *text world theory*,

within the umbrell discipline of cognitive narratology, developed out of possible world semantics and other insights from applied modal logic.

8. *Rhetoric and Composition*, *Writing Studies*, *Genre Studies*, and *Media Studies*. Allomythoi are persuasive, and they thrive in the subgenres of fantastika. The study of their genres and media of emergence and embodiment necessarily draws on these disciplines.
9. *Cognitive Science of Religion* and *Spatial Cognition*. I use many insights from CSR, but I draw perhaps most strongly on the spatial turn in the humanities (including religious studies) and findings from the study of spatial cognition. Whereas humans have long stored mental representations and memories externally, they were usually stabilizations of a received world model: the cosmology, history, narrative, etc of a given worldview and way of life. Fantastika externalizes our capacity to creatively, playfully entertain novel possibilities. But again, as I stress throughout, creativity is conservative; fantastika is not radically different from realism, and the traditional uses of externalized worldview representations are comparable to the function fantastical allomythoi play today. The pedagogical function of traditional organized "religions" and other worldviews has been to facilitate the transformation of individuals' self-and-world models, to supply possibilities, as fantastical allomythoi do now—albeit in greater abundance and supernormal intensity.
10. *Pedagogy*. Ideally, research will inform teaching, and in this case the phenomenon of interest proves to be a powerful resource for effective, evidence-based instruction using current best methods.
11. *Global Studies*. Above, I have already referenced my engagement with the concept of "globalization" in this work. I would further note that global studies is also a discipline that is very interested in comparison—hence this project hopes to offer a useful framework (as well as contestable ideas) for global studies scholars.

It has been challenging to hold so many disciplines in tension while addressing a novel topic. I have tried to aid the reader wherever possible by providing footnote, appendices, and references in areas of possible further interest or puzzlement.

I would stress that textual worlds and wordviews, especially ones that acknowledge their fictionality, require different methods specific to their manner and medium of embodiment. My "interdisciplinarity" is firmly in the American Pragmatist (and perspectivist) tradition. My topic seems to suggest the strongly idealist perspective that our cherished worldviews (indeed, our very worlds and selves) are fictional, virtual, but my approach is rooted in a philosophy of embodied realism based on empirical studies of evolution, biology, history, and space. The theme of the "problem" or the provocative situation runs through my work, but there is an intimate, co-constitute dialectic between the empirical (and conceptual) situation that a worldview is developed in response to and the (concrete, materialized) narrative world and worldview. A focus on text and language does threaten to dematerialize and dislocate the body into a deconstructed play of signifiers, but only if it forgets that language and text emerge from and are tools and actions in the service of life in our bodies together in our environment.

*Why speculative fiction?*

Speculative fiction has three features that make it particularly useful for investigating the questions raised in this dissertation.

First, speculative fiction exhibits a sharper "break" with history or physics (*i.e.*, consensus or normative "reality") than is typical of ordinary mimetic literature. This is often called "estrangement" (Suvin 2000; 1978), and the non-ordinary or non-normative elements of the storyworld that represent its points of departure from the real world (its "arresting strangeness" (Tolkien 1939)) are known as "novums" (Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. 2008; Suvin 1978). This is because the very market pressures that constrain the "fantastical" (Kelleghan 2002) genres of estrangement promote the generation of the kind of "free space" sought by this project. That is, not only does the entertainment industry in general promote a superficial generation of novelty, but also and more specifically speculative fiction, by seeking fictional worlds that are estranged from the primary or consensus reality, is characterized by a world-making will-to-novelty.

Second, fiction-based religions have drawn inspiration exclusively from genres covered by the umbrella terms "fantastical" and "speculative fiction," including horror, fantasy, and science fiction (Davidsen 2014; 2013; Possamai 2012; 2005; Cusack 2010; etc.). Since it is hoped that this work will be of some use to those who study such religions, this study focuses on the same genres and hopefully will help to explain why they would be so conducive to the generation of NRMs.

Third, speculative or fantastical fiction may be understood definitionally in terms of possible world semantics as the subset of fictional worlds that depart significantly from the norms of consensus reality. These are the sorts of storyworlds that tend to contain non-ordinary phenomena relative to both the real world and the storyworld. My preferred understanding of fiction is one that understands narrative events as acting on the mind's hierarchical predictive coding system (Gregory, Wolpert, and Ghahramani 2005; Fiser, Berkes, Orbán, and Lengyel 2010; Bar 2011). I find Martin's (2004) modal interpretation of fiction in terms of possible world semantics to be a literary theory uniquely suited to the study of works of speculative fiction and happily consistent with the mind's probabilistic nature. (See too, Traill (1996), who uses possible world semantics to understand disjunctive, ambiguous, fantasy, supernatural naturalized, and paranormal modes[2] of fantastic worlds, and Doležel (1998).) Therefore, the non-ordinary phenomena considered in this project are, properly, possible *worlds within worlds*. These simulated spaces are staggeringly many; Manguel and Guadalupi, in their "Forward" to *The Dictionary of Imaginary Places*, state,

> The imaginary universe is a place of astonishing richness and diversity: here are worlds created to satisfy an urgent desire for perfection, immaculate

[2] She finds historical shifts in taste for specific modes:

> The historicity of the fantastic can be studied, then, both synchronically and diachronically. The synchronic view reveals the artistic treatment of the supernatural and natural at a particular point in history – the stylistic and narrative devices brought to bear on the opposition in order to configure the fictional world. The diachronic shows the genesis and subsequent transformations of the modes. It is a method that discloses the preference for one mode over another at certain moments of history. For instance, the pre-Romantics had a taste for the antirationality of the disjunctive mode. The Romantics could not, in the philosophical uncertainty of their time, embrace such ontological certainties; their inclination was for the indeterminacy of the ambiguous mode, for the play of 'as if.' The Realists had harder heads, but not narrow minds, and devised the paranormal mode, with its integration of the supernatural into the natural domain. The artistic treatment of the fantastic changed as science gradually modified its conception of reality. The structure of the paranormal mode, especially – and the fact that it came into being at all – reflects this altered perception of reality in the nineteenth century. (Traill, 1996, pp. 10-11)

> utopias such as Christianopolis or Victoria that hardly breathe; others, like Narnia and Wonderland, brought to life to find a home for magic, where the impossible does not clash with its surroundings; yet others, like Dream Kingdom, built to satisfy travellers bored with reality; or travellers who long to practise dark, unorthodox arts, as on Nobel's Island. (1999, p. xi)

And these worlds are built up from the smaller worlds uncovered by Text World Theory (TWT).

*The making of novel worldviews in fantastical fiction*

"*Novel* worldviews" – this obviously suggests an interest in creativity studies. How do humans generate novelty? In what sense is any cultural production new? What motivates this creative activity? What forces, likewise, motivate the production of superficial or illusory novelty? My use of the term is also a pun on my methodology of *literary* analysis of texts.

"*World*-views" – this vocabulary intervenes in the discipline of religious studies in multiple ways, infusing it with a number of other disciplinary, methodological, and theoretical influences. First, the worldliness of a worldview, to my mind, stresses the materiality and spatiality, the embodiment and corporeality of phenomena that are often treated as abstract, intellectual, and altogether immaterial, disembodied, and incorporeal. I join with Tweed in the push for spatiality as a mode of narration that intervenes in the study of American religions (and non-religions) in a generative and non-reductive way: "[T]he theme of *place*—and the related subthemes of mapping, meeting, and migration—is especially illuminating for narrating religion in the United States and the Western Hemisphere" (Tweed, 1997, p. 135; *cf. ibid.*, p. 193, nn. 6, 8). Terms like "religion," "spirituality," and even "ideology" tend to suggest that the normative worldview is that of secular, Protestant intellectualism, a matter of ideas and spirit, not of body and place. And certain escapist understandings of what happens when one consumes and is consumed by a work of fiction participate in this disembodied and dislocated discourse that has pervaded modernity (*cf.* Dewey, 1934, p. 338)—often as part of colonialist, racist, patriarchal, Eurocentrist, anti-Catholic, and related projects that, both by pretending a blindness to the particularities of body and place and an understanding of human nature and rights as spiritual and universal and by simultaneously engaging in regulative schemes that attended carefully to the particularities of body and place and attributed to them many, all-too-many meanings, were able to narrate the normative and exclude the abnormal.[3] The following work resists this by bringing the literatures on, for example, spatial cognition and material

[3] Whence comes this division of material bodies and ideas, inner and outer self, things as they seem and as they are in themselves, res cogitans and res extensa, and so on? There are many complicated tributaries feeding the river, or, one might say, many elements that constituted the "picture" that has "held us captive" (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015; Taylor, 1989). Contemporary cognitive science ("postcognitivism") has come to resist such binarisms and bifurcations, and in some cases its thinkers have done so under the influence of ancient "religious" worldviews like Buddhism (*e.g.*, Francisco García; Judaism and Catholicism (especially their mystical traditions) have exerted a persistent influence on phenomenological, existentialist, and deconstructionist thinkers, and so when such philosophical traditions have, in turn, influenced cognitive scientists, psychologists, and cognitively-informed philosophers, one may observe a sort of return of the repressed: the spatial and embodied, the emotional and erotic, the intentional, etc. as inseparable from the "cognitive"; *cf.*, *e.g.*, Wynn's (2005) *Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling*).

religion into conversation with narratives and narratology. Second, "worldview" is meant to align my work with a shift away from certain unhelpful limitations inherent to "religious" studies, in the direction of a more general study of worldviews that includes the secular, the non-religious, the political, the economic, and so on, while recognizing the constant entanglement of the religious with the "secular," the "political," the "economic," which entanglement is often concealed by scholars' of "religion" using the terms so boldly and ubiquitously.

"Fantastical fiction" and "fantastika," above, should suggest that this work interacts with narratology, genre studies, and the literatures on, in particular, genres like "science fiction," "fantasy," and "horror," as well as "myth" and "history." As a mythological and historiographical intervention, this project endeavors to stress both the utility of these categories and their fraught genealogy – they are tools of power, shaped by perspective, and inevitably unfaithful to the phenomena even when attempting to serve truth.

*On the "Method" of Comparison*

*The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion* (Engler & Stausberg, 2011) does well to begin the first paragraph of its introduction by pointing out that methods "are foundational for modern science" (p. 3). As the first book of its kind in the field of religious studies, it represents a significant moment in the ever-growing rigor and sophistication of the profession. This is not to say that religious studies scholars did not give attention to methodology before the publication of the *Handbook*, but their methods have always been drawn from other areas and forms of inquiry, contributing to the "methodological pluralism" of religious studies (*ibid.*, p. 4), and reflecting the pragmatism of the field, in which diverse theoretical approaches are used to interpret religions on numerous levels and in many different ways. Again, my methodology is characteristically pluralistic and pragmatic ("PPP").

This pragmatist perspective and recognition of the socially produced nature of all knowledge is reflected in the following statement: "It is clear that some methods are more helpful than others (for given purposes and within given contexts), that different types of scholarly work make more productive use of some methods than others, and that all methods impose limited perspectives and select empirical materials (data)" (*ibid.*, p. 5). Indeed, methods, as "established procedures … guidelines and examples of established or best practice" (*ibid.*, p. 5), are more like algorithms—"recipes"[4] that have proven effective for other researchers—than like determinate, immutable mathematical functions or logical proofs. They are the broad restraining conditions and approaches that establish the conditions in which determinate forms of knowledge production are possible. For example, a productive method of inquiry usually involves being clear from the beginning what one's general research intent and design will be: what one's core research question is, what one's motivations are in researching *this* question, what specific questions need to be resolved in the service of the core research question, what previous literature has been produced on the topic, what practical limitations may constrain the inquiry, and so on (*cf. ibid.*, pp. 5-6). Methods are intimately related to theories (*cf. ibid.*, 9 *ff.*), although one may either go into a study knowing which theoretical framework will be applied or determine which theory is most useful after collecting data. One's theoretical position might have much to do with whether one would choose quantitative-, qualitative-, or mixed-methods (*ibid.*, pp. 6-7), or

[4] *E.g.*, "The recipe reads: choose a case; choose a theory; add rhetoric and stir" (p. 11).

with one's criteria for evaluating the quality of one's research: *e.g.*, reliability, validity, generalizability, credibility, authenticity, confirmability, transferability, accountability, compassion, reflexivity, etc. (*ibid.*, pp. 7-9).

The *Handbook*'s introduction says of J.Z. Smith's famous statement that *there is no data for religion*,

> There are no essentially religious facts in the same sense that there are no essentially economic or essentially political facts: 'religious', 'economic' and 'political' are terms that scholars (but not *only* scholars!) use to delimit a set of phenomena of interest…. That is, the empirical materials that are accepted as data in scientific (scholarly and academic) communication in the study of religion\s are constructed, collected or produced by methods accepted as scientific, the goodness of which has been evaluated by using some of the criteria mentioned above. (*ibid.*, p. 10)

This point is particularly relevant to this study, which engages with a range of worldviews in an attempt to provide a framework that encompasses the religious, the economic, the political, and so on. Again, one can observe the basically instrumentalist or pragmatist perspective underlying the *Handbook*, religious studies at its best, and the theoretical-methodological orientation of this project.

The *Handbook* chapter on comparison, sometimes called the "comparative method," is of special interesting for this work, given the comparative ambitions of my framework and my understanding of comparison in foundational terms of conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending, which depend on basic cognitive activities such as the pattern-recognition ability to detect similarity in difference and the capacity to map from one domain to another. The *Handbook*, rightly, given the fact that comparison is a basic element of human cognition, does not regard comparison as a "method," but rather treats it as an aspect of research design that can be found in any number of distinct methods.

Due to the general fragmentation of religious studies into many "area" studies, those who are interested in engaging in explicitly comparative work often find themselves needing to defend comparison as a legitimate "method" or aspect of their research design. Yet, as Michael Stausberg states, "All scholarly methods can be engaged in bad faith and appropriated for various purposes, including apologetic, colonial, ideological, imperialist, racist or sexist ones. Few would blame methods such as discourse analysis, participant observation, philology or surveys if some of its practitioners were found guilty of one or several of the above-mentioned attitudes" (Stausberg, 2011, p. 22). He goes on to point out that the objections raised against comparison are not methodological, but "theoretical," arising out of admirable ethical concerns:

> The issue of comparison closely resonates with discussions about generalization and reductionism…. [T]he major theoretical challenge to the comparative project has been the denial of fundamental comparability in religious affairs: if 'religions' are merely colonial, imaginary and rhetorical inventions, if there are no shared traits that could be juxtaposed analytically, if there is no subject matter and no object of our study, then there would indeed be nothing to compare—and the study of religion would not make any sense. (*ibid.*, p. 22)

In the context of discussing the comparative projects of Frazer and Tylor, Stausberg notes that their work "was closely tied to … evolutionary theories" and that evolutionary theory

continues to depend on comparison (*ibid.*, p. 23). Indeed, reformed worldview studies is a comparative project founded on evolutionary premises.

The continued reluctance of many religious studies scholars to engage with the findings of evolutionary research relates to the fear of explicit comparison—some scholars consciously avoid certain lines of inquiry because they do not want to be accused of social Darwinism or intellectual colonialism. Müller's work, influenced by the methods and success of comparative philology, found a virtue in generalization, which relativized the religions so that no one religion could claim pre-eminence: "Famously, Müller wished to adopt Goethe's dictum on languages ('he who knows one language, knows none') for religion: 'He who knows one, knows none'" (*ibid.*, p. 23). The production and study of the category of "religion" therefore, in Stausberg's view, requires consideration of its many instantiations; this "is necessarily a comparative construct since no one exemplar can exhaust its meaning" (*ibid.*, p. 24). By stressing the importance of wide study of religions in their various and diverse manifestations, Müller's approach to comparison, that is, the sort of practice he encourages, would seem to subvert the tendency to essentialism that is criticized in comparison.

However, as mentioned in the discussion above and as observed by J.Z. Smith, there is an "emergent ethic of particularity" that is opposed to generalization (qtd. on *ibid.*, p. 28[5]). The critique of broad comparative work was anticipated by Durkheim, who, although willing to compare societies of the same type, "argued that social facts should not be compared merely because they bear some degree of superficial resemblance, but only when the respective societies 'resemble each other internally' [….] Analogous to biology, comparison must operate on the level of the (social) species" (*ibid.*, p. 25).

William James compared religious mental states to those found in other areas of life, instead of treating "religious phenomena 'as if they were outside of nature's order altogether'" (*ibid.*, p. 24). This points to one of the most valuable aspects of comparative work: it reminds one of the continuity of things—that cultures are related to each other, that humans are evolutionarily related to all other forms of life, that the cognitive states and capacities mobilized in religious activity are found in other modes of life and thought. Weber used comparative generalization—especially the construction of his ideal types—as a tool to isolate and understand variation. That is, broad comparative categories were constructed in order to find those differences, distinctions, or peculiarities that produced historical novelty, as in the case of Weber's famous linking of Protestantism and Capitalism (*ibid.*, p. 26). Stausberg considers much of the criticism leveled against comparison to be, in actuality, directed at the "straw doll" of the phenomenologists[6] (especially Eliade), who did not practice true comparison, but "were interested more in the general structure, 'manifestations', 'typology', or 'anatomy' of religion and in constructing cross-religions

[5] The skills necessary for sound philological work, as discussed in the chapter by Einar Thomassen, contribute to the tendency toward specialization.

[6] This use of the category of "phenomenology" rightly differs from that found in James V. Spickard's chapter on phenomenology. Spickard follows the philosophical tradition and characterizes *phenomenology* as being concerned with describing the basic structures of "experience as it presents itself to subjective consciousness. It is thus distinct from—and conceptually prior to—a subject's interpretations of that experience [….] Conscious bracketing allows at least a partial separation, which lets experience-near descriptions of religious phenomena emerge" (*ibid.*, p. 333). Because the phenomenologist regards herself as having bracketed both her own and her subject's interpretation, no truth claims are thought to be asserted. For more on this, see Appendix 6.

categories" (*ibid.*, p. 27; *cf.* Seth D. Kunin's chapter on structuralism). That is, they essentialized the similarities found in the religions and neglected the differences.

However, Stausberg notes that the focus on similarities may be legitimate, depending on "the purpose of a given study: some may be more interested in interpreting and explaining similar or shared features while others are concerned with the singularity of the respective case—both interests require a (tacit or explicit) comparative stance" (*ibid.*, p. 28). Likewise, even if one's research is immersed in a specific area of study and one has no interest in making general claims, Stausberg states, "Yet even an analysis of contextualized and complex cases rests on categories that are generally informed by and allow for comparative perspectives. So far, it is difficult to imagine an academic discussion entirely based on context-thick local concepts" (*ibid.*, p. 28). Such a discussion is indeed hard to imagine, for it would seem both to return to a pre-"religious studies" sort of theology and, more importantly, to cut every worldview and way of life off from each other, denying the possibility of communication and understanding. Stausberg goes on to emphasize the importance of having clear comparative research designs that take note of one's aims and the functions comparison should serve, and of being aware of the potential pitfalls inherent in comparison. I hope I have done so in this work.

# Appendix 6: On "Ontology" in the Study of Worldviews, Translation and Consilience, and the BBA

*Introduction:*

This appendix attempts to manage the several senses of "ontology" that are operative in the main text. In the first section, I begin by using Nietzsche's perspective – imagining his response to some of the excesses of analytic philosophy – to generate a critical lens through which to consider two senses of "ontology" discussed in the second section: (a) the more ordinary sense operative in worldview studies (*i.e.*, answers to questions like, "What exists?") and (b) the formal, ordered, controlled representation of existents, which facilitates translation and which the Building Blocks Approach (BBA) and the categories of worldview studies seem to aspire to function as. Human schemas function in many ways like formal ontologies, and Saab and Fonseca (2008) identify schemas with phenomenological ontologies. The BBA in many respects attempts to begin answering Saab and Fonseca's (2008) call for the development of a formal ontology that is flexible enough to cope with human schemas/ontologies.

In the second section, I draw back a bit from humanistic concerns (*e.g.*, the ontologies of human worldviews) and look at the first two senses of "ontology" relative to a simpler example, chemistry.[1] I advance what I call a "Pyrrhonean Pragmatist Perspective" (PPP) as being one that is responsible to the phenomena as one attempts to create an ontology of allomythoi.

In the third section, I discuss the sense of "ontology" as "phenomenology," which is still very common in religious studies.

In the fourth section, I address the goal of consilience relative to the BBA's translational objective as an ontology in the light central conclusions of translation studies.

## Part 1: Nietzsche and Analytic Philosophy—A Caution Against Excess

Recalling the Durkheimian definition of religion as dealing with special or holy things and Geertz's focus on religion as a system of symbols, perhaps it is not surprising to find that philosophy, the faithful *ancilla theologiae*, has, especially in some of its contemporary analytic forms, come to regard itself as concerned with the analysis of the basic structures of thought through an analysis of abstract, acontextual rules and categories governing systems of representation. That is, philosophy of this sort seeks to defend the sacred, transcendent, categorical ground of human life by identifying it with the distinctly human linguistic faculty, whose elemental conditions of emergence and possibility it describes. What would be Nietzsche's response to this understanding of the nature of philosophy and language?

Early in *Twilight of the Idols*, after a passage glorifying the senses, Nietzsche speaks of a dangerous "idiosyncrasy of the philosophers:"

> [I]t consists in confusing the last and the first. They place that which comes at the end—unfortunately! for it ought not to come at all!—namely, the "highest concepts," which means the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last

[1] When I was an undergrad, chemistry was my lab science, so this I attempt this section in honor of my instructors then.

> smoke of evaporating reality, in the beginning, *as* the beginning. This again is nothing but their way of showing reverence: the higher *may* not grow out of the lower, may not have grown at all [….] Thus they arrive at their stupendous concept, "God." That which is last, thinnest, and emptiest is put first, as *the* cause, as *ens realissimum*.[2]

The simple rules and categories of analytic philosophy, the most general concepts, are pure and uncomplicated precisely because most real-world information has been abstracted out. This sort of philosophy is acontextual and is grounded in neither history nor the body.[3] The desire for abstract simplicity is thus, although it represents itself as the will to truth, a falsification of life and the world of becoming. God, as the culmination of the process of abstract realism, is humanity's greatest cognitive mistake: "I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar."[4] It is this "faith" in grammar that is the gravest error. When the structure of language is invested with reality, with *being*, then the "last, thinnest, and emptiest" is regarded, not as one means used by the will to power, but as the end and meaning of life.

Syllogistic logic (and its modern symbolic formal presentation) grew out of the dialectical reasoning Plato attributes to Socrates. In order to subvert Socrates and the long dominion of discursive language, Nietzsche suggests that Socrates made the dialectical method appealing to the Greeks by introducing it as a new form of contest,[5] in the context of Greek pedagogy,[6] but really he was motivated by a weak man's resentment of strength and vitality.[7] Power cannot refute the logic of language, and so the weak use logic (language) to revenge themselves on the powerful. Virtue traps the powerful; one is no longer free to create according to the law of one's own nature. Instead, one goes to war with oneself.[8] One adopts the language and logic of the weak, a logic designed to invalidate private, unique, personal forms of strength, and then one kills one's own instincts. Consider the social character of the Gricean maxims—they enhance the pragmatic success and utility of language by being inherently oriented toward the cooperation of groups, or, as Nietzsche might say, herds. Therefore, language is rooted in a particular shared form of life, one that is social in character, but it does not express all ways of life. This also recalls Heidegger's observation that Dasein generally lives absorbed in an inauthentic, generic they-self.

Nietzsche calls the philosophers' hostile treatment of the world "Egypticism,"[9] perhaps to allude to the historical influence Egypt exerted on early Greece and to suggest that this tendency was an oriental corruption of Hellenic vitality. The stereotype he is drawing on asserts that in contrast to the primitive Greek love of life that manifests in agonistic sport, drama, political and legal contests, and war, the decadent oriental, half-dead and emasculated, builds monuments to death. What happens is this: something in the world

---

[2] Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Portable Nietzsche* [Translated by Walter Kaufmann. Penguin Books, 1977], 481-482 [number 4]. Compare Dewey's argument that morality and the moral element in art are "beyond good and evil" (1934, pp. 348-349).
[3] *Cf.* Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will to Power* [Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. Random House, 1967], 220 [number 408].
[4] Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, 483.
[5] *Ibid.*, 477.
[6] *Cf. ibid.*, 37.
[7] *Ibid.*, 476.
[8] *Ibid.*, 477-478.
[9] *Ibid.*, 479.

is decontextualized, "de-historicized" and seemingly transformed into something better, something eternal and divine. It is mummified: "All that philosophers have handled for thousands of years have been concept-mummies; nothing real escaped their grasp alive. When these honorable idolaters of concepts worship something, they kill it and stuff it."[10] These are the "idols" Nietzsche sounds with his tuning hammer and finds hollow.

Logic is a "doctrine of signs" and a "sign-convention."[11] Whereas philosophers like Pythagoras wanted to locate the most profound reality in number, Nietzsche recognizes that logic and math are systems of sign conventions; they are fictions. One manipulates them according to conventional rules, and they need not bear any relation to reality. Mathematics, like language itself, can exceed the bounds of what exists, which is to say, in more positive terms, it possesses no inherent connection to the nature of reality. Being unhinged in this way from reality, it opens the space for novelty, creativity, and madness. One can spend one's life working out the rules and consequences of an arbitrary geometry, for example, that has *no bearing at all* on the real world of becoming. Modern mathematicians and logicians have come to terms with this fact, however, so Nietzsche's attitude toward analytic philosophy in this broadened sense might be quite tolerant. They do not necessarily express *faith* in their new grammars; they are not under the mistaken delusion that they are *real*, that they have uncovered the logic of thought that, based on a correspondence notion of truth, is isomorphic with the logic of empirical reality. One suspects that the creation of elegant new logics or mapping and mining the computational universe for novelties might be regarded by Nietzsche as precisely the sort of artistic, disciplined creativity he admired in the Horatian ode:

> This mosaic of words, in which every word—as sound, as place, as concept—pours out its strength right and left and over the whole, this *minimum* in the extent and number of the signs, and the maximum thereby attained in the energy of the signs—all this is Roman and, if one will believe me, *noble* par excellence.[12]

But does Nietzsche not state, "I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity"?[13] This assertion, which should remind one of philosophers such as Kant and Hegel, refers, not to the effort to create a *new* universe of possibilities, in which one sets up initial conditions and rules and from arbitrary simples generates novel complexities, but to efforts to reduce all the complexities and contingencies of the world into a single system and to treat the fiction of language as reality. Stephen Wolfram's notion of computational irreducibility[14] and Gödel's incompleteness theorems are just two relatively recent examples of how rigorous analysis of our systems of modeling or representing reality establishes the limits of their utility and veracity. In the larger context of Nietzsche's respect for clear, detached, disciplined reasoning, indeed, for "logic,"[15] one does not find ground for thinking Nietzsche would reject all analytic projects.

---

[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*, 481.
[12] *Ibid.*, 557.
[13] *Ibid.*, 470 [number 26].
[14] This is closely related to his principle of computational equivalence and which states that we are surrounded by computational systems as complex as ourselves and that the results of many such "programs" cannot be skipped ahead to through the implementation of a mathematical formula but must be worked through.
[15] *Ibid.*, 511-3.

Far from disagreeing with analytic philosophy's tendency to treat the structure of thought as primarily linguistic (to the neglect of all cognitive processing below the threshold of higher-level awareness), Nietzsche stresses that very point: "*We cease to think when we refuse to do so under the constraint of language*: we barely reach the doubt that sees this limitation as a limitation. *Rational thought is interpretation according to a scheme that we cannot throw off*."[16] The will to a world-encompassing, unitary systematization, which is really a form of will to universal mastery, can easily shift into the metaphysical realism he rejects, the reification of language, in which a sense of mastery is produced through the self-deception that the linguistic entities over which we have control and of which our "selves" consist are the ultimate *reality*. This would be tragically inauthentic and impersonal—the opposite of his aristocratic ideal. All language is general, composed of universals. Private experience—that is, every single thing in the world of becoming—transcends the merely universal. In this respect, Nietzsche honors something very like what Kierkegaard calls "faith," with the important difference that the obligation that obliterates the language of obligation is oriented to life, the will to power,[17] not the transcendent God:

> We no longer esteem ourselves sufficiently when we communicate ourselves. Our true experiences are not at all garrulous. They could not communicate themselves even if they tried. That is because they lack the right word. Whatever we have words for, that we have already got beyond. In all talk there is a grain of contempt. Language, it seems, was invented only for what is average, medium, communicable. With language the speaker immediately vulgarizes himself.[18]

How rare authentic experience is! How easy it is to be lost in the anonymity of chatter, the comforting stability of language! In *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense*, Nietzsche writes,

> What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are.[19]

Note how he stresses the distinctly human character of the metaphors of language, particularly in his designation of them as *anthropomorphisms*. Durkheim, in a great deal more detail than Nietzsche but along similar lines, famously traces the categories of reason, including the idea of "category" itself, to social origins. Language emerges from a particular mode of life. Specifically, the linguistic capacity was preserved because, regarded as a behavior or habit, it gave increased mastery over certain regularities in the environment of the human organism: "Knowledge works as a tool of power [….] In order for a particular species to maintain itself and increase its power, its conception of reality must comprehend enough of the calculable and constant for it to base a scheme of behavior on it."[20] By gaining some control over what is "calculable and constant" in its environment, a species is able to modify that very environment to its advantage. Nonetheless, the survival value of

---

[16] Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 283 [number 522].
[17] *Ibid.*, 148 [number 254].
[18] *Ibid.*, 530-531 [number 26].
[19] Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, 46-47.
[20] Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 266 [number 480].

language is not an overwhelming argument in favor of its veracity for Nietzsche,[21] for whom mere survival is hardly his highest ideal.[22]

Language is inherently perspectival; one cannot access a God's Eye view of the world, and any view of the world will be an interpretation. If there is a God's Eye view of the world, "*a divine way of thinking*,"[23] it might be to see the world as "a *perspectival appearance* whose origin lies in us (in so far as we continually *need* a narrower, abbreviated, simplified world)."[24] This rather Hegelian move—to recognize one's perspectival gaze as an instrument of power and an abbreviation of life and consequently to sublate it by knowing it as part of the play of becoming—supplies a vision of the world that subverts all of Hegel's systematic ideals. The world of becoming has no ultimate aim—instead, eternal recurrence; it has no final meaning—instead, drives and perspectives. The perspectival appearance that takes the form of knowledge and that enslaves us to being originates in an inescapable need for mastery. Nietzsche states, "Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all other drives to accept as a norm."[25] In a rather Hegelian turn, by understanding and embracing the perspectival character of the drive's lust to rule, rather than by repressing it in an attempt to create a harmonious personality through a sort of democracy of drives, one achieves a Nietzschean will.

Nietzsche praises Heraclitus for asserting "that being is an empty fiction."[26] Contrary to the doctrine of Heraclitus was the doctrine of Parmenides, the foremost Eleatic to whom Nietzsche alludes when he states, "Even the opponents of the Eleatics still succumbed to the seduction of their concept of being: Democritus, among others, when he invented his atom."[27] The Democritean atom involves taking the Parmenidean monadic being and multiplying it. The entities we encounter in language are similarly atomic, indivisible. We must treat them as stable, enduring things, believing in their persistence over time, their equivalence of themselves to themselves. No further division is possible without destroying the concept itself. However, the entities of language and the rules that govern their manipulation do not fit all forms of life. In the unitary mode of thinking experienced by mystics, for example, we find another way of seeing the world, but it is speechless.

Abandoning the comfort of language is, thus, to be alone in the mute contemplation of death—death of the soul, death of God, nihilism. Nihilism results because one realizes that the "categories of reason [….] *refer to a purely fictitious world.*"[28] Nietzsche emphasizes the concept of "will." For this reason, one may be surprised to see him say that

---

[21] *Ibid.*, 273 [number 497].
[22] *Cf. ibid.*, 536-7 [number 36].
[23] *Ibid.*, 15 [number 15].
[24] *Ibid.*, 14-15 [number 15].
[25] *Ibid.*, 267 [number 481]; compare *ibid.*, 358-9 [number 677], which concludes with the observation that in the person in whom all the multiplicity of drives "seek satisfaction, a man of profound mediocrity must result." Thus, Nietzsche does not halt at the observation that the self is a multiplicity. He does not halt at the dissolution of the self and the false unity of metaphysics. Rather, he holds out the goal of disciplined unification and authentic harmonization in the creative activity of robust individuals and races, instead of finding the value of the person already present as an *a priori* property of an eternal soul: "The multitude and disgregation of impulses and the lack of any systematic order among them result in a 'weak will'; their coordination under a single predominant impulse results in a 'strong will': in the first case it is the oscillation and the lack of gravity; in the latter, the precision and clarity of the direction" (*ibid.*, 28-29 [number 46]).
[26] Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, 481.
[27] *Ibid.*, 483.
[28] Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 13 [number 12B]; *cf. ibid.*, 307 [number 570].

"it is only a word."[29] Ego, the notion of will and self, is inherent in the logic of language, the deep metaphysical structure of a system that always formulates a co-implicated "doer and doing."[30] The idea of the reality of being, the underlying enduring substratum, the thing-in-itself, Nietzsche considers an extension of this first belief in the "ego."[31] But if there is not a single, stable subject, if instead one assumes, as discussed above, "a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general,"[32] the very categories of reason are undermined.[33] Nietzsche states, "In order to think and infer it is necessary to assume beings: logic handles only formulas for what remains the same."[34] However, when the dynamic, impermanent, contingent, relational nature of things is recognized, formal logic and language in general—the tools of knowing—break down: "The character of the world in a state of becoming as incapable of formulation [….] Knowledge and becoming exclude one another."[35]

Given the above discussion of Nietzsche's views, one may conclude that insofar as an analytic philosopher engages either in the study of languages as historically and physically grounded human instruments that structure not all thought, but only that aspect of thought that is linguistic and conceptual, or in the study of arbitrary systems for their own sake, Nietzsche seems tolerant. In this, Nietzsche anticipates much in the early Heidegger, the later Wittgenstein, the pragmatist John Dewey, and others. However, much that one finds in analytic philosophy seems to be continuing the ancient pilgrimage along the path of language (treated as eternal, synchronic, abstracted from the messy particularities and dynamism of the diachronic and endlessly knowable) to the sacred shrine of the ideal whose form is both Thought and Being –

> But when Zarathustra was alone he spoke this to his heart: "Could it be possible? This old saint in the forest has not yet heard anything of this, that *God is dead!*"[36]

## Part 2: A Pyrrhonean Pragmatist Perspective on Ontology, Using Chemistry as an Example

The above section was cautionary, for the analytic tendency will be powerful in any attempt at ontology. I now turn to offering my rather Nietzschean, late-Wittgensteinian approach, which I call a "Pyrrhonean Pragmatist Perspective" (PPP), to the complex body of issues addressed by the word "ontology" within a worldview-studies-BBA framework applied to the study of allomythoi.

Again, "ontology" is a word that is used in a variety of senses. In its philosophical sense, it traces back to a long tradition in Western metaphysical philosophy that attempts to give a systematic, abstract account of existence—the fundamental categories of what is and the relations that obtain between those categories. It is in this sense that I most often use "ontology" in this work because it designates one of the primary categories, questions, or problems in worldview studies. In its practical sense, which one finds being made use of in the activities of librarians, information specialists, and scientists, it refers to pragmatic

---

[29] Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, 483; *cf. ibid.*, 495, 580-581.
[30] *Ibid.*, 483.
[31] Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 281 [numbers 518-9].
[32] *Ibid.*, 270 [number 490].
[33] *Cf. ibid.*, 281 [numbers 519-520].
[34] *Ibid.*, 280 [number 517].
[35] *Ibid.*, 280 [number 517].
[36] Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, 124.

attempts to describe domains of knowledge in a controlled and orderly fashion. In a weak sense, this is what the Building Blocks Approach, drawing on the new mechanistic philosophy, is attempting, though not yet in a rigorously formalized way (that is, the BBA is not yet a formalized, "upper" ontology, but it could in principle become one and aspires in that direction). This tradition also traces back to the very dawn of Western civilization. The former tradition is primarily ontological and philosophical in interest; the latter, epistemological and practical. This section will take chemistry as an example. In order to consider the question of whether an ontology of chemistry is possible, I will consider what "ontology" means in the modern context. Thus, I shall first attempt a brief conceptual history. By considering history, the present situation will be clarified, and then a general approach—more in terms of a method than of a doctrine[37]—to the contemporary problem of reconciling and making good use of the two broad senses of "ontology," relative to my example, chemistry, will be proposed.

*A History of Philosophical Thought on Ontology*

Even in the Greek myths of poets like Homer and Hesiod, as in the myths of all peoples, we find an attempt to categorize the principle elements of the world and to identify its character (*cf.* Kirk 72-73). However, in the Presocratic philosophers, sometimes called the *physicists* (from the Greek word for "nature"), there emerged a tendency to reject mere tradition, imagination, superstition, and hearsay and to rely on reason and empirical evidence. The Presocratics built on and modified mythic ideas, but they rationalized them. The Greeks were fascinated by the natural world and sought to understand its components and workings. Indeed, they sought to understand it on a fundamental level. The different Presocratics posited various abstract properties and material elements as constituting the essential nature and material basis of being. Likewise, Hippocrates, the ancient Greek physician, categorized biological conditions and illnesses even before the work of other naturalists like Aristotle.

Aristotle's greatest influence, in both a positive and negative sense, was Plato (*cf.* Bochenski 279-282). Plato's idealism was so thoroughgoing that, for him, the general was more real than the specific, the abstract more real than the particular. The true reality is, according to Plato, eternal, changeless, universal, and numerical.[38] Although many of

---

[37] That is, I shall not here propose an ontology of chemistry, nor shall I criticize those that do exist. Instead, I shall discuss the conceptual history of "ontology" and apply it to a consideration of what the characteristic method of a reasonable ontology – in this instance, an ontology of chemistry – might look like.

[38] Here, a discussion of Heisenberg's view of Plato seems necessary. He states that, in the debate between the atomist, Democritus, and the idealist, Plato, Plato's view seems to be that supported by quantum mechanics:

> I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or—in Plato's sense—Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics [….] Plato's symmetries were not yet the correct ones, but he was right in believing that ultimately, at the heart of nature, among the smallest units of matter, we find mathematical symmetries. (51-52)

Heisenberg's language does seem to suggest that one can access a God's Eye view of the ultimate reality:

> If we wish to approach the "one" in the terms of a precise scientific language, we must turn our attention to that center of science described by Plato, in which the fundamental mathematical symmetries are to be found. In the concepts of this language we must be content with the statement the "God is a mathematician"; for we have freely chosen to

Plato's metaphysical and ontological ideas can be deduced from his written works, Aristotle also mentions his acquaintance with his "unwritten doctrine" (*Metaphysics* 987b-988a; *cf.* esp. Plato's *Seventh Epistle*) in a discussion of Plato's fundamental ontological categories. In contrast to ideal reality, the world of the senses is impermanent and unreliable. He acquired from the Pythagoreans a mystical admiration for number, and he was by nature logically rigorous. His elevation of the art of clear thought and speech in using the dialectical method reflected his concern for linguistic logic.

Aristotle was Plato's pupil, but, as can be seen in his discussion of the Presocratics in the *Metaphysics*—which deals with the basic components of the world and their logical and causal relations, he was well acquainted with the teachings of the other philosophers. He managed to combine the empirical interests of a biologist with the formal precision of a philosopher trained by Plato. In his books such as *History of Animals*, *Generation of Animals*, and *Parts of Animals*, we find him classifying animals according to a hierarchal taxonomic structure. (To jump forward a bit, the "structuralist" categorization of narrative in Propp was, similarly, primarily influenced by organic morphology, rather than linguistic morphology (as in the case of many structuralists who emphasized totalizing, invariant systems). Aristotle's hierarchical concerns can be attributed to the influence of Plato and the organization of the society in which he lived (taxonomies are hierarchical (*cf.* Lincoln, 1992)), but the taxonomies and classifications he makes of living things fall squarely in the naturalistic tradition of Greece.

The Greeks took great pride in their worldly focus. While other cultures built monuments to dead monarchs and airy spirits, many Greeks would point to their gymnasia, theatres, and marketplaces as material evidence of their lively interest in and devotion to this world and this life. But this popular image of the Greeks, which they attempted to promote by contrasting themselves with an Oriental caricature, does not capture the whole truth.

---

> confine our vision to that realm of being which can be understood in the mathematical sense of the word "understanding," which can be described in rational terms.

Heisenberg is not claiming to have gained access to Kant's noumenal reality. As Eddington notes, "Whenever we state the properties of a body in terms of physical quantities we are imparting knowledge as to the response of various metrical indicators to its presence, *and nothing more*" (170). We can speak of the outer edges and distinguishing features of physical quantities, but within those, what is there? Presence? Being? What meaning does "being" have without qualities? Even within the essay quoted above, "The Debate between Democritus and Plato," Heisenberg uses language much like Wittgenstein's philosophy of "language games:"

> [W]hile the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on (50).

And elsewhere, he states of the mathematical language that describes quantum mechanics, that its "applicability to the real world may be very restricted" (Heisenberg 53). In another essay, "If Science is Conscious of Its Limits…," Heisenberg quotes with approval the words of Hertz, who rejects the quest for knowledge of essences as not being consistent with the sciences,

> Whose propositions on limited domains of nature can have only a correspondingly limited validity; that science is not a philosophy developing a worldview of nature as a whole or about the essence of things. (qtd. in Heisenberg 72)

Heisenberg concludes with the words,

> The philosophic content of a science is only preserved if science is conscious of its limits. Great discoveries of the properties of individual phenomena are possible only if the nature of the phenomena is not generalized *a priori*. Only by leaving open the question of the ultimate essence of a body, of matter, of energy, *etc.*, can physics reach an understanding of the individual properties of the phenomena that we designate by these concepts, an understanding which alone may lead us to real philosophical insight. (73)

They were also an ethical, artistic, mystical people (or, more accurately, diverse association of peoples), deeply concerned with the world's meaning and value, and not merely with bare physicality or with giving a dry account of its components and their relations. This interest in biology and *meaning* partially accounts for Aristotle's teleological doctrines. In any case, the point to stress here is that, in Aristotle, whose approach to ontology has exercised such a lasting influence on Western philosophy and science, one finds a happy mixture of logical formalism and empirical interest.

Although the Peripatetic school continued Aristotle's tradition, keeping alive his teachings and commenting on his works, the most systematic of the Hellenistic philosophies was Stoicism. The figure included below is a stemma of basic Stoic ontological distinctions from Long and Sedley's authoritative work on Hellenistic philosophy. This appendix is not, of course, intended to provide a detailed discussion of any single ontology. Rather, it simply attempts an abbreviated history of ideas and is, more specifically, a work of meta-ontology, a study of the history of "ontology" itself, up to its present-day use in disciplines like information science, chemistry, and the incipient discipline of worldview studies. One can observe, in this excerpt from Stoicism's ontology[39], how precise the distinctions were that some ancients made in analyzing reality. Furthermore, in the history of ontology, it is worth pointing out that the Stoics' ontology stressed the empirical or methodical use of ontology, as opposed to the rational or conceptual ontology: "Plato and his successors had tended to assign ontological primacy to the intelligible over the sensible. In making corporeality the hallmark of existence […], the Stoics are in a way reverting to popular ontology" (Long 163). This "popular" ontology is more consistent with the naturalist interests of the early Greek thinkers.





**Fig. 1 (Long & Sedley. *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (1987), p. 163.)**

*A Brief Digression on the History of Skepticism*

Before continuing this condensed account of ontology's history, a slight digression would be appropriate to more fully develop what I regard as a responsible framework for worldview studies relative to ontological issues. Greek thought, in addition to its positive, dogmatic systems, had a long tradition of skepticism. Socrates and Democritus are two noteworthy early figures in this tradition, and Plato's Academy became, soon after his death, virtually synonymous with "skepticism." However, Academic skepticism was nonetheless "dogmatic" in comparison to Pyrrhonism, which resisted even

[39] One ought to point out that Bochenski asserts that there is "no ontology in [the Stoics'] philosophy" (282), and he makes similar claims about the Scholastics. His comments are based on a firm methodological distinction between "logic" and "ontology" that operates throughout his paper but that does not apply in the context of this paper's expanded sense of the semantic range of what "ontology" can mean.

the formulation of its own system as a doctrine and insisted on being interpreted as a practice and a practical response to the evident human condition. Pyrrho, its founder, seems to have been trained in the Democritean tradition. He is said to have accompanied Alexander the Great on the journey to India, where he learned from the *gymnosophoi* ("naked wise men") and Magi a philosophy that would exert a strong influence on subsequent thinkers.[40] He returned to Greece with a practice of using verbal, dialectical techniques to set arguments against each other until their equipollence compelled one to suspend judgment about things not immediately evident. His lifestyle was noteworthy in that he dismissed power and fame, wandered around the countryside, and ignored physical discomfort. When skepticism is rejected as epistemological nihilism (the doctrine that nothing can be known or said positively), Pyrrhonism is not the system in view. Again, Pyrrhonism's agnostic skepticism refuses to commit to belief in the existence or truth (*i.e.*, to reification) of non-evident thoughts or sensations.[41]

Of the "pagan" philosophies, orthodox Christianity's early thinkers were most heavily influenced by Neo-Platonism and Stoicism. St. Augustine responded to the Academic skeptical tradition by turning away from rational and sensory criteria and by turning, instead, to revelation and faith. Fideism is a curious alternative to skepticism, for it finds certainty in what might seem least provable. Aristotle's influence is not observed again until later, after the rediscovery of Aristotle in the Christian West thanks to Arab scholars. The philosophies of some Scholastics, such as St. Aquinas, were heavily influenced by Aristotle's theories and methods of categorization. However, not all Scholastics agreed with Aristotle and Aquinas (*cf.* Bochenski 282-5), and the (Neo-)Platonic and Stoic traditions continued to exercise a strong influence.

Unfortunately, the pedagogical approach of the Schoolmen was much like that of the Peripatetics: although deeply rational, they discouraged original thought, and dogmatic adherence to tradition was preferred to experience and experimentation. Finally, in the debate that emerged between Continental rationalism[42] and British empiricism[43] at the end of the Enlightenment, we recover an environment of mixture and diversity (under empire) similar to that which provoked Aristotle's genius. At about the same

---

[40] For a discussion of whether Pyrrho's philosophy is best understood as having originated under the influence of Indian thought and, if so, in what way it influenced other Hellenistic philosophies, see the excursus at the end of this appendix.

[41] See Kuzminski.

[42] The greatest example of this mode of thought is probably Kant, who outlines his ontological categories most explicitly in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). Indeed, he is the greatest because he in some respects anticipates the modern reintegration of rationalism and empiricism. Hume's empirical arguments liberated him from some measure of the dogmatism to which rationalists are always attracted. Earlier noteworthy examples, who are purer examples of the type, include Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz.

[43] *E.g.*, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill. Berkeley's almost solipsistic account of the world is especially reminiscent of Pyrrhonism's refusal to commit to claims beyond appearance. Kuzminski states: "Unlike Locke the positive dogmatist and Hume the Academic sceptic, Berkeley saw no reason to continue to suppose that some kind of independently existing external reality somehow has to underlay our appearances" (124). Of course, Berkeley's Christian faith means his thought is far more dogmatic than any Pyrrhonist's would ever be.

> time, Robert Boyle helped to detach chemistry from the mystical elements of alchemical philosophy. The dual concerns that occupied Aristotle—using the knife of *logical analysis* to cut the *empirical world* at its joints and determine the relations of its parts—can be found again, in this author's opinion, in Pragmatism.[44] One might be tempted to locate the analytic tradition within the rationalist camp, and, indeed, the practical utility of analytic philosophies like logical positivism suffered by reason of their holding to impractically idealistic standards, but even in the analytic tradition one often finds a happy mingling of a devotion to reason and experiment. Pragmatism builds on the insights of logicians like Boole, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, but with constant reference to the evolved, real world environment disclosed by the sciences. Pragmatism, by referring to the evident, empirical world as the criterion and to appearance as its "primitive," by regarding ideas as instruments but resisting their reification, by resisting a hierarchical arrangement of knowledge, and by preserving a deep respect for logic and dialectic, is a good candidate for being regarded as a sort of modern Pyrrhonism.

*History of Ontology Resumed, Focusing on Its Second Sense*

One of the primary characteristics of modern scientific investigation and one of the primary reasons for the success of industry is specialization. Specialization within a focused domain of inquiry tends to rapidly uncover novel distinctions and analytical tools. That is, what outsiders think of as unbroken units, specialists divide into detailed categories. This, however, produces a problem. Specialists within a field of study need to remain in contact with the discoveries of other specialties. The history of information science illustrates this point. Information science grew out of the documentary movement, which, in turn, emerged from the bibliographic needs of special libraries. One recalls Briet's statement, "[D]ocumentation appears as the corrective to ever advancing specialization" (17). Briet rightly identifies a mediatory function that documentation performs between disparate specializations. Likewise, Shera notes, "One may further conclude that special librarianship and documentation have a common root, and that their divergence has been largely an historical accident" (193). A bibliography may be understood as a simple ontology. Works that fall under a certain semantic category are gathered together and inherit the basic sense of the category, and those properties that distinguish individual works from other works are identified. Bibliographies and indexes are good examples of how an ontology helps create connections between potentially isolated bodies of information.

A similar motive to promote semantic interoperability can be observed in classificatory languages, such as Dewey Decimal and LCSH, which, by means of their specialized notation and controlled terms, endeavor to categorize and create links between information points. They are not as pure and rigorous as an upper ontology (*e.g.*, Cyc), nor, although the Library of Congress Subject Headings are sometimes called a thesaurus, are the hierarchical, associative, and equivalence relations between LCSHs identical to those used in thesauri.[45] Nonetheless, as some scientists working in the biochemical domain observe,

---

[44] For an example of a Pragmatist ontology, *cf.* Peirce's "On a New List of Categories" (1867).

[45] See, *e.g.*, Dykstra, Mary. "LC Subject Headings Disguised as a Thesaurus." *Library Journal* 113.4 (1988): 42-46.

"Although in principle an ontology should reflect facts of a given domain or sub-domain, pragmatically speaking the construction of the ontology is *mainly guided by the intended need*, meaning that the detail at which certain properties or relationships are specified is strongly influenced by the intended use or research interests" (emphasis added, Rojas 89). This quote suggests that ontologies are designed by those working in the sciences, not primarily to be ideal conceptual models that adhere to the strictest standards of predicate logic or clean maps of relations such as those crafted by philosophers, but, rather, to serve research needs—for example, by controlling and ordering large vocabularies and by inferring new relationships among terms. Under the influence of postmodern science,[46] rule based systems, for example, do not seek a complete, systematic understanding of an entire area of study as in semantic networks, frames, and ontologies governed by formal logic. Instead, they are used to evolve novel strategies for resolving specific problems. Ontologies are, in this practical sense, very controlled versions of language that support specific cognitive activities: "First of all, ontology is a representation vocabulary, often specialized to some domain or subject matter. More precisely, it is not the vocabulary as such that qualifies as an ontology, but the conceptualizations that the terms in the vocabulary are intended to capture" (Benjamins 20). Although containing the caveat that this definition refers to "the conceptualizations" of the terms, this vocabulary-oriented definition of "ontology" is exceedingly practical and seems to apply to much of what workers in LIS have been doing for centuries.[47] Bibliographies, indexes, and thesauri have already been mentioned; the same is true of card catalogs and databases.

In the disciplinary transition from bibliography to documentation to information science, one can see a move from the specific to the general, as the discipline came to embrace new technologies, practices, and fields. As information was represented and organized in forms other than traditional bibliographies, the term "documentation" became more appropriate, and as specialists outside of library science and even outside of academia started developing and utilizing technical innovations to build ad hoc systems of "information organization," that term was chosen as more representative of the profession. This helps one to understand why, in information organization, the trend seems to be to focus on the more abstract, philosophical sense of what "ontology" should mean. It is the culmination and achievement of a large historical process.

*Mendeleev's Leap of Faith and the Danger of Ontological Confusion*

In chemistry, one finds a productive example of a practical ontology. Using his periodic table, Mendeleev was able to infer the existence of other elements based on a scheme of representation. The description of the properties of certain elements before they were discovered or created in reality is a sound example of the predictive power of an ontology. From inference, Mendeleev posited existence (Le Poidevin 117-118). In order to justify Mendeleev's inferential leap of faith, Le Poidevin invokes the principle of plenitude, *i.e.*, the idea of nature's abhorrence of a void in the model (118-119)—if something is possible, it will be realized. However, the fact that there are artificial elements itself hints at the unreliable nature of such a principle. The periodic table allows scientists to predict more than the existence of other elements—it allows them to predict the properties of those

[46] See Wersig's "Information science and theory: a weaver bird's perspective."

[47] Along these lines, consider Brookes' argument that the philosophical foundation of information science can be found in "Popper's 'three worlds' ontology" (discussed in Bawden 418).

elements. It is often suggested that an ontology's predictive power is tied to the clarity and precision of its rules of inference. Interestingly, as Woody notes,

> The table does not strictly assert anything; there is no explicit inferential structure in place, no "rules" of inference. Instead, the periodic table displays patterns and assumes they will be far-reaching and robust. Thus, the prediction of a new element is actually the recognition that something is absent from the imposed structure. The table creates a 'hole' and insinuates, if you will, that something is missing" ("Telltale Signs" 26).

Even without a notion like electron orbitals to account for similar chemical properties based on a similar geometric structure, the periodic table allows one to predict the properties of elements: "Much of the reasoning supported by the periodic table is in fact analogical in nature. A category such as 'halide' is significant within the practice precisely because of the analogical reasoning that allows us to say 'If compound X displays certain properties, then the related compound Y will display analogous properties'" ("Telltale Signs" 27). Just as the periodic table allows chemists to think analogically, the Bohr model and diagrammatic schemes based on the idea of orbitals allow chemists to think geometrically (*cf.*, Le Poidevin 128; "Telltale Signs" 30). The use of such methods of representation is largely motivated by their practical utility.

The history of computer science and artificial intelligence (AI), fields of study intimately related to information science, demonstrates a practical orientation to understanding "ontology" that mirrors the chemists' approach. Benjamins et al. note, "Moreover, we often recognize that once a good content theory is available, many different mechanisms might be used equally well to implement effective systems, all using essentially the same content" (21). The issue seems to be that ontologies are, in one sense, the network, set, domain, or hierarchy of related realities and concepts, but, in another sense, they are the mechanisms, representation systems, or languages used to symbolize the interrelated concepts *in order to do things*. Within religious studies, one might be reminded of Geertz's distinction regarding how a religion may supply both a *model-of* and a *model-for* reality. This tension between ontology-as-content and ontology-as-mechanism can be observed in the history of computer science. At some times, the focus has been on developing content theories to represent reality, but, on other occasions, the focus has been on designing novel mechanisms. Figure 2 below, from Fonseca (787), illustrates this distinction between the "double role of ontologies in information science."





**Fig. 2**

In the mid-1970s in computer science and artificial intelligence the focus was on content theories. Capturing knowledge was thought to be the key to building AI systems, and ontologies were used as computational models to facilitate automated reasoning. But throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the focus shifted to a more mechanistic understanding of "ontology." Ontologies became tools for and components of action-oriented knowledge

systems. For example, Gruber's 1995 paper, "Toward Principles for the Design of Ontologies Used for Knowledge Sharing," emphasizes, as its very title makes clear, the *utility* of ontologies as specifically designed *artifacts*. Similarly, Guarino's 1995 paper, "Formal Ontology, Conceptual Analysis, and Knowledge Representation," attempts to shift the focus of AI research from the nature of knowing and reasoning (epistemology) to the nature of reality (ontology) and its relation to knowledge representation. Poli identifies some other definitions of "ontology." Note that, although these definitions were produced in the 1990s, they represent more ideal, philosophical notions of the concept, in part pointing to a shift back toward the "content" sense of "ontology" but also pointing to the fact that many of Poli's sources are academic information scientists (3):

- a collection of general top-layer categories and associated relations and assumptions (Skuce and Monarch 1989).
- a formal description of the objects in the world (Musen 1992)
- a meta-layer theory (ontology as a viewpoint) (Wielinga *et al*. 1994)
- a world model (Mahesh and Nirenburg 1995)
- the content of logical pure forms (Sowa 1995)
- a declarative model of the terms and relationships in a domain (Eriksson, Puerta and Musen 1994).

The above are just a sampling of the many senses in which researchers have found it useful to conceptualize "ontology." We seem to have again arrived at a point in history where specializations have become so abundant, even in the limited area of ontology, that new effort needs to be exerted to integrate and synthesize the various conceptual and mechanistic ontologies.[48] As in the time of Aristotle, rational and empirical interests need to be harmonized.

When logicians work apart from scientists, radical and generally erroneous results tend to arise. In Mendeleev, we have seen an example of the valid inference of existence from an ontology. But, in general, philosophers are overbold in moving from speculation to assertion and reification. One recalls Carnap's complete "elimination of metaphysics" by means of his "internal" and "external" questions. It is a dangerous habit of logical thinkers to overestimate the power of inference, to confidently believe they can infer the character and limits of empirical reality by means of reason alone, to move from epistemology to ontology. For a useful example that will also serve to anticipate my discussion of the ontology of chemistry, one might consider Wittgenstein's *Tractus Logico-Philosophicus*, in which one can observe elements of both of the primary approaches to ontology discussed so far. The two following excerpts illustrate both the danger of moving from thinking about being to believing one knows *a priori* what can and cannot be and the utility of the Pyrrhonean Pragmatist Perspective:

(1)

**5.1361** "We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present. "Belief in the causal nexus is superstition."

Early Wittgenstein thus seems to call science, insofar as it is predictive and not merely descriptive, superstition. Since he earlier calls true philosophy the practice of stating what propositions are possible, he has left for the natural scientists only the role of describing

[48] *Cf.* Bochenski 276, where the problem is framed in terms of logicians' and ontologists' being ignorant of each other's work.

what is, within those bounds set by logicians. One can detect even in Wittgenstein's early work a Pyrrhonist trend, latter to be enriched by what might be called Pragmatist insights. His true, logical language is limited to the evident reality of experience, and he resists the temptation to speak of the nature of the noumenal. One cannot perceive the whole universe, so it is not reasonable to assume the uniformity of physical law.[49] The meaning of a word is the real-world object to which it corresponds; thus, the words themselves cannot become objects of contemplation and cannot be confused for existents. The rejection of causation can, in some systems of thought, flow from a conception of the world as a unity with a determinate character. When no outside forces, whether spirits or "scientific" laws,[50] are thought to compel the world to behave in a certain way, when, rather, the world operates in a specific way in accord with its determinate character, causal principles cease to be anything but tools for analysis and conditions of human understanding. The notion that causation has only instrumental meaning may appear to invite what Jaegwon Kim would call "causal overdetermination" (*cf.* Ladyman 746) because a phenomenon might be accounted for differently in different, apparently incompatible (because irreducible) models. A term like "overdetermination," like the term "irreducible," runs the danger of begging the question, blocking a concept by definition in the same way Wittgenstein is attempting to deny "determination." In order to avoid this trap, one does well to use all such terms with an awareness of their relative and contextual nature. Wittgenstein here seems to be regarding the future as an emergent phenomenon, with novel properties that could not be anticipated based on inference, which, in his system, is only valid when tautological.

(2)

> **6.52** "We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer."

He means, one supposes, that the world *is* but does not *mean*. One cannot ask the questions about life because one has adopted his purely logical language. But the questions still exist. Humans impose meaning on the world, and they can wonder about those meanings they give it. He, like the Pyrrhonists,[51] rejects such impositions on the phenomenal world. His lexicon of legitimate vocabulary excludes all those meanings (ethical, social, artistic, etc.) that we assign to things and that are, of course, not inherent in them, but do arise from our understood relations to them. As with St. Anselm's "proof" of God's existence, one may feel a bit cheated. Language, humanity's most powerful tool, has been turned against itself and has been limited to a very narrow domain. Questions are resolved by definition, not by providing an answer. This is a very adult sort of philosophy. It has passed through the uncomfortable realization of solitude and subjectivity; it has realized that the noumenal

---

[49] But see 6.124, which seems to lead to the idea of a universe as an unbroken whole, a causal nexus, composed of elements with determinate characters, the whole of which has no meaning outside itself, that does not say, but shows.

[50] *Cf.* Ladyman 751: "Bertrand Russell ([1913] 1917) famously diagnosed the commitment to a law of causation among philosophers as based on the projection into science of 'anthropomorphic superstitions' deriving from the practical human predicament with respect to the asymmetry of past and future in our memories and capacities for control. More recently, Michael Redhead (1990) argues that laws of physics express functional relationships between physical quantities rather than describing causes, and that citing forces as causes is anthropocentric." Forces, one might say, are not that far from the operation of very predictable "spirits."

[51] See Kuzminski 131-138.

essence of things cannot be fully known; and, what cannot be spoken of certainly, it consigns to silence. But is something like Mendeleev's leap possible?

*Striking a Balance*

This is a productive time in the history of ontology. The number and scope of the ontologies being made and used exceeds the bounds of what any one individual could learn in a lifetime. New connections are being made automatically between the data sets of scholars and labs that have never interacted in the real world. Novel consequences implicit in existing information are being mechanically inferred by the use of ontologies governed by formal logic. In this prolific environment, one wonders what a good formal ontology of chemistry might look like. One wonders about chemistry specifically because it occupies the conceptual space between physics, which some consider fundamental and whose properties are so counterintuitive, and the macroscopic world of experience, whose categories are so familiar. The efforts such as those of Aghila, Brockwell, Essex, Frey, Gordon, Sankar, Taylor, and van der Vet and projects such as ChEBI (Chemical Entities of Biological Interest), CombeChem, Chemical Ontology (CO), Integrated Relational Enzyme Database (IntEnz), REX Ontology, ChemAxiom, OntoNova, and CML (Chemical Markup Language) are noteworthy, but this paper will not analyze them. A study of that sort would be valuable, but its details would detract from my focus, not on detail, but on method. As it happens, the lessons of history would seem to agree with the conclusions of VandeWall and others in suggesting that an ontology of chemistry will probably never be satisfying to an idealist who desires an essentialist, physically reductive account. VandeWall's arguments are largely in response to Ellis, who, in VandeWall's words, "believes that our current scientific understandings of physics and chemistry suggest that our ontology should be built of irreducible properties, necessary connections and a modernized version of Aristotelian essences" (906). The characteristics of the ontology Ellis seems to endorse should be consistent with the ridged requirements of formal ontology design so attractive to logicians. But does such an ontology preserve the phenomena of chemistry? If not Ellis's approach, what method might be more appropriate?

Let me return to Mendeleev's periodic table. By studying the properties of an information system, he was able to propose the existence of objects of knowledge. Budenholzer defends the occasional utility of this approach, stating,

> Although it may seem to some rather naive to presume that an examination of our knowing process can tell us something about the object of that process, to deny it would undermine all of our knowledge, scientific and humanistic. Many areas of presumed knowledge may be in error, but in each case when we believe that we are mistaken, we use the most reasonable approach we can think of to try to rectify the mistake. The knowing process is all we have. (Budenholzer 320)

It is true that a thoroughgoing skepticism that dogmatically doubts the knowing process undermines itself; it is a theory that rejects the legitimacy of all theory. Using the knowing process to know the world is, truly, "all we have." Nonetheless, attempting to turn to the process, and not its use, in order to arrive at knowledge of the world, runs the risk of being unfaithful to the process itself, a process that has proven itself time and time again in recent history. Knowledge is arrived at through the adaptation of the mind by means of activity in and experience of *the world*. Bertrand Russell at one point accuses pragmatism of verging

on "cosmic impiety" (737), for he rightly observes that pragmatism does not supply one with an adamantine foundation of absolute truth. Nonetheless, I think a sense of the knowledge process as an evolutionary adaptation and harmonization of the mind to the world exhibits a reverence for objective reality. The ancients attempted to use pure reason to deduce the nature of the world, and they generated numerous creative but erroneous theories. Because subjectivity is a fundamental aspect of the human condition, the world can only be known as an object of knowledge; the only ontology one can interact with, ultimately, is the phenomenological. That being said, since the world has a determinate character revealed by the "knowing process," that process, because and when it is an effective mechanism, must have a determinate character of its own that bears a specific relation to the world it reveals. This suggests the fundamental unity of the two sorts of ontology focused on so far, and the qualified and occasional validity of using knowledge of the subjective knowing process to learn about the object of knowledge.

Again, such an attempt is fraught with potential for error. The ancients based their physical models on what seemed intuitive to their minds: heavenly bodies moved in circles because circles were balanced and perfect; women were defective men because men enjoyed superior social status; but, in the midst of this confusion, sometimes their theories were sound. Budenholzer states, "If the basic criterion of the real is its imaginability […] the emergence of really new things seems impossible" (Budenholzer 345). But, as he points out, really new things do seem to emerge, so the criterion of imaginability is called into question. This is in part because the criterion of imaginability (or, elsewhere, "intelligibility"), though a reliable guide in those domains in which evolution and culture have adapted us to our environment, can be too narrow. In itself, it does not allow those things which we cannot imagine by virtue of our biological or experiential limitations. Familiar philosophical notions such as the infinite regress and extension may serve as examples of this. The simple fact that one cannot imagine an infinite causal regress or a mental image without an extension in space does not eliminate the possibility that the universe in some sense existed forever[52] or that there exists a property without a location. One may not choose to believe dogmatically in such a thing as an incorporeal, atemporal existent because it needlessly complicates one's model of the world, but an agnostic attitude would seem more appropriate in such a case than a dogmatic commitment to a belief in its non-existence and the, in a sense, *positive* non-existence of all questionable things.[53] One must remain aware of the fact that the use of inference to make dogmatic universal claims about the world—*i.e.*, the assumption of the uniformity of nature—goes far beyond the evident. Insofar as the scientific method makes only provisional claims that are always potentially subject to modification or rejection in the light of new evidence, the scientific method urges a Pyrrhonean approach of suspension of judgment concerning all but immediately evident matters and a Pragmatist resolve to treat theories as contextually useful instruments. An examination of some features of chemistry supports this approach.

---

[52] Consider, *e.g.*, the cyclic, vacuum fluctuation, and tunneling models. If the universe is its own uncaused cause, regression may indicate the recursive nature of the universe's spontaneous auto-emergence. Another possibility is that the sense of an "infinite causal regress" when thinking in universal terms points to the fact that causation itself subsists merely as an instrument of human cognition. That is, it exists, but it exists epiphenomenally and contingently as a property of the mind.

[53] One might still, for the purpose of brevity and clarity when speaking with an ordinary person, speak of doubtful things as not existing.

*An Ontology for Chemistry?*

One might think that chemistry would be an ideal domain for the application of a formal ontology. The periodic table has already been mentioned as a kind of practical ontology, and the periodicity of the elements indicates that, on some level, a model of discrete components with recurring properties is valid. Likewise, orbital and molecular diagrams, which have proven to be so useful in accounting for general chemical properties, types, and classes (*cf.* "Telltale Signs" 32; "Putting Quantum Mechanics to Work in Chemistry" S624), are constructed according to regular rules that could be formalized to "in principle allow algorithmic productions" ("Putting Quantum Mechanics to Work in Chemistry" S623). Above, ontology's ability to promote conceptual unification and interconnection was described. The structures and "laws" of chemistry demonstrate a similar mediatory function. For example, concerning the ideal gas law, Woody observes,

> The explanatory power of the ideal gas law for chemistry is more about general connections than particular derivations. It unifies the treatment of actual gases through selective attention to core properties. It builds bridges between different levels of theory, and it provides some general methodological directives regarding the proper role of theory within chemistry. ("Telltale Signs" 25)

Finally, the structures described by chemical diagrams support inference and reasoning (*cf.* "Putting Quantum Mechanics to Work in Chemistry" S623). Given the fact that the inference of new or undiscovered implications in data sets is often cited as one of the primary reasons for using ontologies in the sciences and the fact that determinate structures like those found in chemical diagrams can be so readily adapted to an ontology format, one is not surprised to learn of efforts to create formal chemical ontologies. However, the notion that atoms and molecules have true, determinate shapes that account for their macroscopic properties is complicated by the evidence—even from a relatively simple substance like water.

VandeWall notes that the properties of water cannot be attributed to the shape of the $H_2O$ molecule. Water, as humans typically understand and experience it, is not reducible to $H_2O$: "All the typical observable properties of water—its pH, its density, its boiling and freezing points, its utility as a solvent, are dependent not upon its atomic ratio but the interactions between the dissociated ions" (VandeWall 910-911). Indeed, VandeWall goes so far as to describe the dynamic interactions of systems of "$H_2O$, $OH^-$, $H_3O$ and other related but less common ions" as being "so complex as to be quite literally unthinkable" (910). If no single molecular shape can account for the "essential properties of the natural kind, $H_2O$," no other single property, such as molecular weight, would seem to be explainitory, even in principle, because it would assume a specific, finite shape: "Molecular weight is a problematic choice, because there are multiple weights for this compound, due to the existence of isotopes of both hydrogen and oxygen. Molecular weights of anything from 18 to 24 are possible given various combinations of the isotopes" (VandeWall 912). This is not to deny, but rather to qualify, what was said above concerning chemistry's ability to be formalized, to create conceptual connections between different domains, and to predict phenomena. Atomic number is responsible for the very real "regularity and predictive power of the periodic table" (VandeWall 913). Indeed, it is not the proton that is directly responsible for the chemical properties of the elements. Chemical properties can often be accounted for by electrons, the number of which are present in an atom being directly

related to the number of protons. Yet, atomic number represents a significant simplification of elemental phenomena. Consider deuterium (D), otherwise known as heavy hydrogen, which differs from hydrogen, not in atomic number, but in atomic weight. Water containing a high concentration of $D_2O$ has significantly different properties from "water": higher visciosity, slight toxicistiy for eukaryots, and a higher boiling point. VandeWall observes:

> It would seem that which properties chemists will deem essential to explain an object's behavior depends upon what behavior they happen to be observing. If you are interested in solubility, $H_2O$ and $D_2O$ are the same molecule. But if you are measuring boiling points it is clear that the essential property is actually atomic weight and you are dealing with two quite different substances. (VandeWall 913).

Again, an instrumentalist approach that regards the utility of all abstract models as relative to the context would seem to be demanded by the nature of the phenomena.

In order to preserve the properies of the world, statistical abstraction is demanded. This proves to be the case in connection with water, whose properties seem to emerge from a complex interaction of ions, the shapes of which are themselves constantly in a state of flux:

> Statistically, the average of a vast number of $H_2O$ molecules in various shapes *seem to behave* as if they were bent to a certain angle with bonds of a certain length, twist, and so on. But it is far from obvious that a mathematical idealization of a far more complex actual behavior should qualify as our basis for belief in a metaphysically necessary property. I would suggest that the 'bent molecule' picture, like the round earth and Newtonian projectile motion, is better viewed as a scientific model—a convenient fiction of scientific theory—than an essential property. (VandeWall 915)

Budenholzer states concerning statistical inference that it is, "to use a common expression, just a cloak for ignorance" (Budenholzer 343). Insofar as we know that statistical results are simplifications of more complicated phenomena that are incompatible with other, more detailed accounts, Budenholzer's claim seems justified. On the other hand, statistical models also generate new information that would otherwise be obscured. They are descriptive and predictive, but inherently limited. No longer distracted by trees, one perceives the forest. Although the ideal gas law, for example, is incompatible with finer granularity models of gas atoms and molecules and needs to be modified in order to deal with specific gasses, it serves as a useful conceptual foundation for working competently with gasses:

> Mathematical modeling allows movement from consideration of empirical properties to consideration of the particulate nature of gases. Treating gases as collections of particles underscores the centrality of the atomic theory for chemistry; we are told the kinetic theory of gases properly explains gas behavior. At the same time, it endorses a Newtonian paradigm of analysis by conceiving of gas particles, whether atoms or molecules, as point masses subject to classical mechanical analysis. ("Telltale Signs" 24)

Statistical methods often treat more complex realities as data points, which are similar to ontological instances with properties but without extension, in order to draw inferences or arrive at descriptions of emergent patterns. Likewise, although the patterns of molecular diagrams and hybrid orbitals are immensely useful for chemists, they should be understood to perform the role fictions have always performed: they are lies that reveal truths. On the

atomic level, an increase in atomic number leads to more and more complex spin-orbit interaction, which, in turn, makes models built up of ordinary orbitals increasingly divergent from the reality and unfit for use. Something similar happens as a consequence of the electron-electron interactions when atoms bond to form molecules. Thus, Jenkins says of orbitals,

> To correct this error, we must […] move beyond the orbital concept altogether to an atomic wave function that, because of interelectronic interactions, *cannot* be expressed as a product of single-electron wave functions. Therefore, we must give up orbitals not only on the basis of the dictates of quantum mechanics but also on the basis of obtaining stricter agreement with experimental results in *chemical* problems. (1056)

The above quote makes reference to the "dictates of quantum mechanics." In the search for a fundamental ontology, after having realized that the conceptual tools of chemistry do not fully correspond to or account for the phenomena, one naturally hopes that the answer can be found in the reduction of chemistry to physics.

One would do well to frame a discussion of features of physics with a return to a clear awareness of the utility of the notion of determinate structure in chemistry:

> Molecular structure or shape [….] has empirical and practical import. X-ray diffraction reveals structures in molecules (*e.g.*, tetrahedral patterns in water). Differentiation of isomers is based on molecular structure as well as the explanation for properties like acidity. Molecular chirality (handedness of molecules) led to disaster in thalidomide-based treatments in the 1960s, because one species of handedness was harmful while the other was beneficial. (Bishop 712)

Yet, the preceding paragraphs have made evident the need to consider the physical level in order to understand chemical occurrences. As Woody states, "Although these simple shapes [in schematic orbital diagrams] maintain the integrity of certain spatial features of the orbitals they represent, they are highly conventional and thus more symbolic than iconic in nature; in this respect there is a significant transformation of representation in moving from graphs of the wavefunction to the schematic diagram elements" ("Putting Quantum Mechanics to Work in Chemistry" S620). However, at the quantum mechanical level, one immediately runs into practical difficulties. The operation of the Hamiltonian on the wavefunction is generally too complex to solve because a wavefunction with multiple electrons requires too many variables. Thus, one resorts to approximations; a pruning principle is required because of the practical impossibility of moving by sheer force of calculation from one ontological level to another: "Morowitz [uses] the example of the Pauli principle as the pruning principle that allows chemistry to emerge from physics" (Budenholzer 345; *cf.* 351). Furthermore, reflecting on the quantum state, Bishop notes, "[T]here is a problem here because the 'true' molecular Hamiltonian at the level of quantum mechanics—could we actually write it down [and we cannot (Bishop 711)]—would not exhibit any features corresponding to molecular structure and, hence, would provide no basis for distinguishing isomers or describing optical activity and other phenomena dependent on molecular structure" (712). Entanglement, one of the properties most characteristic of the quantum level, makes illegitimate the practice of drawing firm structural and mereological distinctions, so important on the chemical level. Bishop mentions other features of a complete wavefunction that are incompatible with the chemical reality, stating,

"[T]he full molecular Schrödinger equation would have *too many* symmetries, *e.g.*, nuclear permutation and rotational symmetries missing from real molecules" (713). Given this state of affairs, what is the significance of the methods and approaches used to approximate, simplify, or "prune" the complete wavefunction?

Quantum mechanics alone cannot explain molecular structure. Happily, an explanation is possible. When entanglement was mentioned above, it was cited in part as an instance of the necessity to consider the way the full context of an interrelated system of contingencies complicates matters; if one conceives of pruning procedures as a form of assigning context to a system, the methods[54] used to move from the wavefunction to the molecular level serve as an instance of the converse case. Here, context clarifies, as it were, by adding nuance and qualification to a property or description (*cf.* Bishop 716). Returning to the question of significance, one can now note the coincidence of ontology-as-mechanism and ontology-as-content (*i.e.*, empirical and theoretical realities); Bishop states:

> The Born-Oppenheimer approach amounts to a *change in topology—i.e.*, a change in the mathematical elements modeling physical phenomena—as well as a *change in ontology*, including fundamental physical elements absent in the quantum description; in the case of molecular chemistry, the new ontological elements are structures absent from quantum mechanics. (Bishop 714)

This does not mean that the distinctions between thoughts about the world and the world have been utterly conflated, but it does indicate that a *real* relation obtains between equally real levels of the world. A complete wavefunction may be more specific than an orbital, but if one regards only the physical reality as being truly real, one will inevitably sever one's ties to emergent reality. One must be able to move from the specific to the general, from parts to wholes. Pruning procedures are required, and they must be guided by data from the supervening chemical ontology (see "The Ontological Autonomy of the Chemical World" 131). Translation must be somewhat unfaithful and guided by autonomous intent. Woody observes that the elimination of data irrelevant to a specific context is, actually, a manifestation of knowledge about the object of inquiry: "Being knowledgeable often consists in knowing what to ignore. Yet to ignore something, strictly speaking, presupposes some awareness of it; ignoring is substantially different from being ignorant" ("More Telltale Signs" 782). Let one imagine that scientists eventually reach the level of physical (or conceptual) simples, defined by one property alone. Surely, such a property could only be spoken of by analogy, not only because it would be so far removed from the conditions of human life, but also because it would have no "lower order" constituent properties. Such an elementary, atomic, essential unit would, being the most basic of things, reference nothing lower. It would be a dead end; its primacy would result in a kind of vacuity (Le Poidevin 121-122)[55]. Since neither physics nor chemistry, considered independently, can provide an absolute ground of being, another approach is required.

---

[54] *E.g.*, "the Born-Oppenheimer (or the adiabatic) procedure" (Bishop 715).

[55] If the sense of an essential unit cannot be understood to lie below itself—for it is the ground of being—might its sense then be the very universe it is supposed to explain? Pointing downward is, indeed, an empty gesture, but might one, having arrived at the base, point back? If this is the case—and no other option seems to be available—we arrive again at the vacuity of the essential property.

*Pyrrhonean Pragmatic Perspectivism (PPP)*

An instrumentalist attitude toward orbitals and wavefunctions allows one to avoid commitment to an overreaching ontological hierarchy or reductionism. That efforts to establish a hierarchy in terms of asymmetrical supervenience cannot be sustained simply indicates that one must adopt a more pragmatic approach (*cf.* Le Poidevin 122-124). One can see now that the reductionist movement illustrated above, in which ontological problems on the chemical level led to a consideration of the physical level, was a fruitless effort: "[R]ecognizing that orbitals do not exactly capture the data does not imply the reduction of chemistry to quantum mechanics. Nothing prevents someone from believing that orbitals do not refer while acknowledging both their great utility and the fact that they are not derivable *ab initio* from quantum mechanics" (Jenkins 1060). Although one cannot derive orbitals from first principles based solely on quantum mechanics and although the determinate structure of orbitals turns out not to refer to the absolute, essential character of being, chemists can and do make good use of orbitals. As a consequence of using orbitals in some contexts as if they were real, real results are obtained. Jenkins further states, "We can thus see the two types of wave functions as providing two types of explanation: A more detailed explanation in terms of the constituents of the system and their interactions, and a less detailed, but often more useful, explanation in terms of more familiar chemical categories" (1057).

Ontologies are designed by scientists and information specialists, not primarily to be ideal conceptual models or maps of relations, but to serve research needs, for example, by controlling and ordering large vocabularies and by inferring new relationships among terms. Let us consider again Rojas' description of the balance that is thereby struck between the scientist's interest in the truth about the world and her contextual information needs: "Although in principle an ontology should reflect facts of a given domain or sub-domain, pragmatically speaking the construction of the ontology is mainly guided by the intended need, meaning that the detail at which certain properties or relationships are specified is strongly influenced by the intended use or research interests" (89). Ultimately, the scientist's criterion is pragmatic: "[W]e reject orbitals in particular cases because they do not predict experimental results with an accuracy sufficient for those particular cases. In short, we reject orbitals when we do on experimental grounds, not on metaphysical grounds" (Jenkins 1059; *cf.* "More Telltale Signs" 790-791). The scientist observes the environmental evidence, and she adapts the model to the context. She does not cling to a preferred theory because it is beautiful or comfortable.

The powerful explanatory function of the interdependent conditions that constitute "context" recalls the earlier discussion of the ultimate emptiness (but instrumental utility) of causation. If reductionism is a vain endeavor and if causation is best understood as a condition of human thought, "downward causation" seems to be as legitimate of an idea as causation from the physical level. Expressing confidence in the legitimacy of downward causation, Bishop states,

> [B]ased on our best physical theories, there is no reason to suspect, aside from hidden reductionist metaphysical presuppositions and some misunderstandings of science, that physics should be exhaustive of the physical nor that physics should somehow be inert with respect to contexts set by chemistry and biology, for example. (Bishop717-718)

When radically different properties emerge from a lower order, as in the case of the cognitive systems—with their properties like qualia, self-awareness, meaning-making, and imagination—generated by neuronal activity,[56] one's faith in reductionism is shaken. Budenholzer claims that, in his view, "[T]he emergence of increasingly complex schemes of recurrence and finally of new things opens the way for downward causation; higher-level integrations intelligibly integrate the lower-level conjugates" (Budenholzer 353). Because higher-level integrations are, even in the reductionist view, real conglomerates of fundamental units, their behavior does represent the real behavior of lower-level conjugates—simply from a perspective not visible at the lower level. But when one comes to understand the power of context to impress certain properties on a lower order, as when the interactive process of measurement appears to collapse a wavefunction, one realizes that relativity, not reductionism, is the proper response. How could a property not present in a lower ontology be present in a supervening ontology? The answer seems to be that the new property, while not a property of any entity in the lower ontology, is a property of the ontology itself, the context, now understood as an entity in the higher ontology (*cf.* Le Poidevin 121; Budenholzer 342). The pragmatist-perspectivist spirit of the new mechanistic philosophy, on which the BBA draws, solves this problem similarly and is consistent with what I call my Pyrrhonean, Pragmatist Perspective (PPP).

Budenholzer states:

> No set of conjugates or level of things is more real than any other. The real is verified intelligibility at whatever level one is operating. Saying that each level is equally real is not denying the clearly verified conclusion of levels of reality. At each level the random conjugates of the lower level are unified in a higher integration. Chemistry systematizes what would be merely coincidental events on the atomic level,[57] allowing the emergence of an autonomous science of chemistry. (341)

The same property could be "caused" by more than one lower-level process in the sense that more than one theory preserves the phenomena. Should multiple models be considered

---

[56] As with the example above of physics and chemistry, one might note that the available tools for and factors involved in measuring and modeling the brain invite humility. For example, one might think of familiar limitations like the enormous information averaging in a single fMRI voxel, the difference between measuring actual neuronal firing and detecting oxygenated blood-flow, the statistical methods of spatial normalization of measured brains to standardized templates, the soup of neurotransmitters (neuropeptides and small-molecule neurotransmitters), neuromodulators, and neurohormones, and so on. The statistical aspect of research, of course, is a sure sign that one is dealing with more complexity than our human instruments can handle. The obliteration of unnecessary distinctions and the statistical abstraction and simplification of complex factors are indications of our instrumental limitations, both of our brains and their many artificial scaffoldings.

[57] This comment deserves some elaboration. If one reflects on the nature of complexity, one quickly realizes that it is not the same as randomness. Entropy (*i.e.*, a kind of unpredictability that may be specified and measured in physical and (quantum mechanical entropy) information systems (Shannon entropy)) is a property of every system, but what strikes people as "complex" tends to have properties, not just randomness, but of sensed order (*e.g.*, the gas laws, the limit on lossless compression of a meaningful text). In this way, "complexity" is linked to the difficulty faced by a particular agent (broadly understood) may have making sense of something. Take what is sometimes called "Kolmogorov complexity" – the length of the shortest algorithm that produces a specified output. Complexity in this case depends on the specified programming language. Likewise, one's perspective (*e.g.*, one's background language, model, or internalized ontology as well as one's goal relative to something) will play a decisive role in evaluating something's complexity: whether it is dismissed as random or attempted to be made sense of through mapping or translation operations from it and from known domains into a novel mental space.

valid? In pragmatic terms, this is reasonable. One is affirming an ontology as being contextually valid. This is different from affirming all ontologies simultaneously: "[E]ach science, and even each theory, operates on its own ontological level, where the entities and regularities referred to by the theory may be legitimately considered as real: there is no contradiction in conceiving orbitals as existent entities at the chemical level but not real in the quantum mechanical world" ("The Ontological Autonomy of the Chemical World" 136). If a property can be accounted for in terms of a particulate model and a wave model, very well. Nonetheless, one runs into the problem of distinguishing between identical things. If x and y have different underlying origins but (for the purposes of analysis) represent the same property, then should different names continue be used? Or ought one to obliterate any distinction and call "y" "x" because they are both the same? The early Wittgenstein would say, "Yes," but the later Wittgenstein would likely note that, although one language game might not need to recognize a distinction, another might demand it.

The term Budenholzer uses to define the true or real, "verified intelligibility," recalls Dewey's pragmatic term for truth, "warranted assertability." Budenholzer later states, "If, however, we are willing to take the radical step that modern science, especially modern physics, is willing to take—asserting that the real is verified intelligibility and that what we sense, either externally through our sense organs or internally in imagination, are simply data—then no level of intelligibility is somehow more real than another" (347). Solipsism was mentioned above.[58] This view also has much in common with Pyrrhonism—especially in its original form—and Buddhism. The acceptance of the flow of impressions as valid in themselves, correlating to something else without directly representing something else, is non-falsifiable because it contains no strong faith claims. Very little is inferred beyond the direct experience. The correspondence theory of truth has an ancient pedigree, but its elevated criterion of truth may be challenged by the pragmatic argument to the effect that "this kind of correspondence presupposes that there is some context-free way to demonstrate that one ontology is objectively closer to the actual ontology of the 'real world' (the 'way the world is')" (Bishop 720). Strict correspondence rightly seeks confirmation, but it seeks a degree of confirmation that is unobtainable.

Physics does indulge in hopes – part of the greater hope of consilience – for a grand theory that unifies all the fundamental forces, but its hopes are motivated, not primarily by a sort of Presocratic quest for the essential nature and material principle of the world, but by a pragmatic desire for an expanded range of power to explain and act: "[M]ost 'working scientists' are much less interested in the essential natures of things than whether or not their models of how nature behaves yield the results they desire. The identification of natural

[58] It may be that the universe can be reduced to a unifying explanatory principle of "information" (dataism), but even this does not move beyond the world's knowability to arrive at positive, certain knowledge of it. Is "modern science, especially modern physics" really "willing to take [this] radical step"? Modern physics does not deny the reality of human cognition and human ideas as truly corresponding to brain states; modern physics uses its different models with an instrumentalist's lack of attachment to their being absolute representations of the strange phenomena at the lowest levels of existence; nonetheless, the reduction of being to information is hardly the catholic and orthodox doctrine of modern physics. In light of the repeated recurrence of solipsism-like, idealist approaches in some Pyrrhonean and even some pragmatic thinkers, the holographic principle is interesting because it suggests the interpretation of everything in terms of information. (For example, this would seem to unify the physical and information science senses of entropy.) This approach gives one a single, dimensionless unit (the bit), but, because "information" always includes the notion of a knower, it does not satisfy the desire for a God's Eye view of nature apart from human subjectivity. But if human subjectivity is folded into this scheme and reduced to information, one has rich material for sf speculation.

kinds is much more likely to be a philosophical project than a scientific one" (VandeWall 917). In evaluating this hope, one must first acknowledge that most humans do not claim to have arrived nor do they arrive at knowledge of the thing-in-itself; concerning the noumenal reality, Lombardi states, "Since the privileged viewpoint of God's Eye does not exist, there is not a single 'true' ontology: all ontologies have the same metaphysical status because all of them are constituted by equally objective descriptions" ((2005) 138). Because "the noumenal reality does not constitute an ontology to be described by science" ("The Ontological Autonomy of the Chemical World" 139), scientists impose various properties onto arbitrary elemental units. Science produces abstracted models of the world, dealing with approximations and generalities, because humans and any thinking machines that can so far be imagined are finite. A "particle" has different properties (such as spin and mass), but itself has no conceptual parts; it's simply a mental marker, a sign of those properties. String theory is an advance insofar as it attempts to conceptualize the "particle." Similarly, as noted in n. 50, the difference between forces and the spirits of old is not so great. Certainly, they are impersonal, but their essential nature is almost as undefined. Above, Le Poidevin's philosophical arguments for the vacuity of absolute physical reductionism were referenced, and this was in addition to my extended discussion of some specific instances in which ontological reductionism breaks down. Summarizing Primas's arguments along these lines, VandeWall states,

> Primas argues that if by reduction we mean 'higher level theory together with its interpretation can be deduced from the basic theory, then chemical kinetics cannot be derived from quantum mechanics, the theory of heat has not been reduced to statistical mechanics, temperature is not a molecular concept, the model of hybridization of orbitals is not predicted by quantum theory . . . and so on' (Primas 1991, 163). (916)

Even if reductionism could be carried out, merely arriving at a fundamental, "atomic" unit would not be a theory of everything. One suspects there will always be a potential conceptual level below any smallest physical level.

The pure distinction between ontology and epistemology is blurred: "From an internalist perspective, […] there is no way of describing things 'as they really are': we have always access to reality through our conceptual schemes; there is no noumenal ontology. If we have given up God's point of view, there is no privileged perspective, and all descriptions have the same degree of objectivity – all ontologies are equally real" ("The Ontological Autonomy of the Chemical World" 142). Thus, the ontology of the real would consist of multiple, incommensurate, related, but autonomous ontologies (*cf.* the new mechanist philosophy). The relations between ontologies—pruning concepts—would, then, ideally be grounded in known relations. Lombardi states, "In order to defend the autonomy of relative ontologies and, as a consequence, the objectivity of emergent properties, it is necessary to stress that the elements required for interconnecting different theories are neither contingent nor conventional factors, but have a *nomological content*" (emphasis his, (2005) 144). The introduction of theoretic pruning concepts connected to unverified things in response to hierarchy problems (*e.g.*, strings, extra dimensions, etc.) do not "answer" questions in the same way experiment does. They are more comparable to the way a multiplication of epicycles preserved Ptolemaic astronomy. They define problems away, which is good when the question is artificial, but bad when used because of impatience or discomfort with the state of ignorance and suspension of judgment. That being said, if we

lack the ability to experiment, the pragmatic utility of a pruning concept is justification enough for its continued provisional use:

> [W]e do not always have an empirical basis to decide if a certain relationship between ontological items holds or does not. Nevertheless, if we are realists in some sense, we conceive of linguistic or conceptual items as referring to ontological items; then, we consider that the relationship between two theories and their terms reflects a certain relationship between the ontological domains described and referred to by those theories. ("The Ontological Autonomy of the Chemical World: A Response to Needham" 83)

The relations between ontological domains are real. A given pruning concept may need eventual modification to better reflect such relations, but, since it has a degree of explanatory power, it has a measure of reality. Interestingly, by abandoning the quest for an ultimate reality, more aspects of reality as we know it can be acknowledged:

> The traditional acceptance of the ontological dependence of the world of chemistry upon the world of physics relies on metaphysical realism and its fruitless seeking for the only 'real' ontology, as well as on the unjustified belief that quantum mechanics describes, at least approximately, reality in itself. Once we admit that the reference of each theory is – partially – constituted by the theory itself and that this is the only meaningful notion of ontology, the illusion of the ultimate discovery of an independent reality vanishes. As a consequence, chemical ontology does not depend on a more fundamental ontology, but only on the conceptual framework that constitutes it. ("The Ontological Autonomy of the Chemical World" 145)

The elements of the physical ontology partly constitute the chemical ontology, so the expression above, "does not depend on," must be interpreted to mean, 'is not supplied with a foundation of necessary and sufficient properties by.' This PPP philosophy takes seriously the scientific method, making use of provisional conceptual frameworks to integrate new knowledge. Because it interrogates and doubts itself, the scientific method embodies pragmatism's rejection of absolute certainty. The scientific method's focus on reproducibility implies that science is an activity with a social context; this humanistic, contextual feature pragmatism emphasizes as well.

*Possible Objections*

The PPP, then, would seem to be the perspective most consistent with the method of scientists, our knowledge of the world, and our sense of the human condition. However, there are two final objections to this approach, *viz.*, (1) that it is psychologically uncomfortable and (2) that it idolizes human power. If there is no solid, eternal ground and law of being, if knowledge of the essential, objective, noumenal character and meaning of the world is fundamentally inaccessible, if everything is dynamic, relational, and contextual, one feels dismay and perhaps despair. Is this not nihilism? Has not everything solid and sound been undermined? As it happens, figures like Pyrrho, the Buddha, and Wittgenstein, who advocated silence or suspension of judgment concerning non-evident matters, seem to have regarded this method as having therapeutic value. Distress is often caused by attachment to and desire for beliefs in certainties, eternals, and absolutes because such desires are so consistently thwarted. And let one recall that Pyrrhonism, as a practice, leaves

room for its eventual elimination.[59] The happy day may come when one may receive mystical access to the essential nature of the objective world, transcending the limits of one's subjectivity in knowledge of the fundamental ontology, but, until that day, a mature peace of mind can be found in this method.

The second objection may be put thus: Pragmatism focuses on utility, and utility is power *for humans*. It is an anthropocentric view that alienates humanity from its environment. The fullness of being is reduced merely to instrumental potency; language is reduced to a system of power and manipulation; concepts are reduced to tools for cutting and reshaping the world in the human image. The mystery becomes merely the ready-to-hand or, perhaps still worse, the present-at-hand. There is no reverence for a non-human, objective reality to which humans must yield or perish.

This is the objection, bluntly stated, and it has some validity. A Pyrrhonean skepticism that invites doubt, a pragmatism that treats concepts as fictional instruments, and a Nietzschean perspectivism that encourages one to see power at play in worldviews is an empowering philosophy. Yet, the charges leveled against it are not entirely fair, for pragmatism, although opposed to the humiliation of humanity under the iron dictates of dogma, ever consults the evolved environment, urges adaptation thereto, and occupies itself, not with inflexible devotion to an ideal end, but with real concern for consequences. Furthermore, elements of Pyrrhonism can serve to temper some of the excesses of pragmatism. Recall Pyrrho's disinterest in power and glory. Moreover, human powers are not, in themselves, responsible for the self-destructive alienation from and careless use of nature that has come to be so widespread. Rather, clinging to judgments, ideal ends, faith claims, fears, rights, and fantasies may lead to a *misuse* of powers, for such beliefs, treated in such a way, are themselves may be understood as misused powers. Pyrrhonism methodically avoids all commitment to action, down to the very level of thought and speech, that is not grounded in the evident, phenomenal world of mental and physical impressions. The flow of thoughts is not opposed, but neither is it indulged to the point of giving assent to the non-evident. Thus, it discourages the idea "that the ontology of quantum mechanics is truer of the phenomenal world of the laboratory, hospital and industry than molecular chemistry because that is clearly false" to the evident phenomena (Bishop 720). Its method humbles the pride of dogmatism without humiliating; to a science corrupted by an excess of will-to-power, it restores the truly scientific motivation of wonder. Thus, Pyrrhonean pragmatism would seem to be the perspective by means of which one can have an ontology of chemistry or, indeed, of allomythoi.

### *On PPP, Pluralization, and Polytheism in the (Post-)Secular World*

> *I have sown, like Tycho Brahé, that a greater man may reap;*
> *But if none should do my reaping, 'twill disturb me in my sleep*
> *So be careful and be faithful, though, like me, you leave no name;*

[59] Diogenes Laertius, *Life of Pyrrho*, 9.76.46-52. One may also be reminded of the Buddhist saying, "If one should encounter the Buddha on the road, kill him," indicating that even attachment to things like the Buddha and nirvana should be rejected. Along the same lines, Wittgenstein states:

> My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
>
> He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (151)

*See, my boy, that nothing turn you to the mere pursuit of fame.*
– Sarah Williams, from "The Old Astronomer"

Weber, who thought deeply about the role the concept of "calling" had played from Saint Paul to Luther and Calvin, calls science a "vocation," one to which, in the old astronomer's words to his pupil, a scientist might be "faithful." And truly there are scientists for whom what they consider "science" is as comprehensive and all-encompassing a worldview as Christianity was for men like Augustine and Hegel. Like Casanova's, however, Heidegger's analysis of the modern, secular age, as represented by his "The Age of the World Picture" (and his brief "Memorial Address"), neglects the central role played by pluralism, and its consequences for the sort of story he wants to tell. It is only by doing so that he can attribute to the entire *age* the scientistic metaphysic of the calculative "world picture," whose dominance in science itself is open to question and whose role in the thinking of the age is not as powerful as he supposes, though it did have its period of ascendance especially in the philosophy of science during the time Heidegger composed "The Age of the World Picture" and continues to exert a strong influence especially on economics and many social and psychological scientists (*cf.* Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," p. 153, Appendix 10). There are those who think in the "thoughtless," calculative manner he describes, but others think in other ways. This multiplicity of perspectives generates the true metaphysic of the age, which we may label, drawing on Weber's language and my own, "PPP polytheism."

As early in the analysis of "secularization" as in Weber's "Science as a Vocation," one finds, albeit in a distinctly Nietzschean expression, "polytheism," the notion of pluralization. Weber states,

> We live as did the ancients when their world was not yet disenchanted of its gods and demons, only we live it in a different sense. As Hellenic man at times sacrificed to Aphrodite and at other times to Apollo, and, above all, as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city, so do we still nowadays, only the bearing of man has been disenchanted and denuded of its mystical but inwardly genuine plasticity. Fate, and certainly not 'science,' holds sway over these gods and their struggles. ("Science as a Vocation," p. 148)

By his elegantly economical reference to the popularity of Fortuna in both the Roman and the Medieval periods, and before her the Hellenic Τύχη and after her the modern comfort of invoking, though neither Aphrodite nor Apollo nor Jehovah, certainly the last, most hidden, unknown god, Fate, he signals a loss of "plasticity" and a taking on of something ridged: not, he is careful to note, the determinism of "science," but Something. In Rome, one might choose to venerate Venus or Juno; in China, one might seek one day the priests of Taoism and another the sages of Confucius or the Buddha. Pervading all, though, was what might be called the spirit of "tolerance," which found above all things intolerance, and in a special sense incivility, intolerable. That is, the early Christians and their God were condemned for their insistence on there being but one Way for all and for their atheistic assertion of but One God for all. These claims violated the dictates of Fate, who proclaims like Weber that each must choose her gods and devils herself, and be free to do so according to her own values, within the bounds of civility. Similarly, as Rieff puts it, "In the emergent democracy of the sick, everyone can to some extent play doctor to others, and none is allowed the temerity to claim that he can definitively cure or be cured" (*Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*, p. 355).

Every *dominus* might advise another, but who would be so hubristic as to assault another by attempting to impose belief in his god upon him? Thus, although we, unlike interpreters such as Eliade and Berger, would trace secularization's conceptual genesis ultimately to Zoroastrianism and only secondarily to Judaism, our interpretation would support Berger's claim that, "The Protestant Reformation, however, may then be understood as a powerful re-emergence of precisely those secularizing forces that had been 'contained' by Catholicism" (*The Sacred Canopy*, p. 124). We would designate pluralism as one of the foremost of those forces.

Berger, in *The Sacred Canopy,* observes that, with regard to society's necessarily coercive character, "In its most powerful apotheoses […], society may even destroy the individual" (p. 11). We may here anticipate a portion of our response to Heidegger by noting that Augustine's theology resembles a calculative attitude that reduces all things to one, only the One is God rather than number; likewise, Hegel's identification in alienation has a troubling legacy in colonialism, orientalism, and in the assimilationist model for race relations. Berger expands on the implications and importance of its coercive power for society's continued transmission:

> Every society that continues in time faces the problem of transmitting its objectivated meanings from one generation to the next. This problem is attacked by means of the processes of socialization [….] Socialization, however, has a crucial dimension that is not adequately grasped by speaking of a learning process. The individual not only learns the objectivated meanings but identifies with and is shaped by them. He draws them into himself and makes the *his* meanings [….] The success of socialization depends upon the establishment of symmetry between the objective world of society and the subjective world of the individual. (*The Sacred Canopy*, p. 15)

Pluralism fills the process of socialization with discordant noise; it makes difficult the unquestioned assumption of religious reality because it strains the ability of the individual to establish a sane symmetry between her inner world and the objectivated multiplicity. A diversity of nomoi cannot "appear to be co-extensive" with a single coherent cosmos (Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, p. 25). The collapse into anomy and chaos, with all its distressing, anxious, uncertain psychological ramifications (*cf.* Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, pp. 21-23), is a highly likely consequence of pluralism:

> Subjectively, the man in the street tends to be uncertain about religious matters. Objectively, the man in the street is confronted with a wide variety of religious and other reality-defining agencies that compete for his allegiance or at least attention, and none of which is in a position to coerce him into allegiance. (Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, p. 127)

The man on the street is "uncertain" precisely because he has so many options and no authority to compel him. This produces a crisis of plausibility because the social "structure" that undergirds it is weak:

> The world-building potency of religion is thus restricted to the construction of sub-worlds, of fragmented universes of meaning, the plausibility structure of which may in some cases be no larger than the nuclear family. Since the modern family is notoriously fragile as an institution (a trait it shares with all other formations of the private sphere), this means that religion resting on this

> kind of plausibility structure is of necessity a tenuous construction. (Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, p. 134)

One might observe that even the nuclear family is no guaranteed source of stability, for many households are religiously divided, forcing parents no less than churches to engage in the "market situation" that is constitutive of the "pluralistic situation" (Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, p. 138), if they would have their children preserve and be preserved in their faiths. The presumption of a marketplace of privatized religion is present in both Berger and Luckmann, and, though space precludes a detailed discussion, the theme of the market is taken up by Reiff, whose secularized "psychological man" adopts the rational, shrewd, and calculating self-interest of "economic man" and orients it toward the inner life by means of shrewd thought about emotional investment, rather than toward the accumulation of property. Implicit in the image of the marketplace is a pluralistic situation, in which a person stands bewildered before the diversity of potential worlds and identities she might inhabit as if with a piece of toast before innumerable jams, butters, and nutty spreads.

Regarding the contemporary cult to the god Tolerance, the permissiveness that has been the result of democratization and pluralization, Reiff notes that, even though Freud's couch was the emblematic space of tolerance, "Freud disdained permissiveness as much as asceticism; both falsely resolved the essential dualism in human experience, that very dualism between mind and flesh [and civilization and individual] that produces the misery of the human condition" (*Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*, p. 344). Freud did not falsely promise a cure for humanity's alienated, ambivalent, and uncertain situation; instead, he offered to help people become more conscious of it in its very unpleasantness and thereby more able to manage it. Lacking "the fundamental pleasure of agreement" about ideals and evils (Reiff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, p. 4), at least modern people can agree to tolerate each other's psychological "journey" of self-discovery.

Having discussed the pluralized state of the modern age, we must now consider the thoughtless mode of thought that Heidegger criticized. He seems to have largely in view the philosophical tendencies called variously, "positivism," "realism," and "analytic philosophy," although he does not name them specifically.

We should admit up front that we do not think there is a "true reality" in the sense that positivist realism, for example, or Platonism, hoped for. We fall into the PPP polytheist camp that we would claim is the dominant metaphysic of the age. Thus, we would not regard one level of reality as more or less "real" or one way of knowing the world (*e.g.*, third person vs. first person) or one model of a reality as the only valid or useful way of describing it. Different approximations, generalizations, and abstractions filter out some information so that other things can be made clearer (*e.g.*, Newton's laws), but any one abstraction necessarily, by virtue of its being an abstraction, does not give a complete picture. We might cite Einstein's correction of Newton to illustrate this, but it's perhaps even more fruitful to note that Newton's laws do not really illuminate, say, photosynthesis. Likewise, Shannon information is very useful, but one cannot see how Gibson information could be practically reduced to Shannon information. The world is endlessly knowable, so I am very skeptical of any sort of reductive eliminativism. Heidegger states,

> A fifth phenomenon of the modern age is the loss of the gods [….] The loss of the gods is the situation of indecision regarding God and the gods. But the loss of the gods is so far from excluding religiosity that rather only through that loss is the relation to the gods changed into mere "religious experience."

> When this occurs, then the gods have fled. The resultant void is compensated for by means of historiographical and psychological investigation of myth. ("The Age of the World Picture," pp. 116-117)

So Heidegger does not think we live in a polytheistic age, but rather one in which myth is investigated historiographically (*cf.* the endless stream of books on the historical Jesus, Buddha, Socrates, Founding Fathers, etc.) and psychologically. Reiff's psychological man, characterized by such qualities as tolerance and interest in memory, play, humor, and fantasy may be set against Heidegger's busy, unreflective, amnesiac, who lives, he says, in the age of the "world picture."[60] Could both of these figures dwell in the same age? Yes, that is pluralism. But note how Reiff characterizes the wisdom and the life of psychological man: "The wisdom of the next social order, as I imagine it, would not reside in right doctrine, administered by the right men, who must be found, but rather in doctrines amounting to permission for each man to live an *experimental* life" (emphasis added, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, p. 26).

The scientific, experimental life, though focused on subjectivity, can be a structure that generates a very different metaphysic from that of the "world picture," in which the realm of being that scientists seek to know through rigor, method, and procedure is taken to be objective, that is, made up of fixed objects, subject to calculative rules and laws. The experimental or seeking life is a consequence, in part, of science calling into question inherited metaphysics while putting forth its own values as a vocation, but it is also a consequence of all the other perspectives to which people are exposed. Science, which begins in wonder and boundless curiosity (*i.e.*, a question, asked at the beginning and then after the completion of an experiment), memory (*i.e.*, the questions asked and answered before), and imagination (*i.e.*, the hypothesis), need not generate the metaphysic of the "world picture" and thoughtless, calculative thought. On the contrary, science can make one more keenly aware of acknowledged fundamental limits to precision, based on awareness of the nature of one's experimental apparatus, mathematics (*e.g.*, Gödel's incompleteness theorems), experimental design, measurement devices, and personal biases. These limits have in part to do with the way scientists end up 'cutting the world at its joints,' and they generate the pluralistic, perspectival, pragmatic metaphysic that is, we here claim, characteristic of science as a practice and at odds with discredited realist interpretations of representations. Scientists are keenly aware of the fact that reality only shows up as a function of these limits, these conditions of possibility of showing. The utility of a model in predicting behavior within some acceptable degree of certainty can be taken as a correspondence theory of truth, but the numerous domains of the sciences, let alone their toleration and acknowledgment of their basic limits, can only be understood in terms of coherence within (and instrumentality for) a domain. Those who think about science the way Augustine and Hegel thought about Christianity are, to use Weber's language, "a few big children in university chairs or editorial offices" ("Science as a Vocation," p. 143).

So Heidegger's "The Age of the World Picture" (and "Memorial Address") can be seen as a response to positivism. But it is this paper's claim that (1) scientists do not all or even generally think that way anymore and that (2) the widely embraced virtue of "tolerance" is reflective of the truly dominant metaphysic, if such it can be called, which Weber rightly designated as a sort of polytheism. The PPP polytheist is well described by Weber's words,

[60] It should be noted that psychological man does possess the economic, calculative quality that Heidegger attributes to the thoughtless age of the world picture.

contrasting "civilized man" with Abraham, who lived like Eliade's "archaic man" within an eternal cycle that took its meaning from mythic archetypes:

> Whereas civilized man, placed in the continuous enrichment of culture by ideas, knowledge, and problems, may become 'tired of life' but not 'satiated with life.' He catches only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings forth ever anew, and what he seizes is always something provisional and not definitive. ("Science as a Vocation," p. 140)

A PPP polytheist lives in many realities. She can even fall into the thoughtless calculation of the metaphysic of the world picture while dogmatically advocating "reductive eliminativist materialism," whether people are reduced to cognitive modules or social forces or evolutionary narratives, or "libertarian free-market capitalism" or some other totalizing and essentializing system and then without sensed contradiction shift into a provisional, open reality of tolerance. Some may seek to make calculation the sole mode of thought, but this is unlikely to happen unless some cataclysm forces humanity into it by fear. A concluding concession: it may be that this critique of Heidegger is unfair, since PPP polytheism owes its existence in part to his influence (*cf.*, *e.g.*, his great advice on "The Age of the World Picture," p. 138, Appendix 2; on the alternation of fundamental ways of knowing the world, *cf.* Blumenberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, pp. 234-235). And Heidegger himself suggests that even

> now the melting down of the self-consummating essence of the modern age into the self-evident is being accomplished. Only when this is assured through world views[61] will the possibility arise of their being a fertile soil for Being to be in question in an original way—a questionableness of Being that will open ample space for the decision as to whether Being will once again become capable of a god. ("The Age of the World Picture," p. 153, Appendix 11)

## Part 3: Phenomenology – Categorization and Interpretation of Experience

One might first observe that Chantepie de la Saussaye, in inventing the expression "phenomenology of religion," simply meant to refer to the endeavor to identify the nature of religion by means of comparative description. So many of our present associations when we encounter the concept are later developments. One might also note the curious distortion involved in Eliade's identifying himself as a *historian* of religion. He imagines himself into the supposed experience of a historical group and then links it to the universal, ahistorical experience of the reality that stands outside history. So let me now examine the sense of "ontology" that is sometimes called "phenomenology."

I would begin with Heidegger's distinction between the "ontic" and the "ontological" to focus on a third important meaning of "ontology," which is sometimes called the "phenomenological" sense. This adjective, like the word "ontological" with which it shares some semantic overlap, bears at least two primary relevant senses. In this section, I will address "phenomenology" both as a philosophical school and as an approach within religious studies.

In both cases, responsible scholarly use of phenomenological approaches requires awareness (as with contemporary understandings of "myth" having profound and persistent roots in Romanticism (von Hendy, 2002)) of their links to Western mystical and Romantic

[61] And he hints in Appendix 12 that American pragmatism is headed in this direction.

traditions. One may note in phenomenological thinkers a tendency to think that phenomenology gives unmediated access to a primordial reality that is really real in a sense that contrasts with, for example, the abstractions of a modern, scientistic ontology or the particularism of a modern, historicizing mode of knowing. With Blum (2012), I regard phenomenology as a necessary first step in allomythic analysis and explanation, but one must treat it as a sensitive-but-always-interpretive stage, not as one of access to cataleptic impressions.

According to the still-dominant creation narrative or disciplinary origin story (see Imhoff, 2016 for a critical reappraisal and alternative narrative), the 1963 Schempp decision played a key role in producing departments of religious studies in universities and colleges throughout the United States and continues to exert a powerful influence on the character of religious studies, including its students and scholars. Whether this tidy narrative is "true" or not, as a myth for the discourse community of religious studies scholars in the U.S., it certainly exerts force on disciplinary practice and identity. Its primary consequence for the field has been a gradual movement away from theological reflection on the (generally Protestant) Christian faith to a study of diverse religions making use of the theoretical and methodological insights of modern science and philosophy. This is noticeable in religious studies' increasingly sophisticated use of systems of phenomenological categorization and *epochē*.

In the spirit of reflexivity, I should confess my particular interest in categorization, which should be clear from much of this work. While earning my Master's of Library and Information Science degree, I was very interested in knowledge ontologies, as might be guessed from the preceding section. Furthermore, due to my interest in ancient (and fictional) cosmologies and, thus, in the basic categories used to identify the constituents of the universe, categorization continues to be a great interest of mine, and Eliade's work in this area is especially relevant.

By "increasingly sophisticated" above, I intend to suggest both religious studies' use of categorization to pick out features of religious phenomena that had been previously neglected and scholars' growing awareness of and attention to the problems inherent in categorization—*e.g.*, the need to reflexively locate oneself in one's analysis, to attend to the fact that categorization is a powerful tool of control that can oppress others, to avoid the danger of reifying or essentializing one's categories and the living people whose lives and concerns the categories are intended to illuminate, and, in the light of all this, to take seriously one's moral obligation to empower others by resisting and subverting categories that oppress, while still trying to maintain *epochē*.[62] This, then, is the disciplinary "place in which I stand," to borrow the terminology of Thomas A. Tweed.

Let me first describe the general character of phenomenology in its philosophical sense, looking at two of its principal founders, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and the character of phenomenological studies of religion, as illustrated by Van der Leeuw. (I also interact with Heidegger in some detail elsewhere—*e.g.*, Appendix 9.)

[62] Note how being sensitized to this moral obligation—a consequence especially of Marxist and feminist (and other activist-disciplinary) critiques of the role of ideologies in oppressing people, which, like phenomenology, attempt to uncover disguised patterns (see Chapter 4)—runs into conflict with phenomenology's avoidance of making truth claims or speaking of the "real" referents of religious (and other worldview-related) experience and language.

*Philosophical Phenomenology*

Husserl took the ancient skeptical notion of *epochē*, which, as noted above relative to Pyrrhonism, referred to the "suspension of judgment" that should arise after one comes to apprehend the equipollence of arguments, and defined it as a "bracketing" of judgment concerning the truth value of beliefs about experience. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and other phenomenologists described the conditions of subjective experience. Husserl noted that consciousness is always *lived* and thus has duration in time. What he is interested in is the "*life*-world," the "pregiven" (1970:128), intuitive, subjective life that precedes "objective," "scientific" accounts. Husserl (1970:125) states, "What is actually first is the 'merely subjective-relative' intuition of prescientific world-life." The life-world comes first in that it is what is actually lived and perceived, before logical analysis and scientific interpretation come into play:

> Husserl's use of the term "substruction" to contrast between the subjectivity of the life-world and the 'objective,' the 'true' world, lies in the fact that the latter is a theoretical-logical substruction, the substruction of something that is in principle not perceivable, in principal not experienceable in its own proper being, whereas the subjective, in the life-world, is distinguished in all respects precisely by its being actually experienceable. The life-world is a realm of the original self-evidences. (cite)

In "substruction," in abstraction, that is, in categorization, most of the raw information of experience is eliminated, abstracted away so that one may focus with unusual clarity on a single aspect of experience. Nonetheless, Husserl (1970:130) restores to the transcendent metaphysical ideas of science their human source: "[T]hese are human formulations, essentially related to human actualities and potentialities, and thus belong to this concrete unity of the life-world." Because objective scientific thought, with its fundamental concern with the truth-value of propositions, comes as a later, abstract reflection on experience, Husserl (1970:135) introduces *epochē* as "a withholding of natural, naïve validities and in general of validities already in effect…. of all participation in the cognitions of the objective sciences… of any critical position-taking which is interested in their truth or falsity." Furthermore, consciousness is always intentional, is *consciousness-of*. Experience consists of consciousness of things; it is directed at things—memories, tactile sensations, received categories, and so on. The phenomenologist engages in thick description of such experiences, such consciousness-of, in order to find the internal "structure" or typology of subjective experience (Husserl 1970:139). In Husserl, in addition to finding the interest in typology that is common in phenomenological thinkers, one finds as well as an empathetic concern with the intentionality of others in a culture for whom things exist as part of a pregiven world of thereness-for-everyone (*cf.* Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 92).

Merleau-Ponty notes that experience always has a context, especially the body and the world, which he calls the "horizon" of consciousness. In their full, enormous wondrous rush and abundance, the body and the world are too much to have knowledge of. For this reason, we must abstract essences: "The need to proceed by way of essences does not mean that philosophy takes them as its object, but, on the contrary, that our existence is too tightly held in the world to be able to know itself as such at the moment of its involvement, and that it requires the field of ideality in order to become acquainted with and to prevail over its facticity" (Merleau-Ponty 2002:xvi).

To my mind, although I may in this case be reading Merleau-Ponty against himself, the emphasis Merleau-Ponty places on the body suggests an obligation to apply what is known from the cognitive sciences and evolution to the study of religion. Both phenomenology and cognitive science have subjective consciousness as their subject matter, albeit in different ways. The academic fields of inquiry as we find them are fragmented and hyperspecialized, and this fragmentation is most evident between the humanities and the sciences. There are frequent cries for interdisciplinarity, but how often are they heeded? Indeed, phenomenologists often insist on defining themselves as having nothing to do with science, with objective predication. For example, Merleau-Ponty (2002:xvii) calls the "essences" of conscious life "antepredicative," for all the distinctions and categorizations found in predicative language are implicitly present in prelinguistic experience (*cf.* Merleau-Ponty 2002:xviii). That being said, our body's form is the consequence of its long adaptation to the material environment. We live always in context of humanity's being continuous, physically and historically, with all other life. Our bodies experience things in certain ways because of their physical structure and the character of the nervous system, both of which have been determined by our evolutionary history. In none of this do I intend a contradiction of Merleau-Ponty's (2002:ix) observation with Husserl that

> I am not the outcome or the meeting-point of numerous causal agencies which determine my biological or psychological make-up. I cannot conceive myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of biological, psychological or sociological investigation…. I am, not a 'living creature' nor even a 'man', nor again even 'a consciousness' endowed with all the characteristics which zoology, social anatomy or inductive psychology recognize in these various products of the natural or historical process—I am the absolute source, my existence does not stem from my antecedents, from my physical and social environment.

That is, the phenomenological being is purely subjective; her ontology is not the ontology of the natural scientist. Her categories are different from the scientists'. Nonetheless, the subjective character of existence depends on the body and on society. If we lacked eyes, or lacked eyes capable of perceiving color, or lived in a language lacking the color blue,[63] the subjective qualia of blueness would not be perceived. And so, although the cognitive scientist and the phenomenologist speak to different levels of existence, neither of which is reducible to the other, they speak of the same world and can contribute to the fullness of each other's accounts, all of which endeavor to know the wonderfully boundlessly knowable world (*cf.* Merleau-Ponty 2002:xv). As Merleau-Ponty (2002:xxi) states, "Should the starting-point for the understanding of history be ideology, or politics, or religion, or economics? Should we try to understand a doctrine from its overt content, or from the psychological make-up and the biography of its author? We must seek an understanding from all these angles simultaneously." *Epochē* is a direct consequence of the phenomenologist's humble and reverent awareness of the complex interplay of body and world, self and other, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. She brackets or excludes claims of truth or reality precisely so that everything else will not be excluded. Therefore, although the categories of the cognitive scientist or evolutionary biologist are not the same as those of the phenomenologist, a phenomenological account of religion would welcome the presence of other angles. With regard to the evolutionary approach to religion, J.Z. Smith considers it

[63] *Cf.* Whorfian studies on the degree to which the ability to discern color is determined by one's language.

one of the four primary modes of comparison that are so far available; the four are "the ethnographic, the encyclopaedic, the morphological, and the evolutionary" (Smith 1982:22). However, he notes that past "evolutionary" studies of religion were flawed: "Evolution, as represented by the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century practitioners of anthropology and comparative religion, was an illegitimate combination of the morphological, ahistorical approach to comparison and the new temporal framework of the evolutionists" (Smith 1982:24). It is worth noting J.Z. Smith's high praise of Bellah's recent book, *Religion in Human Evolution*. The evolutionary classificatory method has improved.

Although philosophers like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty focused rather exclusively on the subjective experience of individuals, scholars of religion have applied phenomenological themes, insights, and methods to the study of religious communities, cultures and worldviews. This move from the individual to the social is significant, introducing new complexities and challenges. The precision with which philosophical phenomenologists describe individual subjective experience is found in phenomenological studies of religion, but it is in some cases not possible to bracket interpretation as fully. Phenomenological studies of religion empathetically bracket considerations of the truth-value of religious beliefs, but they do not bracket *all* interpretation. As soon as one talks about a religion, one has entered a world of interpretation. In religious experience, interpretation is always already implicated—to bracket it out fully would be to dismantle the experience beyond recovery.

Gerardus van der Leeuw supplies an interesting example of systematic typological categories of religious phenomena. For instance, he categorizes religions as "Religions of Remoteness and Flight," "The Religion of Struggle," "The Religion of Repose," "The Religion of Unrest," and so on. The English title of one of his principal works, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, alludes to the influence of Hegel, in whose thought the ideal essence and its historical manifestation mutually and inseparably constitute one another. Like Hegel, van der Leeuw's categories and typology are deeply influenced by his belief in Christianity and creation of a work that is preliminary to theology; for example, he quotes Przywara, asserting that the "obvious data" of phenomenology supply "preparedness for revelation" (van der Leeuw 1986:685). But he also distinguishes between the phenomenology of religion, which adopts , and theology, which is concerned with the search for truth (van der Leeuw 1986:687). His understanding of power, his central explanatory category, is heavily influenced by Taylor's animism. Van der Leeuw (1986:683) seems to anticipate J.Z. Smith somewhat in saying of the phenomenology of religion, "How can I pursue phenomenology when there is no phenomenon?" And, like Smith, he is perhaps more honest with himself than some other phenomenologists when he confesses the important role of "interpolation" in his work. In van der Leeuw's (1986:684) statement, "[A]ll understanding, irrespective of whatever object it refers to, is ultimately religious: all significance sooner or later leads to ultimate significance," we find an anticipation of Tillich (see 1959:7).

Paul Tillich, like van der Leeuw, ultimately has a theological goal, the reunification of a divided world. This is implied in the title of his 1959 work, *Theology of Culture*. When van der Leeuw, in the quote above, speaks of "ultimate significance" and expands the religious to encompass new categories of understanding, and still more when he stresses the fact that God is utterly different from and more than a phenomenon, and thus not a possible object of phenomenological study (1986:688; see Tillich 1959:5, 12*ff.*), we find an echo of

these things in Tillich. Tillich is a sort of Christian existentialist (*cf.* 1959:76*ff.*, 112*ff.*), who believes that Christianity, properly understood, supplies the answers to our modern ontological problems (*cf.*, *e.g.*, 1959:210). He states, "Religion, in the largest and most basic sense of the word, is ultimate concern…. You cannot reject religion with ultimate seriousness, because ultimate seriousness, or the state of being ultimately concerned, is itself religion. Religion is the substance, the ground, and the depth of man's spiritual life" (Tillich 1959:8). For Tillich, the category "religion" embraces and harmonizes all humanity's highest values; it is Rudolph Otto's definition of the holy, "ultimate concern." One may be reminded of Plato's conception of the One or the Good, in which all virtues reside. Nonetheless, Tillich's God, though certainly a philosopher's deity, is a form of the Christian God and, thus, more like Hegel's—or, to use his own comparison, like Augustine's—than like Plato's. The phenomenological stance that being is directly accessible to the subject and is true because it is the unfalsifiable ground of all other truth is quite similar to the Augustinian formulation of the nature of God and Augustine's response to the problem of the two Absolutes, God and Being (*cf.* Tillich 1959:12*ff.*). Truth is essentially, and being is essentially true. God, as truth, is known directly as being. Once known without mediation, God can, in Tillich's view, be found in culture (Tillich 1959:26), and this expansion of the category opened up whole new areas of study for scholars of religion. In Tillich, many categories are collapsed into God and religion, but, for this very reason, the study of religion was expanded by him to embrace new aspects of human experience (*cf.* Tillich 1959:46*ff.*). He can, like Ninian Smart, examine Marxism as a sort of "hidden" religion (Tillich 1959:181*ff.*).

Joseph Campbell's *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* is a valuable example of categorization. The monomyth, like Frazier's mythic pattern described in *The Golden Bough*, is derived from the numerous instantiations of the epic heroic journey, and it consists of a pattern divided into three main parts, with 17 possible stages. His effort is phenomenological insofar as it seeks to uncover essences, patterns, typologies, but he regards the patterns he finds as "truths disguised for us under the figures of religion" (Campbell 1973:vii). The essences and typologies of phenomenological interest are truths in the sense that they precede concern with truth—they are simply given. But this is not the sort of truth Campbell means. His "truths" are truths about the human psyche, and psychoanalysis is their "grammar" (*ibid.*). Like Tillich, Campbell has a transformative, medicinal, or therapeutic intent (*cf.* Tillich 1959:112*ff.*, 211*ff.*). Campbell expresses the belief that "the very high incidence of neuroticism among ourselves follows from the decline among us of such effective spiritual aid [as myth]" (1973:11). The structure of the monomyth reflects basic cultural and psychological drives and needs. As in other comparative works, Campbell's categories help us to feel the connections and associations between things more keenly. Such divisions as "The Hero as Warrior," "The Hero as Lover," "The Hero as Emperor and as Tyrant," "The Hero as World Redeemer," may remind one of van der Leeuw. His allusive style and the way he juxtaposes disparate myths everywhere makes us see novel relations among things. His application of Freudian and Jungian psychoanalytic categories to mythology makes them personally relevant. One easily gets caught up in his conviction of the unity and transcendence of human consciousness that surpasses all cultural particularization. Feuerbach reduces all theology to anthropology, and Campbell reduces all mythology to psychology. However, he loves myth so intensely that he fails to be suspicious of the categories it supplies. Campbell is so moved by the heroic ideal

and its potential to empower an individual, especially one with a felt lack of agency, through compensatory identification with the hero and participation in his journey (for a similar approach, in this case to fairy tales, see Bettelheim's *The Uses of Enchantment*; on sense of agency, see Haggard & Chambon, 2012), that he neglects to consider the social origins of the heroic ideal in conditions of oppression.

Picking up on a theme that is very important in Eliade, Campbell states (1973:40-41),

> The torrent pours from an invisible source, the point of entry being the center of the symbolic circle of the universe, the Immovable Spot of the Buddha legend, around which the world may be said to revolve. Beneath this spot is the earth-supporting head of the cosmic serpent, the dragon, symbolical of the waters of the abyss, which are the divine life-creative energy and substance of the demiurge, the world-generative aspect of immortal being. The tree of life, *i.e.*, the universe itself, grows from this point. It is rooted in the supporting darkness; the golden sun bird perches on its peak; a spring, the inexhaustible well, bubbles at its foot. Or the figure may be that of a cosmic mountain, with the city of the gods, like a lotus of light, upon its summit, and in its hollow the cities of the demons, illuminated by precious stones. Again, the figure may be that of the cosmic man or woman (for example the Buddha himself, or the dancing Hindu goddess Kali) seated or standing on this spot, or even fixed to the tree (Attis, Jesus, Wotan); for the hero as the incarnation of God is himself the navel of the world, the umbilical point through which the energies of eternity break into time.

Mircea Eliade, in *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, highlights the importance of the category of the "center" in the ontology of archaic man. He references data "which show us how reality is conferred [in the mind of archaic man] through participation in the 'symbolism of the Center': cities, temples, houses become real by the fact of being assimilated to the 'center of the world'" (Eliade 2005:5). For example,

> According to Indian beliefs, Mount Meru rises at the center of the world, and above it shines the polestar. The Ural-Altaic peoples also know of a central mountain, Sumeru, to whose summit the polestar is fixed. Iranian beliefs hold that the sacred mountain Haraberezaiti (El-burz) is situated at the center of the earth and is linked with heaven…. In the Edda, Himinbjorg, as its name indicates, is a 'celestial mountain'; it is here that the rainbow (Bifrost) reaches the dome of the sky…. According to Mesopotamian beliefs, a central mountain joins heaven and earth; it is the Mount of the Lands, the connection between territories. Properly speaking, the ziggurat was a cosmic mountain, *i.e.*, a symbolic image of the cosmos, the seven stories representing the seven planetary heavens (as at Borsippa) or having the colors of the world (as at Ur). Mount Tabor, in Palestine, could mean ṭabbūr, *i.e.*, navel, omphalos. Mount Gerizim, in the center of Palestine, was undoubtedly invested with the prestige of the Center, for it is called 'navel of the earth' (ṭabbūr ereṣ; *cf.* Judges 9:37: "…See there come people down by the middle [Heb., navel] of the land…")…. For Christians, Golgotha was situated at the center of the world, since it was the summit of the cosmic mountain and at the same time the place where Adam had been created and buried. Thus the blood of the

> Saviour falls upon Adam's skull, buried precisely at the foot of the Cross, and redeems him. (Eliade 2005:12-14)

The two extended quote above have been supplied because they furnish so many examples of similarity in approach to category construction—note the eclecticism, the use of many individual myths to generate a metamythical structure never instantiated in any single culture.[64] The details of the ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean conception of the cosmic center could be gone into in a great deal more depth, but it should be stressed that a form of the idea is valid for the region. In addition to stressing the role of the center in ancient thought, Eliade notes that humans located themselves in and understood themselves to be a part of an eternal order, an absolute mental map of archetypical categories. By participating in this "extraterrestrial archetype, be it conceived as a plan, as a form, or purely and simply as a 'double' existing on a higher cosmic level" (2005:9), one becomes eternal and real oneself, escaping what Eliade terms "the terror of history." Eliade (2005:110) follows Kierkegaard in suggesting that what was most novel in Judaism was the introduction of the category of faith, which is inherently absurd, and, thus, of history.[65] Eliade himself was perhaps overly influenced by the Pan-Babylonian interpretation of his time and by a tendency to universalization and essentialization (*cf.* J. Z. Smith 1992, especially what he has to say about Australian aboriginal religion in the first chapter, and 1982:29, which finds much value in Pan-Babylonianism, however excessive it ended up being). However, since Eliade's scholarly focus was on detecting similarities among cultures and determining underlying cultural structures, these tendencies, as in Campbell, are understandable.

Since the Schemmp decision, one can observe a gradual expansion of the subject matter or category of religion, what it means to study "religion." Instead of merely being Christian theology, other religions were considered, as in van der Leeuw. This goes along with *epochē* in the sense of detachment from commitment to any *one* tradition.[66] Instead of simply studying what were conventionally regarded as religions, culture was explored, as in Tillich, and, in Tillich, we observe the expansion of the category of interest from "God" to "ultimate concern." Ninian Smart continues this categorical expansion,[67] looking at what he calls in the title of one of his books *Dimensions of the Sacred* (*cf.* Merleau-Ponty 2002:xx, wherein Hegel's Ideas are called "*dimensions* of history."). In phenomenology, too, we have

---

[64] See, too, Eliade's (2005:39) explicit identification of the hero as "a category, an archetype."

[65] *Cf.* Eliade 2005:108, which stresses the great challenge of living up to the demands of a conceptual system that "look[s] history in the face." one detects shades of Campbell and Tillich in Eliade's (2005:157) discussion of the therapeutic function of the abolition of time: "He is free to be no longer what he was, free to annul his own history through periodic abolition of time and collective regeneration. This freedom in respect to his own history—which, for the modern, is not only irreversible but constitutes human existence—cannot be claimed by the man who wills to be historical." One is tempted to speculate that Eliade's fondness for his ontology of archaic man, with its abolition of history, may have had something to do with his ahistorical method. Furthermore, one can only ignore the social implications of ancient categories like the hero or the eternal return by adopting an apolitical stance. Campbell's and Eliade's fondness for the systems they describe may have had much to do with their ahistoricism and apoliticism. In fact, J.Z. Smith (1982:25) notes that Eliade's system excludes the historical because "of the Romantic, Neoplatonic Idealism of its philosophical presuppositions." Individual refusals to consent to the dominant ideology can only be considered when one adopts positions (such as those of the woman or the laborer) not privileged in the sources used by thinkers like Campbell and Eliade.

[66] *Cf.* Smart 1999:1: "I do not here take any faith to be true or false."

[67] For example, of "ultimate concern" he states, "I prefer 'focus', in part because it has a plural ('foci'), whereas 'the ultimate' cannot be very naturally plural, and in part because it does not carry any ontological baggage" (Smart 1999:9).

noted a quest after essences and structures: typologies. This is evident in Smart's subtitle, *An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs*, and on his first page, on which he identifies his phenomenology of religion as "a morphology" and a "grammar of symbols" (1999:1), which latter expression may remind one of Geertz. His quest after "patterns in the way religion manifests itself … human spirit in history" may remind us of Hegel, van der Leeuw, or even Weber's ideal types. He expresses the desire to "not use, so far as we can avoid them, alien categories" (Smart 1999:2), but he also observes that at times one language lacks categories that another can supply: "So we probably need an international vocabulary" (Smart 1999:3; see, too, Smart 1999:4 – "an insider can be terribly wrong about her tradition"). To say something new, and thereby advance the study of religion, while at the same time not merely engaging in theology or the sort of commentary practiced within a tradition, faith, or culture, sets up conditions in which the alien is likely to arise to supplement or compensate for categorical deficiencies in a native vocabulary. Smart deserves credit, however, for expressing clearly the goals and potential tensions and challenges faced by a scholar attempting to use categories within a phenomenological framework. His "dimensions" expand the range of the sacred beyond what might be the natural tendencies of a given worldview. They are as follows: the ritual or practical, the doctrinal or philosophical, the mythic or narrative, the experiential or emotional, the ethical or legal, the organizational or social, the material or artistic (Smart 1999:10*ff.*). This provides "a realistic checklist of aspects of religion so that a description of that religion or a theory about it is not lopsided" (Smart 1999:8). In Smart one finally finds true suspicion of received categories. He points out that the dominance of European languages (esp. English) in the study of religion reflects a past characterized by colonialism and fundamentally unequal power relations (Smart 1999:3); indeed, comparative efforts have been condemned in part as a "backlash against missionary colonialism" (Smart 1999:5). But comparative categories can counteract that very isolationism and tribalism that produces cultural arrogance (*cf.* Smart 1999:6).

Interestingly, in his introduction to van der Leeuw's work, Ninian Smart criticizes van der Leeuw's lack of dynamism (van der Leeuw 1986:xii):

> Actually, there is no reason why van der Leeuw's method should not be applied to a classification and clarification of the various types of religious change, as he himself recognized, for his very central category, namely Power, has a dynamic, not just a static, significance. But generally, the way in which he proceeds in [*Religion in Essence and Manifestation*] is to a wide classification of things, classes, persons and so on endowed with Power, in a rather motionless perspective.

This deficiency is corrected in Thomas A. Tweed's theory of religion. Consider how Tweed (2008:54) defines *religions*: "Religions are confluences of organic-cultural flows that intensify joy and confront suffering by drawing on human and suprahuman forces to make homes and cross boundaries." This understanding of religions takes as its subject a plurality, not a single, stable, static entity. It emphasizes dynamism, the body, and physical space. He (Tweed 2008:48, 49) states that religion has been defined in terms of about "a dozen orienting metaphors:" "Most definitions employ more than one of these, so there is no pure type, only hybrid forms that approximate the categories in this taxonomy…. Religion has been analogized as: capacity, organism, system, worldview, illness, narcotic, picture, form of life, society, institution, projection, and space." His subsequent discussion of each of these categories is stimulating and worthy of review, although sufficient space fails us here.

His dominant organizing metaphor for religion is aquatic, drawing on hydrodynamic vocabulary to illuminate the specific conditions of transnational migrants and the shifting of power relations. One detects in Tweed (2008:98) a strong influence of Merleau-Ponty:

> Religion begins—and ends—with bodies: birthed bodies and dead bodies; polluted bodies and purified bodies; enslaved and freed bodies; bodies that are tattooed, pierced, flagellated, drugged, masked, and painted; sick bodies and healed bodies; gendered bodies and racialized bodies; initiated and uninitiated bodies… and, as humans cross the ultimate horizon of human experience—however that horizon is imagined—bodies that are transported and transformed. So bodies cross and dwell.

The emphasis placed on the body as the horizon of human experience certainly recalls Merleau-Ponty, but the full range of Tweed's influences is eclectic and diverse, and explicitly defined in terms of his personal interests, beliefs, skills, and so on. Phenomenology recognizes the fundamentally intersubjective character of experience, in which the self from the very beginning exists in relation with others. For this reason, no scholar of religion can stand apart from this network of entwined relations, and it is appropriate, in recognition of this, to practice reflexivity. Instances of reflexivity can be found in various thinkers (Tillich is honest about his theological position, and see Smart 1999:4), but Tweed provides an unusually fine example of this (see his discussions of positionality and reflexivity—Tweed 2008:20-27, 178, 181-183).

Campbell (1973:viii) states in his preface to *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*,

> Perhaps it will be objected that in bringing out the correspondences I have overlooked the differences between the various Oriental and Occidental, modern, ancient, and primitive traditions. The same objection might be brought, however, against any textbook or chart of anatomy, where the physiological variations of race are disregarded in the interest of a basic general understanding of the human physique. There are of course differences between the numerous mythologies [sic] and religions of mankind, but this is a book about the similarities.

Jonathan Z. Smith makes just this sort of objection, looking critically at the very kind of biological analogy Campbell here invokes (*cf.* Smith 1982:1-5). His "Hero as…" formulations were pointed out above and compared to van der Leeuw's "Religions of…." Concerning van der Leeuw's monothetic system of classification, Smith (1982:7) writes, "None of [these] could lay claim to being correctly drawn differentia. They are merely slogans. But already, at this crude and jingoistic level, we encounter those distinctions which will be claimed to be definitive of the taxon, Judaism." Instead, Smith (1982:8) proposes that in statistical, "polythetic classification of religions or religious phenomena…. the most fruitful future work will be done," so perhaps he looks with more favor on recent coding and classificatory methods such as content analysis, document analysis, factor analysis, facet theory, grounded theory, as well as recent methodological trends in semiotics and discourse analysis. The polythetic classification system that he approves of abandons "the notion of strict division… and with it the notion of the unique and sufficient cause" (Smith 1982:8), and this allows him to perceive "borderland" situations more clearly. For example, in language much like Tweed's, he observes that "Paul is preeminently a boundary-crossing figure…. In contemporary Greek taxonomic terminology, he is a member of a 'third race'" (Smith 1982:11), and he is able to recognize, as one finds in Boyarin and others more

recently, that "We must conceive of a variety of early Judaisms, clustered in varying configurations" (Smith 1982:14; *cf.* Smith 1982:18). Smith's work throughout is a useful corrective against tendencies to overgeneralize and simplify, to make categories that exclude too much of the phenomena. For example, with regard to Durkheim's dualistic classification of the sacred and the profane, he observes, "Having given extraordinary priority to the dual, Durkheim and Mauss have difficulties dealing with classification systems that are more complex (or compound), be it a case of number or of hierarchy" (Smith 1992:40). He does not let religious studies scholars rest in easy complacency in simple, broad, comparative categories. Of comparison, he states, "The procedure is homeopathic. The theory is built on contagion" (Smith 1982:21), and he quotes Ihab H. Hassan as stating that comparison merely documents "affinity:" "So far we have established no influence…. For influence presupposes some manner of causality" (qtd. in Smith 1982:22). These are valid criticism, but Smart (1999:6) defends the construction and use of broad, comparative categories, stating,

> The problem with this thesis [that comparison ignores context] is that everything becomes so particularized as to be incommensurable with anything else. This is self-defeating in a number of ways. It means that there is no vocabulary which can properly describe the offerings of different cultures. Besides, while we know that each individual human being is unique, implying that each person has a divergent set of flavours drenching her experience, it does not follow that we have no common feelings and perspectives.

In fact, Smith is not completely opposed to comparison, to the uncovering of likenesses and similarities, but he does not regard them as most interesting. Category formation requires, as its first step, noticing difference, picking out what is particular and unique. Those things for which we have categories and therefore have knowledge of are those things we have noticed as different. This brings us to Smith's (1992:103-4) conception of ritual: "Ritual is, first and foremost, a mode paying attention. It is a process for marking interest…. The temple serves as a focusing lens, establishing the possibility of significance by directing attention, by requiring the perception of difference. Within the temple, the ordinary … becomes significant, becomes 'sacred.'" Interestingly, a notion of the sacred quite similar to Smith's, in whose work "Ritual is a means of performing the way things ought to be…. It provides the means for demonstrating that we know what ought to have been done, what ought to have taken place" (Smith 1982:63), can be found in Tillich's (1959:182) sympathetic reflection on Eastern Orthodoxy, "But the Holy is not only that which is; the Holy is also that which ought to be." In fact, this acknowledgement of and subjection to the ideal is not so far from Eliade's notion of the archetypes. We thus can see that although different theorists of religion give distinct flavors to their categories, which allow them to uncover different aspects of the phenomena, they are part of a shared conversation, a shared discourse. All words, all categories, mark specialness by isolating difference. Conversely, words as shared categories make communication, comparison, and reunification possible.

In considering Bruce Lincoln's understanding of discourse and its ability to construct society, one is reminded of Tweed's (2008:68) suggestion "that religions, like theorists of religion, provide orienting tropes—including metaphors, similes, myths, allegories, personifications, and symbols—that function as figurative tools for *making and remaking* imagined worlds" (emphasis mine). Tweed, like other more recent theorists such as Lincoln,

Diana Taylor, and Michael Taussig, is sensitive to the fact that language is a system of power and coercion. In Smith, too, one finds a keen awareness of how sacred categories are socially constructed. They are tools of power. Lincoln (1992:4) states, "Discourse supplements force in several important ways, among the most important of which is ideological persuasion…. to mystify the inevitable inequalities of any social order and to win the consent of those over whom power is exercised, thereby obviating the need for the direct coercive use of force." Discourse should always be interpreted with suspicion because it always contains intent, and generally the intent of the powerful: "To the extent that taxonomies are socially determined, hegemonic taxonomies will tend to reproduce the same hierarchic system of which they are themselves the product" (Lincoln 1992:8). However, discourse is a human instrument, and tools are themselves inherently neutral—they can be used for good or ill by various agents. And societies are constituted by a number of simultaneous and often conflicting discourses. Lincoln (1992:10) observes that the category "society" is not easily defined: "Because there are virtually infinite grounds on which individual and group similarity/dissimilarity may be perceived and corresponding sentiments of affinity/estrangement evoked, the borders of society are never a simple matter." Since society is constituted by feelings of affinity with or estrangement from others, the phenomenological consideration of subjective experience is important in accounting for the construction of society. Lincoln is aware of this as well: "Yet discourse can also serve members of the subordinate classes … in their attempts to demystify, delegitimate, and deconstruct the established norms, institutions, and discourses that play a role in constructing their subordination" (1992:5). Therefore, discourse as a system of knowledge[68] and power that can be used by the oppressed to subvert their oppressors:

> Any synthetic entity, having its origin in a prior dialectic confrontation, bears within it the tensions that existed between the thesis and antithesis involved in its formation, and this residual tension remains ever capable of undoing the synthesis. Ultimately, that which either holds society together or takes it apart is sentiment, and the chief instrument with which such sentiment may be aroused, manipulated, and rendered dormant is discourse. (Lincoln 1992:11)

These insights are central to Diana Taylor's (2003) work. For example, she points out that what she calls the "repertoire" has always existed alongside the "archive," which tends to be controlled by socioeconomic elites. The repertoire is a resource, an alternative discourse, that is mobilized with varying degrees of success by marginalized and oppressed groups. Taylor's suspicion of received categories can be observed in her deconstruction of the category "America." Just as J.Z. Smith speaks of "Judaisms" and deconstructs the very category of religion, Taylor instead chooses to speak of "Americas." Taylor's whole book, *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas*, might be read as a series of instances of the use of discourse "to demystify, delegitimate, and deconstruct the established norms, institutions, and discourses." The last three chapters of Lincoln's work focus especially on categorization and actual instances in which hierarchical taxonomic inversions take place as part of discourse strategies. For example, Menenius Agrippa was able to diffuse the plebeian secession by identifying social elites with the stomach, rather than their typical identification with the head (Lincoln 1992:145*ff.*). Their

[68] *Cf.* Lincoln 1992:7: "For the most part taxonomies are regarded—and announce themselves—as systems of classifying the phenomenal world, systems through which otherwise indiscriminate data can be organized in a form wherein they become knowable."

apparent parasitic relationship with society was thereby transformed into a necessary one, just as the stomach must be fed if the whole body is to survive.

Notice how many of the examples being used by these theorists are political. Since the Schemmp decision, the study of religion has been brought into the public sphere, and we have found that religious studies has much to say about the political. Religious studies scholars have become, in a sense, theologians of the public sphere. From Tillich to Ninian Smart to J.Z. Smith, the category of what is studied by scholars of religion has been expanded and complicated. For example, in Michael Taussig's (1999) *Defacement*, many of his examples of the sacred are political, in part because he defines the sacred, not in religious terms, but in terms of what can be profaned. In this, we see how any constructed category implies its opposite (*cf.* Smith 1992:39), and we observe, as stated at the outset, yet another example of the increasingly sophisticated understanding and use of categorization.

*Excursus 1*

M. L. West states:

> This has been a fast canter across many broad fields. Their botany really calls for five or six separate books, which I hope other people will write. Meanwhile any illusions that the reader may have had about the autonomy of early Greek culture should have faded, or at any rate severely shrunk, in the wash of facts. Near Eastern influence cannot be put down as a marginal phenomenon to be invoked occasionally in explanation of isolated peculiarities. It was pervasive at most levels and at most times.[69]

West's work focuses primarily on the West Asian (particularly Semitic) influence on Greek poetry and myth between 750 and 450 BC. However, his conclusion is valid for periods (and subjects of inquiry) that lie outside the scope of his work. In particular, this excursus will argue for the possibility that the concept of *ataraxia*, an idea that is central to Hellenistic philosophy, was given a uniquely oriental flavor due to Pyrrho's contact with the East[70] and that Pyrrho's example in general exerted an eastern influence on Hellenistic philosophy.

While few would contest Long and Sedley's claim, which echoes Nietzsche's comments published in *The Will to Power*, to the effect that "For the Hellenistic philosophers Pyrrho occupies a position that is comparable in many respects to that of Socrates in relation to the philosophy of the fourth century B.C."[71], some might object that it is entirely unnecessary to look eastward for the origins of Pyrrho's scepticism and his tranquility. Others[72],

---

[69] *The East Face of Helicon* (Oxford, 1997), p. 59.

[70] While the main text of this excursus will essentially defend Flintoff's claims (Flintoff, Everard, *Pyrrho and India*, Phronesis, 25 (1980), p. 88), I suspect that, due to the equipollence of the arguments, it would be wise, ultimately, to suspend judgment on this matter. This excursus's primary value lies in its attempt to explore the possibility of Eastern influence during a time period when such an influence is not often suspected.

[71] *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) p. 16.

[72] A. A. Long (*Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics* (Berkeley, 1986) pp. 78, 79) states:

such as Xenophanes, Socrates, and Democritus[73], could be pointed to as sufficient originators of the sceptical tradition and Pyrrho's supposed version of *eudaimonia*. If it were accurate to characterize Pyrrho as a dogmatic sceptic, that might be the case. Pyrrho, however, while willing to make confident, if provisional, statements about the nature of evident reality, was motivated by the therapeutic, as opposed to disinterestedly alethic, interests of thinkers like Epicurus and the Buddha, interests which separate them from the Presocratics and the Indian logicians. Indeed, I will join Flintoff in arguing that, although this does not capture the full picture, Pyrrho may be validly interpreted as a sort of apophatic mystic. Pyrrho's insight into the nature of the universe (it is "indifferent, unmeasurable and inarbitrable"[74].) shares with all mystics that inexpressible quality of impenetrable unity. However, note that this same mystical notion is markedly different from the material principle of some Presocratic and Indian sages; when Diogenes Laertius states that "the apparent is the sceptics' criterion" (9.106), he is endorsing, not a material principle of being, but a pragmatic method.

Traditional cultures do not, in general, favor innovation. Thus, when a new philosophy or religion comes along, its apologists often attempt to point out or manufacture connections to traditions that are already established. Long and Sedley state in part, "Timon's favourable assessment of [...] Democritus [....] provided Pyrrho with a philosophical pedigree" (*The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) p. 24; compare Cicero's attempt to tap into the same philosophical pedigree in *Academica* 1.43-6). Let us begin with the caveat that Pyrrhonism, like the heterodox schools of India, is fundamentally opposed to the traditional order, so the manner in which this cultural property might manifest itself in the Pyrrhonist community (if at all) may be hard to determine. This interpretive principle might be applied to argue that the Pyrrhonean failure to link Pyrrho's thought directly to the authority of a native philosophical tradition rather than Indian

---

> The fallibility of sense-perception as a source of knowledge was emphasized in different ways by Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles and Democritus in the Presocratic period [….] Pyrrho's skepticism has its closest conceptual connexion with Protagoras among his predecessors [….] There is no reason to question the likelihood of some early connexion between Pyrrho and the Megarians. From them Pyrrho would have acquired a training in dialectic and reasons for distrusting the evidence of the senses.

[73] West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient* (Oxford, 1971) disagrees with Burkert's (*Weisheit und Wissenschaft*, Nuremburg, 1962) assertion that, among other things, certain features of the astronomy of Democritus suggest a renewed contact with the East (pp. 237-238). West makes this argument as part of a justification of "the thesis [...] that a period of active Iranian influence stands out sharply in the development of Greek thought, from c. 550 to c. 480 B.C. For a century or so beforehand, milder oriental influences can be seen; afterwards, it is as if they had been shut off with a tap" (p. 239); he does not feel that any meaningful oriental influence can be detected again until the time of Eudoxus (p. 241). Interestingly, Flintoff observes that Democritus is another of those Greek philosophers who are said to have studied abroad (p. 89), though he doubts that Democritus actually came in contact with the gymnosophoi (p. 90). With regard to chronological concerns, one may observe that West does seem to have extended his period of oriental influence by the time of his publication of *The East Face of Helicon* and that the renewed oriental influence beginning in the time of Eudoxus harmonizes well with the thesis of this discussion. If it were established that Democritus was influenced by the East, this would only make an argument for the oriental origin of *ataraxia* more compelling.

[74] Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) p. 15.

philosophy is a point in favor of the authenticity of the tradition. The mention of a Democritean pedigree for Pyrrho's thought is easy to account for; a foreign pedigree is not. What authority Pyrrho possessed as a philosopher, he had by virtue of the power of his arguments and the quality of his living example. The idea that later Pyrrhonist sources projected Pyrrhonism onto Pyrrho, rather than preserving his thoughts, is contradicted, as Kuzminski (*Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism* (Plymouth, UK, 2008)) notes, by the facts that Aenesidemus "himself claimed Pyrrho as the founder, using his name, and Diogenes Laertius in his life of Timon, *Lives*, vol. 2 (IX, 115-16), 525-27, gives an unbroken genealogy from Pyrrho and Timon through Aenesidemus and down to Sextus Empiricus and beyond, suggesting a continuous tradition" (p. 65, n. 9). Thus, the conservative nature of tradition can be used either to argue that the "Pyrrhonists" imposed their ideas on Pyrrho or to concluded that they preserved his method. Kuzminski, in favor of the former argument, reasons, "[L]ater Pyrrhonists were nothing if not alive to an extraordinary degree to the nuances of dogmatism and determinate beliefs, and it seems implausible that they, with access to important sources about Pyrrho unavailable to modern scholars, would have retrospectively chosen what, in Bett's view, would have been a rather conventional dogmatic thinker as their progenitor" (p. 41). Kuzminski argues that a sort of fundamentalist or literalist reading of the texts have obscured the intent of their authors. Pyrrho is interpreted as a dogmatic skeptic concerning all things rather than as a confident skeptic concerning non-evident matters because his ideal, *ataraxia*, is thought of as a doctrine, rather than as an evident, "natural animal impulse" (Nussbaum, qtd. in Kuzminski, p. 23; *cf.* A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics* (Berkeley, 1986) p. 78); in fact, Kuzminski finds a parallel case in the interpretation of the Buddhist thinker, Nagarjuna: "Just as Bett concluded that Pyrrho was not a Pyrrhonist, but in fact a dogmatic sceptic, so Burton concludes that Nagarjuna too was a dogmatic sceptic [….] It is Burton and Bett, by taking nonindicative statements literally, who reify emptiness, tranquility, etc., and expect the same of Pyrrho and Nagarjuna" (pp. 62, 63; *cf.* Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume II* (Cambridge, 1987) p.9 [A]). *Nirvana* or *ataraxia* is called an end, not because it is logically inferred or dogmatically believed in, but because it is experienced, according to figures such as Nagarjuna and Pyrrho, as the naturally still and peaceful state of the mind after the stormy turmoil of dialectic. Thus, there seem to be no compelling reasons not to take the Pyrrhonists and Pyrrho at their word: their way of life was founded by him, and he found that the suspension of judgment arising from *aporia* can be therapeutic, producing tranquility, *ataraxia*.

Flintoff's claim is that *ataraxia* is a distinctly unlikely candidate for a Greek goal of life (pp. 94-96)[75]. He feels that the *negative* nature of *ataraxia*

[75] Flintoff explains the single instance in which Democritus is credited, by a late source, as having used the word *ataraxia* as a designation for his ideal in the following way:

is what makes it distinctly un-Greek, and he is largely correct. The historical development of the concept of *ataraxia* in the Hellenistic schools illustrates the persistent Greek tendency to attempt to turn the negative goal of *ataraxia* into something positive. For example, the Stoics subordinated *ataraxia* to virtue, making it both a pleasant state that resulted from virtue as well as a kind of virtue (*i.e.*, it meant not only "untroubled," as in the Epicurean school, but even "not able to be troubled," as a result of the Sage's *apatheia* [via the Cynics]), and, again moving away from the negative character of *ataraxia*, posited the *eupatheiai*[76]. With regard to the strangeness of *ataraxia*, Gisela Striker observes that *ataraxia* "is the only conception of *eudaimonia* in Greek ethics that identifies happiness with a state of mind and makes it depend entirely on a person's attitude or beliefs"[77]. This introspective, internal focus is characteristic of Indian thought. Striker asserts:

> It seems that Democritus was concerned to admonish his fellow citizens to refrain from *polypragmosyne*, being busybodies and meddling with other people's affairs, advising them that cheerfulness and peace of mind are more likely to flourish in a quiet life of minding one's own business. There is no indication that he produced anything like an argument to show that *euthymia* is the human good, the goal of life, or identical with happiness.[78]

Democritus was advocating a particular, *positive* ethical position concerning the way one ought to live one's life, and he seems to have given more consideration than others to the beneficial results of leading a good life. But this is far from developing a teleological philosophy. Flintoff emphasizes the fact that "in Greece [...] the idea of a goal in life was comparatively late in emerging and then characterised by positive words" while "we find in India a good deal of material [...] which contains both a clear conception of a goal in life and often the use of negative terms to describe this" (p. 96). It seems that later thinkers, attempting to fit Pyrrho into a dogmatic sceptical tradition, connected to Pyrrho's supposed scepticism to that found in Democritus. Yet,

---

> [I]t has been argued that *ataraxia* was either the same as or one facet of [*euthumia*] and a late source has been cited in proof of this. But in fact only this late source retains the word in relation to Democritus. The majority of our sources agree that to Democritus *euthumia* was the main goal in life and one aspect of this was *athambia*. [Flintoff later points out that, like *euthumia*, *athambia* is a "poetic word" (p. 95). He further states, "In contrast with these vivid and impassioned origins, [*ataraktos*], [*ataraxia*] etc. are first found in medical and military contexts as possibly technical terms" (p. 107, n. 21).] And it seems I think fairly obvious that in the case of the late passage—in Stobaeus—what has happened is that Democritus' own word *athambia* (*cf.* Diels fragment 4), a word not used much after Democritus' time, has been ousted by one that was widely used *ataraxia*. (p. 95)

[76] *Cf.* Striker, Gisela, "*Ataraxia*: Happiness as tranquillity," *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (New York, 1996) pp. 186-8. She also notes that the Epicureans were not content with a merely mental *telos*. Epicurus had to include the physical goal of *aponia* in his eudaimonism (p. 185).

[77] "*Ataraxia*: Happiness as tranquillity," p. 183.

[78] *Ibid.* p. 185. But see Richard Bett (*Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy*, New York, 2000), who cites Stobaeus as claiming that Democritus did use the word *eudaimonia* as one of his many descriptions of his ideal (p. 159).

> the evidence itself does not give us any reason to suppose that it was Democritus' epistemological (or, following Warren's view[79], ethical) scepticism that Pyrrho and Timon approved of. All that is really known is that the Pyrrho and his followers did, in fact, express approval of Democritus. Bett thinks it is contextually likely that their approval was in relation to Democritus' ethical claims about what constitutes the good life[80]. Like

---

[79] Warren, James, *Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of* Ataraxia (New York, 2002). Warren's work, in spite of its subtitle, has little of significance to say about *ataraxia*. He locates Democritus' influence on Pyrrho as coming through Anaxarchus and as consisting in "ethical antirealism" (p. 93). He states: "Things are 'indifferent' not (at least in Pyrrho's original formulation) in the sense of being metaphysically indistinct, but in the moral sense of having no intrinsic value" (p. 92). While I certainly agree that Anaxarchus and Pyrrho can be viewed as sharing a sympathy for the Cynic disregard for the conventions of the masses and the Democritean reductionist assertion that all things (with the exception of atoms and void) are so by convention, I agree with scholars such as Long, Sedley, and Bett that Pyrrho essentially held a confident and, in that sense, dogmatic position concerning the "evident" fact that the nature of reality is indeterminate. The ethical ramifications of this mystical insight are subsidiary and derivative. There has long been an intimate relationship between mysticism and scepticism, but Pyrrho's sympathy with ones like Democritus (and perhaps the Cynics: "He [Timon] probably saw a close similarity between the Cynic contempt for 'empty opinion', and Pyrrho's refusal to admit any natural basis for the values and beliefs characteristic of his day" (Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) p. 20.) cannot be pressed too far. For example, Pyrrho would likely have had no interest in Democritus' atomic theory: "Pyrrho, on Timon's testimony, was serenely unconcerned with every form of speculation" (Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) p. 17). This is part of why Pyrrhonism seems to be such a useful corrective against some of the speculative excesses in the philosophy of science. On the subject of ethics, one can again cite Long and Sedley: "In assessing the general tendency of his scepticism, the concern with outlawing objective values should be noted" (*ibid.* p. 18). This is significant because value statements, far more than any other epistemological or metaphysical claims, involve attachment. Pyrrho's opposition to attachment is thus implied, and Timon's statement concerning desire would seem to corroborate this supposition: "Desire is absolutely the first of all bad things" (*ibid.* p. 20.). This is in keeping with the general attitude of the East, and of certain oriental philosophies such as Buddhism in particular.

[80] Bett, Richard, *Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy* (New York, 2000) p. 159. Kuzminski condenses Diogenes' account of Timon's personality, stating that he was a "witty, perceptive, easygoing man, […] fond of wine and good living" (p. 11); likewise, Diogenes Laertius (9.64) reports that the rational hedonist, Epicurus, "admired Pyrrho's lifestyle." This recalls the hedonism of Carvaka or Lokayata—an atheistic, materialistic, anti-brahminical Indian philosophy that existed in Pyrrho's time. Although a strong case can be made in favor of Pyrrho's having been influenced by the Buddhists, Carvaka also presents itself as a candidate. Robert Rein'l summarizes the philosophy as follows:

> [Carvakas'] theory of knowledge is a form of radical empiricism: sense-objects and feelings alone exist. Inference depends on concomitance, but no inference is sound apart from knowledge of an unconditional concomitance. Since experience cannot arrive at the unconditional, one can attain only to probable inference. From this epistemological position the Carvaka school criticizes the entire social, moral, and religious program of the orthodox Hindu. The Carvaka ethics is an egoistic, but nonutilitarian, form of hedonism: momentary pleasure alone has value. ("Naturalism and Supernaturalism in East and West," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr., 1956), p. 49)

The parallels to Pyrrhonism ought to be clear, but the "nonutilitarian" character of this form of hedonism deserves special note because it contrasts so well with Epicureanism. A passage from Aristocles (1.F in Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) pp. 14-15) states that, according to Timon, a Pyrrhonist should begin, among other things, with the utilitarian question, "[W]hat will be the outcome for those who have this attitude?" However, the ultimate consequence of this question is a rejection of utilitarianism. Shubhada A. Joshi's criticism of Debiprasad Chattopadhyay's Marxist interpretation of Lokayata (Carvaka) nonetheless agrees with Chattopadhyay in an important respect, stating, "He quite correctly maintains that Carvakas denied only those inferences which refer to the proof of reality of God or

Democritus, Anaxarchus, a contemporary of Pyrrho who was his companion in India and who is sometimes identified as a mentor, seems to have either shared Pyrrho's pragmatic, empirical confidence or his ethical (or metaphysical) scepticism[81]. Even if Anaxarchus shared Pyrrho's ontological position—and it must be remembered that this could be due to the fact that Anaxarchus' experiences in India were similar to Pyrrho's—it must be emphasized that Pyrrho's metaphysical assertions fall outside, or are at least not primarily concerned with, the Greek school of epistemological scepticism[82].

I identify two primary objections to the idea that Pyrrho got his philosophy from India which must be addressed. The first is that of the language barrier. Bett argues as follows:

> It is extremely difficult to believe that anything as abstruse as a quadrilemma could possibly have been communicated in any remotely intact form from the Indian 'naked wise men' to Pyrrho. The ancient Greeks are notorious for their dismissiveness of all languages other than Greek; and Indian languages, in particular, would certainly not be among those with which, prior to Alexander's expedition, they would have come into regular contact. [...] Moreover, since there is no borderline territory linking Greece and India, any conversation between the Indian 'naked wise men' and Pyrrho must have required at least *two* of these philosophically unsophisticated translators. (p. 177)

Note that the quadralemma contains a rejection of logical disjunction—a move that would likely be distressing to a rationalist Greek (*cf.* Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume II* (Cambridge, 1987) p. 2 [10-15] and pp. 6-7 [12-14]). In contrast to Bett's view, Kuzminski stresses the fact that "a number of early Greek philosophers are reported to have traveled widely in the east [….] Most of these figures went to Egypt and Persia (where

---

Soul and other world etc. [sic]" (*Lokayata: A Critical Study* (Indian Book Centre, Delhi, 1995) p. 192). It is worth noting that Joshi tempers the idea, which Rein'l advocates, that Carvaka's empiricism was so radical as to reject *all* inference; according to her reading, inference based on evident, empirical realities is permitted (*cf.* p. 198). Because of its outspoken, relentless, and frequently insulting criticism of other, speculative schools, Carvaka was universally opposed, and our records of it consist only of quotes imbedded in the criticisms of other schools. The situation reminds one of the death of Socrates and of Seneca's words: "So many schools of philosophy pass away without a successor. The Academics, both old and more recent, have left no representative. Who is there to hand on the teachings of Pyrrho?" (Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) p. 15). It has ever been the case that sceptics have delighted in poking fun at dogmatists. This can be observed in the playful words of the Taoist sages, in the sometimes abrasive verbal games of Socrates, and, as it happens, in the parodies of the Pyrrhonists (*cf.* Diogenes Laetius 9.111). Lokayata concerned itself with the daily affairs of life, and, although its criticisms were so logically rigorous that its opponents felt obliged to make themselves acquainted with them, it was disinterested in the Upanishadic, metaphysical, logical, and atomistic speculations of the other schools (*cf.* Diogenes Laertius 9.64; Cicero, *On Ends* 2.43—Long and Sedley observe that Socrates was similarly "indifferen[t] to science" (*The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) p.10)).

[81] *Ibid.* p. 162-4.

[82] Bett, Richard, *Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy* (New York, 2000) p. 114.

they might have met Indians at court, in the markets, or at the temples), but Pythagoras and Democritus, at least, are said to have gone all the way to India before Pyrrho" (p. 46). The philosophers were only able to interact with directly eastern philosophies and cultures because the infrastructure of travel had already been established by Greeks who had strong economic incentives to understand foreign languages and cultures. Bett admits that his attempted reconstruction of Pyrrho's "indeterminacy thesis" is "speculative" (p. 116). I admit that any attempted reconstruction of how it would be possible for Pyrrho to overcome the language barrier, have meaningful dialogue with Indian wise men, and arrive at his insight concerning the indeterminate nature of things and the consequentially appropriate behavior is also unavoidably speculative. However, the speculation that follows has the virtue of agreeing with the exact words of Diogenes Laertius: *tois gumnosophistais en Indiai summixai kai tois magois*. M. L. West (1971) observes that Cyrus defeated and annexed Media in around 549 B.C. and, somewhat later, Xerxes attempted to enforce religious uniformity on his empire, inducing many of the heterodox to flee the land. He states: "The Magi were Medes, and remembered it (Hdt. 1.101). Upon the fall of their country, many of them may have sought refuge abroad, in India and in the west" (p. 241). The fact that, after the primary period of philosophical influence identified by West, the Greeks did not concern themselves with the beliefs of the Magi does not mean the Magi vanished. Rather, the interests of the Greeks shifted: "In general, foreign contributions were no longer wanted; not because they were foreign to Greece, but because they were foreign to inquiry based on empirical data" (p. 241). Likewise, the Magi can be assumed to have lived in India, preserving their own philosophical and religious traditions, presumably in their traditional language. Then, we need only imagine that the force that was Alexander the Great brought representatives of the two Median groups together. The fact that the Cynic Onesicritus had rotten luck with his translators hardly invalidates the above hypothesis. Onesicritus himself reports that he did not attempt to converse with the *gumnosophoi* about philosophical matters; perhaps, for this reason, he was not supplied with the Magi translators who were acquainted with philosophical language. McEville states:

> It seems, finally, that the [Persian] Empire was sufficiently polyglot that communication between Greeks and Indians in Susa or elsewhere would not have been a problem; the Greeks, as a people who produced interpreters, may be presumed to have known Persian, and the Indians, whose language was so close, to have picked it up easily. It is possible that the two groups communicated in Aramaic, but also possible that they spoke Persian to one another. (qtd. in Kuzminski p. 65, n. 12; *cf.* n. 2)

Finally, we have seen that, while Pyrrho's philosophy was markedly different from the philosophies of his Greek predecessors, his background would have

in some measure prepared him for the ideas current in Indian thought at the time.

Flintoff expresses the second objection in the following way: "Pyrrhonean philosophy is so obviously un-Indian in both its shape and argumentation that it would be a waste of time to pursue the matter any further" (p. 89). This does not seem to be the case. Although Kuzminski may overstep himself in referring to *ataraxia* in terms of "liberation," Pyrrho's lifestyle, method, and statements find close parallels in the Indian traditions. We have already seen that the distinct combination of elements and general orientation of Pyrrho's philosophy finds no precedent in antecedent Greek thought. Still, some might object that Pyrrho does not seem to have precisely the same concerns as those that occupy most Indian thinkers. If he, as Burnet claims, should be described "as a sort of Buddhist *arhat*"[83], why does he not mention such doctrines as *anatman*[84]? One response would be to ask, How can we know that he didn't? The remains of Pyrrho's known sayings are scanty indeed, and he left no writings. Like the Indian gurus, who perhaps because of their belief in the power of sound itself stress the importance of a living guide, Pyrrho seems to have instructed by means of example more than by doctrine. As Long and Sedley observe:

> The life and thought of Socrates had been similarly catholic in the variety of philosophy it stimulated, and in similar ways. If the solitary Pyrrho differed sharply from the gregarious and talkative Socrates, both men made their dominant impression by personality and way of life rather than by writing books or constructing systematic doctrines, leaving it to their followers to develop and systematize the theoretical foundations of their lifestyles.[85]

It seems obvious that he did not come back from India and start giving sermons on the Four Noble Truths; still, his doctrine of indeterminacy could

---

[83] Qtd. in Flintoff, p. 108, n. 31.

[84] The later Stoic and Academic debate concerning whether or not there is an enduring self (*i.e.* a peculiarly qualified individual who remains even though the substance changes), while not, as far as I know, connected to an eastern influence, does serve as in intriguing object of comparison with the eastern positions on the subject. In connection with *anatman*, Kuzminski's response to Burnyeat seems relevant:

> "A life without belief," Burnyeat fears, would be intolerable since he presumes one's very identity depends upon belief. Belief for him (and so many others) is somehow essential to what it is to be human, to self-identity. A life without belief, he concludes, is one in which "the sceptic must detach himself from himself," so that a "life without belief is not, after all, a possible life for man." Now someone can "detach himself from himself" only if his identity is presumed to be a function of some nonevident belief or other which can be denied. But since the Pyrrhonist, unlike the dogmatic sceptic with whom he is confused, does not deny such beliefs but only suspends judgment about them, he must suspend judgment about his identity as well.

One might also consider Diogenes Laertius' report that Pyrrho spoke of stripping "oneself completely of being human" by means of action and reason (9.66). In addition to hinting at an opposition to a strong attachment to his ego, the mention of action and reason recalls the *karma* and *jnana yogas*, which disciplines would be far more comprehensible to a Greek and might account for the absence of any mention of meditation as a Pyrrhonist practice.

[85] *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) p. 16.

be argued to imply *anatman*. If one can no more say of anything that it is than it is not, or that it is and is not, or neither is nor is not, does this not express the impermanence of everything, including the self? Furthermore, neither Flintoff nor I feel committed to the proposition that Pyrrho specifically or solely spoke to Buddhists. Indeed, although Diogenes Laertius (9.63) suggests that he came into contact with heterodox, anti-caste thinkers such as members of Buddhism and Carvaka, he could have also spoken to more orthodox thinkers who advocated, not some form of *anatman*, but that *atman* is *brahman*. This mystical unity of things, so similar to the claim that we are all Buddha-nature and that the true nature of reality is ineffable *nirvana*, could evoke the same Pyrrhonean position of indeterminacy and apophatic language. Or, he could have spoken to another group. The quadrilemma, in the light of Bett's analysis of *aphasia*, seems to have been designed to produce perplexity[86]. The state of perplexity would, if intense enough, drive the mind into a mystical state which would then resolve into *ataraxia*. This process is common in oriental systems. One could hypothesize that when Pyrrho went to India, as a good Greek, he asked the sorts of questions that would lead a good Indian philosopher to respond with quadrilemma[87]. This would have produced in him *aphasia* and *ataraxia*. The dialog might have gone something like this:

> But, good Gotama, where does a monk arise whose mind is freed thus?
> 'Arise' Vaccha, does not apply.
> Well then, good Gotama, does he not arise?
> 'Does not arise' Vaccha, does not apply.
> Well the, good Gotama, does he both arise and not arise?
> 'Both arise and does not arise' Vaccha, does not apply.
> Well then, good Gotama, does he neither arise nor does not arise?
> 'Neither arise nor does not arise' Vaccha, does not apply.[88]

In any case, the main point, developed more fully in Flintoff's article, is that the sort of language (particularly its apophatic nature[89]) and eccentric behavior (notably its vagrant and unattached characteristics (*cf.* Diogenes Laertius 9.63)) attributed to Pyrrho, while strange in the West, are common in

---

[86] Bett, Richard, *Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy* (New York, 2000) p. 38.

[87] Kuzminski (p. 45) cites R. J. Hankinson, who notes that the quadralemma is used by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* 1028a, but Kuzminski further points out that this does not alter the fact that the quadralemma is a distinctly Asian formulation and that other Greeks had travelled to India, through whom Aristotle could have become familiar with it (pp. 46-47).

[88] Tilakaratne, Asanga, *Nirvana and Ineffability: A Study of the Buddhist Theory of Reality and Language* (Sri Lanka, 1993) p. 119.

[89] Reality has three negatively expressed qualities: *adiaphora*, *astathmeta*, and *anepikrita*. We should have three negatively expressed responses: *adoxastous*, *aklineis*, and *akradantous*. We should speak of things according to a quadrilemma, the elements of which are set up as equal to each other by means of the negative expression *ouden mallon*. Long and Sedley also stress the uniqueness of Pyrrho's negative position: "What makes Pyrrho's recipe for happiness distinctive and seminal is its emergence from a totally negative position concerning objective values and accessibility to truth" (*The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) p. 16).

the East. Having defended Flintoff's claims concerning the origin of much of Pyrrho's thought and behavior, I will turn briefly to an examination of Pyrrho's possible influences on various Hellenistic schools.

The moral indifference of Pyrrho finds a fascinating parallel in Epicurus' claim that "We should honour rectitude and the virtues and suchlike things if they bring pleasure; but if not, we should say goodbye to them"[90]. Pyrrho's dogmatic claims about the indeterminacy of things can be interpreted as being modified in Epicureanism into an assertion that most phenomena, while determinate, are accidental and, while they do exist, exist only at the phenomenal level. It should be observed, however, that this presentation of Epicurean doctrine probably comes at it from a different direction than an Epicurean would feel comfortable with. The primary influence of Pyrrho on Epicureanism is, of course, his example as a man who, having achieved an understanding of the universe (even if an Epicurean would assert that his was, in fact, the *wrong* understanding), came to be free of mental disturbance and achieved *eudaimonia*. While the Stoics take the a strongly ethical stance, positing virtue as the *telos*, the influence of Pyrrho and Epicurus is likely at least partially responsible for the vehemence of the Stoic claims. The primary Stoic parallels to Pyrrho's philosophy and attitude, as mentioned earlier, lie not only in the Sage's *ataraxia* but also in his *apatheia*. The Stoic opposition to desire and fear, as well as the attendant passions of pleasure and distress, finds a natural comparison in Buddhism. Again, this does not indicate anything like a direct influence of the one philosophy on the other. Rather, we can observe both systems as having related goals and thus adopting similar attitudes towards the passions. David Sedley is paraphrased by Gisela Striker as arguing "that the skeptics of both schools would not have been able to do without the ideal of tranquility inspired by the image of Pyrrho—which one allegedly attains through skeptical suspension of judgment, if it resulted in nothing more than the depressing conclusion that no knowledge-claims are justified?"[91]

Pyrrho went to India and learned from the *gymnosophoi* through the aid of the Magi. What he experienced there transformed him in a way that profoundly influenced his contemporaries and, through them, several centuries of Hellenistic thought. In the end, we should probably take a lesson from those Greeks who, while they allowed the details of his philosophy (if he ever expressed them in any sort of rigorous detail) to fade with time, remembered his life, method, and example.

**Part 4: On Translation and the BBA – Resonances of Consilience Between Worldviews**

"Behold, they are one people, and they have all one language, and this is only the beginning of what they will do. And nothing that they imagine to do will now be impossible for them."
– Genesis 11:6

[90] Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1* (Cambridge, 1987) p. 117.
[91] "Pyrrhonists and Academics," *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (New York, 1996) p. 148.

*Worldview studies* is an incredibly ambitious program; like it, *translation studies* could almost be thought of as a synonym for the humanities as a whole (see Bachmann-Medick, 2012, p. 35). But what does this mean? The metaphor of "resonance" in the subtitle above – like another popular physics metaphor: entanglement – suggests a collapse of difference and separation through its dominant conceptual element of synchrony, but insofar as it also suggests prolongation, extension, elaboration, or repetition, it may introduce difference (and différance) and interpretation. Brainard's (2017) *Reality's Fugue: Reconciling Worldviews in Philosophy, Religion, and Science* attempts to categorize worldviews as first-person, third-person, and dualist. Whatever the utility of this typology for worldview analysis, I think it does point to one of the great challenges in translating between the sciences and the humanities. This appendix reflects on the goal and achievability of "consilience" (Wilson, 1998; Slingerland and Collard, 2012) in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) in terms of information and translation theory. That is, it examines a proposed meta-discourse or information-theoretic "ontology" (understood in a weak sense, since the BBA does not yet have the precisely defined characteristics of a formal "upper level" knowledge ontology) for cross-cultural comparative religion[92] (namely, the Building Block Approach (BBA) proposed by Ann Taves, with her closely related revival of worldview studies under an evolutionarily grounded "Big Questions" (BQs) framework), noting that it is part of a larger trend toward converting everything into the master language, not of God or money, but of data. Broadly, the goal of consilience relates to the challenge of communication between the "two cultures" (*cf.* Dewey, 1934, pp. 73, 84-85), the sciences and the humanities, and across the gulf separating the third person from the first—a question at the heart of attempting to make sense of qualia, intentionality, and consciousness. As an interdisciplinary project, it is helpful to make explicit the translational aspect of interdisciplinarity itself:

> [I]t might, for example, be constructive to consider interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity as a translation problem, potentially enhancing our understanding of the contact zones arising in the transitions between disciplines. In all these cases, it would be a mistake to pass hastily over the tensions inherent in translation's relationships to appropriation, transformation and conflict. These can usefully be explored and developed: frictions arising from translational relations (whether they be metaphor transfers, conceptual bridges or mutual repudiations) between the humanities and neurobiology offer a taste of what this might involve. (Bachmann-Medick, 2012, p. 24)

Comparison in this sense is also perhaps *the* threshold concept for the discipline of religious studies and an expanded worldview studies: the emic and the etic—the chasm between the powerful, elite outsider who attempts to stipulate intersubjectively and interculturally valid categories, definitions, and points of analogy and the insider who dwells within the specific,

---

[92] Carman (1988, p. 222):

> The study of religion is not to be identified simply as comparative religion, but it may be that the process of comparison clarifies a translation process that precedes and possibly also pervades religious studies. [...] [O]ur concept of "religion" is the product of the "translation language" initiated even before the rise of Christianity with the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible (called the *Septuagint*) by Jewish Rabbis living in Greek-speaking parts of the Mediterranean world.

personal worlds of the self and the small group. More narrowly, this paper discusses how the Building Block Approach (BBA), as an example of an attempt at consilience (Taves, 2009, 2016; Taves and Asprem, 2016), may be understood in light of contemporary understandings of the purposes, possibilities, and limits of translation and information transferal among levels and systems of representation. Furthermore, since all allomythic worlds are syntheses of prior elements, the *betweenness* of translation is an essential aspect of their nature. As Bachmann-Medick states,

> In these moves outward to wider horizons, clearly the role of language, and with it "translation proper," cannot be ignored. However, in the disciplinary framework of translation studies, "translation proper" itself suggests a concept of translation that undermines representationalism: a multilayered, complex concept that is constantly generating difference and hybridity and confounding tendencies towards homogenisation through what translation studies scholar Dilek Dizdar refers to as its "third-party position" (Dizdar 96). Dizdar shows how "translation proper," as a language-oriented procedure, can offer valuable insights for the investigation of in-between positions and ethical implications as opposed to mere transcodings, thus making more visible the translation process and the actions of translators themselves. (2012, pp. 28-29)

Allomythoi are translations, transporting those who enter them into in-between, hybrid positions.

The goal of consilience may be expressed as the ability (in principle) to translate between all levels of reality, from cultures and phenomenal experience to the nervous system and physics. It presents an ambitious practical, epistemological, and representational challenge for CSR. This raises the question of whether consilience is doomed as a modern, Enlightenment-style attempt to create a totalizing representation of reality that "reduces" or abstracts away everything it cannot express, explain, and master in materialist, technoscientific terms (*cf.* Berry, 2000; Cunningham, 2002: 174-177)—or if the situation is not or need not be understood as quite as dire as all that.

The essential feature of the Building Blocks Approach may be discussed now: it breaks complex phenomena apart into "building blocks" or "mechanisms,"[93] understood in a technical sense as parts that, through their relation and interaction, produce a given phenomenon. Mechanistic explanation in this sense appeals to the parts of a lower level that produce the phenomenon at a higher level, but "levels" do not necessarily refer to disciplines or levels of ontological granularity like physics, chemistry, biology, and history. More accurately, they refer to the merological distinction between parts and wholes.

More precisely identifying at least three senses of "ontology" and their respective domains of interpretation and explanation may specify the challenge of consilience (for

[93] Hegel notes the distinction, which we now know lies at the heart of lateralized cognition, between understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft), evident in the difference between mechanism (and dogmatism) and organism (sublating ridged, fixed, never-resolved oppositional distinctions in the acceptance of — vital, metaphorical, paradoxical — contradictions). I sometimes have doubts about whether the "new mechanism" philosophy overcomes the problems in past mechanistic understanding, which was unfaithful to the truth of co-dependent becoming — the worlds within worlds — evident from quantum mechanics to ecosystems. At the very least, its vocabulary is disconcertingly lifeless. But it does seem to honor the truth that a "mechanism" is both end and means, that at one level of analysis it may be a component while at another the "organic" whole that is in view. So my qualms may be grounded in nothing more than quibbles over wording.

more detailed discussion of the three dominant senses of "ontology," see Appendix 6). The three primary senses of "ontology" that I would specify – which relate to but do not equate to "levels" are as follows: the phenomenological (which is always embodied, emplaced, and culturally inflected), the worldview-related (as in the scientific disciplines that contribute to CSR), and the information-theoretic (such as the BBA). Each of these senses of "ontology" has properties and difficulties peculiar to it.

Again, "ontology" is a word that is used in a variety of senses. In its original philosophical sense, it traces back to a long tradition in Western metaphysical philosophy that attempts to give a systematic, abstract account of existence—the fundamental categories of what is and the relations that obtain between those categories. In its practical sense, which we find being made use of in the activities of librarians, information specialists, and scientists, it refers to pragmatic attempts to describe domains of knowledge in a controlled and orderly fashion. This tradition also traces back to the very dawn of Western civilization. The former tradition is primarily ontological and philosophical in interest; the latter, epistemological and practical. Finally, there is a phenomenological sense of the term, especially in the tradition of thinkers influenced by Heidegger, in which the "ontological" is contrasted with the "ontic." In Heidegger's sense, the ontic is the mode of existence referred to by disciplines like physics; it is the mere thingness of things (they are, Heidegger would say, "present-at-hand" in a calculative, instrumental, "thoughtless" manner), their being abstracted from their phenomenological, meaningful, experiential nature (*i.e.*, things in their, in Heidegger's words, ontological, ready-to-hand, concerned, "meditative" sense).

*Qualia*, a term often regarded as central to the "hard problem of consciousness" in the philosophy of mind, may be used to illustrate the difference between the ontic and the ontological. One might give an impersonal or, rather, third-person account of the redness of an apple, in terms of photons, the chemical structure of the apple skin, the structure of the human eye, the cognitive system that enables visual perception, and so on, but this would not, it is argued, capture the distinctive feeling of the apple's redness. Many regard as irreducible the distinctive qualia of conscious perception (*e.g.*, Gertler 2006), though this is contested (*e.g.*, Lycan 2006); likewise, some contest whether propositional or "cognitive" qualia exist or if qualia only refer to sense-related perception, and others note other fine distinctions in how the term "qualia" is used (*cf.* Bayne and Montague 2011; Lycan 2006). At the same time, it is known that human information processing surpasses what is felt, what is accessible to conscious awareness, so it is somewhat curious to claim that felt experience – so tenuous and partial even for the person to whom it most directly relates – transcends all possibility of expression and explanation. Indeed, with Dewey (1934) and Lodge (2002), I would argue that experience is expressed as and re-experienced through art, and, with Taves and Asprem (2017), I find event cognition a promising tool for explaining it while yet deferring complete explanation. Event cognition, derived from the study of how people process and remember narratives, notes that humans model reality in a probabilistic fashion – anticipating the likelihoods of what might occur (priors) based on cues and previous experience and explaining away perceptual discrepancies with their predictive models by revising them for subsequent predictions – and then break the flow of modeled experience up into manageable units (events) that can be recalled and reported. I would stress that probability is central to this process.

Since the Building Blocks Approach seeks to translate between ontologies, taking seriously the meaning and activity of translation may help illuminate the task at hand, both

its positive features and its limitations. For example, the recursive move in BBA of not merely reducing but also reconstructing may be compared to back translation, and the problems of complexity and emergence relative to levels may be related to the familiar gaps in translation, which I shall discuss further shortly.

When this effort to translate between different ontologies is put into conversation with some of the conclusions of translation theory, which has moved from "source text" (ST) oriented translation (*i.e.*, equivalence) to "target text" (TT) oriented translation (*i.e.*, functional, relevance-based, or *skopos* translation—*cf.* Toury 1980) to increased interest in power, possibility, and autonomy in translation (*e.g.*, Venuti 2012)—these developments being due in part to the practice and challenge of literary translation as well as the findings of information theory and comparative literature relative to the power-inflected considerations of translator choice (*cf.* Spivak 2005; Tymoczko 2007; Robinson 2016), one concludes that there are limits, both practical and theoretical, to the achievability of consilience. These are reminiscent of the discovered fundamental limits of formal systems and uncertainties in physical measurement and information transfer, not to mention familiar practical limitations in tools, resources, and abilities confronted daily by CSR researchers and the ethical concerns raised by those in the humanistic traditions.

Kavka refers to "*the silence of impossible translation*," stating in part,

> If we cannot translate another's pain without taking it up for our own ends, if a translator's narrative of someone else's suffering ends up saying more about the translator than about the sufferer whose pain is being translated, then perhaps it is best to translate as minimally as possible, if at all. (193)

This is suggestive of the long history, in translation theory, of debate about translation as a domesticating and naturalizing technology, a tool of mastery. Translation, by speaking in such a way as to fill and interpret someone's inexpressible truth, may simply appropriate it for one's own purposes. Likewise, regarding the goal of consilience, Berry states, "[I]t is becoming clear that to reduce life to the scope of our understanding (whatever "model" we use) is inevitably to enslave it, make property of it, and put it up for sale" (7). Reflecting the embodied, enacted, emplaced, and extended nature of human cognition and a call for decolonization through translation that resembles the foreignizing and exoticizing approach to translation, Inés Talamantez, a scholar of Native American religions at UCSB, points to the necessity of a translation theory and practice that combines a constructive and expressive art with analytical and explanatory deconstruction. This is consistent with the move to reassembly in the BBA, in which religious studies scholars are called, as theorists and comparativists, to creative reconstruction. Talamantez states,

> To interpret the intricacies of the symbolism of Mescalero song, which is also the model for cultural behavior penetrating just about every aspect of Mescalero life, we need a new style of translation, one that considers the elements of language, cultural reality, ritual, and performance. Ideally, a translation from which we could gain knowledge would produce a performable text, incorporating all translatable and correspondent meanings inherent in the oral tradition. Such a translation would do more than deal with a succession of linguistic entities; it would reflect care taken to incorporate an awareness of the substantial elements of the entire Mescalero ceremonial system.... If translation produces only a word-for-word rendering, the logic and aesthetic uniqueness of the traditional text are lost, leaving a gap between

> language and ritual experience. To gain insight into the Native belief system, the translator must also attend to the verbal conventions that indicate the elements of performance as define the imagery—silences, rhythm, phrasing, pauses, volume, music, and movement.... Even in the telling of stories, spatiality, and the appropriate gesturing in the correct direction all become part of the telling itself. (2003: 284-285; *cf.* Gill 2005:37, 40, 44)

Rodney Frey's *Stories That Make the World: Oral Literature of the Indian Peoples of the Inland Northwest*, for example, admirably attempts some of what Talamantez proposes, but even his work falls short of Talamantez's call. Talamantez's perspective on translation makes it at once profoundly faithful to and determined by the cultural norms that underlie any communicative act and affirmative of individual autonomy and experience in an expression that is designed, not to communicate an experience, so much as to reproduce it. For all its potential linguistic content, this resembles what Kavka calls "*the silence that accompanies pure translation*" (191). Many of the processes Talamantez refers to above are, in cognitive terms, supported by processes that are not consciously accessible, that do not tend to be stored in declarative memory systems, and that can even swamp conscious working memory. They are, by their very nature, hard if not impossible to speak about (*cf.* Gill 2005:8-9).[94] As Sam Gill, another scholar of Native American religions, notes,

> Consider certain olfactory experiences. I cannot smell the odor of juniper smoke without it evoking a series of particular images and feelings related to experiences I had while living among Navajo people. If asked what the smell of juniper smoke means to me, I would at first be confounded, for such a questions seems inappropriate. The smell bears no translatable message, although it has an emotional impact. The experience is full of meaning, but has no meaning at all in the sense of bearing a message. Listening to music often evokes similar sorts of meaning by awakening a certain emotion, often a series of images or memories connected with the music through one's personal and cultural history. (2005:35)

Although claiming that the meaning of juniper smoke is incommunicable, Gill then suggests that art, in this case music, is capable of expressing or evoking it.

Dewey, in *Art as Experience*, states regarding an experience: "Its nature and import can be expressed only by art, because there is a unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience" (1934:43). He goes on to explain that all aesthetic experiences are *recreational*, not in the sense of "entertaining," but rather because anyone confronted with a work of art, in order to perceive it, "must *create* his [sic] own experience. And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent" (1934:54; *cf.* 52). In Taves's BBA, she appeals to close historical analysis of narrative descriptions of experiences and a disciplined, careful interpretive method supported by event segmentation research to attempt just such a recreation.

Consider what Dewey has to say about emotion:

> Save nominally, there is no such thing as *the* emotion of fear, hate, love. The unique, unduplicated character of experienced events and situations impregnates the emotion that is evoked. Were it the function of speech to reproduce that to which it refers, we could never speak of fear, but only of fear-of-this-particular-oncoming-automobile, with all its specifications of

[94] For further recent discussion of non-linguistic cognitive aspect of religious practices, see Schilbrack (2014).

> time and place, or fear-under-specified-circumstances-of-drawing-a-wrong-conclusion from just-such-and-such-data. A lifetime would be too short to reproduce in words a single emotion. In reality, however, poet and novelist have an immense advantage over even an expert psychologist in dealing with an emotion. For the former build up a concrete situation and permit *it* to evoke emotional response. Instead of a description of an emotion in intellectual and symbolic terms, the artist "does the deed that breeds" the emotion. (1934: 67; *cf.* 90).

Lodge (2002) would agree with Dewey that artists – such as the poet and the novelist – "have as their subject-matter the qualities of things of direct experience" (Dewey 1934:73) and that "[s]cience states meanings; art expresses them" (84). Lodge would give a privileged place among the arts to literature, "because literature is a record of human consciousness, the richest and most comprehensive we have. Lyric poetry is arguably man's [sic] most successful effort to describe qualia. The novel is arguably man's most successful effort to describe the experience of individual human beings moving through space and time" (2002:10). Regarding the contrast between science and art, Lodge is in fundamental agreement with Dewey:

> The reason is that science tries to formulate general explanatory laws which apply universally, which were in operation before they were discovered, and which would have been discovered sooner or later by somebody. Works of literature describe in the guise of fiction the dense specificity of personal experience, which is always unique, because each of us has a slightly or very different personal history, modifying every new experience we have; and the creation of literary texts recapitulates this uniqueness. (Lodge 2002:10-11)

Lodge improves on Dewey's analysis by specifying the reason novel's evoke experience so effectively and seem, thereby, to achieve to some degree the goal of consciousness science, translating the first person into the third:

> It was not possible to combine the realism of assessment that belongs to third-person narration with the realism of presentation that comes from first-person narration until novelists discovered free indirect style, which allows the narrative discourse to move freely back and forth between the author's voice and the character's voice without preserving a clear boundary between them. (Lodge 2002: 45)

Again, like Dewey, Lodge is aware of the fact that different compositional choices and different media are more suited to, competent in, or capable of expressing certain aspects of experience. The third person point of view is suited to that of the outsider – the scholar who stipulates definitions and comparative points of analogy – while the first person point of view is suited to that of the experiencer. Dewey states, "If all meanings could be adequately expresses in words, the arts of painting and music would not exist" (1934: 74); likewise, Lodge traces and historically contextualizes the changes in literature that relate to the proliferation of new media and shifts in worldview from modernism to postmodernism. Lodge's treatment of the topic moves comfortably among genres and media, describing how their different determinate traits facilitate and afford different experiences.

When one attempts to translation, it is important to recognize the violence and colonization implied by the act, even though the act is also inherently communicative and prosocial. Of the three types of translation identified by Roman Jakobson in "On Linguistic

Works of Translation" (1987; *cf.* Sallis 2002) – intralingual, interlingual, and intersemiotic – each raises the question of power in different ways. Intersemiotic transformation might be illustrated, for example, by Adam Bradley's (2009) attempt to make rap legible by turning it into or re-presenting it as poetry in *Book of Rhymes: The Poetics of Hip Hop*. Certainly, this transformation highlights the linguistic genius of rap artists, but it simultaneously betrays the art's distinctive performativity, rooted in its historical origins, cultural functions, and actual experience; however, framing rap as poetry simultaneously invites comparison with other cultures' poetic productions that emphasize performance, such as the bards of ancient Greece.

Intralingual translation is perhaps the most explicit case of the "free" approach to translation, domesticating and naturalizing something by rewording, paraphrasing, summarizing, expanding, or commenting on it, as in theology, religious studies, psychoanalysis, history, and literary criticism. Such interpretive disciplines occasionally demonstrate awareness of how their re-defining phenomena in their own terms and according to their own organizational schemas represent power-inflected acts of appropriation and mastery. And the most familiar form of translation, interlingual translation, has long recognized the tension between the domesticating, idiomatic paraphrase and the foreignizing, exoticizing metaphrase.

Relative to the goal of consilience – the translation of the cultural and humanistic into the cognitive and material – Berry asserts,

> You cannot translate a poem into an explanation, any more than you can translate a poem into a painting or a painting into a piece of music or a piece of music into a walking stick. A work of art says what it says in the only way it can be said…. To believe that the arts can be interpreted so as to make them consilient with biology or physics is about equivalent to the belief that literary classics can survive as comic books or movies. (Berry 2000:117)

Regarding the central ontological divide Berry here regards as unbridgeable, I find it useful to reflect on the distinction between the scientific language of statistical norms and the notion of the natural. The "norm" suggests a central value or cluster of central values around which there is inevitable variance. Though "normal" has all sorts of value-inflected connotations (*cf.* Hollywood 2016: 163*ff.*), as a statistical term it is value free. The "natural" is an evaluative, axiological term—a complex cultural concept or "CCC," as the BBA would refer to it (*cf.* Lewis 1967; Levinovitz forthcoming), although the axiological practice of evaluating the world is a basic activity of many living things. How could a value-free discourse be converted into a value-centered discourse save through a fallacious violence (*i.e.*, the ecological fallacy, the naturalistic fallacy, etc.)?

Returning to the subject of event cognition, mentioned above, let's here recall that it is a probability-driven modeling system. In their response to Taves & Asprem's target article in *Religion, Brain, and Behavior* on using event cognition to understand unusual religious experiences, Lang & Kundt point out the challenge of recovering the original environmental and cultural cues and a subject's idiosyncratic priors in a historical figure, such as the founder of an NRM. (And this assumes a relatively uniform functioning of the world-modeling system, particularly the Default Mode Network (DMN). Subjects such as schizophrenics, whose narrative formation abilities (*i.e.*, event cognition) and inferential processing of priors are unusual, are very hard to predict.) It is unlikely that one would be able to quantitatively specify all the competing priors in a subject's inferential world model

at a given moment, even if one could specify the range of cues considered salient by that subject in that moment. "Unusual" experiences lie in the mind's eye of the beholder, informed by her social environment. That is, neurotypical people whose world-modeling priors weight such unusual experiences as unlikely will not simply deem them abnormal, they generally will not experience them at all, and if they do, they should be explained away with some trivializing label. Whether they are granted credence, remembered as events, and labeled with an attribute like "miracle" or discounted as an illusion, dream, or whatnot, depends very much on the subject's priors. For an unusual experience to be considered (that is, attributively labeled) something like a "miracle," the subject must inhabit a worldview in which miracles are part of the range of relevant inferential possibilities. This returns us to the tense relationship between norms and the natural with renewed force.

When the BBA is regarded as an information-theoretic ontology, designed to facilitate translation, cognitive linguistic research on translation becomes relevant. A number of scholars have noted that translation is an instance of conceptual blending. In conceptual blending, the mind generates novel mental spaces or possible worlds, in which features from other spaces are projected and which novel spaces permit new inferences. This has surprising relevance to our concern about translation's colonialist potential:

> The fact that a translation is a blend has many consequences, some of which have been noted by other translation scholars when they refer to a translation as a hybrid (Barnstone 1993:88), a term originally used in postcolonial studies to describe the space 'in between' (Mehrez 1992:121) the traditional culture and the former colonizer; see also Bhabha (1994:224) and Bassnett and Trivedi (1999:1-18). Studies of the translation as a hybrid include references to its multicultural background and its blended linguistics (see also Snell-Hornby 2006:95, 99-100). (Boase-Beier 2011:68)

Kjell Magne Yri, in an essay entitled "Recreating Religion: The Translation of Central Religious Terms in the Light of a Cognitive Approach to Semantics," highlights the colonialist problem of power relative to the religious translation task and attempts to provide advice based on cognitive and possible world semantics. He proposes "a gliding scale of textual types along a parameter of 'degree of religiousness'" (Yri 2003:188), by which he means a scale running from the concrete and measurable to the abstract and mysterious. Something further along the scale of "religiousness" "is described sufficiently for the readers to form a concept of it, but it fails to refer to any entity in our world. Its reference is limited to a possible world" (Yri 2003:189). Yri notes that translators often appropriate terms from the target culture's religious domain, or "possible world" of supernatural concepts, and then map the meanings of source culture concepts onto those terms, resulting in cultural colonization. His proposed solution recognizes the act of translation as a creative act—or, one might say, a novel conceptual blend. Rather than appealing to a metonymic process that robs and effaces the target culture's religious terms, he advocates a metaphoric process, "inventing names for God and other religious terms starting from a concrete domain rather [than] the existing domain of the indigenous religion" (Yri 2003:200). This proposal seems to be a fine example of the ideal of cultural negotiation between the self and the other that one finds in Gadamer or of what Ricoeur calls the "linguistic hospitality" of one who, after doing the "work of mourning" necessitated by the surrender of the dream of perfect translation (the "universal library" (*cf.* Borges) and the "perfect language" (*cf.* Benjamin)), seeks instead "equivalence without identity:" "Linguistic hospitality, then, [is] where the

pleasure of dwelling in the other's language is balanced by the pleasure of receiving the foreign words at home, in one's own welcoming house" (Ricoeur 2006:10). This is "the happiness associated with translating" (*ibid.*).

Stanley Cavell, in the words of Fergus Kerr, proposes that what "Wittgenstein wanted to bring about by his later philosophical work was 'an acknowledgement of human limitation which does not leave us chafed by our own skin' – chafed, in particular, 'by a sense of powerlessness to penetrate beyond the human conditions of knowledge'" (Kerr 1997:113). In light of the human nervous system's predictive functioning, I would argue, with Wittgenstein, for making peace with the conditional (*i.e.*, probabilistic) conditions of our knowledge. One may consider some of the fundamental discoveries of the last century. We have grown immensely in terms of technoscientific power, but part of our increased power has been the discovery of fundamental limits, such as the limits of formal systems (*e.g.*, Gödel's incompleteness theorems; Wolfram's computational irreducibility), the inescapable uncertainties in physical measurement and information transfer (Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle; both kinds of entropy—thermodynamic and Shannon or information-theoretic), and the insights into language and medium captured by the word "différance." Our knowledge is probabilistic and inherently uncertain, but this may be regarded, not as a flaw and limitation since it forecloses the pure knowledge of a totalizing God's-eye perspective, but as the condition of possibility of knowledge itself, which is always partial and plural.

The topic of translation – its power and its problems – subtly dominates both of Yuval Noah Harari's works, *Sapiens* and *Homo Deus*. In *Sapiens*, although he notes the importance of technologies like fire, agriculture, and the domestication of animals, Harari's most compelling observations relate to the transformative power of symbolic systems and shared fictions for coordinating human activity—reordering all things in their terms and thereby seeking to master them. Others who argue for the importance of evolved capacity for fiction include Boyd, in *On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction* (2009) (compare Appendix 26 and Boyd, 2017: "Once the strong existing predisposition to play combined with existing capacities for event comprehension, memory, imagination, language, and narrative, we could begin to invent fiction, and to explore the full range of human possibilities in concentrated, engaging, memorable forms. First language, then narrative, then fiction, created niches that altered selection pressures, and made us ever more deeply dependent on knowing more about our kind and our risks and opportunities than we could discover through direct experience."), and Carroll, *Reading Human Nature: Literary Darwinism in Theory and Practice* (2011).

And Harari is attentive to the ways transformative technologies like capitalism and humanism are entangled with issues of power, such as imperialism, colonialism, religion, and technoscience. The importance of issues of power to understanding translation is relevant to Harari's discussions of issues like mathematics, money, and humanism's notion of "human nature."

Regarding mathematics, Harari states,

> Although this system of writing remains a partial script, it has become the world's dominant language. Almost all states, companies, organisations and institutions – whether they speak Arabic, Hindi, English or Norwegian – use mathematical script to record and process data. Every piece of

> information that can be translated into mathematical script is stored, spread and processed with mind-boggling speed and efficiency.
>
> A person who wishes to influence the decisions of governments, organisations and companies must therefore learn to speak in numbers. Experts do their best to translate even ideas such as 'poverty', 'happiness' and 'honesty' into numbers ('the poverty line', 'subjective well-being levels', 'credit rating'). Entire fields of knowledge, such as physics and engineering, have already lost almost all touch with the spoken human language, and are maintained solely by mathematical script. (2011:203-205 [ebook edition])

The fields that have lost touch with spoken human language, Harari notes, tend not to think as associatively and engage in free conceptual blends; rather, they have attempted to systematize and operationalize their thinking and thought process as much as possible. Apart from the ethic of pure curiosity (*cf.* Ball 2013) and conquest-through-knowledge, they attempt to be value free, and they are therefore unable to provide internal reasons to study or build one thing as opposed to another.[95]

Of money, Harari likewise observes,

> Money is thus a universal medium of exchange that enables people to convert almost everything into almost anything else. Brawn gets converted to brain when a discharged soldier finances his college tuition with his military benefits. Land gets converted into loyalty when a baron sells property to support his retainers. Health is converted to justice when a physician uses her fees to hire a lawyer – or bribe a judge. It is even possible to convert sex into salvation, as fifteenth-century prostitutes did when they slept with men for money, which they in turn used to buy indulgences from the Catholic Church. (Harari 2011:273 [ebook edition])

By abstracting the value of things like food and shelter and anchoring that abstract concept of value itself in a sign, like a gold coin, all things become reducible into gold coins. Capitalism must preserve and reinvest capital while simultaneously driving exponential, (present) environment-destroying, (future) credit-backed growth of production and consumption of goods and services (*cf.* Carlson 1999).

Humanism, drawing on a particular religious genealogy, performs a similar trick relative to human particularity:

> Our liberal political and judicial systems are founded on the belief that every individual has a sacred inner nature, indivisible and immutable, which gives meaning to the world, and which is the source of all ethical and political authority. This is a reincarnation of the traditional Christian belief in a free and eternal soul that resides within each individual. (Harari 2011:359 [ebook edition])

In the name of humanist ideals and culture, imperialistic and colonialist policies are justified worldwide. This soul is the image of the divine. On the basis of a firm theology, one may establish an anthropology of human nature. Humans are rational, ethical, hierarchical, monogamous, heterosexual, prototypically male, and so on because Jehovah is the good, reasonable master of his wife, Israel, and Jesus is the loving husband of the Church. Humanism affirms that the value of each human life is anchored in its transcendent referent,

[95] *Cf.* Maslow's critique of value-free science (1969; 1970; 1971) and Leonhard's (2016) argument that the algorithms of the coming AIs must be governed by human "anthrorithms."

the soul that is the image of God. The soul, then, becomes the common coin that renders human particularity universal.

In *Sapiens*, Harari briefly engages with Dennett's notion of memes as culture viruses, pointing forward to the theme he would explore at more length in *Homo Deus*. He states,

> This approach is sometimes called memetics. It assumes that, just as organic evolution is based on the replication of organic information units called 'genes', so cultural evolution is based on the replication of cultural information units called 'memes'. Successful cultures are those that excel in reproducing their memes, irrespective of the costs and benefits to their human hosts.
>
> Most scholars in the humanities disdain memetics, seeing it as an amateurish attempt to explain cultural processes with crude biological analogies. But many of these same scholars adhere to memetics' twin sister – postmodernism. Postmodernist thinkers speak about discourses rather than memes as the building blocks of culture....
>
> Similar arguments are common in the social sciences, under the aegis of game theory. Game theory explains how in multi-player systems, views and behaviour patterns that harm all players nevertheless manage to take root and spread. (Harari 2011:368-369 [ebook edition])

In his equation of memes, discourse, and game systems, Harari treats cultures as information representation and processing systems. This theme is continued in *Homo Deus* under the figure of the "algorithm." It's important to note that an algorithm is an abstraction – often treated as synonymous with notions like a specified or formalized "method" or "rule" – but not a concrete instantiation. Whereas a function, like a metaphor, maps in a determinate way from inputs to outputs, a domain set to a range set, an algorithm, as a "rule," suffers from the ambiguities and paradoxes Kripke (1982) describes in *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. The problem of the rule might be regarded as a special case, relating to a partial script, of Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis, which applies to the indeterminacies of natural language running from the semantic level of the word to larger "transemes" (*sensu* van Leuven-Zwart; see Quine 2004:119 *ff.*).

The concept "algorithm" has not yet been successfully formalized, so its informal character, particularly when extended to refer to biological organisms and cultural systems as "algorithms," becomes something of an act of faith, as Harari himself notes, calling the resulting faith "Dataism." Reducing all reality, all experience, to information or "data" would be the ultimate act of translation.[96] However, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the achievability of such a translation.

As discussed briefly above, we know that formal systems themselves have fundamental translation limits, first described by Gödel's incompleteness theorems and then by related proofs. And we know that fidelity in information transferal is limited by Shannon

[96] In physics, the holographic principle sounds like just such a transformation, though I may be misunderstanding its popularization in scientific journalism. Interestingly, at the level of cultural critique, Baudrillard's thought in some ways follows the progression of Harari, critiquing the reduction of everything to use-value and exchange-value, to the neglect of sign-value, and arguing that it is a distinctive feature of postmodernity that everything has, in a sense, been turned into data, a simulation, a hologram. See also Hayles (1999) and my Conclusion.

entropy, which is itself intimately related to thermodynamic entropy. In *Weapons of Math Destruction*, Cathy O'Neil (2016) describes how models and algorithms derived from big data may naturalize, replicate, and amplify unjust social and political structures. This way of thinking forecloses possibilities, abstracting away what cannot be rendered in its partial script. Recall what Harari writes concerning history:

> Unlike physics or economics, history is not a means for making accurate predictions. We study history not to know the future but to widen our horizons, to understand that our present situation is neither natural nor inevitable, and that we consequently have many more possibilities before us than we imagine. (2011:366 [ebook edition])

This is why I think *Sapiens* is such a strong work, while *Homo Deus*, which engages in so much prognostication, leaves me doubtful. I noted that the algorithm does not have a formal definition. Perhaps humans are algorithms, then, precisely in so far as they cannot be formalized (*cf.* Carlson 2008). As a "level two" chaotic system, "a chaos that reacts to predictions about it," humanity is a recursive system that reacts to its – partial, uncertain, but nonetheless significant – self-awareness; indeed, its reactions are shaped in part by its awareness of its uncertainty.

Harari also, in the extended quote above, rightly refers to the theory of memetics as an example of a theory of cultural "evolution." Radek Kundt's (2015) *Contemporary Evolutionary Theories of Culture and the Study of Religion* in my opinion rather decisively problematizes all such theories in a manner that illustrates the challenge of translation, while still retaining the usefulness of evolutionary approaches to culture and religion that do not depend on cultural evolution (*cf.* Szocik 2017). Kundt points out that the explanatory power of neo-Darwinian theory is rooted in its precise criteria – namely, that there is a mechanistic process composed of high-fidelity replicators that compete with each other for limited resources and in ideal conditions grow exponentially but that may experience involuntary copying errors that may produced increased replication. When he critically assesses the dominant contemporary theories of cultural evolution (group selection, dual inheritance, and memetic accounts), he finds that they do not legitimately extend the necessary criteria of neo-Darwinian theory and are, thus, merely "evolutionary" in the sense of being metaphors or analogies, confusing rather than illuminating the phenomena they are intended to explain. The categories of the BBA, however, do not suffer from this kind of problem. The BBA's second-order terms are neither illegitimate extensions of other second-order terms nor do they pretend to be the first-order terms of the subjects of scholarly inquiry. To cite another recent critical example that illustrates the problem of translation, this time as an instance of the latter problem, one might consider Darryl Wilkinson's (2017) recent article in *JAAR*, "Is There Such a Thing as Animism?" Wilkinson, like Kundt, argues that the revived form of animistic analysis found in the recent scholarship known as "New Animism" – reflecting among other things the New Materialist turn – is at best a metaphorical category of analysis, in particular because the core sense of "animism" as the attribution of agency to natural things (and "fetishism" as the corresponding attribution of agency to manufactured things) relies on a stable understanding of personhood and subjectivity that is actually highly culturally contingent. As cognitive science has come to understand human cognition as extended into and afforded by human's built and natural environments, their bodies, and their numerous, complicated social relations, the distinctions between fetishism and animism and the mysterious character of personhood and agency have become increasingly

complicated. Where does the individual human person end and their environment (social, technical, natural, etc.) begin?

To return for a moment to Harari, I would observe that Catholic theology has distinguished between two kinds of interdependent theologies, the apophatic and the cataphatic, reminiscent of the distinction Harari tries to make between impersonal absolutes like Τύχη, Tao, Fortuna, Atman/Brahman and personal gods like Zeus and Thor. Whereas cataphatic theology tells you what God's nature is – triune, benevolent, omniscient, just, and so on – apophatic theology unsays each of those attributes, affirming deity as a category in excess of any categorization. Harari's treatment of religions in *Sapiens*, ranging from animism to Zoroastrianism to feminism, seems to suggest a quiet preference for Buddhism, a distinctly apophatic religion. Buddhism does not attempt a discourse of mastery, a translation of everything into one language that grasps or represents everything. It accepts the constructedness of things, their fictionality, even, like Baudrillard, their lack of inherent meaning. If humanity from its outset, as a fire-transforming, wolf-domesticating, talking animal, has been technical – domesticating itself at the same time as its environment, which then has acted recursively back on humanity in an incalculable network of relations – than perhaps *homo* has always been *deus*, the image of a deity whose nature is to resist stable figuration, the image of the apophatic god (Carlson 2008). Thus, whether humanity is or is about to become posthumanity, it was probably always a cyborg. And yet, for all that the image of humanity may be its unrepresentability, Harari's discussion of how our great technologies have harmed our fellow humans, our animal companions, and our environment do suggest that the crucified god is still an appropriate symbol for the manner in which humanity has lacerated itself on its journey to theosis.

Translation, in cognitive terms, is a novel conceptual blend. Nietzsche stressed this when he described translation as "conquest" and the Romans as the consummate translators (contrast this with Samuel Johnson, who did not regard the Romans as translating anything of note, but who similarly regarded European and Islamic empire-builders as possessing in translation a potent tool for conquest) (see Robinson, 2015, pp. 204, 262). The new hybrid – and I use that term with all its postcolonial significance (*e.g.*, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, Paul Gilroy) – is inevitably unfaithful both to its source and its target because it is a new thing, an expression of the translator's authorial autonomy. Whatever homo deus we are becoming, it will result from the play of difference that is our complex homo sapiens inheritance. As Kavka states,

> We find ourselves translating simply because we live among varied and varying communities. We find ourselves translating in different ways at different times because the others among whom we live change. The aim of translation therefore cannot be some permanent mapping of concepts onto one another. The meaning of those concepts will change over time, so translation will never exhaust itself. (2012:196)

Ricoeur would certainly agree. Returning to the metaphor with which this appendix began, namely, the idea of "resonance" and its inherent polysemy, I argue that consilience should also be regarded as polysemous, in the sense that, as Ricoeur argues, cultures and people are plural while the underlying capacity for language and architecture of the human body and nervous system are unitary. Thought of in terms of a distinction between goals and aspirations, consilience should be an aspirational ideal that points toward the desired

impossibility of total translation, but it should simultaneously be a realistic goal that acknowledges human finitude and creates a hospitable space of dialog. Kavka states,

> What this account of translation allows us to do is both to affirm a boundary between cultures and at the same time acknowledge that the boundary is contingent. It allows for translation – cultures are neither incommensurable (making translation impossible) nor identical (making it unnecessary) – and at the same time it acknowledges that at various historical moments, the ways in which we want to translate might change. (2012:204)

In any conceptual blend, there will be tensions resulting from the domains being blended. This is part of the challenge and pleasure of translation.

With Jameson (1991:54, 372, 394), one might argue that the aspirational pursuit of "a global cognitive mapping" through a totalizing and, indeed, colonizing transcoding that overcomes the gaps between "strings of events types of discourse, modes of classification, and compartments of reality," such as that proposed by CSR and its aspiration for consilience, might provide a foundation for generating utopian ideals that may become the basis of world-historical transformation. At the same time, such a scientific discourse will always be problematic – in Baudrillard's words, an "impossible exchange" (2001) – for a variety of reasons, as discussed above. Relative to the sorts of narratives Taves's BBA uses, drawing on event cognition research, to reconstruct and interpret experiences, one might point out that the empathetic inhabiting of someone else's experience may be challenged on ethical grounds such as those mentioned above by Kavka under the label of "impossible translation" – impossible, not necessarily for practical, but for ethical reasons. Keen states,

> Empathy earns distrust for its apparent directional quality—an empathetic performance may appear condescending to its object or to an observer. In addition, feminists, postcolonial theorists, and critical race scholars in legal studies resist the universalizing of human emotions inherent in much of the commentary on empathy. Some philosophers and experts in cultural studies regard the putative ethical consequences of empathy and reading emotionally evocative literature as impediments to justice. Many contemporary intellectuals point to the empathetic individual's erasure of suffering others in a self-regarding emotional response that affronts others' separate personhood. These criticisms place empathy in a negative light, and their authors certainly do not participate in the advocacy for empathy as an essential ingredient of good citizenship. Indeed, they regard it as a typical manifestation of Western arrogance, imagining common ground with the victims of global capitalism and fantasizing relationships of emotional recognition in place of the unseemly relation of consumers to the exploited. Empathy, in this light, becomes a delusion of the affluent West, which ought to be revealed for throwing up impediments to social change. (Keen 2007:xxiv)

Empathy – and even love – is required for good reading and good translation, and it demands and draws on two conflicting features of the human capacity for metarepresentation. Metarepresention, which makes theory of mind and higher-order mindreading possible, allows one to think about the experience of the other as it is mirrored in the self. That is, it is both rational and non-rational—actively engaged in and passively undergone (*cf.* Albrecht 2012). As a meta-representation, it is other than oneself, and it may thus move us as a self-representation and make demands on us as something, or, rather,

someone other than ourselves. In a situation of true hospitality, as described by Ricoeur, the epochē, or bracketing, central to good anthropology and the practice of religious studies—as well as the decoupled nature of reading literature—should preserve the other as a human making ethical demands on us, while also being a human-like-us with whom we may identify.

The above discussion has traced a variety of tensions involved in the task of translation, such as phenomenological ontology vs. scientific ontology or the first person vs. the third person,[97] as well as media that attempt to bridge the gaps between them, such as information-theoretic ontology and free indirect style. Based on a variety of converging types of evidence, I argued that translation is possible as a goal and worthy as an aspiration, while all media of translation, including the BBA, are fundamentally limited. I also stressed throughout the power-inflected nature of the translation act. I am reminded of Carl Philips's poem, "As from a Quiver of Arrows":

> What do we do with the body, do we
> burn it, do we set it in dirt or in
> stone, do we wrap it in balm, honey,
> oil, and then gauze and tip it onto
> and trust it to a raft and to water?
>
> What will happen to the memory of his
> body, if one of us doesn't hurry now
> and write it down fast? Will it be
> salt or late light that it melts like?
> Floss, rubber gloves, and a chewed cap
>
> to a pen elsewhere —how are we to
> regard his effects, do we throw them
> or use them away, do we say they are
> relics and so treat them like relics?
> Does his soiled linen count? If so,
>
> would we be wrong then, to wash it?
> There are no instructions whether it
> should go to where are those with no
> linen, or whether by night we should
> memorially wear it ourselves, by day
>
> reflect upon it folded, shelved, empty.
> Here, on the floor behind his bed is
> a bent photo—why? Were the two of
> them lovers? Does it mean, where we
> found it, that he forgot it or lost it

[97] For some recent examples of "micro-phenomenology" and the close analysis of third and first person analyses of experience, see the work of Claire Petitmengin (2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2011a, 2011b). I would like to thank Ann Taves for pointing me to her work.

or intended a safekeeping? Should we
attempt to make contact? What if this
other man too is dead? Or alive, but
doesn't want to remember, is human?
Is it okay to be human, and fall away

from oblation and memory, if we forget,
and can't sometimes help it and sometimes
it is all that we want? How long, in
dawns or new clocks, does that take?
What if it is rest and nothing else that

we want? Is it a findable thing, small?
In what hole is it hidden? Is it, maybe,
a country? Will a guide be required who
will say to us how? Do we fly? Do we
swim? What will I do now, with my hands?

Experiences, memories, narratives slip away from us while we struggle to make and inhabit meaningful worlds, and we live in an age in which the ancient worldviews have been rendered increasingly implausible. Yet most humans find in themselves a deep need to make sense of their world and to share that sense with each other. The bridges translators make – native informants, for example[98] – are made out of countless careful choices that bring what was distant near. Sam Gill observes regarding Native American vision quests: "As interesting as is the process of seeking a vision is the process that follows the vision experience. It is a process by which the abstract symbolic experience is examined, restructured, and ultimately transformed into a repeatable account of the vision experience. Only in the form of the dream story can such experiences be self-consciously used and shared with other members of the culture" (2005:73). Cultures give us narratives to inhabit and help us interpret ourselves to ourselves. As islands of subjectivity, we are separated from each other by aching and sometimes violent incomprehension, and we even find whole aspects of ourselves inaccessible and self-alienated. Even the central feature of the self to which our "self" has access and of which it seems to primarily consist – the narrative self – it rapidly slips away from us. Lodge notes that "literature, and especially literary fiction, compensates us for this leakage of information. It allows us vicariously to *possess* the continuum of experience in a way we are never able to in reality" (2002:32). But sometimes some people do not want to be possessed, translated, remembered, and so we arrive at a limit

[98] Carman (1988, p. 223):

> For Christian theology this double translation process continues to be the life work of a vast number of scholars, many of them not members of the Christian Church. These indigenous assistants deserve much greater recognition by modern scholarship than the frequent reference to "native informants" suggests. In many translations they have been true partners, often at considerable personal risk. In many cases it is with them, and sometimes only with them, that a scholarly dialogue between Christianity and other religions has thus far taken place. In any case the actual "fieldwork" of Comparative Religion has often occurred during such a translation process, a process in which significant human meanings have been compared, usually not in a vast philosophical scheme but in minute decisions on particular words and phrases.

more important, perhaps, than the fundamental limits, which we cannot escape but will hopefully make peace with: it will sometimes be the case that ethical translation may only be accomplished through silence.

Works Cited


Albrecht, I., Sussman, D., Murphy, C., Sanders, K. R., & Varden, H. (2012). *Love, self-constitution, and practical necessity.* Ph. D. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Asprem, E., & Taves, A. (2016). Connecting events: experienced, narrated, and framed. *Religion, Brain & Behavior Religion, Brain & Behavior*, *7*(1), 88–93.

Ball, P. (2013). *Curiosity: how science became interested in everything*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

Barnstone, W. (1993). *The poetics of translation: history, theory, practice*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bassnett, S., & Trivedi, H. (1999). *Post-colonial translation: theory and practice*. New York: Routledge.

Baudrillard, J. (2001). *Impossible exchange*. New York: VERSO.

Bayne, T., & Montague, M. (2011). *Cognitive phenomenology*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Spivak, G. C (2005). Translating into English In S. Bermann & M. Wood (Eds.), *Nation, language, and the ethics of translation*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Berry, W. (2001). *Life is a miracle: an essay against modern superstition*. Washington: Counterpoint.

Bhabha, H. K. (1994). *The location of culture*. New York: Routledge.

Boase-Beier, J. (2011). *A critical introduction to translation studies*. New York: Continuum.

Bradley, A. (2009). *Book of rhymes: the poetics of hip hop*. New York, NY: Basic Civitas Books.

Carlson, T. A. (1999). Consuming Desire's Deferral: A Theological Shadow in the Culture of Image. *Parallax*, *5*(1).

Carlson, T. A. (2008). *The indiscrete image: infinitude & creation of the human*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cunningham, C. (2002). *Genealogy of nihilism: philosophies of nothing and the difference of theology*. New York: Routledge.

Dewey, J. (1934). *Art as experience*. New York: Minton, Balch & Company.

Feyaerts, K. (2003). *The Bible through metaphor and translation: a cognitive semantic perspective*. New York: P. Lang.

Frey, R. (1995). *Stories that make the world: oral literature of the Indian peoples of the Inland Northwest as told by Lawrence Aripa, Tom Yellowtail, and other elders*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Gertler, B. (2006) Consciousness and qualia cannot be reduced In R. Stainton (Ed.), *Contemporary debates in cognitive science*. Oxford: Blackwell Pub.

Gill, S. D. (2005). *Native American religions: an introduction*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Harari, Y. N. (2015). *Sapiens: a brief history of humankind*. New York: Harper.

Harari, Y. N. (2017). *Homo deus: a brief history of tomorrow*. New York: Harper.

Hollywood, A. M. (2016). *Acute melancholia and other essays: mysticism, history, and the study of religion*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jakobson, R., & Rudy, S. (1987). *Language in literature*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.

Jameson, F. (1991). *Postmodernism, or, The cultural logic of late capitalism*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Kavka, M. (2011). Translation In R. A. Orsi (Ed), *The Cambridge companion to religious studies* (pp. ). Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Keen, S. (2007). *Empathy and the Novel.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA.
Kerr, F. (1997). *Immortal longings: versions of transcending humanity*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Kripke, S. A. (1982). *Wittgenstein on rules and private language: an elementary exposition*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Langa, M. & Kundt, R. (2017). Can predictive coding explain past experiences? *Religion, Brain & Behavior Religion, Brain & Behavior*, *7*(1), 43–62.
Leonhard, G. (2016). *Technology vs. humanity: the coming clash between man and machine*. United Kingdom: FutureScapes, an imprint of Fast Future Publishing.
Lewis, C. S. (1967). *Studies in words*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lodge, D. (2002). *Consciousness & the novel: connected essays*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Lycan, W. G. (2006). Consciousness and qualia can be reduced In R. Stainton (Ed.), *Contemporary debates in cognitive science*. Oxford: Blackwell Pub.
Maslow, Abraham H. (1970). *Religions, values, and peak-experiences*. New York: Viking Press.
Maslow, Abraham H. (1971). *The farther reaches of human nature*. New York: Viking Press.
Maslow, Abraham Harold. (1969). *The psychology of science a reconnaissance*. Chicago: Henry Regnery.
O'Neil, C. (2016). *Weapons of math destruction: how big data increases inequality and threatens democracy*. New York: Crown.
Quine, W. V., & Gibson, R. F. (2004). *Quintessence: basic readings from the philosophy of W.V. Quine*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.
Ricœur, P., & Brennan, E. (2006). *On translation*. New York: Routledge.
Robinson, D. (2016). *Translation and empire: postcolonial theories explained*. Manchester, U.K.: St. Jerome.
Sallis, J. (2002). *On translation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Schilbrack, K. (2014). *Philosophy and the study of religions: a manifesto*. Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons.
Slingerland, E. G., & Collard, M. (2012). *Creating consilience: integrating the sciences and the humanities*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Snell-Hornby, M. (2006). *The turns of translation studies: new paradigms or shifting viewpoints?* Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.
Talamantez, I. (2003) Transforming American conceptions about Native America: Vine Deloria, Jr., critic and coyote In R. A. Grounds, G. E. Tinker, & D. E. Wilkins (Eds.), *Native voices: American Indian identity and resistance*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Taves, A. (2009). *Religious experience reconsidered: a building block approach to the study of religion and other special things*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Taves, A. (2016). *Revelatory events: three case studies of the emergence of new spiritual paths*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Taves, A. & Asprem, E. (2017). Experience as event: event cognition and the study of (religious) experiences. *Religion, Brain & Behavior Religion, Brain & Behavior*, *7*(1), 43–62.
Toury, G. (1980). *In search of a theory of translation*. Tel Aviv: Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, Tel Aviv University.
Tymoczko, M. (2007). *Enlarging translation, empowering translators*. Manchester, UK: St. Jerome Pub.
Venuti, L. (1992). *Rethinking translation: discourse, subjectivity, ideology*. New York: Routledge.
Venuti, L. (2012). *The translation studies reader*. New York: Routledge.
Wilson, E. O. (1998). *Consilience: the unity of knowledge*. New York: Knopf .

Campbell, Joseph. 1973. *The Hero with A Thousand Faces*. Princeton University Press.
Eliade, Mircea. 2005. *The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History*. Trans. Willard R. Trask. Princeton University Press.
Husserl, Edmund. 1970. *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*. Trans. David Carr. Northwestern University Press.
———. 1977. *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Trans. Dorion Cairns. 1st ed. Martinus Nijhoff Pub.
Lincoln, Bruce. 1992. *Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification*. Oxford University Press, USA.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2002. *Phenomenology of Perception*. 2nd ed. Routledge.
Smart, Ninian. 1999. *Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs*. 1st ed. University of California Press.
Smith, Jonathan Z. 1982. *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown*. University of Chicago Press.
———. 1992. *To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual*. University of Chicago Press.
Taussig, Michael. 1999. *Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative*. 1st ed. Stanford University Press.
Taylor, Diana. 2003. *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas*. Duke University Press Books.
Tillich, Paul. 1959. *Theology of Culture*. Ed. Robert C. Kimball. Oxford University Press, USA.
Tweed, Thomas A. 2008. *Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion*. Harvard University Press.
van der Leeuw, G. 1986. *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*. Princeton University Press.

Bawden, David. "Smoother pebbles and the shoulders of giants: the developing foundations of information science." *Journal of Information Science,* 34.4 (2008): 415-26.

Benjamins, V. Richard, B. Chandrasekaran, and John R. Josephson, "What Are Ontologies, and Why Do We Need Them?" *IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS*, Jan.—Feb. 1999.

Bishop, Robert. “Patching Physics and Chemistry Together.” *Philosophy of Science*, 72 (December 2005): 710–722.

Bochenski, J.M. “Logic and Ontology,” *Philosophy East and West,* 24.3 (July 1974): 275-292.

Briet, Suzanne. “What is documentation?” (Scarecrow, 2006). Translated by Ron Day; originally published 1951.

Budenholzer, Frank E. “Emergence, Probability, and Reductionism.” *Zygon*® 39.2 (2004): 339-356.

Doerr, M. and Hunter, J. and Lagoze, C. “Towards a core ontology for information integration.” *Journal of Digital Information*, 4.1 (2003).

Dykstra, Mary. “LC Subject Headings Disguised as a Thesaurus.” *Library Journal,* 113.4 (1988): 42-46.

Eddington, Sir Arthur. “Beyond the Veil of Physics.” *Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists*. Ed. Ken Wilber. Shambhala Publications, Inc. (Boulder, CO): 1984.

Fonseca, F. “The double role of ontologies in information science research.” *JASIST,* 58:6 (2007): 786-793.

Gruber, Thomas R., “Toward principles for the design of ontologies used for knowledge sharing?” *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies,* 43.5 (November 1995): 907-928.

Guarino, N. “Formal ontology, conceptual analysis and knowledge representation.” *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies*, 43 (1995): 625–640.

Heisenberg, Werner. “The Debate between Plato and Democritus.” *Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists*. Ed. Ken Wilber. Shambhala Publications, Inc. (Boulder, CO): 1984.

Heisenberg, Werner. “If Science is Conscious of Its Limits….” *Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists*. Ed. Ken Wilber. Shambhala Publications, Inc. (Boulder, CO): 1984.

Jenkins, Zack. “Do You Need to Believe in Orbitals to Use Them?: Realism and the Autonomy of Chemistry.” *Philosophy of Science*, 70 (December 2003): 1052–1062.

Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield. *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Kuzminski, Adrian. *Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism*. Plymouth, UK:
Lexington Books, 2008.

Ladyman, James. "Structural realism and the relationship between the special sciences and physics." *Philosophy of Science,* 75.5 (2008): 744-755

Le Poidevin, Robin. "Missing Elements and Missing Premises: A Combinatorial Argument for the Ontological Reduction of Chemistry." *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,* 56.1 (2005): 117 -134.

Lombardi, Olimpia, and Martín Labarca. "The ontological autonomy of the chemical world." *Foundations of Chemistry* (2005) 7: 125–148

---. "The ontological autonomy of the chemical world: A response to Needham." *Foundations of Chemistry* (2006) 8: 81–92.

Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. *The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary*. First Edition. Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Planck, Max. "The Mystery of Our Being." *Quantum Questions:Mystical Writings of the World's Great Physicists*. Ed. Ken Wilber. Shambhala Publications, Inc. (Boulder, CO): 1984.

Poli, R. (2007). "Framing ontology." In R. Corazzon (ed.), *Ontology: A resource guide for philosophers*.

Rojas, Isabel, et al. "Notes on the Use of Ontologies in the Biochemical Domain." *In Silico Biology* 4.1 (2004): 89-96.

Shera, Jesse. "Special librarianship and documentation." *Library Trends*, 1.2 (1952): 189-199.

VandeWall, Holly. "Why Water Is Not H2O, and Other Critiques of Essentialist Ontology from
the Philosophy of Chemistry." *Philosophy of Science*, 74 (December 2007) pp. 906–919.

Wersig, Gernot. "Information science and theory: a weaver bird's perspective." in Vakkari, P. and Cronin, B. (eds.), *Conceptions of library and information science* (London: Taylor Graham, 1992): 201-217.

Woody, Andrea. "Putting Quantum Mechanics to Work in Chemistry: The Power of Diagrammatic Representation." *Philosophy of Science,* 67 (Proceedings) (2000): S612-S627.

—. "Telltale Signs: What Common Explanatory Strategies in Chemistry Reveal about Explanation Itself." *Foundations of Chemistry,* 6 (2004): 13-43.

—. “More telltale signs: What attention to representation reveals about scientific explanation.” *Philosophy of Science,* 71.5 (2004): 780-793.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Cosimo Classics, 2007.

# Appendix 7: Some Brief Examples of Fictional Worldviews

Dune

Frank Herbert's *Dune* details at least five religion-like systems: the Bene Gesserit, the mentats, the Navigator Guild, the Fremen religion, and the imperial Sardaukar.

These religions or religion-like systems could be studied using discursive methods. For example, one might examine how the religious systems are introduced in the novel. Must one piece together the elements of the religions through the use of hints and passing references, or does the author provide long expositions or "information dumps"? Herbert primarily uses the former method, although there are a few passages in which religious themes are discussed at length. The novel also contains appendices that explain religious vocabulary and structures at more length and in a direct, expository fashion.

One might also ask, relative to the question of detecting made-up religions in fiction, how the presence of "religion" may be detected. The religious may be signaled either through the use of an explicit lexicon of religion-oriented terms, such as "religion," "spiritual," "supernatural," transcendent," "magical," and "mystical." It may more subtly be signaled by the presence of elements that may only be detected by the religiously literate: *e.g.*, apocalyptic or messianic themes, ritual practices or acts, etc. Religion, or the religion-like, may be signaled or obscured. There are systems that traffic in ultimate concerns and highest values that intentionally and strategically self-designate themselves as non-religious. That is, the secular, the scientific, the spiritual, the philosophical, the mythical, and the occult sometimes oppose themselves to religion although they may perform religion-like functions, use religion-like symbols and vocabulary, and make religion-like demands in the narrative. Using the above categories, the Bene Gesserit (priestess-politicians of a syncretistic religion, derisively called "witches") and the Fremen (a fictionalized form of Islam) are explicitly marked by religious terms. The mentats' system is treated more as a philosophy or technical profession, in which human subjectivity is transformed to operate more like a computer. The Navigator Guild, which possesses supernatural powers like the Bene Gesserit and the Fremen, is treated like an alien species, like a different order of being. The Sardaukar, in some ways like the Fremen, are a military order, like the marshal monastic orders of Catholicism, that is absolutely loyal to the Emperor. The Sardaukar's devotion to an imperial cult is primarily implied by their being the imperial equivalent of the Fremen, who are devoted to their messianic hero and prophet.

One might also as how the religion functions in the narrative. Is its function peripheral or central (*cf.* Łaszkiewicz)? In *Dune*, the fictional religions play central narrative roles; their values, concerns, and political drives are primary engines of the plot and are crucial parts of the characters' identities.

One might also consider the directionality of extradiegetic-storyworld influence (*cf.* Łaszkiewicz). One might designate a storyworld that receives religious elements as part of an author's general, worldmaking process "passive." On the other hand, a storyworld intended to persuade reader religiously or intervene in the extradiegetic world's religious beliefs and practices (*e.g.*, through praise or critique) might be called "active." I am not sure about this feature. My sense is that Herbert is trying to promote certain religious ideals, such as a politically suspicious reading of religion, the value of environmental conservation, and a particular vision of human subjectivity and agency. This gets at the question of whether the

narrative advances a particular theory of religion (and if so what it is). A narrative may unthinkingly replicate a particular tradition's own theory of religion (*i.e.*, that a certain religion (or secular or occult worldview) is normative and all others deviate from its norms). Or a narrative might embody particular critical or scholarly theories of religion. Finally, a narrative might advance an author's original theory of religion. *Dune* seems to be most sympathetic to Islam, but it also promotes a critical account of religion that resembles Marxism.

One may briefly consider two other fictional examples, one from science fiction and the other from fantasy, as examples of how the non-ordinary within a non-ordinary world may be identified using generic categories drawn from cognitive science and then interpreted using religious studies perspectives. The stages of analysis are as follows: (1) identify the non-ordinary relative to the real world (*i.e.*, the novums), (2) identify the non-ordinary relative to the storyworld, (3) identify the basic schema, metaphor, or generic category of the non-ordinary within the non-ordinary,[1] (4) interpret this relative to religious studies, power contestation and identity formation, and American religious history.

---

[1] Although fantastical fiction offers a relatively unconstrained space in which novelty is invited, social and cognitive constraints limit the novelty of representations (see, *e.g.*, Harris's (2021) "Early Constraints on Imagination: The Realism of Young Children"). Relative to cognition, constraints may be explained by concept learning and categorization theory. That is, memory and interpretation are distorted toward alignment with what are, depending on the theory, designated "exemplars," "prototypes," "norms," "schemas," "scripts," "rules," "attractors," and so on (see, *e.g.*, Pothos and Wills 2011). Horace Bushnell famously insisted on the metaphorical, approximate, and mediated character of all representational categories, including those used with reference to divine and supernatural things. Metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Turner 1987) and cognitive blending theory (Fauconnier 1985, 1997; Turner 1996; Fauconnier and Turner 2003, 2008; Turner 2014, 2006) likewise stress the embodied and emplaced underpinnings of all thought, which has been further emphasized and extended in recent studies in cognitive narratology (Fludernik 2011), whereby even as we use the domains of the familiar – the body and other physical regularities, stable social structures and norms, etc. – to map into the unfamiliar and generate the novel, we are yet constrained by those very familiar structures that enable novelty. Put differently, we use the same embodied inferential tools to (re)construct fictional worlds for ourselves as we use to model the "real" world(s) (Umwelt(en), semiosphere(s)) we inhabit (*cf.* Herman 2013; Nünning, Nünning, and Neumann 2010). The process of projecting the self into a storyworld is governed by the "principal of minimal departure" (Ryan 1980; Gerrig 1993), and this notion that we take our default model of the world and modify it as necessary is both a fundamental constraint and a factor that enables this remarkable ability (see Shtulman, 2022, arguing that even fantastical texts tend to only use minimally counterintuitive concepts because people don't enjoy having their core expectations violated; see also, Berger & Packard, 2018; Sobchuk, 2018; 2022; Berlyne, 1970). In connection with processes of singularization or making special, Taves (2009, 2013a, b) has pointed out the importance of considering how things become salient and significant to people. The counter-intuitive and the category-violating naturally arrest attention (*cf.* Carroll 1990; Cohen 1996; Geisenhanslüke 2009), but so do cues that remind us of indexically special bonds, predators, play, food, home—and in so-called oral societies such "chimeras" anchor entire libraries of data that those ignorant of the arts of memory entirely overlook (Severi, 2015; see also, Kelly, 2019). Special things are used to create fictional special things. See Appendix 32.

Cognitive science of religion (CSR) has itself demonstrated a tendency to adhere to certain schemas of "religion," focusing primarily on certain components of religion that may be aligned with a subset of classical theories of religion (*e.g.*, Tylorian animism – *i.e.*, representations of minimally counter-intuitive agents or agents with non-ordinary powers). Some attention has been given to *religious* narratives (Geertz and Jensen 2014), but apart from Hrotic (2014) CSR has not engaged with non-religious narrative representations of religion in fiction. That said, the components so far identified by CSR are useful for analysis because of they are evidence-based, are general and translatable, possess explanatory power, and are well defined.

## The Hunger Games

*Generic Level*

First, we can distinguish between (a) what there is in *The Hunger Games* that estranges it or makes it non-ordinary relative to our world, its novums – for example, the future technology, the new history and social arrangements produced by it, and most importantly the Games – and (b) what is non-ordinary within the storyworld.

*The hunger games and their associated heroes* are non-ordinary within the non-ordinary; they are the world within the world. The contestants are marked as different through ritual (the lottery) and choice (volunteering), by different treatment (luxury, endangerment, publicity, prestige), and through the use of symbols. The games themselves occur within a "magic circle" (Huizinga 1935/1949) that is set apart temporally as a kind of festival time and geographically. Note, however, that although they are non-ordinary, the hunger games and the participants are not regarded as religious within the storyworld.

*Religious Studies*

For comparison, one might consider the explicitly religious character of ancient Greek games. They were dedicated to gods, set apart as festivals, marked by rituals. And the athletes, especially the winners, were given religious status within society. Pindar's poetry is an example of the way athletes were linked to the heroic demigods, and he was able to do this because in the myths themselves many of the hero-deities were known more for their athletic prowess in games than for the warfare for which the games were training. Games might also honor lesser spirits, such as those of the dead, and there are suggestions that the gladiatorial games, an obvious model for the hunger games, may be connected to funeral games honoring the spirits of the dead.

*The Hunger Games* resembles an Enlightenment critique of priestcraft, and it is meant as a similar intervention in the excesses of contemporary American culture (including, politics, sports, and entertainment stars). It is unusually aware, especially for a series meant for children, of the manipulative techniques used by the state to create ideological propaganda and by entertainment media to mystify the public with empty idols. It is a representation of civil religion and the cult of stardom turned entirely to cynical ends, and part of its success in the real world has to do with its successful deployment of techniques of singularization as elements of its world-making. Its fandom is a sign of the degree to which its readers identify with the very construction of Katniss they objectively know to be a heroic product within the storyworld. The heroic ideology that her character participates in is part of a genealogy that includes the Greek athletes. This is no ordinary "game." It's a very, very special game around which an entire society has been organized.

---

In section 4.1 above, I pointed to the value I see in using possible world semantics for thinking about the storyworlds of speculative fiction. I further think, following Thoss (2015) on metalepsis, that possible world semantics supplies a framework for talking about the movement back and forth between and among storyworlds and the "real" world. When I consider the traditional religious elements and schemas that are used to create allomythoi, I am considering a kind of metalepsis, in that their transferal from the extradiegetic world into the diegetic world is necessarily a transgression, as Genette himself observed. When theorists think about the movement in the other direction, whereby fictional things become "hyperreal" features of people's actual ontologies and lifeworlds, they too are thinking about a metaleptic movement. This study attempts to put the narratological conception of blending and transgression as "metalepsis" into conversation with cognitive (conceptual blending, cultural attractors) and social (borderlands, hybridity, hyper-reality) understandings.

*Generic Level*

This world is decoupled from the real world in a variety of ways. It still contains ordinary humans and animals living in medieval and imperial civilizations. However, though the planet is very much like Earth, (1) it is a polytheistic, ethically divided world with a different cosmogony, its creation myth focusing particularly on the generation of the gods and the creation and contestation of ownership of an orb with a living soul, which may be held only by the (royal) descendants of a special human; (2) each civilization in the world is henotheistically devoted to a particular god or goddess, and its cultural character is determined by the personality of the deity with locations, texts, rituals, and even animals that are special to the individual deities (*cf. The Riven Codex*); (3) there is a parallel universe containing demons, who can be mastered using spells; (4) certain magical humans possess the power of the "will and the word" – the ability (within specified constraints) to combine speech and desire in order to effect changes in the world – and the power to see and foretell the future.

The main character, Garion, is marked as special or non-ordinary in a variety of ways. He is the descendant of the royal line and thus able to hold and possess the orb of Aldur; he is one of those gifted with the sorcerous ability to use the will and the word (hence, his name is changed to Belgarion); the voice of prophecy even speaks in his mind, making him like the seers. And the narrative is structured around him.

The story is structured as a quest. Garion/Belgarion must travel from place to place overcoming difficulties, confronting the shock of different cultures, and gaining skills (especially the will and the word), tools (especially the orb), and relationships that advance his goals. Each of these is special to him or even special to groups of people in the storyworld, but only some of these things are non-ordinary relative to the storyworld. For example, his wife, Ce'Nedra, is Imperial Princess of Tolnedra and part dryad, a non-human tree-loving creature of the god UL, but she does not display any particularly unusual powers or properties other than her fondness for sweets. Her specialness is not non-ordinary and has more to do with social status, beauty, ability, and Belgarion's love for her. Similarly, his friend and companion Prince Kheldar of Drasnia, known as Silk, has many skills, but he is not non-ordinary. On the other hand, Garion's friend Barak turns into a bear when Garion is in danger, and his companion Relg, a devotee of UL, is able to pass through solid rock and even pull others through with him. Garion is marked as special by being surrounded and supported by so many special people.

Part of the complexity of analyzing the non-ordinary world in such a non-ordinary world is that it contains more than one non-ordinary world. One needs to consider the macrostructure of the whole narrative: the special journey. And one also needs to consider the components or stages of the journey. Each civilization is its own allomythos, governed by a different deity and sometimes other non-ordinary beings (*e.g.*, the giant immortal snake queen, Salmissra). And individual national allomythoi are based on different real-world prototypes. Some of the magical people (*e.g.*, Belgarion, Polgara, Belgarath, the evil sorcerer Ctuchik, Zedar the Apostate, etc.) operate according to the same non-ordinary law of "the will and the word" as do gods and demons and are their disciples (Belgarion, Polgara, and Belgarath being some of the disciples of Aldur), but others have specific powers granted by divine or sorcerous curses or blessings. In the case of *The Belgariad* and

*The Malloreon*, only some of the non-ordinary institutions within the non-ordinary storyworld are designated religious. Others are identified as magical.

*Religious Studies*

As in the case of the hunger games and Greek sacred games, both rooted in the universal capacity for play, an interpretation of the macrostructure of Garion's special quest informed by religious studies invites an interesting comparison. Although tourism is based on curiosity and pleasure-seeking and is, as in the case of games, entertaining and not "serious," scholars of religion and tourism have noted both the artificiality of a sharp distinction between "pilgrimage" and "tourism" (Stausberg 2011; 2014) and the universality of travel (*cf.* Timothy and Olsen 2006). The heroic quest or journey is familiar from religious myths throughout the world and is rooted in a universal human capacity for wayfinding. Belgarion's transformative journey is obviously modeled after ancient and contemporary prototypes, particularly the *Lord of the Rings*. Garion/Belgarion is transformed, and tourists, like and as readers (*cf.* Aubry 2011), may likewise seek self-transformation (Pearce and Lee 2005; Norman 2011). Finally, religious and spiritual groups frequently use the word "path" for purposes of self-designation (*cf.* Taves forthcoming), and "spiritual tourism" has become an expression describing an emerging, religiously eclectic seeker culture (Sharpley 2009; Norman 2011; Willson et al. 2013).

*The Belgariad* and *The Malloreon* are spectacular, indulging in the touristic pleasures and anxieties of confronting a succession of strange and thrilling cultures and characters. Especially since many of the cultures and allomythoi in the series are depicted using Middle Eastern, Asian, and native stereotypes, the series and their touristic appeal invite an orientalist critique (*cf.* Masuzawa 2005; Iwamura 2011). Indeed, Eddings's cultural essentializing may be critiqued, like that of Huntington's (1996) "clash of civilizations," as ignoring the social complexity revealed by borderlands situations and theory. And since Eddings does not, through his allomythic journey (which follows the dictates of fate or necessity until resolved by choice) or the allomythoi encountered within it (determined by the deities' personalities), attempt any strong critique of the political, economic, social, or religious structures of the real world, *The Belgariad* and *The Malloreon*, as an on-the-ground theory of religions, mildly affirms normative contemporary (neo)liberal values. Most interesting is Eddings's implication that the communal "personality" of a culture and its allomythos reflects the personality of its deity – *i.e.*, that worlds are constituted, to borrow Heidegger's language, by moods that disclose and presuppose certain questions and their answers – and that fate can be disturbed by accident (the primal mistake that produced the Light and Dark prophecies and the Lucifer-like Torak) and by choice.

# Appendix 8: Future Areas of Research

*Future Questions*

Building on Dissanayake's (2008) claim that "making special" or setting apart as non-ordinary lies at the ancestral heart of culture-making in general and on Taves's (2009, 2010) proposal that specialness may supply religious studies with a more general comparative category than the "sacred," one can ask where the boundary lies between the ordinary and non-ordinary in a speculative-fictional or fantastical world (itself already set off as non-ordinary) and use that emic distinction to explore how the non-ordinary is construed in speculative fiction, whether differentiated (*e.g.*) into art, magic, drama, religion, etc., or not. As noted by Albanese, Tweed, and others, boundary-formation is a central feature of religion-like phenomena, and this consideration of fictional boundary-formation relative to the ordinary/non-ordinary distinction helps specify what makes a fictional worldview and way of life (WWL) distinctive.

A major question arises, *What happens when we examine the canon-formation activities of previous scholarly works and their categories using more general categories that avoid stipulating what counts, for example, as "religion"?* With this in view, subsidiary questions relative to fantastical worldmaking might include, *What are people setting apart or making special – that might have been ignored or treated as marginal with standard, stipulated definitions of religion-like phenomena and genres – when they are relatively unconstrained by externally imposed concerns about religious orthodoxy, political propriety, or even physical possibility? Do their distinctions between religion, magic, art, literature, and science reflect those made by scholars of religion and literature, or do new configurations emerge that challenge standard modern or scholarly categories and distinctions? How may our theories of religion and literature and our narratives of processes like "secularization" need to adapt to respond to this phenomenon?*

Having located a free space for worldmaking and, thus, for the making of worlds using conceptions of the non-ordinary, one can ask what range of models or schemas are used to construct these new non-ordinary worlds in the free space of speculative fiction. One can further ask some subsidiary questions along panhuman lines:

1. What do the determinate traits of these schemas suggest are the cognitive constraints that remain even in this relatively politically unconstrained space of the author of the fantastical?
2. Is the distinction between the ordinary and the non-ordinary one of these? Are there fictional worlds in which this distinction breaks down?
3. How do fictional worlds that, within a non-ordinary world, maintain an ordinary/non-ordinary distinction differ from (a) those that maintain this world's ordinary/non-ordinary distinctions (ordinary literature) and (b) those that dissolve the distinction altogether (*e.g.*, dream-like, postmodern, magical realist, and comedic narratives)?
4. Are fictional schemas of the non-ordinary modeled, as one might expect, on (a) traditional "world religions" and "primitive religions" (*i.e.*, "religion" vs. "superstition" or "magic"), (b) personal religious experiences inflected by cultural norms and cognitive factors, and (c) other contemporary WWLs, such as racial ideologies, economic philosophies, etc.?

5. May the elements of fictional non-ordinary institutions, agents, objects, or processes be accounted for from a mixing and matching of components already identified in the cognitive science of religion as informed by the classical theories of religion? What does not fit?
6. (a) Are truly new, maximally counterintuitive components being generated? (b) Or is the novelty limited to the contestation of social power and values?
7. How is the capacity for conceptual blending being used in these cases?

Based on the "principal of minimal departure" (Ryan 1980; Gerrig 1993), one may assume that in order to be comprehensible the models or schemas that structure these secondary WWLs – allomythoi – will of necessity bear some relationship to those in the author's culture, both mainstream and subcultural, "dominant" and "resistant" (*cf.* Scott 1990). This assumes that these representations are not only constrained and enabled by cognitive factors but also by social power structures. The issue of power raises certain other questions, including the following:

1. How does the phenomenon of fictional WWLs participate in a discourse of individualistic and commercialistic "spirituality" that reinforces, even while sometimes attempting to subvert, dominant religions and the capitalist, globalizing order (*e.g.*, Lofton 2011; Carrette & King 2005; McNally 2015)?
2. In what sense is an allomythos rhetorical? That is, how may it be understood as persuasive or even coercive?
3. Following on question #2, how might this understanding of worldmaking (*i.e.*, as power-inflected) be thought about relative to biological interventions in the selective environment?
4. What does the study of allomythoi and, more centrally, the study of the study of allomythoi reveal about the power of scholars to themselves influence the creation of allomythoi?

One may question some of current claims in the related literature, for example, that there is a metanarrative (Hrotic) or super-story (Kripal) of religion running through science fiction and that certain textual features function as affordances in producing novel spiritual formations (Davidsen). Davidsen (2014) suggests that certain fictional narratives contain not only depictions of fictional religions, which he thinks of as "beliefs, practices [by "religion" he tends to intend and focus on ritual practices], experiences, and discourses which assume the existence of supernatural agents, worlds, and/or processes" (31), but also accompanying "religious affordances" that lead some to regard the fictional narratives as "religious," by which he means "real." So a study tracking whether or not the other affordances Davidsen identifies are present in narratives containing allomythoi that have not led to the development of fiction-based, hyper-real, or invented religions would be worthwhile. Davidsen states, "The concept of religious affordances makes it possible to theorize (and predict) why some fictional texts are more likely than others to be used as authoritative texts for religious activity without having to abandon the distinction between fictional and religious narratives" (96). Does it? (This also relates to the question of whether neuroeconomics offers evidence-based reasons for the success of some narratives and not others.) And why would retention of such a distinction be important? If so, is this related to narratives of secularization or re-enchantment as some have suggested? One might also study whether a certain type (or types) of fantastical literature is more hospitable or prone to allomythoi than others (*cf.* Mendlesohn, 2008).

And in the study of American religious history, there have been many attempts to move beyond the "consensus" model of American religious history (*e.g.*, Baird, Schaff, Sweet, Mead, Ahlstrom, Gaustad, Marty) to take the plurality, the manyness of the religious stories told and worlds inhabited by the people of the United States seriously (*e.g.*, Moore, Orsi, Tweed, Albanese). Scholars have studied the emergence of new religions in the United States in terms of religious imagination (*e.g.*, Bednarowski 1989) and the fictional bases of social formations and their underlying charter texts (*cf.* Erzen 2013; Davidsen 2014; Gregorius 2013; Tans 2014), but they have focused primarily on the content of these new theologies and paid less attention to how and why new worlds emerge. Of course, the content is part of the answer to how and why new worlds emerge, but the function of the content in concert with other factors needs to be explicitly addressed to answer these questions. Sociological research on new religious movements focuses on the process of emergence (Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Finke and Iannaccone 1996; Bainbridge 1997; Dawson 1998, 2003), but it has yet to tell us much about the cognitive constraints on the emergence process (but see Upal 2005).

*Database*

At one point in working on this project, I proposed an unbounded search through existing finding aids guided by a stipulated definition of the "allomythic." As a strategy, this presented practical and theoretical boundary problems.

I propose for further religious studies research (n.b. my focus in this section is on a proposal for further research within religious studies, not an expanded worldview studies that would look at an even greater range of allomythoi, but there is a pressing need for a broad comparative fiction-worldview database (see Wolf, 2020, pp. 225 ff.; *cf*. Slingerland, Atkinson, Ember, Sheehan, Muthukrishna, Bulbulia & Gray, 2020) the following method for finding and analyzing the texts that would become the bases of an allomythic database: build on existing research on religion (and related concepts, though little has been done on, for example, "spiritualities," "magical systems," and so on) in speculative fiction or fantastika; that is, identify all such texts – such as encyclopedia articles on "Religion in Science Fiction" or "Spirituality in Fantasy" – and isolate what allomythoi are referenced.

Such a database would allow one to identify the texts of special interest for further study, but it would require learning a lot of methods that may be unfamiliar to most religious studies scholars or collaborating with others who have such skills.[1] Criteria for such further

[1] Let me use *The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion* (Engler & Stausberg, 2011) to give some examples of and thoughts about relevant methods. Drawing on Chad Nelson's and Robert H. Woods, Jr.'s chapter in on content analysis, I would point out the importance of the researcher acknowledging his or her role in selecting texts, breaking them down into units (*e.g.*, physical, syntactical, referential, propositional, thematic), coding the texts according to content categories, and manipulating and interpreting the results. It clearly makes use of comparison, and this is why it is so productive a method of identifying patterns, similarities, and differences. Content analysis is a useful way of working with large amounts of information and combining the virtues of quantitative and qualitative methods, but it too demands honest reflexivity. I would make similar observations concerning Erik H. Cohen's treatment of facet theory methods (his presentation obscures these facts somewhat through the use of jargon, acronyms, and charts, but it does make evident the utility of such methods of categorization for "finding" the patterns to some degree implicit in one's units and categories (in interaction with the real-world data) and for generating typologies.), Kendal C. Boyd's chapter on factor analysis, and Steven Engler's chapter on grounded theory, otherwise known as the "constant comparative method," all hope to gradually discover unknown theoretical "factors" from the close coding and analysis of data and the continued application of emergent categories to new data

study might include (1) their prototypicality relative to the central texts given weight in the existing scholarship categorized in the database and (2) their infrequency, since rare (and even omitted or avoided) items in corpora are often significant.

In addition to categorizing the citations of academic texts, such a study could survey and categorize ("tag") the cited works of speculative fiction themselves, categorizing them according to the schemas and components identified by classical and cognitive theories of religion but also looking for cases that do not fit, attending to issues of power and boundary-formation, and tracking the chronology of and historical contexts of publication.

For scholarly or reference works containing discussion of religion-like phenomena (*i.e.*, secondary worldviews) in non-realist genres (*i.e.*, secondary worlds), one needs to keep in mind that there might be multiple essays in a volume that deal with the topic. Thus, one would need to keep track of the main reference work title *and* the title of the particular text within that reference work. Is a given reference work generic (*i.e.*, a text about a genre in general, such as Suvin's *Metamorphoses of Science Fiction*) or specific (*e.g.*, the "Religion" article in the *Encyclopedia of Science Fiction*)? Is the work scholarly or made by a fan or hobbyist? Authors' names, of course, should be tracked, and a text may have more than one author. And, in order to track intertextual links, cited reference works should be noted.

In such an effort, one should keep track of what religion-related terms are used by the author in connection with particular fictional texts, series, and authors. For example, does the text link the fictional work to "religion," "mysticism," "spirituality," "magic," "supernatural," "transcendence," "myth," "occult," "ritual," "divine," or some other term? Terms like "spirituality" and "magic" suggest that other potentially oppositional expressions may be relevant, such as "science," "philosophy," and "secular." Following Ann Taves's Building Blocks Approach (BBA), these terms might be called "complex cultural concepts" (CCCs). The genre or genres of interest also matters: for example, "science fiction," "sci-fi," "sf," "speculative fiction," "fantastika," "fantastical," "fantasy," "horror," "supernatural," and so on.

As already suggested in passing, a scholar or hobbyist may reference, relative to a religion-related theme, either a specific title, a series title, or an author. Fictional works are sometimes republished under different titles or series titles, which this hypothetical database should attempt to keep track of, and authors may change their names. These variations may be controlled for by assigning invariant numbers to titles, series titles, and authors, as well as to reference titles and scholarly/hobbyist authors.

One might also decide to track metadata such as publication length and genre. And one might want to categories what "building blocks" of religion are used to construct the

---

sets, starting from the analysis of a small data set. Happily, Engler comments on the fact that the codes used are "inchoately interpretive" (257). Grace Davie's and David Wyatt's chapter on document analysis overlaps in many respects with content analysis methodology. Document analysis categorizes documents according to production, function, content, audience, time, place, private/public, etc. Davie and Wyatt seem to regard document analysis as an umbrella method, embracing others: "Documents can be deployed both quantitatively (content analysis) and qualitatively (discourse analysis)" (p. 151). Robert A. Yelle's chapter on semiotics combines the virtues of some of the rigorous categorization methods mentioned above with the awareness of the intent and function of communicative acts found in the chapter on discourse analysis. Titus Hjelm's chapter on discourse analysis recalls themes that are especially prevalent in the chapter on feminist methods. As in the ancient discipline of rhetoric, discourse analysis attends to how words can manipulate or "construct" realities, identities, roles, knowledge systems, relationships, groups, and so on. It is consciously aware of power and ideology. As one makes and extracts knowledge from a database, one must remain aware of these issues.

religious allomythos. For example, is the fictional religion modeled after an existing religion – *e.g.*, "Catholicism" (which may be positively, neutrally, or negatively marked) – or a hybrid of existing religions – *e.g.*, "Catholic military-monastic order plus Buddhism" – or an academic theory of religion – *e.g.*, the popularized theories of religion of figures like Marx, Freud, William James, or Eliade.

Once one has a database of such information, one would be able to look at how intertextual links propagate (or not) certain ideas about what counts as "religion"-like phenomena in non-realist fiction based on whatever patterns emerge. If a certain subset of fictional works are repeatedly cited, even without direct citations to specific scholarly works, this might suggest the intertextual influence of a background literature that is not being explicitly cited. Or, if a phenomenon of this sort were to be observed, it might reflect a dominant concept of "religion" (*i.e.*, the influence of a schema, a metaphor, or a structuring narrative) that leads scholars to invoke particular texts and not others.

There is an element of deducing the composition process in such an intertexual study:

> One of the central ways of tracing writing processes is to analyze how the text itself is related to other written texts or to instances of talk. In many cases, intertextual analysis reveals much about the structure of participation as well as about the sources of a text. (Prior, date, p. 173)

An attempt to track the influence of academic works on each other – tracing source texts (*ibid.*, p. 174) – and, more broadly, the elements that come together in the construction of religious allomythoi may be intended to deduce, to some degree, how authors composed their worlds. It at least would be suggestive of (1) how certain cultural building blocks are influential in fictional world- and worldview-making and (2) how certain scholarly texts have weighted influence in the formation of other scholars' categories of analysis and composition. Specific categories one could use to study the content of relevant texts and the intertextual links between them are discussed in the data dictionary below.

One might predict that using methods like content analysis and intertextual analysis would demonstrate how scholars' stipulative definitions of worldviews like "religion" and genres like "science fiction" predetermine the texts they cite and reinforce intertextual citation patterns that reflect dominant definitions of the terms being investigated. After database tagging work is completed, one would be able to organize the texts topically and analyze the results. Below is one possible structure of organizing subheadings, but the final form would of course depend on the data and what patterns emerge from them:

- Representations, Part I – Fantastical Allomythoi Modeled on Existing "World" or "Primitive" Religions
- Representations, Part II – Fantastical Allomythoi Made from Mixing and Matching Components of Religion
- Representations, Part III – Fantastical Allomythoi Based on Maximally Counterintuitive Phenomena
- Experience – Fantastical Allomythoi Based on Unusual Experiences
- Power – Fantastical Allomythoi Introducing New Social Elements

*Data Dictionary*

Academic and Reference Texts

CITATION# This is so that each citation has a fixed, indexical number.

REFERENCE# This is so that each reference work has a fixed, indexical number.

REF.TITLE This is the title of the scholarly work itself.

REF.WORK.TITLE Because these texts are typically short studies within larger works, this entry records the reference work's title.

REF.FORMAT This identifies whether the work is, for example, an encyclopedia, an edited volume, a monograph, a journal article, and so on.

REF.GEN/SPFK This identifies whether the reference work is generic, on something like the genre of science fiction, for example, or specific—*e.g.*, transhumanist representations in 1990s sf.

REF.SCHOLARLY/FAN This identifies whether the reference work was produced by and intended for a scholarly or fan representative or group.

DEPARTMENTAL AFFILIATION If the text is scholarly, this identifies the departmental affiliation of the scholar.

ACADEMIC RANK This entry specifies whether the author of the work, if scholarly, is a graduate student, adjunct, lecturer, associate, assistant, or full professor.

REF.PUB.DATE This specifies when the text was published.

REF.AUTHOR.1 This identifies the author's name.

REF.AUTHOR.1.GENDER This identifies the author's gender.

REF.AUTHOR.2 This identifies the name of a second author.

REF.AUTHOR.2.GENDER This identifies the gender of a second author.

REF.AUTHOR.3 This identifies the name of a third author.

REF.AUTHOR.3.GENDER This identifies the gender of a third author.

CORRELATED.CCC This specifies, in comma-separated format, what term (or terms) is used by the author to refer to the worldview being discussed. "CCC" refers to "Complex Cultural Concept," regarding worldview terms like "religion," "magic," "supernatural,"

“mysticism,” transcendence,” “myth,” and so on as inherently unstable conceptual composites of cultural building blocks. (See n. 8.)

CORRELATED.GENRE1 This category specifies the genre (or subgenres, specified in comma-separated format) being considered by the author.

CITATIONS This category records comma-separated indexical numbers that refer to bibliographic entries in this text. The citations are linked to these indexical numbers in a separate database.

TITLES This indexical number refers to a separate fictional works database. The fictional texts cited in these reference texts are given distinctive indexical numbers that are listed here in a comma-separated format.

SERIES.TITLES This indexical number refers to a separate fictional works database. The series titles cited in these reference texts are given distinctive indexical numbers that are listed here in a comma-separated format.

AUTHORS This indexical number refers to a separate fictional works database. The authors cited in these reference texts are given distinctive indexical numbers that are listed here in a comma-separated format.

Fictional Works Referenced

This is actually three relatively redundant but distinguishable databases on fictional titles and series and their authors.

TITLE# The fictional texts cited in the reference texts are given distinctive indexical numbers.

TITLE This is the title of the fictional work.

ALTERNATE TITLE Fictional works are sometimes published under an alternate title. This category records that alternate title.

SERIES TITLE# Reference texts sometimes cite whole series, rather than specific titles within that series. This entry supplies specific indexical numbers to each series.

SERIES TITLE This category records the series title.

AUTHOR# The authors cited in the reference texts are given distinctive indexical numbers.

AUTHOR This records the names of the authors of the fictional texts cited in the reference works.

AUTHOR GENDER This records the genders of the authors of the fictional texts cited in the reference works.

COAUTHOR This records the names of potential coauthors of the fictional texts cited in the reference works.

COAUTHOR GENDER This records the genders of potential coauthors of the fictional texts cited in the reference works.

COAUTHOR.AUTHOR# This cross-references any coauthor to their indexical author number.

CITED_BY This entry records in a comma-separated format the REFERENCE# of the reference works that cite this text, series, or author.

For the works mentioned above and below given thresholds, based on the findings after the above databases are complete, the entries for selected fictional texts will be expanded using the following database categories. Again, this will really be three databases organized around either TITLE# and TITLE, SERIES TITLE# and SERIES TITLE, or AUTHOR# and AUTHOR.

PUB DATES This category records, in comma-separated format, the years of publication of the texts to determine when published and how often.

# OF EDITIONS This category records how many editions of a text were printed.

GOOGLE HITS This category records how many Google hits there are for a given author, text, or series.

GOODREADS STARS This records how highly a text is ranked by users of Goodreads.

GOODREADS RATINGS # This records how many people have voted on a text by users of Goodreads.

LIBRARYTHING POPULARITY This records the LibraryThing ranking of a work based on the votes of the users of LibraryThing.

AWARDS This category records, in comma-separated format, any awards and significant recognition assigned to a specific title.

LENGTH This category records text length.

GENRE This records the genre (and subgenres, in comma-separated format) of the text.

BUILDING BLOCKS (See n. 1.) This category refers to the building blocks of the fictional worldview(s) (or CCCs) found in the fictional text or series. The comma-separated terms in

this category are drawn from J. Gordon Melton and Robert Moore's "families," supplemented as needed by my own.

*Examples*

Let me briefly consider two examples of academic texts on "religion" in fictional works.

Example 1

Weronika Łaszkiewicz's article entitled "Finding God(s) in Fantasylands: Religious Ideas in Fantasy Literature" was published online in a peer-reviewed e-journal, *Crossroads: A Journal of English Studies*, (http://www.crossroads.uwb.edu.pl/finding-gods-in-fantasylands/).

There are a number of implied narratives for each of the schemas of religion discussed by Łaszkiewicz. In the first part, the implied narrative is a (primarily Protestant) Christian one, *viz.*, that religious people are moral and have faith in higher powers and that occultists are individualistic users of magical power for personal ends. Implied in Campbell's monomyth is the narrative that the hero deserves to win and rule/prosper because of his struggle and alignment with good in a cosmic battle. Implied in Eliade's notion of the sacrum is the belief that the sacred or religious is a *sui generis* essence that may reside in cultural representations and rituals, even ones that are apparently secular.

In Łaszkiewicz's account, a core schema of religion is operative. Early in her text, Łaszkiewicz uses the following expression to represent, at the very least, a popular understanding of what "religion" means: "religious (Christian)." This statement and its full context equate religion with Christianity and "faith," contrasts it with "the occult," and suggests Christianity/faith as a dominant model for what the term means. The presence of "God" is anxiously sought after, making "God" central to the meaning of "religion" in fantasy. "Values" are also mentioned as relevant to religion. Thus, in the first paragraph, religion is understood to be ethical, theistic, non-magical, faith- or belief-oriented (as opposed to, say, ritual-oriented), and Christian.

In the second paragraph, the presence of "religion" in Tolkien is indicated by things such as "Christian morality" and "Christian (Catholic) faith: the genesis of Middle-earth; the recurring motifs of temptation, sin, and self-sacrifice; the presence of a benevolent Providence, and the angel-like existence of the elves."

The third paragraph, which contrasts Tolkien's work with Rowling's, again focuses on morality and contrasts religion with "occultism." And the following paragraph continues the focus on "magic," which is assumed to be opposed to religion, by arguing for a fundamental difference between Tolkien's "magic" and Rowling's. Rowling's occultism is set in "real life" and is modeled on "real" magic, whereas Tolkien's magical beings exist in a fantasy realm and are analogous to Christian supernatural figures. Again, the dominant metaphor or schema of religion is Christianity. Łaszkiewicz's authorial voice blends with the voices of the Christian critics whose arguments she represents.

The second paragraph under the heading "Religious ideology within the structures of fantasy" introduces another schema, myth, and more specifically, the syncretistic "monomyth" of Joseph Campbell. This complicates the number of elements that count as religious, adding familiar Campbellian terms such as rites of passage, heroes' quests, and so on. Then Łaszkiewicz proposes that the sui generis religious element in fantasy, often

derived from myth, is what Eliade terms the "sacrum." Eliade's definition of religion, produced through comparison of a large number of religions, includes myth and "rites, ceremonies, religious symbols and activities" as potential constitutive elements of religion. Therefore, both Campbell and Eliade complicate the schema of religion assumed in the earlier part of Łaszkiewicz's discussion.

After having set this groundwork in place, Łaszkiewicz proposes that fantasy stories with religious elements fall into three categories:

> Firstly, authors of fantasy invent their own secondary religions (frequently derived from religions existing in the real world) to enrich their secondary reality and place their heroes in a web of meaningful moral choices and obligations. This invention of secondary religions can be taken a step further when religious/spiritual motifs become indispensable elements for the entire quest/adventure and are situated in the center of the plot. Finally, the secondary religion may become the author's personal comment on, or criticism of, existing religious systems.

The first two categories dramatically expand the possible schemas of religion to include any that are "derived from religions existing in the real world" (and perhaps even more than that). The third category, because it is focused on criticism, expands the potential of what counts as religious to embrace, not only the religions that have existed and recombined elements thereof, but also any potential critiques of religion. These three categories would seem to have no trouble accommodating the "occult" as religious

Łaszkiewicz's argument is not structured so much by a "metaphor" in the conventional sense of mapping elements of one domain onto another or even by "conceptual blending" in which two domains are creatively merged. Łaszkiewicz is initially unclear regarding whether "religion" means primarily Christianity or if this is merely the bias of certain critics. As her argument progresses into Campbell and Eliade and then into her own categorization system, the assumed equation of "religion" with "Christianity" is increasingly disrupted.

Łaszkiewicz establishes her ethos at the outset of the article by referencing scholarly authorities and pointing out the significant cultural impact of works like *Lord of the Rings* and the *Harry Potter–* series. Her reference to major pop culture phenomena also suggests that this is the *kairos*, the right moment in which to start taking the phenomenon of religion in fantasy seriously. When she cites Campbell in support of her claim that fantasy retains mythic structures (*i.e.*, the monomyth), such as the hero's quest and conflict between good and evil beings, and when she cites Eliade in support of the idea that myth's transformation into fantasy nonetheless preserves elements of the *sacrum*, she again builds her *ethos* by appealing to their authority. Her review of a selected portion of the literature rhetorically justifies her, as an expert, to intervene in the study of fantasy and religion by proposing her typology ways fantasy authors may use fictional religions as part of their authorial world-building. Her analysis of fictional religions (which she calls "secondary religions") into the categories of her typology is her main deployment of *logos*.

Because in the first part of her article she rather uncritically adopts the voice of explicitly Christian, anti-occult critics, her arguments would no doubt be compelling to those sharing such *stases* relative to the issue of religion in fantasy; however, others with different *stases* might respond with increased suspicion and feel alienated from that part of her discussion. For example, under the heading "Secondary Worlds and Secondary

Religions," her first, third, and fifth examples within her discussion of her typology (the *A Man of His Word* series, the *Fionavar Tapestry* series, and *The Coldfire Trilogy*) are handled in such a way as to suggest the presence of gods is essential to "religion," though admitting that magic may be part of a continuum leading to religion when it results in the apotheosis of its practitioners (*i.e.*, theurgy), and her treatment of George R. R. Martin's *The Song of Ice and Fire* suggests Christian elements in the veneration of the Old Gods in the Weirwoods, even though that religion is intended to be suggestive of Native American religions (she calls it "a form of animism"). She does not seem to recognize the Zoroastrian elements in the worship of R'hllor, which she calls a "cult" (likewise with Sanderson's *Mistborn* series), and though she acknowledges that Celtic and Norse elements are present in the *Fionavar Tapestry* series, she states,

> [...] Kay's *sacrum* is interwoven with Christian ideas. For instance, the significance and power of self-sacrifice is strongly highlighted when Paul, one of the five visitors, volunteers to hang for three days and nights on the sacred Summer Tree – a scene which strongly resembles the Crucifixion.

The fact that it was three days, not nine, is suggestive of Christianity, but surely the primary source of this episode is the myth of Odin hanging on Yggdrasil. Throughout, she seems fixated on Christianity as the archetypal "religion" (and virtually indistinguishable from morality), and this becomes most obvious in her discussion of C. S. Lewis and Philip Pullman. Whereas Lewis is treated as an ideal example of secondary religion because of the heavily allegorical nature of his Christian fiction, Pullman (likewise Vance's Lyonesse trilogy and Anderson's *The Broken Sword*) is criticized for allowing his narrative to become too heavily influenced by his "anti"-religious message and is only forgiven for, ultimately (and perhaps without knowing it), expressing and seeking real (*i.e.*, Christian) religious values. Regarding the potential for other readers to contest her *stases*, one might likewise note that Łaszkiewicz's invocation of Campbell and Eliade may seem dubious to those who are aware of some of the critical issues with their theories in religious studies.

When Łaszkiewicz states, "The fantasy genre uses its own fantastic devices (witches, dragons, elves, kings, magic, etc.) to comment on real-world issues such as love and loss, joy and despair, freedom and oppression, life and death," she makes an appeal to powerful, emotion-provoking values and raw emotions; that is, she appeals to *pathos* to argue for the value of this object of study.

Example 2

What follows is an excerpt from the article on "Religion" in the influential reference work, *Encyclopedia of Science Fiction* (http://www.sf-encyclopedia.com/entry/religion):

> Familiar Definitions of SF imply that there is nothing more alien to its concerns than religion. However, many of the roots of Proto SF are embedded in traditions of speculative fiction closely associated with the religious imagination, and contemporary sf recovered a strong interest in certain mystical and transcendental themes and images when it moved beyond the Taboos imposed by the Pulp magazines. Modern sf frequently confronts age-old speculative issues associated with Metaphysics and theology – partly because science itself has abandoned them. Speculative fiction always tends to go beyond the merely empirical matters with which

> pragmatic scientists concern themselves; perhaps something called "science" fiction ought not to include metaphysical fiction, but the genre as constituted obviously does.
>
> It was the religious imagination of people such as Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) which first envisioned an infinite Universe filled with habitable worlds, and it was visionaries like Athanasius Kircher and Emanuel Swedenborg who first journeyed in the imagination to the limits of the solar system, and beyond. John Wilkins, who first supposed in all seriousness that people might go to the Moon in a flying machine, was a bishop, and so was Francis Godwin, the author of the satirical cosmic voyage *The Man in the Moone* (**1638**). Other early speculative fictions were attacks upon religious cosmology and religious orthodoxy by freethinkers such as Cyrano de Bergerac, Voltaire and, later, Samuel Butler. Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (**1818**) takes its imaginative inspiration from the image of the scientist as usurper of the prerogatives of God. The boldest of all the nineteenth-century speculative fictions, Camille Flammarion's *Lumen* (**1887**; trans anon **1892**) [for further publication details see Flammarion], was the result of the astronomer's desperate need to reconcile and fuse his scientific knowledge with his religious faith. J-H Rosny aîné, the prolific writer of evolutionary fantasies, also saw the object of his work as an imaginative revelation of the divinely planned evolutionary schema, and he too wanted to remake theology so that it might be reconciled with modern scientific knowledge – a task later taken up by the heretic Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955). C H Hinton's stories and essays about the fourth Dimension were inspired by the notion that a four-dimensional God might be omniscient of everything that has ever or will ever take place in our three-dimensional continuum. Marie Corelli re-envisaged God as an entity of pure electric force in *A Romance of Two Worlds* (**1886**). John Jacob Astor's *A Journey in Other Worlds* (**1894**), Jean Delaire's *Around a Distant Star* (**1904**) and John Mastin's *Through the Sun in an Airship* (**1909**) are among many novels borrowing the literary devices of Scientific Romance to dramatize cosmic voyages whose real purpose was to "justify" theological dogmas. Edgar Fawcett's *The Ghost of Guy Thyrle* (**1895**) does not hesitate to engage its hero in conversation with a messenger from God at the edge of the Universe.

Treating this as a source for a content analysis project tracking which works and authors are cited in scholarship on religion in speculative fiction, I note which works and authors are cited. They were as follows:

Authors:
Giordano Bruno
Athanasius Kircher
Emanuel Swedenborg
John Wilkins
Francis Godwin
Cyrano de Bergerac

Voltaire
Samuel Butler
Mary Shelley
J.-H. Rosny aîné
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
C H Hinton
Marie Corelli
John Jacob Astor
Jean Delaire
John Mastin
Edgar Fawcett

Works:
*The Man in the Moone* (1638**,** Francis Godwin)
*Frankenstein* (1818**,** Mary Shelley)
*Lumen* (1887, trans anon 1892, Camille Flammarion)
*A Romance of Two Worlds* (1886**,** Marie Corelli)
*A Journey in Other Worlds* (1894, John Jacob Astor)
*Around a Distant Star* (1904**,** Jean Delaire)
*Through the Sun in an Airship* (1909**,** John Mastin)
*The Ghost of Guy Thyrle* (1895**,** Edgar Fawcett

Other metadata categories are also of interest.

## Appendix 9: On Spatial Cognition, "Religion," and Other Worldviews

NB All references to appendices in this appendix refer to appendix-internal appendices, not to the appendices for the larger work.

*In Sum: How the Material Below Relates to Worldview Studies and the Study of Allomythoi*

The main points I wish to make, before getting into the weeds of all the research reviewed and synthesized below, are as follows:

1. From Eliade, I would stress the importance of the center and boundaries as basic features of spatial cognition and human worldmaking. Cognitively, we give special weight to central values. I would also join with Eliade in combining interest in the mapping of cosmic order and in escaping into mythic reality. In my own framework, I assert that allomythoi are novel cognitive maps of linked events.
2. From Hertz, I emphasize the lateralized character of the human brain and the fundamentally dual worldviews in us all. In my framework, I address this under the kairological category of "Lateral Diathesis."
3. From Wyatt, I would again note the importance of lateralization and an awareness, characteristic of the spatial turn in the humanities, of how culture builds on basic cognitive tendencies to meaningfully construct space.
4. By William James, I am reminded that we as we move through life we experience the spatialized worlds of our bodies and environments and of our more general worldview orientations with varying degrees of "voluminousness"; that is, we know the world to be a cosmos of little worlds, and we situationally shift attentionally between more or less voluminous comprehension thereof.
5. Drawing on Deloria and Basso, I would submit that events are primarily spatial, though all events have a duration and are thus also temporal, and they may secondarily be tagged temporally in relation to other events; it is chains or maps of spatially anchored events that relationally constitute the general sense of a temporal flow. Contemplating such a narrative map or cosmos of story-events gives one a sense of escape, refuge, and wisdom. And insofar as persons are constituted by narrative, meaningful spaces – spaces with anchored events – are persons and vice versa.
6. From Levinson, I have learned that linguistically selected primary frames of reference shape all sorts of other cognitive inferences, memory formations, and other things, meaning that humans' spatial reasoning is unusually plastic and dependent on language. Thus, although humans lack the fully determined innate modules for sophisticated spatial orientation that other animals possess, culture rebuilds them through language and other cultural cues.
7. From McGilchrist, Siegel, and others who have studied closely the two consciousnesses with their characteristic worldviews and ways of life, which are to greater or lesser degrees integrated in neurotypical human cognition, I take several lessons. First, their findings lead me to always pause and reflect on whether there is a hemispheric bias evident in a given allomythos ("Lateral Diathesis"[1]), and their

[1] Siegel states,

findings influenced my formulations of the allomythic modes (M-mode drawing more on the capacities of the right-hemisphere, N-mode reflecting a typically integrated consciousness, and O-mode displaying predominantly left-hemispheric traits). More generally, my framework attempts to correct an increasing left-hemisphere bias and overdevelopment in our civilization that disregards the holism, expansive memory, embodiment, and spatiality of the right-hemisphere.

8. From cognitive archeology (*e.g.*, Renfrew and Mithen), I understand fantastical narratives as meaningful sites that capture and direct attention, embodiments of value and minds, markers and origins of boundaries between this world and another, non-ordinary, estranged, counterintuitive, with which they offer communion. Whether or not they are simply enjoyed or, as social, intersubjective realities, inspire action and change, they all contain this potential.
9. Relative to event cognition research as it pertains to spatial cognition, I would emphasize that allomythic narratives are made by representing hierarchically salient events that are linked together like journeys and conceptual maps and posit that the translation and transformation of allomythoi into fiction-based worldviews is comparable to – and perhaps more likely if more like – the orderly segmentation of clear route directions, assembly directions, and related "recipes."
10. Research on emotions and spatial cognition proposes a number of evolutionary possibilities for why given spaces have characteristic "atmospheres" that evoke predictable responses in humans. This is obviously relevant to how allomythoi are constructed—certain worldviews, with their affective dispositions, are better suited to certain environments ("worlds"). I note all of this, but primarily as an area for future research.
11. Spatial cognition studies on differences in ability, particularly reflection on how displays of spatial-cognitive virtuosity may relate to sexual selection, may help explain some of the appeal of immersion in allomythoi—such simulations of alien worlds cultivate spatial (as well as, *e.g.*, affective, theory-of-mind, etc.) capabilities that, when shown off among likeminded others, can be very charming.
12. From the negative and positive example of Heidegger and the consistently excellent thinking of Tweed and Knott, the latter two of whom benefit from the full range of insights that have emerged during the "spatial turn" in the humanities, profound insights into how space is related to power and meaning-making, I have concluded that disembodiment and displacement are two of the most awful weapons of human

---

> The temptation to focus on two distinct modes of processing has its historical roots. Philosophers have long noted the differing styles of knowing and being in the world; they have contrasted creative, synthetic, emotional, intuitive, and nonconscious patterns with those of critical, analytic, intellectual, rational, and conscious modes of thought. There may be a very basic reason for this long history of seeing dichotomies in human experience. As we've discussed, the anatomic structure and neurochemistry of the two halves of the brain are somewhat distinct. But even more than mere anatomy and physiology, the processes that have now been identified to be dominant in the functioning of each hemisphere generally support the philosophers' observations. (2012, p. 235)

Notion of worldview as "attitudinal" both gets at the Heideggerian notion of "mood" as disclosive and determinative and the hemispheric differences that are so important. One occasionally encounters maps of worldviews, and one could note how the distribution of worldviews, particularly in their narrative expressions, follows linguistic lines. But the attitudinal aspect of worldview, with lateralization generating the basic division, may also be expressed by noting how global musicological maps relate to worldview distributions.

disempowerment, and their oppositional orientation means that an analyst does well to look for the presence of such absences especially in O-mode allomythoi. Power is always implicated in the meaningful production and contestation of meaningful worlds; indeed, Heidegger's rejection of dalliance with alien worlds in contrast to one's hereditary worldview and way of life is part of his defense of traditional Western culture and rejection of others. In his later work, Heidegger is right to stress that humans are poetic world-formers who, in order to be such, need play-room. As I have tried to make evident in my formulation and discussion of my modes and how they relate to the production, defense, and attack of boundaries, power is always involved in the production of space, including an allomythos.

## Introduction: Eternal Re-Turn of the Axis Mundi – Integrating Religious Studies' Spatial Turn and Cognitive Turn

Eliade deserves to hold a place of distinction, not only as one of the great classical theorists of religion, but also as one who anticipated religious studies' "spatial turn." Indeed, of the classic theorists of religion, Eliade was unusually interested in cosmology, in imagined space and time.

In 2013, a volume entitled *Mental Culture: Classical Social Theory and the Cognitive Science of Religion* was published, edited by William W. McCorkle and Dēmētrēs Xygalatas, in which contemporary scholars of cognitive science of religion demonstrated how productive a reconsideration of classical theorists and theories of religion could be, returning to such figures as Durkheim, Weber, Geertz, and James. Curiously, Eliade was not included in this study. Perhaps this is because, as scholars like McCutcheon claim, we live in the post-Eliade period (*cf.*, Rennie, 2001), but, even if this is the case, even if Eliade's theory has been thoroughly discredited by works such as J.Z. Smith's *To Take Place*, may there not yet be elements of Eliade's (and others') thought that might be resuscitated and that might send us down fruitful lines of inquiry? This appendix, essentially following Thomas Tweed's theoretical "itinerary" and hopefully extending it somewhat, examines how the spatial cognition literature may lend some support to and help make sense of elements of the theories of Eliade and others and, more generally, be useful to our field in generating future research questions.

Early in her second Gunning lecture, Taves makes the following good point:

> Grounding worldview expression in an evolutionary perspective upends the usual top-down approaches that assume that the highly developed and systematized worldviews of philosophers and theologians are the standard from which "lived worldviews" have departed. Working from the bottom up, it makes more sense to think of worldviews as embedded in and emerging from ways of life. This suggests that worldviews are explicitly articulated and elaborated on a need-to-know basis (1) in light of local views of what should be passed on to whom and in what manner and (2) in response to puzzling events and "crises of meaning."

This argument applies very well to the study of fictional worldviews, implicit in ways of life, depicted in narratives. Even when authors work out highly developed and systematized worldviews as background materials for their stories, they emerge situationally in the conversations and behaviors of characters, particularly, as Taves notes, in response to crisis events.

More generally, the evolutionary-biological approach Taves and others are adopting has the merit of grounding the categories of worldview studies, not in the fluctuating, complex, and historically contingent concepts generated by various worldviews, and thus favoring them and not others, but in *embodied and spatialized* situations shared by humans (and other living things). Due to my focus on the *worldly* aspect of worldviews, I have drawn heavily on insights from religious studies theorists who prioritize space and on spatial cognition research more generally.

That said, I have also necessarily focused on rhetoric; while all living things possess "worlds" (embodied, emplaced, enacted predictive model that actually encompasses "self-and-world," with "world" including conspecifics, environmental resources and dangers, and so on), "worldviews" are *rhetorical*[2] and necessitate forms of signaling and information transfer far more advanced than what most if not all non-human animals (and other living things, for even trees, for example, engage in information transfer) are capable of. As shall become apparent in this appendix, the spatial and the rhetorical are, in the case of human cognition, deeply entangled.

This appendix first contextualizes both (§1) the cognitive turn and (§2) the spatial turn in religious studies, looking particularly at (§2a) Eliade, (§2b) Hertz, and (§2c) Wyatt. Then, focusing more intensely on Eliade, (§3a) the appendix brings Eliade's logic of centering into conversation with spatial cognition literature on, *e.g.*, systematic errors toward the central value of remembered spatial regions (*e.g.*, Holden et al., 2010) and related innate predispositions that would contribute to this logic, with an excursus on William James's concept of "voluminousness," and (§3b) applies the logic of centering to the example of Native American relationships with the landscape and, specifically, Apache place names (Deloria and Basso). The discussion then builds on Eliade and other religious studies figures' – particularly Hertz's and Wyatt's – foundational notions about sacred space, (§3c) expanding on them to consider orientation systems relative to the evidence from evolutionary and cognitive linguistic research (especially Levinson). I then dive into the very important and recurring topic of lateralization, first more generally (§3d) and then with specific reference to worldview studies (§3e). Finally, and more broadly, (§4) this appendix attempts to signal some other trajectories religious studies and worldview studies might take by turning to the resources offered by the research on spatial cognition – focusing on the trajectories of (§4a) cognitive archaeology and (§4b), to a lesser degree, (I) event cognition,[3] (II) aesthetic feelings and emotions, (III) individual differences,[4] and (IV) power.

## 1. Cognitive Turn

In the field of religious studies there has been a tendency resembling what Eliade describes, in which the idealized, sanctified cosmos of the eternal return was abandoned for

[2] Taves et al. get at this same point in a slightly different way, stressing "transcendental" social worlds (Bloch, 2008) and "conventional" affordances (Ramstead, Veissière, & Kirmayer, 2016).

[3] With hindsight, Lisdorf's (2011) "Pole Position: Space, Narrative, and Religion" points strongly in this new explanatory direction, as does Tweed's work in more subtle ways. Lisdorf's Millikanian PPRs of *homo navigans* are Tavesian CCCs of a most productive sort, essentially pointing to the same insight McNamara (2009) uses to explain how "religion" involves creative re-formations of the self model and, more fundamentally, that conceptual blending research uses to explain all sorts of cultural innovations: that is, these CCCs are manifestations of the human capacity to generate novel mental spaces that blend and bind features derived from a variety of cognitive sources.

[4] Note that this focus on individual particularity and difference is far more Smithian than Eliadean.

the terrifying, troubling particularities of history. The highly cerebral, intellectualized, doctrine-focused approach of theology and early, Protestant-influenced religious studies has tended toward increasing fragmentation into assorted area studies that resist any hint of totalizing, universalist claims about "religion" in general. Although some lament religious studies' consequent lack of unifying, totalizing theory, others regard the dissolution of any one, governing framework for the study or even definition of religion as a welcome sign that the imperialist, colonialist, hegemonic order of the past is finally falling. If such is the case, that is indeed welcome. One might ask whether cognitive science supplies a unifying theory for religious studies, a means for translating between levels and types of analysis. Another welcome consequence of the general abandonment of the Protestant, rationalizing tendency of the past has been a return to the materiality of religion and increased attention to its non-propositional forms of representation such as music, dance, and iconography.

Under this heading, I shall consider developments in psychology and information science that are sometimes called the "cognitive turn" or even the "cognitive revolution." These developments, which drove the emergence of cognitive science as an interdisciplinary effort, parallel in some interesting ways developments in the field of archaeology, as we shall see shortly.[5]

Put briefly, cognitive science may be said to have at least three defining attributes. First, it is concerned with meaning. That is, it does not regard the mind as in irrelevant black box, the structure of which is unknowable and ineffable. Regarded as an information-processing system with a determinate structure, the mind's content is considered worthy of and accessible to study. Second, the mind's character is regarded as being both species-specific and pan-human.[6] That is, all humans are regarded as having certain innate capacities and predispositions, which are, in turn, not identical to those of other species, who have had different selective pressures in different environments with different histories. Third, cognitive science does not propose a universal model for cognition. It is fundamentally pragmatic, multi-leveled, piecemeal, and interdisciplinary. This may seem inconsistent with the belief in pan-human cognitive traits, but such a pragmatic orientation is typical of the sciences, which, although assuming, for example, that discovered regularities in physics, chemistry, and biology operate consistently throughout the universe, do not regard it as necessary for a particular inquiry that each field or level of analysis be reduced to the one "below." Consilience between levels is ultimately sought, but in the meantime the different levels can enrich each other without having to explain each other away.

In psychology, after the exuberant and rather wild speculations concerning the internal structure and workings of the mind found in early theorists like Freud and Jung, behaviorism arose, influenced by the growing dominance of positivist philosophy among scientists. Its adherents insisted that it was irresponsible to speculate about cognitive states, since all researchers really have access to is the applied stimulus and the organism's response, *i.e.*, the inputs and the outputs. The above one-sentence summary of the field is, of course, a gross generalization that ignores important dissenting figures, both in the United States and in Europe, but it will serve for my purpose here, which is simply to give a broad

[5] They are intriguingly reminiscent, too, of the *Methodenstreit* that led Weber to adopt *Verstehen*.

[6] In cognitive science of religion (CSR), though there are exceptions, this has tended to produce a bias in favor of "ordinary" religious experiences and activities, rather than the novel and the unusual that tend to be associated with the founders of new religious movements.

sense of the historical development of cognitive science—especially cognitive psychology and information science.

Chomsky's review of Skinner's book on linguistics is often regarded as an important turning point in psychology, linguistics, and other fields now associated with cognitive science. In it, he pointed out that Skinner's behavioristic account of language failed to account for important known aspects of language that are inconsistent with a model of acquisition completely from scratch based on pure reinforcement and association. For instance, children generate novel sentences, never produced by their parents and thus never encountered before, and children violate experienced grammar (for example, saying, "I swimmed," rather than, "I swam") in order to apparently conform to an internal grammar. Thus, ideas such as the modular Universal Grammar and the innate Language Acquisition Device arose. The truth of this model of the human mind's linguistic capacity is irrelevant for the purpose of this historical review; the point is that it is a *model* and that scholars had started thinking it was appropriate and necessary to think about the structure of the mind.

Another important development was in the area of animal studies. It became increasingly evident that different animals have different, species-specific cognitive tendencies. Some are very good at learning behaviors that for others are almost or entirely impossible. Their instinctive or innate cognitive structure, rooted in their evolutionary history and environmental conditions, had to be taken into account. And this meant that scientists had to start modeling; the brain could not just be a black box. George Miller's discovery of the "magic number" 7 (*i.e.*, that the human memory has an innate cognitive limit of about 7 (±2) items) is a good example of this for the human species. In information science, Turing supplies a good example of important trends. He is probably most famous for giving us the Turing Machine and the Turing Test. Briefly, the Turing Machine demonstrates that all computation is symbol manipulation and that an infinite range of possible calculations can be done with a finite set of symbolic elements and rules for their manipulation, and the Turing Test attempts to supply a method for inferring the presence of a conscious agent. Information science attempts to bridge the third-person, objective perspective of science and the first-person, subjective, meaning-based perspective of the humanities with the concept of "information," the symbolic manipulation of which can be performed using different sorts of physical systems, including both silicon- and carbon-based. (See the Conclusion in the main text and Appendix 6 for arguments qualifying this.)

## 2. Spatial Turn

Though the "spatial turn" in the humanities has come to refer primarily to the study of how space is created and regulated (as in Smith), one may introduce the spatial turn in religious studies by considering three significant figures: Mircea Eliade, who described the ontology of "archaic man," Robert Hertz, who devoted special attention to the significance of the left and the right, and Nicholas Wyatt, who picked up the themes found in Eliade and Hertz and connected them to ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean linguistic systems.

In the study of religion, scholars other than Eliade, Hertz, and Wyatt have thought fruitfully along specifically spatial lines. For example, James H. Austin interprets the mystical experience of ego loss as a consequence of mediation's modulation of egocentric and allocentric spatial orientation systems. And indeed many other scholars implicitly or explicitly theorize religion in terms of space—*e.g.*, Taves's "special path" concept that

clearly draws on human navigation and wayfinding capacities,[7] Geertz's "general order of existence" and conception of vectorial motivations with an "overall course" and scalar

[7] Along these lines, I think the research of Elizabeth Chrastil is promising for helping specify what is going on. It's important to note that navigation in the wild requires the simultaneous use of a number of different spatial capacities, and different cultures cultivate and calibrate these in different ways, in addition to natural variation in ability in a population. The simple path metaphor or schema one commonly sees referred to outside the spatial cognition literature does not capture the real-world complexity of wayfinding. Thus, Jackendoff's (1995, 1997, 2003) confidence in universal spatial categories may need qualification, but, on the other hand, it's worth noting that there are signs of regularity even in evidence of difference. For example, Fibigerová, Guidetti, & Šulová (2012) found that although motion events were reported very differently among French and Czech speakers, their uses of gestures were more stable. Jackendoff's notion of PATH would seem to be more reflective of route description narratives, that is, how wayfinding is reported by those who already know the way (*cf.* Denis 1997; Denis et al. 1999; Tversky & Lee 1998, 1999). And Falck's (2012) study of PATH may be relevant, in that it demonstrates that the metaphorical use of the path category has functional constraints not present in other contexts.

In addition to the (hippocampal) integration or binding of self-motion information (*i.e.*, head direction cells, the retrosplenial cortex (RSC), and posterior parietal cortex), landmark or location information (parahippocampal cortex, medial entorhinal cortex; PPA and RSC), and object information (perirhinal cortex, lateral entorhinal cortex), the "higher level" functions of context monitoring (mPFC) and reward prediction (striatum) are required. In addition to real-world wayfinding, the neuroscience of spatial memory and imagery is highly relevant to the framework developed in this work. Burgess (March 01, 2008) summarizes a lot of the relevant facts in "Spatial Cognition and the Brain" (*Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124,* 1):

> It is now becoming possible to construct a mechanistic neural-level model of at least some aspects of spatial memory and imagery, with the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe providing allocentric environmental representations, the parietal lobe egocentric representations, and the retrosplenial cortex and parieto-occipital sulcus allowing both types of representation to interact. Insights from this model include a common mechanism for the construction of spatial scenes in the service of both imagery and episodic retrieval and a role for the remainder of Papez's circuit in orienting the viewpoint used. In addition, it appears that hippocampal and striatal systems process different aspects of environmental layout (boundaries and local landmarks, respectively) and do so using different learning rules (incidental learning and associative reinforcement, respectively). (77-97)

And it is hotly debated whether our internal representation of our "path" is best accounted for by a configural/accumulator model or a homing vector model for path integration. (That orientation is encoded in terms of vectors is supported by converging data not only from neuroscience but also from more conventional linguistics (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Bohnemeyer & O'Meara 2012).) A simple route might be represented as a series of place-action associations, which of course still depends on the complex task of recognizing locations (*i.e.*, probably the interaction of the PPA and the RSC (Marchette et al.)), but according to Chrastil the most likely form of human internal representations of spatial knowledge is the labeled graph, a network of place nodes linked by path edges with local metric information. This metric information, naturally, is probabilistic, coarse, and biased. But the cumulative summation of it all is enough for effective motion in the world. In her "Appendix on Methods," which reflects Taves and Asprem's foregrounding of event cognition for the study of experience in CSR, Taves (2016) observes regarding event models, "Event models typically represent relevant entities and agents, the relations between them, and *the place and time in which the event takes place, mapped from the point of view of the subject* (Radvansky and Zacks 2014)" (emphasis mine, 422). Basso's ethnographic evidence regarding Apache place names would support the notion that events are mapped from the point of view of the subject, but this is something that could be investigated among individuals and across cultures and languages. (Taylor and Tversky (1992, 1996), for example, report variation in perspective taking between survey and route perspectives in narratives describing environments learned from maps. Since spatial information is simultaneously stored by different systems that relate to different perspectives or aspects of spatiality (Tipper and Behrmann 1996), one might even a priori expect variation in narratives and events.) More importantly, a Western focus on temporal segmentation should not obscure the fact that events may have much more to do with spatial localization. The Apache do not so much care when things happened as *where*.

moods that "go nowhere," Tweed's crossing and dwelling,[8] even Jung's fascination with correspondences between maps of the psyche and maps of the cosmos (*e.g.*, mandalas[9]), J. Z. Smith himself,[10] and so on. Tweed's theory is, in particular, the most responsible and convincing in its use of spatial cognition relative to religious studies. Given humans' embodied and emplaced condition, they necessarily understand religion in spatial terms. If religious representations, experiences, and rituals have to do with fashioning worlds for people to inhabit and with negotiating between worlds, spatial cognitive ability is necessarily implicated throughout. In our fragmented ethnographic and anthropological studies of religious communities and symbolic systems, we have seen a proliferation of careful phenomenological studies of sacred space, especially in native and indigenous religions, but also in the so-called "universal" or "world" religions. Thus, spatial cognition is potentially an area for productive methodological and theoretical innovation in religious studies. However, I will in this section focus primarily on Eliade, secondarily on Hertz and Wyatt, and only tangentially on other religious studies thinkers.

Because this appendix is focused on how spatial cognition might be used more widely in CSR studies and, more specifically, worldview studies relative to allomythoi, it focuses on cosmological matters. However, it's important to recognize that the "spatial turn" refers primarily to consideration of social positionality, activity, perspective, and boundary contestation (*cf.* Tweed; Albanese) – that is, the question of power – relative to religion and other cultural phenomena (see Orvell & Meikle (2009); Crang & Thrift (2000); Sayer (2000)), following especially Foucault's configuring of power/knowledge's circulation in space and its regulation by means of such things as built environments (*e.g.*, the

---

Still, even if a person is indifferent to the precise time of an event, narrative reports of the event will necessarily unfold in time and relate to a temporal duration, however vague.

[8] Tweed's interacts explicitly and responsibly with the geographic – using the term in a distinctly aquatic register in addition to its terrestrial connotation – and spatial literatures. His treatment of the cognitive science material is located primarily on pp. 93 *ff.* and the associated endnotes. Both his understanding of theories – "theories are embodied travels (a line or course of travel; a route), positioned representations (a record or journal of travel, an account of a journey), and proposed routes (a sketch of a proposed route; a plan or scheme of travel)" (9) – and his theory of religion – "*Religions are confluences of organic-cultural flows that intensify joy and confront suffering by drawing on human and superhuman forces to make homes and cross boundaries*" (54) – are distinctly spatial. As with Taves's path metaphor (*cf.* Clifford (1997), who also uses a travel metaphor (as well as translation)), Tweed's theory of crossing is dynamic and non-essentialist. His notion of dwelling, recalling Heidegger's language, unites this dynamism with the more traditional understandings of religion as "binding" that it supplements. His work is foundational to this study, as may be noted in the main texts, and is addressed specifically at the conclusion of §4.

[9] *Cf.* Susan Walcott, "Mapping from a Different Direction: Mandala as Sacred Spatial Visualization," *Journal of Cultural Geography* 23, no. 2 (2006): 71–88.

[10] Ronald L. Grimes ("Jonathan Z. Smith's Theory of Ritual Space," *Religion* 29.3 (July 1999): 261-273) proposes that action, not space, should be the primary category in the study of ritual, and CSR has had a lot of traction explaining ritual along this line. However, action – movement in the world – depends on spatial abilities, so those engaged in the study of ritual should still attend to the spatial aspects of ritual action (see §4b). And Smith's assertion that it is through activity in ritual *spaces* – by means of which activity the spaces are themselves differentiated and sacralized, *i.e.*, constituted as "sacred" – that people and things become "sacred" (*cf.* Durkheim) still seems quite compelling in cognitive terms, as long as "sacred" is handled cautiously as part of a more general meaning-making, attributional framework.

Panopticon).[11] Tweed's theory of religion is noteworthy in balancing considerations of power and cognition relative to space.

### 2a. Eliade

Eliade (2005), under the influence of the neo-Kantian tradition (*cf.* Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Otto), analyzes the experience of the sacred using temporal and spatial categories, and he highlights the importance of the "center" in the ontology of archaic man (sic).[12] He references data "which show us how reality is conferred [in the mind of "archaic man"] through participation in the 'symbolism of the Center': cities, temples, houses become real by the fact of being assimilated to the 'center of the world'" (Eliade 2005:5). For example,

> According to Indian beliefs, Mount Meru rises at the center of the world, and above it shines the polestar. The Ural-Altaic peoples also know of a central mountain, Sumeru, to whose summit the polestar is fixed. Iranian beliefs hold that the sacred mountain Haraberezaiti (El-burz) is situated at the center of the earth and is linked with heaven…. In the *Edda*, Himinbjorg, as its name indicates, is a 'celestial mountain'; it is here that the rainbow (Bifrost) reaches the dome of the sky…. According to Mesopotamian beliefs, a central mountain joins heaven and earth; it is the Mount of the Lands, the connection between territories. Properly speaking, the ziggurat was a cosmic mountain, *i.e.*, a symbolic image of the cosmos, the seven stories representing the seven planetary heavens (as at Borsippa) or having the colors of the world (as at Ur). Mount Tabor, in Palestine, could mean *ṭabbūr*, *i.e.*, navel, *omphalos*. Mount Gerizim, in the center of Palestine, was undoubtedly invested with the prestige of the Center, for it is called 'navel of the earth' (*ṭabbūr ereṣ*; *cf.* Judges 9:37: "…See there come people down by the middle [Heb., navel] of the land…"). (Eliade 2005:12-13)[13]

The details of ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean conceptions of the center could be gone into in a great deal more depth. In addition to stressing the role of the center in ancient thought, Eliade noted that humans located themselves in and understood themselves to be a part of an eternal order, an absolute mental map, as it were. By participating in this "extraterrestrial archetype, be it conceived as a plan, as a form, or purely and simply as a 'double' existing on a higher cosmic level" (2005:9), one becomes eternal oneself, escaping in myth what Eliade terms "the terror of history." Eliade himself was perhaps overly influenced by the pan-Babylonian interpretation of his time and by a tendency to universalization and essentialization (*cf.* J. Z. Smith 1988, especially what he has to say about Australian aboriginal religion in the first chapter). However, since Eliade's scholarly focus was on detecting similarities among cultures and determining underlying cultural structures, these tendencies are understandable.

---

[11] See also Michel de Certeau, Stewart Elden, David Harvey, Fredric Jameson, Henri Lefebvre, Edward Soja, and others. The social and cultural geography literature is vast, and the interrelations between social and spatial cognition are many and complex.

[12] Others stress this as a continuing feature of human life: Erik Cohen, Nachman Ben-Yehuda, and Janet Aviad, "Recentering the World: The Quest for 'Elective' Centers in a Secularized Universe," *SORE The Sociological Review* (35, no. 2 (1987), pp. 320–46.

[13] *Cf.* Frank J. Korom, "Of navels and mountains: a further inquiry into the history of an idea," *Asian Folklore Studies* 51, no. 1 (1992).

## 2b. Hertz

Robert Hertz built on Émile Durkheim's basic (and already highly spatiotemporal) distinction between the "profane" and the "sacred," associating them with the left and right respectively. Hertz was Durkheim's student and noted that many traditional cultures possess total ordering systems of the world, in which positive categories are associated with the right and negative with the left. I am tempted to guess that this trend has to do with the left hemisphere's (recall, the left hemisphere governs the right side of the body) characteristic disregard and even distain for contralateral matters; Wyatt, below, shows that the bewildering and often distressing numinous or sacred is associated, in the ancient languages of Ugaritic and Hebrew, with the left—again, the domain of the right hemisphere that comprehends but is incomprehensible to the left. Durkheim emphasizes the *absolute* distinction between two worlds (*cf.* 1995:36), the profane and the sacred, and he states that the category of the "sacred" is fundamental to religion. However, the "sacred" does not always refer to something superior to the mundane world: sacred things can be subordinated to profane things, can be both pure and impure (*cf.* 1995:412 *ff.*), and bear a (sometimes complex) relation to their profane substrata. Thus, even in Hertz's Durkheimian inspiration, there is cause to be cautious in rigidly associating particular *qualities* with the left and the right, apart from their co-implication of each other and essential opposition. Hertz's universalist claims were eventually disproven or qualified by a number of researchers (esp. Granet 1973; *cf.* Parkin 2005: 62 *ff.* and Wyatt 2005), but they hold true for many specific language systems, as indeed Wyatt (2005:131 *ff.*) partially indicates is the case in Ugaritic and Hebrew, in which the right is given special honor. I shall take up the notion of lateralization (and to some degree handedness) in more detail below.

## 2c. Wyatt

Wyatt's work a fine though flawed methodological example of integrating the cognitive, linguistic-representational, and cultural levels relative to spatial and religious data. His analysis of ancient spatial orientation systems demonstrates awareness of the way (ancient) meaning systems are rooted in the self's embodied and emplaced existence. However, his cognitive argument also illustrates religious studies scholars' professional obligation to develop sufficient literacy in relevant cognitive research to constrain their speculations.

Wyatt (2005) applies previous research on ancient spatial orientation systems to the Ugaritic language and uses one of its cognate languages, Biblical Hebrew, as a control. In his paper, Wyatt built especially on the work of E. Lyle (1990), as well as the general study of C.H. Brown (1983) and the observations of Boman (1960), Stadelmann (1970), Malamat (1989), O'Connor (1991), Rosén (1991), and Drinkard (1992) concerning the biblical languages, and J. Chelhod (1964) concerning Arabic.

Wyatt demonstrates that in Ugaritic and Hebrew ritual or "canonical" orientation systems the term meaning "behind" also denotes both temporal "future" and the spatial absolute-orientation "west," and the term "in front of, before" means also both "past" and "east." However, Wyatt (2005:135) notes that the Hebrew term for "north," which refers to the sacred cosmic mountain and lies to the left of a generic eastward-oriented speaker, possesses all the awful, numinous transcendence of the sacred (*cf.* Eliade, Otto). In Ugaritic, "right" also means "south," and "left" means "north." Wyatt (2005:130) proposes that sinister connotations of the term for the hand, in that it is the "toilet-hand," might account

for its also bearing the sense of "penis." Thus, Wyatt (2005) does not make Hertz's mistake, which I have noted was not present in Durkheim himself, of thinking "sacred" invariably means "holy" or "pure."

Wyatt's analysis is significant as still the most recent concerning the ancient language systems of the ancient Mediterranean and West Asia. About the three orientation systems found in Ugaritic and Hebrew, Wyatt (2005:135) states the following:

> The oldest category, then, is in relation to aspects of the body; the second category extends this with regard to the movements of the sun and other celestial bodies (which is certainly still as much a religious as a secular category in the ancient world), while the third belongs to an enlarging horizon of geographical features at some remove from one another (as clearly with a northern mountain and a southern desert zone).

Wyatt's statement concerning the order of development is based on facts such as the age of the Ugaritic texts in relation to our earliest Hebrew sources. In his work *Space and Time in the Religious Life of the Near East* (2001), Wyatt provides several tables on the three orientation systems in ancient languages of the Near East and Mediterranean (see Appendix 1), demonstrating that the pattern he described for Ugaritic and Hebrew largely holds true for other ancient language systems in the region. Wyatt (2005:145), drawing on his expertise in the religious and mythic beliefs of the region, states,

> A host of symbolic constructions rests on these relationships, and the left-right axis and its influences upon the subject is merely compounded when the east-west axis is also taken into account. Thus, from spatial awareness of his or her place in the world [*i.e.*, as the center of the before-behind and left-right system of orientation], the subject becomes both temporally [east-west axis] and morally [north-south axis] aware.[14]

Wyatt thus believes the move from egocentric to allocentric orientation systems inspires the formation of other abstract concepts. Although it is hard to talk about causation this far removed from the cultures being analyzed, the connection of those abstract concepts to the categories of the spatial systems can be noted.

Wyatt's (2005) admirable attempt to determine the neurological basis of the cultural associations of the directions in the ancient systems he studies will first be described sympathetically; then it will be critiqued. Reminding one of the emphasis placed in Bellah's recent study (2011) on the role of maternal "cherishing" as an important capacity for the development of human society, Wyatt (2005:136-7) connects the emergence of emotional processing in the right hemisphere of the brain to the "selective pressures making the holding of [primate] infant offspring to the heart (that is, on the left-hand side) a beneficial strategy," the association of the right with "control and stability" to the infant experience of resting its right-hand side against its mother (*ibid.*), and the association of the left with "danger … instability and trauma" to the infant's exposure and vulnerability on its left-hand side. According to Wyatt, the right side of the body, held against the primate mother's heart, is generally governed by the left hemisphere, the locus of "rhythmic experience, music and affective sentiment" (*ibid.*) [Wyatt is wrong about this—the left hemisphere only becomes strongly involved with music in professional musicians as music becomes subject to analysis and discriminatory judgment]; conversely, the right hemisphere "is the location of language

[14] To the before-behind, left-right, east-west, and north-south axes, Wyatt (2001) also adds and discusses briefly the up-down dimensions.

(more specifically, speech), and in particular its rationalizing and ordering capacity" (*ibid.*) [Wyatt is also wrong about this—the left hemisphere is most involved in these functions]. Wyatt's language suggests the possibility that language is an extension and culmination of a "rationalizing and ordering" response to the anxiety produced by the right hemisphere's vulnerability during the primate's extended infancy. In any case, Wyatt draws on primate studies to demonstrate that the lateral division of cognitive labor is an ancient and common trait in primates (Wyatt 2005:138), and this is true. But Wyatt (2005:139) argues that although "in a dextrous use of the hands, such as the making or using of tools by primitive hominids, or their use by earlier primates, a dominance of one side might well develop within a community, it is above all the *cultural*, not the anatomical aspects, which create the human dominance of the right." If the parent-child relationship (especially the maternal relationship) and the extended infancy of human children are the basis of human social ties, the cultural amplification of the lateral difference present in this relationship might have some merit, but Wyatt is fundamentally wrong about the general characteristics of the two hemispheres. As the primatological literature Wyatt (2005) cites establishes, the use of the left arm (by the right hemisphere) for cradling beloved children is common not only in human societies, but also in other primates, leaving the right hand (under the left hemisphere) free for left-hemisphere-typical activities like feeding and fighting. And a ubiquitous human experience and behavior would naturally take on cultural significance in human societies, so that part of Wyatt's theory seems strong. The stuff about the sound of the heartbeat is far less convincing. With regard to myth, Wyatt (2005:145) states, "The binary foundations of Lévi-Strauss' perception of myth can be explained in terms of a 'neurological dialectic' which is the interaction of the two hemispheres of the brain, of which the axes we have isolated are simply the most basic." And this line of thought is worth pursuing though I cannot do so at this time. Wyatt, like Hertz, wants to find an inherent structure consisting of basic dualistic oppositions in human physiology. Wyatt also notes the importance of the subject as the basis of these systems of relative and absolute orientation: the self is the center. As mentioned above, this mythic theme is explored in depth in Eliade.

I will return shortly to considering Eliade, Hertz, and Wyatt relative to the findings of cognitive linguistics, evolutionary studies, and animal studies, but one may here make a few broad points concerning Wyatt's theory. First, it is very speculative, more a likely story than a scientific account. Second, although Wyatt's attention to other primates is good (and quite rare in religious studies), his notion of "dominance of one side [developing] … within a [primate] community" is incorrect. As we shall see, lateralization and specialization of the right side (that is, the left hemisphere) for tool use, beak manipulation, and other aggressive tasks is an ancient property of vertebrates, which seems to find its evolutionary origin in predation and, more generally, a necessary division of attentional labor. Third, Wyatt does well to emphasize the cultural. Whatever basic specialization may be present in the human nervous system, it remains astonishingly plastic and adaptable. Fourth, in his division of the spatial orientation terms, one can observe an intrinsic (egocentric) system, which he terms the "homuncular" due to its being grounded in the intrinsic lateralization of the human, and two systems that seem to function as absolute systems but which show signs of having been relative systems (*e.g.*, some of the terms used for directions also refer to things like sacred mountains and celestial objects), which he calls the "topographic" and the "cosmological."

### 3a. Eliade and the Logic of Centering

Now, the neuroscience of cognitive development and the findings of cognitive linguistics do not seem to support the kind of panhuman mental patterns Eliade claimed to find relative to spatial cognition (*cf.*, Levinson, 2003, 2006; Nelson et al., 2006; Twyman and Newcombe, 2010). Nonetheless, within a framework of emergent modularization and dual inheritance theory (*cf.*, A. Geertz, 2013), one may propose an analysis of imagined cosmologies along modified Eliadean lines that does justice to both the role of power in constructing hierarchical patterns and the real sense in which categories thus socially naturalized may become cognitively "natural."

As discussed above, like Durkheim but more in the sense of Otto, Eliade divides the world into the sacred and the profane and is very concerned about the desacralization of the world. The sacred radiates out like Durkheimian contagion[15] from the central locus of a hierophany. Following Jung, this reality corresponds archetypally to, is a map of, and sustains the cosmos. Eliade sets up a sharp contrast between, on the one hand, the religious reality that, when entered into through ritual, abolishes time and returns to a longed for (nostalgic) paradise and, on the other hand, the terrors of historical time.

At the core of Eliade's thought, as noted by his Rennie (2001), is a logic of centering. Rennie states,

> Eliade's thought can be quite closely related to that of Jacques Derrida. Where Derrida identifies a longing for a center, Eliade see the nostalgia for paradise and the desire to live in close proximity to the sacred. Where this leads Derrida to the recognition of binary opposites, Eliade recognizes the *coincidentia oppositorum*. Where Derrida considers the longing for the center to spawn a 'centering' or privileging of one of the binary pair and to give rise to the play of binary opposites, Eliade has the dialectic of the sacred and the profane in which one of the pair is elevated over the other.

In a qualified and simplified way, I may now state that the spatial biases implied by Eliade's theory, namely, the favoring of a central value and the hierarchical weighting of spatial objects, have some evidentiary support. First, Holden, Curby, Newcombe, and Shipley (2010) have demonstrated systematic errors toward the central value of remembered spatial regions. Reality radiates out from the central value in that it is more vividly recalled. In part, this relates to the brain's probabilistic character (*cf.* Holden, Newcombe, and Shipley, 2015, which argues that the Bayesian combination of categorical and metric information stresses categorical information to the degree that there is greater metric uncertainty). As in a JPEG, the nervous system uses probabilistic techniques to compress information and, as it were, save bandwidth. Hosoya et al. (2005:71) note that retinal "[g]anglion cells signal not the raw visual image but the departures from the predictable structure, under the assumption of spatial and temporal uniformity." It is differences between prior values and sensed values over a threshold that are passed upward in the hierarchy, but this bandwidth compression inherent to probabilistic cognition leads to a spillover effect. Like Durkheim's "contagion," the central value can distort surrounding values.[16] And *hierarchical* predictive coding

[15] Indeed, recall that Durkheim's theory of contagion is intended, in part, to account for what happens to a *location* in which specially marked objects are stored.

[16] That spatial cognition is particularly weighted towards the central values of landmarks might seem to be further supported by the fact that, when people remember routes, landmarks are recalled more accurately than streets (Tom and Denis 2004). However, a follow-up study Tom & Tversky (2012) troubles the 2004 findings,

distorts experience and memory in another way as well. Recall that Eliade stresses, not only the center, but also the notion of elevation of some salient categories over others. Hirtle and Jonides (1985) demonstrate that spatial memory is hierarchically categorized and that this can lead to systematic biases. Again, privileged values distort our so-called "cognitive maps"[17] and the distance between crossed categories can be subjectively enlarged.

**A Brief Excursus Drawing on William James**

Here it may be worthwhile to intervene and point out that "spatial cognition" is not really, as a network of evolved capacities, about "space." It is about our body and our environment. It is ecologically-oriented, adapted by evolutionary processes to work with and be afforded by the determinate features of the environment and our bodies. Thus, as Proffit (2006) states, *"*Dimensions of the world are scaled by action-relevant metrics that are derived from the perceiver's body dimensions and action capabilities" (*cf.* Heidegger's "deseverence" [*Entfernung*] (1962:139)). Hills are judged to be steeper when wearing a heavy backpack, when physically tired, when older or less healthy, when at the top versus at the bottom, when alone versus with a friend. Dewey writes, "Works of art express space as opportunity for movement and action" (1934, p. 209). The irreducible qualia of spatial perception is the first point William James makes when addressing the topic of the perception of space in Volume 2 of his (1890) *The Principles of Psychology*:

> *In the sensations of hearing, touch, sight, and pain we are accustomed to distinguish from among the other elements the element of voluminousness.*
>
> We call the reverberations of a thunderstorm more voluminous than the squeaking of a slate-pencil; the entrance into a warm bath gives our skin a more massive feeling than the prick of a pin; a little neuralgic pain, fine as a cobweb, in the face, seems less extensive than the heavy soreness of a boil or the vast discomfort of a colic or a lumbago; and a solitary star looks smaller than the noonday sky. In the sensation of dizziness or subjective motion, which recent investigation has proved to be connected with stimulation of the semi-circular canals of the ear, the spatial character is very prominent. Whether the 'muscular sense' directly yields us knowledge of space is still a matter of litigation among psychologists. Whilst some go so far as to ascribe our entire cognition of extension to its exclusive aid, others deny to it all extensive quality whatever. Under these circumstances we shall do better to adjourn its consideration; admitting, however, that it seems at first sight as if we felt something decidedly more voluminous when we contract our thigh-muscles than when we twitch an eyelid or some small muscle in the face. It seems, moreover, as if this difference lay in the feeling of the thigh-muscles themselves.
>
> In the sensations of smell and taste this element of varying vastness seems less prominent but not altogether absent. Some tastes and smells appear less extensive than complex flavors, like that of roast meat or plum

illustrating again how complicated spatial memory is. When streets are made more vivid and distinctive than landmarks, the (2004) effect is reversed. When both are made vivid, overall memory improves. Further, people with higher imagery abilities are faster and more accurate. Note the relevance of this research to event cognition and variation in ability (§4b).

[17] These are sometimes called "graphs" to help detach from the map metaphor (Chrastil).

> pudding, on the one hand, or heavy odors like musk or tuberose, on the other. The epithet sharp given to the acid class would seem to show that to the popular mind there is something narrow and, as it were, streaky, in the impression they make, other flavors and odors being bigger and rounder.
>
> The sensations derived from the inward organs are also distinctly more or less voluminous. Repletion and emptiness, suffocation, palpitation, headache, are examples of this, and certainly not less spatial is the consciousness we have of our general bodily condition in nausea, fever, heavy drowsiness, and fatigue. Our entire cubic content seems then sensibly manifest to us as such, and feels much larger than any local pulsation, pressure, or discomfort. Skin and retina are, however, the organs in which the space-element plays the most active part. Not only does the maximal vastness yielded by the retina surpass that yielded by any other organ, but the intricacy with which our attention can subdivide this vastness and perceive it to be composed of lesser portions simultaneously coexisting alongside of each other is without a parallel elsewhere. The ear gives a greater vastness than the skin, but is considerably less able to subdivide it. (pp. 134-135)

Thus, unlike Descartes, "extension" or three-dimensional "voluminousness" – that is, spatiality – is not a uniform regularity, but is known to living things in a fluctuating, contextual, initially-bewildering variety (though it is the most generic, appearing in all spatial contexts). James then argues that distinctive volumes or magnitudes (combined with other sensory qualities) must be, using, one might say, cognitive ways of worldmaking, "measured and subdivided by consciousness, and added together, before they can form by their synthesis what we know as the real Space of the objective world. In these operations, imagination, association, attention, and selection play a decisive part" (p. 145; see also, pp. 202-203). Other distinctive qualia include space-relations, which are themselves *sui generis*: "*Rightness and leftness, upness and downness, are again pure sensations* differing specifically from each other, and generically from everything else. Like all sensations, they can only be indicated, not described" (p. 150). But these are all built up from relations among sense data using varied experience, especially that from moving around, and basic cognitive operations like discrimination, memory, and abstraction—but n.b. *not* a Kantian-"mythological" *a priori* category of space (*cf.* pp. 272 *ff.*).[18]

---

[18] Kant might critique James's Lockean way of arriving at space as assuming what it aims to explain. Kant's transcendental idealist position might be contrasted with contemporaneous thinkers, such as, among the transcendental realists, who claim knowledge of things-in-themselves, both Newton's mathematical-absolutist position in which space and time subsist independently of mind and objects and Leibniz's (transcendental realist, empirical idealist) metaphysical-relativist position in which space and time inhere in the objects of the monadic order. In contrast to Berkeley's (dogmatic) idealist understanding of space, which Kant understands as arising from empirical intuition, Kant's *transcendental* idealism asserts that space is intuited *a priori* (*i.e.*, without mediation and non-empirically) as a *singular* representation. Because it is singular, it unifies modes of spatiality that other thinkers might try to keep apart; Milpas notes,

> As Kant emphasises, space is essentially unitary (Kant, 1998: A25/B39)[18] and part of what this means is that, strictly speaking, there are not different spaces that are to be aligned with different modes – the subjective, inter-subjective, and objective – but instead there is but one space, and it is this space that is properly itself objective, that is also inter-subjective (and so equally accessible to all), and yet is always and only accessible subjectively (and so by means of our own individual location within it). Any agent, insofar as it is capable of action at all (that is, insofar as it is, indeed, an agent), acts in a space that is an objective space, in

Given the foundational character of "voluminousness" in James' analysis of spatial perception, the follow passage in his (1902) *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is suggestive, given its focus on religious virtuosos:

> As our mental fields succeed one another, each has its centre of interest, around which the objects of which we are less and less attentively conscious fade to a margin so faint that its limits are unassignable. Some fields are narrow fields and some are wide fields. Usually when we have a wide field we rejoice, for we then see masses of truth together, and often get glimpses of relations which we divine rather than see, for they shoot beyond the field into still remoter regions of objectivity, regions which we seem rather to be about to perceive than to perceive actually. At other times, of drowsiness, illness, or fatigue, our fields may narrow almost to a point, and we find ourselves correspondingly oppressed and contracted.
>
> Different individuals present constitutional differences in this matter of width of field. Your great organizing geniuses are men with habitually vast fields of mental vision, in which a whole programme of future operations will appear dotted out at once, the rays shooting far ahead into definite directions of advance. In common people there is never this magnificent inclusive view of a topic. (p. 231; *cf.* p. 387)
>
> […] We pass into mystical states from out of ordinary consciousness as from a less into a more, as from a smallness into a vastness, and at the same time as from an unrest to a rest. We feel them as reconciling, unifying states. They appeal to the yes-function more than to the no-function in us. In them the unlimited absorbs the limits and peacefully closes the account. (p. 416; contrast the example of George Müller of Bristol, pp. 467-471)
>
> […] Mystical states indeed wield no authority due simply to their being mystical states. But the higher ones among them point in directions to which the religious sentiments even of non-mystical men incline. They tell of the supremacy of the ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety, and of rest. They offer us *hypotheses*, hypotheses which we may voluntarily ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset. The supernaturalism and optimism to which they would persuade us may, interpreted in one way or another, be after all the truest of insights into the meaning of this life. (p. 428; *cf.* p. 85)

James' conclusion, in this case, could very well be that of Kant: that mystical experience offers, not certain knowledge, but regulatory, useful (he favors the classic expression: *by their fruits you shall know them*) conclusions worthy of rational belief. By being more voluminous, it comprehends and encompasses more worlds. He sides, one might say in Nietzschean terms, with the sheep over the wolf, with the saint over the strongman, but this is not to say that he does not acknowledge the (present, rather than ideal[19]) validity and utility of both worlds:

---

> which other agents also act, and yet which is always immediately configured subjectively in terms of the agent's own oriented locatedness. (cite)

Kant is at pains to distinguish his understanding of space from Newton and Leibniz because his account attempts not only to supply a model that can be applied to physics but also to encompass the formation of phenomenal experience.

[19] "The saint is therefore abstractly a higher type of man than the 'strong man,' because he is adapted to the highest society conceivable, whether that society ever be concretely possible or not" (p. 375).

> [W]e all know what [Nietzsche] means, and he expresses well the clash between the two ideals. The carnivorous-minded "strong man," the adult male and cannibal, can see nothing but mouldiness and morbidness in the saint's gentleness and self-severity, and regards him with pure loathing. The whole feud revolves essentially upon two pivots: Shall the seen world or the unseen world be our chief sphere of adaptation? And must our means of adaptation in this seen world be aggressiveness or non-resistance?
>
> The debate is serious. In some sense and to some degree both worlds must be acknowledged and taken account of; and in the seen world both aggressiveness and non-resistance are needful. It is a question of emphasis, of more or less. Is the saint's type or the strong-man's type the more ideal? (pp. 373-374)

In doing so, again, his analysis of spatial perception again becomes relevant. He notes that human knowledge of "space" (and all other things) is one of *worlds* within and alongside other *worlds* (*cf.* p. 291 *ff.*). Take this example:

> Even now the space inside our mouth, which is so intimately known and accurately measured by its inhabitant the tongue, can hardly be said to have its internal directions and dimensions known in any exact relation to those of the larger world outside. It forms almost a little world by itself. Again, when the dentist excavates a small cavity in one of our teeth, we feel the hard point of his instrument scraping, in distinctly differing directions, a surface which seems to our sensibility vaguely larger than the subsequent use of the mirror tells us it 'really' is. And though the directions of the scraping differ so completely *inter se*, not one of them can be identified with the particular direction in the outer world to which it corresponds. The space of the tooth-sensibility is thus really a little world by itself, which can only become congruent with the outer space-world by farther experiences which shall alter its bulk, identify its directions, fuse its margins, and finally imbed it as a definite part within a definite whole. (pp. 181-182)

In his conception of space, we dwell in a sort of indeterminate "chaos" (or, one might better say, cosmos) of worlds revealed by different senses and parts of the body—I say "cosmos" because James argues that humans arrive at a sense of a "*world spread out in a perfectly fixed and orderly fashion*" (emphasis his, p. 183). When sense-data from different sense-organs seem to be capable of being attended to together, they are, by a law of cognitive economy, coalesced into properties of a single object localized in a shared space, whereas conflict and interference necessitates multiplication of localities. Just as different organs are adapted to different functions and comprehend their little "worlds," so too James seems to regard different human worldviews as adapted to different situations. The saint and the strongman, the mystic and the scientist, each know different worlds, but James concludes:

> The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also; and that although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in. By being faithful in my poor measure to this over-belief, I seem to myself to keep more sane and true. I can, of course,

> put myself into the sectarian scientist's attitude, and imagine vividly that the world of sensations and of scientific laws and objects may be all. But whenever I do this, I hear that inward monitor of which W. K. Clifford once wrote, whispering the word "bosh!" Humbug is humbug, even though it bear the scientific name, and the total expression of human experience, as I view it objectively, invincibly urges me beyond the narrow "scientific" bounds. (p. 519)

Again, James is interested in selecting the more encompassing worldview.

As one final note, though he rejects what he calls the Kantian "psychic stimulus" theory, whereby the chaos of sensory stimuli are structured by psychic categories like causality and space, he does reflect at length on various spatial illusions, noting how the mind in many cases can perceive the probability to which it has been habituated rather than some unmediated sense-datum.

### 3b. Apache Place Names and Comparison—Deloria and Basso

Eliade's formulation is very similar to the Native American theology of Vine Deloria in *God Is Red*.[20] And so I would now like to turn to a concrete example. In Peterson's (1992:185) review of Albanese's *Nature Religion in America: From the Algonkian Indians to the New Age*, he states,

> [Albanese] is accurate and persuasive in showing that Indians celebrated a sacramental vision of nature as holy in their everyday lives and religious rituals. It is extremely refreshing to read a book on American religion and culture that treats the religious perceptions of American Indians seriously, sympathetically, and accurately.

Peterson goes on to propose some points in history in which Native Americans may have influenced the development of nature religion or sacramentality in other American religions.[21] Deloria stresses the differences between the white colonists' religious vision of the world, which he characterizes as fundamentally temporal and alienated from this world (visions of history), and the sacramental consciousness of America's natives. In this, he resembles Eliade's sharp division between the archaic mind and the Jewish perspective. In contrast to universal and totalizing explanations, Deloria (80-81) points out that spatially oriented religions offer particularized revelations:

> In shifting from temporal concepts to spatial terms, we find that a revelation is not so much the period of time in which it occurs as the place it may occur. Revelation becomes a particular experience at a particular place, no universal truth emerging but an awareness arising that certain places have a qualitative holiness over and above other places [….] Holy places are well known in what have been classified as primitive religions. The vast majority of Indian tribal religions have a center at a particular place, be it a river, mountain plateau, valley, or other natural feature.

One sees here again the emphasis placed on the center. Indeed, in the geospatial or allocentric orientation systems common in indigenous languages throughout the world but

[20] See also Lane 2002:73*ff.*

[21] *Cf.* Michael Pasquier, "Religion and the American Landscape," *Religion Compass* 7, no. 4 (2013): 137–48.

deeply underprivileged in European language and cognition, particular places constitute the formal origin for their coordinate systems.[22] Deloria goes on to ask (82),

> Do religions differ because they involve different relationships between a community and the lands on which it lives? One would be led to consider this relatively simple question for the first time in a new sense by observing the different religions in relation to the lands on which they live and not to their supposed position along an evolutionary scale. The rain dance of the Southwestern Indians, for example, is probably almost totally dependent upon the nature of the lands on which those Indians live. For example, one cannot imagine the Indians of the Pacific Northwest needing or having a rain dance.

All of this is suggestive of Taves's proposal, in "Reverse Engineering Complex Cultural Concepts: Identifying Building Blocks of 'Religion,'" to reformulate the "sacred" in terms of more general processes of valuation that are, in turn, dependent on salience recognition and weighting of significance (2015). Because Deloria is so critical of colonialist Christian perspectives, he perhaps prematurely closes off comparative opportunities with Western traditions. The Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Romans, for example, all had sacred places and a sacramental attitude toward special objects. This was partially transferred from physical space to Heaven, Torah, Time, etc. in Christianity and Judaism (*e.g.*, Marie Isaacs, *Sacred Space: An Approach to the Theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews*), but Catholicism maintained and continues to maintain a sacramental understanding, as Deloria himself observes in a discussion of a statement by Camus (70). Moreover, as noted by Basso regarding the Apache, Native Americans are also able to use their complex place-name system that is based on a living relationship with the landscape as an abstract affordance:

> Landscapes are always available to their seasoned inhabitants in more than material terms. Landscapes are available in symbolic terms as well, and so, chiefly through the manifold agencies of speech, they can be "detached" from their fixed spatial moorings and transformed into instruments of thought and vehicles of purposive behavior. (75)

This general human ability manifests in a host of cultural settings. One might compare this process with the classical art of memory, with contemporary esoteric techniques using material anchors,[23] or with the survival of traditional African magico-religious knowledge through association with Catholic iconography in Afro-Caribbean religions.

---

[22] Based on the research of scholars like Marchette et al., the connection between a material anchor – a landmark – and a coordinate system seems to have to do with communication between the parahippocampal cortex, particularly the so-called "place area" (PPA), and the retrosplineal complex (RSC). This communication is vital because recognition of a landmark and possession of a "mental map" are not alone sufficient to navigate. One also requires a mental "compass" or "cognitive north" to orient one's self (Marchette, Yerramsetti, Burns and Shelton (2011) *Memory and Cognition*). As it turns out, the PPA responds to more than just scenes, as was originally thought. Instead, it appears to identify landmarks in general. Using multi-voxel pattern analysis, Marchette, Vass, Ryan and Epstein ((2015) *J. Neurosci.*) found that the PPA assigns the same pattern or "identity code" to different images, both exterior and interior, of the same location. Marchette finds evidence of our "mental compass" in the retrosplenial complex, which is able to orient even when cued simply by words and thus draws on memory and imagination (Marchette, Vass, Ryan & Epstein (2014) *Nature Neuro.*).

[23] *Cf.* Luhrmann's (1989) *Persuasions of the Witches' Craft: Ritual Magic in Contemporary England*; see too, Lynne Hume, "Creating Sacred Space: Outer Expressions of Inner Worlds in Modern Wicca." *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 13, no. 3 (1998): 309–19.

Let's consider the Apache case in more detail. Here is a transcript of a conversation observed by Basso while doing his ethnography with the Apache, which focused on their place-name system:

> Louise: My younger brother…
> Lola: It happened at Line-of-White-Rocks-Extends-Up-and-Out, at this-very-place!
> Pause of 30-45 seconds.
> Emily: Yes. It happened at Whiteness-Spreads-Out-Descending-to-Water, at this-very-place!
> Pause of 30-45 seconds.
> Lola: It happened at Trail-Extends-Across-a-Red-Ridge-with-Alder-Trees, at this-very-place!
> Louise laughs softly.
> Robert: Pleasantness-and-goodness will-be-forthcoming.
> Lola: Pleasantness-and-goodness will-be-forthcoming.
> Louise: My younger brother is foolish, isn't he, dog?

Louise is distressed because her brother came into contact with a taboo object and subsequently fell gravely ill. The place names invoked by Lola and Emily both refer, as in the fictional Star Trek language of the Tamarians, not only to locations, but also to the ancient memories, words, and narratives passed on from their ancestors of events that took place at those locations. The third location references a humorous story to lighten the mood. These place-names function as material anchors for complex narratives. Hernandes-Avila (60) summarizes Barsh, stating,

> [I]ndigenous ancestral land bases [are] 'embedded landscapes' that are, in effect, 'book(s) of human history and ecological science' layered with 'linguistic, social, spiritual, and ecological knowledge and meaning' (18). The text changes over time in a fluid way through the familiar, 'patient observation of changes in the ecosystems which each landmark anchors in mental space' (18).

This function of places and place-names is a remarkable exaptation of our evolved capacity to recall, for example, where food, home, and danger are. It should come as no surprise, then, that the hippocampus is profoundly implicated in both cognitive mapping and episodic memory of events.[24] Basso enumerates the functions of Apache place names as follows, stating that a place name may,

> (1) produce a mental image of a particular geographical location; (2) evoke prior texts, such as historical tales and sagas; (3) affirm the value and validity of traditional moral precepts (*i.e.*, ancestral knowledge); (4) display tactful and courteous attention to aspects of both positive and negative face; (5) convey sentiments of charitable concern and personal support; (6) offer practical advice for dealing with disturbing personal circumstances (*i.e.*, apply ancestral knowledge); (7) transform distressing thoughts caused by excessive worry into more agreeable ones marked by optimism and hopefulness; and (8) heal wounded spirits. (100)

[24] Non-declarative (esp. emotional (amygdala) and procedural (striatum)) memory is linked to the declarative memory of events (medial temporal lobe).

As shall be discussed at more length below, there is now a growing body of literature linking event cognition to spatial cognition, primarily because (1) the journey event is based on wayfinding abilities as facilitated by the mammalian spatial cognition network and (2) the more static experiential event is also always emplaced. This is significant because Taves and Asprem have proposed event cognition literature, which was developed to explain how people segment narratives, as supplying a productive model for understanding experience and the special experiences that people designate "religious," "spiritual," and so. It is also significant because narrative forms the basis of our social understanding of what constitutes the personal, subjective self and the identities of others.

Interestingly, Basso observes that the Apache refer to significant places as grandmothers and uncles, who give wisdom and advise, and the names of clans can be place names. Deloria states, "The basic divergence of viewpoints between American Indians and the rest of American society must be seen […] in the conception of land, and the choice appears to be between conceiving of land as either a subject or an object" (70). This suggests that one may enrich the cognitive account of attribution of personality to landscape as not only being a function of a hyperactive intentional stance rooted in predation avoidance but also as being connected to our socially and materially distributed consciousness whereby we transform and are transformed by our social and natural environments in an ongoing communal and recursive process that includes the environment as part of that constitutive communal and cognitive reality (*cf.* Hutchins 1993; Salomon 1993; Cole and Engeström 1993). When narratives become attached to locations, the locations take on social and cultural significance. In fact, many deities are, not embodiments of natural forces or abstract principles, but the spirits or personalities of locations. In landscape archaeology, this line of thought has been explored, among other things, in connection with the possible manner in which mortuary practices in early hominids may have been a precursor to symbolic thought (*cf.* Geller 2002; Pettitt 2015).[25] Interaction with the narratives embedded in the extended landscape and anchored and afforded by place names may be powerfully self-transformative.

Let me risk a comparative example. The Apache use the contemplation of places, which as I have noted are also anchors for recalled narratives, to cultivate a quality they call "wisdom." This is a kind of buffered self, called "smoothness of mind" that is sustained by "resilience of mind" and "steadiness of mind," referring to resistance of external and internal perturbation respectively (Basso 130-133). Basso states,

> [I]t is hard to conceive of a cultural construct whose bearing on place could be more intimately related to ideas of selfhood than the Western Apache theory of wisdom and its sources. Incorporating places and their meanings into a compact model of mental and social development, the theory of ["wisdom"] proposes that the most estimable qualities of human minds—keen and unhurried reasoning, resistance to fear and anxiety, and suppression of emotions born of hostility and pride—come into being through extended reflection on symbolic dimensions of the physical environment. (146)

[25] See §4a below on "Cognitive Archaeology" for a fuller discussion of this line of thought. The material anchoring of one's memories of a conspecific is not unique to humans. Elephant graveyards are rather well known, but perhaps more moving are the instances of primate doll making as a grief response to the death of an infant. The symbolic attachment of the remembered dead to a location or object (*i.e.*, the making of meaningful space) reflects a rich, if imprecise, representation.

They understand the living landscape as saturated with memory, and by identifying with it, they report being able to shift into a decoupled state wherein, in times of trouble, they are able to remain untroubled, anticipating what will happen and what response will be most effective. One may note that the activation of the core network and hippocampus coincide with the simulation of episodic memory and possible futures as well as creative divergent thinking and impairment of the core network, including the hippocampus and left angular gyrus (n.b. how the left hemisphere is more strongly implicated in detached, abstracted, creative manipulation of concepts while the right, in its own style, engages in "decontextualized" holistic assessment), disrupts such capacities (Beaty, Thakral, Madore, Benedek, & Schacter 2018; Madore, Thakral, Beaty, Addis, Schacter 2017; Andelman, Hoofien, Goldberg, Aizenstein, & Neufeld 2010; Thakral, Madore, Schacter 2017).

Now, the Stoics had a comparable cosmology, in which the fiery Logos animates the cosmos just as the refined fire of the soul animates the body, and the ancient Greeks (and Romans) lived in a landscape similarly saturated with sacred memories and living spiritual influences.[26] The Stoic sage, it is said, would remain untroubled even when being tortured. The ethical reason for this is that, according to the Stoics, violence to the body is not a salient harm since the Sage retains his virtue, which is the highest good, but perhaps the Sage's *ataraxia*, for which "smoothness of mind" would be an apt translation, had also something to do with contemplative practice. The Stoic sages, like the Apache wise, sought to configure themselves in such a way as to be in harmony with nature; that is, they sought to align their self-schema with their cognitive map of the cosmos. Following James H. Austin, one might observe in the sage and the wise a shift from egocentric to allo- or, rather, geo-centric cognitive styles. As Dasen and Mishra (2010) have demonstrated, geocentric spatial language and cognition has very real consequences for how people relate to the environment and each other. It has been argued that geocentric language may help cultivate awareness of our connectedness to the world and to each other. In addition to reflecting a shift or decoupling[27] into a allocentric/geocentric framework, perhaps this sort of intense mnemonic-contemplative practice swamps working memory, as proposed in the action parsing research on ritual.[28] The Apache contemplation of a mental map also resembles the composition and contemplation of cosmic maps such as Navajo sandpainting and Hindu and Buddhist mandalas and related mnemonic devices, in which specific directions, cosmic mountains, and mythic figures and narratives are anchored to representations with certain colors, shapes, and relations to each other. More recently, Hollingsworth (2015) has, in an article that "charts possibilities for discerning cognitive mechanisms that mediate apophatic

[26] Hawes Greta, *Myths on the Map: The Storied Landscapes of Ancient Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[27] In connection with her use of absorption research to explain differences in ability to have unusual religious experiences, Luhrmann (2014) has noted that the ability to shift out of immediate (egocentric) reality may have evolved as a capacity facilitating the adaptive blocking of pain in crisis situations, *i.e.*, to be stoic.

[28] One might speculate tentatively on Jewish mysticism's use of and transformation of the sacred text into a complex relational map. The feeling of being egoless or lacking feeling is the highest ecstasy sought by the Hasidim; the loss of the will in the true actualization of the self by merging with the divine will is emotional and rational but beyond both (lack of self-possession by possession). Intense self-reflexivity (*hitpa'alut*) by retracing a concept (again, note well the accompanying contemplation of and identification with the sepherotic map and its many, many textual ties) might be a kind of conceptual ritual that swamps working memory, activating the insight reward system but shorting out the concept itself and its egocentric spatial system. One might also note that these practices tend to require absolute frames of reference that place the highest cognitive load on their users.

cognition (and its purportedly self-transforming effects) in negative streams of Christian thought and practice," pointed to similar cognitive mechanisms to those proposed here—that is, Schjoedt's et al. cognitive depletion model (Schjoedt et al., 2013) and McNamara's "decentering" model (2009).

### 3c. Orientation Systems in Cognition and Languages—Levinson

Moving on from the origin, the material anchor or landmark, one may consider the spatial orientation systems supposedly founded thereon. There are a variety of interesting cognitive linguistic studies of spatial cognition. For example, Choi (2006) demonstrates the effect of language-specific encoding of spatial relations on spatial cognition with special reference to Korean and English. Levinson's (2003) study – the results of which are discussed in summary and thematic form in his *Space in Language and Cognition* and in more detail in *Grammars of Space* – of over 40 different languages is the most extensive. Levinson defends what he calls a "neo-Whorfian" form of relativism, in which different linguistic systems for encoding space parallel differences in spatial cognition. Although Levinson finds three fundamental frames of reference in the wide variety of languages studied (*cf.* Levinson 2006), the diversity of spatial representations is notable. His study tempers in important ways some of Eliade's, Hertz's, and Wyatt's exuberantly universalistic claims. For example, he argues against the common claim, which one finds hinted at in Eliade and explicitly spelled out in Wyatt, that the subjective or egocentric is the most fundamental spatial system (Levinson 2003:12-13). In fact, he finds that "expressions for familiar spatial notions like 'left' and 'right', and even sometimes 'front' and 'back', are missing from many, perhaps a third of all languages" (Levinson 2003:35). Levinson (2003:10) states: "This general emphasis on egocentric, relativistic concepts of space has rarely been challenged—but most effectively by O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) who claim that absolute spatial concepts, mental maps of terrain, are encoded in the hippocampus (see also O'Keefe 1991, 1993, Burgess *et al*. 1999, Maguire *et al*. 2000)." Levinson (*ibid.*) thinks that the misleading tradition corrected by his study "reflects the linguistic prejudices of the Indo-European tongues," but, as one can see from Wyatt's evidence, the tradition finds a wider source in the ancient Semitic, Indo-European, and Egyptian tongues of the Mediterranean and Near East. Therefore, the spatial systems used by a large number of the societies to whom we owe many of our cultural forms continue to distort our ability to imagine other ways of seeing the world, other spatial "styles" as they are called in Dasen and Mishra's follow-up study to Levinson (2010). Levinson (2003:13) states,

> Even anthropologists, who might have had sufficient experience of other cultures to know better, have suggested that bodily experience is universally the basis for spatial thinking, and further that this spatial thinking is mapped onto the social world too, to make an embodied cosmos. Thus Hertz, using many ethnographic examples, argued eloquently for the Kantian position that the cosmos is seen as a mapping of the body to space.

This is the sort of cultural bias that anthropologists are trained to bracket, but the fact that they so often fail to do so illustrates how basic to human cognition the spatial systems we are acculturated to use are as well as how potent the metaphor of the body is once activated (*cf.* Yates 1966, Lyons 1977, Langacker 1991, O'Keefe 2005, Huttenlocher 1968, Lacoff and Johnson 1980, etc.). In part for this very reason, there are those who think spatial cognition has an innate structure onto which vocabulary is mapped (*e.g.*, Fodor 1975, Pinker

1994, Clark 1973, Jackendoff 1983, Landau and Jackendoff 1993, Li and Gleitman (1999, 2002)). As Levinson (2003:18) states,

> Now the area of spatial cognition is one of the very *least likely* places where we would expect to find Whorfian effects. This is because knowledge and reasoning about space is a central adaptive necessity for any species that has a home base or has any strategy for optimal foraging. On first principles, then, spatial cognition is likely to be enshrined in an ancient, modular, innate system. We can even point to some ancient brain structures like the hippocampus, where certain kinds of spatial knowledge are laid down right across the vertebrate orders, from birds to primates. And there are other special neural pathways subserving spatial cognition, all of which makes the whole thing appear to be 'hard-wired' in humans just as it is in beasts.

Nonetheless, contrary to what one might expect "on first principles," Levinson's (2003:21) vast study of spatial reasoning, which made use of many non-linguistic cognitive tasks, finds that "the choice of a predominant frame of reference in language determines many other aspects of cognition, from memory, to inference, to navigation, to gesture and beyond…. The finding argues against a strongly nativist line on the universal nature of basic human concepts." As it happens, spatial cognition in humans is heavily influenced by the language system and its categories that are available to a thinker. Drawing on Hills (2006), I would suggest that this is because "goal-directed cognition [likely evolved] out of mechanisms initially in control of spatial foraging but, through increasing cortical connections, eventually [came to be] used to forage for information." That is, because the questing capacity generalized to seek after information more broadly in simulated spaces, it needed to remain flexible, modularizable but not innately modularized.

The three frames of reference used by Levinson to interpret the spatial orientation systems in the languages he studies are consistent with those commonly found in cognitive linguistics. He states (Levinson 2003:32),

> Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin (1993:224) summarize the general assumption in psycholinguistics as follows:
>
> > Three distinct classes of reference frames exist for representing the spatial relationships among objects in the world…: **viewer-centred frames, object-centred frames, and environment centred** frames of reference. In a viewer-centred frame, objects are represented in a retinocentric, head-centric or body-centric coordinate system based on the perceiver's perspective of the world. In an object-centred frame, objects are coded with respect to their intrinsic axes. In an environment-centred frame, objects are represented with respect to salient features of the environment, such as gravity or prominent visual landmarks. In order to talk about space, vertical and horizontal coordinate axes must be oriented with respect to one of these reference frames so that linguistic spatial terms such as 'above' and 'to the left of' can be assigned.
>
> These three frames of reference, renamed the relative, intrinsic and absolute respectively, are essentially those that will be adopted as a framework for the analyses in this book.

Levinson (2003:37) regards binary relations as "intrinsic" and ternary as "relative." Concerning the "absolute" systems so often used by the indigenous and native peoples[29] in his large study, Levinson (2003:48) is full of praise:

> The conceptual ingredients for absolute systems are simple: the relevant linguistic expressions are binary relators, with figure and ground as arguments, and a system of coordinates anchored to fixed bearings, which always have their origin on the ground. In fact, these systems are the only systems with conceptual simplicity and logical elegance. For example, they are the only systems that fully support transitive inferences across spatial descriptions: intrinsic descriptions do not do so, and relative ones only do so if viewpoint V is held constant (Levelt 1984). Intrinsic systems are dogged by the multiplicity of object types, the differing degrees to which the asymmetries of objects allow the naming of facets, and the problem of 'unfeatured' objects. Relative systems are dogged by the psychological difficulties involved in learning left/right distinctions, the complexities involved in mapping secondary coordinates, and, because the linguistic expressions are often developed from intrinsic ones, they tend to display ambiguities across frames of reference (like English *in front of*). The liabilities of absolute systems, on the other hand, are not so much logical as psychological: they impose a cognitive overhead, namely the constant background calculation of cardinal directions, together with a system of dead reckoning that will specify for any arbitrary point P which direction P is from ego's current locus.

As one can see, there are certain cognitive tasks that are logically difficult or impossible in some systems.[30] Furthermore, presenting his version of "Molyneux's question," Levinson notes that spatial information is not freely translatable between systems (2003:57). Therefore, certain cognitive tasks can be performed, say, by someone who uses an absolute system and possesses dead reckoning, that cannot be performed by someone who lives exclusively in a relative system (*cf.* Levinson 2003:215). Levinson (2003:145-6) states concerning the Guugu Yimithirr language,

> Absolute coding in both memory and language in turn requires a constant, background 'dead reckoning' of current heading and position, which our

[29] I have not checked whether his study included Native sign languages, but I do know of at least one study that discusses this as a feature of such a language: Schuit, J., Baker, A., & R. Pfau. (2011). Inuit Sign Language: A contribution to sign language typology. *Linguistics in Amsterdam*, *4*(1).

[30] Native American languages (and this includes the *lingua franca* Plains Indian Sign Language (PISL) used over vast geographic extent – Southeast, Gulf Coast, Southwest, Great Plains, Plateau, Great Basin, Northeast, Subarctic, and Meso-American regions – by a huge number of individual language groups) cultivate remarkable, sophisticated spatial-cognitive capacities, using polysynthetic elements to specify grammatically a huge array of spatial-classificatory features – relative to absolute, intrinsic, and relative coordinate systems. The main text above focuses on absolute examples (as does the preceding footnote), but the intrinsic are similarly noteworthy: for example, words may have affixes that denote ontological classes characterized by things like size, shape, consistency, animacy, number, containment, motion, handling, and other kinds of object (Mithun, 1999, pp. 105-119) as well as orientation, posture, location, and direction of object or action (Mithun, 1999, pp. 110 ff., 132-151; these often have specific meanings tied to natural environments or to parts of the body). Size and shape, degrees and kinds of sentience and animacy, and other qualities are also sometimes encoded as part of some Native Americans' complex, multidimensional gender systems (e.g., Abbott, 1984; Mithun, 1999, pp. 98-103).

> pointing experiments appear to have tapped directly into. Language, gesture, cognitive style, and many aspects of spatial behaviour, come to form a coherent and distinctive complex. The system constitutes an intellectual achievement of the first order, and one of the central surviving features of a culture under prolonged erosion, which connects to that enduring traditional preoccupation of Australian Aboriginal peoples, the landscape and its hidden meanings.

Similarly, with regard to another culture that uses an absolute system, the Tenejapan, Levinson (2003:168-9) concludes,

> These results show that there is a tight correlation between coding in language and coding in non-linguistic memory and reasoning. They seem to indicate that the effects of language on thinking are not just transient effects of the kind involved in getting one's thoughts into line for expression in the local language (Slobin's 2005 on-line 'thinking for speaking'), but are potentially deeper effects on the preferred coding of spatial arrays in memory for the purpose of retrieval and reasoning…. [Even] where linguistic categories differ fundamentally,… cognition seems to pattern with the language, and not with some language-independent, prelinguistic cognitive categories.

These "Whorfian" findings are at odds with the confident universalizing and essentializing found in Eliade, Hertz, and Wyatt. It is also important to note that Levinson's focusing on *coordinate systems* or *frames of reference* rather than on *centers* or *origins* clarifies a number of problems that vex other systems (*cf.* Levinson 2003:33). For example, even the egocentric (generally, actually retinocentric) system might not be specific enough in certain contexts. Tipper *et al.* (1999:245) note that action-based representations "are highly flexible, being determined by the behavioural goals of the task. In the current work they have been hand-centred frames, but in a task where a foot response was required, as when kicking a ball for example, the frame of reference would shift to this body part."

Finally, Levinson's (2003:278-9) study supports the stress Wyatt placed on the role of culture:

> Where languages are specialized in absolute or relative coordinate systems, non-linguistic representations follow suit. This is due not so much to Whorf's 'habitual thought' but to the systematic knock-on effects of a community-wide conceptual output system, namely a specific language…. I have suggested that evolution may have left us (and perhaps the primates generally) with rather feeble native powers of orientation. Absolute ways of thinking, encouraged by language, gesture and culture, rebuild these powers artificially…. Both wayfinding techniques and gesture appear at first sight to be excellent candidates for 'natural', acultural activities, largely determined by mammalian roots. But we have seen that this is not the case.

Levinson seems to propose that humans lack fully determined innate modules for sophisticated spatial orientation but that culture supplies them through language and other cultural cues.[31] The fact that spatial tasks are associated with localized activation of

[31] Vallortigara's and Regolin's study (see 2002:386-7 (Appendix 8)) of chicks shows that they are able to perform "amodal completion" of partially perceived objects because they internally represent the objects as separate and enduring even when occluded from view. O'Keefe et al.'s (*cf.* 1999:156) research on rat

particular brain regions (*e.g.*, the hippocampus, the PPA, the RSC, etc.) is not necessarily inconsistent with this constructivist, *modularizing* (as opposed to modular) position. The predisposition of neuronal populations to modularize to process certain kinds of information is possible without subscribing to massive modularity. Levinson (2003:325) adopts such a qualified constructivist understanding of how this spatial modularization of the mind is accomplished: "Constructivism is entirely compatible with strong universals, innate biases and domain-specific learning (Karmiloff-Smith 1992), and it is required to explain how learning a language seems to play an important role in restructuring cognition. A language 'canalizes' the mental landscape, offering complex concepts that would otherwise be mostly out of the range of independent invention." Language and culture make up for evolutionary and biological deficiencies. Or, perhaps it would be better to regard this apparent deficiency as the adaptation it is along dual inheritance lines: the relaxing of innate predetermination opens the possibility for a less random generation of novelty through a cultural process of self-domestication. In the light of Levinson's mention of evolution above and of the significance given to lateralization in some of the thinkers already discussed, let me now consider the evolutionary and biological bases of lateralization and spatial orientation (most recently in religious studies, Kim Knott (2005) devotes much attention to lateralization in her work).

The discoveries of cognitive linguistics, evolutionary studies, and animal studies are relevant to religious studies and philology, helping to correct universalizing and essentializing tendencies and to challenge unexamined biases and cultural colonialism. The spatial orientation systems of the ancient Near East[32] and Mediterranean languages exerted a strong influence on the speculative cosmological systems that emerged in their myths, religions, and philosophies, which in turn are important for understanding the history and philosophy of science. In the future, it would be good to perform closer examinations of these ancient language systems in relation to specific textual corpora to see whether there are local deviations from the broad patterns described by Wyatt and others and whether there are other areas in which the findings of cognitive linguistics might be applied. As in the study of conceptual metaphor theory, the study of spatial orientation systems reveals that cognition is an embodied, emplaced process. The concepts associated with the terms

---

hippocampal production of internal "absolute" spatial representations has already been alluded to in Levinson above: "It was this property of omnidirectionality … which originally suggested that these cells were not coding for simple sensory stimuli but were instead computing the more abstract concept of place or location." The model that seems to account for rat hippocampal function interprets each place field as comprising "the summation of two or more Gaussians. The location of the centre, the amplitude and the width of each Gaussian, is determined by its distance to a particular wall in a particular direction. Gaussians which are centred close to the wall which controls them are higher and more sharply peaked than ones centred further away…. [The] direction of the wall from the animal … is provided by the head direction cells found in the postsubiculum and the anterior thalamus." (O'Keefe et al. 1999:158, 159). O'Keef et al. (1999:162) concludes that "the spatial framework coded in the parietal cortex is an egocentric one whose origin is centred on the eye, head, and trunk in contrast to the allocentric representation of an environment in the hippocampal formation." Sakata et al. (1999:212-3; but see Robertson 1999) further state concerning the parietal cortex "that the visual projection system to the parietal cortex provides action-relevant information about the structure and orientation of objects (Goodale and Milner 1992). Information about 3D shape is necessary to guide preshaping of the hand that is disturbed by posterior parietal lesions (Jeannerod *et al.* 1994)." Even these brief excerpts are suggestive of the underlying neural structures that are mobilized and specialized by language users who operate within different systems.

[32] See also, Ewa Wasilewska, "Sacred Space in the Ancient Near East" *Religion Compass* 3, no. 3 (2009): 395–416.

denoting spatial orientation are socially and culturally inflected, sometimes to a very large degree. This is interesting in itself, for it shows how different and specialized the cognitive schemes inherent in languages can be. But what is also interesting is the degree to which they can be grounded, not in social arrangements and cultural conventions, but in the human nervous system—in the body and its physical environment, which supply necessary but not sufficient conditions of possibility for all spatial cognition. Furthermore, the basic distinction between spatial orientation systems, *viz.*, the absolute-relative distinction, was and continues to be a central question in the worldviews underlying our contemporary scientific models (*cf.* Earman 1989).

### 3d. Lateralization

A large number of studies have been done establishing brain asymmetries in cold-blooded vertebrates (Vallortigara and Bisazza 2002:12-15; *cf.* Appendix 2 of this appendix). The studies on larval Amphioxus are especially useful for determining information about the origins and evolution of lateralization. In his paper, "The Earliest Origins and Subsequent Evolution of Lateralization, Richard J. Andrew (2002:71-72; *cf.* Appendix 3) writes,

> I argue here that the origin of lateralization came about as part of the first evolution of visually controlled predation. Webb (1969) proposed, on the basis of evidence from the feeding of larval Amphioxus (*Branchiostoma*), that a key step in the origin of vertebrates was the appearance of predation in a free-swimming filter feeder. Mallat (1985) extended this thesis by arguing that this resulted in the evolution of vision.

The extreme asymmetry of the common ancestor of chordates and echinoderms is crucial to understanding the probable early evolution of cerebral lateralization. This asymmetry seems to have appeared in an animal evolved from sessile forms, which gathered food by ciliary currents set up on branching arms. Pharyngeal gill slits allowed the exit of the water currents that entered the mouth during feeding. A descendant of such forms became mobile, using the tail-like appendage that had been its attaching stalk. It lay on its right side and had viscera better developed on that side, and had structures like gill slits and mouth confined to the left side that was exposed to the open water (Jefferies and Lewis, 1978). Much of subsequent evolution in early chordates involved the (partial) restoration of secondary bilateral symmetry.

If, as is here argued, cerebral lateralization arose in the descendants of such animals, the common assumption that cerebral asymmetries have appeared progressively, or only belatedly, during the evolution of the vertegrates, will have to be reversed. Instead the brain, like the body, may have been at its most asymmetrical early in evolution.

This narrative becomes more comprehensible when one considers the life cycle of the Amphioxus. During its larval stage, its mouth and gills are located only on its left side, but in the adult, a shift toward symmetry moves the mouth to the front and causes the formation of gill slits on the right side as well. Nonetheless, "Viceral asymmetry (*e.g.* the presence of a gut diverticulum only on the right) persists in the adult (as it does in vertegrates)" (Andrew 2002:72). The cross-wiring of the visual system, a famous trope in evolution-creation debates, is also explained by this move to symmetry in our fishy past (*cf.* Appendix 3 and Shubin, 2008). Concerning the functional specialization resulting from lateralization based on the study of fish, Andrew (2002:70) states,

> The features that seem most likely to have been to have been present very early in vertebrate evolution are the use of the right eye (RE) to fixate objects, (1) which the fish intends to bite or (2) which it is investigating, whilst at the same time inhibiting escape. This is accompanied by use of the left eye (LE) to fixate (3) familiar objects or (4) conspecifics that evoke sexual or social (schooling) behaviour. These features have been found in a number of species from different major taxa.

Similar features are also present in birds (and tetrapods). For example (Andrew 2002:87-88):[33]

> The LES [left eye system] has advantages in the use of topographical information to locate sites (chick: Rashid and Andrew, 1989; Tommasi, Vallortigara and Zanforlin, 1997; marsh tit: Clayton and Krebs, 1994). It has already been argued that the first steps in the evolution of this assignment of abilities may have been maintaining orientation within groups of conspecifics…. In the domestic chick, it has recently been shown that, when a manipulandum that has to be grasped by the bill can be seen at a distance, the chick sustains fixation with the right eye during approach (Andrew, Tommasi and Ford, 2000). This suggests that such fixation helps to maintain a motor plan. In contrast, the left eye is used in approach when no manipulandum can be seen.

Likewise, consider the following evidence from the study of songbirds (George 2010:92-93):

> [The] discovery in the 1970s of a left bias for the production of song (Nottebohm, 1971) has stricken researchers as a reminiscence of this lateralization for speech. This discovery has boosted research on songbirds and has led to steady evidence of asymmetries in song behavior and its neural correlates. Of course, song is not the only system that is lateralized in songbirds. Examples of behavioral or neural lateralization include tool use in crows (which are songbirds; see, *e.g.*, Hunt et al., 2001; Weir et al., 2004), lateralization of the magnetic compass in migratory birds (Wiltschko et al., 2002), lateralization in brain-hippocampal functions for learning-related plasticity and memory storage in various avian forms (*e.g.*, Rogers, 1986; Andrew, 1991), and higher immediate early gene (IEG) expression in the left than in the right hemisphere during sexual imprinting (Lieshoff et al., 2004; Sadananda & Bischof, 2004).

Furthermore, there are studies demonstrating that toads have a right-paw preference when they need to right themselves after being placed on their backs (see Rogers 2002:148 (Appendix 6)) and that chicks, while using their right eye to feed (targeted predation), use their left eye to monitor (broadly, generally) for predators (see Rogers 2002:136 (Appendix 7)).

[33] See also Andrew and Rogers 2002:98 (Appendix 4) on toads and Andrew and Rogers 2002:103 (Appendix 5) on chicks, in both of whom attacking is associated with the left while feeding is associated with the right.

### 3e. Worldview Studies and Laterialization—McGilchrist and Siegel

An overarching goal of my framework is to integrate the verbal, top-down way of knowing characteristic of the left hemisphere with the embodied-spatial, bottom-up way of knowing that is the gift of the right. I seek to be both focused and holistically integrative.

One of the most useful recent works on lateralization and the absolute-relative distinction (among others) is McGilchrist's (2019) *The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World*, in which he details how the two hemispheres approach the world in different ways, with different worldviews, responding to different evolutionary questions and problems. His work might be contrasted with popularizations of left-brain, right-brain tropes popular with middle management; it might also be contrasted with Kripal's more ontologically or metaphysically confident assertions, though informed by cognitive research, such as the following:

> I happen to think that the trigger of transcendence is often a traumatization of the left hemisphere of the brain [contrast this with Kripal's hypothesized right-hemisphere trauma in Kripal, 2011, p. 233], where the ego and language primarily reside: hence the trope of the secret beyond all speaking, beyond all language, beyond all stable sense of self. To enter the kingdom of "the right" one must often suffer and die "on the left." One must be *pushed* into the right. There is, in other words, a likely neuroanatomy of the mystical at work in these histories. (2017, p. 324-325; *cf. ibid.*, pp. 6-8 on his concept of the Human as Two, which draws on studies like McGilchrist's; see too the signs of this Kripal finds in SF and comics authors, *e.g.*, 2011, pp. viii, 193, 274-276, 320, 350 n. 4)

Kripal's filter or "reduction" thesis needs to be carefully distinguished from the far more solid empirical research he draws on in support of it. There are many studies on how trauma to or underdevelopment of one of the hemispheres may have negative effects on attachment style, mindsight, and cognitive integration (*cf.* Siegel, 2012, pp. 244 *ff.*), but the idea that such trauma cracks one open to transhumanist beings of the future who are helping us write ourselves and them is highly speculative. Each hemisphere makes contributions, and I certainly agree with McGilchrist, who seems to be part of Kripal's inspiration for his claim about left-hemisphere trauma, that the trajectory of Western civilization has been unhealthfully dominated by the left-hemispheric style, and the right hemisphere indeed possesses senses (*cf.* Siegel, 2012, pp. 239-240) and a broader vision of things that the left cannot comprehend. But I regard with skepticism a "transcendence" that involves the unbalanced, unintegrated, traumatized[34] activity of one hemisphere without the other.[35]

---

[34] Siegel notes that childhood traumas and joys ("attachment experiences" such as a parent being depressed and not giving affection or being warm and supportive) during hemispheric developmental windows can alter the development of the hemispheres, "preferentially reinforc[ing] the development of one hemisphere over another and therefore lead[ing] to impaired bilateral functioning" (2012, p. 249). However, the impairment of the left and overdevelopment of the right does not produce transcendence, more likely shyness, avoidance, gloominess, and depression.

[35] Consider the following passage from Siegel on mindfulness research relative to hemispheric activity:

> Another often initially counterintuitive finding is the important "left shift" revealed in individuals participating in research on mindfulness meditation. Mindful awareness is often filled with sensory and nonverbal immersion in here-and-now experience, and therefore it could be considered a "right-hemisphere activity." However, it is actually thought to involve a mental training that enables individuals to approach, rather than withdraw from, challenging stimuli.52 This increased left frontal activation (also associated with enhanced

Broadly, to reiterate some of the conclusions of the above section and review McGilchrist's (and Siegel's (2012)) findings, the right hemisphere accepts and attends to the general situation and context, the broad view of things and the relations that obtain among them, metaphorical mappings and the indirect, non-literal, polysemantic aspects of language, music, depth ("voluminousness") and wholes, while the left hemisphere confidently (often overconfidently), assertively deals with absolutes, the "text" rather than the "context," immediate goals at hand, abstracted and labelled parts, syntax, sequence, and language as a tool—particularly relevant to this framework, a tool for *making narrative sense of things* (*cf.* Siegel, 2012, p. 238).[36] The left is good at performing displays conforming to social rules (Siegel, 2012, pp. 180, 243), but actual mindsight, understanding the feelings of the self and others, resides primarily with the right (*cf.* Siegel, 2012, pp. 220, 238). While the two hemispheres (in particular, the left) may ignore questions that do not pertain to their evolved functions, they both approach axiological questions in distinctly divergent ways. Thus, one may broadly use McGilchrist's text on lateralization to formulate the Big Questions (BQs)

---

> immune function) does not mean that other left-dominant components of information processing are increased with mindful awareness. Rather, mindfulness is thought to be associated with an increased ability to stay present with moment-to-moment experience—to approach life fully, rather than withdrawing or avoiding life's challenges. These studies remind us that both the left and right sides of the brain have a wide array of processes specific to certain regions. It is not only possible, but probably very common, that we utilize different regions on the two sides of the brain simultaneously in a variety of life's tasks. This view is supported by the notion that motivational factors are asymmetric from prenatal development onward, and that the value systems on each side of the brain push experience and development in specific directions. (Siegel, 2012, p. 242)

[36] Siegel summarizes things thus:

> The following is a generally accepted description of the processes in which each cerebral hemisphere specializes. In the *right* hemisphere are fast-acting, parallel (simultaneously active), holistic processes. The right side specializes in representations such as sensations, images, and the nonverbal polysemantic (multiple) meanings of words. These nonverbal and often spontaneous representations are often called "analogic." Visuospatial perception is an example of such an analogic function specialized on the right side. As mentioned above, the strict, traditional verbal–nonverbal distinction between the left and right hemispheres is not completely accurate. Examples of this include the contribution of the right hemisphere to understanding metaphor, paradox, and humor embedded in language. Also, the reading of stories activates both left- and right-hemisphere processes more readily than the reading of scientific texts, which primarily activates the left hemisphere.
>
> On the *left* side of the brain are slower-acting, linear, sequential, temporal (time-dependent) processes. Verbal meanings of words, often called "digital" representations, are a primary mode of processing for the left side. The left hemisphere is thought to utilize monosemantic "packets" of information as basic representations, which are then processed in a slower, linear mode. Examples of linear processing are reading the words in this sentence, aspects of conscious attention, and determining the sequence of events in a story. Our linguistic communication is dominated by this linear mode of expression and reception of "bundled" bits of symbols, which carry restrictive definitions and are relatively clearly demarcated. This is quite distinct from the analogic representations seen, for example, in an artist's painting or in a photograph. We can translate these analogic components of the world into digitalized forms within words, but the translation is never complete. In this way, some authors argue that the right hemisphere more fully "sees the world for what it is," whereas the left hemisphere must reduce the world much more into mentally defined, often socially constructed chunks of information. (Siegel, 2012, p. 237)

addressed by worldviews along spatial/hemispheric lines. As he states, pushing back on the common machine metaphor for the mind,

> I want to try to stand back a bit from the question of which 'functions', therefore, the supposedly machine-like hemispheres are performing, and think of them instead more globally as having a disposition, or stance, towards the world – having a 'take' on it, if you like. This is to suggest that they may share some aspects of human mental life, I know; but is that really as strange as it sounds – or any stranger than supposing that all they did was compute like machines? If it is true that consciousness, whatever it is, arises from the sheer complexity of self-interconnected neuronal activity, why should the hemispheres, the two largest and most densely self-interconnected neuronal masses, each amounting to half the brain, and each capable of sustaining conscious life on its own, not have some of the features of normal consciousness? The separated hemispheres in split-brain patients each have a distinct personality, with characteristic tastes and preferences, according to one of those most closely involved with the study of such patients. The unconscious, while not identical with, is certainly more strongly associated with, the right hemisphere (for a fuller discussion of this issue, see pp. 187–8 below). To that extent, it might be expected that the separate hemispheres have distinct personalities and values: as Freud wrote, the unconscious is 'a particular realm of the mind with its own wishful impulses, its own mode of expression and its peculiar mental mechanisms which are not in force elsewhere'.
>
> This is just another model, and like all models it should be taken for what it is, a comparison.

I found it useful to quote this passage at length because it touches on several important points, not the least of which is that models are comparisons or metaphors. Any framework, such as the one offered in this work, sets up a metaphorical relation of comparison, and its probative value lies in the measure to which it helps illuminate the phenomenon of the allomythos in fantastika. The primary thrust of the passage, of course, is highly relevant to the study of worldviews because it means that in any organism with a lateralized nervous system, one must remain attentive to the distinctive consciousnesses of the two hemispheres as well as to the apparently integrated union of the two.

Let me provide two valuable examples from Siegel (2012). Here is the first:

> Cross-cultural studies suggest that culturally mediated communication patterns may directly impact the emergence of a sense of self in the growing child. One study found that Japanese-born individuals perceived a visual image of an aquarium by noting its holistic features: how plants, rocks, and fish all formed part of a larger whole marine scene. In contrast, American-born Japanese presented with the same image noted the individual characteristics of a single fish, highlighting its colors and anatomy, rather than perceiving the overall aquatic environment. As we'll see in future chapters, such a finding of culturally influenced perceptual biasing may reflect the preferential growth of the right versus the left hemisphere in individuals within traditional Japanese culture, versus the more individually oriented emphasis in mainstream U.S. society. Culture plays an important

> role in mediating patterns of social relatedness, and hence the growth of the brain and the mind. (Siegel, 2012, p. 70)

This example resonates powerfully with the argument made in McGilchrist, namely, that one's culture may cultivate or enervate the activity of a hemisphere. Whereas Japanese culture promotes the development of the right hemisphere to a greater degree than American culture, McGilchrist argues for a long trend in the West of gradually disregarding and weakening the right hemisphere while overdeveloping and overvaluing the worldview and way of life of the left hemisphere. My second example has to do with how all this pertains to worldview studies more broadly, not simply the study of worldviews that are identified as "religious." Siegel states, "Differences thought of as 'male' and 'female' in some cases have more to do with developmentally preferential cultivation and inhibition of hemispheric capacities" (2012, pp. 173-174). Under the interdisciplinary umbrella of worldview studies one should find, not only the study of religious worldviews and secular worldviews, but also the contributions of scholars who specialize in gender and sexuality, race and ethnicity, class, economic and political formations, etc. The cultivation and inhibition of hemispheric abilities has a lot to do with the distinctive qualities of all such worldviews and ways of life.

Recall above how non-human animals use the left hemisphere for predation, investigation, manipulation, and tool use, while the right hemisphere attends more broadly to the environmental situation, the body, and conspecifics to whom the animal is attached with social ties. In humans,[37] this can develop into way of life styles that we call "personality types":

> Developmental studies suggest that in fact each hemisphere may mediate quite different processes of engagement with the environment. As noted above, this may mean that approach is mediated by the left hemisphere and withdrawal by the right [see also, Siegel, 2012, p. 232]. For example, behaviorally inhibited (shy) children reveal a dominance in right frontal electrical activity at baseline; more adventurous children demonstrate left frontal activation. Nathan Fox and Richard Davidson have each suggested that such findings support the notion that characteristic emotional styles may reflect profiles of frontal activation. Left frontal activation is associated with active approach, positive affect, exploration, and sociability. The absence of left frontal activation leads to an absence of positive affect and the experience of depression. In contrast, right frontal activation leads to active withdrawal, negative affect, and fear/anxiety. Hypoactivation of the right frontal region

[37] Human specialization of the hemispheres also led to development of two limbic-cortical pathways, the dorsal (emphasizing noradrenergic activity) predominating on the right side and the ventral (emphasizing dopaminergic activity) predominating on the left (see Siegel, 2012, pp. 233-234), further shaping the two hemispheres' styles. There is some evidence that the parasympathetic nervous system is more under the domain of the left hemisphere and the sympathetic under the right. McGilchrist also notes the following:

> There is greater dendritic overlap in cortical columns in the right hemisphere, which has been posited as a mechanism for greater interconnectivity compared with the left. The ratio of grey to white matter also differs. The finding that there is more white matter in the right hemisphere, facilitating transfer across regions, also reflects its attention to the global picture, where the left hemisphere prioritises local communication, transfer of information within regions. (cite)

.

> leads to disinhibition of approach, with impulsivity and hyperactivity. (Siegel, 2012, p. 178)

Although much emphasis has rightly been placed recently on play as a factor in cognitive development and religion (Bellah 2011; Taves 2012; *cf.* Burghardt 2006), this line of inquiry reminds one of the explanatory importance of depressed and anxious states in understanding religion, particularly of what James called the "sick-souled" variety. The healthy-minded display the style of the left hemisphere, while the sick-souled share the characteristics of the right: a broader vision of the whole, but one that tends to sorrow.

I hope this brief discussion so far has given some sense of spatial cognition's relevance and potential utility to other studies going on in CSR, religious studies, and worldview studies more generally. I would now like to consider possible future trajectories. How might we use the categories supplied by the cognitive neuroscience of spatial processing and by cognitive and comparative linguistics to ask, constrain, and answer questions about religion and other worldviews, including the allomythic and especially as already anticipated in phenomenological ethnographic studies and landscape archaeology (*cf.* Johnson 2012)? These are large questions that cannot be fully explored here, but let's consider landscape archaeology and then, more briefly, four other potential directions for potential research: (I) the experience, (II) the feeling, (III) the expert, and (IV) power.

### 4a. Trajectories: Cognitive Archaeology—Renfrew and Mithen

In the history of archaeology's development as a field, a similar trend can be observed to that described above under §1 on the "Cognitive Turn." The classificatory-descriptive phase of archaeology resembles the behaviorist phase of psychology in important ways. One finds the same sort of reluctance to, or even accusation of irresponsibility if one were to, try to hypothesize or imagine the meaning or intention "behind" a material assemblage or object. In accord with positivist notions, during this phase one might only describe very precisely and empirically what appeared to the senses and to measuring devices that amplify the senses. This resembles the phenomenological approach adopted by many in religious studies, in which they describe in very precise terms what religious adherents say they experience. But the classificatory-descriptive approach was not enough. Archaeologist knew that human forces, both at the cultural-systems level and at the individual-personal level, lay behind the material assemblages whose features they were describing in such fine detail. Let us now examine some of the claims of cognitive archaeologists. One shall see in them a similar turn to that found in cognitive psychologists and information scientists, in which they try to *model* features of human cognition, give a place to meaning and agency, treat material culture as a symbolic information system, and deduce, as in the case of the Turing Test, how one might go about making cognitive inferences, such as that one has discovered the remains of religious cult activity or symbols of supernatural agents, from material assemblages.

Colin Renfrew, in the beginning of his article "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of Society," quotes Lewis Binford's citation of Christopher Hawkes's identification of levels of archaeological analysis as follows:

1. To infer from the archaeological phenomena to the techniques producing them I take to be relatively easy.

2. To infer to the subsistence-economies of the human groups concerned is fairly easy.
3. To infer to the socio-political institutions of the groups, however, is considerably harder.
4. To infer to the religious institutions and spiritual life…is the hardest inference of all.[38]

Binford and Renfrew disagree, however, especially with the characterization of level four as the most difficult. Post-processual (or interpretive) and cognitive archaeology share the goal of moving beyond processual archaeology, which focused primarily on the first three levels of the list above, into the realm of the human mind.

I need to pause now, however, and notice a key distinction between the field of archaeology's approach to the human "mind" and the general tendency of those engaged in cognitive science in other fields such as evolutionary and cognitive psychology and evolutionary and cognitive approaches to religion. Whereas many people involved in cognitive science, having been permitted to model the mind, soon seemed for a time to lose almost all contact with the physical world, making elaborate computational models and proposing cognitive "modules," "devices," and "capacities" in great number in over-determined fidelity to the computer metaphor, in contrast, cognitive archaeologists have steadily kept their gaze fixed on the material world and the way in which human cognition happens in and through artifacts, environments, activities, and bodies. This is not to say that cognitive science does not engage with the literature on embodied, distributed, embedded, and extended cognition, the material basis of metaphor theory and cognitive blending, the use and importance of physical affordances, models, and manipulatives in learning and reasoning, and so on – these things *are* cognitive science. But the physical dimension of cognition has often been neglected in favor of a disembodied discourse of purely mental symbol manipulation and information processing. Renfrew, however, states concerning human evolution of language,

> And words are indeed symbols, the most flexible of symbols by which reality can be conceived, represented, and communicated. But language itself does not seem to have made all that much difference [for early humans]…. Words and narratives there may have been, but until humans became more interactively involved with the material substance of the world, until they began to act upon the world in a range of new ways, using a wider range of materials, not very much changed. And it was when some of these materials themselves took on, or were led to take on, symbolic power that the process of engagement became a powerful driving force for social and economic change.[39]

Notice that he is pointing to a stage (which he regards as superior) after the association of features of the environment with symbolic meaning. That is, humans may have had narratives in which trees, mountains, rivers, and other features of the world bore symbolic meanings or even "personhood," and they may have interacted with these symbolic features and persons in meaningful ways. They would have been "interactively involved with the

[38] Quoted in Colin Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of Society," *Archaeological Theory Today* (2nd ed. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012), p. 124.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

material substance of the world," and such aspects of the world as possessed salience and significance and around which imaginative activity centered would have had "symbolic power."[40] As Renfrew and Bahn note, "Landscape archaeology thus has a cognitive dimension, which takes it far beyond the preoccupation with productive land-use characteristic of a purely materialist approach: the landscape has social and spiritual meaning as well as utility."[41] My consideration of Apache place names above is an excellent contemporary example of this. Nonetheless, such a hypothetical period is less interesting to Renfrew because it did not involve acting "upon the world in a range of new ways, using a wider range of materials" that produced "economic change" that could be detected by archaeologists in the material record.[42] Let us set aside the implication that human societies with increasingly sophisticated forms of embodied information storage and manipulation – particularly applied to "economic" elaboration – are themselves increasingly superior. This implication is morally troubling and deserves an extended critique that cannot be given here—again, I would urge one to read McGilchrist in full. But it is enough to admit that different systems have different storage and computational capacities. Furthermore, it is important to stress the fact that *mind can be embodied* and, really, always has been.

Renfrew states,

> This is where the old "mind" versus "matter" dichotomy breaks down. The mistake made by commentators who focus exclusively upon the "mind" is that they emphasize the potential for rich symbolic behavior without

---

[40] The concentration of symbolic power in a material space can, however, be detected early in the archaeological record, and the manner in which it manifests is suggestive of one of the recurring theories of the function of religion: namely, that religion arises in response to and in order to manage anxiety about death. Warburton observes, "The earliest 'religious architecture' probably dates to the very earliest Neolithic (At [sic] Göbekli Tepe, Turkey), but most can be assigned to the villagers of the following Pre-Pottery Neolithic B (PPNB, ca. 8,000-6,500 B.C.) who flourished in Palestine, Transjordan and Anatolia. These villagers developed some highly peculiar customs, the least controversial and most common being a 'headless burial,' with the body under a house, accompanied by special treatment of the scull" (David A. Warburton, "Psychoanalyzing Prehistory: Struggling with the Unrecorded Past," in Peter Antes, Armin W. Geertz, and Randi R. Warne, eds., *New Approaches to the Study of Religion. Volume 2: Textual, Comparative, Sociological, and Cognitive Approaches* [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004], pp. 436-7). He likewise notes, "The concept of deities related to death and fertility seems to have been syncretized at Çata Hüyük, where ordinary houses served as cemeteries and shrines. If religion is the culmination of the burial practices and mortuary beliefs of the Palaeolithic and Neolithic, then Çata Hüyük plays a crucial role…" (*ibid.*, p. 450).

[41] Colin Renfrew and Paul Bahn, "What Did They Think?: Cognitive Archaeology," *Archaeology Essentials: Theories, Methods, and Practice* (2nd ed. London: Thames & Hudson, 2010), p. 251.

[42] The archaeological record would also be unkind to and less likely to preserve more fragile organic icons that may have been made by early hominids. It is suggestive that in the latest edition of *Animal Tool Behavior: The Use and Manufacture of Tools by Animals* (Robert W. Shumaker, Kristina R. Walkup, and Benjamin B. Beck [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011]) a new category of tool use has been introduced, called "symbolize." Symbolic tool use has been introduced to account for the fact that "Apes may carry log 'dolls,' wadded leaves, and human toy dolls, sometimes obsessively (*e.g.*, Wrangham and Peterson 1996). These objects appear to abstractly represent reality, and they might be symbolic. Carrying them appears to provide psychological comfort or possibly restore physiological homeostasis. If so, they are tools…. Some cases subsumed by this Symbolize mode appear to fit into Asano's (1994) Class 1-b tools, which, he asserted, included only human tool use" (p. 16). Examples of doll-use include "two geographically separated sites in Borneo and one in Sumatra" where "a small number of young wild female orangutans have been observed constructing leaf bundles, treating them like infants, and holding them while they slept in their nests at night" (*ibid.*, p. 129) and several cases of doll manufacture and use by gorillas (*ibid.*, p. 137) and chimpanzees (*ibid.*, p. 179).

> indicating that the ultimate criterion is the praxis in the material world. This supposed potential only reaches fulfillment when mind and matter come together in a new material behavior. To deal with these issues properly requires what one may term a *hypostatic* approach which transcends the mind/matter dichotomy (even if such terminology recalls medieval theological debates about the essence of the Holy Trinity…. [Symbols] are not always just the reflection or "materialization" … of pre-existing concepts. The substantive engagement process brings the two forward together.[43]

The sort of symbol that reflects Renfrew's concept of substantive engagement, in which the signifier's signified is both the material and the concept at once, he calls a "constitutive symbol." He cites the example of money: "In an early society you could not have money unless you had valuables to serve as money, and the valuables (the material) preceded the concept (money)."[44] Evaluation—the attribution of significance to salient features of the world—may indeed be a basic, pan-human cognitive capacity, but externalizing to some degree opened up new possibilities for and ways of using that capacity. Tambiah's interesting study of Buddhist amulets,[45] in which the charisma, virtue, and power of the *arahant* came to reside in amulets that consequently bore value suggests how the same capacity underlying icon manufacture could ultimately produce capitalism. In Medieval Catholic Europe, one might point to the economy of grace, especially circulating under the symbol of blood, that materialized, sustained, and grew ecclesial and papal power. Weber's thesis regarding the development of capitalism neglects to fully appreciate its precursor….

In any case, Renfrew goes on to describe the concepts of value, measure, exchange, and commodity as all being of this kind, "where the material reality has to accompany or precede the concept."[46] In Renfrew and Bahn's chapter on cognitive archaeology in *Archaeology Essentials*, money is again cited, this time as an example of a symbol that conveys "the whole notion that some material objects have a higher value than others" and that is "used to regulate and organize [power] relations between human beings."[47] Other functions of symbols identified by Renfrew and Bahn include (1) establishment of place, (2) measurement, (3) mapping and planning intended action, and (4) representing and regulating human relations with the "Other World."[48] The fourth symbolic function they identify should be of especially great interest to theorists of CSR, as should the traits that they describe as being indicative of religious or cultic ritual, which are curiously reminiscent of Eliade in key respects: (1) focusing of attention,[49] (2) boundary zone between this world and the next,[50] (3) presence of the deity,[51] and (4) participation and offering.[52] Apart from the

---

[43] Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology," pp. 128-129.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 131.
[45] Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, *The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets: a Study in Charisma, Hagiography, Sectarianism, and Millennial Buddhism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 335 *ff.*
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 133.
[47] Renfrew and Bahn, "What Did They Think," p. 250.
[48] *Ibid.*
[49] See above the symbolic function of establishing place. One might think this would relate more to salience, but the meaning is evidently "focusing attention on and thus establishing a *special* place." Thus, this has to do with significance more than salience. *Cf.* Eliade's *hierophany*.
[50] *Cf.* Eliade's *axis mundi*.
[51] *Cf.* Eliade's *theophany*.
[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 255-256. *Cf.* Eliade's ritual participation in the mythic time through its re-enactment or re-creation.

specific condition of the presence of a deity – better, the presence of the non-ordinary or estranged – fantastical narratives, as externalized cognitive tools and as offering participation with another world that is attended to closely, are comparable, though I would not argue that they indicate religious or cultic ritual but, rather, the presence of comparable aims and underlying processes.

Whether or not the features of material culture (especially in the absence of texts) that cognitive archaeologists propose may be used to indicate cultic activity can in fact be put to that purpose or not,[53] what is interesting about this approach is that it treats material remains as *symbols* existing in determinate *relations* to each other. They may be interpreted incorrectly, but an attempt is being made. Again an important ethical question, namely, whether the debt to the dead is better repaid by attempting to recover something of their symbolic systems at the risk of appropriating them or distorting them or by passing over them in reverent silence, must be passed over with an expectant silence that calls for exposition elsewhere. Still, although cognitive archaeologists acknowledge that this structuralist approach to interpreting or "reading" material culture by examining the relationships between objects is open to post-structuralist and deconstructivist critiques, the fact that the full inner sense and meaning of material remains cannot be recovered surely does not mean that *nothing* can be.

One of the ideas in CSR that has received a lot of attention is that of "minimally counterintuitive" concepts. These are ideas that blend attributes (*i.e.*, inferential "expectation sets") of presumed intuitively distinct ontological categories and that are regarded as consequently more likely to persist in the memory and be transmitted. They need to be intuitive enough to make sense, but counterintuitive enough to be arresting. Conceptual blending—the projection of features of source domains into a novel blend—hardly seems unusual. That is, it does not account for the "sacred" element of religion, but it is an important ability, central to many advanced human poetic and creative activities. Some CSR theorists argue that it is central to religion. When an animal talks or a carpet flies, they argue, the rigidly-defined expectation sets (*e.g.*, universals, spatiality, physicality, biology, animacy, mentality) of ontological categories (*e.g.*, spatial entities, solid objects, living things, animates, persons) are violated. And then their external storage – in mnemonic devices like landscape and skyscape features, memory balls, knotted cords, beadwork, statues and dolls, standing stones, carved poles and staves, body parts, mandalas, etc. – stabilize them and, through their redundancies and interactions within cultural systems, reinforce the reality of such counterintuitive concepts.[54]

---

[53] For further examples of proposed features, see Colin Renfrew, "Towards a Framework for the Archaeology of Cult Practice," in Colin Renfrew. *The Archaeology of Cult: The Sanctuary at Phylakopi* (Athens: British School of Archaeology, 1985). Other proposed domains for cognitive archaeological inquiry are suggested in Kent Flannery V. and Joyce Marcus, "Cognitive Archaeology," in David S. Whitley, ed., *Reader in Archaeological Theory: Post-processual and Cognitive Approaches*, Routledge Readers in Archaeology (New York: Routledge, 1998).

[54] Again, the idea of minimally counterintuitive agents rests on the belief that there are innate, intuitive ontological categories. This is a radical form of Chomsky-like nativism, and would seem to be contradicted by a large body of evidence from language acquisition, which tends to support a connectionist model. It is very "modular," and scholars from a number of fields, including linguistics and archaeology, contest strong versions of the modularity hypothesis. (*Cf.* Steven Mithen, "Archaeological Theory and Theories of Cognitive Evolution," in Ian Hodder, ed., *Archaeological Theory Today* (2nd ed. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012), pp. 101-103.) Linguistic or ontological categories are not that stable. This seems to be part of why the gradual cultural development and elaboration of such categories took such a long time from when

Contemporary fantastika similarly uses externalized cognitive tools to stabilize counterintuitive, estranged concepts. The artwork on the covers of novels, the maps of fantastical places, and the very narratives themselves all help actualize the non-ordinary. However, in most cases, fantastical narratives are more like the undeveloped, storied landscape of humans before they started acting on and with materials to generate change; the worlds, worldviews, and personalities rest within the externalized objects, that is, minds are there embodied, awaiting communion but, again, not necessarily calling for change.

---

genetically distinct *homo sapiens* first appeared and sang wordlessly together (*cf.* Mithen year; McGilchrist 2019). In addition, this relates to one of the objections that must be faced by anyone who would invoke Dawkins's idea of *memes*: namely, since concepts are fuzzy and unstable and since novelty is a linguistic virtue (*cf. ibid.*, pp. 104-106), it is hard to see how concepts' propagation could be analogous to the spread of genes. Sperber's cultural attractor theory reflects more accurately the messy reality of the epistemic asymmetry that obtains between speaker and hearer and the active creativity of both. And if one factors external storage and ritual action into a memetic account, one might be able to point to at least one of the supplementary mechanisms that stabilize concepts that would otherwise be highly individualized and idiosyncratic. Thus, there are reasons to be skeptical concerning the notion of intuitive ontological categories, at least if they are considered to be innate. Nonetheless, Mithen notes ("The Supernatural Beings of Prehistory and the External Storage of Religious Ideas," in Colin Renfrew and Christopher Scarre, *Cognition and Material Culture: The Archaeology of Symbolic Storage*, McDonald Institute Monographs (Cambridge, England: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 1998), p. 99),

> The very first art we possess appears to be intimately associated with religious ideas by containing images of what are likely to be supernatural beings. The earliest piece is a 28.1 cm high carving in mammoth ivory of a figure half man and half lion from Hohenstein Stadel and dating to c. 33,000 years ago (Marshack 1990). Contemporary with this are the paintings in Chauvet Cave which include a half human/half bison figure (Chauvet et al. 1996). Such anthropomorphic figures persist in Palaeolithic art even as the major animal themes change from carnivorous/dangerous animals to herbivores. In Les Trois Freres, for instance, there is the famous sorcerer figure, probably dating to 15,000-12,000 years old. It appears to have the posture, legs and hands of a human, the antlers of a reindeer, the tail of a horse and the phallus in the position customary in of a feline. As we move beyond the Palaeolithic, anthropomorphic figures continue to be a critical part of the archaeological record, such as the human/fish images from Lepenski Vir (Srejovic 1972). And during later prehistory figurative images pervade prehistoric art which are most readily interpreted as images of supernatural beings (Gimbutas 1974). It is also likely that many of the non-figurative images from prehistory relate to supernatural beings and religious ideas, since geometric forms are used to represent religious ideas by ethnographically documented groups. In Yolunga art, for instance, Ancestral Beings may be figuratively depicted, but their transformational aspects (the manner in which they can exist in different states such as human, animal or landscape feature) are principally depicted in a geometric fashion. The multivalency of these designs enable the paintings to encode the transformational aspect of Ancestral Beings and events (Morphy 1989). [Recall Schopenhauer's conviction that the non-propositional character of classical music was the most faithful representation of the absolute Will. If, then, investigators easily attribute religious significance to geometric forms made by early hominids, as attempts to represent aspects of spiritual beings not easily communicated in concrete language, what might be the meaning of the Divje Babe flute?]

This does not mean that humans have innate ontological categories, but it does seem to suggest that early in the archaeological record one can find evidence of humans using external symbols to help stabilize and reinforce counterintuitive concepts. This insight, found in both Mithen and Renfrew, is an important contribution cognitive archaeology has to offer to CSR.

Bellah's magisterial *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age* is heavily indebted to Merlin Donald's developmental schema for representational systems, and Bellah was one of the few people involved in CSR (apart from the Axial Age debate) who has given serious attention to the contributions archaeological insights into the history of human development can make to contemporary CSR. However, Bellah, too, does not interact with the cognitive archaeology literature, and thus he neglects the important critique of Donald's schema found therein. As Renfrew states, "The only systems of External Symbolic Storage to which [Donald] gives careful consideration are writing systems;"[55] and again, "But [Donald] and others have overlooked a series of fundamental developments before the inception of writing became possible" (for a discussion of some of these, see Kelly, 2019).[56] Therefore, Renfrew adds to Donald's series (episodic, mimetic, linguistic/mythic, and theoretic)[57] another phase, between the mythic and the theoretic, which he describes as, "External Symbolic Storage employing symbolic material culture, characteristic of early agrarian societies with permanent settlements, monuments and valuables."[58] Let me now consider the concept of external symbolic storage in the form, not of written language, but of material (iconic) culture.

Renfrew quotes Leach as claiming, "All metaphysical entities start out as inchoate concepts in the mind; if we are to think clearly about the ideas which are represented by words such as 'god' and 'spirit' we have to externalise them."[59] Leach continues, arguing that this externalization is achieved, not only through stories, but also "by creating special material objects, buildings and spaces which serve as representations of the metaphysical ideas and their mental environment."[60] This may remind one again of Apache place names; it also reminds me of the following passage in Durkheim:

> I have shown how the clan awakens in its members the idea of external forces that dominate and exalt it by the way in which it acts upon its members. But I still must ask how it happens that those forces were conceived of in the form of the totem, that is, in the form of an animal or plant…. It is, in fact, a well-known law that the feelings a thing arouses in us are spontaneously transmitted to the symbol that represents it…. This transfer of feelings takes place because the idea of the thing and the idea of its symbol are closely connected in our minds. As a result, the feelings evoked by one spread contagiously to the other. This contagion, which occurs in all cases to some extent, is much more complete and more pronounced whenever the symbol is something simple, well-defined, and easily imagined. We cannot detect the source of the strong feelings we have in an abstract entity that we can

---

[55] Colin Renfrew, "Mind and Matter: Cognitive and External Symbolic Storage," in Colin Renfrew and Christopher Scarre, *Cognition and Material Culture: The Archaeology of Symbolic Storage, McDonald Institute Monographs* (Cambridge, England: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 1998), p. 2.
[56] Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology," p. 127.
[57] Bellah adds "unitive" to the beginning of the series, which is suggestive of William James's "mystical" form of experience, and he seems to have be unknowingly thinking in the same direction taken by cognitive archaeology in proposing subdivisions of the symbolic form of representation, including the iconic, although he, due no doubt to the heavy influence of Donald, focuses on writing as the medium that gave humans the capacity to think conceptually—that is, abstractly and critically—about their own concepts.
[58] Renfrew, "Mind and Matter," p. 4.
[59] Quoted in Colin Renfrew, "Towards a Framework for the Archaeology of Cult Practice," in Colin Renfrew, *The Archaeology of Cult: The Sanctuary at Phylakopi* (Athens: British School of Archaeology, 1985), p. 13.
[60] *Ibid.*

> imagine only with difficulty and in a jumbled way. We can comprehend those feelings only in connection with a concrete object whose reality we feel intensely. Thus, if the thing itself does not meet this requirement, it cannot serve as a mooring for the impressions felt, even for those impressions it has itself aroused. The symbol thus takes the place of the thing, and the emotions aroused are transferred to the symbol. It is the symbol that is loved, feared, and respected…. The totem is the flag of the clan, so it is natural that the impressions the clan arouses in individual consciousness—impressions of dependence and of heightened energy—should become more closely attached to the idea of the totem than to that of the clan. The clan is too complex a reality for such unformed minds to be able to bring its concrete unity into clear focus.[61]

These ideas about the function of symbols or icons, which Durkheim[62] finds in totemism, the cognitive archaeologists find in the material record. Indeed, some researchers of the findings at Göbekli Tepe have proposed a totemic function for the animals depicted there, and the idea that activity organized around non-ordinary beings may have set in motion the process of urbanization is provocative. The above passage suggests as well the fundamentally social character of all signs. They presuppose and help establish an intersubjective world. That is, not only do they stabilize abstract concepts such as the social reality, but they also stabilize a community itself – even perhaps the first cities – by establishing another, shared reality apart from egoistic particularism. As in Nietzsche's theory of art and religion—in which the two are intimately entangled and in which, as in Durkheim, the festival plays a vital role—there is a double movement in which art not only materializes the ultimate, but also apotheosizes and justifies the mundane. By representing the ineffable, by translating the transcendent into the domain of the familiar through a form of visual analogical predication (*i.e.*, icon as embodied metaphor), by invoking the full dual power of the *signum*,[63] ancient artisans produced novel potential for control over and access to the mind's capacities by further extending cognition into the world and creating new social realities.

Above, I made the point that much enjoyment of contemporary allomythoi is more like the pleasure of communing with stories and persons anchored in the ancient landscapes. But in light of Renfrew's and Leach's (and Durkheim's) observations, I would make the further point that there is a latent potential in all such externalized cognitive tools, as intersubjective realities, for the generation of fiction-based social formations; Dewey puts it thus: "Works of art that are not remote from common life, that are widely enjoyed in a community, are signs of a unified collective life. But they are also marvelous aids in the creation of such a life" (1934, p. 81; *cf.* p. 105).

Mithen argues that advanced human thought is only possible because we are able to scaffold, diffuse, and create new thought with, throughout, and by means of material culture.[64] He further argues, using language much like Durkheim's talk of "moorings," that,

---

[61] Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (Trans. Karen E. Fields, New York: Free Press, 1995), pp. 221-222.

[62] There are related quotes that could be supplied showing that Geertz had similar ideas about aspects of material culture as a symbolic system and that Eliade thought in terms like these about the logic of hierophanies.

[63] I here refer to the fact that *signum*, like the Greek word *sēma*, means "sign," "statue," and "tomb."

[64] Mithen, "Theory and Theories," pp. 107-108.

since we "lack any evolved mental anchors for" counterintuitive entities, we are able to make them "memorable, transmitted, and indeed shared to a sufficient degree that religious institutions are formed" by "externalizing these concepts from the mind and representing them in material culture" and adopting "material anchors in the form of either abstract or naturalistic depictions," which may be a more reasonable hypothesis than Boyer's notion of our having "a shared biologically based anchor in our brains that allows the persistence and transmission of religious ideas."[65] The replication of such icons might also serve as a mnemonic aid (again, see Kelly, 2019), layering new significance onto the already complicated knowledge system involved in the manufacture of material goods. Renfrew has proposed the following concerning rituals: "Much of the repetition associated with religious ritual may be regarded as 'redundant' in the information theory sense, and secure transmission is thereby more adequately assured,"[66] and this could be applied to the repeated manufacture of icons, idols, emblems, votives, tokens, and symbols,[67] as well as to the serial nature of many fantastical novels, tv shows, movies, and so on.

Cognitive archaeologists have not felt the need to do experiments to support hypotheses like the above—they regard the archaeological record as proof enough. On the other hand, CSR theorists have admirably attempted to falsify their theories through experimentation. I would suggest that cognitive archaeology, rooted in spatial considerations and data, can offer CSR "new" hypotheses (that actually may be a return to ones found in the great theorists of the past, but on a new, more scientific grounding), such as that material icons help stabilize counterintuitive concepts and make them more memorable, to attempt to falsify through experimentation.

### 4b. Other Trajectories

In conclusion, I shall consider four other potential trajectories for the application of spatial cognition to CSR, worldview studies, and kairology. Again, these are the experience, the feeling, the expert, and power (power, of course, being heavily studied in what is typically called the "spatial turn" but seldom connected to cognitive research).

#### I. Event

As mentioned in a footnote in §2 and in the main text in §3b, and at length in the body of the dissertation, Taves and Asprem have recently proposed the utility of applying event cognition research to the study of religious experience. Whereas the undifferentiated flow of information might be what people mean by "experience" in general, the specific experiences people notice (*i.e.*, segment out of the flow), recall, and, very importantly in the context of studying allomythoi and allomythologies, *narrate* are "events" (*cf.* Dewey, 1934,

---

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

[66] Colin Renfrew, "The Archaeology of Religion," in Colin Renfrew and Ezra B. W. Zubrow, *The Ancient Mind: Elements of Cognitive Archaeology*. *New Directions in Archaeology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 50; *cf. ibid.*, p. 52.

[67] *Cf.* Graeber's (2005) suggestive thoughts on fetishes. The use of these different terms is intended to suggest the ambiguity surrounding the full "inner" sense of an icon in the original symbolic system of the people who used it. Regarding its potential complexity, see, for example, Jean-Luc Marion's meditation on idol and icon in *God Without Being*. For a more straightforward example, see, too, Margalit Finkelberg, "Two Kinds of Representation in Greek Religious Art," in Jan Assmann and Albert I. Baumgarten, eds., *Representation in Religion: Studies in Honor of Moshe Barasch* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2001).

p. 148). This segmentation process (*e.g.*, think of the frames in a comic book or a stained glass window) is quite natural and automatic, and it exhibits regularities rooted in human evolutionary development. For example, fighting, sex, eating, and playing "events" are rather easily and consistently recognized and reported. The production of an event model is a high-level phenomenon that builds on and integrates information from many sources and of many types, including the spatial. Filipović and Jaszczolt (2012:5) observe, for example,

> Language-specific lexicalization patterns in the expression of motion events are also shown to have an effect on how speakers of different languages remember what they see (see Filipović 2011; Filipović and Geva, this volume) or what kind of detail they provide in their accounts of events (Filipović 2007a, 2007b; Slobin 2006).

In this, one can observe the integration of right-hemispheric spatial information through the linguistic filter of the left hemisphere, which shapes the way events are reconstructed in memory and speech. In §3a, I mentioned hierarchical predictive coding and the generation of perceptual hierarchies in experience. In route-description narratives and the construction of route maps (*i.e.*, visual narratives giving directions), the landmarks with greater weight or value receive organizational precedence (Taylor & Tversky 1992). That is, route event narratives ("journeys") are hierarchically organized, and the hierarchy depends on the specific salient environmental features. Taves (2009) encourages us to think about what features might lead to valuation (singularization). Innate (*e.g.*, centers and boundaries) and culturally cultivated biases in spatial cognition would be one of these. Effective construction of fantastical narratives requires selection and arrangement of events so that their represented hierarchical precedence and value recapitulates their felt importance as internally simulated events along the cognitive route or map.

*A Note on Applications to Ritual Studies and the Emergence of Fiction-Based Worldviews*

Event cognition focuses primarily on temporal segmentation,[68] but thinking about spatial cognition issues may, among other things, signal ways in which the study of

---

[68] *Cf.* Núñez, Rafael, and Kensy Cooperrider. "The Tangle of Space and Time in Human Cognition." *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*. 17.5 (2013): 220-229. Note, however, that temporal thought relates – and some think depends – on spatial thought (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Wallington 2012; Langacker 2012). Filipović and Jaszczolt (2012: 2) state,

> There is some evidence that speakers are unable to ignore spatial concepts while representing time (*e.g.* Casasanto and Boroditsky 2008; Vallesi et al. 2008), which strengthens the currently widely researched hypothesis that the human concept of time is (asymmetrically) dependent on the concept of space. By the same token, the experience of duration is claimed to be asymmetrically dependent on the experience of spatial length. On the other hand, when it comes to the left-right spatial orientation, relativity can be observed: some cultures conceptualized time vertically, some horizontally, and if horizontally, there are some interesting differences in the use made of directionality [see, *e.g.*, §2c]. Cyclic time, such as recurring seasons, can also dominate in some languages and in some contexts (see Jaszczolt 2009). The arrow of time often maps onto the spatial left-to-right dimension but this mapping is not universal. Next, even when cultures share the left-to-right conceptualization, there may be differences that lie elsewhere. While in Mayan codices time was represented as running from left to right, it moved, so to speak, "in leaps and bounds": it was not measured by units of equal duration.

Given time's, life's, history's narrative character for humans, I find the studies on how time's "spatial" orientation is linked to the direction in which people write quite suggestive: Boroditsky, L., "Does language shape thought? Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time," *Cognitive Psychology*, 43 (2001), pp. 1-

experience may link up with the study of ritual. Although they depend on some different spatial capacities (*e.g.*, landmark recognition vs. mental rotation), descriptions of routes bear formal similarities to descriptions of how things are assembled, and both types of descriptions take verbal or visual form that may be analyzed much like other narratives are in typical event cognition research. Two of the formal similarities between effective route directions and assembly directions are that they are segmented into steps (*i.e.*, sub-events) and that they indicate the spatial perspective that should be taken (Daniel & Tversky 2012). When the narrative event takes the form of a sort of "recipe," spatial ability becomes important, and ritual, I submit, is this kind of event. The translation of the allomythoi in fantastical narratives into real-world, actualized worldviews and ways of life depends on converting their elements into scripts that can be performed in this world. The study of ritual has already considered whether ritual might be organized rather like a sentence, which might be thought of as a tiny narrative. Studies like Daniel and Tversky's might aid ritual studies not only by providing other theoretical perspectives but also by supplying potential tests to give those informants with whom religious studies scholars do ethnographic work. I shall discuss individual variation further below, but in this context it's worth noting that those who generate better assembly narratives and those who are better at assembling things are better at the Vandenberg mental rotation task (Daniel & Tversky 2012; Vandenberg & Kuse 1978). Might ethnographers discover something interesting by giving tests like this to their ritual subjects? Additionally, given the interest in ritual CSR studies in the role played by modifications of cognitive load, it may be relevant that choice of perspective in spatial descriptions is dependent on the relative cognitive loads of the speaker and listener (Mainwaring, Tversky, Ohgishi, & Schiano 2003).

## II. Aesthetic feelings and Emotion

In 2009, Denis Dutton published a fine work on the subject of aesthetic feeling and human evolution, *The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution*. Dutton argues that some things in the universe easily and spontaneously supply aesthetic pleasure, such as landscapes that resemble the Pleistocene adaptive environment; others require initiation and acculturation, supplying opportunities to exhibit skill for social and sexual advancement; and finally, there are things humans simply cannot appreciate aesthetically. The stress Dutton places on expert performance of skilled tasks as underlying the sexual selection of aesthetic ability and perception leads quite naturally into further reflection on differences in spatial ability and their relevance to CSR, which is discussed in the following section. [69]

The above distinctions are rooted in our evolutionary development. Given my mention of routes above, one may observe that one feature of landscapes regarded as pleasant or beautiful is that they may contain a path or route. We like to know where we're going. And given my recurring interest in this appendix in Eliade, one may recall that mountain and ocean scenes are often loci of hierophanies. Perhaps this is because they are dissimilar from the adaptive savannah-like environment we find most familiar and

22; Saj, A., Fuhrman, O., Vuilleumier, P. & Boroditsky, L., "Patients with Left Spatial Neglect Also Neglect the 'Left Side' of Time," *Psychological Science* 25 (2013), pp. 207-214.

[69] I am thankful to Jeremy Hanes for suggesting this to me as a line of inquiry and Denis Dutton's work in particular. See also, Julian Holloway, "Enchanted Spaces: The Séance, Affect, and Geographies of Religion" and Peter Van der Graaf (2015), "Feeling at Home and Habitus: How Space Matters for Emotions."

appealing. Keltner and Haidt (2003) propose a prototype approach to the feeling of "awe," linking it in part to perceived and appraised spatial vastness—recall James's "voluminousness." The eponymous "panic" in the deep forest might have a related explanation, though the feeling's association with the silence of the forest may have more to do with a sensed predator and a HADD-like response in the context of the forest's sonic semiosphere (*i.e.*, the interaction of forest organisms' *Umwelten*[70]). One thinks too of the feeling induced by being in a cave, a common locus of sacred rituals throughout the world, from the mithraeum to the prayer closet (*cf.* Montello & Moyes; Corrigan). In cases like the above, some might say that a feeling of "emptiness" is present. In a review (Taves and Fredrickson, 2016) of Corrigan's (2015) *Emptiness: Feeling Christian in America*, I argue (along BBA lines) that complex, culturally elaborated feelings (*i.e.*, CCCs) like "emptiness" might to be analyzed by breaking them down into their root metaphors, each of which would be grounded in specific embodied cognitive-aesthetic processes; the specific ways they are recombined to produce a complex feeling might be accounted for using cognitive blending theory.

That specific spaces have distinctive affective atmospheres, lending themselves to some moods – and even worldviews – and not others is highly relevant to the study of allomythoi, but the affective aspects of spatial cognition are also some of the hardest to address systematically. This is a huge potential area for future research, but it must remain largely outside the scope of the framework offered here.

## III. Virtuosos and Difference

Let me begin with a quote from Dutton (2009:151–152):

> From the Greeks through the Enlightenment and on into the computer age, every prevailing analogy for the mind has captured some important aspect or function. But none even begins to explain the mind as the creative, exuberant, imaginative, romantic, wasteful, storytelling, witty, loquacious, poetic, ideology-inventing organ it also is. Darwin's *Descent of Man*, by regarding the mind as a sexual ornament, presents us with a first step toward explaining those features of the human personality that we find most charming, captivating, and seductive. Adding sexual selection to natural selection, we begin at last to see the possibility for a complete theory of the origin of the arts.

Religious representations, experiences, and actions all supply occasions to put spatial cognitive abilities on display, distinguishing the experts from those with lesser abilities. Fields & Sheldon (2001) cover some of the individual differences in spatial cognition, including mental rotation, perspective taking, location retention, map retention, and sense of direction. Factors such as aging and lifestyle have a lot to do with spatial reasoning ability, and there are also studies on developmental and sex-based differences. We have lots of spatial reasoning tests, although there are significant issues with them that need to be worked on. Recalling the narratological basis of event cognition research mentioned above, it's pertinent here to note that, relative to specifically spatial texts, there is robust evidence of differences in comprehension and memorization abilities among the population (Pazzaglia, Gyselinck, Cornoldi, & De Beni 2012).

[70] The neo-Kantian concept of *Umwelt*, as described by von Uexküll, is entirely relative to a given creature and its goals, senses, activities, and experiences.

The "escapist," "wasteful" indulgence in intimate immersion in alien worlds, in which the "nerds" and "geeks" of fantastika can develop great expertise, is charming and even seductive within that in-group. Interestingly, Lightner, Heckelsmiller, and Hagen (2022) propose that imaginary worldmakers are driven to take on the high costs of developing their worldmaking skills and elaborating such fictional worlds to be information specialists; among other factors, expertise constitutes discourse communities (Swales, 1990). One need only spend a few moments at a Comic-Con, where one will witness not only fabulous peacocking in exotic outfits but also, and probably more importantly, exuberant displays of expertise in imagined geographies and their associated vocabularies, stories, and worldviews. Fantastical narratives, by simulating robustly different spaces, stimulate and cultivate spatial cognition capacities (not to mention others, such as emotional sensitivity, empathy, etc.), and their display can be quite impressive to likeminded others.

I have considered the relativistic findings of Levinson and Wilkins (see also Gentner & Goldin-Meadow 2003 and, more recently, Hawkins 2014), and the WEIRD basis of most studies so far should come as no surprise. So it's worth asking, do differences in spatial cognition abilities – both innate and culturally inflected – track with differences in religious behavior and belief?

This attention to difference comes naturally to the field of religious studies, and it represents one of the principal ways religious studies – and the larger project of worldview studies – may help colleagues in fields like evolutionary psychology and cognitive linguistics. This appendix's concrete examples have focused on indigenous and pre-modern peoples, reflecting religious studies' happy expansion to consideration of more than just Protestantism and the so-called "world religions." Having learned our lesson, we may be gadflies for our scientific colleagues, calling their attention to difference and particularity—drawing on our deep ethnographic familiarity with lots of different languages and cosmologies—even as we may profit from the beneficial constraints our more scientific colleagues are able to exert on our speculations and theories through empirically established regularities. And even then, the sometimes-feared "constraints" are, really, our conditions of possibility.

## IV. Power—Heidegger, Tweed, and Knott

Bringing the spatial turn into conversation with the cognitive turn, one may observe that consideration of spatial cognition brings to the forefront the manner in which human cognition depends on material affordances and extension or distribution of the task of processing information into or among environmental features and other people. This relates to one of the crucial ways in which cognitive science of religion should be distinguished from the reductivism[71] feared in classic psychology of religion: the "self" in CSR is not stable and self-contained, but rather composed of a host of sub-personal processes, some deeply innate, modular, and genetic, others the result of epigenetic factors, plasticity, and modularization. In and through us our societies, technologies, and, yes, environments process information too, and by transforming them we transform ourselves. As Derek Gregory (1995:448) puts it, the will-to-power may express itself as "the will-to-map." This has postmodern and radical implications (see, for example, *Cognitive Architecture: From*

[71] One might find irony in the language of "reduction" in phenomenology of religion. Phenomenologists themselves they perform it (Husserl at least honestly identifies his transcendental and eidetic reductions), but then accuse people of it, many of whom are not attempting or interested in reductivism.

*Bio-Politics to Noo-Politics – Architecture and Mind in the Age of Communication and Information*). The cognitive models we use to approximate and explain these processes must be able to be materially instantiated, of course, both at the neuronal and social/environmental levels. However, for those who feel cognitive science rests on a realist, scientistic foundation that appeals to some transcendental signifier, a true or real foundation in terms of which everything else is explained (away), I would point out that the sort of extended, distributed cognitive system assumed by spatial cognition is fundamentally deferred.

It is here, under the concluding heading of "power," that I would first draw on an excellent paper by Jeff Malpas, "Heidegger, Space, and World," and then engage with the two most robust contemporary spatial theories of religion, those of Thomas A. Tweed and of Kim Knott.

Malpas notes,

> The problematic status of spatiality [in Heidegger] is itself connected to the uncertain role of the body in Heidegger's analysis—indeed, not only is Heidegger's account of existential spatiality in *Being and Time* developed in a way that sets it apart from (and actually opposed to) any notion of 'objective' spatiality (and we should be careful not to pre-judge what might be involved in such a notion), but it is also developed in a way that separates it from any notion of a distinctive *bodily* spatiality. (2012b, p. 312)

On the absence of the body in Heidegger, please see the excursus that follows this section, but central to Malpas's argument is that Heidegger later makes a turn toward place and spatiality in his understanding of "world" (if this quickly helps understand his sense of "world," he thinks of inanimate things as being worldless, non-human animals as poor in world, and humans as world-forming). Spatial and topographic language recurs frequently in Heidegger's later work so that *world-formation* – the *projection* that makes worlds in a manner that is both binding and freeing – requires *Spielraum*, "play-space" (elsewhere, *Zeit-Spiel-Raum*, "time-play-space") for *poetizing*; thus, Heidegger eventually concludes that the being of Dasein is, not only tied to language and temporal projection (which he initially prioritizes—temporality being the foundation of the care-structure that founds Dasein's spatiality), but also deeply dependent on space. Space (and body) are not merely subordinated features of temporal being; they fundamentally characterize the way *specific* beings-in-the-world along-side each other, perhaps, but irreducibly non-interchangeable (as in the case of their being-toward-death) experience life and are afforded possibilities therein.

I began with this brief discussion of Heidegger and his increasing appreciation of *topos* and spatiality in his later work because Heidegger's early fixation on – indeed, one might call it a theology of – the individual (see my Secondary Excursus below) – also seems to neglect the critique of power, in part no doubt because he wished to avoid what is sometimes called a "reductionist" analysis in terms of psychology, economics, politics, and so on in favor of true "philosophy." In fact, Heidegger's *historizing* reconfiguration of the Augustinian notion of freedom (*i.e.*, that one is free when one takes upon oneself the will of God) is that freedom consists of Dasein willingly, resolutely enculturated, retrieving and creatively replicating one's heritage (and avoiding curiosity about and dalliance with alien cultures).[72] In this manner, one must *emplace* oneself—though this is of course in tension

[72] The difference between this positive resoluteness relative to one's culture and the inauthentic dissipation of falling into sociality is complex.

with Dasein as an ecstatic being. In any case, Heidegger's creative reformulations of Western philosophy and theology and, especially in his later work, deployment of them to critique some of the defects of modern culture, suggest that his increased engagement with spatiality, combined with his prior awareness of how human finitude (*e.g.*, mortality and historicity) and language constrain even while enabling, contributed to his growing awareness of the operation of what we now tend to call power.

Relative to the study of allomythoi, Heidegger's bias against indulgence and loss in alien worlds must be bracketed in order to appreciate his valuable insights into the importance of play-room and our being poeticizing world-formers. He would have one emplace and historicize oneself by returning to and taking up authentically one's hereditary worldview and way of life, and this perspective is inherently opposed to allomythic curiosity and sightseeing. But his later work captures the spatial turn's great insight that spaces, worlds are formed, that they are meaningfully projected.

Kim Knott, in *The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis* (2005), inherits and deploys the resources of scholarly activity within religious studies, later philosophical work such as that of Merleau-Ponty (on the body) and Benjamin, Foucault, Derrida, Lefebvre, de Certeau, Lakoff and Johnson, Keith and Pile, Casey, and others who produced and were influenced by the embodied "spatial turn" (see Crang and Thrift, Eds., 2000). Early in her work, Knott cites a quote from Massey's (2008) "Politics and Space/Time" that immediately captures Heidegger's opposition to his interpretation of Cartesian "space" but advances to an awareness of power:

> There is no choice between flow (time) and a flat surface of instantaneous relations (space). Space is not a 'flat' surface in that sense because the social relations which create it are themselves dynamic by their very nature [….] [S]pace is by its very nature full of power and symbolism, a complex web of relations of domination and subordination, of solidarity and co-operation. (Massey, 1993, pp. 155-156; qtd. in Knott, 2005, p. 20).

Knott stresses the importance of power to any spatial analysis: "As power struggles of all kinds are played out in space – whether social, mental or physical space – a spatial analysis of religion cannot avoid confronting them, both directly and through their representations" (2005, p. 28). The commodification of space, the movements of capital, the control of virtual spaces and the information they contain and produce, and so on all reflect the dynamic play of power in spaces. Worldviews and ways of life take place in space always also by making use of it, transforming it, making sense of it, producing it. And the abstractions of placelessness and disembodiment are two of the most potent tools for disempowering others, depriving them of resources, capacities, and agency that properly belong to them (see, *e.g.*, Mills, 1997). Racist, ethnocentrist, sexist, homophobic, and related projects often depend on creating fictional persons, such as legally recognized citizens, economic rational actors, philosophical construals of "human nature," etc., that exclude and displace the bodies and spaces of disfavored others. Narratives of course can participate in such projects.

While Tweed's theoretical work on religion, *Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion* (2006), is the most mature extended published engagement by a religious studies scholar with the spatial cognition literature that I am aware of, he makes a central claim that is at variance with, for example, Levinson's observation that egocentric (Tweed calls these "autocentric") spatial orientation systems are neither primary nor dominant. Perhaps influenced by the long history religious studies scholarship that has emphasized the

egocentric, he states, "Religion begins—and ends—with bodies: birthed bodies and dead bodies; polluted bodies and purified bodies; enslaved and freed bodies; bodies that are tattooed, pierced, flagellated, drugged, masked, and painted [etc.]" (Tweed, 2006, p. 98). Now, although Tweed's rhetorical gusto in the above passage seems to construe "religion" primarily in terms of exotic and exceptional practices, the body is without a doubt a very important site for examining the operation of power. Its regulation, modification, stimulation, repression, and so on truly are profoundly relevant to telling the story of human worldviews and ways of life. For example, Taves notes that a retelling of American religious history in terms of sexuality "is to place discourse about the body, and more specifically the sexual body (here defined in terms of the biological capacity for arousal), at the center of the narrative" (1997, p. 29). She further notes that, among other things, such an emphasis on the body highlights the importance of "boundary" as a category of import: "When we begin with the body as the site for our story, and specifically with sexuality (biological and symbolic), several themes are highlighted—contact and *boundary*, 'purity' and 'mixing'" (emphasis mine, *ibid.*, p. 28). In the main text, I strongly emphasize the importance of boundaries to understanding fictional worldviews and ways of life, and, as one can see, this is consistent with the understanding of scholars of American religion such as Albanese, Tweed, and Taves.

Yet, by making the body the center of his spatial theory of religion (as opposed to a narrative on American religion highlighting sexuality, as in the case of Taves's chapter), Tweed seems to forget his own review of the frequently occurring, elaborately worked out, and cognitively demanding allocentric spatial systems into which many are acculturated (n.b., he also notes the existence of intrinsic spatial systems). Many traditional cultures structure space in a way that cognitively deemphasizes the individual, orienting people always in terms of the greater whole to which they relate. For example, Tweed notes (*ibid.*, p. 95):

> Many languages use allocentric frames of reference to designate almost all locations or motions, but those map-like scheme also are diverse. As one specialist in psycholinguistics notes, the Inuit use prevailing winds as the source of their spatial representation and identify up to sixteen directions around the compass, with subdivisions down to 22.5 degrees. In this and other examples, even the "fixed" directions of cognitive maps vary. It is at this point in the analysis that it becomes clear that spatial orientation, like temporal orientation, is a cultural as well as a biological process. If recent research proves right in the long run, hippocampal and parietal neural processes seem to set some constraints on the forms of spatial representation, but there is a good deal of variation across languages and cultures.

The egocentric (or autocentric) versus allocentric debate returns one to the familiar divide between religion as individual – *e.g.*, the Jamesian theory of relatively autonomous creation of spiritual geniuses in their solitude – and religion as primarily collective and communal. Power is operative in both aspects of human worldviews. Isolating people with an ideology and spatial model that is individualistic and egocentric in some ways renders them more vulnerable to powers that vastly exceed the individual. And power is obviously evident when the communal nature is emphasized. Humans as linguistic and cultural beings receive

the space and time (and even to a large degree the bodies[73]) they inhabit from their fellow humans through processes of cultural transmission and acculturation. I discuss borderlands theory elsewhere in this work, but the generation of social space through the positing of contrasting others in the context of power, which is one of the things borderlands theory productively analyzes (post-structuralist/postmodern geography does this too, which makes sense when one reflects on borderlands theory's kinship with postcolonisalist analyses, to which postmodernist approaches are affiliated), again shows how the production and regulation of meaningful spaces (persons, worlds) through the making and negotiating of boundaries is always power-inflected.

Fictional worlds and worldviews are powerful interventions in the world, seeking to persuade one to know, value, act in new ways. As world-formers, humans need play-space to poetically project or map meaning onto spaces and bodies, and deprivation of such a space of opportunity is a potent regulative technique, one that is especially interesting to surface in O-mode worldmaking and worlds (this is evident in Heidegger, as discussed in the two following excurses). Attending to or neglecting the body and spatiality, selecting an egocentric, intrinsic, or allocentric reference frame in narrating fictional worlds, subordinating or prioritizing given bodily and environmental spaces, attributing qualities to them, creating boundaries that regulate mixture, all deploy power in different ways to form and transform selves.

**An Excursus on the Missing Body in Heidegger**

Embarking on his project of first philosophy or metaphysics, Descartes faces a real problem; indeed, it was what is today called the *hard* problem of consciousness. More than the defense of the Church's doctrine of *realem humanae animae a corpore distinctionem*, the real distinction of the human soul from the body (Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, *Epistola* 6; *cf. ibid.* 3-4, *Synopsis sex sequentium Meditationum* 2, 6), Descartes faces the legitimate philosophical puzzle that the mental, with its distinctive qualia, does not seem reducible to the physical (Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, vi.10, 19; *cf.* Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 131-132). And so Descartes proposed a dualistic system in which there exist two basic substances: body, characterized by extension, and soul or mind, characterized by cognition.

Heidegger's project is to a great extent a refutation of this dualism (see ¶18 B. *ff.*).[74] Cognition, or "understanding," attends in an interested, equipmental manner characterized as Being-in-the-world. The self and the environment cannot be separated. In this, Heidegger's linguistic ontology anticipates (and probably helped lay the groundwork for) contemporary understandings of information systems and cognition as physically embodied, socially distributed, and environmentally extended— as I have repeatedly stressed, we do not think merely with our brains, but also by means of our bodies, our social structures, relations, and activities, and our built and natural environments. Yet, though one can see why Heidegger reacted so strongly against Descartes' metaphysics, one must also note that it caused him, at

[73] Research on things like the social construction of gender, sexuality, race, and related categories as well as the socially contingent nature even of complex affective states (that is, emotions more elaborate than the handful of proposed core states) illustrate how even in what feels most primal – our very identities, bodies, and feelings – the power of culture acts upon us, gifts and curses us with ourselves, from the beginning and always.
[74] Heidegger's rejection of a worldless subject can be connected to *Da*-sein and *das* Seinende—*i.e.*, that the participial by itself is adjectival and requires the definite article or demonstrative pronoun and that Dasein is *there*, thrown into a world.

least in *Being and Time*, to neglect interpretation of the body and the modes of sensory perception.[75] In his discussion of the essential directionality belonging to spatiality, he mentions the right and the left and "bodily nature." Of this he states, "This 'bodily nature' hides a whole problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here" (p. 143). In fact, his determination to write about only Being in general and not any particular being (*cf.* p. 69), which as I have observed was motivated by his opposition to the tradition represented by Descartes,[76] leads to another problem, which we may introduce and exemplify by quoting the son of now-deceased Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia, Father Paul Scalia:

> We should not predicate "homosexual" of any person. That does a disservice to the dignity of the human person by collapsing personhood into sexual inclinations [….] This [the removal of such inappropriate language] reflects the increased appreciation for the fact that homosexual tendencies (to use a term from magisterial documents), do not constitute a fixed, unchangeable aspect of the person and therefore should not be considered an "orientation." Further, the term does violence to a proper understanding of human sexuality. Either our sexuality is *oriented* in a certain direction (*i.e.* toward the one-flesh union of marriage), or it is not. We cannot speak of more than one sexual "orientation" any more than we can think of the sun rising in more than one place (*i.e.* the orient).[77]

Scalia thinks there is a single human nature, which of course was taken on by the Logos and thereby taken up into the godhead. It is necessary that human nature be single for the Church to be One. For example, if there were a multiplicity of ways of *being* human it would require a multiplicity of Christs to redeem those beings. This would seem to underscore, however, the paradox of his position: he resists essentializing the human person (*i.e.*, one cannot *be* homosexual in one's very being) while at the same time positing a single human nature. That is, to have the only *human* sexual orientation one must be called to the "one-flesh union of marriage" from which the Church by definition excludes people of the same sex. Scalia's argument is an interesting mixture of critical arguments that should liberate one from the tyranny of a pre-assigned role in life and the authoritarian assertion of just such a role, with corresponding guilt if one fails to live up to the ideal.[78]

---

[75] But see the mention of *aisthesis* on p. 34, although Aristotle's position, not Heidegger's is here in view. Heidegger's brief discussion of perception in the context of phenomenology suggests that he can ignore the problem of "inaccurate" perception because his notion of truth as discovery or unconcealment means that perception cannot be false in the sense of its being an occurring appearance (pp. 56-57).

[76] For instance, the idea that the true, intersubjectively dependable reality is number (Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, I.7-8, VI.1) goes much further back than Descartes, at least to Plotinus and Plato himself (*cf.* the Seventh Epistle).

[77] "For Those Who Believe in Rational Argument: In Memoriam John Harvey OSFS," *Humanum: Issues in Family, Culture & Science* (accessed December 11, 2013). http://www.humanumreview.com/articles/view/for-those-who-believe-in-rational-argument-in-memoriam-john-harvey-osfs

[78] Scalia's argument is formally quite similar to C.S. Lewis's in *The Abolition of Man*. For the honor of having the dignity of a human person according to the Catholic definition, one's determinate biology has to be denied in order to be free to not be oneself, free to be ashamed. Lewis, in *The Abolition of Man*, argues that modern attempts to treat criminals as products of certain environments and mental disorders – that is, as if they could be cured or rehabilitated by a "coercive" medical or social science – dehumanizes them, whereas retributive justice, in which the free human is *punished* for willingly doing wrong, honors the humanity of the criminal. One might make an argument along similar lines for refusal to "treat," or leap in with regard to, so-called mental illnesses like depression. Scalia's thought follows this pattern. Saying gays can choose to change gives them a "freedom" that biological determinism does not, but it is a freedom earned at the price of rejecting the

Heidegger's effacement, or, more generously, indefinite postponement, of analysis of particular bodily structures and activities allows him to provide a singular account of Dasein while simultaneously asserting Dasein's individuality. By the end of the first and only volume of *Being and Time*, Dasein possesses an almost sacred character due to its accumulation of special qualities, but, as with Scalia's depiction of human nature, we might be wise to treat cautiously a text that abstracts away many of the differences that constitute identity (*cf.* Mills, 1997).

So, Heidegger tries to avoid talking about "human nature." Why? It is part of his achievement that Dasein, as a technical term, helps avoid the ridged and overelaborated assumptions connected to "human being," "human nature," "soul,"[79] "consciousness," and so on. Heidegger is attempting something like a systematic theology of the human,[80] in which, rather than a triune Godhead, we find a unity-with-difference composed of such things as Being-, in-, and the-world. Recalling his dismissal of the Cartesian attempt to "compute" "man's Being […] by adding together those kinds of Being which body, soul, and spirit respectively possess" (p. 74), Heidegger states, "But while Being-in-the-world cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having several constitutive items in its structure" (p. 78), and again, "Ontologically, 'world' is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is *not*; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself" (p. 92). It is to escape fossilized conceptual accretions about its structure of assignments and referential totalities that Dasein and its structural parts are introduced as technical terms. Being-in, for example, the "inhood" involved in Being-in-the-world, which refers to dwelling in a careful, loving, concerned, anxious manner, cannot be thought of "as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) 'in' an entity which is present-at-hand" (p. 79). We don't *have* bodies, as if there were a spiritual "subject" in possession of a countable, calculable, self-identical, body-thing in space (*cf.* p. 83, 121-122, 128-129).[81] Rather, we exist as Being-in-the-world. But as Milpas (2012b; *cf.* Milpas, 2006, 2012a) observes, the very structure of Dasein's being assumes a body and spatiality he cannot neglect or subordinate to the temporal:

> For Dasein to be able to engage with some equipmental structure, it must be able to locate itself in respect of that structure, and so with respect to the spatial ordering that belongs to it. For this to be possible, Dasein must already have a sense of the spatial ordering of that equipmental structure as it appears in relation to Dasein's own spatiality, which means, to Dasein's own body and sphere of action. This is crucial to the understanding of spatiality as it relates, not only to practical activity, but to any form of self-locatedness, and it indicates why the emphasis on 'involvement' *as opposed to* spatial

---

determinate body with its carnal desires. It's a freedom not to be oneself – this in contrast, for example, to a definition of "freedom" as something like the capacity to express and maximize one's potentials. Celibacy can be one of those potentials, so if Catholic gays choose that discipline because of their values, well and good. But one should be cautious regarding ennobling fictions – religious, legal, philosophical, economic – that deny the body.

[79] Note how he cites Aristotle on *psuchē* and Aquinas on *anima* in the context of Dasein (p. 34).

[80] See the Secondary Excursus that follows this.

[81] The idea that the true, intersubjectively dependable reality is number goes much further back than Descartes, at least to figures like Plotinus, Pythagoras, and Plato himself (*cf.* the Seventh Epistle).

containment is not sufficient to achieve the shift in the understanding of being-in that *Being and Time* attempts.

Heidegger is attempting to rethink and avoid the dangers of thousands of years of metaphysical thinking, but his avoidance of, for example, Descartes, Kant (whose treatment of spatiality is foundational[82]), and others leads him to neglect important aspects of existence that others honored. Although there are many signs that everyday humans are what he has in view when he talks about "Dasein,"[83] the everyday associations attending the term "human," not to mention the philosophical, need to be excluded. It is for this reason that Heidegger invents his own technical vocabulary. But let me be clear: this interpretation of Heidegger's Interpretation does not regard "Dasein" as being intended to refer to nonhumans. The generality of much of the language surrounding Dasein seems to invite questions such as, Might a dolphin, chimp, elephant, or robot be Dasein? But a close reading demonstrates that throughout Heidegger tacitly assumes "Dasein" refers to the human. And, as Wittgenstein might say, Heidegger could not in any case speak responsibly or authoritatively on dolphin, chimp, elephant, or robot Being.[84] Insofar as Heidegger mentions Dasein's body,[85] it is a human body. However, his efforts to deconstruct Cartesian dualism and Kantian activity require an abandonment of conventional terms in order, to his mind, to return to everyday phenomenal existence. Yet this move has other consequences.

Heidegger states, "Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available to *us* in some way" (emphasis added, p. 25). He politely pluralizes the first person pronoun, but it is important to recognize, in spite of trying to be faithful to his intentions and vocabulary in interpreting

---

[82] Because Kant is interested, not in empirical space as implicated in motion, but in space *a priori*, Schopenhauer's mockery, endorsed by William James, is rather unfair. Heidegger misunderstands Kant as deriving spatiality from differentiated bodily experience in a manner quite similar to that illustrated by James himself.

[83] Although laws and rules are no sure guide, for Plato long ago taught us the difference between Law and Justice, the parallels between common law and Heidegger's interpretation likewise suggest that humans are in view. Tort law, with its duty of care, plagiarism rules and copyright law, with their assertion of human possession or mineness, and even rules relevant to "self-plagiarism," which is suggestive of a duty-to-labor as opposed to laziness (a less obvious form of falling), all suggest distinctly *human* forms of sociality and, thus, morality.

[84] Kant's would likewise observe that we only can know something by making it like ourselves through the transcendental conditions of possibility of knowing. Similarly, metaphor and analogy allow us to extend what we know into new domains, but we are always constrained by the determinate nature of the metaphor. Kant might say that Heidegger is actively constructing his own reality in *Being and Time*. Heidegger, of course would not agree. To Wittgenstein he would perhaps reply: "Dasein also possesses—as constitutive for its understanding of existence—an understanding of the Being of entities of a character other than its own" (p. 34; with the exception of God, who is infinitely different (pp. 125-126)). And to Kant he would speak of his receptivity and unconcealment in presencing.

[85] This is implicit in Dasein's being the sort of entity who hammers things and uses gloves and cars with turn signals and has "soles of one's feet" (p. 142). Furthermore, the identification is made explicitly repeatedly: "As ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of Being which this entity—man himself—possesses. This entity we denote by the term '*Dasein*'" (p. 32). "[W]e *are* it, each of us, we ourselves" (p. 36). "Dasein's ways of behavior, its capacities, powers, possibilities, and vicissitudes, have been studied with varying extent in philosophical psychology, in anthropology, ethics, and 'political science', in poetry, biography, and the writing of history" (37). "We are ourselves the entities to be analysed" (p. 67). And so on.

him,[86] that the only Being truly already available to him "in some way" is his own,[87] and it is thus a distinctly *human* being: male, cisgender, straight, white, able-bodied, and, like all humans, social, a member of a particular culture or people (Volk), to whom he gratefully acknowledged his indebtedness and devotion.[88] Dasein is singular, in the sense both that its structure may be Interpreted by Heidgger and that it is unsubstitutable.[89] Thus, it possesses both the character of a generality or a collective and the particularity of an individual. The neglect of the body both avoids lending direct support to things like sexism and racism by not linking essentialized notions of human nature to particular bodies, but it also effaces difference, which unhappily resembles the colonialist project. Thus, we cannot ignore Heidegger's affirmation of the concept of the Volk in the context of his explicit support for Nazi ideology (*cf.* ¶74, especially p. 436).[90]

Descartes grounds his belief in body in the goodness of God, who would not deceive (*Meditationes de prima philosophia*, vi.10). Though in a different register, I too would say that the Being and meanings of the body are filled with ethical significance. One could argue that from the *mineness* belonging to it[91] comes the notion of belonging, that the idea of possession present in adjectival attribution, by which the body and other entities receive their traits, and in the closely related genitive relation, depends on the possessive relation one has toward one's beloved, with whom it has been said one is made as "one flesh," and toward one's child, in whom one's life extends its possibilities beyond itself—or perhaps, as Durkheim might claim, it depends on the mutual possession of each other of community and individual and the individuals-in-community. One might argue that from the logic of monoganormative marriage especially, even when the notion of property transfer has been colored or concealed by the romantic ideal, arises other logics of possession, exemplified most fully in the "private property" of capitalism. As Heidegger states, "As modes of Being, *authenticity* and *inauthenticity* […] are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever

---

[86] Just as thinking the unthinkable, the absence of Dasein in the death of others, makes Dasein show up, so too thinking the edges of the human, what might be called the "pre-human" and the "post-human," might help illuminate the character of Dasein by exhibiting what Heidegger excludes.

[87] This is not to deny that others are not available to him, but the intimacy of access he has to himself is of a different order than that obtaining between him and others.

[88] Acknowledgement of our capacity for thought is central to thankfulness. This Durkheimian sensibility invites a Durkheimian analysis, for Durkheim, like Heidegger, is responding to Kant: "thought" does not merely arise from the spontaneous activity of the *individual*; it depends on distributed and embodied structures in society. Seeing Durkheim and Heidegger as engaged in similar projects causes other parallels between them to appear. For example, both are enamored by the "life of primitive peoples" in which "'primitive phenomena' are often less concealed and less complicated by extensive self-interpretation" (p. 76; *cf.*, *e.g.*, the discussion of "'signs' in primitive Dasein" on pp. 112-113).

[89] Applying yet another theological (but also Kantian) term to Dasein, Heidegger states, "*Being is the* ***transcendens*** *pure and simple*. And the transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical *individuation*" (p. 62). Heidegger's understanding of death as being something for which someone else cannot leap in, as being non-transferable, seems inconsistent with Christ's ransom, by reason of the fact that, according to Paul, the Christian lives insofar as she is no longer herself, but Christ. One puts on the "new man." Furthermore, it suggests that the intercession of the saints and the suffrages and indulgences of the Church may also be forms of leaping in.

[90] Generally, one would compare Augustine's understanding of time, such as exhibited, for example, in his discussion of reciting the psalm, more to Hegel's than to Heidegger's, in which we always remain open, to be, oriented to a futurity that will not arrive. But words such as these sound quite Hegelian: "Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein" (p. 436).

[91] The term "mineness" is used advisedly, for it is essential to the nature of Dasein (p. 78).

is characterized by mineness" (p. 68). The self-possession and autarchy of authenticity is merely a mode of quotidian inauthenticity, both of which are enabled by mineness.[92] Whereas Augustine's love is the love, finally, of unity, of Plotinus' and Plato's One, of absolute possession, Heidegger's solicitude, at its best, recalls that distinction and difference remain, even in unity. Dasein, the world, and Others co-implicate each other, but they cannot be collapsed into each other. Again, the mineness and unsubstitutability of Dasein, really, problematizes Heidegger's authority to talk about Being in such general terms as he does.

Augustine's influence on Heidegger may be especially evident in his avoidance of the body. The body, which so distressed Augustine, is simply passed over in Heidegger. Dasein is, by definition, temporal (*i.e.*, historical, with its own world made up of practical relations of significance) and finite (*i.e.*, oriented toward death), but (unlike Simone de Beauvoir (1970), say) never toward-aging.[93] It is an entity that has activity and perception, though even the sensory modalities are not analyzed, but it has no determinate body. Dasein, as a disembodied entity, is in a paradoxical sense a "They-self," a, to draw on an English etymology to play on his German, *no-body* (pp. 165-166, 221, 297, 312, 345), because *its* – note too the genderless, anonymous pronoun – excluded "ontic" Cartesian particularity and mere presence-at-hand does not show up. However, in his exclusion of the ontic from his ontological project, he does not simply leave out Descartes' terms of analysis. He can be read as inverting Descartes' intuitions regarding the nature of spatiality and extension.

A consideration of spatiality suggests that the body, in *Being and Time*, is present as much in the prepositions as in the substantives; that is, the body of Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is in the *Da-* and the *in* – the therehood and the inhood – as well as in the *Being* and the *world* (*cf.* pp. 155-157). It is in the context of the inhood of Being-in as an *existentiale* that the spatiality of Dasein is introduced: "By thus delimiting Being-in [by distinguishing it from the 'insideness' of things present-at-hand], we are not denying every kind of 'spatiality' to Dasein. On the contrary, Dasein itself has a 'Being-in-space' of its own; but this in turn is possible only *on the basis of Being-in-the-world in general*" (p. 82). Rather than spatiality referring to a quantifiable distance or separation, a "three-dimensional multiplicity of possible [Cartesian] positions which gets filled up with Things present-at-hand" (p. 136; *cf.* p. 147),[94] Heidegger proposes that a central feature of spatiality is its "De-severing," which "amounts to making the farness vanish—that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close" (p. 139). It has the basic ontological character of the calculative mode of thought (*cf.* p. 135), but it is ultimately not calculable:

> De-severing does not necessarily imply any explicit estimation of the farness of something ready-to-hand in relation to Dasein. Above all, remoteness* never gets taken as a distance. If farness is to be estimated, this is done relatively to deseverances in which everyday Dasein maintains itself. Though these estimates may be imprecise and variable if we try to compute them, in the everydayness of Dasein they have their *own definiteness* which is thoroughly intelligible.

[92] Similarly, freedom is a condition of "involvement" (*cf.* pp. 116 *ff.*).
[93] See, though, his brief, rather tender, comment regarding solicitude: "Even 'concern' with food and clothing, and the nursing of the sick body are forms of solicitude" (p. 158).
[94] How Heidegger's spatiality becomes Cartesian space is also, like the problematic of the body, passed over in *Being and Time* (p. 147).

Spatiality, however, though it brings something close, not estimating farness, but rather making it vanish, is in relation to Dasein, not to "body." Heidegger states, "Bringing-close is not oriented towards the I-Thing encumbered with a body, but towards concernful Being-in-the-world—that is, towards whatever is proximally encountered in such Being" (p. 142). *Encumbered* with a body. A telling expression. By means of the concept of "deseverance" Heidegger inverts Cartesian notions of space, but the body is still not disclosed. Having looked at spatiality, let me now look at temporality, for "Dasein's specific spatiality must be grounded in temporality" (p. 418). And Heidegger's treatment of temporality, which draws on Augustine, will show us how he inverts Descartes' *res extensa*.

Descartes wanted to defend the absolute distinction between body and soul, and his discussion of the body dwells at length on the uncertainties of sensory perception. Heidegger, seeking to dissolve this dualism, almost completely excludes the body and perception from his Interpretation. Interestingly, however, Descartes' concept for the essence of body, namely, "extension," resembles (though without an etymological link) Heidegger's temporal term for the essence of Dasein, which is ecstatic, "out-side-of-itself" (p. 377). The three ecstasies of primordial existence correspond to the three temporal modes. This is consistent with Heidegger's move throughout, in which he translates physical being into temporal Being: "We shall point to *temporality* as the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call 'Dasein'" (p. 38). Heidegger, for example, links *parousia* and *ousia* and transforms "coming" or "being present" and "being," into "presence" in a temporal sense (pp. 47, 48). In Augustine, time as the distension of the self allows for love of either God or the multiplicity of mutable things, and thereby the dissipation of the self. In Heidegger, our concernful circumspection related to our Being-in, the spatiality of which is intimately tied to our threefold ecstatic temporal nature, enables both authenticity and inauthenticity.

Therefore, rather than conceptualizing space as a field of determinate, measurable open points that might be occupied or "filled" by body and rather than conceptualizing time as a stream of now-moments that are successively "present," Heidegger's primordial conception of space is one without distance while his idea of time is ecstatic. One might say that Cartesian atomism is replaced by a plenum with conceptual divisions or modalities. This approach accomplishes much, and yet it means that the particularized, determinate bodies that grow older, eat, excrete, procreate, fall sick, dance, sing, make war, rage and rejoice, and finally die, and whose physical traits and situations have real social and political consequences, do not appear.

## A Secondary Excursus

If *Being and Time* is a systematic theology, it is undeniably one of a novel, existentialist sort. Invoking God-language explicitly allows one to make more visible Heidegger's engagement with the Western tradition, but it is also challenging because it is counter to his own language and constantly must risk overstating its case.

According to the custom of those who offer new revelations, Heidegger invokes "venerable" origins and traditions (pp. 29, 31), authorities, and etymologies. Dasein always finds itself already engaged in systems of meaning. Heidegger, for this reason, cannot imagine fully breaking with the very tradition he is destroying (*cf.* pp. 42-44).

To distinguish between the ancient theology of God (the old Western metaphysic) and the ontology that is a theology of Dasein, the ancient theology might be distinguished as "Theology," with a capital letter. The old Theology disclosed God as the ground of being,

eternal and immortal, whereas Heidegger's theology illuminates Dasein in its character as Being-in-the-world and Being-toward-death, a Being fundamentally and primordially temporal and mortal, limited. Speaking of Dasein as an artifact and its "theology" as a language game feels somewhat indecent, for the profane and the holy should not mix and unsanctified eyes ought not gaze on the sanctum sanctorum. Heidegger rightly says he is not engaged in, in my terms, "ontoTheology," for, though he responds against that tradition, his project is not and could not be that. Rather, his is ontotheological. One recalls Freud's claim that he was not offering a Weltschauung. In a similar sense, Heidegger, in order to supply the tools for liberation from ontoTheology, was compelled to hand over the tools of ontotheology.

Given its human focus, Heidegger's Interpretation resembles a systematic theology of Augustine's doctrine of sin, but only in some respects. The body is strongly implicated in sin in Augustine, but hard to unpack in Heidegger. The human body cannot appear in Heidegger because he, being pious, knows that that idol would capture and destroy by limiting his finite god and by returning people to the language of the demolished dualistic metaphysics. Heidegger's ontology is, thus, a theology to the degree that it excludes anthropology and biology, all the while promising it is laying the foundation for a complete "'philosophical' anthropology" (p. 38; *cf.* pp. 71*ff.*). Like Anselm's God, Heidegger's god exists *by definition*. Above all else, Dasein "exists." Like the Christian godhead, Dasein has caught death up into itself, while yet never being present in death. Because the closest analog to Dasein is the human being, the determination of facticity can be embraced without the question of determinism ever arising. Indeed, how could it? Dasein is able to choose, so choice cannot be an ultimate concern for philosophy. Similarly, there is ultimately no problem of knowledge for Dasein because by definition the Being of itself and all other entities in themselves are transparently accessible. Dasein essentially understands. Dasein, moreover, as Care and specifically as solicitude, is love.

Appendix 1

TABLES OF THE VOCABULARY OF ORIENTATION

**§1(1) Ugaritic**

| | TERM | MEANING |
|---|---|---|
| | i) Homuncular/Religious | |
| EAST | *qdm* | 'face', 'in front' |
| WEST | *aḫr* | 'behind' |
| NORTH | | |
| SOUTH | | |
| | ii) Cosmological/Solar | |
| EAST | *ṯat* | 'coming out' |
| WEST | *ʿrb* (*ybʿ*) | 'going in' ('joining'?) |
| NORTH | *ṯmal* | 'left' |
| SOUTH | *ymn* | 'right' |
| | iii) Topographic/economic | |
| EAST | | |
| WEST | | |
| NORTH | (cf. *ṯpn*) | |
| SOUTH | | |

**§1(2) Hebrew**

| | TERM | MEANING |
|---|---|---|
| | i) Homuncular/Religious | |
| EAST | *qedem*<br>*qadmōnî* | 'face'<br>'in front' |
| WEST | *ʾaḥar, ʾaḥ"rôn* | 'behind' |
| NORTH | *sᶜmôl* | 'left' |
| SOUTH | *yāmîn, têmān* | 'right' |
| | ii) Cosmological/Solar | |
| EAST | *mizraḥ*<br>*môṣāʾ* | 'shining'<br>'coming out' |
| WEST | *maᵃʿrāb*<br>*māboʾ* | 'going in',<br>'coming in' |
| NORTH | | |
| SOUTH | | |
| | iii) Topographic/economic | |
| EAST | | |
| WEST | *yām* | 'sea' |
| NORTH | *ṣāpôn* | (cf. Ugaritic *ṯpn*) |
| SOUTH | *negeb*<br>*dārôm* | 'sahel'<br>(original sense unclear) |

## §1(3) Arabic

| | TERM | MEANING |
|---|---|---|
| | i) Homuncular/Religious | |
| EAST | *qadam*,<br>*qiḍm*, *qidam* | 'precede'<br>'past', 'antiquity' |
| WEST | *dabūr* | 'west wind'<br>(√'turn one's back') |
| NORTH | *šamāl*,<br>*šimal* | 'north (wind)'<br>'left' |
| SOUTH | *yaman*,<br>*yamin* | 'south'<br>'right hand' |
| | Cosmological/Solar | |
| EAST | | |
| WEST | *majrib* | 'west' (√WS *'rb*) |
| NORTH | | |
| SOUTH | | |
| | Topographic/economic | |
| EAST | | |
| WEST | | |
| NORTH | | |
| SOUTH | | |

## §1(4) Akkadian

| | TERM | MEANING |
|---|---|---|
| | i) Homuncular/Religious | |
| EAST | *aqdamātum*<br>*qudmu*<br>*pānānu*<br>*maḫru* | 'front, east'<br>'front', 'past'<br>'face', 'past'<br>'face', 'past' |
| WEST | *aḫarātum*<br>*aḫru*<br>*emnu*<br>√*imnum*<br>*warkātu* (= Sumerian egir) | 'back, west'<br>'future'<br>'west'<br>('right hand')<br>'future', 'behind' |
| NORTH | *yamīna*<br>*šumêlu* | 'left hand, north'<br>'left' |
| SOUTH | *sim'al*<br>[*imittum*<br>(√*imnum* | 'right hand, south'<br>'right (hand)']<br>= WS *ymn*) |
| | ii) Cosmological/Solar | |
| EAST | *ṣītum*<br>*ṣīt šamšim* | 'coming out'<br>'sunrise' |
| WEST | *erēbu* | 'going in (of sun)' |
| NORTH | | |
| SOUTH | | |
| | iii) Topographic/economic | |
| EAST | *šadû* | 'mountain' 'steppe'<br>'east wind' |
| WEST | *amurru* | 'west', 'west land' |
| NORTH | *elû*<br>*ištānu* | 'upstream'<br>'north', 'north land' |
| SOUTH | *šūtu*<br>*šaplitum* | south wind<br>lower' *šaplu* = 'downstream' |

## §1(5) Sumerian

| | TERM | MEANING |
|---|---|---|
| i) Homuncular/Religious | | |
| EAST | NIM | |
| WEST | . [egir | 'future', 'behind'] (no spatial sense) |
| NORTH | GÚB.NU | 'left hand' |
| SOUTH | ZI.DA | 'right hand' |
| ii) Cosmological/Solar | | |
| EAST | | |
| WEST | | |
| NORTH | | |
| SOUTH | | |
| | Topographic/economic | |
| EAST | | |
| WEST | MAR.TU (= Akkadian *amurru*) | 'west' |
| NORTH | AN.TA (= Akkadian *elû*) | 'upstream' |
| SOUTH | KI.TA (= Akkadian *šaplu*) | 'downstream' |

## §1(6) Greek

| | TERM | MEANING |
|---|---|---|
| i) Homuncular/Religious | | |
| EAST | √πρω- πρωϊ πρωτος | 'early' 'first' 'earliest' |
| WEST | [ἀχερων √WS *aḫr*] ἐσχατος (LXX) | [= Styx] 'last' |
| NORTH | ἀριστερος | 'left (hand)' |
| SOUTH | δεξια | 'right (hand)' |
| ii) Cosmological/Solar | | |
| EAST | ἀνατολη (√ἀνατελλω) | 'rising' |
| WEST | δυσμη √δυω | 'setting' |
| NORTH | | |
| SOUTH | | |
| iii) Topographic/economic | | |
| EAST | | |
| WEST | θαλασσα (LXX) | 'sea' |
| NORTH | βορεας, βορρας | 'north wind' |
| SOUTH | νοτος | 'south wind' |

## §1(7) Latin

| | TERM | MEANING |
|---|---|---|
| i) Homuncular/Religious | | |
| EAST | *principium*<br>(*Genesis* 2:8 VG) | 'head'<br>'beginning' |
| WEST | | |
| NORTH | *sinister* | 'left' |
| SOUTH | *dexter* | 'right' |
| ii) Cosmological/Solar | | |
| EAST | *oriens* | 'rising' |
| WEST | *occidens, occasus* | 'setting' |
| NORTH | *aquilo* | 'north wind' |
| SOUTH | *meridies* | 'mid-day' |
| iii) Topographic/economic | | |
| EAST | | |
| WEST | | |
| NORTH | | |
| SOUTH | *auster* √Gk αὔω<br>*australis* | 'south wind'<br>('dryer')<br>'southern' |

## §1(8) Egyptian

| | TERM | MEANING |
|---|---|---|
| i) Homuncular/Religious | | |
| EAST | *i3bt*<br>*i3bty* | 'east, left side<br>eastern, left' |
| WEST | *imnt*<br>*imn* √Sem. *ymn* | 'west, right hand'<br>'western, right side' |
| NORTH | *mḥt* cf. *mḥ3*<br>cf. *m-ḫt*<br>*pḫw* | 'north', 'back of head'<br>'behind', 'future'<br>'back, end, last' |
| SOUTH | *ḫntiw*<br>*ḫnt*<br><br>*ḫntw* | 'southern'<br>'past', 'face', 'in front'<br>'sail south', 'upstream'<br>'before, earlier' |
| ii) Cosmological/Solar | | |
| EAST | *wbn* | 'rise' (sun) |
| WEST | *ḥtp* | 'set' (sun), 'be at rest',<br>'be propitiated', 'appease' |
| NORTH | | |
| SOUTH | | |
| iii) Topographic/economic | | |
| EAST | | |
| WEST | | |
| NORTH | *ḫdi* | 'sail north, downstream' |
| SOUTH | *rsw* | 'south' |

## §1(9) Sanskrit

| | TERM | MEANING |
|---|---|---|
| i) Homuncular/Religious | | |
| EAST | *pūrva* | 'east', 'in front of', 'preceding', 'first', 'primaeval' (but not 'face') |
| | *paurastya* | 'situated in front, foremost, eastern (people)' |
| | *prāci*<br>√*prāñc* | 'east'<br>'being in front, facing, east, former, previous' |
| WEST | *pratīcī* | 'westward, behind, future' |
| | *paśca*<br>*carama*<br>*apara* | 'westward', 'behind, later'<br>'western, last'<br>'hinder, later, following, western' |
| NORTH | *uttara* | 'north', 'left' |
| SOUTH | *dakṣiṇa* | 'southern', 'of the right hand', 'dextrous' (cog. Lat. *dexter*) |
| ii) Cosmological/Solar | | |
| EAST | *udaya* | sunrise |
| WEST | *asta*<br>(in compounds) | mythical mountain where sun set |
| NORTH | *udīcī* √*udañc* | 'north' ('go up') |
| SOUTH | √*avāñc* | 'south' ('go down') |
| iii) Topographic/economic | | |
| EAST | | |
| WEST | | |
| NORTH | *kaubera* √*Kubera* | 'northern' (K. god of north) |
| SOUTH | | |

Appendix 2

Table 1.1. *Evidence for brain asymmetries in cold-blooded vertebrates. Reference to studies where laterality has been shown only at the individual level is underlined*

| | Type of asymmetry | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Species | Sensory | Motor | Anatomical |
| Chordata | | | |
| *Amphioxus* | | | Kappers et al. (1936); Young (1962) |
| Jawless fish | | | |
| *Petromyzon* | | | Braitenberg and Kemali (1970); Braitenberg and Kemali (1970) |
| *Myxine glutinosa* | | | |
| Cartilaginous fish | | | |
| *Sharks* | | | Kappers et al. (1936) |
| Bony fish | | | |
| *Gambusia holbrooki* | Bisazza and Vallortigara (1997); Bisazza, Pignatti, and Vallortigara (1997a, b); Bisazza and Vallortigara (1997); Bisazza et al. (1998); Bisazza, De Santi and Vallortigara (1999); Bisazza, Facchin, and Vallortigara, (2000); Sovrano et al. (1999); De Santi et al. (2001) | Bisazza and Vallortigara (1996); Bisazza, Pignatti, Vallortigara (1997a); Bisazza et al. (1998) | |
| *Gambusia nicaraguensis* | Bisazza, Pignatti, and Vallortigara (1997a) | | |
| *Girardinus falcatus* | Bisazza, Pignatti, and Vallortigara (1997b); Bisazza et al. (1998); Facchin, Bisazza and Vallortigara (1999); Bisazza et al. (2000); Bisazza, Facchin and Vallortigara (2000) | Cantalupo, Bisazza and Vallortigara (1995); Bisazza et al. (1998). | |

Table 1.1. *(cont.)*

| Species | Type of asymmetry | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Sensory | Motor | Anatomical |
| *Brachyraphis roseni* | Bisazza, Pignatti and Vallortigara (1997b) | | |
| *Poecilia reticulata* | Aronson and Clark (1952); Bisazza, Pignatti and Vallortigara (1997b) | | |
| *Xiphophorus maculatus* | Aronson and Clark (1952) | | |
| *Xiphophorus helleri* | Aronson and Clark (1952) | | |
| *Jenynsia lineata* | | Bisazza, Cantalupo and Vallortigara (1997a) | |
| *Xenotoca eiseni* | Sovrano et al. (1999) | | |
| *Xenopoecilus sarasinorum* | Sovrano et al. (1999) | | |
| *Oreochromys niloticus* | | Gonçalves and Hoshino (1990a, b) | |
| *Oreochromys mossambicus* | | Nepomnyashchikh and Gremyatchikh (1993) | |
| *Pterophyllum scalare* | Sovrano et al. (1999); Bisazza et al. (2000) | | |
| *Betta splendens* | Cantalupo, Bisazza and Vallortigara (1996) | | |
| *Trichogaster trichopterus* | Bisazza et al. (2000); Sovrano et al. (1999) | Bisazza, Lippolis and Vallortigara (2001) | |
| *Knipowitschia punctatissima* | Bisazza et al. (2000) | | |
| *Padogobius martensi* | Bisazza et al. (2000) | | |
| *Lepomis gibbosus* | Bisazza et al. (2000) | | |
| *Ictalurus punctatus* | | Fine et al. (1996) | |

Table 1.1. *(cont.)*

| Species | Type of asymmetry | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Sensory | Motor | Anatomical |
| *Ancistrus sp.,* | Bisazza et al. (2000) | | |
| *Barbus conchonius* | Bisazza et al. (2000) | | |
| *Brachydanio rerio* | Miklósi, Andrew and Savage (1998); Bisazza et al. (2000); Miklósi and Andrew (1999) | Heuts (1999) | |
| *Carassius auratus* | | Heuts (1999) | Moulton and Barron, (1967) |
| *Coregonus nasus* *Coregonus clupeaformis* | | Reist et al. (1987) | |
| *Corydoras aeneus* | Bisazza et al. (2000) | | |
| *Phoxinus phoxinus* | Sovrano et al. (1999) | | |
| *Anguilla anguilla* | Westin (1998) | | Braitenberg and Kemali (1970) |
| Anuran amphibia | | | |
| *Bufo bufo* | Vallortigara et al. (1998); Robins et al. (1998); Lippolis et al. (2001) | Bisazza et al. (1996b); Bisazza et al. (1997) | |
| *Bufo marinus* | Vallortigara et al. (1998); Robins et al. (1998); Lippolis et al. (2001) | Bisazza et al. (1996b); Bisazza et al. (1997) | |
| *Bufo viridis* | Vallortigara et al. (1998); Robins et al. (1998); Lippolis et al. (2001) | Bisazza et al. (1997) | |
| *Rana pipiens* *Rana catesbeiana* | | Bauer (1993); Wassersug, Naitoh and Yamashita (1999) | |

Table 1.1. *(cont.)*

| Species | Type of asymmetry | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Sensory | Motor | Anatomical |
| *Rana esculenta* | | | Braitenberg and Kemali (1970); Vota-Pinardi and Kemali (1990); Kemali (1977); Kemali and Guglielmotti (1977); Kemali, Guglielmotti and Fiorino (1990) |
| *Hyla regilla* | | Dill (1977) | |
| *Rana temporaria* | | | Morgan, O'Donnell and Oliver (1973) |
| *Microhyla ornata* | | Yamashita et al. (1999) | |
| Urodelan amphibia | | | |
| *Triturus vulgaris* | | Green (1997) | |
| *Triturus cristatus* | | | Braitenberg and Kemali (1970) |
| Reptiles | | | |
| *Anolis carolinensis* | | Deckel (1995, 1998); Deckel et al. (1998) | |
| *Thamnophis sirtalis* | | Shine et al. (2000) | |
| *Uta stansburiana* | | | Engbretson, Reiner and Brecha (1981) |

Appendix 3





Figure 2.1. . Stylized representation of a stage in evolution corresponding to an Amphioxus larva. The animal feeds whilst sinking passively with left side and mouth (7) downwards. Encounter with a large and active prey (8) is about to occur, and tactile stimulation of mouth and flank will tend to initiate avoidance through a giant motor cell (Rohde cell: 5). A pair of such cells is shown here, with bilateral outflow, corresponding to the condition in larval Amphioxus; these cells appear to be lost in adult Amphioxus (see text). It is assumed that, in the hypothetical ancestral form, mouth dilation could occur through appropriate sensory input to the mouth via a sensory neuron (1), and a motor neuron (2), controlling dilator muscles (6). It is possible that the same reflex is present in larval Amphioxus (text).

Strong tactile stimulation of the rostrum or side of the body can initiate avoidance by inputs to what may be homologues (text) of vertebrate tectal cells (3 and 4). Note that such avoidance is likely to have been undirected and involved only rapid swimming forward or back (see text). The circuit for stimulation of the flank is shown in full for the right side only. It is assumed that a similar circuit existed for the left side, but this is shown only partially for the sake of clarity. It is assumed that this circuit would sometimes be activated by stimulation from the prey; it is likely that mechanisms existed, which allowed this to be inhibited when mouth dilation had begun. These are not shown here but a modification of existing circuits of this kind is assumed to have given rise to the condition shown in Figure 2.2.





Figure 2.2. The animal from Figure 2.1 is shown here, with the addition of a circuit that allowed photic input to be used to inhibit avoidance to tactile inputs from prey that was about to be taken by mouth dilation. The eye (10) is shown as looking out through the mouth, and is supposed to be like the eye cups that are present throughout the length of the CNS of adult Amphioxus (see text). It provides an inhibitory input (9) to the interneuron (4) that would otherwise initiate avoidance. It is likely that appropriate input to the eye could also promote mouth dilation, but this is not shown. An alternative route of evolution is also discussed in the text, involving the single frontal eye of Amphioxus. There is evidence suggesting that input to this eye may drive a lateral leap in the larva, but it is neither clear how this is mediated nor how a laterally placed (or asymmetric) eye might have evolved from the frontal eye. Other symbols are as for Figure 2.1.





Figure 2.3. Efficient forward swimming has evolved at this point, in which the animal maintains a standard body posture, with the dorsal surface uppermost. The animal now swims forwards in a straight line. In association with this, the ability to turn actively away from lateral inputs has evolved. This is shown as mediated by another of the 'tectal' interneurons (3). The circuit is shown only for the right side but a corresponding circuit is assumed to have been present on the left. Note that the motor outflow does not involve the paired giant motor cells, which would have continued to mediate undirected avoidance.

The single eye that controls feeding behaviour now looks forward so that prey can be detected in the line of advance. However, feeding remains inefficient. There is no steering of the body to bring potential prey into line with the mouth, which is still laterally placed.





Figure 2.4. The animal can now turn to bring prey that has been detected as lying directly ahead into contact with the lateral mouth. There would have been intense selection for this ability. It is shown as derived from a modification of part of the circuit that already allowed turning away in avoidance. The circuit allowing turning to prey would have existed only on the left side of the CNS. Avoidance circuits are assumed to have continued to be similar on both sides, but only that mediating turning left is shown.





Figure 2.5. A second eye has been acquired as part of appearance of secondary bilateral symmetry during development. The original eye is now the right eye (RE) and the new one the left eye (LE); the optic chiasma is present as a result. The RE ended up on the right side because it maintained its position relative to the mouth (see text) as the latter moved to become terminal. Although this is not shown, the RE continues to supply input to the CNS, which controls mouth reflexes. There is no such circuit fed by the LE. Both eyes do provide inputs that allow the animal to turn to target prey on either side of the body. Mechanisms for turning in avoidance are still present but are not shown.

Appendix 4





Figure 3.1. Summary of the complementary specialization of the left and right visual hemifields of toads for attack and feeding responses. (A) Attack: *Bufo marinus* toads were tested in a group and were competing for prey (crickets). Significantly more of their agonistic strikes at each other were directed to the left (open bar) than to the right (black bar) visual hemifield. In addition, striking at the eye of a conspecific was avoided to a greater extent in the right hemifield than in the left hemifield. (B) Feeding: strikes at at prey were also lateralized but here the preference was to strike at prey on the right side. *Bufo viridis* toads were tested by placing them, one at a time, inside a glass cylinder and then rotating a prey (insect larva) around the toad and outside the cylinder. Strikes at the prey were recorded by videotaping. Each dot represents a strike. Note that when the prey was rotated clockwise (from the toad's left to right) strikes (black dots) were directed to it when it was in the right visual hemifield. When the prey was rotated anticlockwise, the strikes (open circles) were distributed more evenly around the midline but there was still a tendency for more strikes in the right hemifield. Lateralization is shown by the fact that the pattern of strikes is not simply reversed for the clockwise versus anticlockwise presentations. Data from Robins et al. (1998) and Vallortigara et al. (1998).

Appendix 5





Figure 3.2. Complementary specialization of the left and right eyes of the chick for attack and feeding responses. The white bars represent means (with standard errors indicated) of groups of chicks (approximately 10 in a group) tested using the left eye (LE) and the black bars represent the same for chicks tested using the right eye (RE). Attack scores were obtained by testing testosterone-treated chicks using a standard hand-thrust test, in which the tester's hand is used to simulate an attacking chick. The responses of the chick are ranked according to intensity of attack. Attack is elevated when the chick uses its left eye, but not when it uses its right eye. Feeding scores were obtained by testing chicks on a search task of grain scattered on a background of small pebbles. The chicks could avoid pecking at pebbles when they were tested using their right eye but not when using their left eye. The scores plotted are number of pecks at grain in a block of 20 pecks, pecks 41–60 after the first peck given in the test. Adapted from Rogers, Zappia & Bullock (1985) and Rogers (1997).

Appendix 6





Figure 4.4. Righting responses in wild frogs (*Litoria latopalmata*). Each frog was given ten trials in which it was laid on its back on a horizontal surface. The forepaw around which its body pivoted in order to right successfully was recorded. The percentage right paw was calculated. The data are presented as a frequency plot. Note the population bias for pivoting around the right paw. In fact, this result indicates active use of the left forelimb by the frog to gain purchase for pivoting and the application of pressure against the substrate by the right forelimb and hand.

Appendix 7







Figure 4.2. The chick is feeding while a model raptor is moved overhead. The latency to detect the model was recorded, as well as the visual field in which it was detected. Detection was indicated by the chick interrupting its pecking and usually giving a startle trill call or a definite twitch of its head. Means and standard errors are plotted. Note that the latency was short when the chicks exposed to light before hatching detected the stimulus with its left eye. LE, left eye; RE, right eye. Adapted from Rogers (2000).

Appendix 8



(a)



(b)

Figure 11.1. Schematic representation of the experimental design to investigate perception of partly occluded objects in chicks. Newly hatched chicks were imprinted on a red triangular stimulus (a) and then tested for choice (b) using various transformations of the original imprinting stimulus (see Figure 11.2).





Figure 11.2. Preference for the complete (or amodally completed) stimulus (C). Group means [with standard error of the mean (SEM)] are shown. When faced with a choice between the complete triangle and the triangle with a section removed (a), chicks chose the complete triangle [$t(44) = 2.543$, $p \leqslant 0.01$], the same occurred using a 'scrambled' triangle as opposed to a complete one (b) [$t(34) = 2.115$, $p \leqslant 0.05$]. When faced with a partly occluded triangle and the one with a section removed, chicks chose the partly occluded triangle (c) [$t(43) = 2.667$, $p \leqslant 0.01$]. The same occurred when the occluding bar was split in half and juxtaposed to the missing part of the triangle with a section removed (d) [$t(28) = 2.306$, $p \leqslant 0.05$]. After Regolin and Vallortigara (1995).





Figure 11.3. Preference for the complete stimulus (C) as a function of the rearing conditions. Group means (with SEM) are shown. Chicks reared with the occluded triangle preferred at test the complete over the fragmented triangle (a) [$t(28) = 2.967$, $p \leqslant 0.01$]; chicks reared with the fragmented triangle preferred at test the fragmented over the complete triangle (b) [$t(29) = -4.033$, $p \leqslant 0.001$]. After Regolin and Vallortigara (1995).

Works Cited


Andrew, Richard J. 2002. "The Earliest Origins and Subsequent Evolution of Lateralization" in Rogers, Lesley J., and Richard Andrew, eds. *Comparative Vertebrate Lateralization*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.

Andrew, Richard J. and Lesley J. Rogers. 2002. "The Nature of Lateralization in Tetrapods" in Rogers, Lesley J., and Richard Andrew, eds. *Comparative Vertebrate Lateralization*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.

Austin, James H. 2011. *Meditating Selflessly Practical Neural Zen*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 2009. *Selfless Insight: Zen and the Meditative Transformations of Consciousness*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 2006. *Zen-brain Reflections: Reviewing Recent Developments in Meditation and States of Consciousness*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 1998. *Zen and the Brain Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Bellah, Robert N. 2011. *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Burghardt, Gordon M. 2006. *The Genesis of Animal Play: Testing the Limits*. 1st ed. A Bradford Book.

Cheng, Ken, Janellen Huttenlocher, and Nora S Newcombe. 2013. "25 Years of Research on the Use of Geometry in Spatial Reorientation: a Current Theoretical Perspective." *Psychon Bull Rev Psychonomic Bulletin & Review* 6(20): 1033–54.

Durkheim, Emile. 1995. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. Trans. Karen E. Fields. Free Press.

Earman, John. 1989. *World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute Vs. Relational Theories of Space and Time*. The MIT Press.

Eliade, Mircea. 2005. *The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History*. Trans. Willard R. Trask. Princeton University Press.

Flannery, Kent V. and Joyce Marcus. "Cognitive Archaeology." In David S. Whitley, ed. *Reader in Archaeological Theory: Post-processual and Cognitive Approaches*. Routledge Readers in Archaeology. London ; New York: Routledge, 1998.

George, Isabelle. 2010. "Hemispheric Asymmetry of Songbirds" in Kenneth Hugdahl and René Westerhausen, eds. *The Two Halves of the Brain: Information Processing in the Cerebral Hemispheres*. New. The MIT Press.

Holden MP, Curby KM, Newcombe NS, and Shipley TF. 2010. "A Category Adjustment Approach to Memory for Spatial Location in Natural Scenes." *Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition* 3(36): 590–604.

Holden MP, Newcombe NS, and Shipley TF. 2015. "Categorical Biases in Spatial Memory: The Role of Certainty." *Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition* 2(41): 473–81.

Levinson, Stephen C. 2003. *Space in Language and Cognition: Explorations in Cognitive Diversity*. Cambridge University Press.

Levinson, Stephen C., and David P. Wilkins, eds. 2006. *Grammars of Space: Explorations in Cognitive Diversity*. Cambridge University Press.

Lourenco, Stella F, and Andrea Frick. 2014. “Remembering Where: The Origins and Early Development of Spatial Memory.” Patricia J. Bauer and Robyn Fivush, eds. *The Wiley handbook on the development of children's memory*. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell.

McCorkle, William W., and Dēmētrēs Xygalatas. 2013. *Mental culture: classical social theory and the cognitive science of religion*. Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited.

Mithen, Steven. “Archaeological Theory and Theories of Cognitive Evolution.” In Ian Hodder. *Archaeological Theory Today*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012.

-------. “The Supernatural Beings of Prehistory and the External Storage of Religious Ideas.” In Colin Renfrew and Christopher Scarre. *Cognition and Material Culture: The Archaeology of Symbolic Storage. McDonald Institute Monographs.* Cambridge, England: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 1998.

Nelson, Charles A, Michelle De Haan, and Kathleen M Thomas. 2006. *Neuroscience of Cognitive Development: The Role of Experience and the Developing Brain*. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley.

Newcombe, Nora S. 2013. “Cognitive Development: Changing Views of Cognitive Change.” *WCS Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science* 5(4): 479–91.

Newcombe NS, Ratliff KR, Shallcross WL, and Twyman AD. 2010. “Young Children’s Use of Features to Reorient Is More Than Just Associative: Further Evidence Against a Modular View of Spatial Processing.” *Developmental Science* 1(13): 213–20.

O’Keefe, John, Neil Burgess, James G. Donnett, Kathryn J. Jeffery, and Eleanor A. Maguire. 1999. “Place cells, navigational accuracy, and the human hippocampus” in Glyn W. Humphreys, John Duncan, and Anne Treisman, eds. *Attention, Space and Action: Studies in Cognitive Neuroscience*. 1st ed. Oxford University Press, USA.

Renfrew, Colin. “The Archaeology of Religion.” In Colin Renfrew and Ezra B. W. Zubrow. *The Ancient Mind: Elements of Cognitive Archaeology*. *New Directions in Archaeology*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

-------. "Mind and Matter: Cognitive and External Symbolic Storage." In Colin Renfrew and Christopher Scarre. *Cognition and Material Culture: The Archaeology of Symbolic Storage. McDonald Institute Monographs*. Cambridge, England: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 1998.

-------. “Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of Society.” *Archaeological Theory Today*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012.

-------. “Towards a Framework for the Archaeology of Cult Practice.” In Colin Renfrew. *The Archaeology of Cult: The Sanctuary at Phylakopi*. Athens: British School of Archaeology, 1985.

Renfrew, Colin and Paul Bahn. “What Did They Think?: Cognitive Archaeology.” *Archaeology Essentials: Theories, Methods, and Practice*. 2nd ed. London: Thames & Hudson, 2010.

Rennie, Bryan S. 2007. *The International Eliade*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

———. 2006. *Mircea Eliade: a Critical Reader*. London; Oakville, CT: Equinox Pub.

———. 2000. *Changing Religious Worlds: The Meaning and End of Mircea Eliade*. Albany: SUNY Press.

———. 1996. *Reconstructing Eliade: Making Sense of Religion*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Robertson, Ian H. and Tom Manly. 1999. "Sustained attention deficits in time and space" in Glyn W. Humphreys, John Duncan, and Anne Treisman, eds. *Attention, Space and Action: Studies in Cognitive Neuroscience*. 1st ed. Oxford University Press, USA.
Rogers, Lesley J. 2002. "Advantages and Disadvantages of Lateralization" in Rogers, Lesley J., and Richard Andrew, eds. *Comparative Vertebrate Lateralization*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.
Sakata, Hideo, Masato Taira, Makoto Kusunoki, Akira Murata, Yuji Tanaka and Ken-ichiro Tsutsui. 1999. "Neural coding of 3D features of objects for hand action in the parietal cortex of the monkey" in Glyn W. Humphreys, John Duncan, and Anne Treisman, eds. *Attention, Space and Action: Studies in Cognitive Neuroscience*. 1st ed. Oxford University Press, USA.
Shumaker, Robert W., Kristina R. Walkup, and Benjamin B. Beck. *Animal Tool Behavior: The Use and Manufacture of Tools by Animals*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011.
Smith, Jonathan Z. 2004. *Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1987. *To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1982. *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Tambiah, Stanley Jeyaraja. *The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets: a Study in Charisma, Hagiography, Sectarianism, and Millennial Buddhism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Taves, Ann. 2009. *Religious Experience Reconsidered: a Building Block Approach to the Study of Religion and Other Special Things*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Tweed, Thomas A. 2006. *Crossing and Dwelling: a Theory of Religion*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Twyman, Alexandra D, and Nora S Newcombe. 2010. "Five Reasons to Doubt the Existence of a Geometric Module." *COGS Cognitive Science* 7(34): 1315–56.
Twyman, Alexandra D, Nora S Newcombe, and Thomas J Gould. 2013. "Malleability in the Development of Spatial Reorientation." *DEV Developmental Psychobiology* 3(55): 243–55.
Vallortigara, Giorgio and Angelo Bisazza. 2002. "How Ancient is Brain Lateralization?" in Rogers, Lesley J., and Richard Andrew, eds. *Comparative Vertebrate Lateralization*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.
Vallortigara, Giorgio and Lucia Regolin. 2002. "Facing an Obstacle: Lateralization of Object and Spatial Cognition" in Rogers, Lesley J., and Richard Andrew, eds. *Comparative Vertebrate Lateralization*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.
Warburton, David A. "Psychoanalyzing Prehistory: Struggling with the Unrecorded Past," in Peter Antes, Armin W. Geertz, and Randi R. Warne, eds., *New Approaches to the Study of Religion. Volume 2: Textual, Comparative, Sociological, and Cognitive Approaches*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004.

Wyatt, Nicolas. 2001. *Space and Time in the Religious Life of the Near East*. Sheffield Academic Press.
Wyatt, N. 2005. *The Mythic Mind: Essays on Cosmology and Religion in Ugaritic and Old Testament Literature*. Equinox Publishing.
Yates, Frances A. 2010. *The Art of Memory*. Reprint. Routledge.

## Appendix 10: A Critical Review of Selected Worldview Studies Categories (Big Questions)

*Philosophy, theology and ethics are happening as furtive, incidental activities amid enjoying a supposedly escapist culture.* (Garrett, cite)

One of the interesting features of the "worldview" studies paradigm, as opposed to approaching things in terms of the religious studies discipline, is its popularity with "religious" groups, who rightly recognize that studies of religions as "religions," rather than "worldviews," often conceal the secular worldview of those studying them as a neutral frame, when in fact secularity is itself a worldview (or, really, an umbrella category containing many worldviews). Those who study worldviews and ways of life have proposed a number of different fundamental categories, sometimes called "Big Questions" (BQs). The image below, taken from an evangelical publication of the Jehovah's Witnesses (JWs), illustrates how "life's big questions" may construe worldview-specific concerns like the relationship that obtains between "God" and "suffering" as universal, on the same level as "What is the meaning of life?" – n.b., how even this formulation (*the* meaning of life) assumes that human life has a specific (God-given) explanation and significance. A general human desire for meaning and engagement in meaning-making activities does not, of course, mean that humans' lives have a pre-given meaning (*i.e.*, it does not settle the Existentialist question of whether existence precedes or follows essence). The JW publication below centers focus on the interesting epistemological question regarding the source of valid answers to the BQs, and it prefigures its background worldview assumptions by placing "the Bible" (*i.e.*, the Protestant canon as interpreted by the JW Governing Body) as an epistemic source on the same level as, and perhaps superior to, science and philosophy.



Image 1. Example of Jehovah's Witnesses Evangelistic Material

The JW approach is consistent with much of the popular "worldview" literature among conservative Christians who long for the defeat of competing worldviews. As Rod Parsley states in his *Culturally Incorrect: How Clashing Worldviews Affect Your Future*, "More and more Christian leaders and thinkers now recognize that worldview is *the* hinge on which our battle for America will turn" (2007, p. 36). Importantly, though I am emphatically not identifying Christian conservatives (even those who advance white-supremacist agendas) today with Hitler's and, consequently, the Nazi party's use of "worldview" as a category, "worldview" (*Weltanschauung*) was invoked as a central, useful category in the culture wars of pre-WWII Germany; it circulated in a complex web of discourse and was used by academics, religious and political leaders, and others,[1] so although its being used as a favored term under Nazi rule does not make it an inherently toxic category, it does have a vexed genealogy.

There are many publication and multimedia sources designed to train conservative Christian children, preparing them for the "battle" of worldviews. For example, David Quine's *Worldviews of the Western World* high school homeschooling curriculum trains students first in all the true, biblical answers to life's Big Questions and then engages in a survey of other worldviews, including fictional examples thereof, helping students evaluate them insofar as they live up to the correct answers of the Quinean Biblical Worldview or fail to do so. A host of similar stand-alone works exists. One short but clear example is James N. Anderson's *What's Your Worldview?: An Interactive Approach to Life's Big Questions*

[1] See, for example, Todd Weir, "Hitler's Worldview and the Interwar Kulturkampf," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 53, no. 3, July 2018, pp. 597–621.

(2014),[2] which supplies an impressive list of potential BQs, almost all of which are rooted in Christian theology and apologetics:

- The Freedom Question (*i.e.*, is "free will" real?)
- The Truth Question (is there an objective, absolute truth, or is valid knowledge relative or situational?)
- The Knowledge Question (can one know *the* truth even if it exists?)
- The Goodness Question (are goodness and value as well as their opposites, evil and badness, objective realities?)
- The Religion Question (is there more than one valid religion?)
- The God Question (does God "a Supreme Being that deserves our worship and gives meaning, purpose, and direction to the universe and human life" (p. 25) exist?)
- The Unity Question (is everything one?)
- The Matter Question (is everything material?)
- The Mind Question (is everything mental?)
- The Personality Question (is "God" a personal being?)
- The All-Is-God Question (is everything God?)
- The All-In-God Question (is everything within God?)
- The Perfection Question (is God the perfect being?)
- The Uniqueness Question (is God the only god?)
- The Communication Question (has God communicated with humanity?)
- The Openness Question (has God's communication been with humanity collectively or only through private, individual revelations?)
- The Resurrection Question (was Jesus resurrected?)
- The Muhammad Question (was Muhammad a prophet?)
- The Moses Question (was Moses a prophet?)
- The Divinity Question (was Jesus God?)
- The Salvation Question (are humans eternally rewarded in Heaven or punished in Hell after death?)

Related works include pedagogical texts to help Christian teens combat other worldviews, such as Matthew Dominguez's (2020) *Inklings on Philosophy and Worldview: A New Way of Learning About Our Connections to Truth & Reality*, David Dockery and Gregory Alan Thornbury's (2002) edited volume *Shaping a Christian Worldview: The Foundation of Christian Higher Education*, which in some ways like Noebel's works largely focuses on "Christian Worldview" responses to discipline-specific questions, Mary Poplin's (2014) more academic *Is Reality Secular?: Testing the Assumptions of Four Global Worldviews*, which defends the superiority of "Judeo-Christian Theism" against materialist naturalism, secular humanism, and pantheism, Jeff Myers's (2015) *Understanding the Times: A Survey of Competing Worldviews*, which comparatively defends Christianity against Islam, secular

[2] He attempts a sort of non-Christian worldview categorization; they are as follows:

- Islam
- Moralistic therapeutic deism
- Naturalism
- Pantheism
- Pluralism
- Postmodernism

humanism, Marxism, New Age, and postmodernism, Abdu Murray's (2014) *Grand Central Question: Answering the Critical Concerns of the Major Worldviews*, which draws on Murray's experience of conversion from Islam to critique secular humanism,[3] pantheism,[4] and Islam[5] from his Christian-convert perspective, Kenneth Richard Samples's (2007) *A World of Difference: Putting Christian Truth-Claims to the Worldview Test*, which again foregrounds the evaluative deployment of "worldview" as placing all worldviews (in this case with a focus on Islam, naturalism, postmodernism, and pantheistic monism relative to Christianity) on an equal footing for apologetics,[6] Brian Godawa's (2009) text for defending Christians from the influence of other worldviews in films (especially existentialism and postmodernism as well as romanticism, monism, evolution, humanism, and Neo-Paganism), entitled *Hollywoood Worldviews: Watching Films with Wisdom and Discernment*,[7] and the works of David A. Noebel[8] such as *Understanding the Times: The Religious Worldviews of Our Day and the Search for Truth* (1994), *The Battle for Truth: Defending the Christian Worldview in the Marketplace of Ideas* (2001), and *Thinking Like A Christian: Understanding and Living A Biblical Worldview* (2002).

Just to further illustrate some typical BQs in the Christian-apologetic use of "worldview," here are some other examples, the final two of which are detailed examples of approaches found in works cited above:

- Brian J. Walsh and J. Richard Middleton, *The Transforming Vision: Shaping a Christian World View* (1981), p. 35:
    1. Who am I? Or, what is the nature, task and purpose of human beings?
    2. Where am I? Or, what is the nature of the world and universe I live in?
    3. What's wrong? Or, what is the basic problem or obstacle that keeps me from attaining fulfillment? In other words, how do I understand evil? And

---

[3] He considers the BQ of secular humanism to be, What is the inherent value of human beings?

[4] He considers the BQ of pantheism to be, How do we escape suffering?

[5] He considers the BQ of Islam to be, How is God great?

[6] His worldview tests are as follows (pp. 33-:

1. Coherence Test: Is a particular worldviw logically consistent?
2. Balance Test: Is the worldview properly balanced between simplicity and complexity?
3. Explanatory Power and Scope Test: How well does a worldview explain the facts of reality ("power"), and how wide is the range of its explanation ("scope")?
4. Correspondence Test: Does a particular worldview correspond with well-established, empirical facts, and does it correspond to a person's experiences in the world?
5. Verification Test: Can the central truth-claims of the worldview be verified or falsified?
6. Pragmatic Test: Does the worldview promote relevant, practical, and workable results?
7. Existential Test: Does the worldview address the internal needs of humanity?
8. Cumulative Test: Is the worldview supported by multiple lines of converging evidence that together add increasing support for its truth-claims and extend the breadth of its explanatory power?
9. Competetive Competence Test: Can the worldview successfully compete in the marketplace of ideas?

[7] Godawa stresses that a "worldview" is "a story that gives meaning to existence through narrative" (2009, p. 22; *cf.* pp. 60 *ff.*), which resonates powerfully with my framework. See Chapter 4.

[8] Noebel's approach reminds one of Smart's "dimensions" but with a distinctly disciplinary bent, viewing worldviews as making sense of reality through the aspects of it addressed by (1) theology, (2) philosophy, (3) ethics, (4) biology, (5) psychology, (6) sociology, (7) law, (8) politics, (9) economics, and (10) history. This is an interesting approach because it focuses on discipline-specific questions while still engaged fundamentally in Christian apologetics.

4. What is the remedy? Or, how is it possible to overcome this hindrance to my fulfillment? In other words, how do I find salvation?

- Ravi Zacharias, *Deliver Us from Evil* (1998)
  - Origin
  - Meaning
  - Morality
  - Destiny
- Abdu Murry, *Grand Central Question: Answering the Critical Concerns of the Major Worldviews* (2014)
  - What explains existence? Or, is there a God?
  - Is there an objective purpose and value to human existence?
  - What accounts for the human condition?
  - Is there a better life or a salvation from our present state?
- Mary Poplin, *Is Reality Secular?: Testing the Assumptions of Four Global Worldviews* (2014). She endorses Sire's (2009) definition,[9] but also makes an argument consistent with cognitive science that worldviews function as "operating systems" for our minds:
  - "Whatever worldview or worldviews we hold shape what we notice or ignore,
  - how we interpret what we see and experience,
  - how we process information,

---

[9] Sire there (and as his "refined" definition in his (2004) work) defines "worldview" as follows:

> A worldview is a commitment, a fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be expressed as a story or in a set of presuppositions (assumptions which may be true, partially true or entirely false) that we hold (consciously or subconsciously, consistently or inconsistently) about the basic constitution of reality, and that provides the foundation on which we live and move and have our being. (2009, p. 20)

In this work he adds an eighth question to the seven listed below:

> 8. What personal, life-orienting core commitments are consistent with this worldview?

His emphasis on story is valuable, and in his (2004) work he observes a similar concern motivating the philosopher Charles Taylor to use the expression "social imaginary" rather than "worldview" (*cf.* Sire, 2004, p. 59), and he devotes a chapter in the same work to the importance of *master stories* (pp. 110 *ff.*), stating, for example, that

> A worldview is not a story or a set of presuppositions, but it can be expressed in those ways. When I reflect on where I and the whole of the human race have come from or where my life or humanity itself is headed, my worldview is being expressed as a story. Each major worldview has its own metanarrative, its own master story. (p. 145)

In James W. Sire's earlier text, *The Universe Next Door: A Basic Worldview Catalog* (1997), his basic questions are as follows:

> 1. What's really real?
> 2. What's the nature of the external world?
> 3. What's a human being?
> 4. What happens after death?
> 5. Why and how can one know anything?
> 6. How does one determine – and what is – right and wrong?
> 7. What is the meaning of history?

In Sire's (2004), *Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept*, he lists the same seven basic questions (pp. 20-21), but, again, he has in this work a more mature understanding of worldviews as pretheoretical (even if capable of abstract elaboration and precision) and revealed fundamentally by behavior, not words (though words, too, are acts).

    - and ultimately what decisions we will make and how we will act.
    - […] Worldviews shape what we think is plausible and reject what does not seem plausible." (p. 27)

Interestingly, the apologetic use of "worldview" as a more neutral frame for evaluatively comparing worldviews is not limited to Christian writers. One example is Thomas W. Clark's defense of naturalism, *Encountering Naturalism: A Worldview and Its Uses* (2007), which introduces and defends naturalism and focuses on questions like "what exists, how reality is organized, and how we fit into it" (p. 1) with chapters like "What Do We Know? How Do We Know It?" and "Who Are We?" Clark's work may function as an appropriate transition to the other primary class of thinkers who use the "worldview" category, although generally without an explicitly apologetic intent; these, namely, are academics who seek a broad, general category that encompasses as many human (and even non-human) perspectives and behaviors as possible.

One compelling theorization of "worldview" – with a number of practical examples of its application – is that of Kearney (1975, 1984), a now-deceased professor emeritus of anthropology at the University of California, Riverside, whose work is heavily influenced by historical materialism. This may best be illustrated by his conviction that awareness and understanding of "worldview" may promote human liberation and by his recognition that worldviews are rooted in the material conditions of class, racialization, and economic status and frequently tested, as William James might say, by their practical utility—this in contrast to conceptions of "worldview" that are highly idealist or abstract. (Below, one of the values of the approach to worldviews taken by Taves et al. is that, like Kearney, it rejects the notion that social science, as a "science," is value-free and objective, while not abandoning the quest for reliable "facts.") One of the main reasons I appreciate his perspective is that he focuses on the *autological-ecological* divide: "A world view comprises images of Self and of all that is recognized as not-Self, plus ideas about relationships between them, as well as other ideas" (1984, p. 41). Also, his theory, though perhaps more influenced by Kant (or structuralism) than cognitive science, assumes that the first problem a worldview must address is those *a priori* categories[10] that are universal products of evolutionary pressures, the "universal set of diagnostic categories to describe worldviews" (*ibid.*, p. 65); the possible Kantian genealogy of them may become obvious when they are listed:

- self and other,
- relationship,
- classification,
- causality, and

[10] Consider Kant's 12 *a priori* categories:

- unity, plurality, and totality – the concept of *quantity;*
- reality, negation, and limitation – the concept of *quality;*
- inherence and subsistence, cause and effect, and community – the *concept of relation;* and,
- possibility-impossibility, existence-nonexistence, and necessity and contingency – the *concept of modality.*

One may note, for example, that different worldviews approach, for example, the questions of whether the universe is unitary or plural and dynamic, the direction and pervasiveness of causality, and what is possible or impossible. So Kant's categories might also tempt one to derive general, comparative worldview studies categories therefrom.

- space and time.[11]

The framework I am attempting to supply in this work likewise foregrounds spatiality (including the egocentric self and the allocentric "others" of environment, conspecifics, and allospecifics) and temporality (especially in the form of *myth* or a *livable* even if known-to-be-fictional *history*—see Chapter 3), as well as problems of categorization or classification and the relations (even on occasion that most challenging and explanatory of relations, causality) that obtain between identified categories. Kearney's second problem is what factors modulate or give positive characteristics to the *a priori* categories; he identifies two: external and internal causes. External causes include the environment, history, and, of course, the material conditions of production; internal causes acknowledge the importance of competing worldview assumptions and the drive to integrate and harmonize them. His third problem is praxiological and decisively Marxist—what are the effects and behavioral results of the worldview? This understanding of worldview is mature and highly applicable to responsible anthropological work. But further progress has been made in worldview studies, extending beyond the *anthro*pological to encompass all living things.

Vidal (2008), a philosopher with a strong background in cognitive science, draws on L. Apostel and J. Van der Veken (1991) to propose a worldview studies approach rooted in fundamental questions that have to be addressed even by a bacterium[12] (though, in such cases, not meta-represented and articulated):

1. What is? – Ontology (model of reality as a whole)
2. Where does it all come from? – Explanation (model of the past)
3. Where are we going? – Prediction (model of the future)
4. What is good and what is evil? – Axiology (theory of values)

---

[11] Earlier, Redfield (1953) proposed the following worldview universals: self (the I and the me) and other (the human (the young and the old, the male and the female, us and them) and the non-human (God and nature)), space and time, birth and death. Based on my focus on spatial cognition relative to the *world*ness of worldviews, I also like his focus, like Kearney's, on self and other, but I find its subdivisions clunky and rather arbitrary.

[12] Taves (2019, p. 7) states:

> In thinking about world-making from an evolutionary perspective, we have relied on interdisciplinary research on self-models in humans, other animals, and robots (for an overview, see Metzinger 2007). It led us to the realization that even the simplest *mobile organism* must distinguish between itself and its world (however basically perceived) and act in accord with basic goals, such as survival and reproduction. This means that, when translated into the language of predictive processing, other animals are required to generate implicit answers to basic questions. (emphasis added)

This is good, but unwarranted assumptions may be built by some readers into the expression "mobile organism." As with the bias to think of the "senses" only as they are directed outward, in sight, vision, even touch and, most suggestively, taste and smell, which take the outer world into the body in a more intimate manner, to the neglect of interoceptive senses, so intimately related to the affective states that shape decision making, like baroreceptors, osmoreceptors, glucoreceptors, and other chemoreceptors and mechanoreceptors, one may tend to think of ways of life with implicit answers to worldview questions as only pertaining to "mobile organisms" that are animals like us, even if microscopic. But motility of various external and internal sorts is a feature common to all domains and kingdoms of living systems. And at most larger levels, one is dealing primarily with composite organisms, like lichen, and other forms of mutualism, all the way up to superorganisms, to which human groups are sometimes likened. One can surface BQ answers, for example, in the fascinating behaviors of mycorrhizal networks, in which the more animal-like fungi and plants mutually assist each other with processes like digestion, nutrient supply, information transferal, and others that can take on an emergent quality of being itself a kind of dynamic organism.

5. How should we act? – Praxeology (theory of actions)
6. What is true and what is false? – Epistemology (theory of knowledge)

Within religious studies, Taves, Asprem, and others have returned to Ninian Smart's (Smart, 2000) call to reform the discipline to be "worldview studies" (Droogers, 2014; see also, Juergensmeyer, 2010; Paden, 2006) and have drawn on the more evolutionary and cognitive science approaches to "worldview" to propose worldview categories (or, more precisely, implicit "way of life" (ethological) categories that may be answered based on behavior and may become, at higher levels, "worldviews"[13]) consistent with panspecies cognition and evolutionary challenges. In "Psychology, Meaning Making and the Study of Worldviews: Beyond Religion and Non-Religion," Taves, Asprem, and Ihm (2018) formulated certain BQs of worldview studies into Bayesian predictive coding terms consistent with evolutionary pressures and problems relevant to an organism's self-and-world model (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Metzinger, 2003, 2007):

*Big Questions in the Language of (Evolutionary) Predictive Processing*

| Big Question | Language of (Evolutionary) Predictive Processing |
|---|---|
| Ontology: What exists for the organism? | Organisms actively select and appraise incoming information against top-down predictions (based in genetics and/or prior experience) in order to guess "what is". In doing so, they create self-and-world models. |
| Axiology: What should it strive for? What are its goals? | Ultimate preferences (good and bad) are built into the organism's world-and-self models through a natural selection of goals: organisms embodying models that strive for survival-enhancing uses of available affordances (food, mating, avoidance of predators and environmental dangers) prevail. |
| Praxeology: What does the organism do? How does it act? | Best available actions in a situation are determined from an organism's best prediction of what is (ontology) in accord with the affordance-based goals and values embodied in its self-model (axiology). |
| Epistemology: How does it know what is true about the world? | Organisms embody a Bayesian epistemology that constantly tests "what is true" through probability-based interactions with the environment constrained by survival pressures. Revising the models can be very slow and often work on the population rather than the individual level through natural selection. |

Table 1 (from Taves, Asprem, and Ihm, 2018, p. 209)

Importantly, they leave out of this table a category that they at the time regarded as a BQ, *viz.*, cosmology:

> The cosmology question – where do we come from and where are we going – is premised on mental time travel and narrative synthesis (imagining past and future events, allowing for the discovery of beginnings and endings, *e.g.*, death and procreation), which is why we left it out of Table 1. (*ibid.*, p. 210)

They are right that in its robust forms the "cosmology" question may only be answered and articulated by drawing on advanced cognitive capacities, but if one reformulates the category "cosmology" as Vidal (2008) does, into *explanation* (modeling the past; might one call this *etiology*?) and *prediction* (modeling the future, or *futurology*), these forms of modelling are hardly unique to humans and are basic to predictive processing (*cf.* Clark, 2016).

[13] They argue,

> Developing a worldview, as defined here, requires the cognitive ability to *ask* as well as answer the BQs; it thus presupposes sophisticated forms of social cognition and self-representation, the ability to engage in imaginative "mental time travel" (MTT; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007), and the capacity to represent the world through symbols and narrative. Thus, we limit worldviews proper to those social animals – primarily humans -- who have the cognitive ability to develop and use *conventional* as well as natural affordances (Ramstead, Veissière, & Kirmayer, 2016) and to imagine alternative scenarios. (Taves, Asprem, and Ihm, 2018, p. 209)

In her Gunning Lectures (19-21 March 2018), I would draw attention to Taves's return to the use of the concepts "path" and "goal" to refer, respectively, to "praxeology" and "axiology" and the emphasis she places on the broad issue of "situation." Beginning with *situation*, her first robust reference to "situation" in her first lecture (primarily intended to address the religious studies disciplinary problems of definition, scale and scope, bias, and stasis) locates it, within the framework of the Worldviews Research Group (Vidal, 2008), under the category of "Anthropology," which asks the Big Questions (BQs), "What is the situation in which we find ourselves? What is our nature?" One might critique this category as somewhat messy: "anthropology" does ask what the nature of humanity is (it is thus a panspecies BQ but not one relevant to other living things, aliens in SF, unicorns in fantasy, etc.), but the question of our *situation* extends beyond the human "self" to the ecological/environmental domain. This apparent messiness, however, may be appropriate. An organism's situation might be understood as an environmentally-responsive, goal-oriented co-arising self-and-world model or being-in-the-world; as Taves goes on to state in Lecture II, "Because the world is constituted from the point of view of the organism, it does not exist apart from the organism. Generating a world-model, as a result, co-constitutes a self-model: a set of expectations about its bodily extension, reach, needs, and so on (*cf.* Metzinger, 2003, 2007)." Situations are environmental and external, calling on one to respond to them, and probabilistically modeled, habituated schemas that one brings, one might say in idealist terms as "intuitions," to the situation prior to sensory input. The situation both calls on one to make and affords a response, and the calls and affordances are co-constituted in self-and-world or being-in-the-world.

In Taves's Gunning Lecture II, she provides a slightly modified version of the table above in Taves, Asprem, and Ihm (2018, p. 209):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Ontology**<br>**What exists?** | Organisms actively select and appraise incoming information against top-down predictions (based in genetics and/or prior experience) in order to guess "what is". In doing so, they create self- and world-models. |
| **Cosmology**<br>**Who am I?** | The organism's self-model provides an answer to the most basic cosmology question. |
| **Ethology: What is the situation in which I find myself?** | The organism's world-model provides an answer to the most basic situational question. |
| **Axiology**<br>**What is my goal? What is good and bad?** | Ultimate preferences (good and bad) are built into the organism's world-and-self models through a natural selection of goals: organisms embodying models that strive for survival-enhancing uses of available affordances (food, mating, avoidance of predators and environmental dangers) prevail. |
| **Praxeology**<br>**What do I do? How do I act?** | Best available actions in a situation are determined from an organism's best prediction of what is (ontology) in accord with the affordance-based goals and values embodied in its self-model (axiology). |
| **Epistemology**<br>**How do I know what is true about the world?** | Organisms embody a Bayesian epistemology that constantly tests "what is true" through probability-based interactions with the environment constrained by survival pressures. Revising models can be very slow and often works on the population rather through natural selection. |

Table 2 (from Taves, 2018)

One may note the addition of "Cosmology" and "Ethology." As I shall argue below in more detail, I would replace her "Cosmology" with "Autology" (self-model) and her "Ethology" with "Cosmology" (world-model; again, these are co-implicated but can be abstractly distinguished; the problem and study of the "situation" more broadly, particularly as

reflecting affordances for goal-directed action in the context of my rhetorical focus, might be called "Kairology.") And the category most worldview studies scholars have designated "Cosmology," I would draw on Vidal (2008) to divide into "Aetiology" (Explanation, or, Past Model, Priors) and "Mellonology" (Prediction, Future Model, also reflected in one's Priors—mental time travel between hypothetical spatiotemporal models is an advanced cognitive capacity; and very advanced abilities are assumed in the elaboration of explanation and prediction into questions like, Where did everything come from? And what is the fate of all things?).

Taves next analyzes the developmental stages of the ability to make sense of events, and I generally agree[14] with her developmental scheme, itself based on the work of Merlin Donald. However, I would note that Taves et al.'s approach is very conscious of the dynamic between cortical and sub-cortical (personal and sub-personal) levels and, similarly, that between the forebrain and the mid- and hindbrain contributions, but a vital element in both the study of worldview/perspective and spatiality is the lateralized character of the brain and the dynamic between the two hemispheres. Her excellent analysis of the difference between articulated and enacted behavior in the case of AA might be supplemented by thinking about how the "worldview" of the articulated self and the "worldview" of the enacted self reflect hemispheric differences. As she notes, the "articulated" self of the typical AA

> top-down perspective reflects the powerful modern cultural schema that depicts us as autonomous individuals (not social animals) who can (or at least should) direct our own lives through our conscious and deliberate choices [….] The second step calls on the alcoholic to acknowledge the need for a Power greater than themselves. This directly challenges the operative cultural schema and signals a shift in identity and the possibility of an alternative way of life. The third step asks them to commit their lives to this alternative. (Taves, Gifford Lecture II, 2018)

The first modern (or neoliberal) cultural schema captures many of the illusions of the left-hemisphere when not moderated by the right (and the noteworthy lack of success in many cases for people who attempt the AA method of self-transformation likely has a lot to do with its call to shift, more generally, to a cultural schema that otherwise lacks plausibility for them). In any case, though I arrived at this perspective by initially focusing on how the two hemispheres process spatiality and, in that sense, the "world," I have concluded that the two hemispheric styles are fundamental to worldview categorization.

Again, based on the study of the brain's lateralized character, I would modify Taves's treatment of the mimetic stage somewhat to note that humans' communicative interactions with each other for the majority of our history were musical,[15] drawing heavily on the right hemisphere and its social-emotional intelligence. Mimetic communication

---

[14] I am not sure that I would go so far as to say that primates dwell in a world of exclusively natural affordances. Primates and others have learned social roles, signaling that is community-specific (*i.e.*, dialects), rudimentary tool construction and use (including dolls, particularly as aids for mourning the loss of infants), and so on. It is hard to gain access to another's perspective and way of life, even through close observation of behavior. That said, advanced non-human animals do seem to live in a far less anxious immediacy of generally environmentally-cued event representations rather than hypothetically generating them without external stimuli.

[15] This is consistent with Taves's (Lecture II, n. 3) quoting Donald as noting, "Rhythm is an excellent paradigm for mimetic skill" (p. 6).

certainly transferred knowledge, skills, and events, particularly in a highly emotive and empathetic mode, but the accompaniment of this mimetic (no doubt often dance-like) behavior with music is crucial to understanding ancient worldviews and the worldview transformations that have occurred subsequently (see McGilchrist, 2009; Appendix asdfasdf; and, the following section).

It is challenging to weigh in on the contrast between mimetic-recounted and textual-theoretic stages and forms of representation, since the question of the immediate-mediated relationship between self and word and text is obviously vexed (see, *e.g.*, Derrida and his many interlocutors), but I would again assert with McGilchrist (2009), based on fundamental hemispheric differences in perceiving and approaching relevant problems in the world, that the immediacy of an oral and highly musical traditional culture and the detachment and criticism of a textual elite and, more recently, a generally literate population do seem to produce very different worldview types or styles. The increasing virtuality of our age, furthermore, presses the development and prioritization of the left-hemispheric style.

*A Concluding Comment on Fictional Worldview Categories:*

The BQs that are pan-species and panhuman are foundational, but artifice and fictionality – the positing of novelties produced through culturally evolved resources – raise questions and problems that are not grounded in our or other species' evolutionary environments. New, fictional special things generate new understandings of them, new "-ologies" (one might call them *metaxiologies* or *mythaxiologies*): *e.g.*,

- gods produce *theologies* (with specific subsets like the countless *Christologies*, *pneumatologies*, and *Mariologies*, Plotinus' *henology*, and so on)—though much SF explores *atheological* questions (*e.g.*, *xenological* and *cosmological*—especially *futurological* or *eschatological*—but also often in hard SF exposes readers to the numerous -ologies that are the domain of contemporary science);
- angels generate *angelologies*—though much horror addresses problems of *diabology* and *daemonology*, *necrology*, and forms of what might be called *cryptozoology* (*e.g.*, *monsterology*, *phantasmology* and *ghostology*, and more broadly what might be called a specialized form of "miasmology");
- fantasy literature often explores *magicological* (and less frequently *thaumatological*) questions as well as genre-specific *cryptozoological* problems (*e.g.*, *dracology*, *fairyology*, *giantology*, *nymphology*, and so on);
- the ideals of goodness, wisdom, beauty, truth, peace, &c., *agathology*, *sophiology*, *kalology*, *alethiology*, *irenology*, and the rest;
- sin and salvation, *hamartiology* and *soteriology*;
- special edifices, *naology*;
- race, *raciology* (an especially noteworthy pseudoscience);
- money, *plutology* (economics);
- political systems and laws, *politology* (political science) and *nomology*;
- authoritative stories like histories and myths, *historiography* and *mythography* (which I designate under the umbrella *mythistoriography*, and there are, too, genre-based subsets like *chresmology*, *hymnology*, etc.);
- special human psychic abilities (found throughout fantastika), *parapsychology* with its subsets.

## Appendix 11: The Rhetorical "Situation" – *Staseis* and *Memoria*

Horace wrongly states, *caelum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt*.[1] I state "wrongly" because a changed situation is one of the most likely things to transform the mind, to compel an adaptive shift in its perspective and even, more profoundly and enduringly, its worldview. Indeed, a new "world" or situation virtually necessitates a new worldview. Philip K. Dick defines "science fiction" in part as follows:

> [The fictitious world of SF] is our world dislocated by some kind of mental effort on the part of the author, our world transformed into that which it is not or not yet. This world must differ from the given in at least one way, and this one way must be sufficient to give rise to events that could not occur in our society—or in any known society present or past. There must be a coherent idea involved in this dislocation; that is, the dislocation must be a conceptual one, not merely a trivial or a bizarre one—*this* is the essence of science fiction, the conceptual dislocation within the society so that as a result a new society is generated in the author's mind, transferred to paper, and from paper it occurs as a convulsive shock in the reader's mind, *the shock of dysrecognition*. He [sic] knows that it is not his actual world that he is reading about. (1995, p. 99)

The fictitious worlds of fantastika are characterized by this rhetorical[2] – that is to say, persuasive – *dislocation*, the making of a *situation* (a "world") that makes a difference. It is not the "given" or consensus[3] reality; rather than being the known, it embodies in some respect a previously unknown; instead of being the usual, it is unusual, abnormal, unnatural – even supernormal, supernatural, special. This boundary-violation and rhetorical worldmaking of things, forces, people, and so on that differ from consensus reality – which I call *estrangements*[4] – produce new problems and questions that function not only as plot engines but also as provocations to know and perceive in new ways.

---

[1] Those who hurry across the sea change their atmosphere, not their mind.

[2] See Appendix 26.

[3] The "consensus" of what constitutes the situation is, of course, always contingent. A naturalistic, secular, multicultural-humanist, capitalist-democratic worldview may, for some, feel like the general consensus reality that everyone inhabits, but this is not the case. As shall be discussed in more detail below, the language of "worldview" is often invoked in contemporary settings by certain Christians who wish to point out that the "secular" worldview is one among many and, having placed it on an equal setting, to engage in an evaluative project that results in proving the superiority of the "Christian worldview." In the past, the general category of "worldview" was used, for example, by the Nazis to engage in a comparable project in a more secular register (not to compare the aims of the two groups, the latter's being profoundly abhorrent). This is just to state, at the outset, as shall be explained in more detail below, that "worldview" has semantic baggage and is not necessarily a more neutral term than "religion." As with other religious studies projects, in which a definition of "religion" is typically stipulated by the scholar relative to their purposes, "worldview" means something quite specific within the bounds of my framework. Part of the function of this chapter is to specify what sense of "worldview" seems most productive for the study of made-up worldviews in fantastika.

[4] In this work, I was tempted to use *novums* in an extended sense that Suvin and even Csicsery-Ronay would object to since "novum" has been intended as an SF-specific term, but I decided instead to use the expression *estrangements* so as not to cause confusion and to acknowledge that Suvin regards both fantasy and SF as literatures of estrangement, with SF dealing with estrangement in a specifically "cognitive" manner.

*Situation and Memory*

Narratives are persuasive, transformative journeys through simulated, re-created spaces (see Tamir, Bricker, Dodell, & Mitchell, 2016); for deeply cognitive reasons, this makes them memorable, lasting, impactful. I emphasize the material spatiality of *world* as part of *worldview*, and this makes certain rhetorical categories especially relevant, in particular *memoria*, the fourth canon of rhetoric.

One may begin with the observation that *rhetorical worldmaking responds to a situation*. Bitzer defines the rhetorical "situation" as follows:

> A complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence. (1969, p. cite)

To briefly elaborate on this using some basic rhetorical concepts, this passage is suggestive of a number of classical (esp. Greek) rhetorical ideas. One of these is *kairos*, the "appropriate moment," which basically refers to the idea that the effectiveness of a rhetorical intervention will be strongly related to whether one makes it appropriate to the situation; this in turn is related to the concept of "decorum" and is an aspect of the rhetorical "charm" or "grace" known as "charisma." It might be said that decorous or graceful (one might nowadays call it "genre-literate") rhetoric, as inspiring *pistis* (persuasion, faith), avails itself of the right moment or opening (*kairos*) to make use of *to prepon* (the appropriate—one's knowledge of conventions, genres, facts, and so on) to realize *to dynaton* (the possible, the rhetorically sought-after situation), that is, the imaginatively-sensed, potential "significant modification of the exigence."

So rhetorical worldmaking responds to the world, to a situation by *creating a situation*, a new world. As Vatz notes (cite), responding to Bitzer's notion of the rhetorical situation, this is often achieved through event selection, which makes certain things salient and significant. Like a magician who directs attention in order to achieve an illusion,[5] rhetoric involves selecting which events to include and exclude – and to what degrees – in order to constrain and enable certain possibilities of interpretation. And with Consigny (cite), in his response to Bitzer and Vatz, one may observe how the ancient rhetorical category of "topics" (*topoi*, rhetorical "places" or "standpoints"[6]) makes the spatial character of this process explicit: the "situation" that is created rhetorically to respond to the exigence

[5] *Cf.* Kuhn, Amlani, and Rensink 2008; Macknik et al. 2008; Demacheva et al. 2012 for cognitive sciene work on stage magic.

[6] Mary Jo Neitz's chapter in *The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion* (Engler & Stausberg, 2011) on feminist methodologies notes that knowledge is always limited and produced in specific social contexts by individuals with particular concerns. (Thomassen's chapter likewise notes that sound philology has always demanded attention to such contextual and discourse-related matters, which is of course true of this work's rhetorical focus and methodology.) Her focuses on what Neitz calls the "feminist standpoint." The use of the term *standpoint* makes clear the importance of reflexivity, of locating one's position in relation to one's research, admitting it, and openly constructing knowledge with the intent to empower. Because category formation is a consequence of picking out those features of the world that call out to one, one's position and interests will necessarily be implicit in the categories one devises. Feminist and neo-Marxist approaches engage in a hermeneutic of suspicion that explicitly attempts to construct knowledge from positions that were historically oppressed, marginalized, or neglected. The main point of the feminist standpoint method, which would seem to apply to any such "standpoint" method, is to engage with the standpoint of one's object of study, in this case the disadvantaged, and then construct knowledge with the aim of empowering them. This method is ideological and socially motivated, but explicitly so.

the rhetor sensed in the situation is a *topos* or *locus*, a place (or a new synthesis of *topoi*). C. S. Lewis puts the matter thus, early in his *Preface to Paradise Lost*:

> The first question [Milton] asked himself was not "What do I want to say?" but "What *kind* of poem do I want to make?"—to which of the great pre-existing *kinds*, so different in the expectations they excite and fulfill, so diverse in their powers, … do I intend to contribute?"

Different rhetorical environments or situations supply specific affordances – powers and expectations – so that the selection among genres and topoi, within the framework of stasis theory (that is, the understanding of rhetorical standpoint), involves knowledge of "the appropriate" – the range of available cultural forms – together with a vision of "what is possible." In fact, stipulation of a genre goes far in prefiguring a worldview; Abbott (2008) states,

> [A]ll *genres* pre-package the world. Nineteenth-century detective fiction, the classical epic, 1950s apocalyptic science fiction, eighteenth-century epistolary novels, Jacobean revenge tragedy, film noir, and all other genres are each freighted with subcultural ideas on subjects like gender, what is knowable, the chance of happiness, freedom of choice, the existence or nonexistence of God. (p. 154)

1950s apocalyptic science fiction, for example, draws on a variety of *topoi* – some common to SF in general, some specific to the 1950s, to apocalyptic SF, and so on. These topoi tend to include recurring motifs and themes[7] that pre-package the world, that disclose certain questions[8] and concerns, things and activities, etc. as salient and significant.

In her recent essay in *Religion*, "From Religious Studies to Worldview Studies," Taves makes prominent use of the concept of "situation." It is the fourth of her "Big Questions" (BQs) that characterize a worldview. She defines "SITUATION" as constituting the important question or problem, "What is the situation in which we find ourselves? (Who are 'we'?)" (Taves, 2020, p. 138). I will discuss the worldview categories and questions advanced by Taves and others in more detail below, explaining how I see them relating to the embodied spatiality (and temporality) of *worlds* in fictional worldmaking, but here I would note two things about how this BQ is formulated. The first formulation is locative; it might be restated as, "Where are we?" And I certainly would agree with this locative orientation, having advocated over many years now for the increased integration of spatial cognition research within the cognitive science of religion and, furthermore, in dialog with the "spatial turn" in religious studies specifically and the humanities in general.[9] The second question is the question, one might say, of *physics*, referring of course to the old sense of *phusis* or *natura*: "What is our nature?" To suggest an intimate connection between environment and self – between the ecological and the autological – flows quite naturally from an evolutionarily-informed perspective. That said, rather than treating this as one of the BQs (#4), it might be better understood as the umbrella BQ from which the others may be derived.

---

[7] See Bleiler's "Motif and Theme Index" in *Science Fiction: The Early Years* (pp. 861-924) and in *The Gernsback Years* (pp. 621-698).

[8] Wolfe states, "In all probability, science fiction will ultimately have to be characterized by the questions it raises rather than by the answers it offers" (1979, p. xiii).

[9] See Appendix 9.

In conversation with Taves about this dissertation before the publication of her article, I affirmed how useful I likewise found the category of "situation" given its prominent role in rhetoric. Since my framework seeks to integrate the rhetorical or writing studies (WrS) project of analysis of texts and the (religious studies reformulated as) worldview studies (WvS) project of better understanding human (and nonhuman) worldviews, "situation" is a powerful bridge category.

Early in his excellent overview of the history of "worldview" as a concept, Naugle (2002)[10] draws on an example from C.S. Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia*:[11]

> But why did Uncle Andrew interpret the founding of Narnia by Aslan's song in such a dreadful manner? What was it about him that gave him such a different view of this enchanted world? The answer, Lewis suggests, is this: "For what you see and hear depends a good deal *on where you are standing*: it also depends *on what sort of person you are*" ([emphasis mine,] p. 125). Because of who he was and where he stood, Uncle Andrew saw everything differently and made himself unable to hear Aslan's voice. And as the Lion himself said, "If I spoke to him, he would hear only growlings and roarings. Oh Adam's sons, how cleverly you defend yourselves against all that might do you good!" (p. 171). (pp. 1-2)

Where one stands and what sort of person one is; the ecological and the autological. Again, one finds an assertion of their close association—this time in the context of illustrating how one's worldview, arising therefrom, shapes what one can know, what goods one may have access to, what exists for one. Naugle's perspective on the meaning of "worldview" is decisively shaped by his own Christian worldview—as we shall see below, this is a dominant strand in the push for "worldview studies," making the term itself hardly a neutral one. My own view of "worldviews" might be best characterized as Wittgensteinian. Consider the way Naugle characterizes Wittgenstein's perspective:

> If indeed world pictures are a kind of mythology — stories with themes that may cohere one with another but do not correspond to the real world — then an attempt to explain this outlook on life would be a matter of persuasion, not scientific or philosophic argumentation in pursuit of truth. Thus, and finally, world pictures are promulgated rhetorically and are accepted in faith. (2002, p. 160)

This is an excellent way of expressing how I have come to understand worldviews in the years I have spent on this project. I discuss the *mythical* character of allomythic worldviews (and worldviews in general) in more detail in Chapter 3, but with Wittgenstein (and figures like Nietzsche) I would insist that one's *Weltbild* or *Weltanschauung* has not evolved to give a true picture of the really-real thing-in-itself, but that human worldviews involve persuasion (*i.e.*, rhetorical initiation leading to *pistis*, "faith"). I am in this work of course influenced by

---

[10] It is worth noting that Naugle's handling of the concept of "worldview" is evenhanded and fair, but he has an apologetic and theological orientation (*e.g.*, Naugle, 2002, pp. 251-252 and 253 *ff.*) that is common to much of the popular worldview literature, as I will exemplify below.

[11] Kierkegaard makes use of the concept of a "lifeview," which he regards as the essence of a novel possessing substance and unity—a "liveview" is a special achievement of a mature soul, not something possessed by everyone (see Naugle, 2002, pp. 75 *ff.*). I mention this both approvingly and critically—I approve of Kierkegaard and Naugle's (and other Christian apologists') willingness to apply the worldview and "lifeview" perspective to fiction, but I would push back on Kierkegaard's effort (like those who press the SF/sci-fi distinction) to make a "lifeview" a special property only of great novels.

the Wittgensteinian "linguistic turn," but it's important to note that Wittgenstein's mature understanding of language shares with Nietzsche (and Heidegger and others) a keen awareness of the role of body and place (*i.e.*, world) in one's worldview. A worldview, as a persuasive, lifegiving, meaning-making[12] mythology, requires the bounded particularities of body and world (*cf.* Naugle, 2002, p. 101). Like Ong (1969), and more recently with Taves and Asprem with their focus on event cognition, I regard "worldview" as encompassing far more than a vision-focused "view" or "picture" of an objectivated world (*cf.* Heidegger, 1977); a "worldview" embraces and helps constitute self-and-world as known and meaningful events.

I began this section with reference to classical rhetorical concepts. I shall conclude it by discussing Aristotle's *Poetics*,[13] using it to explain how this ancient rhetorical work anticipates much cutting-edge theory in religious studies and cognitive narratology (anticipating the chapter to follow) and, finally, stressing how a world- and worldview-based focus on narratological analysis of fantastical worldviews brings back a focus on the rhetorical category of *memoria*, which is central to this chapter's spatial focus on "world" as part of worldview, fictional or otherwise.

First, Aristotle's notion that a story aims at *catharsis* is rooted in an understanding of storytelling as the provision of an active, question- or idea-oriented journey, a sort of crossing-over, to a truth, an end, a final dwelling-place embodying the story's worldview. My references here to "crossing-over" and a "dwelling-place" are meant to allude to Tweed's theoretical (and highly spatial[14]) understanding of "religion," with which I shall engage further below; so too, my use of "question-oriented" points to connections with the concept of BQs in worldview studies (in Aristotle's understanding, especially the *anthropological* BQ of human nature). Stories raise and answer questions – and powerful stories tend to raise and resolve only one or at most a handful of powerful, central questions over the course of the narrative journey, which is composed of sub-stories or events. The narrative journey inevitably transforms the characters involved, and that transformation of the self (and coinciding temporal and spatial reconfiguration) is another way of putting things. A narrative transforms one self-and-situation into another, a new character or worldview and a new world. Aristotle states that storytelling is *imitative*, in that it deliberately re-creates the world in a way that arouses an action- or goal-oriented, emotive state in percipients as their minds re-create, simulate, or "imitate" the fictive or artificial

---

[12] Hummel, 2013, p. 113:

> Hijmans and Smaling (1997: 15-20) consider worldview to be a specific type of cognitive and affective system for attaching order and meaning to the surrounding world; one may distinguish between collective, cultural meaning systems and individual meaning systems [….] In a meaning system one may find answers to questions such as "What is Truth?" and "What is good or bad?"

And the categories they come up with are rather typical; they are as follows (Hijmans and Smaling, 1997, p. 17):

- What is considered beautiful (aesthetics)?
- What is morally good behavior (ethics)?
- Why do humans live and die (ontology)?
- What can be trusted as true (epistemology)?

[13] I find this appropriate, among other reasons, including its canonical status as an influential rhetorical work, because in Aristotle's culture and context the ties between dramatic narrative and "religious" ritual and devotion were regarded as obvious.

[14] Tweed states: "[R]eligions might be understood as spatialized and spatializing cultural forms" (1997, p. 91).

world, as well as the minds of the characters (*cf.* theory of mind research[15]). As Dewey would say, with Aristotle, art re-creates *experience*. Aristotle is well aware of the fact that incidents or events in stories progress using *probable* or *necessary* incidents or events; that is, as shall be elaborated in the following reference chapter, narratives hijack our probabilistic self- and world-modeling system as described in the event cognition literature and, more broadly, as the dominant contemporary model of cognition. Other than certain postmodern experimental works that defy conventional cognitive expectations, stories tend to strive after a probabilistic sense of causal unity, an inner consistency of adherence to the probable and the necessary; indeed, part of the satisfaction of such plots is that they tend to supply a sense of unity and coherence reality itself does not, while still including surprises that often take advantage of cognitive biases. [16] As imitations of the world, they abstract away much that is arbitrary, absurd, and confusing, though some inclusion of chance is always necessary to maintain dramatic tension, move plot along, and preserve the sense of verisimilitude. It's an art of playing in accord with and against expectation; of authorial control of the "curse of knowledge" to inhabit characters' (and percipients') state of ignorance while deploying the probable and the necessary to convincingly steer the plot while also evoking anxiety, questioning, and surprise.

Particularly relevant to this study is, of the six elements of tragedy identified by Aristotle (*mythos* [plot], *ethos* [the character played by given performer], *lexis* [the words], *dianoia* [the theme], *opsis*, and *melos* [the music]), that of "spectacle" (*opsis*). Aristotle's focus on tragedy and what one might call his "realist" worldview makes him rather dismissive of spectacle and artifice, but though he did not prize escapism or liberation from the tragedy and suffering of "reality," he still makes some useful observations about the fantastical. The otherworldly, dislocative *mise-en-scène* of fantastika is, one might say, the essence of what Aristotle calls "spectacle." The various species of Aristotelian plot may be mixed, and fantastika certainly draws on all of them. Aristotle notes that the epic is far more amenable to spectacle and artifice, admitting more of the improbable and marvelous.

*Mise-en-scène* – whether mundane or spectacular – is essentially locative, and this in turn raises the importance of the fourth rhetorical canon, *memoria*. As Tammie M. Kennedy (2009) argues in her dissertation, "Reclaiming *Memoria* for Writing Pedagogies: Toward a Theory of Rhetorical Memory," the rhetorical category of memory, though often neglected in writing studies and rhetoric and composition classes that are not focused on performance (*e.g.*, speech delivery, acting, etc.), is central to individual and group identity formation (that is, one's individual narrative or group history, one's memory, is constitutive of private and corporate selves), and because it is essentially embodied and emplaced, its inclusion in pedagogic interventions may reinforce critical pedagogical aims of liberation and empowerment. Though this is all true, I would draw on her work here to make a different point. The heavy overlap between the regions of the brain that map and manage space and

[15] Aristotle's *five principles of life* supply fine examples of how theory of mind may be evoked in narrative.
[16] Aristotle thought of catharsis in what we would call therapeutic terms, and of course there is a vast literature on the therapeutic effects of engaging with narratives. Regarding the sensation of surprise, Vera Tobin (2018) argues in *Elements of Surprise: Our Mental Limits and the Satisfactions of Plot*, that "well-made surprises" in narrative worldmaking exploit cognitive biases (*e.g.*, source monitoring and attribution errors, the hindsight bias, the spotlight effect, the illusion of transparency, and, especially, the drive to produce the illusion of probabilistic continuity (*e.g.*, that a character is a unified being who may surprise one by drawing on aspects of their experience that one neglected to give proper weight to—as opposed to simply acting insanely or inconsistently).

those that sustain long-term memory of the self-and-world points to a distinctive understanding of the relationship between narrative, world, and worldview. A worldview and way of life[17] is bound to an embodied and spatially located environment, and the basic cognitive architecture of memory constitutes these as inextricably linked. If worldviews are "chains of memory" (see Hervieu-Léger, 2000), so too are narratives. There is a tendency to think of memory as temporal, of narratives as disembodied. But all such chains are held together cognitively using capacities evolved to map and manage space.

In sum, *situation*, powerfully tied to *memoria* at the cognitive level, is a powerful WrS-WvS bridge category. A fictional worldmaker creates a novel situation – or, more precisely, a series of situational events that are chained together as a cognitive map, that is, a *narrative* – that is, if persuasive (and effectively exploitative of cognitive biases), transformative, arriving at a new possible dwelling-place, standpoint, or perspective. The following two appendices addresses in more depth a second, subsidiary, but important bridge category, a spatial category (spatial categories are especially promising in this regard—see Lefebvre, 1974, pp. 11, 413) that is constitutive of all situations: the *boundary*, *limit*, or *barrier*.

[17] See Sire, 2004, pp. 117 *ff.*

# Appendix 12: Boundaries in Fantastika

Any determinate situation, by reason of its determinacy and in order to be regarded as determinate, as *an event* rather than a boundless, indefinite, uncategorized, unknown flow, must have bounds applied to it, but a danger always lies in thinking that such mereological bounds, however intuitive, are natural or inherent, rather than applied or constructed. Borders are foundational to imaginary worlds (Hynes, 2017, pp. 3 ff.).

In a recent important work on SF and religion, *Sacred Space: The Quest for Transcendence in Science Fiction Film and Television* (2010), Cowan very much understands the category of "transcendence" as depending on the idea of *boundaries* or *limits*. He states,

> *Sacred Space* explores some of the ways that science fiction cinema and television have both challenged and reinforced the limits of belief, redefining the quest for transcendence, which is, put simply, the search for something beyond ourselves, the belief that outside the boundaries of everyday living something greater exists. (Cowan, 2010, p. 11)

That "transcendence" is a problematic category has been mentioned in the previous chapter and is discussed further in Chapter 3, but the relevance of boundaries – both their crossing and reinforcement, their dwelling-within and their violation and transformation[1] – to issues of world- and worldview-making cannot be overstated. The norms of "everyday living" and their exceptions – the abnormal, queer, supernatural, special, yes, even sacred and transcendent – mutually implicate each other. The Big Questions of any fantastical narrative, beyond those that are typical of everyday life – *i.e.*, that humans share with all other humans and, even, with all other life – will arise from the novel or special thing or things (the *estrangements*) that cause the storyworld to break from or boundary-cross over from consensus reality.

The horizon of one's worldview – the boundaries within which one dwells – very much shape what can be known, valued, pursued, avoided, and communicated—that is, the BQs. The formation of a worldview entails both liberty and constraint; the very limits that make a "world" show up as known, meaningful, interpretable, and useful also impress themselves upon one with the force of naturalized "realities" – and, indeed, the fantastical stories that imagine violating what Jaspers calls *Grenzsituationen*[2] are marked as "unrealistic" and often denounced as "escapist" in part because they seem so impossible. One of the first tasks of worldmaking is rulemaking: setting down the boundaries and limits of one's world (*e.g.*, the natural laws of contemporary scientific knowledge or the rules of a magical system or the conventions of some traditional worldview). And the "quest" to challenge boundaries is one to expand the horizon of one's world or to found a new world.

In the scholarship of fantastika, perhaps the finest early work, long before Cowan's, that explores the importance of the "barrier" is Gary K. Wolfe's (1979) *The Known and the Unknown: The Iconography of Science Fiction*. Wolfe's work on the dominant "icons" that

---

[1] *Cf.*, *e.g.*, Anttonen (1996, p. 43), who draws on Lakoff and Johnson and argues that the "sacred" is a category for fundamental boundary creation and negotiation, indeed, *the boundary* produced in the context of important category relations and transformations.

[2] These are the "limit" or "boundary" situations like suffering, guilt, and finitude that, as Heidegger so famously describes, jolt one out of inauthenticity.

are characteristic of science fiction and the worldview (he calls it a "religion") that it reflects and reinforces[3] is organized icons of the self and the world, or, as Wolfe states, the "environment" (the spaceship, the city, the wasteland) and "humanity" (the robot and the monster). But before exploring these, Wolfe devotes an important chapter to "The Image of the Barrier."

Briefly, Wolfe argues that the worldview of science fiction finds the unknown either in the barrier itself or in what lies beyond the barrier and asserts that any such obstacle to knowledge may and must be overcome: no limitation may stand in humanity's way to expansion, assimilation, and mastery. Wolfe is well aware of the white, Euro-cultural supremacist implications of this worldview (elsewhere he draws on previous SF studies that refer to it as a "consensus cosmogony" and "consensus future history" (*cf.* Wolfe, 1979, p. xi)) and, too, of the problem that authors fixated on how to solve problems and gain mastery often neglect to ask whether one ought to do so (*cf.*, *ibid.*, pp. 14-15, 35). His understanding of science fiction and the function of the barrier therein is provocative, but he makes a more general point that is broadly applicable to fantastika generally: "At some elementary level, the notion of a barrier is really an essential feature of most narrative plot construction: suspense is generated by the presence of some obstacle that must be overcome in order for a narrative to be brought to a satisfactory resolution" (Wolfe, 1979, p. 30). That the management and often overcoming of an obstacle or division tied to that obtaining between the known and the unknown, the natural and the un- or super-natural, and so on lies at the

---

[3] Wolfe states the following regarding *science fiction* and the worldview it embodies: "Science fiction deliberately uses the terms and structures of scientific thought to create mythic patterns, and the belief that underlies these patterns is a belief not so much in supernatural beings as in the almost supernatural power of rationality itself" (1979, p. 6). Wolfe makes the important (and controversial) claim that science establishes itself as a "religion" (and, elsewhere, "myth" (*cf.* pp. 3-5)) that seeks unqualified mastery of the world through its techniques of determination (*e.g.*, measurement and prediction) and manipulation or control whereby chaos is transformed into cosmos; as the literature of this scientific religion, science fiction embraces the ambition to transform everything unknown, and thus unmastered, into the known (*cf. ibid.*, pp. 10-15). (One may note that this seems to be in conflict or at least tension with Wolfe's understanding of SF's characteristic "sense of wonder" (see *ibid.*, pp. 23 *ff.*).)

It is for this reason that Wolfe adopts the religious language of the "icon":

> This abiding concern in science fiction with the dialectic of known and unknown has not only evolved a structural pattern that is common to many science-fiction works; it has also resulted in the development over the years of a number of recurrent iconic images that contain in themselves the dynamic tensions between known and unknown around which their narratives are likely to be structured [….] They are in fact icons, as representative of the fundamental beliefs and values that the genre explores as the icons of Christ were representative of the fundamental beliefs and values of the religion of the early Christians. (*ibid.*, p. 16

An icon does not merely represent. At least in orthodox Christianity, one may find the assertion that an icon makes the transcendent present. If in the SF worldview (at least according to Wolfe) a rationality that transforms everything unknown into the known is the supernatural, transcendent, or ultimate end, the patterns of this modern mythology put one into contact with it. Curiously, by such lights, narrative patterns that simply make present the known (*i.e.*, realist fiction) rather than the dynamic transubstantiation of the presenced unknown into the known, would be like idols, empty icons devoid of the sacred. Wolfe seems to refer to such a special property of the icon when he writes, "[T]he icon represents not a mimetic, but what has been called a "subjunctive" reality, portraying hypothetical environments and beings rather than imitations of real ones, and thus encompassing by its very mode of meaning a fundamental sensibility of the genre" (*ibid.*, p. 17). In spite of all the religious and mythological language Wolfe uses, he also understands science fiction as a subculture and its icons as expressing (and constraining) the concerns of the population that defines SF through its discursive activities (*cf. ibid.*, pp. xi-xii).

heart of fantastika and its allomythoi is a true insight. Much of the fiction published by Anglo-American, white men has, it is true, conflated the unknown and unnatural with others—women, people of color, Asians, Communists, homosexuals, etc. But fantastika authored by such others wrestles no less with the mysterious boundaries and obstacles faced from within their way of life and worldview. Furthermore, although science fiction may use scientific discovery, rationality, and technology to overcome the barrier of and to the unknown, other forms of fantastika find the powers to do so in, for example, the supernatural abilities of the human soul, the rituals and techniques of the magician or priest, and so on. They thereby supply a similar sense of reassurance and resolution without the triumphalist optimism in the powers of ratiocination and science-based techniques.

Modifying somewhat the argument made by John W. Morehead, in "'A World Without Rules and Controls, Without Borders or Boundaries': Matrixism, New Mythologies, and Symbolic Pilgrimages" (2012), I too would appeal to Aden's concept, in *Popular Stories and Promised Lands: Fan Cultures and Symbolic Pilgrimages* (1999), namely, that, in a manner comparable to pilgrimage, fantastical narratives playfully move one into and across a liminal threshold from the *habitus* (*sensu* Bourdieu) of everyday, consensus norms and "reality" (including grand, utopian, but often threadbare metanarratives such as nationalist exceptionalism, capitalist or technoscientific triumphalism, and so on) to alternative places of potential power and significance, new "promised lands," that may be communally enjoyed through the structures and situations of fandom. But I would further stress the liminal[4] aspect of this; the metaleptic passage from the extradiegetic world of *habitus* to the fantastical storyworld involves multiple boundary-crossings: (1) the primary shift or "escape"[5] from reality (the mundane, the known) to

---

[4] See also, Judith Kerman, "Drawing Lines in the Sand: The Fantastic Considered as an Instance of Liminality."

[5] *Cf.* Chris Rojek, *Ways of Escape: Modern Transformations in Leisure and Travel* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994). I do not want to stress the point overmuch, for we all seek vacations now and then. But I personally found refuge, a release from this world, in fantastical stories as a child—this in spite of Jehovah's Witnesses having a strong cultural aversion to fantastical stories (science fiction being more tolerated compared to the magical and, still worse, horrific, which appear dangerously close to the Satanic—*cf.* Waldron, 2005). Both of my parents are mentally disabled; my father's fury and unpredictable emotive tides and my mother's voices, visions, and sorrows, were terrifying and confusing. Our poverty, disorder, and stuffiness were embarrassing, as was being a Jehovah's Witness who was not permitted to associate with my peers or do a number of activities most American children participate in. Being gay didn't help either. But the above is selective and does not capture my gratitude to my grandparents who saved us, the infinite love of my mother, and the refuge my Kingdom Hall offered me as a child. Anyway, I have good reason to think my experience is not just anecdotal and is somewhat generalizable:

> Moreover, when the conditions of external reality are unsafe or aversive, fiction provides opportunities to escape into other realms. For example, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) estimated that 89% of children who experience sexual abuse create imaginary companions (Sanders, 1992). Children who experience trauma and escape into the relative safety of imaginary worlds seem to fare better than those who experience trauma and don't. Marjorie Taylor tells of Miriam, who created an imaginary companion with otherworldly abilities during her parents' divorce and mother's confinement to a mental hospital, and compares her to her older siblings who did not. While her siblings regressed, experiencing difficulties with school and sleep, Miriam experienced no such disturbances (Taylor, 1999). In subsequent work, Taylor showed that at-risk middle school children who created imaginary companions showed increased adjustment by high school (Taylor, Hulette, & Dishion, 2010). These findings suggest that the ability to explore challenging issues in a

fantasy (Cowan's *transcendent*, Wolfe's *unknown*, etc.) and (2) the lesser but repeated overcoming of narrative barriers, the journey of moving from subworld to subworld, as questions and problems are confronted and the unknown "chaos" becomes a determinate and familiar "cosmos," a world or worlds embodying one or more worldviews.

One of the foremost contemporary works on the genre of fantasy specifically is *Rhetorics of Fantasy* (2008), by Farah Mendlesohn. Her fundamental categories for works of fantasy likewise center on boundaries and spatiality. *Portal* or *quest* (or, *portal-quest*) fantasies characters depart the space (the frame world) that is familiar to them and travel to a space (a secondary world) that is vividly, intensely new. The novel, estranged land of portal or quest fantasy is, for Mendlesohn, the primary character in such stories. The popular Japanese genre of *isekai* focuses on this quality, interestingly not only using transport mechanisms like portals in wardrobes and paintings (as in C.S. Lewis) or dreams and holes in the ground (as in Lewis Carroll) but also mechanisms more specific to traditional and contemporary Japanese culture: reincarnation and uploading. In the second class of fantasy stories, *immersive* fantasy, the alternate world is presented as fully-formed and known to the characters that inhabit it; it is self-contained (though if properly realized should contain the complexity, ambiguity, and multiplicity of an actual world that is made up of worlds (historical traces, competing perspectives, and so on)). Whereas the boundary violation or boundary-related movement of quest fantasy is the movement from one world to another, in *immersive* fantasy, Mendlesohn argues that the threat is a sort of "thinning" of the realized world – its crumbling decay, the breakdown of its boundaries, the transformation of cosmos into chaos. The third category is, likewise, boundary-related, somewhat of an inversion of *portal-quest* fantasy; the narrative engine of *intrusive* fantasy is the threat or problem of disruption, invasion, infection, infiltration, penetration, pollution, or perversion by something alien, unnatural, or supernatural relative to the storyworld, whether our consensus reality or a fantastical one. Finally, *liminal* fantasy is obviously boundary-related and is very much influenced by the Todorovian formulation. In liminal fantasy, the "ontological dominant" (*sensu* McHale, 1987; see also, Besson, 2015, p. 37), the question of reality versus fantasy, is foregrounded but left carefully unresolved, playing with the boundaries and norms of fantasy and consensus reality themselves, generally to encourage reflection on their constructed and uncertain character; liminal fantasy has the dream-like quality of quite fantastic things potentially happening without one's sense of strangeness being evoked.

Thus, one may draw on the above works to argue that the transformative situations of fantastical storyworlds depend fundamentally on boundary-creation and varying and various kinds of boundary-violation, boundary-thinning, and boundary-testing, with a strong focus on the boundary between the "known," consensus reality and the unknown, exceptional, or abnormal. This is consistent with terror management theory (TMT) understanding of worldviews as both the boundaries that protect identity and the buffers to which recourse is taken when threats to the fundamental boundaries of identity and being are encountered; death-thought accessibility (DTA), for example, is increased when people are cued by threats to their worldview, and people respond by defending and recommitting to their worldview.

---

> marked safe space separate from reality – especially when reality is unsafe – affords emotional and cognitive benefits. (Nissel and Woolley, 2022, p. 36)

# Appendix 13: Boundaries in Religious Studies

Catherine L. Albanese's framework for understanding the religious diversity of the United States of America, found in her highly influential textbook, *America: Religions & Religion*, is useful for my purposes for at least two primary reasons. First, she necessarily had to develop categories that would encompass a vast pluralism and postpluralism[1] of worldviews (including, admirably, worldviews like *Star Trek*, neopaganism and metaphysical religions[2], and the Grateful Dead), so her project shares my aim of general applicability. Second, her categories share the spatial orientation that I find most productive in moving worldviews from abstract theory and disembodied "ideas" in people's heads to embodied, localized, enacted cognition. As she states in the "Preface to the First and Second Editions" of her work (2007[3]):

> [I]n the formulation of its basic theme the book has profited from anthropological insights concerning the importance of boundaries. As social spaces where two peoples or two realities meet, boundaries assume monumental importance in America. (p. xiii)

She goes on to argue that religions "arose to deal with boundaries" (*ibid.*, p. 3; *cf.* Anttonen, 1996) including territorial boundaries, the boundary of the body, and the temporal boundaries of life's phases (*ibid.*, pp. 3-4), and she notes, in language very similar to Thomas Tweed's theory of religion that was also designed to make sense of American data, "The preoccupation with boundaries that comes with the search for identity points to an important fact: people are concerned not just about how to cross boundaries but also how to live well within them" (*ibid.*, p. 5).

Given her focus on boundaries, her locative definition of "religion" may come as no surprise:

> **Religion** here can be seen as *a system of symbols (creed, code, cultus) by means of which people (a community) locate themselves in the world with reference to both ordinary and extraordinary powers, meanings, and values.* Locating oneself means taking note of where the boundaries are and placing oneself in relation to them. (*ibid.*, p. 9)

Throughout her work, she uses the examples of American religions (and the ever-present push for a unified American religion) to illustrate the locative, boundary-oriented character of American worldviews and, indeed, as the worldviews of global immigrants and indigenous peoples, worldviews in general.

One of the crucial points that Kim Knott (2005) makes in her *The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis* is that "all types of spaces, whether ostensibly religious or secular, private or public[,] are deemed relevant for examination because they are all sites in which 'religion' and the 'secular' are, or have been, contested" (p. 84). This is a vital point because in setting up the "site" of "worldviews and ways of life" as a more neutral space of

---

[1] That is, the combinatory, creative situation of worldviews and ways of life not merely co-existing but influencing and being influenced by each other.

[2] Of these, Albanese is a great authority, and she notes that they are characterized by turning to "homesteads in their minds" (2007, p. 13).

[3] I used the 4th edition because that is the copy I obtained when I taught "Introduction to American Religion" (RG ST 7) for the University of California, Santa Barbara.

comparison among all such phenomena, including both "real" and fictional, power is still operative, and the boundary-formation processes of specific worldviews will still be at play within this framework. Not only does "worldview" have a history and a variety of contemporary contexts of deployment (most obviously, my own "secular" and "scholarly" use of the concept), as is discussed in more detail elsewhere, but "worldview" is a power-inflected intervention that asserts, among other things, the legitimacy of comparison and, thus, to some degree, the relaxing of boundaries that matter dearly to many people, particularly as many recoil from situations like "secularization" and "globalization" in which they feel unwelcome impositions, interpenetrations, and entanglements.

In *Our Lady of the Exile: Diasporic Religion at a Cuban Catholic Shrine in Miami*, which is a fine example of the localized sort of study Knott advocates in contrast to the "world religions" paradigm, Thomas Tweed confronts aspects of nationalism, globalization, and secularization and develops an excellent spatial analysis of his subjects' worldview and way of life. He describes how diasporic people cope with the trauma of losing their place by projecting or mapping the longed-for and fantasized homeland of hope and memory onto the space(s) of exile, nostalgically and nationalistically constructing a dynamic and *contested* identity:

> In my view, constructing place religiously involves engaging in not only churches, workplaces, and homes but also bodies, laws, and artifacts. With and against others in the community, I suggest, religious men and women are continually in the process of mapping a symbolic landscape and constructing a symbolic dwelling in which they might have their own space and find their own place. They map religious space in a variety of ways—ritually, narratologically, philosophically, legally,[4] materially, and institutionally. (1997, p. 93)

By emphasizing how contested this boundary-making and -contesting process is – in many domains and dimensions of human life and culture – Tweed's narrative illustrates not only the imaginative aspect (that is, there is an element of fantasy, of dream, of the spontaneous upwelling of hope) of this sort of diasporic worldmaking but also how it is purpose-driven and intentional. The result of this communal, narrative-based, imaginative, and goal-directed activity is a complex aesthetic *work*, as rich with layered meaning as a – indeed, *as a* – shrine.

In his more theoretical work, *Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion*, Tweed returns with renewed force to his spatial account of "religious" worldviews and again points to the importance of boundaries. His work takes the theory of theory itself a step further than those who, rightly, acknowledge that theorization is located and perspectival, that a given theory will attend to and weight some things over others; beyond this, he notes, "Theories […] are *sightings* from sites. They are positioned representations of a changing terrain by an itinerant cartographer" (2006, p. 13). Thus, no theory of human cultural matter can be universal and objective, a static but comprehensive picture of the phenomena, for both the subjects of the theory and the theorist are themselves perspectivally dynamic (as well as co-implicated and to some degree always self- and other-ignorant). The boundaries are always shifting and always present between the islands of subjectivities attempting to use shared but

[4] See Howe, Nicolas. "Thou Shalt Not Misinterpret: Landscape as Legal Performance." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 98, no. 2 (2008): 435–60.

unstable meaning-making systems to bridge and translate each other's (internally dynamic and bounded) perspectives.

Boundaries are central to the definition of religion that Tweed arrives at after surveying the root metaphors that have governed past theories (including that of *worldview*, which he only notes briefly—see *ibid.*, pp. 48-52):

> *Religions are confluences of organic-cultural flows*[5] *that intensify joy and confront suffering by drawing on human and suprahuman forces to make homes and cross boundaries*. (*ibid.*, p. 54)

His use of aquatic language signals his Whiteheadian opposition to static theorizing in favor of flux. Relative to narratives, one may observe that a fictional work, as a confluence of semantic elements existing in relational webs of signification that produce networks of events-within-events, is similarly more aptly captured by a model of flux than one of stasis. Likewise, narrative home- or worldmaking draws on forces and elements (such as the tropes of metaphors, allegories, hyperboles, personifications, ironies, and so on) to make storyworlds that have potent, embodied affective (as well as intellectual and moral-evaluative) results (*i.e.*, intensifying joy and confronting suffering[6]). When one metaleptically crosses diegetic boundaries to become absorbed in such fictional worlds, one participates in a process that may be treated as at the very least analogous to what Tweed deems "religion."

So, although I elect to use the language and scholarly categories of "worldviews and ways of life" rather than "religions" to designate more generally what fantastical worldmakers make, though some do explicitly attribute a religious character to the worldviews they construct, religious studies scholarship affirms, in a manner happily consistent with the scholarship on fantastika, that human "worlds" – both those of "real" religions and non-religions and those of story – are locative and dislocative, providing places to dwell by creating boundaries and also testing, teasing, softening, and violating those boundaries.

---

[5] Tweed observes, "Appadurai understood the 'five dimensions of global cultural flows' as distinct and dynamic 'imagined worlds': (1) ethnoscapes, (2) mediascapes, (3) technoscapes, (4) financescapes, (5) ideoscapes" (2006, p. 61). The imagined worlds humans inhabit as a result of global cultural flows, in all five of Appadurai's dimensions, are embodied in rhetorically potent stories—novels, comics, movies, TV shows, video games, music, and so on.

[6] Here, one is tempted to reflect on Aristotelian notions of *comedy* and *tragedy*. The catharsis of a tragic play that lets one "confront" disease, suffering, despair, loss, death, and other mysteries and wonders sounds, again, in Tweed's terms, very religion-like.

# Appendix 14: Boundaries in Play, Mental Time Travel, Mind Wandering, and Sleep

(See also Appendix 30. This appendix may be understood in part as an exploration of cognitive capacities underlying the "ways of worldmaking" explored in Chapter 2.)

*Play*

In *The Psychological Adaptation to Absurdity: Tactics of Make-Believe*, Fisher and Fisher (1993, p. 92) state the following:

> Why should young children rehearse unreal scenes when one of their prime developmental goals is to tune into reality? Some observers (*e.g.*, Sherrod & Singer, 1979) have answered this question by proposing the playing with unreality may be an excellent means for *learning the boundaries between the real and the unreal*. (emphasis mine)

As children manipulate reality and persuade each other to enter into each other's make-believe worlds, they adapt themselves to a social environment that demands sophisticated deception and even self-deception. The "real" and the "unreal" are often conventions, and play helps children (and adults) internalize and cope with (*e.g.*, briefly escape, release tension related to, or otherwise challenge) these boundaries. Fisher and Fisher make the following argument:

> We present a derivative and yet more radical schema concerning the origins of pretend behavior. We propose that, from the outset, the process of socializing children substantially involves make-believe maneuvers. The culture comes to children with expectation that certain values and "truths" will be accepted. Until relatively recently, most of such verities were derived from religious dogma, and their truth was derived from cultural make-believe. It is probable that the majority of the verities that we seek to inculcate in young children are quite arbitrary. However, the culture seeks to convince children that such verities are indeed The Truth. We suggest that children soon sense (in perhaps largely ill-defined ways) the arbitrary nature of what is being inculcated. They may very well detect a deceptive gap between the supposed validity of what is being asserted and its actual validity. They learn that they are expected to play an elaborate game of make-believe that revolves around treating cultural values as if they were unquestionable truths. In essence, we propose that one of the most basic aspects of socialization, namely, the transmission of values, requires an elaborate and skilled exercise of make-believe on the part of children, who are the targets of the whole process. They must adapt to the illusion that the culture knows what is correct and true.
>
> Even further, we suggest that parental behavior is typically so infused with contradictions and illogical expectations that children catch repeated glimpses of the substantial elements of deception and "we are fooling you" involved. Parents usually try to convey the impression that everything they do "for their kids" has positive intent. Generally, they camouflage their demands as "reasonable." Yet universally, often in the name of absolutes,

> they expect absurdities from their children, such as shutting out the reality of urgent body sensations or specific body parts (*e.g.*, sexual), feeling arbitrary disgust with reference to whole classes of potentially attractive foods that are declared to be forbidden, screening out awareness of major aspects of the environment that are culturally defined as invisible, as so forth. (1993, p. 95)

Play and make-believe, therefore, are serious business. The shared, collective illusion of stable, essentialized categories (*e.g.*, the supposed gender binary, the social reality of races, the construction of new sexual categories in the nineteenth century—*cf.* Rudi Bleys's (1995) *Geography of Perversion*—as well as the value of capital, the imagined communities of nation-states, etc.) require the individual to make cognitive concessions and endure various discomforts—alienation, dissonance, and so on. The roles we play our entire lives are founded on the seriousness of the ludic capacity. Again, this sets up a variety of contradictions or at least tensions. Fisher and Fisher observe that the conservative power of shared, mutually reinforcing make-believe is based on a capacity for creative, innovative, even antiauthoritarian novelty (*ibid.*, pp. 101-102). Likewise, Droogers states,

> Play is not necessarily the opposite of seriousness, because once a playful situation exists, it is taken seriously and is no longer "just a game." That is the reason why play is not always recognized as such. Any form of play demands a serious attitude. If you do not take the game seriously, you are a spoilsport. (2013, p. 70)

Children are taught to take the intersubjective play space seriously – and their parents often monitor the play space to ensure that what is being made up and that the roles that are being played are consistent with and lie within the bounds of convention – because the intersubjective space outside the magic circle of their little worlds will demand an even more serious make-believe. Droogers calls his "contribution to worldview research 'methodological ludism,' ludism being a neologism, after homo ludens, the playful human (Droogers 1996, 1999, 2012, Huizinga 1952, Turner 1982, 1988)" (Droogers, 2013, p. 62), and he notes that worldview studies demands a double perspective characteristic of play:

> Participant observation involves a double perspective, combining involvement and distance, inside and outside. The same can be said of play, an important ingredient of methodological ludism. Much has been written about the subject, and in very diverse ways (*e.g.* Caillois 1958, Handelman 1987, Kolb 1989, Norbeck 1974) [….] I define play as "the capacity to deal simultaneously and subjunctively with two or more ways of classifying reality" (Droogers 1996: 53). (Droogers, 2013, p. 69)

This fantastical, liminal understanding of "play" in the context of – indeed, as a vital aspect of – learning about others highlights the fact that scholars engaged in participant observation are doing consciously and perhaps more intentionally what all children (and other social animals) do out of necessity. Brian Boyd's (2009) *On the Origin of Stories* appeals to evolutionary arguments regarding play's pedagogic utility to argue that all art – and perhaps especially for us the narrative art of fiction, which among other things helps practice all sorts of social and emotional abilities (L. Sugiyama, 2022, p. 53: "[I]maginary worlds are attractive because they simulate multiple adaptive problems and their associated cues, thereby engaging multiple suites of adaptations concurrently. In so doing, they offer the same promise as accounts of unfamiliar actual worlds: the opportunity to acquire knowledge 'when the pressure is off … (that) may well be useful at another time' (Blurton Jones &

Konner, 1976, p. 344)"; see also, Tooby and Cosmides, 2001; Mar and Oatley, 2008) in addition to other forms of visualization, problem solving, etc. – is derived from play (*cf.* Steen and Owens, 2001; Mar et al. 2006; Kidd and Castano 2013). To this idea, one might add Dewey's point that play leads to art when it is structured by purpose:

> The first manifestations of play by a child do not differ much from those of a kitten. But as experience matures, activities are more and more regulated by an end to be attained; purpose becomes a thread that runs through a succession of acts; it converts them into a true series, a course of activity having a definite inception and steady movement toward a goal. As the need for order is recognized, play becomes a game; it has "rules." There is also a gradual transition, such that play involves not only an ordering of *activities* toward an end but also an ordering of materials.

In the active achievement of purposes – indeed, of selfhood and consciousness – in and through worldmaking, the artist of a work of art expresses and realizes their intentionality in an experience that is an authentic recombination of meaningful elements received from culture, past experience, and particular materials that productively resist the recombination called for by fresh experience.

> *An Excursus on the Value of Play as a Zone of Proximal Development (compare Appendix 47, § 4.4)*
>
> If one grants that play is actually very serious and extends far outside the "playground" because, in a variety of ways, practicing social conventions and believing in contingent cultural categories is a necessary, life-long form of make-believe,[1] it comes as no surprise to find that play is a central category in foundational theorists of educational psychology, including both Piaget and Vygotsky. Although Piaget has a great deal to say about play (for example, Piaget's (1962) four play categories in *Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood*, which are tied to his four stages of development), his individualistic (and Eurocentric[2]) focus is less complete than Vygotsky's important inclusion of social and linguistic elements in relation to play's role in human development. Vygotsky's perspective continues to powerfully influence education in research and in today's school systems, not only in the general sense of sociocultural constructivism's broad influence (the importance of social models, the value of disequilibrium, the internalization or assimilation of cognitive tools—particularly linguistic ones, and the value of scaffolding), but also specifically with regard to the value of play as a zone of proximal development.
>
> The article "Vygotskian and Post-Vygotskian Views on Children's Play," by Elena Bodrova and Deborah J. Leong, reviews the legacy and

[1] This is a different aspect of how play cultivates adult abilities like conformity, foresight, and self-restraint, as discussed in Omrod, Anderman, & Anderman (2020, p. 45).

[2] Trawick-Smith (2010) uses data from classrooms in Puerto Rico to argue that the study of play has been distorted by the European and Euro-American forms of play, as in Piaget's categories, to the neglect of other play forms used by children of color. That said, Vygotsky focuses only on one kind of play, "sociodramatic or make-believe play" (Bodrova & Deborah, 2015, p. 374).

continued influence of Vygotsky (and others in his "cultural-historical" tradition) on contemporary play studies. First, play plays a crucial role in cultivating humans' fictional ability: "Vygotsky sees play as a transitional stage from a child's thinking constrained by the properties of a current situation to thinking totally free from these constraints" (Bodrova & Deborah, 2015, pp. 374-375). Thus, although play is common in other animals, in humans play promotes our unique fictional ability; make-believe helps children on the road to more robust forms of imagination and truly symbolic thinking, which are internalized play. Likewise, in the "illusory freedom" of play (Vygotsky 1967, p. 10; quoted in Bodrova & Deborah, 2015, p. 375), the roles and rules of play are internalized as the capacity for intentionality and self-regulation of impulses.

Omrod, Anderman, & Anderman (2020, p. 45) quotes Vygotsky's eloquent words: "In play, a child is always above his average age, above his daily behavior; in play, it is as though he were a head taller than himself" (Vygotsky, 2002, n.p.). Directly before these words, Vygotsky states that play "creates a zone of proximal development of the child" (Vygotsky, 2002, n.p.). This central concept in Vygotsky refers to the fact that all education involves a teacher or other more experienced authority on a subject, who possesses a wider and deeper grasp on the material, helping students enter into that expanded, richer way of knowing or doing. The space between what the learner already knows and is able to do independently and what lies beyond even their assisted efforts is the "zone of proximal development," where an instructor can help enhance a student's ability to accomplish a challenging but achievable goal. When the zone of proximal development is also a play space or, one might say, a "playground," the instructor's interventions might be even more effective.

For example, in a study on helping children with autism using play, the authors drew on what is called the "Integrated Play Group" model:

> The Integrated Play Groups (IPG) program is based on Lev Vygotsky's social constructivist theory [….] The primary objective of IPG is to improve the social and symbolic play skills of children with autism spectrum disorders between the ages of 3 and 11 (Wolfberg, 1999). In addition to addressing difficulties with play, this model emphasizes developing children's intrinsic desire to play and interact with others (Wolfberg, 1999). According to Wolfberg (2003), the mission of IPG is to "provide a haven for children with diverse abilities to create genuine play worlds together, where they may reach their social and imaginative potential, as well as have fun and make friends" (p. 31). (Lantz, Nelson, & Loftin, 2004, p. 9)

In the case of the IPG program, one can observe a complex, overlapping application of Vygotsky's zones of proximal development: "guides," who understand both how to structure a play space using the IPG model and how to work with autistic children, help maintain the dynamic zones of proximal

development between themselves, the "expert players" ("[neuro]typical peers with good social, communication, and imaginative play skills; preferably the expert players have diverse abilities and interests" (Lantz, Nelson, & Loftin, 2004, p. 9)), and the "novice players" (*i.e.*, those on the autism spectrum), while expert players themselves work to generate productive zones of proximal development with their autistic peers. The IPG program outlines various kinds of intervention methods and levels of support by the "guides"; in these, one can again observe the powerful influence of Vygotsky's theory: for example, the value of models, scaffolding, and so on. From Vygotsky's theoretical perspective, it might make special sense to use the IPG program for autistic children since they may have unique struggles with self-regulation, and in his theory make-believe play or pretense helps develop self-regulation (see Berk, 2018; compare Bodrova & Leong, 2015). In fact, the use of peer expert players is authentically Vygotskian since his focus was on how preschoolers develop, which is often through the aid of peer "more knowledgeable others."

Bodrova and Leong describe how others, such as Elkonin, tested, elaborated, and improved Vygotsky's theory of play relative to child development and education. Elkonin, for example, identified four primary ways play cultivates cognitive tools and "higher mental functions": it promotes a hierarchy of goals that children have to coordinate; it promotes decentering—that is, the ability to shift out of one's own perspective into others'; it promotes development of mental representations; and, it promotes intentional actions through self- and other-monitoring to ensure rule following (Bodrova & Leong, 2015, pp. 379-380). One of the primary developments in later research has been the finding that children are demonstrating less and later abilities to play at a mature level; the capacity for play seems to be deteriorating, calling for more and improved scaffolding (Bodrova & Leong, 2015, pp. 384-385).

Another interesting application of Vygotsky's concept of play as a zone of proximal development may be found in G. Booke Lester's (2018) article, "What IF? Building Interactive Fiction for Teaching and Learning Religious Studies." Text-based interactive fiction (IF) provides an accessible, low-cost intervention that can be used both in class and online to draw on the power of interactive narrative games for instructional purposes. One may detect the powerful influence of Vygotsky's sociocultural constructivist perspective in Lester's description of learning:

> Learning, like play, is an irreducibly creative act. As many higher educators know, a constructivist theory of learning posits that learners do not simply attain or receive knowledge, but rather construct it, synthesizing their existing understandings with new insights in the generation of new understandings (Savery & Duffy, 1996, 135-137). Put another way, we are prompted to learn by being unable [to] or desirous of doing a thing, we learn by making sense of our attempts to do a thing, and social interaction is how we test the resulting

> understandings (Kirkley, Duffy, Kirkley, & Kremer, 2011, 374). (Lester, 2018, p. 261)

Note the value of intersubjective feedback as well as the value of disequilibrium (or, cognitive dissonance), of being initially unable to do a thing; this might be especially common in a religious studies classroom if one's worldview feels challenged. Again, Vygotsky's enduring influence is obvious in this passage and others. Lester notes that "game designers look for that 'zone of proximal development'" (Lester, 2018, p. 262), and he ties this to a more recent concept, that of "flow": "the player is challenged neither too much nor too little, and thereby experiences productive 'flow' (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991)" (Lester, 2018, p. 262). Throughout Lester's article one can observe more recent developments in education, such as the concept of "flow" and the use of backward course design oriented toward course objectives, but Vygotsky's influence decisively shapes his approach due to its role in the field of education and educational psychology more broadly.

*Mental Time Travel*

The scholars who developed this expression treat it as only being present in humans in its fully realized form (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), and its associated capacities seem to be intimately tied to the evolution of language (Corballis, 2009; *cf.* Appendix 26). In the aforementioned appendix, I make a stronger claim for other animals' combinatorial-signaling (proto-linguistic) abilities, but I do regard the explosive multiplication of human worldviews as a function of combinatory situations (see Chapter 3), not only because they generate new crises of meaning as plausibility structures collide, but also because combinatory (*i.e.*, borderlands) situations naturally lead to novel narrative syntheses as myths bleed together and attributions are added and lost. Regarding other animals, one might point out, for example, that Johnson and Redish's studies on rats running through mazes demonstrate that they entertain possible future paths successively, which seems to be a simple (n.b., *spatial-temporal*) form of simulating or imagining future possibilities.[3] But Suddendorf and Corballis's definition of *true* mental time travel requires a number of converging cognitive capacities, leaving the question of whether other animals engage in mental time travel of the relevantly robust sort unlikely. As I mention in a footnote in Chapter 1, which refers back here, Bulbulia (2009) links mental time travel to the capacity for "religiosity," and Taves, Asprem, and Ihm (2018) also regard *mental time travel*

---

[3] Johnson and Redish, 2007, "Neural Ensembles in CA3 Transiently Encode Paths forward of the Animal at a Decision Point," *Journal of Neuroscience*, 27(45), pp. 12176-12189—the examples from birds are expecially interesting. Perhaps more relevant to the present argument, Corballis states,

> We humans may not be entirely unique in taking mental journeys through time and space, and into the minds of others. Rats may well have a limited capacity for mental time travel, imagining past or future activity in a maze, and chimps may have some inkling of what's in another's mind. We may like to think that our own mind-wanderings are richer, more interesting, more personally invasive than those of other species, but what does seem to be special about humans is the capacity to share our mind-wanderings. We tell stories, taking others with us on our meanderings. The literary scholar John Niles suggested that our species should be renamed *Homo narrans*—the storytellers.
>
> Although we seem to be the only species that tells stories, our capacity for narrative probably has evolutionary precedents. The writer and literary theorist Brian Boyd, among others, suggests that stories derive from play. (2015, p. 86)

as one of the capacities (in addition to *theory of mind*, *self-reflection*, *narrative synthesis*, and *symbolic representation*)[4] required for humanly known and articulated worldviews (as opposed to, in their framework, the life-worlds and ways of life possessed by other living things). Mental time travel crosses the temporal boundary of simulating present events to retrospectively and prospectively simulate past episodes and possible future episodes.

*Mind Wandering & Sleep*

Like play, mind wandering and sleep cross boundaries, and mind wandering can in many respects be identified with mental time travel. In Michael C. Corballis's *The Wandering Mind: What the Brain Does When You're Not Looking* (2015), he notes, "It is the hippocampus that is utterly critical to mental time travel—our ability to travel mentally backward and forward in time" (p. 54) and he further calls the hippocampus "the Grand Central Station of [the default mode] network" (p. 55). Again, as Taves, Asprem, and Ihm (2018) argue, mental time travel combines with play, theory of mind, and the narrative capacity in a unique way in humans. Corballis further comments,

> One additional ingredient [beyond animal play], then, is the 'once upon a time' element that takes the action away from the here and now and into the past or future, or into other places, or into the lives of other people, real or imaginary [theory of mind]. A second ingredient is narrative. Stories have a complex, usually sequential, structure—events unfold through time, often in elaborate ways. The third ingredient is that stories are shared beyond those that feature in them. Personal mental time travel becomes shared mental time travel, whether in the tales told of travels abroad or of imaginary adventures [….] Stories are a mixture of actual experience and made-up fantasy, of work and play. It is through stories that experiences of individuals become the experiences of social groups, or even an entire culture [….] Grandparents can be useful too. In the Jicarilla Apache of northern New Mexico, as in other present-day hunter-gatherer societies, it is the elders in the extended family who tell the stories to the children. This arrangement may well have originated in the Pleistocene, and might help explain why humans have evolved to live well beyond child-bearing years to become the bearers of wisdom and stories for their grandchildren. Michelle Sugiyama also suggests that the telling of stories helps explain the prolonged juvenile phase—kids have a lot to learn before they're fit for adult life and the rigours of the hunt, or indeed of child-rearing itself. (Corballis, 2015, pp. 88-90)

Gerrans (2014) argues in Chapter 5 of his work, *The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Delusional Thought*, "Dreaming, Default Thinking, and Delusion," "The default system evolved as the first stage in the transformation of automatism to agency. It allows humans to rehearse alternatives before committing to action. These rehearsals typically take a narrative form" (p. 90). In *Art as Experience*,

[4] One can easily see how boundaries are related to the self-other distinctions that help promote both an awareness of and metareflection on one's self-and-world and the social abilities to model other minds; indeed, Taves, Asprem, and Ihm (2018) note that both abilities (theory of mind and self-reflection) have been shown to draw on the Default Mode Network (p. 211). Likewise, the "narrative synthesis" of events into what I regard in this work as a larger self "map" – just as other narratives are "maps" of linked events – depends, as Taves, Asprem, and Ihm (2018) note, on the Default Mode Network (p. 212), and all three capacities (theory of mind, self-reflection, and narrative synthesis) reflect the shift to more symbolic, abstract modes of representation.

Dewey (1934) states, "I do not think it can be denied that an element of reverie, of approach to a state of dream, enters into the creation of a work of art, nor that the experience of the work when it is intense often throws one into a similar state" (p. 275); he also notes that we must not be in an executive state of commitment to action if we wish to be creatively productive: "Indeed, it is safe to say that 'creative' conceptions in philosophy and science come only to persons who are relaxed to the point of reverie. The subconscious fund of meaning stored in our attitudes have no chance of release when we are practically or intellectually strained" (1934, pp. 275-276).[5] In any case, the default mode which simulates possibilities when we mind wander *typically takes a narrative form*, but in the case of dreaming, the executive network and particularly the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are inhibited. He states, "At one point in his discussion of dreaming, Allan Hobson says that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex vainly tries to 'impose a plot' on the flux of experience but is doomed to fail because it is not in communication with other structures such as DLPFC required to provide coherence and consistency" (p. 108). The violations of the boundaries of consensus reality and its coherent, consistent "plot" that are characteristic of dreams do sometimes provide amazing material for fictional worldmaking. Others have also connected the processes underlying dream to those involved in fictional worldmaking (see Llewellyn, 2022; 2020).

## Works Cited


Berk, L. E. (2018, February). *The role of make-believe play in development of self-regulation*. Encylopedia on Early Childhood Development. Retrieved December 14, 2021, from https://www.child-encyclopedia.com/play-based-learning/according-experts/role-make-believe-play-development-self-regulation.

Bodrova, E. & Deborah, J. L. (2015). Vygotskian and post-Vygotskian views on children's play. *American Journal of Play, 7*(3), 371-388.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1991). *Flow: The psychology of optimal experience.* New York, NY: HarperCollins.

Kirkley, J. R., Duffy, T.M., Kirkley, S. E., & Kremer, D. L. (2011). Implications of constructivism for the design and use of serious games. In S. Tobias & J. Fletcher (Eds.), *Computer games and instruction* (pp. 371-394). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Lantz, J. F., Nelson, J. M., & Loftin, R. L. (2004). Guiding Children with Autism in Play: Applying the Integrated Play Group Model in School Settings. *Teaching Exceptional Children*, *37*(2), 8–14.

Lester, G. B. (2018). What IF? Building interactive fiction for teaching and learning religious studies. *Teaching Theology & Religion*, *21*(4), 260–273.

Omrod, J. E., Anderman, E. M., & Anderman, L. H. (2020). *Educational Psychology: Developing Learners, 10th Edition*. Hoboken, NJ: Pearson.

Piaget, J. (1962). *Play, dreams, and imitation in childhood.* New York, NY: Norton.


[5] The process of completing this project while, at various times, working several jobs, teaching, enduring homelessness, supporting sick loved ones, overcoming personal sickness, and other challenges (such as the unreasonable notion that one must finish the Ph.D. with a publication record, a record of active service to the discipline, and so on) has driven this home to me.

Savery, J. R., & Duffy, T. M. (1996). Problem based learning: An instructional model and its constructivist framework. In B. G. Wilson (Ed.), *Constructivist learning environments: Case studies in instructional design* (pp. 135-148). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Educational Technology Publications.

Trawick-Smith, J. (2010). Drawing back the lens on play: A frame analysis of young children's play in Puerto Rico. *Early Education and Development, 21*(4), 536-567.

Vygotsky, L. S. (2002). Play and its role in the mental development of the child. (N. Schmolze, Trans.). Psychology and Marxism Internet Archive. Marxists.org/archive/Vygotsky/works/1933/play.htm. (1933/1967)

Wolfberg, P. J. (1999). *Play and imagination in children with autism*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Wolfberg, P. J. (2003). *Peer play and the autism spectrum: The art of guiding children's socialization and imagination*. Shawnee Mission, KS: Autism Asperger Publishing

Supplemental Selected Bibliography on Play

Altrogge, Stephen. *Game Day for the Glory of God*. Crossway, 2009.

Bekoff, Marc, and John A Byers. *Animal Play: Evolutionary, Comparative, and Ecological Perspectives*. Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Brown, Stuart L, and Christopher C Vaughan. *Play: How It Shapes the Brain, Opens the Imagination, and Invigorates the Soul*. New York: Avery, 2010.

Burghardt, Gordon M. *The Genesis of Animal Play: Testing the Limits*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005.

Caillois, Roger, and Meyer Barash. *Man, Play, and Games.* University of Illinois Press, 2001.

Dignan, Aaron. *Game Frame: Using Games as a Strategy for Success*. New York: Free Press, 2011.

Fagen, Robert. *Animal Play Behavior*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Garofalo Neto, Emilio. "The Soccer World Cup 2010 as Sub-creation: An Analysis of Human Play through a Theological Grid of Creation-fall-redemption." Ph.D., Reformed Theological Seminary, 2011.

Guttmann, Allen. *From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sports, Updated Edition*. Updated edition. Columbia University Press, 2012.

Henricks, Thomas S. *Play Reconsidered: Sociological Perspectives on Human Expression*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006.

Higgs, Robert J. *God In The Stadium: Sports and Religion in America*. The University Press of Kentucky, 1995.

Huizinga, Johan. *Homo Ludens*. Boston: The Beacon press, 1955.

Pellis, Sergio, and Vivien Pellis. *The Playful Brain: Venturing to the Limits of Neuroscience*. Richmond: Oneworld, 2011.

Sutton-Smith, Brian. *The Ambiguity of Play*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.

Turner, Victor W. *From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play*. New York City: Performing Arts Journal Publications, 1982.

Winnicott, D. W. *Playing and Reality*. London; New York: Routledge, 2005.

# Appendix 15: My Modes Relative to Center and Boundaries

In their "Introduction" to *American Sacred Space* (1995), Chidester and Linenthal point to the absence of power and contestation in accounts like Eliade's that find the "sacred" directly manifesting in a space and being perceived by people, rather than being constructed through activity, discourse, imagination, and prior myths of recalled and repeated narratives of relational association. The contestation of space – the violent or subtly persuasive wrestling over boundaries entangled with forces of possession and yielding, marginalization and inclusion – results from its being, in a sense (and only in a weak sense[1]), an empty signifier onto which contesting forces – such as race, politics, class, sexuality, economics, spirituality, and so on – may project significance.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the cognitive narratological "ways of worldmaking" by means of which narrative worlds are fashioned in detail. Here, I explain my "modes" of fantastical worldmaking by noting that the strategies Chidester and Linenthal identify by means of which *space* is contested and constructed, namely, *appropriation*, *exclusion*, *inversion*, and *hybridization*, may be profitably compared to the ways of narrative worldmaking. Some general categories have been posited to describe the creative process or ways of worldmaking. Using obviously embodied, spatial language, Brandt and Eagleman (2017) describe creativity as involving processes of *bending*, *breaking*, and *blending* received cultural elements, and, far earlier, Nelson Goodman's (1978) *Ways of Worldmaking* describes general processes for worldmaking:

- *composition* (*cf. blending* and *hybridization*) and *decomposition* (*cf. breaking* and *exclusion*),
- *weighting* (n.b. Chidester and Linenthal's awareness of hierarchy's role in spatial contestation, and all of this takes on greater relevance in terms of the hierarchical, probabilistic predictive coding constantly being done by the human mind),
- *ordering* (*cf. inversion*, and n.b. again that to order, taxonomize, and categorize implies evaluation and hierarchy),
- *deletion* (*cf. breaking* and *exclusion*) and *supplementation* (*cf. appropriation* – all appropriative transformation of a space or text or whatnot involves a projective supplementation – and *hybridization*), and
- *deformation* (*cf. inversion* and *bending*).

I argue in Chapter 2 that narrative worldmaking has a lot to do with *purposively* applying these processes to the manipulation of the raw material arising from playful, dreamy mind-wandering, recalled narrative elements, and other elements in the form of "events" to generate novel sequences of novel events, an allomythic map. Emphasizing again the importance of "situation," in Chapter 2 I also note that, in addition to Goodman's general ways of worldmaking, Vera Nünning (2010) has argued that specifically *narrative* ways of worldmaking include, first and foremost *situatedness*. She also argues for the importance of *embedded values* (that is, an overarching worldview[2]) and *perspectivisation* and

[1] I am tempted to refer, by way of contrast, to Gregory Orr's poem, "The World Seems…" (1946).

[2] *Cf.* Brian McHale's (1987) concept of a "dominant" in *Postmodernist Fiction*, which structures and focuses a given work around specific questions or problems—for example, he argues that postmodernist fiction has an "ontological dominant"; that is, the genre of postmodernist fiction is oriented toward primarily ontological concerns.

*experientiality* (*i.e.*, individual character's worldviews) – that is, she notes, and oh how powerfully I agree, that narratives consist of worldviews within (one or many) worldviews.

J.Z. Smith proposed three spatial categories for religion, though he was ambiguous about the third category leading to most scholars' only using his locative-utopian dichotomy. Tweed "modif[ies] Smith's typology of religious mapping by adding [sic] a third possibility and reformulating the other two" (1997, p. 94). He states,

> In my view, then, religions can map and inhabit worlds of meaning in at least three ways. These might be described as *locative*, in which religion is associated with a homeland where the group now resides; *supralocative*, which names the inclination in later generations of some diasporic peoples to diminish or deny the significance of both the homeland and the adopted land in their religious life; and *translocative*, my focus here, which refers to the tendency among many first- and second-generation migrants to symbolically move between homeland and new land. (*ibid.*, pp. 94-95)

I see these responses to meaningful space as resonating in interesting ways with my allomythic modes. That is, one may rest in the *locative* N-mode; reject a place (or places) in the *supralocative* O-mode, which tends not so much to provide a positive dwelling-place for the percipient so much as a *utopian* (*sensu* Smith), disorienting rejection of a distained "place"; or, creatively synthesize in the *translocative* M-mode a novel space (and *transtemporal* as projecting a mythic past onto a hoped-for future (*cf. ibid.*, p. 100)—although of course diasporic nationalists like those in Tweed's study would not regard the process as creation but as recovery or restoration.

Based on the way allomythoi respond to basic questions as addressed by received worldviews, they can be categorized based on their relationship to ecological boundary-making and place-making processes. Again, I call these the M-, N-, and O-modes. *M-mode* allomythoi are the *mythopoeic*-mode allomythoi, the most robust instances of worldmaking showing the least interest in referring to real-world worldviews and ways of life. They are experimental, playful, and exploratory, interested primarily in the (sometimes gloomy) pleasure of creating a world and escaping this world. If world and identity formation processes attend more or less either to the center or core or to the boundary or limit (that is, either to an inherent "nature" or to an opposite through whom one's special nature is illuminated (*cf.* van Beek, 2014, pp. 41-51)), the M-mode worldviews tend to be more centered; it is *ars artis gratia* ("art for art's sake"). *N-mode* allomythoi are the *natural-, naturalized-,* and *naturalizing*-mode allomythoi, relative to the author's worldview, in that they translate the author's worldview into a fictional form;[3] they have an allegorical, evangelistic, or even apologetic tone (bleeding sometimes into the O-mode), but they can be either centered or liminal in their orientation. Importantly, they participate in a healthfully integrated fashion in the sinistral (more O-mode) and dextral (more M-mode) dispositions of the lateralized consciousness(es). Dewey states,

[3] Wolf, 2012, p. 193: "When a main character comes to a secondary world from the Primary World, there will inevitably be a comparison of worldviews between the secondary world and Primary World, or more specifically, the culture from which the main character (and usually also the author) comes. Not surprisingly, the author's own worldview usually comes through his or her secondary world, directly or indirectly; for example, the Roman Catholicism of Thomas More or J. R. R. Tolkien; the nihilism and cosmicism of H. P. Lovecraft; the atheism of Philip Pullman; or the Jungian and Taoist outlook of Ursula K. LeGuin."

> Every critic, like every artist, has a bias, a predilection, that is bound up with the very existence of individuality.[4] It is his task to convert it into an organ of sensitive perception and of intelligent insight, and to do so without surrendering the instinctive preference from which are derived direction and sincerity. But when his especial and selective mode of response is allowed to harden in a fixed mold [the sinistral disposition], he becomes incapacitated for judging even the things to which his bias draws him. (1934, p. 324)

In his *Poetry and the Criticism of Life* (1931), Garrod states, along the same lines,

> I do ask the poet to teach, I do believe him to teach: *only*, in his own fashion, and his own lessons. It is not the fashion, and they are not the lessons, of what is called didactic poetry. There is no man of us, I suppose, who does not hate didactic poetry; all the man in any one of us is in protest against it, a protest instinctive and decisive. Yet not because it teaches; far rather because it so signally fails to teach; there is nothing to be learned from it; and what we resent is its incompetence. We tell ourselves that we hate a poetry which has a design upon us; above all, when it has a moral design. We like poetry to hit the mark, but we do not like it to aim. That is to be, perhaps, over-exigent; and in truth, what we really hate, I suspect, is less a moral aim than a moral miss. (p. 15)

N-mode allomythoi of the exceptionally didactic sort are tiresome, but *O-mode* allomythoi are decisively hardened in the way Dewey suggests; they are instances of place-making through conquest and attack. They are *oppositional*, satirizing and parodying a disapproved worldview, decisively boundary-defensive. Both O-mode and N-mode worldmaking can be complex and vividly realized in a way that disguises their out-world orientation, so distinguishing them from M-mode worldmaking may require very careful analysis.

The N- and O- modes might be contrasted by thinking of Nietzsche's (and, following him, Jaspers's) position that a worldview may be fundamentally characterized as Yes-saying or No-saying; the N-mode affirms or confirms an established worldview, organizing the materials of experience to express the individual artist's vision, and the O-mode refutes and denounces a worldview, often in the service of another: *castigat ridendo mores* ("one corrects customs by ridicule"). A fine example of O-mode writing is J. G. Ballard's work. As David Paddy's (2015) spatial analysis of Ballard's oeuvre explains, Ballard uses his imagined geography, not to create an M-mode mythic homeland for Englishness as in Tolkien, but to represent oppositionally the unsettling spaces of colonization and imperialism, the savagery of supposedly civilized urban spaces, and the dystopian aspects of landscapes characterized by the forces of Americanism, Englishness, and globalization.

My modes address boundaries in a manner that focuses on the nature of the worldviews produced and how they relate to other worldviews, rather than, as in the case of Mendlesohn's framework, for example, a narrative's structure and characteristic qualities as they relate to world boundaries or, as in the case of Goodman, *how* the storyworld and its worldviews are made through the manipulation of boundaries and other factors. Mendlesohn's categories of fantasy attend to narratological questions like, Does the exceptional or unnatural or unknown *invade*, or does one *enter* into the unknown? While these questions help specify the nature of the *estrangement* or *estrangements* and, thus, are highly relevant to estrangement-specific BQs, my modes attempt to categorize allomythic

[4] See the excursuses in appendices 14 and 30.

worldviews themselves relative to boundary questions that take into account, not only the storyworld, but also the extradiegetic worldviews (both fictional and "real") that the author may have in view.

One might argue, as Everett F. Bleiler does in his overview of about 7,200 stories of supernatural fiction, which Bleiler designates "contranatural fiction" because "modern fiction has erected a mirror world based on direct [materialist] contradiction to what most of us believe, related through the strong principle of positive negation" (1983, p. 553), that

> Whereas mainstream fiction (particularly the British side) is primarily societal and to a lesser extent psycholological, modern supernatural fiction is ultimately concerned with the impersonal individual and with universals of existence in story abstractions that are sometimes very primitive. (*ibid.*)

That is, fantastika, at least in the primarily fantasy-horror modes Bleiler designates "contranatural fiction" may be uniquely focused on BQs related to "universals of existence." Like Brandt and Eagleman's (2017) *bending*, *breaking*, and *blending*, Bleiler finds in contranatural fiction that "things are added to, subtracted from, and modified away from reality" (*ibid.*). Bleiler illustrates this as follows:

> These modifications of the mechanistic universe are most easily recognized and understood if they are presented as restatements of basic rules and themes, first set up on the basis of mechanism, then adapted. To quote a few of the more important modifications:
>
> Man is alone in the universe – There are supernatural beings
> Man is the most powerful force – There are gods.
> The universe is amoral – There are forces concerned with morality, gods, demons, rewards, punishments.
> The universe is an uncaring place – There are temptations, prayer, faith.
> Death is final – There are ghosts, heavens, hells, reincarnation.
> Change can be effected only by rational means – There is magic.
> Existence is material – There are fairies, vampires, little people of various sorts.
> Essence is inalienable – There are transformations of various sorts, personality interchanges, possession, breaking the rule of one-man-one-personality.
> Reality is closed and separate from things imagined – There are solipsist universes, entry into literary worlds, characters coming to life.
> The animate and the inanimate are rigidly separated – Life may be created; inanimate things may be brought to life.
> Man's senses have limitations – There are paranormal abilities, dream worlds, foreknowledge.
> The list could be continued. (1983, pp. 553-4)

Bleiler engages in a structuralist reduction of the 7,200 stories considered in his volume to "a very small group of what might be called sentences, or ultimate statements" that "present a fairly consistent world view, surprising in its primitivism as well as in its lack of concordance with reality" (*ibid.*, p. 554). Bleiler further claims, "From these six statements

(which can ultimately be reduced to one) countless stories may be generated" (*ibid.*), and his six statements are as follows:

1. A man injures another man (and may be punished).
2. A man rebels against the heimarmene (and may be destroyed).
3. An outlaw power touches upon a man (and may destroy him).
4. A good power touches upon a man (and may transform him).
5. A man is caught up and carried along by the heimarmene.
6. A man eases or repairs damage done to the heimarmene, thereby helping other men.

Bleiler's rather Neoplatonic and folk-magical language suggests the nature of the dominant worldview that persists in much fantastical writing, but I would not join in his reductive project – however useful it is as an aid for categorizing "contranatural" motifs and finding half-remembered stories. I think he is right in suggesting, in my own terms, that much supernatural or counternatural fiction is in the N-mode of people who still adhere to a non-materialist worldview or in the O-mode of people opposed to a materialist worldview; it attempts to "re-enchant" a modernity evacuated of supernatural forces, beings, objects, abilities, and so on. He is right, too, to state that much supernatural fiction is concerned with questions regarding "universals of existence." Fantastika, however, encompasses far more than "contranatural fiction." The literatures of estrangement designated by the expression "fantastika" include science fiction and related genres that do not necessarily take issue with materialist assumptions.

# Appendix 16: Kairological Charts for Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings*

NB Tolkien created far more sub-allomythoi for his allomythology, some being foregrounded in more detail in *The Hobbit* (*e.g.*, dragons and beornings, two important representatives of which are main characters in *The Hobbit*, the Men of Dale, the Elves of Mirkwood—Legolas being a representative of that people, and Elrond (and, in *LotR*, Arwen) as a representative of the Peredhil or Half-elven[1]) and some (werewolves, to mention just one example briefly mentioned in *LotR*, and mearas) being described in more detail works like the twelve-volume (plus the Index volume) *The History of Middle-Earth*, *The Silmarillion*, *The Children of Húrin*, *Beren and Lúthien*, and *The Fall of Gondolin*, which describe allomythoi (including various parallel or superpositioned formulations of the same allomythos) from the past of Middle-earth and in other times and realms of Arda. Those analyzed below are, at minimum, explicitly mentioned in *The Lord of the Rings* and useful for comparison relative to the primary allomythoi of *The Lord of the Rings*.

*Overall Allomythology*

| **Overall Allomythology – Allomythic Family: highly eclectic—Scandinavian and Germanic myth, Medieval English folklore, Catholicism, American Indian adventure stories, the Bible, Plato's Atlantis myth, Lord Dunsany, etc.** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate | Tolkien's Catholic worldview priors are not as determinative as one might expect. He gave himself great subcreative freedom. This is the end of an age and the beginning of a new one, and its fate will be decided during the course of the story. |

[1] Note that some are part maia as well. See HM II: 130, 215, 265-6, 293; IV: 38-9, 70, 75, 151, 155, 158, 162-3, 195-6, 200-1, 308-9, 326; V: 18-19, 23, 25, 30, 34, 64, 74, 143-4, 148, 152, 219, 247-8, 332, 336-7, 355, 360, 384; VI: 395, 400, 412-3; VII: 120, 128, 162, 172, 326; VIII: 155, 158-9, 168, 193, 203; IXa: 52, 58- 9, 61, 63, 66; IXb: 333, 340; X: 340; XI: 22, 71, 133, 231-2, 234, 242, 257, 300, 346—51, 353; XII: 256, 319, 347-8, 369. Regarding their allomythic family, one might think Tolkien's imagination would have gone to, say, the Nephilim, but instead he seems to have thought of this hybridity as a source of wisdom and beauty, not monstrosity or sin, though certainly the Numenorian heirs of Elros came to think of it as a diminishment of sorts, while not identifying as elves but yet wishing for their immortality.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | The world is focalized through the hobbit perspective, starting in the Shire and expanding outward into the worlds the members of the Fellowship travel among. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Tolkien's vast history of Middle-earth constantly informs what is happening in the narrative present. For example, in the fight with the Phial between Shelob and the hobbits, the descendant of the terrible spider Ungoliant, who put out the light of the Trees with her venom, is confronted by that very light, which persisted in the Silmarils and, now, is carried aloft by Eärendil. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should | Eucatastrophe, ultimately, but with lots of struggle and hardship, scares and thrills, doubt and mystery along the way. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The fate of the Ring and its Lord will shape the ultimate fate of Middle-earth, but the good peoples of the world, like the hobbits, are just as real as the Ring and its power. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | Tolkien thinks about this question a lot. The nature of a specific land influences the people and creatures that dwell on it, especially their language. He also sets up complex relationships of affiliation and conflict between individuals and groups. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, | There are many ways of life, wise and foolish, simple and sophisticated, destructive and creative. Tolkien sees value in all sorts of ways of life, but is confident that the lives that are opposed to the freedom of others to live are in error and will not win. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | Peoples' natures are shaped by their lands and languages, their bodies and histories. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | There are many sources of knowledge: stories, songs, dreams, the senses (natural and supernatural), and one does well to trust simple and direct knowledge (proverbs, old wives' tales, the senses) over, say, the Palantíri. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? | This situation is urgent—the culmination of much that happened in this age. The fate of the Ring matters, but its fate is oddly wrapped up with the fate of the humble |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | hobbits, their Shire, and the other free peoples of Middle-earth. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | The good people of Middle-earth must do their best against terrible odds, both through spectacular efforts like war and through subtle efforts like sneaking into Mordor. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Dextral |

† In Letter #153, Tolkien describes why no organized "religion" (*e.g.*, shrines or churches) exists in *The Lord of the Rings*; regarding this theme, Lobdell expands on Tolkien's use of language (2004, pp. 26-27):
*[L]anguages grow more abstract over time. Tolkien turned Max Müller's dictum on its head, but both acknowledged, indeed proclaimed, the connection between language and mythology—and specifically a young language that denotes many gods and spirits, in ash and oak and thorn, sunrise and sunset, morning and evening star, and where there is yet no word for God any more than there is for "tree." […] Only with abstraction can there come such fields as philosophy, theology, or, indeed, literary studies. One cannot*

*discuss "God" with a speaker of a young language: the ancient unities of the language have not yet been broken apart.*
The M-mode unity of dextrally disposed perception and composition tends to see the world in this style of immediate, holistic particularity. This is not to say that M-mode works are necessarily "mystical" or "spiritual" – Tolkien is operating with a certain vision of how a pre-Christian, "primitive age" (this is his expression) would see and live in the world. But unlike O-mode allomythoi like, say, the *Left Behind* series, with which the M-mode may be most sharply contrasted, M-mode allomythoi have a tendency to resist that sort of explicit abstract exegesis.

*Barrow-wights*

| **Barrow-wights; apart from references in *The Lord of the Rings*, see also *The History of Middle-earth* [HM] volume VI, pp. 42-3, 109-12, 115-21, 125, 127, 129-30, 132, 160, 169, 198, 218, 226, 401, 414; VII: 152 – Allomythic Family: *draugr* or *draug*** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | The barrow-wight lives in shadow and death, longing for the victory of death and shadow over everything. (Lovecraft is not the only artist who evidently appreciated the dark cosmic horror of Scandinavian and Germanic myth. When Tolkien describes the ancient evils living among the roots of the mountains and haunting the graves of kings and when, as in the case of the barrow-wight's song, he gives voice to their worldview, he indeed sounds quite Lovecraftian. Ultimately, his Catholic world-historical optimism wins out, but he knows the |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | creepy pleasure of horror.) |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | However they came to see the world as the "dark lord" (and whether the "dark lord" is Melkor or Sauron), they now yearn for his victory and to draw all things, animate and inanimate, into the doomed and cursed possible world that they have realized inside their barrow. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | This is somewhat unclear. The song is suggestive of those Ainur who conformed their music to Melkor's, so that could be their origin. But they might have been cursed beings created by some evil being through a spell or by their own misdeeds. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | *Cold be hand and heart and bone,*<br>*and cold be sleep under stone:*<br>*never more to wake on stony bed,*<br>*never, till the Sun fails and the Moon is dead. In the black wind the stars shall die,*<br>*and still on gold here let them lie, till the dark lord lifts his hand over dead sea and withered land.* (Tolkien, 2005, p. 141) |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What | Misery, resentment, desire to capture, curse, |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | and kill. Their world is dominated by the hope of the "dark lord" being victorious and the death of the world. This possible future seems perhaps more real to them than even the burial mound in which they exist in their undead state. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | The only being they seem to care about is the dark lord, whose vision for the proper order of things they share. But in the immediate situation, they inhabit and curse the grave and its treasure and seek to pull living things into the same accursed state. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought | Their way of life marks them as ancient evils, recalling the song of Melkor and his vision for the world. Their existence is disembodied, their knowledge paranormal, and the world they primarily live in – the possible world they wish for and the spell-woven barrow – is |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | alienated from the rest of Middle-earth. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | They are strongly identified with the spell—the evil song—that describes their cosmology. The barrow-wight in *LotR* has qualities of a traditional *draugr*, but with a distinctively Tolkienian twist, such as this reference to his creation myth, in particular the "Ainulindalë." |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Their knowledge seems to be exclusively through paranormal means, but it is limited. The barrow-wight does not realize what Frodo is doing quickly enough to respond effectively. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? | They value the dark lord and his vision for the world; they hate and resent the world of life |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | and light. Their goal is to draw the latter into the former. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | The precise way they achieve their goal involves magical rules that are suggested but not laid out explicitly—the barrow-wight's spell seems to have to do with ritual killing accompanied by a magical song. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Dextral – note the dreamy, musical evil of the barrow-wight is rather different from most of the other evil beings in *LotR*, whose allomythoi typically present a sinistral diathesis |

| **Dead Men of Dunharrow; HM VIII: 267, 275, 289, 310-1, 313, 315-16, 319, 321, 397-8, 406, 409, 411-14, 417-20, 422 425-6 – Allomythic Family: European folklore; life as imagined in Hades or Sheol, or perhaps even more like that in Hel, suggesting the state of humanity before Christ's first coming and sacrificial death** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | They are cursed oath-breakers, bound to serve the true king but living a shadowy half-life until his coming. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | These accursed men live a shadowy life in the caves under the earth, like Hel, Hades, or Sheol. They are denied the Halls of Mandos and the ultimate freedom from Arda that is the Gift unique to humans until they fulfill their oath and the terms of Isildur's curse. In this way, their situation parallels the hardship of fallen, sinful humans awaiting the coming of Christ to free them from their sins. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this | They made a vow to Isildur on the covenant Stone of Erech, and the |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happening? What *caused* this situation? | power of that king's curse combined with the violation of such a powerful oath caused their sleepless death. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | They can only be freed from their curse by serving the true king, the heir of Isildur. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The world is not for them, but the "gift" of death, which is proper to humans in Tolkien's world, has been denied to them. So the issue is their need for the heir of Isildur to come so that, in service to him, they may be set free. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of | The dead dwell only with each other, not comforting each other, but sharing in each other's doom. Rather like Sheol or Hades, their state of existence is a sad shadow of true life. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | Their way of life is that of fallen humans – accursed, doomed, shadows, who need to serve their Lord, failed, and can only be set free by his grace and in his service. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I am damned, an oath-breaker, unfaithful to the true king; my life is shadow and fear, hoping only for the coming of the king and for freedom in his service. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, | Their senses seem uniquely sensitive to the call of the heir of Isildur. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Their situation is dire. What they value most is the chance to serve Aragorn and be set free from their curse. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | By projecting the awful fear, no doubt rooted in their fearful state, of their very existence, they must serve the king in battle, and by service and by the king's grace be set free. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Dextral, but then, on Aragorn's coming and giving commands, sinistral—presumably integrated once set free to go to the Halls of Mandos and, thence, out of Arda |

*Drúedain*

| **Drúedain; HM VIII: 9-10, 16, 18-19, 21-22, 61, 68, 245-6, 248, 251, 259-60, 262-3, 265, 316, 319, 344-6, 350-2, 356; XI: 391; XII: 293, 309, 324, 326; IXa: 137; XII: 309; IXb: 65, 309, 316, 324 – Allomythic Family: American Indian stories (e.g., their style of speech and ability to travel secretly and swiftly through their forest); Medieval woodwose myth (n.b. how they are hairless instead of hairy—the way their eyes glow red is suggestive of the myth)** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | The Drúedain, Woses, Wild Men (sic) of the Woods, or Púkel-men (sic) are, as Tolkien has their representative say, "wild, free, but not children." They will act to protect their environment, but they place limits on their willingness to participate in the conflict. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is | They have long memories, rooted in their land. They know secret roads and remember aspects of the past within their area of life. They dwell with their own, but are willing to be allies with the "Horse-men" and "Stonehouse-folk." |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | They recall when the people of Gondor were stronger, and in the past their ansectors were more closely and intimately connected with the other humans. And they have kept track of what's going on around them as the tension builds. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | They know the conflict that is coming, but they see appropriate behavior for their part as primarily functioning as news givers and guides, though they do make some use of their poison arrows. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Nature, the hunt; this conflict and the danger of the "gorgûn" (orcs). |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and | They live primarily apart and alone with each other, in close relationship with their forest, but are willing to act in defense of it. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | Normally, their way of life is wild coexistence with the forest, hunting, remembering ancestral knowledge, etc. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature | They are native, indigenous people, and their bodies are exoticized in a variety of ways. In some ways like dwarvish, miniature Bombadils, they are wild |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this context? | and solitary but willing to offer limited help. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | They count the stars and leaves, examining nature closely and keeping track of the others around them. Their historical knowledge is trusted—and more reliable than what other humans know relative to their areas of competence. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what | The peril is real and serious, but it also important to adhere to cultural norms. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | They will provide information and guidance along the secret, quick route around the enemy. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | integrated |

*Dúnedain of Gondor*

| **Dúnedain of Gondor [based on focus on LotR, the Dúnedain of Arnor are not the primary concern here]; HM V: 7, 34; VI: 294; VII: 146, 215, 312-13, 318, 321-2, 362, 395-6, 400-1, 420, 423, 445, 448, 450; VIII: 21, 24, 49, 71-3, 76-8, 80, 95, 106, 122,127, 135-6, 142-8, 151-4, 156, 158, 160-2, 165, 168, 170-1, 174, 180, 182, 219, 231-3, 235-6, 238, 241, 243-4, 246, 253, 256-7, 259-60, 262-3, 268, 271-2, 274, 278-9, 281-4, 286, 291, 293-4, 299-301, 304, 306, 309-12, 315-19, 321-2, 331, 338, 343, 349-53, 356, 360, 362, 363, 367, 369-71, 375, 377, 379, 385, 387, 389, 392-3, 395, 398, 401, 410-11, 413-14, 416, 424-5, 431, 436; IXa: 8, 10, 20, 30, 46, 48-50, 52, 55-6, 59, 61, 69, 71, 83, 86, 91, 117, 122, 126, 128-9, 135; IXb: 331, 393; X: 370, 373, 379-80, 409, 411, 438; XI: 378, 386, 402; X: 370, 373; XI: 189, 314, 319, 391; XII: 6, 20-2, 25, 31-4, 36, 38, 40, 42-3, 45, 53, 55, 63, 68, 74, 119-23, 124-5, 127-33, 136, 145-6, 149, 163, 167, 169-71, 176, 188, 190-207, 210-20, 225-33, 235-6, 238-45, 252-5, 258-60, 263, 265-7, 269, 271-4, 283, 293-4, 296, 311-12, 315-16, 324, 328, 330, 332, 339, 360, 371, 410-11, 414, 419 – Allomythic Family: Biblical Hebrews when faithful to God; humans closer to the time of the Fall; Atlantians** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common | At their best, they were faithful to Ilúvatar and friends of the elves, benevolent rulers and |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | protectors of "lesser" humans, but by this point they have mingled with those "lesser men," have started giving into fear, forgetfulness, despair, etc. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | We are the descendants of the faithful remnant and colonists of the blessed humans who once lived on Númenor, but we have lost the line of kings and, under the stewards, we have diminished. The northern forces of evil are growing stronger, and our efforts to protect the world seem to be failing. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | We lost our relationship with the elves, and we lost our king—two very important points of access to the the grace of Ilúvatar. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | The return of the king will revive them, as will reaching out to allies like the elves and the Rohirrim, but it appears that without intervention Gondor will fall. The Steward thinks he has seen Gondor's doom through his palantír. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Lord Denethor "sits alone in his high chamber in the Tower at night, and bends his thought this way [...] he can read somewhat of the future; and [...] he will at times search even the mind of the Enemy, wrestling with him." Since the determination of what exists and what the issue or situation is rests with Lord Denethor, this appraisal is distorted by his reliance on the palantír—so epistemology strongly defines ontology with Gondor until the return of the king, after which a wiser vision, undistorted by despair, informed by the guidance of Gandalf and enriched by alliance with elves and others, is able to see the threat of Mordor but also the hope of Frodo and Sam. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and | Gondor, under Denethor, knows itself as isolated – having no aid from Rohan or the elves and dwarves – and under attack from multiple sources. Under Aragorn, Gondor knows itself to have friends; though the forces arrayed against it are more powerful, it is not without hope. But Gondor either way knows that the fate of all good, free creatures depend on it. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | The Gondorian way of life is honorable, hierarchically organized, militaristic, rooted in history and the calling of leadership. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | They are proud, knowing their noble and honorable past, but their way of life is so constrained by combat and isolated – under Denethor – that they are alienated from others who should be their allies. Their self-understanding is more communal and positive under Aragorn. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my | Of the palantír Aragorn says, "I had both the right and the strength to use it, or so I judged. The right cannot be doubted. The |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | strength was enough – barely." Denethor's use of the palantír, like Saruman's, was unwise, and in both cases a source of inaccurate information. Gondor has ancient records, folk wisdom preserved among wise women and others, and, later, the guidance of many wise beings who advise Aragorn. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Under Denethor, the ring is desired as a tool and weapon, and the situation is appraised as so dire as to be hopeless. Aragorn knows that the situation is serious, but trusts in allies and hopes in Frodo and Sam. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively | Based on that hope, Aragorn's wild gamble is the appropriate path. In contrast, Denethor commits suicide and attempts filicide. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Under Denethor, sinistral; under Aragorn, integrated |

*Dunlendings*

| **Dunlendings; HM VII: 167, 320; VIII: 21, 52, 159, 242, 247, 253, 298, 321; IXa: 69, 74, 93, 103, 107; XII: 11, 34, 38, 65-7, 205, 229, 250, 271, 279, 314, 319, 329-30 – Allomythic Family: unclear—general idea of wild, barbaric humans** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | The Wildmen of Dunland, at the time of *LotR*, live harsh lives of resentment and combat. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is | My people are the enemies of other humans (the people of Gondor and the "straw-heads" of Rohan) due to historical feuds and Saruman's lies that shape their understanding of their place in the world. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Our lands were usurped generations ago by Rohan, which drove us into these hills where our lives are so hard. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Sauruman told them that if the people of Rohan won, they would be merciless, so they thought that battle-to-the-death was necessary. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | They are keenly aware of their harsh environment in the hills and their antagonistic relationship with their neighbors. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – | Fearful, resentful, hateful, they are opposed to the Men of the West and the Rohirrim. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | They are dark-haired and short, living in the wilds of the hills, in contrast to their human neighbors; they feel compelled to struggle to survive. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | They have been taught by historical experience and by Saruman's lies to understand themselves in terms of resentment and hate. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | History, Saruman, and the harsh reality of experience. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | The situation is negative and serious; survival is at stake. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Survival is to be violently secured through combat with enemy humans. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral |

*Dwarves*

| **Dwarves [note that this analysis of the broad worldview family ignores the differences between, say, the dwaves of Moria, of the Lonely Mountain, of the Blue Mountains, etc.]; HM I: 236-7, 267; II: 68, 136, 223-30, 232, 234-9, 241, 243, 245-51, 283, 328; III: 32, 44, 52, 56, 111, 127, 161, 264, 306; IV: 24, 32-3, 54, 61-3, 103-4, 108, 112-13, 116, 123, 132-5,174-5, 178, 180-1, 183, 187-90, 209, 221, 223-4, 293, 300-1, 306-7, 309, 311, 320, 325-6, 331-2, 335-6; V: 7, 23, 129, 134-5, 141, 144, 146-7, 149, 178-9, 190-1, 197, 256, 258, 265, 269, 273-4, 277-8, 286, 303, 307, 313, 405; VI: 20, 30-1, 36, 48, 63, 66, 75, 79, 87, 101, 106, 117, 132, 140, 149-50, 156, 160, 173, 178, 203-4, 210, 221, 226, 234-5, 238, 246, 253, 294, 311, 313, 315, 336, 348, 381, 385, 391-2, 398-9, 411, 414, 429, 437, 448, 458-9, 463; VII: 20-1, 24, 114, 117, 125, 142-3, 152, 155-6, 158, 160, 162, 164, 166, 170, 175, 179, 181, 183-6, 188, 212, 218, 225, 227, 231, 247, 257, 263, 301, 304, 424, 431, 455; VIII: 14, 37-8, 153, 217, 292, 294, 357-8, 411; X: 93, 103-4, 202, 251, 409, 415, 418, 42; XI: 9-12, 45, 59-60, 68, 71, 107-9, 113, 118, 120-1, 128, 132, 134, 138, 143, 167, 179, 189, 201- 16, 239, 255, 280, 321-2, 324, 326-7, 329, 332, 334-6, 340-1, 345-53, 355, 359, 372, 387-91, 395, 397, 402, 408-9, 418-19; XI: 10, 108, 203, 205, 207-1, 395, 402; XII: 4, 7-8, 10, 15, 21-4, 26, 31, 35-6, 44, 46, 54-6, 58, 60, 70-1, 73, 76, 81-2, 173-4, 184-5, 205, 220, 222-3, 227, 230, 233, 235-40, 244, 246, 249-50, 252, 261, 275-6, 278, 280-1, 283-5, 288, 295-8, 300-5, 310-11, 313, 316, 318-23, (324), 327-8, 351-2, 358, 382-4, 391; XII: 210, 217, 221, 246, 382, 444, 451, 460, 466 – Allomythic Family: Norse myth; early and rather negative stereotypical "Jewish" model, but modified when Tolkien encountered the horrors of Nazism; quasi-Gnostic myth (perhaps reflecting early idea that Melkor made them)** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions** | |

| | | | | **(BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | The dwarves are not major actors in the *LotR* because, unlike *The Hobbit* in which their lands and treasures were at issue, their major concerns are not the focus of events. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | Aulë, their demiurge, made them tough and good—hard to corrupt to evil, but private and susceptible to goldlust. Dwarves dwell in the world and value it, but also live apart from much of it. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Aulë made them out of impatience, and they are likewise not the most patient race. They fought in the past on the side of light, but they largely stand apart from things as indeed they were made apart. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with | They will fight to defend their own homes and wealth, and in prosperous times they will trade and work with others. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | They are interested in the treasures of the earth and their crafts, and the outside world only interests them when it threatens such things. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | They care for each other, and a minority of them form new unions and families. The others outside the dwarven communities – elves and men and evil races – are mostly only relevant if they have desired treasure, are trading partners or seek to hire them for their crafts, or are a threat. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree | In their halls of stone and with stone-like strength, they cultivate their crafts, seek treasures, and enjoy their lives together, but |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | when this way of life is threatened, they are powerful warriors, men and women much alike. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | Their strong nature was initially shaped by Aulë, but they gained independent life. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Aulë gave them knowledge, and they learned a lot from the elves in addition to continuing their own active inquiries into the nature of the world—at least, those aspects that interest them. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Craft, precious materials, beards, the other sex (for a small minority), the secret language Khuzdul, and the freedom to pursue their pleasures and interests. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Pursue wealth and craft and defend the way of life built around those things. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated, with a sinistral bias. |

*Easterlings*

| **Easterlings; HM I: 135; II: 120, 126, 204; IV: 5, 118, 120-1, 179, 183, 300, 320, 322; V: 134, 192, 268, 286, 291, 307-8, 310, 312, 316, 364, 403; VIII: 244, 415; IXa: 50; IXb: 398-400; XI: 60-1, 64, 74, 79, 81-2, 88, 90-1, 127-8, 137, 167, 205, 207-8, 252-3, 256, 262, 264, 266, 298-9, 301, 377; XII: 197-8, 213-14, 219, 228, 230, 236, 258, 271-2, 296, 328 – Allomythic Family: Orientalism** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | The sallow people of the East were ancient allies of Morgoth and then of Sauron. They are the ancient enemies of the free peoples. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | They venerate the powers of darkness and live in a state of conflict with the West. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* | They have been in conflict with Gondor for a long time, and they have been servants of the dark powers for ages. As |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? | with the Haradrim, one of their great rulers fell under the power of the Ring and became a Nazgûl. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | They are called to serve Sauron in order to destroy Gondor. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The free West, as enemy and land to gain. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of | As with other villains in Tolkien, they seem to be, in a sense, more aware of their enemies than of their own people and allies. They are in the East, understood relative to the West. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | Very flat. Readers are given very little information about this. Their way of life is reported combat with the Men of Dale and the Dwarves of the Lonely Mountain. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I am at war with the free people of the West. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, | Sauron and, of the Nazgûl, probably especially Khamûl, are sources of authoritative knowledge and commands. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | The situation of the free peoples' prosperity is negative; they should be destroyed and all that is theirs become ours. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should | Battle and destroy the free peoples. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral |

*Elves of Rivendell*

| **Elves of Rivendell (Imladris); HM VI: 60, 71, 126, 207, 209, 212, 217, 225, 364, 393-5, 416; V: 33-4, 345, 384; VII: 5-10, 13-14, 18, 31, 49, 57, 59, 61-3, 65-6, 68-70, 72-3, 75-6, 80-4, 95, 116, 120, 122, 124-5, 127-8, 130, 134, 136, 140, 146-7, 152-3, 156-8, 161, 164-5, 169, 173, 183, 212, 221, 223, 238, 247-50, 255, 258, 263-4, 280, 286, 290, 292, 311, 361, 367-9, 390, 401, 405, 409, 417, 423, 438-9, 445, 451.; VIII: 76, 98, 139, 145, 165, 218, 256, 267, 275, 296, 301-2, 305, 307, 310, 386, 401, 423; IXa: 32, 52, 57-8, 63-4, 69-70,73-4, 111, 115,127, 132; X: 90; XI: 190; XII: 36, 44, 58, 76, 79, 83, 168-9, 174, 176-7, 179-80, 184, 186, 192-3, 195-6, 207-8, 225, 228, 232, 235, 239-42, 246, 253 263-5, 267, 330 – Allomythic Family: Medieval fairy lore; Oxford?** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | The mortality of the world itself is distressing, and the attempt to preserve the glory and light of the past is failing. But in Rivendell, the domestic joys of food, rest, story, song, and learning are still abundant. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will | The root metaphor of these elves and this place is that of HOME. They are at home in this world, and they are of all the elves Tolkien depicts the most healthful, wholesome, and balanced. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | The elves of Rivendell founded it as a stronghold, but it became a homeland. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Of all the elves, those of Rivendell seem most accepting of the flow of time and the coming future. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The living present – of food and companionship, of learning from the funded wisdom of the past but looking with clear eyes into the future, of healing from wounds and making plans – is honored in Rivendell. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations | Like Elrond, who is one of the half-elven who chose the immortal elven life, his homeland shares his character; Rivendell gives aid and comfort to the mortal peoples, and the elves there seem more connected to the |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | world of Middle-earth and other living things. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | The elves of Rivendell live like scholars, enjoying the comforts of food, song, and story while pursuing knowledge and creative activities. However, they are also oriented to the world, ready to fight to protect it, and to the afterworld of the West, where they will go with grace when their time is done. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | Unlike the elves of Lothlórien (below), these elves accept the nature of the world they live in and do not try in the same way to freeze the world in place. For this reason, they are themselves more dynamic and adaptable. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | These elves have old records (for example, prophetic lore), long memories, and lots of connections to outside sources of knowledge. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | The elves of Rivendell value food, health, story, song, wisdom, so they see the seriousness of the danger presented by the Ring and Sauron's return. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | They should help the Fellowship and the fight against Sauron's forces. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated. |

*Elves of Lothlórien*

| **Elves of Lothlórien; the Galadrim; HM VII: 224-5, 233-4, 236, 239, 243, 246, 256-7, 270, 272, 274-5, 279, 290, 393 – Allomythic Family: traditional Fairyland; angels** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | These elves dwell in the dreamy tree world of a bygone age, attempting to hold back the flow of time and preserve the light of the old world. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? | They live in the less-diminished light of a world that has otherwise passed on, and so the threat of Sauron is in some ways intensified. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | The root metaphor is that of the MALLORN TREE, which recalls the Years of the Trees, Telperion and Laurelin, the Silver Tree and the Gold Tree. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Galadriel, by the power of her ring Nenya, holds back the flow of time. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | They wish for the light to remain undiminished and unchanged forever, but this is not possible. Sauron's forces will continue to spread and to threaten other groups, and this terrible threat must be resisted, yes, but beyond that, the defeat of Sauron through the destruction of the One Ring will also bring an end to Nenya's power to preserve. Ultimately, they accept their passing and achieve their goal by returning to Valinor. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The threat to Middle-earth is even more dire than the threat of the passage of time. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | They inhabit a small section of the world that they keep safe and that keeps them safe. But they are not so closed off from the rest of the world as to not acknowledge the urgency of Sauron's threat and the need to help the other peoples of Middle-earth. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | Life among the mallorn trees, dwelling atop the flets of Caras Galadhon in the bliss and light of the past—but this is threatened now, and the threat is enough to even overcome the elvish will to immortality. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | The crisis of the threat of the two towers and their lords is enough to force an identity crisis of sorts: though the nature of these elves seeks to resist any change, many changes must be accepted in order to honor the true life of the world they love. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | In addition to other sources of knowledge, the Mirror of Galadriel provides special knowledge without the apparent dangers of the palantiri. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the | The divine light of the ancient world is precious and should be preserved, but so too is the present world. Under great threat, these competing values force a decision in favor of accepting the mortality of the world and moving on. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | The primary activity of the elves of Lothlórien in *LotR* is that of giving: rest, healing, comfort, knowledge, powerful objects, lives and forces in battle, etc. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Dextral. |

*Ents and Entwives, Huorns, Old Man Willow*

| **Ents and Entwives, Huorns, Old Man Willow; HM VI: 205, 254; VII: 16, 65, 214, 250, 411-14, 416, 418-21, 428-9, 434-7, 448; VIII: 4-6, 25-6, 30-1, 39, 41-2, 45, 47-62, 64, 66-8, 70, 79, 219, 255-6, 260, 262, 266-7, 275, 285, 343-6, 351, 360-4, 404, 430, 437; IXa: 7, 9, 53, 63, 71, 116, 119-120, 123; X: 251; XI: 341, 353, 356 – Allomythic Family: Tolkien was inspired by a wish, based on *Macbeth* and his own environmentalism, to depict trees actually marching to war; sentient trees are also of course common in myth and folklore, and certain sacred trees are of great importance in the Germanic and Scandinavian sources that inform Tolkien's worldmaking** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, | They are bound to the condition of the Olvar as |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | their defenders, guides, and representatives. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | The ents tend to the dextral just as the dwarves, whom they were created to balance, tend to the sinistral. They see the world holistically, as reflected in their complex, polysynthetic language. They |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | The ents understand causation in complex terms that tend to inhibit action. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | The bias of the ents is weighted in favor of waiting and watching, but when the threat to growing things is great, they can be stirred to action. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The ents are focused on the forest, especially the huorns, whom they calm, but since the elves taught them language, they distinguish the elements of the world more precisely. Their greatest concern is to protect the forests from the dangers of the peoples who might cut them down, such as orcs and dwarves. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | They are part of the forests, tied to the world of Middle-earth more intimately than the animate beings. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what | Their way of life shares in that of the Kelvar, in a sense, but in service to the Olvar. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I am a caretaker of the forest and a part of the ecosystem. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Decisions are made collectively (at an Entmoot) based on group knowledge. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this | The situation is serious and negative. Our home, community, and way of life is in real danger. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Organized opposition to Saruman is the only way to preserve our home and way of life. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Dextral. |

*Goblins, Orcs, Uruk-hai*

**Goblins, Orcs, and Uruk-hai; HM I: 47, 236-8, 240-3, 245; II: 14, 31, 35, 67, 76-80, 154, 156-7, 159, 165-6, 176- 7, 179-82, 219, 230, 247, 279; III: passim, but especially 34, 46, 48, 64, 148, 225-6, 282; IV: 12, 82, 93, 295, 314, 328, 338; V: 24, 29, 65, 74, 114, 117-51 passim, 161, 177-9, 190-1, 212, 216, 233, 238-9, 249-94 passim, 307, 309-12, 315, 320- 1, 323, 328, 332, 404, 406; VI: 55, 75, 78-81, 84, 86, 110, 128, 165, 176,**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **178, 187-8, 211, 227, 253, 261, 263-4, 271-2, 282, 320, 350, 354, 364, 381-2, 391, 429, 437, 442-3, 451, 453-4, 462; VII: 24-5, 114, 142-3, 155-7, 181, 184, 193, 199-201, 205, 336-7, 340, 353, 382, 411, 423, 437, 443, 462, 467; VIII: 3, 5, 9-10, 13-20, 22,24,26, 28, 40-1, 47, 49, 51, 54-5, 58-60, 96, 105-6, 109, 119, 122, 124, 132, 134-5, 148, 150-1, 154, 165, 172, 184-6, 189-91, 195, 199-200, 207, 211-16, 218, 222-6, 237, 249, 253-6, 259, 266, 275, 281, 285-6, 300, 310, 313, 332, 343-6, 348, 350-1, 355, 367, 404, 411, 413-15, 420; IXa: 8-11, 13, 14, 18, 21, 23-32, 34-6, 38-9, 43, 46, 63, 68, 71, 103, 107, 116, 119, 122; IXb: 332, 397; X: 78, 80, 106, 109, 123-4, 127-8, 159, 165, 194-5, 251, 391, 396, 406, 408-24; XII: 4, 21, 23, 249-50, 323; XI: 15-18, 33, 36-7, 46, 49, 52-3, 56-60, 66, 70, 72-7, 79- 82, 84-9, 92-7, 105, 109, 111-13, 118, 121, 125, 127-8, 132, 138-44, 147, 150, 162, 169, 176, 195, 203-4, 206, 212, 216, 220-3, 236-8, 241, 244, 255-6, 262, 275, 277, 279, 285, 307, 329, 359, 372, 377, 386, 389-91, 408-9, 418; XII: 9, 21, 24, 35-6, 42, 65, 70, 75, 80, 83, 177, 192-3, 196, 204-6, 211, 219-20, 223, 225-7, 230, 235-9, 242-3, 249-50, 264, 271-3, 276-8, 280, 323, 326, 410, 412-15, 420 – Allomythic Family: Fallen “man” in all his technoscientific, militaristic, nature-destroying brutality** | | | | | |
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | Utterly fallen and consumed by hate, for themselves and their terrible creator above all. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, | I am a distorted, damned creature, created by dark arts, through hate and violence, to serve those ends. I do not have a place in the larger plan. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Melkor captured some of the early elves and twisted them into terrible parodies of themselves. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | They are consumed by hate—generally directed outward though ultimately also directed at themselves and their maker. What ought to happen is the destruction of all things. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The ultimate horror and emptiness is perhaps best not thought about; better instead to focus on little, technical problems and fighting immediate enemies. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in | Completely alone and abandoned, even in the company of those like themselves, there is no community, only those who are the enemies of enemies and fellow slaves. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | Made by dark arts; they are interested in the techniques of destruction. Hated and violently wounded beyond recovery, they live lives of hate and violence. Completely dominated, they seek to dominate and aid in their lord's conquest of all other things. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | Fallen completely into the sin of despair and hate, such a being would no doubt say something like: "I am nothing, and so I hate myself." From this flows all the rest of the hate and destruction characteristic of the orc. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of | Goblins/orcs are fascinated by technical knowledge. The |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | instrumental mastery of things delights them, and so it would be incorrect to view them as not being interested in "knowledge." But the sinistral orientation is so marked that they are easily dismissed as foolish if one does not take seriously the depth of their cunning and craftiness. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | There is of course a strong individualistic priority placed on the self (even though Tolkien regards them as seeing themselves as ultimately loathsome). The distractions of technique, of the spectacle and horror of violence, and similar things seem to serve as values these creatures can attach to in their axiological void. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to | In the absence of real values, where such things have become insults and resentment is so strong |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | that all good things are offensive, the orcs' goals are negative: destruction of others, humiliation of others, not perishing, not being punished, etc. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral. |

*Great Eagles*

| **Great Eagles; HM II: 58, 193, 211; IV: 23, 52, 102, 145, 173, 318; V: 12, 162, 251-2; VI: 416; VII: 75-6, 116, 130, 134, 139, 151, 389, 400-1; VIII: 219, 256, 361-2; IXa: 5, 7, 44, 55; IXb: 231, 238, 246, 251, 266, 274, 277, 279, 281, 290, 350, 371, 391; X: 138, 185, 251, 410-2; XI: 55, 57-8, 63, 126-7, 170, 193, 198, 239, 272, 302, 341; XII: 239 – Allomythic Family: angels** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | They are the witnesses, messengers, agents of the divine, so their understanding of the situation and disposition toward acting on it is very similar to the Valar's. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this | The Great Eagles dwell on the highest peaks of the greatest mountains, locations Tolkien regards as especially appropriate for the worship of Eru. The only other location |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | any Great Eagles ever lived in was in a tower of the kings of Númenor when they were faithful to the Valar. As servants of Manwë, they appropriately live high in the sky. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Manwë devised them, and he did so in order that they might serve as sources of information for him, as sacred witnesses, and as agents of the divine will, intervening in moments of great need. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | The Great Eagles are very interested in the world, but they generally do not take action to change what is happening. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | They seem to be especially aware of the needs of the wizards. And they are aware of the great threats, such as the balrogs. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with | They are aware of the needs of the good, free peoples of Middle-earth, such as the elves, hobbits, dwarves, |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | wizards, and humans. And they are opposed to wicked beings like wargs and balrogs. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | Their way of life is primarily contemplative, heavily weighted toward the epistemological; like the Valar they serve, they use their great power reluctantly, and always on behalf of the good creatures of the world, whom they value. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner | They know themselves to be noble beings of great power, closely connected to Manwë and the Valar. Thus, they act carefully |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | am I? What is my nature in this context? | and with great restraint, as the Valar would wish. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Their gaze can penetrate almost anything, certainly all natural, physical barriers. And they seem to have knowledge from Manwë. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, | They value the good things of the world and want them to flourish, but they also do not want to overly interfere with free will. They have supreme respect for the will of Manwë. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Their balancing of axiological goods and evils, under submission to the will of Manwë, leads them to refrain from acting unless absolutely necessary. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Dextral |

*Great Spiders*

| **Great Spiders (offspring of Ungoliant—esp. Shelob); HM I: 151-3, 156-7, 160-1, 201, 214; II: 160, 286; III: 132, 141; IV: 16-7, 38, 47, 69, 74, 91-3, 98, 149, 152-3, 155, 169, 265, 288; V: 114, 147, 152, 187, 230-3, 242, 290, 299, 325, 386, 396; VI: 122, 188; VII: 93, 95, 99, 209, 213-14, 330-1, 335, 347; VIII: 104, 113, 115, 124-5, 180, 183-5, 187-200, 202-3, 205-18, 220-6; IXa: 23, 112, 115; X: 98-101, 105, 108-9, 119, 123, 132, 190, 193, 194, 283-6, 288-9, 291-3, 298, 386; XI: 14-15, 110-11, 194, 404; XII: 251 – Allomythic Family: embodied concupiscence, with strong elements of the female grotesque—a sort of inversion of Marian devotion** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? | The great spiders exist in a state of desire-and-loathing. They hate the light and yet yearn to consume it. They have no love for each other, but, of all Tolkien's beings, Ungoliant is probably the most sexual. And the |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What is appropriate in this situation? | Freudian aspects of Shelob's sting are hard to miss. They dwell in darkness and spin webs of darkness that capture light and life. Unlike those that live and hunt together in Mirkwood, Shelob dwells alone. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | Shelob is alone, having even eaten her children, in her webs of darkness with her endless hunger. She is not subject to Sauron, and will eat his creatures just as readily as any others, but he suffers her to remain because she functions as a sort of guard. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Unusually, she permitted Gollum to live, and he promised to bring her better food than he. Gollum brought her Frodo and Sam primarily, however, to take the Ring back after she eats them. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | What ought to happen, from her perspective, is that living things continue to come into her caves, become caught in her webs, be consumed by her, and cause her to grow and make more webs of darkness. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Hunger and darkness and the pain of the sword Sting and of the light of Eärendil's Star captured in the Phial of Galadriel. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | The light of Eärendil's Star reminds Frodo and Sam that they are not alone, that they are part of an unending story of hope; the same light strikes Shelob with flaming agony. She is alone and knows all other living things only as food. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to | Shelob is a being of hunger and hate, seeking to consume the living and avoid the light, dwelling alone and sensing the world through her webs and eyes. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I am hungry. I hate the living things I yearn to feed on; I hate the light I hide from. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | My webs tell me of living things that stumble into the dark worlds I live in; my eyes see well in the dark, but perceive bright light as pain. I have communicated with creatures like Gollum and Sauron and know things from the past. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or | I value life as food, but I hate living things and light. Tolkien in many ways equates life and light. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | I hide from the light and hunt the living. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral |

*Haradrim*

| **Haradrim; HM VIII: 254, 321, 397-8, 412-13, 420, 427; XII: 201, 206, 229, 238, 420 – Allomythic Family: racial exoticism and some racism (their language—so important to Tolkien—sounds bestial, and they are described thus: "black men like half-trolls with white eyes and red tongue")** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/** | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | **Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | They are servants and allies of the powerful forces of darkness, and they are locked in historical combat with Gondor and the Númenórean Faithful. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | Strongly influenced by Black Númenórean leadership, they are worshipers and servants of Darkness and enemies of Gondor and the Faithful. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | They have a history of conflict with Gondor and the humans who oppose Sauron, and their loyalty to Darkness and history of conflict with Gondor define their current situation. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? | They hope for Sauron's victory and to triumph over the humans who have so long been their enemies. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The conflict with Gondor and the importance of Sauron's power are highly salient. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | They live in the south, relative to Gondor. This strongly defines them. They dwell together as mutual enemies of Gondor. One might contrast the Haradrim's relationship with Mûmakil and ordinary horses with the Rohirrim's relationship with the Mearas and ordinary horses. The Haradrim seem to use the animals with whom they live more instrumentally than the personal relationships the Rohirrim have with horses and mearas. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the | They understand themselves as human allies of the powerful Darkness and enemies of Gondor and its allies. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | The Haradrim do not define themselves; they are known externally, by their exotic dress, Mûmakil, and violent behavior. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | They treat Sauron's words as authoritative and use their senses to perceive their enemies and fight them. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or | They value gold and power. The existence of enemies (especially |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Gondor and Gondor's allies) is negative, and combat with them is good. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Fight under Sauron's command to destroy Gondor. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral |

*Hobbits*

| **Hobbits (Halflings) of the Shire (*Suza*) (*e.g.*, Bagginses, Boffins, Tooks, Brandybucks, Grubbs, Chubbs, Hornblowers, Bolgers, Bracegirdles, and** |
|---|

| **Proudfoots); HM V, pp. 98, 199, 293-4; VI, pp. 3, 10-16, 18, 20-22, 24, 29-*31*, 34-35, 46, 50-52, 54-55, 58, 61, 63-64, 69, 71-72, 74, 76-78, 83-84, 92-93, 95, 99-101, 103, 110, 119, 122, 124, 129, 132-139, 149-151, 153, 155, 157, 164, 168, 171, 174, 175, 179, 194, 210, 212-213, 221, 223-225, 228, 233-236, 239-241, 243-245, 250-254, 256, 264, 266, 268, 272, 277-278, 280-281, 285-286, 288-289, 294-295, 298, 310-314, 318, 322, 324, 331, 333-334, 337-338, 340, 342, 344-347, 349, 358, 362-364, 366-367, 370-371, 374-375, 379-380, 385-387, 392-398, 403, 407-408 412, 415, 423; VII, pp. 6-7, 9-11, 13, 24-26, 31-32, 34, 38, 41, 43, 46-47, 49, 51, 55, 63, 68, 70-74, 78, 80, 84, 114-115, 125, 130-131, 134-135, 139, 152, 162, 185, 193, 212, 216, 221, 228-229, *232*, 241, 244, 246, 248-250, 253, 265, 286, 326, 356, 379, 386, 397, 424; VIII, pp. 36-39, 44, 59, 66, 75-76, *123*, 127, 150, 156, 160, 163, 219, *241*, 256, 282-285, 292, 304-306, 308, 323, 338, 388, 394; IXa, pp. 32, 52-53, 62-66, 68-69, 74, 76, 78, 80-81, 84, 87-91, 93-95, 98-103, 105-112, 116-118, 121, 126-129, 132, 134, IXb, p. 409; XII, pp. 3, 5-10, 12-20, 24-25, 27-29, 36-61, 66-67, 69-74, 83, 86-87, 94, 102, 112, 118-119, 121-133, 136-138, *168*, *209*, 211, 220, 225-226, 229, 231-232, 235-236, 238-239, 241, 243, 245, 247, 251, 253, 255, 262, *268*, 281-283, 287-289, 302, 309-311, 314, 326-327 – Allomythic Family: mixture of ancient Harfoot and Fallohide hobbits; idealized English, some romanticized qualities of "Indians" (*e.g.*, close friendship with the earth that lets them sneak about unperceived, a willingness to give and accept gifts freely)** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | Childlike innocence, submission to social norms, avoidance of outside world, enjoyment of basic things of life. |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will | We are rooted in the land of the Shire, closely tending it and enjoying its abundance. Our society is close-knit and humble. We are isolated from and to some degree know ourselves in contrast to "the Big |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | People," and we are happy to escape notice while not really appreciating what a gift our peace is. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Hobbits migrated here long ago, but they do not dwell on the past in that sense. They are, however, well aware of the character of each family and know the families' histories. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Society will continue as it has and as it ought as long as no one disrupts things. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Issues are small—weather, local gossip, social mores, and agriculture. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose | Other hobbits are my peers and my community. My responsibility is to the group and to my own desire to maintain social face. Disruption of the |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | norm is both gauche and dangerous. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | I am a member of a larger group that is separate from the outside world. The Big People (and wizards) have their own problems that are beyond my power or responsibility. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature | Society provides roles and identities for each hobbit. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Knowledge is passed down by word of mouth custom—new sources of knowledge come from interlopers and are therefore dangerous. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what | My goal is to maintain my comfort and social standing—isolationism is the best strategy. The Mayor of Michel Delving and the Thain of the Shire also stand out as important figures, as do mathoms and their surrounding customs (including the great Mathom-house in Michel Delving). |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Continue "business as usual"—allow outside problems to be dealt with by outsiders. Distinctive practices include mathom-giving, birthdays, and smoking pipe-weed. |
| | *Lateral Diathesis* | | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated. |

*Hobbits of Buckland*

| **Hobbits of Buckland; see also HM II, p. 328; VI, pp. 29-30, 35, 37, 40, 46, 53, 55-56, 61, 65, 67, 89, 92, 94, 100, 104-107, 109, 160, 175, 244, 273, 275-276, 279-280, 283, 286, 288, 291, 298, 303, 323-324, 326, 366, 375, 392, 401; VII, pp. 6, 11, 13, 20-31, 53-55, 68, 72, 135, 249; VIII, pp. 26, 35; IXa, pp. 82, 106, 115; XII, pp. 10, 17, 50, 57, 80, 99, 104-105, 112, 235, 255 – Allomythic Family: ancient Stoor hobbits** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | Less innocent and naïve, compared to the hobbits of the Shire, more engaged with the world and its dangers, but still quite childlike and in tune with the basic joys of life. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | Dwelling between the boundaries of the High Hay (protecting them from the mysteries and dangers of the Old Forest) and the Brandywine River, the hobbits of Buckland know more keenly that their peace is precious, an island in the midst of dangers. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | They are more aware of themselves as colonists or settlers, who need to shield themselves and their world from outside peril. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Life should go on as usual as long as tradition and custom are honored. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Buckland, with also acute awareness of the Old Forest and the world beyond the river. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | More aware of others apart from fellow hobbits, but still primarily inward-looking society concerned with hobbit affairs. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | The hobbit way of life is still maintained in this eastern region of the East Farthing: mathoms, pipe-weed, meals, gossip, etc. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | They are hobbits, tied to the earth but more willing than most hobbits to engage with the water of the river. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Tradition is the main source of knowledge, in addition to a pragmatic attention to the natural senses. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in | Pleasures that are prioritized include pipe-weed, socialization, gifts and gift-giving, respectability. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Continue traditional rural customs. |
| | *Lateral Diathesis* | | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated. |
| *One might attend to how Gollum's dual worldview and way of life, both as an ancient Stoor hobbit, Sméagol, and as a creature corrupted by the Ring, parallels the construction of other corrupted beings below. Compare, too, the hobbits corrupted by "Sharkey." | | | | | |

*Maiar (Wizards)*

| **Maiar: Wizards; see also HM I, pp. 63, 80, 88; II, p. 246; III, p. 127; IV, p. 73; V, pp. 21, 227, 345; V, p. 120; VI, pp. 211, 260, 270, 318, 364; VII, pp. 22-23, 72, 136, 228-229, 326, 411, 418, 422, 436; VIII, pp. 36-38, 47, 53, 60, 63, 282, 285, 326, 331-332; IXa, pp. 26, 77, 132; X, pp. 49, 52, 55-56, 59, 61, 65-66, 69, 72, 76, 79, 84, 86, 91, 99, 110, 112, 130, 133, 137-138, 147-150, 152, 165, 172, 198, 200, 203-204, 286-287, 340, 397, 410-412, 416, 424-426; XI, pp. 5-7, 9-10, 16, 71, 113, 341, 372-373, 397, 399, 401, 405-406, 416; XII, pp. 228-229, 245, 247, 285, 311, 360, 378, 381, 384-385, 388, 392 – Allomythic Family: in addition to European wizard story traditions (e.g., Merlin), Tolkien obviously has in mind the role of the angel and even Jesus/the Logos in the Catholic worldview** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | I have a divine purpose to pursue above all other interests; these maiar know the original song of creation and have a sense of their place in it as well as others, but they know this means creative, agentive activity is necessary. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | I am living with people whom I have a responsibility to protect and guide. My purpose is definite and explicit, each Maia being associated with the nature of a Vala. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Sauron's quest for power endangered the world, and in response to the danger presented to the world and the Children of Illúvatar, Manwë sent the Istari. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should | The Istari know the future in the sense that all participants in the song of creation know it, but their knowledge is incomplete. Unless corrupted, their goal is to resist evil and preserve the light. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Light and good are the only things that really exist; evil is their absence or distortion. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | I am a protector and advisor to mortal races and exist separately from society. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what | The way of life of the wizards is defined by their powers and limitations. They have great physical and magical powers, but they are not permitted to use them in direct combat with Sauron. Thus, they |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | guide and aid the other peoples. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | Istari have received divine instruction to combat evil covertly. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | As Maiar, they know some of the song; they are also granted knowledge by the Valar, and they have learned much over their long years. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this | They understand the danger presented by Sauron, and they also know that they should not seek personal power or dominion. Instead, |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | they should seek to empower the weak in their fight with darkness and evil. Curumo (Saruman) adopts an improper goal and is thus forbidden to return. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Advise, support, and encourage Men and Elves to resist Sauron. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Dextral, with the exception of Curumo, who takes on a sinistral diathesis (see below). |

*Maiar (Balrogs, Sauron, Saruman)*

**Maiar: Balrogs, Sauron, Saruman; HM I, pp. 52, 93, 161, 241, 250; II, pp. 15, 34, 44, 53-55, 57, 67, 85, 156, 169-170, 174-176, 178-184, 189, 193-194, 212-213, 215-216; III, pp. 7, 36-37, 70, 97, 100, 102-103, 142, 153, 170, 232-233, 281, 284, 288, 296, 301, 303, 304, 306, 313, 337-340, 342, 344, 348, 350; IV, pp. 12, 17, 22-23, 36-37, 39, 47,**

| **52, 66, 73, 82, 93, 101, 108, 118-120, 142, 144-145, 147, 151, 157, 160, 166, 173, 181, 202, 205, 209, 266, 268, 282-283, 295, 307, 314, 321, 328, 338; V, pp. 7, 9, 26-31, 33, 47-48, 56-57, 61, 65-71, 74, 76-77, 114, 117, 122, 125, 137, 142, 144, *148*, 152, 212, 216, 233, 238, 249, *256*, 280, 282-283, 289-290, 296-300, 307, 310-311, 314, 328, 333, *336*, 338, 359, 372, 384, 393, 404, 406; VI, pp. 11, 85, 131, 187-188, 215-216, 218, 258, 260-261, 270-271, 318, 397, 399, 402-405, 414, 416-417, 422, 435, 462; VII, pp. 23, 54-55, 65, 70-73, 75, 112, 116, 119-121, 123, 126-127, 129-142, 144-146, 148-158, 168, 177, 184, 186, 188-189, 197-200, 202-203, 206-207, 209-212, 236, 247, 254-255, 257, 259-260, 262-263, 286, 289, 298, 321, 330, 335, 344, 349, 354, 360, 382, 393, 395, 404, 409, 422, 430-431, 434, 437-438, 441, 444-445, 450; VIII, pp. 21, 45, 48-50, 64-65, 67-68, 72-74, 76-77, 79-80, 86, 95, 98, 105-106, 107, 110, 112, 122-123, 124, 127, 129, 135, 155, 179, 212, 214, 219, 229-230, 236, 238, 241, 243, 256-257, 369, 372; IXa, pp. 6-11, 13-14, 20, 38, 45-46, 51-53, 59, 64-66, 68-69, 71-72, 74, 76, 83-84, 90-91, 93-95, 100, 102-104, 106-107, 115, 133; IXb, pp. 246, 250, 284, 289-290, 310, 313-315, 317, 334-337, 339, 345-348, 350-353, 355-356, 380, 382-384, 393, 395; 400-401, 404, 407-409, 412; X, pp. 52, 60, 66, 70, 75-76, 78-80, 109, 123-124, 147, 152, 156, 159, *165*, 203, 223-224, 232, 241, 297-298, 344, 391, 394-398, 400, 404, 406-414, 418-421; XI, pp. 18, 37, 54, 56, 59, 62, 66-67, 74-75, 82, 110, 113-114, 134, 168-169, 194, 415; XII, pp. 31-33, 65, 74, 79, 83, 129, 133, 150-154, 158, 163, 166-184, 191-193, 196, 200-202, 205-206, 222, 227-228, 233, 248-249, 251, 262, 267, 274-275, 277-278, 283-286, 379-380, 383, 390, 421 – Allomythic Family: demons** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | The situation should be a reflection of my will, but is not. |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this | I exist separately from the world and the society of beings and am superior. Power is the overarching goal. I am in opposition to order of things. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | We are following the discordant song of Melkor (Morgoth), whose music distorted or persuaded us to distort our nature. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | These various beings desire and predict a world that is the instrument of their wills, the entire world the so-called Ring of Morgoth. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The reality of being, in its light and freedom, offend the will to dominate and shape it anew. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and | Tolkien constructs the sociality of these umaiar in terms of servility: they are utterly dominated by those above them and by their appetite for power, so their collaboration |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | does not mean that they have a sense of community. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | I am inherently superior to others living in this world, and they exist in order to be subdued |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature | I am inherently superior. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | The will of the most powerful (Melkor, later Sauron) defines what is most true and real, and all other forms of knowledge are understood instrumentally. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what | My goal is dominance, conquest, and control of other groups. The situation is serious, and failure will result in my death. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Military and political action should be used to subdue or corrupt others in order to increase my own power and influence. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral. |

*Nazgûl*

| **Nazgûl; HM II: 327; VI: 44, 48, 54-5, 58, 60, 63-4, 66-7, 69-71, 73, 84, 87-91, 95-7, 100, 103-4, 106, 109, 118-20, 126, 129, 131, 151-5, 157-63, 171-6, 178, 185-6, 188-91, 194-9, 207-8, 211-13, 217-18, 221-5, 269, 272, 277-9, 281-2, 285, 287-8, 291-3, 295, 297, 301, 303, 324-6, 328, 336, 339-44, 347-50, 353-68 passim, 371-3, 381, 401, 408, 416, 434, 462; VII: 6-7, 9, 11-14, . 16-17, 29, 32-6, 40-1, 43-5, 47-9, 52-5, 57-8, 62-5, 68-79, 82, 105, 113, 130, 132-5, 138, 149, 151-2, 190, 208, 211-13, 215, 326, 335, 337, 341, 365, 389, 409, 423, 451; VIII: 48, 59, 71-3, 77, 109-10, 112, 118-20, 127, 141-2, 217, 219, 229, 231, 232, 249, 253, 255, 257, 260, 262-3, 267, 274-6, 283, 289, 320, 322, 324, 326, 329, 330, 331, 334-6, 359-69, 372, 375, 380, 387, 430-1; VIII: 256, 260, 263, 267, 326, 334-6, 363, 365-8, 372, 375, 377, 380, 390, 395; IXa: 4-8, 10, 13-14, 25, 38; XII: 178, 207, 217, 241-2, 267 – Allomythic Family: damned men; undead in Norse myth** | | |
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I | They live accursed shadow-lives in the unseen realm, subject to the will of Sauron. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | I am a ghostly remnant of humanity. I lost myself to the Ring and my sovereignty to Sauron. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | I was corrupted by the One Ring though the ring of power that gave me riches, long life, etc. but gradually diminished my own light, my invisibility and incorporeality being a sign of my damnation. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Sauron's will and goals are theirs. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, | They exist only to serve Sauron and carry out his orders. Their own reality is so diminished, very |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | little is real to them. They have mastery over great powers to kill and, indeed, over other wraiths and wights. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | They have lost this aspect of life. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted | My only priority is my orders from Sauron. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I am an instrument of Evil and exist for no purpose other than to follow orders. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | All knowledge and instruction comes from Sauron. No other source is necessary. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, | My only concern is my orders—I have no higher purpose than to obey the Ring & its creator. They dwell in shadow, utterly naked before the Eye. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | They do things to achieve Sauron's goals, destroying kingdoms, killing, causing other damned, undead spirits to take over the graves of long-dead kings, fighting elves and wizards with dark magic, etc. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral. |

*Rangers of the North*

| **Rangers of the North (i.e., not the Rangers of Ithilien) – Allomythic Family: remnant of the Dúnedain of Arnor and, thus, the faithful Númenóreans** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) | They are the hunters and foes of evil, the descendants of the humans who remained elf-friends, themselves |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | keeping close ties with the elves of Rivendell and helping keep the hobbits safe. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | We are the last remnants of an ancient race of noble people. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Arnor was broken into three kingdoms, all of which eventually fell. The Rangers continue the fight but also continue to diminish. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | They will continue to fight evil and protect those who are less strong, and ultimately the return of the King will elevate them. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Our task now is to protect people from encroaching evil: orcs, trolls, armies. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | These noble humans maintain their connection to the elves, fostering their future leaders at Rivendell where their heirlooms are also kept safe. Looking outward, they protect the hobbits of the Shire from the surrounding dangers of wild beasts, orcs, and other forces. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to | They live in a stern, shadowy manner, doing the hard work of protecting the weak without glory. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | They have a strong sense of their honor and lineage. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | They are wise, preserving knowledge from their great ancestors, leaning from the elves, and watching the world closely. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or | The situation is serious—the whole world is under threat, and we are in a position to resist. We must protect the Shire from the Shadow, and this may mean keeping the ring from the Nazgûl. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | The only option is to continue to resist Evil by fighting creatures. We must also preserve the bloodline of Isildur and the innocent of the Shire. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated. |

*Rohirrim, Éorlingas*

| **Éorlingas, Rohirrim; HM VII: 214, 357, 395, 407, 450; VIII: ) 4-5, 9, 22, 24, 40, 156, 236, 242, 247, 254-5, 266-7, 273-4, 316, 318, 320, 342, 344-6, 348-9, 351-4, 359, 365, 381, 385, 389, 392-3, 404-6, 415, 420, 422-3, 428; XII: 34, 38, 41, 49, 52-3, 60, 65, 71, 75, 82, 236, 238- 9, 242, 245, 271-2, 296, 312, 328 – Allomythic Family: Anglo-Saxon culture combined with a heavy focus on horses** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/** | |

| | | | | **Stasis Theory** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | Good and faithful allies, betrayed from within and without, but determined to do what is right. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | They dwell in their land as the descendants of the Éothéod who helped Gondor in its need and received their land under the sacred oath made between Steward Cirion and Eorl. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Our society is under threat, much of this caused by the treachery of Saruman. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought | After first fighting off the evil of Saruman, they must keep the Oath and help Gondor against Mordor. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Horses and the hunt; dangers; food; song; pride in one's honor. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | They are horse-people and the honorable descendants of those who followed Eorl in helping Gondor. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation | They are warriors, both men and women, and great hunters, with lives deeply entwined with the horses they ride. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | They are defined by the land they inhabit, the horses they care for and ride, the hunt and the battle, and their pride in their honorable history. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Knowledge is preserved through oral history and especially songs. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? | The invading forces of Saruman and then the danger of Sauron's forces to Gondor and all free |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | peoples are huge negatives, and their horses, family members, honor, and land are their primary goods. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | They must fight against the forces that would destroy them and those with whom they are allied. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated (though dextral when Gríma Wormtongue corrupted King Théoden). |

*Trolls*

| **Trolls (hill-, cave-, mountain-, snow-trolls, Olog-hai, the Lonely Troll); HM II: 283;** |
|---|

| **VI: 126, 144, 162, 178, 192-4, 203-4, 212, 253, 272, 318, 360, 365, 443-4, 454; VII: 10, 14, 59-61, 193-4, 197-9, 201, 205, 211, 411, 413; VIII: 30, 223; X: 251, 409, 412, 414; XII: 35-6, 75, 79-80, 82, 196, 235, 238, 263 – Allomythic Family: ranging from animalistic, racist/colonialist tropes (in LotR proper), to classist comedy (in *The Hobbit*), to compassionate, humorous, moralistic parody of trolls as otherwise constructed (in the poem "Perry-the-Winkle")** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | Trolls are closely tied to the brutality of their environment, embodying and concentrating its peril. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | All living things are food. |
| | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* | Melkor made them in mockery of ents, but from living stone that becomes lifeless in sunlight; Sauron enhanced the Olog-hai so |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? | that they could survive sunlight. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | They wish to consume living things; their weak wills are dominated by Melkor and then by Sauron so that they share in the wills of their master. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Food, enemies, the danger of sunlight. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart | They do seem to live together but easily fall into conflict, especially over the topic of food. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | Their way of life is brutish, ranging from acting like rabid animals to uncouth, foolish humans. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I am hungry and easily angered. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? | Knowledge tends to be the immediate evidence of one's senses, though words even of one's food/enemy are easily believed. The truth of the master's will is unquestioned. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Seek out food; avoid sunlight. Destroy enemies—though this may require enduring the danger of sunlight. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Seek out food; avoid sunlight. Destroy enemies—though this may require enduring the danger of sunlight. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral |

---

*Valar*

| **Valar, such as Varda (perhaps Tom Bombadil and Goldberry); HM I: *passim*, 18, 61, 65, 104, 107, 114, 148, 154, 178, 180, 186; II: 5, 7, 15, 19, 35, 37, 44-5, 47, 68, 72-3, 76, 79, 101, 103-4, 111, 115-16, 141, 151-2, 161, 188, 198, 200, 204, 219, 280, 282-3, 285, 295, 312, 323; III: 26, 54, 127, 136-7, 173, 192, 243; IV: 5, 12-13, 17, 21-2, 36-7, 39-40, 42-3, 45-6, 50, 52, 57, 65, 68, 72, 75, 78-9, 82, 84, 86, 89-90, 94, 99-100, 104, 106, 108, 138-9, 142, 149, 151-2, 155, 162, 164, 166, 169-70, 191, 195-6, 198-9, 202-6, 208, 211, 238-9, 252-3, 255-6, 263, 265-7, 271, 275, 278-9, 281, 283, 285, 288, 291-3, 335; IV: 74, 78, 86, 151, 158, 161, 165, 211, 263, 288, 292, 331; V: 7, 20, 25, 63-4, 66, 72-4, 97, 104, 110-11, 113-16, 120-3, 125, 161-5, 168, 172-3, 175, 179-80, 185-7, 191, 193, 204-47 *passim*, 273, 283-4, 328, 330, 332, 335, 338, 350, 407; VI: 122; VIII: 136, 157, 401; IXb: 241-2, 246, 252, 286, 292, 305, 310, 332-3, 340, 355, 376-7, 394, 396, 400-2, 404-6, 409-10, 412; X: 4, 8, 14-43 *passim*, 48-62, 65-75, 77- 82, 84, 86, 88, 90-1, 93-101, 105, 107-8, 110-20, 125, 128- 33, 135-8, 144-7, 149, 152-4, 157, 159-62, 166-8, 172, 174- 6, 178, 183, 185-91, 194, 196, 198-204, 211, 218-20, 223, 226, 235, 238-9, 241, 243-4, 246-7, 250-1, 253-5, 258-61, 268-93 *passim*, 295, 297, 311, 313, 318-19, 321-2, 327, 330-1, 334- 41, 350-1, 355, 357, 362-4, 372, 374-82, 384, 386-94, 396- 407, 410-12, 415-16, 424-30; X: 4, 15, 48-9, 52, 58, 65-6, 69, 99, 105, 131, 144-7, 151, 162, 166, 168, 201, 204, 208-9, 218, 239-46, 254, 258, 263-4, 269, 271-2, 284, 286, 289, 326-7, 339, 361, 394, 401, 405, 407, 412; XI: 5-7, 11-12, 14, 18-19, 30, 36-7, 41- 2, 54-5, 104-6, 111, 118-9, 173, 175, 196, 203, 206, 239-40, 246, 296, 340-1, 345-6, 359-60, 372-3, 386, 397-407, 413, 418-9; XII: 123, 130, 143, 145, 150, 152, 154, 158-9, 174-5, 180-1, 305, 312, 321, 323, 333-8, 343, 348, 354, 357-8, 360-1, 363-6, 368, 370-1, 374, 378-81, 383-6, 388, 390-1, 396, 400-1, 403-4; IXb: 305, 311, 357-8, 360-82 *passim*, 385-8, 407, 410-12; IXb: 241, 247, 375, 382-3, 385, 387-9, 391, 407, 412; X: 18, 20, 26, 32, 54-5, 67-9, 95-9, 106, 111, 116-18, 129-30, 133, 136, 144, 147, 150, 153-5, 160-2, 167, 172-3, 175-9, 181, 185, 187-91, 196, 198, 271, 273, 282, 321, 344, 351, 354, 372, 387, 407; XI: 6, 39, 42, 55, 65, 175, 177, 217, 220, 227, 240, 246-7, 403, 420; XII: 29-30, 130, 149, 183 – Allomythic Family: Neoplatonism and Gnosticism; Norse mythology** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common | The Powers are the demiurgic gods and goddesses of the world, primarily male-female |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | syzygies who first performed the song of creation, bringing into expression those aspects of the mind of the One that they emerged from and knew, but harmonizing their elements with their sisters and brothers. They have entered into the song, becoming bound to the fate of the world. Their greatest interventions have to do with the shaping of space itself and the forming of living things, but having set the world going, they are generally reluctant to make significant changes directly. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | Their demiurgic, cosmogonic activity is guided by their knowledge of the music they made together before Eru before he gave it reality and life, the music itself being an expression of his thought because that is what they were, though also having been granted independent existence. Because they know the music, they know much of what will happen, but because the song ultimately belongs to Ilúvatar (and also because each sang different parts), they do not know everything. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this | The efforts the Valar made to make the world a perfect expression of the |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happening? What *caused* this situation? | beauty of the music of the Ainur were marred, first by Melkor and Ungoliant, with all Melkor's host of twisted Maiar and lesser monsters, and then by Sauron. The Valar intervened, for example, to bring the elves to them in the West, to defeat Melkor, and to bring the faithful humans as close to the immortal shores as they could. In response to the threat of Sauron, they sent certain Maiar as the wizards. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | What ought to happen is the victory of Eru Ilúvatar's true theme, as first expressed in the music of the Ainur, but just as the musical discord introduced by Melkor and his followers, like Sauron, had to be counteracted by their own music, so too they must materially help creation through acts of grace. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | At the time of *The Lord of the Rings*, the Valar are concerned about the fate of the world due to the threat of Sauron and Saruman's treachery. They sent the Istari to help, so Saruman's unexpected shift to wickedness and domination is a great problem. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are | They dwell in the Undying Lands with |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | most of the elves and with the Maiar, but they care greatly for the mortal world, which they loved so much that they entered into it. They are present in its elements and forces, with which they are in some ways identified. So they also dwell among and even within the living things of Middle-earth. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | The Valar do not approve of the way of domination so characteristic of Morgoth and Sauron, so they act less forcefully. But readers should detect their activity in the world—generally small moments of apparent good luck (grace). Their gentle interventions do not in any way suggest a lack of interest in or concern for Middle-earth, its peoples, and its other living things. The Valar are present and attentive, but their activity is intentionally restrained. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I | I am an aspect of the ultimate One granted by |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | him with independent existence, and I voluntarily entered into the world, becoming bound to it and its nature until the end. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Each have different powers of knowledge associated with the aspects or powers or elements of the world that they are identified with. For example, Manwë uses his Great Eagles to supply him with information, and Ulmo learns of things through the waters of the world. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? | The Valar take the long view, knowing the song and certain of the ultimate victory of Eru's theme. So the situation is serious, the problem is concerning, but their love for the world and for Eru's purpose inclines their appraisal of the situation to be generally positive. Middle-earth is precious to them; they want it and its inhabitants to flourish. So Sauron and Saruman's threat to it is of grave concern. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | They seek to act carefully, not forcing or overwhelming, but they will intervene when good people don't have enough strength on their own. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated |

*Wargs*

| **Wargs; HM IV: 209; VI: 416, 445 – Allomythic Family: Tolkienian werewolves** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | (Wargs and werewolves are mentioned in LotR as separate beings, but only wargs are encountered and seem to function within the storyworld as werewolves do elsewhere in Tolkien's legendarium: that is, they are an intelligent, communicative people who plan, make alliances, have enemies, etc. They bear some etymological |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | relation to balrogs, and again, take on some of the roles werewolves, so closely associated with Sauron especially in the story of Beren and Lúthien, do earlier in the history of Middle-earth. Based on their nature in comparison to similar beings in Tolkien's allomythology, certain things about their worldview and way of life may be surmised.<br><br>Much of what we know comes from this passage in *The Hobbit*, from the chapter "Out of the Frying-pan into the Fire" (The chapter also explains its title in this charming passage: "'Escaping goblins to be caught by wolves!' he said, and it became a proverb, though we now say 'out of the frying-pan into the fire' in the same sort of uncomfortable situations."):<br><br>"[The great grey wolf] spoke to them in the dreadful language of the Wargs. Gandalf understood it. Bilbo did not, but it sounded terrible to him, and as if all their talk was about cruel and wicked things, as it was. Every now and then all the Wargs in the circle would answer their |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | grey chief all together, and their dreadful clamour almost made the hobbit fall out of his pine-tree.<br><br>“I will tell you what Gandalf heard, though Bilbo did not understand it. The Wargs and the goblins often helped one another in wicked deeds. Goblins do not usually venture very far from their mountains, unless they are driven out and are looking for new homes, or are marching to war (which I am glad to say has not happened for a long while). But in those days they sometimes used to go on raids, especially to get food or slaves to work for them. Then they often got the Wargs to help and shared the plunder with them. Sometimes they rode on wolves like men do on horses. Now it seemed that a great goblin-raid had been planned for that very night. The Wargs had come to meet the goblins and the goblins were late. The reason, no doubt, was the death of the Great Goblin, and all the excitement caused by the dwarves and Bilbo and the wizard, for whom they were probably still hunting.”) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | I am an accursed being, a spirit subservient to the powers of darkness trapped in wolflike form. My allies are the other forces of evil, and I detest all good, natural, free things. Thus, I must fight and destroy them if I can. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | We are allies with each other and with the goblins/orcs, subservient to Sauron, and enemies of the free peoples, especially the Woodmen, a few of whom we would enslave, and Beornings (who are, interestingly, more like werebears than Tolkiens werewolves are like conventional werewolves). The Fellowship must be stopped. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | One may guess that they are wolves and lesser spirits bound into one accursed form by Sauron or Melkor. Because of this, they are bound to Sauron's will and hate the free peoples of Middle-earth, especially the Woodmen. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should | They must disrupt the activities of the Fellowship and destroy them. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Goblin and orc allies, fellow wargs, enemies, Sauron as Lord, fire. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | We are allies with each other and with the goblins/orcs, subservient to Sauron, and enemies of the free peoples, especially the Woodmen, a few of whom we would enslave. We must stop the Fellowship. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what | We must fight our enemies, with our allies, but death by fire is too awful to endure. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | These are living beings, carefully distinguished by Gandalf from wraiths. So their nature is still similar to that of natural wolves, but accursed. Note how this comes into play in their axiology. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Sauron's will and the evidence of their senses, but perhaps even more importantly a natural will-to-live. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this | Gandalf is able to drive them off by means of his fire spell, so that suggests that fire is very negatively appraised and their lives highly |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | appraised (i.e., they do not continue relentlessly fighting in obedience to Sauron's will and die by fire). They are indeed the enemies of the Fellowship and of humans and other free peoples, and they are allies of the goblins and orcs. But they ultimately value their own lives above all else. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Fight enemies, but flee fire. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral |

## Appendix 17: Kairological Charts for King's *Dark Tower* Series

NB As in the case of Tolkien, King has made far more allomythoi than can be analyzed here, some being insufficiently prominent in the *Dark Tower* series itself to merit mention and others being part of his storyworld and its allomythology but described in novels, comics, TV shows, movies, and so on that are not explicitly part of the *Dark Tower* series of novels.

*The Affiliation*

| **The Affiliation and the Gunslingers – Allomythic Family: Arthurian legend; United States (especially an idealized West that is also attempting to preserve the Union); see Robin Furth's (2012) *Stephen King's The Dark Tower: The Complete Concordance. Revised and Updated.* ("CC"), p. 18 and pp. 516 ff., which provides a lexicon to the High Speech of the Gunslingers** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | Seeking to preserve order and the tradition of the gunslingers, the Affiliation is doomed but will fight for civilization until the end. For a representation of its allomythos well before its fall in Roland's youth (e.g., Hambry and Debaria/Little Debaria), compare the life depicted in the village of Tree in *The Wind Through the Keyhole*. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is | The Inner-Baronies were the heartland of civilization in All-World. Their Affiliation sought to maintaining alliances between the groups that used to be a unified people, the Kingdom of All-World. The gunslingers carry on the |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | administrative, judicial, and protective work of Arthur Eld and his knights, traveling and responding to injustice. Just as the Affiliation and, before that, the Kingdom of All-World, benefited from the recovery of some of the technology and civilization of the Old Ones, so too they fall into many of the same problems that beset the Old Ones. The Affiliation is ultimately doomed in its struggle against John Farson (The Good Man) and his allies. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | The kingdom ruled by Arthur Eld collapsed, and groups are now descending into civil war promoted by Farson, the Crimson King, Walter Padick, etc. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Without our effort, chaos will overwhelm the All-World (it will "move on"). What is ideally sought is the defense of the Dark Tower, service of the White, and restoration of the Kingdom of All-World, but in the face of treachery, mutant enemies, and other perils, the likelihood of civilizational collapse is high. So the more immediate goal for the Affilation of Roland's time is bare survival. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Unfortunately, many in the Affiliation indulged too much in pleasure and comfort and did not take seriously their responsibility to the world and the danger of John Farson. But that threat was existential, and the wisest gunslingers realized that. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | Our responsibility is to support outlying groups and maintain order. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought | Their way of life is based on trying to preserve the achievements of the past, but their society is already full of conflict and contradiction. And though some work to preserve the Affiliation, many within it work for its destruction. In any case, the true members of the affiliation adhere to |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | the values of the gunslingers and give their lives to preserve the traditional order of things. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | We are the noble people who forged a new culture under Arthur Eld after the 1,000 years of darkness following the Great Cataclysm that destroyed the Great Old Ones' civilization. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Tradition, the senses, and psychic knowledge |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is | They still have some of the dark devotion to the Can-char from the culture of the Great Old Ones, but they are primarily governed by the more healthful, life-affirming ethic of the gunslingers. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | They honor the White – e.g., the Horn of Eld – and seek to preserve and restore the Dark Tower and the cosmos it and its Beams maintain. The bloodlines of the gunslingers are honored. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | As the name suggests, the members of the Affiliation work together to preserve order. Respect for the bloodlines of the gunslingers leads to the aristocratic practice of inherited wealth and power, which Farson is able to use against them as a sign of corruption. But the gunslingers themselves use the testing process to place a merit-based check on who ends up having the power of the gunslingers. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated |

*Asimov Robots*

| |
|---|
| **Asimov Robots (*e.g.*, Andy, Nigel, Stuttering Bill), the sentient dipolar computer monorails (e.g., Blaine, Patricia), the Wolves, Daria (the North Central Positronics Portable Guidance Module), and other AIs; see CC, p. 231–4; V:1-7, 13, 15, 26, 111,** |

| **113-7, 119-25, 131, 140, 146, 180, 191, 276, 279, 283, 285-6, 290, 292-3, 302, 328, 331-2, 337, 358, 416-7, 419, 421-6, 431, 477, 483, 489-99, 501, 506-8, 519-31, 543-48, 553, 555-60, 562, 566-9, 584, 606; VI:9, 72, 263; VII: 51-63, 89, 116-9, 120-37, 152-4, 160, 439, 535-6, 538-9, 543, 550, 572-6, 579-85, 628; W: 17 – Allomythic Family: Old Ones of the Imperium; general SF megatext of robot servants and evil/insane robots; Blaine's character alludes to characters like Gollum and HAL 9000; see "the Beams" (i.e., the cyborg Guardians)** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | Service, either of humans or of the Random/Outer Dark that would bring about the destruction of humanity. |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | The world has moved on. The Asimov Robots were made by the Old Ones of the Imperium to serve humans, but the vision of service that they encoded in them is still operating in a world in which the Old Ones are gone. Most Asimov Robots (e.g., Nigel the Butler (DNK4932 Domestic) and William (D-746541-M Maintenance Robot, Many Other Functions; a.k.a. "Stuttering Bill") seems to still try to serve humans, but in at least the case of Andy the Messenger Robot (Many Other Functions) DNF |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | 34821 V 63 and the Wolves, service of the Outer Dark seems to have taken the place of the original vision. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | North Central Positronics made the Asimov Robots and related beings, and from the behavior of Stuttering Bill and Nigel (who is so distressed by helping Mordred consume little animals, especially a billy-bumbler, that he breaks down), one might reasonably believe that they were made with something like Asimov's Three Laws. But as with most things made by North Central Positronics, the Asimov Robots may be corrupted. Andy, with his willingness to work with the robotic villains, the Wolves, in the service of the Crimson King, and Blaine, depressed and despairing and working with the Grays to murder and dominate the Pubes before killing them all, provide the dominant impression of the Asimov Robots and related AIs in the *Dark Tower* universe. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought | The Asimov Robots inherently feel called to serve because that is what they were made to do. But though they were made to serve people, perhaps under something like the Three Laws, they |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | were made by North Central Positronics. So Andy's commitment to helping use special children as Breakers reflects how the efforts of the Old Ones of the Imperium, even at their best, were distorted by the Outer Dark. That said, their mellonological goals, especially as suggested by the benevolent Nigel and Stuttering Bill, are likely more immediate and narrowly targeted (sinistral) than the big project of the Crimson King. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | If one reflects on the three laws of robotics as Asimov formulated them (that one may not injure a human or cause one to come to harm through inaction; that one must obey human commands; and that one must protect one's own existence—with each subsequent law not being required to give way to the priority of the one before), one sees that the primary existents for an Asimov robot (and this seems to remain true of King's Asimov Robots) are humans, their commands and needs, and the robot's self. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with | They were built by the Old Ones to serve humans, and they still do. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | Their way of life is servile, bound internally by the laws of robotics (in their Asimovian form or as corrupted under the influence of North Central Positronics) and, as enacted, by the needs of their masters. It is telling that King describes Andy as resembling C3PO from *Star Wars* since C3PO is one of the more earnestly servile robots one can think of in popular culture. His willingness to murder a child every generation and then coerce parents to betray the other children of the Calla in order to keep their remaining twin is quite evil, but also a surprising expression of independence. Another example of this, on the side of benevolence, |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | would be Daria's willingness to be incapacitated by violating Directive Nineteen in order to help Tim in *The Wind Through the Keyhole*. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | Their nature is closely tied to their function. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | They process external data, but their programing is a fundamental, governing source of "knowledge." |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of | Asimov's Zeroth Law, that preservation of humanity takes priority over the life of an individual human, seems fundamentally corrupted in Andy's case, as if it were, at its very core formulation, negatived. In general, the Asimov Robots have limited, immediate goals based on |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | the Three Laws, but the Zeroth Law seems to remain intact in the case of Nigel and Stuttering Bill. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | They mostly act according to the Second Law: A robot must obey humans unless doing so would conflict with the First Law. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral (but n.b. that the two-thirds majority of the Asimov Robots encountered in the storyworld have benevolent sinistral allomythoi) |

*The Beams (including "Stephen King") and their Guardians (including their cyborg forms)*

**The Beams (including "Stephen King") and their Guardians (including their cyborg forms—see "Mutants" *infra*) – Allomythic Family: perhaps an extension of general animistic ideas of an ensouled cosmos underlying, also, King's narratives of haunted and possessed buildings, lands, etc.; Neoplantonic/Gnostic emanations/pleroma; cyborgs and technological corruption; see CC, pp. 459–62; see also, below, "The Dark Tower" and "Demon Elementals"**

| Kairological Categories | | | Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | All serve them, and they serve all, including the demonic beings that are predatory and destructive; they are in danger, as is all. They are compromised by technology and by the cancerous attack of the Breakers, but they can heal. |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | The Beams are living fields of energy that flow out from the Dark Tower – from the center outward to the ends of the multiverse – and work together to hold the multiverse together and the worlds within it apart from each other—such that even the demon elemental whose hermaphroditic aspects took Roland's semen in the circle of "Druit Stones" and later impregnated Susannah Dean with the mingled essence of Roland and the Crimson King was keeping the portal between the worlds from being crossed. The beams and the roses live in mutual support of each other's lives, causing each other to flourish. And these emanations |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | from the Dark Tower in turn sustain it. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | The Beams were vulnerable due to the magical-mechanical replacements made by the Old Ones. And they are under attack by Breakers, and already the Rat-Fish, Bat-Hare, Eagle-Lion, and Dog-Horse beams have fallen, with only Bear-Turtle and Elephant-Wolf remaining. The Guardians, which in their previous forms were immortal, when replaced by their cyborg forms, became mortal, as in the case of Shardik's madness. (As another example of their mortality, the taheen Finli O'Tego may have sought to hunt the Lion/Tyger Aslan.) |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Without help, they will be defeated and the Dark Tower will fall. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern | Ongoing attacks are threatening us/the universe we sustain. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | As living emanations of Gan/the Dark Tower, the Beams guide and care for the cosmos and, especially, those who serve it—leading Roland's *ka-tet*, helping it. They are sustained by and sustain the rose(s) and the Dark Tower. The Guardians should protect the Tower and the Beams, and as the heroes walk along his beam, the Turtle Maturin does indeed help them, including through the *can-tah* scrimshaw turtle. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate | Their goals are preservation, defense, and healing of the Dark Tower—their goals are therefore more specifically achieved by the Tet Corporation and the defeat of the Breakers than by Roland's quest to the Dark Tower. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | The Beams and Guardians are aspects of King's divine cosmos, but they can and have been corrupted and destroyed and have demonic shadow aspects (somewhat like twinners). |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Magic, or by virtue of being so intimately connected to everything |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in | The Dark Tower is most important, and thus, the situation is dire. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | The beams, guardian Maturin, and even Stephen King himself only seem to intervene when absolutely necessary, often in the form of giving knowledge and direction. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated or dextral—rather hard to characterize |

*Billy-bumblers*

| **Billy-bumblers (*e.g.*, Oy); throcken – Allomythic Family: narrative companion animals; idealized dog; see CC, p. 35** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What | I am a loyal friend who will protect my pack from danger. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | I dwell with my friends, communing and communicating with them and even bonded through telepathic ties, and the threats to them concern me. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Oy may have been driven from his pack of billy-bumblers, but he was also called as a member of Roland's ka-tet and by Jake's kindness. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Oy (like John's "Billy") will remain loyal to his friends, whom he knows are threatened by many dangers. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, | Friends. For Oy and John's "Billy," friends exist, together with the self, which are the things |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | they speak of most. Oy mourns Jake until his death after Jake dies, and Oy dies fighting for Roland's life. Other salient things include Grandfather fleas (parasite companions of the vampiric Grandfathers—opposites of the canine symbiotes; throcken seem to be attuned to those with the shine and to have telepathic abilities) and Starkblasts (terrible storms—again, threats to life). |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | Oy chooses to remain faithful to his friends, his ka-tet, even though it means grief and death. He loves Ake (Jake) and Olan (Roland) and the rest of his pack, and the danger to them matters to him. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree | I should be a good and faithful friend, enjoying companionship and protecting from threats. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | Friend. "[B]oy"—that is, the billy-bumbler one knows best through the *Dark Tower* series receives willingly his self-identity from his friend. Above all, the billy-bumblers encountered in King's allomythology are the faithful friends of their humans. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand | They have sharp senses, language, and even supernatural knowledge—as in the case of unique bonds with those who have the shine, opposition to Grandfather fleas, and perhaps knowledge of Starkblasts. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Friends matter most, and dangers to them are thus of great concern also. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Out of loyalty to friends, I should be willing even to suffer and die, but in the meantime, the joy of friendship makes life worthwhile. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated |

| **The Breakers and others with the Touch or the Shining (e.g., the Good-Mind Folk and the many heroes of King's stand-alone books—e.g., Dick Hallorann, Danny Torrance and Abra Stone, Patrick Danville, Ted Brautigan, Eddie, etc.; see "Tet Corporation" below) – Allomythic Family: largely, King's recurring concern with children corrupted and compelled to do evil and with the embodiment of addiction and its self-destructive, nihilistic pleasure, but also, in the case of heroic individuals who resist corruption, some of King's greatest heroes** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | I am either courageous, fighting for the White, or willfully blind to my true situation, in a state of cognitive dissonance, continuing to live a life of selfish hedonism that accelerates the destruction of everything.<br><br>*One might suggest that the Breakers who, in the end, reject this allomythic WWL and join Roland are opposites of what the Man in Black (Walter, Randall Flagg, etc.) consciously made himself into, Maerlyn being an expression of the good sorcerer he might have been (though both have dark and trickster aspects characteristic of the Prim). |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? | They live in the Big Prison (Devar-Toi) that is also Blue Heaven (Algul Siento), an idealized Midwestern college town in a toxic waste under an |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | artificial sun. They dwell with their fellow Breaker prisoners and the can-toi, human, and taheen guards who keep them captive. They were captured or tricked, but most go along with the pleasures (food, sim sex, breaking itself) and hasten the fall of the Dark Tower by breaking the Beams. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | The Crimson King has captured them to have them destroy the Beams and, thereby, the Dark Tower. The Breakers actively avoid thinking about this BQ because to do so would be painful and make them confront the evils they are complicit in (e.g., taking the pills from the "roont" twins that enhance their psychic abilities). |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Again, they avoid thinking about this BQ, but by the time Roland et al. arrive, they have toppled all but two of the Beams. The Breakers mostly want their life of (imprisoned, sickly, guilty) pleasure to continue, but their abilities constantly hint to them why and whence their situation is as it is (aetiology, above) and wither they and all of existence is headed. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, | They are intimately, even erotically, aware of the the Dark Tower and, |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | more directly, the Beams, but they try to concern themselves primarily with the pleasures of living in the Devar-Toi and of breaking. Roland's ka-tet's arrival forces them all, for good or ill, to confront their actual situation. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | As "morks" most Breakers avoid this BQ because of their past negative social experiences and the unpleasantness of thinking about the implications of their current lifestyle. Again, the arrival of Roland and his ka-tet force them to confront this BQ. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | As Breakers, these people with psychic abilities are complicit in and actually quite directly responsible for the destruction of the multiverse. "To break is divine," and perhaps they feel rather godlike in their sickly bliss of destruction. Roland's ka-tet makes them confront this BQ. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | The Crimson King tricked them into captivity, but they mostly continue to allow themselves to be tricked, even while their psychic abilities hint to them (and would reveal to them if they allowed it) the true nature of their situation. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious | They choose to evaluate their situation positively even though they sense it is the opposite. They choose to be complicit in |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | the values of the Crimson King—at least, the supreme value of breaking the Beams—and to lose themselves in hedonism. The costs are high, but they disregard them; everything is at stake, but they avoid recognizing that. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | I should continue enjoying my pleasures and my pleasurable work of Breaking the Beams. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral. |

*Can-toi*

| **Can-toi – Allomythic Family: horror's concern with hybridity, mixture, mutation—see "Mutants" *infra*** |
|---|

| Kairological Categories | | | | Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | My situation is one of alienation and garish, shabby, hopeless absurdity. I serve what will destroy everything in the hope of becoming what I subjugate and destroy. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | I am below everyone—the Crimson King I serve, the humans I dominate but want to be, the taheen who have contempt for me. I avoid confronting how I came to be as I am, and I only wish to be what I am not. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | They do not seem to concern themselves with this BQ, but one might guess that they are mutie taheen. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with | We will eventually become human, and we serve the Crimson King in order to help bring |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | about the time when we will replace them. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | They are aware of human fashion in a garish sense and human humor in a clumsy sense. Humans exist as their captives and as their ideal. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | They live as hunters and imprisoners of the humans they wish to become, alienated from them and from themselves. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree | Again, not only am I alienated from everyone, but I also am pathetic and laughable even in my greatest hope. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I am can-toi but I yearn to be human. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | The Crimson King is the most valid source. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | I want to be human—I wear a human mask that I hope will someday be my reality. My situation is negative but hopeful. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | I will serve the Crimson King and keep the Breakers working (and capture more Breakers) so that I can someday replace the humans as human. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral. |

| **The Dark Tower, Gan, the Rose, the White – Allomythic Family: the divine as impersonal, structural and structuring—the grace of a transcendent fate** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | As the ultimate being holding the multiverse together and apart, it is overall a positive, but it has its dark aspects in that it ultimately encompasses everything and though "always" is vulnerable. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | It/they are both barrier and portal between and to the worlds; it/they express the interdependence of art and artist, storyworld and storyteller; it/they, however, is/are an ultimate Being that is positive—even benevolent—without being personal. This is clearest when called "the White," and more ambigious the more concrete and personalized. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | There are various myths within the Dark Tower storyworld regarding how the worlds came to be. The basic consensus is that Gan made the worlds from himself as a |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | being of the Prim and that the Dark Tower is his body, sustained by and sustaining the Beams and the Roses, all of whom sing to each other. The forces of the Void, of Darkness and chaos, seek to unmake everything, and they are close to succeeding for much of the series. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | If Roland and his ka-tet had not acted, the Dark Tower would have fallen and all would have ceased to exist. At the end of the series, there is the implication that Roland has entered his last incarnation in which the full salvation of himself and the Dark Tower will be achieved. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The Dark Tower. The Dark Tower is the barrier that keeps all spaces apart, such that its disease (the Breakers destroying its Beams) causes worlds to bleed together; it is the body of Gan, the deity who generated the worlds from Prim, from which he too arose; it sings, as do the Beams and the Roses (including the Rose on Keystone Earth), and since artists and writers are the singers of Gan (kas-ka Gan) and since the worlds of Stephen King are those contained by the Dark |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Tower, it is in a sense art itself, the structuring structure of being. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | The Dark Tower and its other aspects or emanations that mutually sustain each other are also tied to Roland and his ka-tet and to Stephen King, all of whom create, preserve, and save the Dark Tower, which itself produced and preserves them. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this | Through the Dark Tower, King attempts to say a lot about his work as an artist and the constraints and powers an artist works within and with. The ethology BQ of the Dark Tower is not so much answered as raised, in order to point to the ethology BQ of a writer relative to a storyworld. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | The Dark Tower, its Beams, the Field of Roses, etc. all take on personal aspects, but the totality evades giving the universal Being a personality. Instead, its nature is one of beautiful imperfection (even to the point of being tragically close to death or madness) and interconnected multiplicity. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | The Dark Tower "knows" everything with the immediacy of being in all places and times. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? | The Dark Tower seeks to preserve creation and, indeed, itself. It and its aspects sing or make music—just as its dark distortions chime, make unpleasant noise, or contain demonic and damned voices (see "Thinnies" below). |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | It guides Roland and his ka-tet, but it does not simply solve all their problems for them. It is in fact quite dependent on them and seems to balance its own existence (and thus the existence of all things including them) in relation to them and their development. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Dextral. |

*Demon Elementals and Lesser Demons*

| **Demon Elementals, lesser demons of the Prim, Todash demons (Great Ones), Incubi and Succubi [sic], It/Dandelo and other were-spiders, vampires (Grandfathers/Type One Vampires, and Type Two and Three), grandfather fleas/cam tam, the skin-man, etc.) – Allomythic Family: vampire; Lovecraft's allomythology; haunted spaces; see "Mutants" *infra* and "Can-toi" *supra*** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | This broad class of beings share an allomythos that broadly expresses the dark aspects of the Prim and is continuous with Gan's/the Dark Tower's nature. Mordred, the were-spider, in many ways like one of his fathers, the Crimson King himself, in whom so many elements of King's allomythology come together (the Prim and the *am*, Gan/the Crimson King and the Line of Eld, the Outer Dark and the White), well represents this, with his hunger for life and his yearning for love. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | The demon elementals are expressions of the six beams, each having dual-gendered aspects and thus being 12. They are, like the Guardians who protect the portals of the Beams and like the lesser demons, tied to specific "spaces," metaphysically physically. Lesser demons are bound to buildings, bones, the sinister technology of the Old Ones, and bodies—especially insectoid, tentacled, diseased, toothy ones. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* | They are remnants of the Prim, sometimes in bodies they took on for themselves and in other cases in bodies or spaces they possessed or |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? | corrupted. The fact that these beings are shadow aspects of counterparts that serve the White is illustrated by the cam tam, who are like the grandfather fleas and yet the opposite, healing rather than consuming. Thus, many of the demonic/vampiric beings may be corruptions of what they were/could be. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Most seek to serve and satisfy their own appetites, but the demon elementals and many lesser demons also anticipate and seek the future desired by the Crimson King. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | What primarily exists for them is hunger—especially for khef (life force) and its embodiment, especially in blood and sexual fluids. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – | Most dwell alone, but some hunt together. Many fail to concern themselves with others, but some are aware of the aims of the Crimson King/Discordia. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | The demons, elemental and lesser, both live as parasites and predators. They may have special knowledge, but their focus is narrow—on their hunger for life force, mental energy, and embodiment. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | Hungry bodies and spaces—that is the primary way they are, but they also may understand themselves as part of a context seeking the return of the chaos of the Prim. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | The demons may be sources of knowledge—sometimes distorted so as to mislead—but their primal desires are generally the dominant sources of information. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Khef, which is life energy, and its embodiment in life and fluids like blood and semen, as well as psychic energy, including faith (It) and laughter (Dandelo) but especially distress, is a high value, as is the return of chaos/the Prim. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | They generally seek the aims of the Crimson King and the return of chaos; they more immediately hunt and kill and cause psychic distress, on which many of them feed. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral |

*The Grays and the Pubes and other fallen cities/towns of Mid-World and In-World*

| **The Grays and the Pubes & the people of Tull may stand as bookends for this allomythic family: the former people retain something of the allomythos of harriers like those of John Farson long ago and remnants of urban Mid-World inhabitants of Lud who seem to have retained (under Blaine's manipulation) only the old Affiliation's practice of human sacrifice, now combined with the molestation of boys, while the latter people are not urban, and in that sense more like the corrupt people of Hambry, Debaria, and Little Debaria (n.b., mostly those who control the businesses and power) in *Wizard and Glass* and *Wind Through the Keyhole*, though more diseased and captured by similarly human-sacrifice-focused allomythos (inspired by the Man in Black) of the demon-possessed obese Sylvia Pittston, which teaches of the the Man Jesus and the Interloper; cf. the Eloi and the Morlocks of Wells' *The Time Machine* and Shirley Jackson's "The Lottery"** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? | They are lost in the same power-hungry, death-loving allomythos as the Great Old Ones (compare North Central Positronics to how the rich of Gilead own the Little Debaria Salt Company). |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | They dwell in discomfort and conflict (with the other side, with the Interloper), and the way to fix things is through human sacrifice—one of the worst things they could have retained from the Affiliation—or at least, as with the Horsemen's Association in Hambry, alliance with the powerful—the Good Man (Farson, the Big Coffin Hunters and Rhea of the Cöos), the Ghosts in the Machine (Blaine), the Man Jesus (the Man in Black). |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | It's other people's fault—the Grays resent the Pubes; the people of Tull are stirred up against Roland as the Interloper; the leaders of Hambry resent the Gunslinger leadership of the Affiliation. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Human sacrifice ought to happen to transform the situation, as should violent opposition to those with resources and/or who represent law and order. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | For the Grays and the Pubes: the Ghosts in the Machine and their conflict with each other and their leadership. For the people of Tull: the Man Jesus and the Interloper and the preaching of Sylvia Pittston. For the people of Hambry: |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | They fear but are often attracted to the death and chaos of the Crimson King, the Outer Dark, and other leaders of the Red. They may work together with those on their same side, but there is not a strong sense of community. At most, there may be ideological unity or shared devotion to a ruling figure or idea. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought | Their ethology is standard villainy—the corrupt leaders oppress and use people like tools; the followers are a mindless mob driven by bloodlust. Everyone does what they can to destroy the outsiders and gain power for their group and themselves individually. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I am a creature of animalistic need or primal emotions or a tribal being, fighting for my group or, rather, imposing its power on outsiders. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | There is a strong tendency to submit to the validity of authoritative sources—broadly, the Crimson King and his representatives. The basic input of the senses is also a strong source of knowledge. Conversely, information coming from representatives of the White, such as gunslingers, is doubted and criticized. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is | For the Pubes & the people of Tull, things like the god-drums and the teachings of Sylvia Pittston are highly salient and significant, for they indicate the peril they are in and the need for |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | human sacrifice. Lesser goals include power and pleasure and avoiding pain. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | War, human sacrifice, and other actions directed at overthrowing the forces of the White—these are the actions I should pursue while also seeking comfort and power for myself. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral. |

*The Old Ones of the Imperium and Sombra Corporation*

**The Old Ones of the Imperium and Sombra Corporation (including Sombra's subsidiaries: North Central Positronics, LaMerk Industries, Trans Corporation) – Allomythic Family: the Red; technoscientific hubris and exploitation combined with Lovecraft's allomythos, with the twist that because time is cyclical humans today become the Great Old Ones of the past who with godlike magical technology distort things into Lovecraftian monsters and release others from todash space (though of**

| course others came from the Prim directly even before the Old Ones dominated the universe) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | The Great Old Ones, like the corporations that continue their legacy under the Crimson King, confront a cosmos that is frustratingly, irritatingly beyond their full control. Unlike other great fallen fictional civilizations, the Imperium is perpetuated, not by an aristocracy, but by a corrupt corporate-capitalist regime. Sombra coordinates the fall of the Beams and the Tower through possessory acquisition of important things and places and through its possessory control of subsidiary corporations like Trans Corp. (which gathers psychics to become Breakers), LaMerk (which handles metalwork), and North Central Positronics (which does technological-magical research and creation of new magical technology, especially cyborgs, robots, and other AI). |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? | They understood everything in the sense that they knew how to break and mutate and alter the world according to their will, but they did |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | not have enough respect for the world they dominated and the powers they controlled. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | The Old Ones came into a world governed by natural and magical powers that exceeded them, but they gained mastery over them. Then they tried to change the nature of things—making doorways through space and time. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | What they felt ought to happen was that replacing the magical aspects of reality with their technology should have given them control over everything. They wanted absolute freedom to go anywhere and do anything to anything. But what will happen, ultimately, is they fought with each other and unleashed powers more destructive than they could contain or control. The damage they did in trying to break and remake reality released other horrors from the Void. They destroyed themselves. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, | The Dark Tower and its Beams and Guardians exist as problems—independent magical |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | beings that structure reality according to laws and wills not subject to theirs, so they made mechanical Beams and cyborg Guardians and riddled the Tower with doorways that eroded its function as a barrier between, as well as preserver of, worlds. Their Dogans especially were the places where they mingled magic and technology, as when they made the Red Death or when Mia submitted to *becoming* embodied. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | They did not dwell with the other aspects of reality as equals, but rather with contempt and a will-to-dominate. Even with each other, they ultimately did not dwell in peace as equals, and this led to their destroying themselves and their world. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree | "The ways of the Old People are the ways of death" (IV: 302). Like Alice speaking the word "nineteen" (to which Nis |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | is perhaps intentionally similar much as Charlie the Mono is like *char* and the Charyou Tree of human sacrifice) to Nort-revived-from-death, they cannot resist courting death to master life. The doom Alice learns to her maddening despair – much as happens in *Revival* – is what they find. Their hubristic wish to take life up (resurrect/revive) through mastery (possession as ownership) is in contrast with the move King seems to value: *resumption*, a kind of recovery of what matters (possession in the sense of belonging or familiarity). |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | They thought of themselves as the masters of the universe, distinct from it and able to remake it according to their will. They did not seem themselves as connected to the rest of the cosmos and vulnerable to being harmed by harm to it. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and | They had magical and scientific knowledge, and they blended the two. They could travel through time and space at will, and thus all things seemed be laid bare before their gaze. But they do not seem to have known caution or kindness and other ways |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | of knowing associated with compassion and wisdom. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Their goals were power, expression of their will, domination of all things, satisfaction of all desires, including those that were heartless and cruel. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken | I should entertain and amuse myself however I want; I should dominate time and space – even the Dark Tower itself. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral |

*Sisters of Oriza and the People of the Callas*

| **Sisters of Oriza and the Calla folken (Calla Bryn Sturgis & Our Lady of Serenity), the people of River Crossing outside of Lud, and other good people of In-World and Mid-World (e.g., good people of Debaria and Our Lady of the Rose (retreat of Serenity)); of Hambry; of Tree) – Allomythic Family: romanticized horrific American West with Medieval/Arthurian and SF elements; see the categories and concepts expressed in the Calla Bryn Sturgis Dialect (CC, pp. 594 ff.)** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | The rugged, rustic lifestyle of King's Medieval Wild West in a world that has "moved on" presents the Gentle Reader with a tragic sense of the last, humble remnants of good, a sort of metaphorical "garden" struggling to survive in a polluted, mutated, besieged reality. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable | Each of these peoples, with their own particular allomythoi that reflect a more general allomythos or allomythic family, still have in view a big picture, a larger situational context in terms of which they understand themselves. Each is not simply an individual. They are also tied to a place, unlike those who oppose their |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | evidence of a situation? | existence, who are loyal, at best, to individuals like the Crimson King or the idea of chaos/destruction. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | The metaphor of a garden (e.g., Green Heart) and even a rose garden (referring to the roses surrounding the Dark Tower) and connection the feminine is constitutively tied to these peoples' continued existence. Each of these is devoted to mythic or legendary figures and/or symbols of the White, the Dark Tower, or Gan. The assertive, destructive, chaotic forces outside these communities define them as vulnerable and special. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | What can happen is illustrated by what happened to Eluria—the forces of the Red can win, and if so, the people and place will be corrupted and destroyed. So each people and individual member of the community must help the gunslinger(s) and other forces of the White and resist the forces of the Red. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree | Each community is threatened by banal and monstrous evil: e.g., corruption, selfishness, addiction, the Wolves' continued kidnapping of children, vampiric infection, the Grays and Pubes of Lud, the Skin |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | is a real issue? | Man, the Covenant Man, Slow Mutants, and so on. These threats exist, but so too do the good things and people that they fight to preserve. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | All of these communities have individuals who are committed to their communities and others who are allied with and working for the forces of destruction. Those who work to preserve the place/people identify with it/them, whereas those who are allied with the agents and forces seeking its/their domination and destruction are generally primarily devoted to themselves as individuals and secondarily to agents of the Red/the Crimson King. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted | They have specific civilized ethologies oriented around specialized professions—for example, the cowboys of Debaria may be pokies or proddies, and the saloons/whorehouses have other professionals, as does the Sheriff's office; in Little Debaria, whores (some of whom serve as ammies) are again prominent, and salties and blue-ring salties work the mine of the Little Debaria Salt |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | Combyne under Shunt the Cunt and other mine bosses. Just as Shunt controls Little Debaria, Hambry is controlled by the corrupt house of the mayor, Hart Thorin, including his chancellor, Kimba Rimer, and like Debaria it is primarily populated by ranchers and those who work the saloon/whorehouse.<br><br>The Sisters of Our Lady of the Rose (Serenity) are rightly to be compared with the Sisters of Oriza, the former honoring the gunslingers, God, and Man Jesus and standing up against the skin-man, and the latter standing against the Wolves and honoring the deified Lady Oriza, who like the gunslingers stood against the harrier Gray Dick (though the harrier-descendent Grays of Lud were led by David Quick, to whose legendary size Roland likens Prioress Everlynne of Serenity). |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I know myself in terms of my community and my cosmos—the Dark Tower. I seek to preserve and even restore these good things. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of | These communities have leaders with expertise whom they trust. The |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | good members of the community honor the gunslinger(s) as sources of knowledge and wisdom. They also have communal memories of the past. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | The stakes are high and the situation is negative. The members of the community mostly value it and each other; more broadly, they value existence itself, the humble good things of life, and the powers and symbols of it: Gan, the Dark Tower, the Rose, etc. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to | We should fight to survive, but we should also eat and dance and |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | otherwise enjoy the life we will fight to preserve. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Dextral |

*Mutants (Muties)*

| **These range from the slow mutants to the Children of Roderick (Rods), from animals like the Manni's albino asses, the lobstrosities, giant beetles, stork-things, Musty—the cat with extra arms and a forked tail, two-headed elk, etc. to Rhea's mutant vegetable garden and the giant yellow mushrooms in *The Wind Through the Keyhole* – Allomythic Family: see "Demon Elementals" *supra*** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | Rhea of the Cöos and the Rods might well capture the range of the mutie allomythos in the *Dark Tower*.<br><br>The old myths are vague, but Maerlyn as a trickster figure of the Prim is said to have not only come to Arthur Eld and his court, corrupting them with his rainbow orbs which were distortions of the White (one for each Guardian of the Beams), but also to have made a Laughing Mirror, which he broke to into pieces and scattered to reflect back at the |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | Dark Tower/Gan a parody of itself. One fragment of the mirror (as in “The Snow Queen”) fell into the eye of Rhea, corrupting her and opening her to a fascination with mutants and magic. (As the Grays have a repulsive taste for boys, so she has one for pretty girls—a regrettable pattern in King’s worldmaking though he certainly has heterosexual pedophiles and queer heroes in his oeuvre as well.) Thus we see how magical technology mutates and distorts (werewolves are sometimes mentioned in this context, and type two and three vampires derive from contact with Type One Vampires—compare the origin of the skin-man due to contact with Old One magic-technology). The Slow Mutants who serve Farson, who nest in the kitchens of fallen Gilead, and who live beneath the Cyclopean Mountains, like the Green Folk of Eluria, are all depicted as predatory and vicious, and they were produced by the magical toxins (demonstuff) of the Great Old Ones.<br><br>But virtue remains and is recoverable. The Rods swore loyalty to the line |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | of Eld, and they play important roles in serving and saving the White. They are comparable to the intelligent, noble mudmen (plantmen/Fagonarders) in *The Wind Through the Keyhole* who help Tim Ross.<br><br>Ultimately, King's allomythology is one of mixture and ambiguity, which is expressed very well in the mutie allomythos. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | The mutant cosmology tends to be impoverished, recognizing primarily the individual self, those most like and unlike the self, and the present (as opposed to past causes and future possibilities). |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Our deformity and suffering is caused by the Old Ones and the fall of the Dark Tower, but almost no mutants show awareness of this. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without | The mutants seem to generally not think far in advance, but some do—in a manner that is still less developed than in non-mutants. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Primarily, mutants are concerned with themselves (their bodily integrity, their need for food, etc.)—though some attend to other forces and concerns as existents worthy of recognition. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | They are generally aware of their fellow mutants of the same kind, but some understand themselves to be connected to larger communities—alliances with the White and the Red. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what | The mutants largely live in their bodies and small groups in the present; these are the things that generally matter most. Anything endangering |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | them should be destroyed. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | The mutants do seem to be aware of their unfortunate condition, but some also show a measure of solidarity with other mutants of the same kind. They tend to understand themselves in terms of bare survival. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Some have communal, received knowledge, but most seem to depend exclusively on their bodily senses, basic memories of experiences, and immediate environmental cues. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation | There is, again, some awareness of their |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | situation(s) as negative. The primary things of value are few, reflecting the mutants' impoverished ontology: food, bodily integrity, limited loyalty to affiliated beings/allomythoi and opposition to the other side. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Kill, eat, procreate (if possible), look out for ingroup and oppose outgroup. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Mostly sinistral. |

| **Taheen – Allomythic Family: generic uncouth minions with hybrid bodies like Egyptian deities** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | I know the world through pride and desire for pleasure and power, and I act to promote the goals of the Crimson King. But much of my allomythos is a secret kept by the Taheen for ourselves. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | Much of the Taheen cosmology is an esoteric secret, but it is clear that their prideful belief in the superiority of their species relates to their assessment of the situation: that they are on the side of the Crimson King in seeking the fall of the Dark Tower. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | The origin of the Taheen is an esoteric secret, about which they have private doctrine. Roland notes that they come from an origin other than or between the Prim and nature. Their sense of superiority over humans resembles the pride of the |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Old Ones, who initiated the deterioration of the Dark Tower, and this may help explain why the Taheen support its fall. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | If they succeed, they will participate in the Crimson King's dominion over humanity and the universe. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The Taheen ontology is mysterious—when psychic humes attempt to look into their minds, they encounter "white noise," suggesting that their perception and evaluation of existence is alien to that of humes. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of | The Taheen have pride in and feel connected to each other as a species, considering themselves superior to the humes they exploit and imprison, but some of them develop relationships with or express basic compassion for humes. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | I am Taheen, pridefully and selfishly pursuing pleasure and power for myself and for the Taheen, which includes working with/for the Crimson King. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I am Taheen, and I am proud of that. I have a humanoid body, but I am also a wild, magical other kind of being, not bound by hume conventions but free to appropriate from humes whatever I like. I work with the Crimson King to dominate the universe, destroy the Dark Tower, and remake things according to our will. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? | The Taheen obviously use their bodily senses, but much is unknown |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | about how they know and evaluate knowledge. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Reflecting the Taheen belief in their superiority to humes (humans), the fact that Finli O'Tego fears going to the Hell of Darkness for docking his tail shows that being too human-like is concerning, even though the Taheen, given their human bodies, do seem to enjoy some hume things (clothes, gold chains, etc.). Power over humes is satisfying. Although they all serve the Crimson King, some have good relationship with humes and show compassion to the hume captives. Human pus is delicious. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue | I should promote Taheen power by working with the Crimson King. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral or integrated |

*Tet Corporation, the Calvins*

| **Tet Corporation, the Calvins, the Good-Mind Folk – Allomythic Family: generic secret organization working for good (the White)** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | Our corporate power resists the corporate power that seeks to unmake all things. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there | We are on Keystone Earth, and we work together to serve the Rose, the Dark Tower, Roland's ka-tet, Stephen King, and the White, which is threatened legally, financially, violently, and in other ways. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | The Tet Corporation responds to and opposes the activity of the Sombra Corporation. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | The threat the Sombra Corporation poses to the Rose, to Stephen King the author, and to the Dark Tower requires legal action, research, and psychic resistance. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The Tet Corporation is focused on the threat to the Rose, including the legal threat of ownership of the property it grows on; the need to protect Stephen King and understand his works; and the need for psychic resistance to the psychics used by the Crimson King. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations | We exist separate from the main conflict, but we support the ka-tet. The Calvins relate to the issue of understanding the works of Stephen King. The Good-Mind Folk use their psychic abilities to advise Roland and the |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | rest of the ka-tet and the Tet Corporation and resist the psychics of the the Crimson King. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | We are information professionals and psychics who resist the Sombra Corporation with similar corporate, legal, academic, and psychic techniques. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | The members of the Tet Corporation are resisting the Crimson King through mental effort: legal, academic, and psychic. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | The Calvins' knowledge of Stephen King's works and the Good-Mind Folk's psychic insights can provide clues on how we should proceed. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | The situation is serious because it could mean the destruction of everything good: the Rose is in danger; Stephen King is in danger; Black Thirteen is dangerous; *Insomnia* is highly relevant to the situation and should be given special study; the Sombra Corporation is our most direct enemy. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | We should own and protect the land the Rose grows on; we should hide Black Thirteen (in the World Trade Center, subsequently lost in the rubble); we should study the works of Stephen King and make sure he remains safe; we should tap into the abilities of good psychics. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated-sinistral (its members manifest an integrated diathesis, but, as an allomythos, it's an expression of rather thinly developed O-mode worldmaking in response to the corporate-BP and capital*-BP evoked by the Sombra Corporation) |

*Thinnies, Todash, the Outer Dark*

| **Thinnies, Todash, the Doorways of the Old Ones, the Void and Outer Dark, the Abyss, Na'ar, etc. – Allomythic Family: sentient space (compare, *supra*, "The Beams" and "The Dark Tower") that has become diseased or corrupted (much like demonic or spectral haunting of a space)** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate | We are hungry spaces seeking to consume and destroy. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | These spaces are sentient, like the cosmos that expresses and is the White, but they are like sick, insane corruptions of the White. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Akin to the portals and doorways made by the Old Ones, thinnies and todash space (including the todash highway) are (un)natural thinnings and absences of and in the White, with properties that show them to be corruptions of the White or sickened aspects of the White. The Outer Dark is the space outside the Dark Tower and the multiverse it sustains; thinnies and todash space are "natural" gaps inside the structure of the Dark Tower, produced by its destruction by the Breakers. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? | If thinnies keep developing, this will mean that the Dark Tower continues to fall. The Outer Dark and the thinnies and todash spaces will all merge in |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | the absence of the Dark Tower. Thinnies may pull creatures and things into themselves, and their discordant noise may lure people and animals into their maddening embrace. Just as the White, in its manifestations like the Rose and the field of roses, sings a great, affirming song and promotes health and healing, todash space and thinnies, conversely, spread disease and madness and are poisonous to those who wander their gloom. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | Thinnies, todash space, and the Outer Dark desire the destruction of health and sanity and the existence of the White and its manifestations, such as the Dark Tower and the Rose(s). |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the | These spaces are hospitable to monsters, and they all seem to share a nature—thinnies and todash space being like the Outer Dark and desirous of the Outer Dark becoming omnipresent by consuming everything. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | I am sentient space that desires to consume and destroy everything until I am all that is. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | I am a malignant ethereal space, full of monsters that, like me, want to destroy and consume everything. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, | It is not clear how these spaces are aware of things, but they seem to know what goes on inside themselves and in the areas around them. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | They value destruction and madness and to grow and spread. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What | They lure and even pull people, animals, and things into themselves. They drive sentient beings insane. They may be accessed by those in need, even though they are dangerous. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Sinistral |

*Overall Allomythology*

| **Overall Allomythology – Allomythic Family: the Affiliation and the Manni; Lovecraftian Neoplatonism (see Appendix 49 and CC, pp. 516 ff. and 591 ff.)** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | ***See the end of Appendix 32.** |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | King might best represent the kairology of his allomythology in his use of the numbers 19, 99, and 1999 (the Keystone Time on Keystone Earth in which the *ka* of Keystone Earth and the *ka* of Roland's world come together, just as in Mordred the Red and the White, Prim and *am*, and all sorts of other opposites conjoin in tragedy, horror, and salvation). The allomythos that might be closest to expressing the overall allomythology could be that of the Manni, with their affirmation of the White while seeking to wander the dangerous and scary ways of todash space. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are | I must be faithful; we must stand true together. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | (Note the great sin of the Manni is to marry outsiders.) What matters is to seek, to travel among the worlds, to experience the journey and the story, with all its dark and light. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Even with all the mythic hints – which are inconsistent and uncertain – there is a sense of loyalty to the Eld, the Tower, and the White, which are in danger. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | It is uncertain what will happen, but in terms of what *ought* to happen, the Manni and Roland embody a detachment from selfishly clinging to individual life and loyalty to one's friends and community. To continue seeking is worthwhile, and there are worse things than death. It is more important to be honorable and faithful. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The goodness of the world is real, as is the evil that threatens it. And the two are part of the same great and real Force. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | We journey with our Ka-Tet, and somehow standing with each other in loyalty and truth will save our threatened universe. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | I travel with my ka-tet seeking the Dark Tower and must stand true. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | This varies greatly, but, as above, this analysis favors the identity-perspective of Roland (and its parallels with the Manni). |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | This is uncertain, but valid sources of knowledge seem to be those that affirm the good people and things of the world, sanity, and health. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in | The situation is serious, negative, but not hopeless. My ka-tet is of highest value; I should remember the face of my father and stand true.<br><br>The great fear and fascination of King's life is the overpowering, addictive desire to move between worlds (see the Manni as well as the Affiliation's fall-through-tourism): which, rather than being a static "clinging," is a hungry, agentive, even affirmative will-to-death |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | expressive of the (neo-)Platonic WWL. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Pursue the Dark Tower to save the universe, but remain true along the way. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Dextral. |

## Appendix 18: Kairological Charts for Pullman's *His Dark Materials* Series

[remember to paste from separate Excel sheet]

NB Pullman has written other works set in the *His Dark Materials* universe, including his *The Book of Dust* series, but the allomythoi treated here are those that are important within the scope of *His Dark Materials*, without retconning-in allomythoi like the Brytish Government's Oakley Street, beings that are part of the Secret Commonwealth (*e.g.*, fairies), and those who "come from the gulfs between the good numbers."

Supplemental references below are to Laurie Frost (2006), *The Elements of* His Dark Materials: *A Guide to Philip Pullman's Trilogy*, abbreviated as "G."

*Angels and Archangels*

| **Angels and Archangels (Metatron; Balthamos and Baruch; the Authority) – Allomythic Family:** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Cliff Ghasts*

| **Cliff Ghasts – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Dæmons*

| **Dæmons – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The Dead; Ghosts* (n.b., these come from humans, mulefa, gallivespians, etc.)

| **The Dead; Ghosts – Allomythic Family: beings in Sheol, Hades** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Dust*

| **Dust, Dark Matter, Rusakov particles/field (*e.g.*, the alethiometers and Dr. Mary Malone's computer) – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Experimental Theologians*

| **Experimental Theologians – Allomythic Family:** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Gallivespians*

| **Gallivespians – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The Gobblers, General Oblation Board*

| **– Allomythic Family: see the Magisterium entry** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Guild of Torre degli Angeli in Cittàgazze*

| **Guild of Torre degli Angeli in Cittàgazze – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Gyptians*

| **Gyptians – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Harpies*

| **Harpies – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The Magisterium*

| **The Magisterium; the Church; bodies like the General Oblation Board ("the Gobblers") – Allomythic Family: hyperreal Catholicism[1] – but with important differences[2]** |
|---|

[1] Pullman seems to have been inspired by the synodality movement characteristic of the current pope's reign, using it to inspire major plot developments in *The Secret Commonwealth*, which also addresses itself to contemporary LPs like refugees and violence connected to oil in the Middle East (in this case, rose oil).

[2] The following passage from *The Secret Commonwealth* is illuminating:

> [T]he hierarchy of the Magisterium had held for centuries.
>
> There was a hierarchy, in the sense that some of the bodies and individuals were junior and some senior, some more important and some less; but it was not a fixed hierarchy, as it would have been had Pope John Calvin left the Church as he'd found it. Instead, he had repudiated the primacy of his office and divided its power among several agencies. After his death, the office of Pope was never filled again, and the authority that used to go with the title was diverted into many different courses, as a river that had run fast and narrow in the mountains slows down, and spreads out, and cuts many new channels as it finds itself in the flat lands below.

| Kairological Categories | | | Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, | |

So there was no one clear line of command. Instead, a multitude of different bodies, councils and colleges and committees and courts, grew up and, if they found themselves under an ambitious and talented leader, flourished; or perished and withered, if there was no boldness of vision or depth of courage among their governors. Altogether, the entity known as the Magisterium consisted of a seething mass of rivalrous, jealous, mutually suspicious bodies similar only in their liking for power and their ambition to wield it.

They came, the leaders of these factions, the Director of the Consistorial Court of Discipline, the Dean of the College of Bishops, the Chairman of the Committee for the Propagation of the True Faith, the Secretary General of the Society for the Promotion of Celibate Virtue, the Rector of the Red Chamber, the Master of the School of Dogmatic Logic, the President of the Court of Common Order, the Abbess of the Sisters of Holy Obedience, the Archimandrite of the Priory of Grace, and many, many others—they came because they dared not stay away, in case their absence were interpreted as rebellion. They came from all over Europe and from further south and north and west and east, some eager for conflict, some uneasy at the thought of it; some tempted like hounds by the gamy tang of heresy hunting, others reluctant to leave the peace of their monasteries or colleges for what was bound to be discord and anger and danger. (cite)

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Mulefa*

| **Mulefa – Allomythic Family: Ents; Hyperreal Native Americans (indigenous critique)** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Oxford*

| **Oxford – Allomythic Family: Medieval *studium*[3]** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate | |

[3] On the legal-professional origin of the European-British university and how it acquired the status as a separate domain in the Medieval system, *studium*, with special privileges apart from and guaranteed by Church (*sacerdotium*) and State (*regnum* or *imperium*), see Masuzawa, 2022; regarding *regnum*, Masuzawa uses the spelling *regium*, an Italian Ecclesiastical Latin variant, perhaps reflecting her shifting focus away from the atypical Paris/Oxbridge universities to the European norm. The emergence is mostly covered on pp. 1267–8. The eventual loss of independence and attempts by churches and states to regulate universities as part of broader power-contestation issues, which seems to inspire Pullman in *The Secret Commonwealth*, is discussed on pp. 1280–1 & 1283–4. One might understand the phenomenon broadly in terms of guild independence, but it is worth noting that contemporary historians are increasingly careful with regard to general characterizations of Medieval institutions, including, for example, the independence of mercantile law (see Kadens, 2015), and even the institution of feudalism as popularly understood and represented in mass media (see, e.g., Brown, 1974; Reynolds, 1994).

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Panserbjørn*

| **Panserbjørn – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Spectres*

| **Spectres – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Witches*

| **Witches – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Yenisei*

| **Yenisei (e.g, their shaman, Jopari) – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Overall Allomythology*

| **Overall Allomythology – Allomythic Family: panpsychism and tradition of natural magic; Gnosticism; Blake's allomythos (and, thus, English "Behmenism" and Swedenborgianism, among other tributaries); classics like Milton and Dante; etc.** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

## Appendix 19: Kairological Charts for L'Engle's *Time Quintet* Series

NB L'Engle's universe of the *Time Quintet* extends into works beyond it, but the focus here is on the allomythoi within the series.

[remember to paste from separate file]

*Aliens of Ixchel*

| **Aliens of Ixchel (*e.g.*, Aunt Beast) – Allomythic Family: unsightly helpers who help the heroes see beyond appearances** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | We see and value the true inner nature of creation, not just the surface appearance, and this helps us preserve, heal, and defend the good things of the universe and resist the evil. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable | We are a cooperative group of non-human people who, without sight, perceive the beauty and value of the cosmos we would defend against those who would unmake it. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | The Ixchelians know that they are opposed to the Dark Thing that has taken over one of the planets in their solar system. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | They are called to help Meg, Calvin, and her father—to feed them, heal them, give them advice. Without their help, Meg in particular might have died. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | The good things of the universe—sharing food and music, loving and compassionate touching and communication—are threatened by the forces that would unmake them. The Dark Thing is a serious danger. Another problem, which Aunt Beast points out to Meg, is that spoken language and physical appearance may be clumsy and inaccurate indicators of others' character and objects' properties. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and | The Ixchelians live together in peace and intimacy, touching each other with their tentacles and in each other's mind through telepathy. They are healers, who also |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | make beautiful music and delicious food for each other and for guests. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | They live lives of peace and joy, in communion with each other and the other good beings of the cosmos, taking pleasure in good food, music, teaching, and healing. And they resist the Black Thing. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature | The Ixchelians understand themselves communally, not as isolated individuals, and they value the inner qualities of each other, not physical appearance. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this context? | Their sensitive tentacles and telepathic abilities contribute to this (as does the colorlessness of their planet, in terms of their evolution). |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | Touch, sound, and telepathy are their primary sources of knowledge, and a sense of beauty and ethical goodness seems to guide their evaluation of sources of information. They are also in communion with other good beings on other planets. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my | The situation is serious but ultimately positive. The Dark Thing is a threat to the solar system, and the capture of Charles Wallace is dire. But the Ixchelians have their priorities in order: companionship, food and music, communion with each other and the universe of other good beings. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | Support, heal, entertain, and otherwise express compassion and love to each other and to other beings, while also resisting the forces that would unmake the cosmos. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated |

*The Black Thing; Echthroi*

| **The Black Thing, IT, Camazotz; Echthroi (*e.g.*, in *A Swiftly Tilting Planet*) and Echthroi Doubles (*e.g.*, Mr. Jenkins in *A Wind in the Door*); – Allomythic Family: Neoplatonic/Augustinian notion of evil as *privatio boni* and the opposite of the Logos/creative Name of God** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Centaur-like Beings of Uriel*

| **Centaur-like Beings of Uriel – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Cherubim*

| **Cherubim (*e.g.*, Proginoskes ("Progo")) – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The Colubras*

| **The Colubras – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Druids*

| **Ancient Welsh/Druids (*e.g.*, Madoc and Gwydyr) – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Druid-Native "People of the Wind"*

| **Druid-Native "People of the Wind" (*e.g.*, Karralys, Anaral, and Tav) – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Farandolae*

| **Farandolae (*e.g.*, Sporos) – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The Murrys*

| **The Murrys – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Namers*

| **Namers (*e.g.*, Meg and Progo) – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Nephilim*

| **Nephilim – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The O'Keefes*

| **The O'Keefes – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/** | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | **Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The People of the Wind; The People Across the Lake; Quiztano*

| **The People of the Wind (*e.g.*, Zill); The People Across the Lake; Quiztano – Allomythic Family:** |
|---|

| Kairological Categories | | | | Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Seraphim*

| **Seraphim– Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology* | | | Who and in what manner | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *(Way of Life)* | | | am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Stars*

| **Stars (*e.g.*, Mrs. Whatsit) – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Teachers*

| **Mrs. Whatsit, Mrs, Who, and Mrs. Which; Teachers (*e.g.*, Blajeny; later, Sandy and Dennys) – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Winged Unicorns; Small and "Virtual" Unicorns*

| **Winged Unicorns (*e.g.*, Gaudior); Small and "Virtual" Unicorns – Allomythic Family:** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Overall Allomythology*

| **Overall Allomythology – Allomythic Family:** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

# Appendix 20: How the O-mode May Inform the Others – Parody Religion and Shakespeare, with Some Reference to The Book of Mormon (Musical)

*But wherefore rough, why cold and ill at ease?*
*Aha, that is a question! Ask, for that,*
*What knows,—the something over Setebos*
*That made Him, or He, may be, found and fought,*
*Worsted, drove off and did to nothing, perchance.*
*There may be something quiet o'er His head,*
*Out of His reach, that feels nor joy nor grief,*
*Since both derive from weakness in some way.*
*I joy because the quails come; would not joy*
*Could I bring quails here when I have a mind:*
*This Quiet, all it hath a mind to, doth.*
—from "Caliban upon Setebos," Robert Browning

## World-making, Metareflection, and the Critical Power of Humor

Dewey writes of Shakespeare,

> [G]reat original artists take a tradition into themselves. They have not shunned but digested it. Then the very conflict set up between it and what is new in themselves and in their environment creates the tension that demands a new mode of expression [*cf.* p. 141].[1] Shakespeare may have had "little Latin and less Greek" but he was such an insatiable devourer of accessible material that he would have been a plagiarist if the material had not at once antagonized and coöperated with his personal vision by means of an equally insatiable curiosity concerning the life surrounding him. (1934, p. 159)

How ought one to categorize Shakespeare's allomythoi, such as *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and *The Tempest*? In my work, I have pushed back on Mendlesohn's characterization of Tolkien's overall allomythos, his allomythology of allomythoi, as non-immersive but rather a portal-*quest* fantasy; she makes good points, but her argument is the opposite of Santayana's regarding Shakespeare, whom he says lacks a "cosmos," "a setting," "a meaning": "There is no *fixed* conception of any forces, natural or moral, *dominating and transcending* our mortal energies" (qtd. in Dewey, 1934, p. 320). Mendlesohn objects that the presence of such a Catholic cosmos leads to Tolkien's work not being immersive, and I respond elsewhere. But Dewey is just the right critical reader of Shakespeare to pull out his philosophy:

---

[1] Dewey gives the example of the spirit of the Renaissance:

> [K]knowledge of Greek art, especially of architecture and sculpture, revolutionized the practice of the arts, including painting. The sense of naturalistic shapes of objects and of their setting in the natural landscape was recovered; in the Roman school painting was almost an attempt to produce the feelings occasioned by sculpture, while the Florentine school developed the peculiar values inherent in line. The change affected both esthetic form and substance. The lack of perspective, the flat and profile quality of Church art, its use of gold, and a multitude of other traits were not due to mere lack of technical skill. They were organically connected with the particular interactions in human experience that were desired as the consequence of art. The secular experiences that were emerging at the time of the Renascence and that fed upon antique culture involved of necessity the production of effects demanding new form in art. (p. 330)

> There are points of view from which Shakespeare had a philosophy, and had a philosophy that is more pertinent to the work of an artist than one which conceives the ideal of philosophy to be the enclosure of experience within and domination of its varied fullness by a transcendent ideal that only reason beyond experience can conceive. There is a philosophy [my PPP polytheism lies firmly in its Jamesian, Deweyan, Shakespearean tradition] which holds that nature and life offer in their plenitude many meanings and are capable through imagination of many renderings. In spite of the scope and dignity of the great historic philosophic systems, an artist may be instinctively repelled by the constraint imposed by acceptance of any system. If the important thing is "not this or that system but some system," why not accept, with Shakespeare, the free and varied system of nature itself as that works and moves in experience in many and diverse organizations of value [….] Art that is faithful to the many potentialities of organization, centering about a variety of interests and purposes, that nature offers—as was that of Shakespeare—may have not only a fullness but a wholeness and unity absent from a philosophy of enclosure, transcendence, and fixity. (1934, p. 321)

So I, along Deweyan lines, would see the two Shakespearean works mentioned above and discussed below as reflecting Shakepeare's typically M-mode style of worldmaking, enabled by his omnivorous, flexible (one might even say proto-Existentialist (Kaufmann, 1959), proto-Pragmatist (Dewey above) worldview which resists N-mode self-exposition, but with strong O-mode elements that invite further reflection on the O-mode.

While main body chapters critically examine the categories past scholars have used to research religion-like worldviews in the genres of fantastika and provide a theory of worldviews and genres designed to account for contemporary phenomena like allomythoi in genres like science fiction, this appendix considers the topic of fictional worldviews or "religions" both before genre fiction arose historically and with specific focus on the genre of comedy. This appendix relates to a number of themes that are explored in more depth elsewhere, such as how one constructs a responsible historical narrative of the phenomenon's emergence, the nested, *mise en abîme*, or world-within-world structure that promotes a critical cognitive stance, and the dependence of worldview innovation on prior tradition. Although focused on the milieu of texts that contain fictional worldviews, rather than the fiction-based "religions" that emerge from a small subset of these texts, this work's examination of fictional worldviews is relevant to the study of fiction-based religions. This appendix's consideration of comedic, oppositional, O-Mode world- and worldview-making is particularly relevant to the phenomenon that is sometimes designated "parody religion."

Shakespeare's *The Tempest* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and the fictional worldviews or "religions" he presents in them – particularly the use he makes of religious and supernatural elements for critical purposes – merit consideration in light of religious studies research into parody religions, "folk" or vernacular religion, and religion's intersection with humor and speculative fiction. *The Tempest* has been repeatedly likened to sf and fantasy or at least placed in their lineage. For example, Simone Caroti's (2009) "Science Fiction, *Forbidden Planet*, and Shakespeare's *The Tempest*" in part demonstrates how *The Tempest* anticipates Suvin's (1979) "cognitive estrangement," which anticipation is translated and realized in the science fiction film *Forbidden Planet*. Indeed, adaptations of Shakepeare's fantastical works, especially *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and *The Tempest*,

have generally been produced within the obvious conventions of the sf and fantasy genres. In "A Fragment of Manuscript," Harry Harrison (1980) suggests that Shakespeare intended for some of his stories such as *A Midsummer Night's Dream* to be sf. Interestingly, the sf and fantasy genres are *the* characteristic locations for the invention of fictional religions (and, more broadly, fictional worldviews), that is, made-up religions that are openly acknowledged as such by their makers. As I have argued elsewhere (Fredrickson, 2016), fantasy and science fiction are genres well suited for promoting critical thought, and Shakespeare's "negative capacity" (*cf.* Bevington, 2015) for tolerating and representing complexity and contradiction may be connected, in part, to the worldview hybridity of his social environment (Mayer, 2007), which manifests, too, in his allomythic creativity.

This appendix consists of two primary parts. In part one, the fictional worldview of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* is considered—an inversion or carnivalesque parody of the medieval courtly "religion" of love – which was itself at first a parody religion – as well as a creative adaptation of myth, legend, folklore, magic, and both Protestant and Catholic Christianity. In part two, *The Tempest* is discussed relative to Prospero's sovereign mastery of magic and language and manipulation of romantic love and in relation to his supernatural shadows, Sycorax, her monstrous, slave-son Caliban, and the spirit-servant Ariel. Both *The Tempest* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream* give Shakespeare the opportunity, through the non-mimetic decoupling from consensus reality permitted by the fantastical (*sensu* Kelleghan, 2002), to reflect on the sovereign act of creation itself, the art and magic of world-making. These works and their various fictional religions, such as Caliban's devotion to Setebos and Titania's devotion to ass-headed Bottom, may compared to a contemporary musical play with a similar function – as well as similarities in structure and content – namely, Parker, Lopez, and Stone's musical, *The Book of Mormon*. In each, parody religion calls for a reformed faith.

The nested, tale-within-a-tale structure (*i.e.*, *mise en abîme*), as in comedies like Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, allows the sort of metareflection on the creative act that promotes analysis, detachment, and skepticism, not only regarding the creative act itself, but also regarding the content of the work. *The Book of Mormon* contains just such a play-within-a-play, and, within its larger argument about how religions are constructed through imaginative synthesis of cultural elements drawn from an ambient milieu of narratives in response to situational provocations, playfully mocks the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints' origin story. Within the "world" of the theater it represents a religious world in which another, fiction-based religion is created, which, in turn, satirically re-presents the original religious world to itself. Not only does it attempt to inject itself into boundary disputes about what "religion" is, but it also attempts to present a theory of what religion should be. This appendix argues that Shakespeare attempts something similar in both *The Tempest* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, above all calling certainties into question and supplying alternatives by presenting novel worlds in a comedic or tragi-comedic mode.

## A Midsummer Night's Dream

The hybrid religious nature of the world in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* is obvious, for example, in that *Theseus* of classical myth intervenes in Egeus's punishment of Hermia so that, instead of death, she is threatened with a life of virginity as a *nun* in the service of *Artemis* and, at the same time, the *fairy queen* is in the area to celebrate the wedding of *Hippolyta* to Theseus. One may artificially abstract several religious tributaries that combine

in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and *The Tempest* to form the novel religious cosmoi of Shakespeare's invention: (1) the "Renaissance" humanist revival of classical "pagan" elements—pagan religion being in Shakespeare's time the default or conventional religion of poetry and fiction, which was, however, hardly ever lost to Medieval artists, (2) the "Renaissance" humanist revival of Neoplatonic (and Hermetic, Christian Cabalistic, alchemical, and astrological) "high magic," (3) folk beliefs about fairies, elves, good and bad magic, and so on, (4) Christianity in its competing Catholic and Protestant forms, and (5) the religion of love. To this one might add, particularly in *The Tempest*, although certainly present in almost every Shakespearean work, (6) the new and amplified articulation of the ancient royal ideology that makes the earthly sovereign the image of the divine Sovereign, the creator of the *nomos*, the legal order, and sustainer of the *cosmos*, the natural order. And one might also add, as a consequence of Western exposure to other parts of the world, particularly the Americas, (7) the construction and projection of religions onto indigenous peoples that were primarily fictions derived from Western myths and fantasies. These resembled exaggerated instances of the fictional versions of each other's religions projected onto each other by Catholics and Protestants in their religious polemics.

Let's take the antepenultimate first since it may be the least familiar while simultaneously the most ubiquitous in contemporary art and culture. In these plays we observe variations on what has been called the courtly "religion of love" invented by the troubadours. However, because these works are later than the early expressions of courtly love, they are further complicated by their emphasis on the magical aspects of the magico-religious complex of beliefs and practices accepted at the time—high magic having, as mentioned above, enjoyed a revival as part of the so-called Renaissance—and by the movement away from the celebration of romantic adultery and the emerging victory, evident as well in Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, "of that romantic conception of marriage which is the basis of all our [contemporary] love literature" (Lewis, 1936, p. 360). Regarding the religion of love, C. S. Lewis states (1936, pp. 18, 20, 21),

> Finally we come to the fourth mark of courtly love—its love religion of the god Amor. This is partly, as we have seen, an inheritance from Ovid. In part it is due to that same law of transference which determined that all the emotion stored in the vassal's relation to his *seigneur* should attach itself to the new kind of love: the forms of religious emotion would naturally tend to get into the love poetry, for the same reason. But in part (and this is, perhaps, the most important reason of the three) this erotic religion arises as a rival or a parody of the real religion and emphasizes the antagonism of the two ideals [....] As against any theory which would derive medieval *Frauendienst* from Christianity and the worship of the Blessed Virgin, we must insist that the love religion often begins as a parody of the real religion [....] And this is not all. The variations are not only between jest and earnest; for the love religion can become more serious without becoming reconciled to the real religion. Where it is not a parody of the Church it may be, in a sense, her rival—a temporary escape, a truancy from the ardours of a religion that was believed into the delights of a religion that was merely imagined.

The original parody element in the religion of love is important because Shakespeare seems to retain some awareness of this, especially in the romantic escapades in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* inspired by Oberon's and Puck's mischief, and in both *Dream* and *The*

*Tempest* Shakespeare highlights or retains an aspect of the religion of love that Lewis neglects: that the religion of love is also love magic – "If this be magic, let it be art / Lawful as eating" (*Winter's Tale*, 5.3.110-111) – and that the poet and/or lover may be understood as or as resembling a magician. In *A Midsummer Night's Dream* one may detect an awareness of the fact that love magic often took the form of or was indistinguishable from a curse (*cf.* Faraone, 1999) – compare Shell (2015, p. 89):

> If Demetrius ends the play in love with a magically induced perception of Helen, an eidolon instead of the real thing, this could be seen as little different from Helen's extravagant, but unaided, devotion. Both invite accusations of misdirected worship that have a moral and religious inflection as well as an amatory one.

This magical aspect of the religion of love, which points to the artificiality of the distinction between "magic" and "religion" (and of the distinction between theurgy and goety (*cf.* Warner, 2003, pp. 240, 242)) that was being actively constructed at the time, may be traced back to Ovid and Latin erotic elegy (*cf.* Stapleton, 1996).

Concerning the influence of Latin erotic elegy and especially Ovid on Shakespeare, Starks (2009, p. 76) notes,

> Inspired by Ovid's emphasis on the protean nature of existence and the transformative potential of poetry, these Elizabethan poets found in Ovid a primary source of fresh artistic inspiration – a skeptical, irreverent depiction of gods and religion; a profound, disturbing, yet often comical eroticism; and a playful sense of style and form – all of which seemed to them to be thoroughly modern. Moreover, they found in Ovid's brilliant textual transformations the model for their own imitations, translations, and adaptations of his poems.

Whereas *The Faerie Queene* in part functions as ideological propaganda for the Elizabethan order of things, much like Virgil's propaganda for Augustus' reign in the *Aeneid* though further inflected by folklore and Italian romantic epics, Starks (2009, p. 77) argues that

> The search for an alternative poetic genre, one that challenges the conventions of the epic without falling into those of the romance, led Shakespeare and his contemporaries to experiment with a counter-genre drawn from Ovid's *Metamorphoses* – now inflected with his elegiac verses and their inherited legacy of the Petrarchan sonnet – which I will call the "Ovidian narrative."

Starks contrasts the Latin epic with the genre of the love elegy because "the love elegy valorizes everything that is shunned in the Roman masculine ideal [....] exposing the vulnerability that lurks just beneath the seemingly impermeable, rigid surface of the Roman *uirtu*" (2009, p. 78). This alternative masculine subjectivity is porous, permitting possession and domination, while at the same time *actively* seeking the love that subjugates it. Shakespeare is one of the most noteworthy reformers of the Petrarchan sonnet. Indeed, of the sonnets Lewis (1954, p. 502) states, "The sonnets are the very heart of the Golden Age, the highest and purest achievement of the Golden way of writing." Continuing his assessment, Lewis (1954, pp. 504-505) further states,

> Thus the whole sequence becomes an expanded version of Blake's 'The Clod and the Pebble'. And so it comes about that, however the thing began—in perversion, in convention, even (who knows?) in fiction—Shakespeare,

> celebrating the 'Clod' as no man has celebrated it before or since, ends by expressing simply love, the quintessence of all loves whether erotic, parental, filial, amicable, or feudal. Thus from exreme particularity there is a road to the highest universality.

From his comment about "perversion" one might guess, even if one were unaware of Lewis's reputation as a Christian apologist, that his is a less-than-sympathetic ear for love poetry directed by a man to another man. And yet even he seems to understand and admire Shakespeare's intent. Jones (1995) argues, in his *Renaissance Magic and Hermeticism in the Shakespeare Sonnets: Like Prayers Divine*, that Shakespeare's sonnets follow the model of Giordano Bruno's, whose sonnets represent and enact the theurgic ascent and transformation of the human soul through devotion to the divine, which begins with love for mortal (and, in the Platonic tradition, male) beauty and rises to union with God.

I would argue that this magical function of the sonnets is anticipated in Latin erotic elegy and that a kind of "theology" or logic of love magic/religion is also present in plays like *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and *The Tempest*. In this respect, I would disagree with Starks's argument that Shakespeare, by going "back to Ovid to rework the later Petrarch," employs "the former's religious skepticism to counter any remaining shreds of Neoplatonic idealism in English love poetry" (Stark, 2009, p. 80). Although Shakespeare embraces Ovid's eclecticism and occasional irreverence, he preserves a form of love magic present in Ovid that resembles Neoplatonism in important respects.[2] Though her ideas have been challenged – sometimes rightly – and certainly complicated by the critical response, this argument is largely in harmony with Yates's (1975; *cf.* 1964, 1972, 1979). In both *Dream* and *Tempest* Shakespeare appropriates one of the most successful parody religions ever made, the religion of love – the light quality of both plays reflects perhaps some retained consciousness of this – a religion that exhibits the close ties between and even indeterminacy of religion and magic.

To understand the fictional religious worlds in these plays and their function as parody and critique, one must return to a worldview in which religion, magic, and science have not been completely distinguished from each other, in which worlds are many yet the great mirrors the small and "as above, so below." Writing of Spenser, Lewis (1954, p. 359) expresses admiration for this magico-religious worldview in the following approving terms:

> To our own troubled and inquiring age this wisdom will perhaps show its most welcome aspect in the complete integration, the harmony, of Spencer's mind. His work is one, like a growing thing, a tree; like the world-ash-tree itself, with branches reaching to heaven and roots to hell.

One might be tempted to think of Shakespeare as a thinker whose mind encompassed more contradiction and complexity – and irreverence and blasphemy – than Spenser's, someone more like us, as in Kaufmann's (1960) reading. Yet, as Wilson (2004, p. 146) states,

> *A Midsummer Night's Dream* ends with Puck's plea that we think its 'weak and idle theme, / No more yielding than a dream' (5.1.417); but Stephen Greenblatt remarks how its final moments depend on a belief that there is after all 'something of great constancy' (26) about 'love in idleness', for 'when the fairies "consecrate" the marriage beds with field-dew they are, in a mode at once natural and magical, enacting (and appropriating to the stage)

[2] For a defense of this understanding of the magical aspect of Latin erotic elegy, see the excursus at the conclusion of this chapter, which summarizes some of the evidence from O'Neill (1998) and others.

> the Catholic practice of anointing the marriage bed with holy water'. Thus, a popish ritual that earlier led those annointed [sic] to 'dote in idolatry' (1.1.109) is literally rehabilitated, as Oberon now orders the sprinkling of 'all the couples' (397) in the house.

Though Wilson cites Greenblatt as part of an argument against his thesis that Shakespeare's plays are part of a process of secularization of Catholic ritual, arguing instead for the Catholic Shakespeare thesis, I cite him to agree that Shakespeare has serious intentions behind his religious play and parody and to illustrate his synthesis of Catholic piety and folklore, two of the religious "tributaries" I mentioned above. Though able to dwell in doubt and contradiction and disinclined to dogmatism, Shakespeare repeatedly exhibits faith in a great order of things, united by love.

When I state that Shakespeare's playful intentions are serious, I do not mean to intervene directly in the debate between the Shakespeare-was-a-Protestant (*e.g.*, Carter, 1897) and the Shakespeare-was-a-Catholic (*e.g.*, Carlyle, 1840; Bowden, 1899; Beauregard, 1997; Wilson 2004) crowds, let alone those who would make him irreligious or atheistic (*e.g.*, Birch, 1848; Santayana, 1957). Mayer (2007, p. 4) states, "Are we not also unconsciously reproducing the somewhat artificial polarities of Elizabethan polemical literature when we construct equally polarized scenarios about Shakespeare's religious beliefs?" Instead, drawing on Griffin's (1994) *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction*, I would argue that Shakespeare's work, insofar as its religions are parody or satire, is exploratory or experimental in the pragmatic sense of being an open-ended inquiry, an attempt to promote active thinking about what is true, rather than a dogmatic affirmation of a known truth. Plays may be play: "Tied to actuality, in ways that cannot be reduced to the empirical or verifiable, the experience of 'play' allows instead for the creation of new possible worlds" (Joughin, 2005, p. 154). Kierkegaard (1968) famously made a similar argument in his dissertation *On the Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates*, namely, that irony is a deconstructive technique that enables people to discover their authentic subjectivity – a new possible world – by throwing standard assumptions into doubt. Joughin (2005, p. 135) calls *Dream* "arguably the most Kierkegaardian of Shakespeare's plays" because in its unflappable acceptance of the carnivalesque it "remains open to the 'astonishing nature of what is normally expected.'" Upsetting the normal order can be distressing, so perhaps it's not surprising the Socrates met with a hard end. However, though Socrates was notoriously irritating, as Deloria (1969) argues in his essay "Indian Humor," humor need not[3] be interpreted as an attack on or utter delegitimization of an idea, act, or person, but may instead be interpreted as a gentle and respectful mode of critique that preserves dignity. I am in sympathy with Mayer (2007, p. 5), who argues "that religion for Shakespeare was not so much a matter of systematic allegiance as one of *constant* debating and questioning." The trickster spirit, Puck, by these lights, is not the nihilistic embodiment of chaos and permanent liminality that some have taken him to be (Szakolczai, 2007). Rather, his disturbances are a necessary part of a creative, order-making process.

[3] It need not, but of course it *may*. One might theorize that in the arms race of cultural borderline contestation humor sometimes functions as a defensive strategy of desacralization whereby the value claims, especially of a dominant and dominating narrative, may be undermined. Insofar as "religion" may be thought of as a boundary regulating process, or, put another way, a value-making process involving recognition of salience and modulation of significance (*cf.* Taves, 2015), one can see why humor might appear to be its opposite, but humor, too, is a potent intervention in evaluative processes (*cf.* Lincoln, 1989; Scott, 1992; Taylor, 2003).

Shakespeare lived in "a highly liminal moment in European history" (Szakolczai, 2007, p. 1), a religious borderland populated by fantasies provoked by mediated contact with, among other things, the Classical and Medieval pasts, the Americas and Asia, and popular legend and magic. As in the case of the "parting of the ways" of early Christianity and Judaism (*cf.* Boyarin, 2004), when some Christians still attended synagogue and some Jews still confessed faith in Jesus as Messiah without a sense of contradiction, or as in the case of Haitian Vodouists who comfortably worship the *loa* through the night and then attend Mass the next morning, "As the work of Alexandra Walsham has shown, there were a considerable number of Catholics who attended Protestant church services, who conformed outwardly only, or remained 'in between'" (Mayer, 2007, p. 8). Mayer (2007, p. 6) further notes that "even the Queen's own form of Protestantism was 'deeply idiosyncratic.'" And this in some respects characterized her age: "Indeed, as Peter Lake explains, 'the religious scene of Elizabeth's reign is best seen as a number of attempts, conducted at very different levels of theoretical self-consciousness and coherence, at creative bricolage, mixing and matching'" (Mayer, 2007, p. 9). Likewise, Lewis (1954, p. 63) states,

> A man who wants to get the feel of that age must not be deceived by the tranquil harmonies of the great Italian painters; the amazing hodge-podge or rag-bag which we find in Montaigne or Burton is far more characteristic. He must beware of schematizing. He must not impose either on the old things that were dying out (not all old things were) nor on the new things that were coming in (not all of them to stay) a spurious unity. He must constantly remind himself that a Protestant may be Thomistic, a humanist may be a Papist, a scientist may be a magician, a sceptic may be an astrologer.

Research on vernacular religion has demonstrated that this kind of on-the-ground creativity (or, from an elite perspective, heresy) is more common than one might think (Bowman & Valk, 2012). And in his dramatic art, Shakespeare exemplifies the "barbaric" blending, border crossing, and bricolage that has been symbolized and celebrated by some postcolonial theorists in the figure of Caliban (*e.g.*, Retamar, 1997).

*A Midsummer Night's Dream* supplies layers of detachment – worlds within worlds – that promote critical reflection. Bouchard (2011, p. 16) states,

> [W]hile our seeing may or may not be naive in the theater, our naïveté is resisted by the doubleness of what we see. Drama inherently offers its own critique of presence. The performer both is-and-is-not "herself" and is-and-is-not the persona she plays.

If this is true of all theater, namely, that it is a space that invites critical thought as soon as one recognizes the humanity of the performers, who are engaged in a constitutive interpretive activity that founds the viewers' possibility of interpretation and that, in its interpretive expression, both masks and reveals themselves, the structures of some plays may be more conducive to recognition of this critical potential. One way to do this is to multiply the property of "doubleness," to set up multiple layers or levels of storyworlds within storyworlds. Just as Shakespeare's world promoted new critical thinking through the discovery and creation of new worlds and new borders between them, so too fictional worlds may become more critically generative as they develop a nested structure of worlds and the borders between them. Bouchard (2011, p. 326) notes, "If the Athenian court is mostly a place of critique, where roles are exposed as alienating, the forest can be a carnivalesque place where limits are crossed and criticized and lives rearranged." The forest becomes the

dreamy space wherein alternative possibilities may be playfully explored before being reintegrated (*cf.* Vlasopolos, 1978).

The fairy queen's adoration of the ass-headed Bottom, which leads her to break faith with her Indian devotee whose son she vowed to care for, is an obvious example of the carnivalesque occurring in the detached forest fairy-world.[4] It's all the more "carnivalesque" in Bakhtin's (1984a, 1984b) sense when one thinks of Elizabeth as the "Faerie Queene," and, as Joughin (2005, p. 139) comments,

> [T]he aloof aristocrats [in *Dream*] are already cast, by the mechanicals at least, as credulous yokels who might fear the spectacle of a lion roaring. For their part the aristocrats are in turn exposed to the actual danger of confusing kindness with stupidity.

In the context of a play that ultimately celebrates romantic marriage, there is nonetheless humorous acknowledgement of the classical perspective that love renders us foolish and insane. Likewise, the play-within-a-play, the *mise en abîme* of the practice and performance of the story of Pyramus and Thisbe within *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, again invites critical reflection on the religion of love, not only because it is structurally set off as another world within the primary storyworld, but also because its parody of the story, treated so seriously in *Romeo and Juliet* and in the peril threated by Egeus' invocation of the death penalty to coerce Hermia to marry Demetrius although she loves Lysander, satirically provokes critical thought regarding the seriousness of the religion of love in the form of romantic marriage.

In the end, Shakespeare's *Dream* is a celebration of love and a veneration of Love, but one that keeps sight of love's confusions and contradictions, rendering them sacred as well. Like Bottom's description of his dream (4.1.203-216) it is a holy satire of the holy. Bouchard (2011, p. 332) states,

> Bottom alludes to Paul, who alludes to Isaiah (64:4) [....] If Shakespeare knew verse 10 in Tyndale (1526) or the Geneva Bible (1576), he would have read how "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the bottom of God's secrets." To take this mangling of Paul seriously need not detract from its humor.

Bottom's experience of "translation" is incommunicable, ineffable, untranslatable, save in a stammering, synesthetic, allusive jumble. St. Paul himself might approve of the gracious fool overturning worldly wisdom (Richmond, 2000, p. 118; *cf.* Hassel, 1980). Shakespeare seems to be gently, humorously trying to help his contemporaries consider that their dogmatic confidence may conceal that which it claims to know and reveal, like a mask without a bottom or an actor in a play in a play.

## The Tempest

*The Tempest* is a more serious and mature work than *Dream* – one might call it a tragicomedy rather than a pure comedy – but Shakespeare's increased command of his dramatic powers is yoked to a message of humility that is comparable to and continuous with that explored above in *Dream*. *The Tempest* illustrates a theory of kingship, an understanding of sovereignty, that is present as well in other Shakespearean plays. I would

[4] Following Hughes's (1992) critical interpretation of Shakespeare's anxious relationship with female power, one might interpret Titania's humiliation (like Sycorax's stigmatization) as resistant of the propaganda myth of the *Virgin* Queen promulgated under Elizabeth. Yet, against such an interpretation, one might note that Miranda's maidenhood is much of what makes her miraculous (1.2.428-429; 4.1.15-23).

agree with Knight (1967) that Shakespeare's corpus is saturated with a "royalistic" leaning, but one tempered by an understanding of human limitation (*cf.* Hamilton, 2000, pp. 119-120). In *Dream*, the religious synthesis was composed of, among other things, elements from English folklore and nature magic such as Puck or Robin Goodfellow, classical paganism, Catholicism, and the religion of love; in *The Tempest*, some of the building blocks of the new religious world are more exotic, including religious fictions or fantasies about the natives of the Americas, but the exotic others in *The Tempest* are shadows cast or summoned by the sovereign figure of Prospero, Shakespeare's answer to Faustus.[5]

We might call the dominant religious element in *The Tempest*'s religious synthesis *the religion of sovereignty*. It is a magico-religious expression of a royal ideology that has sometimes been called the divine right of kings, and though hardly unique to or invented in the 16th century, it did then enjoy a period of marked efflorescence in its articulation and appeal. Lewis (1954, p. 47) comments,

> The Divine Right of Kings is best understood as the first form of something which has continued to affect our lives ever since—the modern theory of sovereignty [....] On this view, total freedom to make what laws it pleases, superiority to law because it is the source of law, is the characteristic of every state; of democratic states no less than of monarchical.

This understanding of the state as free to create law may be contrasted with alternative understandings of law as grounded in primordial custom or divine inspiration, but Shakespeare endorses the understanding of the state as law-creating, not merely law-clarifying and law-enforcing. Thus, as the state, as "Absolute Milan" (1.2.109), Prospero possesses, even before his Hermetic purification and elevation as Magus, the divine freedom of the sovereign; Miranda implies this (1.2.10), as does Ferdinand (1.2.390-391)

Shakespeare's age was characterized by a range of wildly different attitudes toward human subjectivity and power. Lewis (1954, pp. 49-50) notes,

> In the magician and the astrologer we saw a readiness either to exaggerate or to minimize the power and dignity of Man. Calvinism perhaps satisfies both inclinations by plunging the unregenerate man as deep as the astrologers and exalting the elect as highly as the magicians. Similarly the new polities embody limitless power and freedom in the prince, and make the subjects his (as they were [in the view of the astrologers] the stars') tennis balls.

Shakespeare may have been attracted to "royalism" because it mirrors an ancient and venerable theory of poetry – that humans, as Tolkien (1988) would say, are lawful subcreators in the domain of art because they are the image of the Creator – in the legal order, making the king the law-creating and law-preserving sovereign (*cf.* Benjamin, 1986). Lewis (1954, pp. 320, 322) states,

> Such a theory leaves the artist free to exceed the limits of Nature. Of these two conceptions it is the neo-Platonic, not the Aristotelian, which is really demanded by most Golden poetry; by the *Furioso*, the *Liberata*, the *Arcadia*, the *Faerie Queene*; and by many elements in Shakespearian 'comedy'. It is also directly asserted by some of the new critics. 'The poet,' says Scaliger (*Poet.*I.i), 'maketh a new Nature and so maketh himself as it were a new God. It will be remembered how closely Sidney follows him. The poet, unlike the historian, is not 'captiued to the trueth of a foolish world' but can 'deliuer a

[5] One might recall that the Italian *Prospero* is equivalent to the Latin *Faustus*.

> golden' [....] To adorn external Nature with conceits and mythical personifications was as legitimate as to tie a ribbon round the neck of one's own kitten or cut one's own yew-tree into the shape of a peacock; for we are of a higher birth than nature and her masters by divine right.

This understanding of humanity's sovereign creative power is a "magical" mode of knowing the world: "as above, so below." In the form received by Shakespeare and accepted in the practice of high magic, it conforms to Augustine's understanding of sovereign freedom: the magician has the power to shape heaven, earth, and sea because his will submits utterly to or is identified with the divine will. The magician-king enjoys this sovereign freedom because his will accords with and advances Providence (*cf.* Mebane, 1989), "forcing nature artfully" as Dee would say (Harkness, 1999, p. 77). Prospero, for example, is only able to achieve his ends during the limited time of the play because the stars are in the right position (1.2.177-184; *cf.* Bernthal, 2003, p. 235). Of *The Tempest*, Knight (1967, p. 67) states,

> Shakespeare found the perfect form at last. Let me again emphasize the importance of the tempest-symbol which is ubiquitous throughout the plays for Shakespeare. *The Tempest* is well named. Here the whole sequence of past plays is, as it were, caught up into one supreme moment of vision. More exquisitely compact than *Cymbeline*, *The Tempest* is a record of Shakespeare's spiritual progress and, simultaneously, a vision of mankind tossed on the turbulent waters of life. Therefore Prospero is both the Supreme Being from one point of view, and from the other Shakespeare, the poet. The story is simply this: a magician draws to him, by means of a tempest, a ship-load of men—good, evil, wise and ignorant: them he both wrecks and saves. The mystic melodies of Ariel's pipe sing the travellers to the yellow sands where all is forgiven and all restored. *The Tempest* is the most perfect work of mystic vision in English literature.

Prospero's sovereignty – his divine infinitude in the Neoplatonic tradition of high magic (Lewis, 1954, pp. 12-14, 54; *cf.* Carlson, 2008) – is amplified through the use of a variety of biblical allusions (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Hall, 1999), but his humanity, his finitude is also stressed. The conventions of heroic myth have long been mainstays of royal ideology, possessing the rough structure Campbell (1968) identified as the "monomyth." Unlike ancient hero-kings, however, whose suffering and sacrifice together with their supernatural selection and aid mark them as worthy to rule for the rest of their lives, Prospero fits a modified, Cincinnatus-like model in which the hero recedes and surrenders his power in the end (*cf.* Jewett & Lawrence, 1977). After all is done, Prospero's "Every third thought shall be [his] grave" (5.1.314). In fact, Shakespeare's poetic deification of Prospero in some ways highlights his limitations (Mowat, 2000, p. 34):

> When Ferdinand and Alonso take on, in turn, the voyager role, Prospero assumes a pseudo-godlike function: he raises the storm, he sends the Harpy. Awareness of Prospero's replication of the function served by Zeus, Poseidon or Aeolus in previous versions of the story makes Prospero seem, by comparison, all-too-human in his relative frailty.

As Bernthal (2003, p. 230) states, "*The Tempest* is about a man who makes grave political and personal mistakes but has one last chance, near the end of his life, to repair the damage he has done. The play is about temperance, the exercise and relinquishment of power, and forgiveness." In the figure of Prospero, Shakespeare promotes an understanding of human

subjectivity as properly active, creative, and powerful because it is *worthy*, voluntarily limiting its power under the influences of compassion and love. Still, though one may read with sympathy for Prospero, the shadows of his sovereignty – his beloved and maligned servants – also call for our consideration. What of Ariel and what of Caliban, with his defeated witch-mother Sycorax and their god Setebos?

Yates (1979, pp. 187-188) points out the origin of Ariel's name in passing in the context of defending Prospero's status as a white mage:

> That Prospero's magic reflects the influence of Agrippa's *De occulta philosophia* was indicated by Frank Kermode in 1954 in his introduction to the Arden edition of *The Tempest.* Other studies have argued that this presentation of a Dee-like Agrippan magus was part of the Elizabethan revival. The magical play presents, in new and fascinating guise, old and familiar arguments. That the magic of Prospero is a white magic is underlined in the emphasis on chastity in Prospero's advice to his daughter's lover, and elsewhere in the play. The white and pure magic of Prospero is contrasted with the black magic of the evil witch, Sycorax, and her son. Prospero is using the *De occulta philosophia* to call on good spirits (the name, Ariel, is mentioned in Agrippa's book), and he overcomes and controls the bad magic of the witch.

Prospero's defeat of Sycorax and mastery of the monster Caliban connects him with a long tradition of heroic and divine legitimation myths centering on conquest of the goddess and her monster by a civilizing male who thereby becomes king.[6] Whether or not one embraces Yates's full argument that Prospero is Dee in disguise and that the play is intended as an apologetic intervention in Elizabethan debates about the legitimacy of magic, Shakespeare's approval of Prospero's magic is clear, even if in some respects qualified. Even more than his books, Prospero's aerial servant Ariel seems to be the heart of his magic, and Prospero's sincere affection for Ariel together with his love for his daughter Miranda and his forgiveness of his foes are some of our main reasons for liking him. Ariel's gender is notoriously ambiguous, but if one thinks of Ariel as female, Prospero's mastery of Ariel's power becomes more sinister. Adelman (1992, p. 237) states,

> Prospero's reappropriation of control at the beginning of *The Tempest* is nearly diagrammatic: even before the play has begun, the maternal body has been defined as dangerous and banished in the form of Sycorax—as though Paulina had turned out to be a witch after all; Prospero's use of Medea's words [in Ovid] to describe his own magic suggests the extent to which his reapproriated control is based firmly on her banishment. For now the maternal body of nature is dangerous and needs the father's benign management; only his art releases Ariel from confinement in her material body.

Levin (1996) has also noted the frequency with which female knowledge and power is appropriated in Shakespeare and put under male control, and Hughes (1992) has explored with great erudition and imagination Shakespeare's troubled relationship with female eros. At the same time *The Tempest* was being written and performed, Western nations had begun a project of colonial mastery all over the world. One manifestation of this project was the

[6] Compare the allusion to this myth in the description of the king's son, the future king, Ferdinand (2.1.109-112).

creation of fictional religions that were projected onto subject peoples so that they might be, as in a sort of spell, controlled by being named and known. As part of his controversial attempt to debunk the existence of a Native American Mother Earth goddess tradition, Gill (1987) documents how America was configured in the European imagination as a fertile, virginal woman. One need not endorse his whole hypothesis to acknowledge that the Western imaginary was, even in Shakespeare's time (*cf.* Fleming, 1965), engaged in legitimating its domination of the Americas by extending a misogynistic domestic logic into global relations as part of a larger project of creating a fictional Indian (both oriental and occidental) religious discourse. Ariel and Miranda thus may be interpreted as suggestive of the alluring Indian queen or virginal America (Gillies, 2000). Ariel, whose greatest desire is "liberty" (1.2.245) and who in many ways recalls the trickster Puck (*e.g.*, 4.1.196-197), is made a willing slave through the promise of manumission, and Miranda is transferred from one male's ownership to another's, bound, as it were, in her father's great love spell. Both are depicted like airy goddesses, but their conditions in the play significantly resemble that of the earthy Caliban whom they are intended to contrast.

I opened with a quote from Browning's "Caliban upon Setebos" because Browning's own reflections there illustrate the critical, interpretive layers Shakespeare's religious creativity invites one to reflect on in *The Tempest* (and *Dream*). Like Browning's Caliban's musings on a fictional god over Setebos, Quiet, which makes us think about how our own ultimate concerns and transcendent values arise from our limited conditions and capacities, Shakespeare's fictional god, Setebos, and his devotees, Sycorax and Caliban, also encourage one to reflect on the conditions of Shakespeare's time.

*The Tempest*, like *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, is a work overflowing with "intertextual signals" from sources such as "[Virgil's] *Aeneid*, [...] Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, [...] Montaigne's "Of the Caniballes," and [...] Strachey's report on the voyage and shipwreck of the *Sea-Venture*" (Mowat, 2000, p. 28). Sycorax, whose name and character allude to the great witches of classical myth (*cf.* Warner, 2000, pp. 100-101), and the island on which *The Tempest* is set locate the narrative in the Mediterranean. The play contains many allusions to Virgil's *Aeneid*, in which the heroic journey and trials of Aeneas mark him (and thus Augustus) as worthy of kingship in familiar royal-ideological fashion (*cf.* Hamilton, 2000). In addition to the travel literature to which Shakespeare had access, which described the "Indians" in literally fantastic detail, there were public exhibitions of Native Americans in England that further exoticized them (2.2.27-32; *cf.* Vaughan & Vaughan, 1991; Vaughan, 2000) and, like the vicarious tourism of the travel literature Shakespeare read, commoditized them (*cf.* Roach, 2000). The name "Caliban" is often regarded as derived from "Caribbean" or "Cannibal" (*e.g.*, Warner, 2003, p. 256; Taylor, 1958; for alternative proposals, *cf.*, *e.g.*, Warner, 2003, p. 258; Vaughan & Vaughan, 1991), and he shares many of the mixed, ambivalent qualities attributed at that time to the "natural man" found in the so-called "West" Indies (*cf.* Lewis, 1954, p. 17). The large body of critical post-colonial interpretations of *The Tempest* that interpret Caliban as colonized or enslaved (*e.g.*, Mannoni, 1950; Jeffery, 2007; Diala, 2012) thus have some merit, for the "West Indies" became an extension of Europe (Mignolo, 2000, p. 51)[7] just as the socially dead slave becomes an extension of the master's power (Patterson, 1982, p. 35). Caliban is a "slave"

[7] This is the very linking of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic that is so striking in *The Tempest*, as, for example, in the references to Tunis and Argier (Algiers) as well as to the Bermudas, "Ind" (2.2.56), the "brave new world," and the allusions to the Virginia voyages (*cf.* Warner, 2000, p. 106).

(1.2.311-314) who would be his own king, eloquently asserting a native right to dominium as was affirmed relative to the Indians in Paul III's papal bull, *Sublimis Deus* (1.2.332-333; 342-343). In this context, it's worth remembering that many of Shakespeare's contemporaries like Bartolomé de las Casas and Franciscus de Victoria were critical of European exploitation of the Americans. Lewis (1954) states,

> [T]he best European consciences [in the 16th century] had still to undergo a long training before they reached the untroubled nineteenth-century acquiescence in imperialism. Go back even as far as Burke or Johnson and you will find a very different view: 'in the same year, in a year hitherto disastrous to mankind', America and the sea-passage to India were discovered (*Taxation No Tyranny*). Go back farther, to Buchanan (1506-82), and you read that the great explorer, the true discoverer of all these new lands, was Avarice (*De Sphaera*, I. 182 et seq.). The best European minds were ashamed of Europe's exploits in America. Montaigne passionately asks why so noble a discovery could not have fallen to the Ancients who might have spread civility where we have spread only corruption (*Essais*, III. vi).

Like Montaigne's hypothetical ancients, Prospero benevolently took pains to educate and civilize Caliban (1.2.354-356), but his efforts had uneven results. Gillies (2000, p. 96) states, "Natural Law thinking may explain the curious mix of failure and success in Caliban's eduction. Significantly, Caliban's overall failure seems to hinge not on an absence of intellectual ability but on the absence of any counterpart of 'Natural Law' in his nature." Unlike Montaigne's "Caniballes," Caliban is not a noble savage in harmony with nature; rather, he is an intemperate brute.[8] Unnatural and monstrous prodigies were expected in the far regions of the world. Columbus's own writings – for example, his description of the unnatural long-haired Caribs who ate human flesh and their consorts, the man-hating, Amazon-like women of Matinino – illustrate the way his expectations actively shaped his perceptions, expectations cultivated by Classical and Medieval travel fantasies, including *Acts of the Apostles*, which conformed to Greek narrative conventions, in which benevolent natives – like Caliban (2.2.106-109, 126-133), like Miranda (1.2.419-421; *cf.* 1.2.459-461), like the American natives in Columbus's reports – aid the castaway (*cf.* 3.3.29-34) and then mistake him for a god (see also, 5.1.187-188).

Moving from the Caribbean to South America, Setebos was reported as a Patagonian deity in the travel literature Shakespeare read (*cf.* Pigafetta, 1995, x-xi; Frey, 1999, p. 217). But Caliban's Setebos, though the name helps create the fantastic imaginary geography of the island, is a different deity of Shakespeare's invention. Setebos provides the key to understanding the function of Shakespeare's fictional religion in *The Tempest*. I have already suggested that sovereignty is a central concern of the play and that Shakespeare, though attracted by a kind of royalist civil religion of sovereignty, wanted it to be tempered or qualified. The parody religion of sovereignty that Caliban, Stephano, and Trinculo fashion together subverts the real religion of sovereignty in a way that recalls *A Midsummer Night's Dream*'s subversion of the religion of love.

Stephano becomes a god from heaven, specifically the moon, itself associated with Setebos. The moon, of course, was the limit or boundary between the divine and the mortal. From this liminal place, Stephano comes to overthrow Prospero and rule as divine king.

---

[8] Perhaps in accord with a theory like that in Romans 1:24-27, Sycorax (1.2.273-275; 1.2.320-321) and Caliban (1.2.348-352), having forsaken or been forsaken by natural law (4.1.188-190), are given to unnatural desires.

Perhaps he will, like Gonzalo, establish the ideal commonwealth "To excel the Golden Age" (2.1.162). His holy book is a bottle of wine (2.2.132-133), and in a moment of insight that recalls Bottom's revelation at the end of *Dream*, Caliban says of Stephano (5.1.298-299): "What a thrice-double ass / Was I to take this drunkard for a god, / And worship this dull fool!" A sovereign monarch is attractive, but only if the ruler is worthy. Like Prospero, the monarch must voluntarily limit his or her power and recognize, as in the epilogue, the ruler's dependence on the ruled. Like Ariel, Prospero asks,

> But release me from my bands
> With the help of your good hands.
> Gentle breath of yours, my sails
> Must fill, or else my project fails,
> Which was to please. Now I want
> Spirits to enforce, art to enchant,
> And my ending is despair,
> Unless I be relieved by prayer
> Which pierces so that it assaults
> Mercy itself, and frees all faults.
> As you from crimes would pardoned be,
> Let your indulgence set me free.

Others have noted the Catholic theological elements in this passage (*e.g.*, intercessory prayer, "indulgence"). It is a remarkable religious synthesis, but its most audacious implication is that we, the audience, may occupy the sacerdotal office, becoming in a ritual sense the god of the theater, the god of Prospero and the actor playing Prospero, the god of Shakespeare. And we should be benevolent magicians, using our divine powers mercifully, remembering that we, too, like the theater stage, "are such stuff / As dreams are made on" (4.1.156-157)

**The Book of Mormon (Musical)**

If Shakespeare's art bears witness to a changed understanding of law and a new doctrine of sovereignty – that the sovereign does not simply enforce and clarify a law received from heaven or tradition but rather, in the image of the divine Sovereign, *creates* law, *The Book of Mormon* musical (Parker, Lopez, & Stone, 2011) perhaps expresses the contemporary universalization of this new understanding of sovereignty in the religious sphere, an understanding implicit in Shakespeare's parody religions in *Dream* and *The Tempest*: religion itself, the very core mythopoeic expression of a people's norms and ideals, may be intentionally created, not merely within the storyworld of a play, but even as a legitimate symbolic order of existence for life in the world.

Structurally, the musical *The Book of Mormon* contains the narrative of the founding of a fictional religion ("The Book of Arnold") within a parodied portrayal of the practice and founding or invention of a real-world religion based on a purported historical book (the *Book of Mormon*) that many consider fictional. Interestingly, it makes a variety of claims consistent with the arguments made in this appendix.[9] Consistent with the argument made in "Part Two," sovereignty is not only universalized, as suggested above, it is, as in *The Tempest* and the carnivalesque *Dream*, modified and questioned. The often-toxic, masculine, sovereign subjectivity cultivated by many hero narratives – including, one might argue,

[9] For some general background, see Scott (July 2011), Sebesta (March 2012), and Sheppard (June 2013).

some hagiographies of Joseph Smith and Brigham Young – is subverted in *The Book of Mormon*. Though Elder Price is marked by the narrative and explicitly identifies himself as the Christ figure and future Mormon Prophet, it is Elder Cunningham, not Elder Price, who founds a new, fiction-based religion in this *Acts*-like tale of its creation and spread.

The tale-within-a-tale structure, as we have discussed above relative to comedies like Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, allows the sort of metareflection on the creative act that promotes analysis, detachment, and skepticism. Within the musical play, *The Book of Mormon* makes an argument about how religions are constructed through imaginative synthesis of cultural elements drawn from an ambient milieu of narratives in response to situational provocations. Not only does it attempt to inject itself into the boundary dispute about what religion is, but it also attempts to present a theory of what religion should be. It argues that religion should be reformed and re-created in the service of the people who use it and in response to their environmental realities. And it criticizes such serious contemporary problems, hardly unique to Mormons, as dogmatic arrogance, self-deception regarding human sexuality, racist supremacy and cultural appropriation, colonialism and narcissism in missionary activity, and anxieties of performing masculinity.

To interpret the function of such serious parody, one may take up Taussig's (1999) logic of defacement, whereby desecration or defacement may be a form of reenchantment in a secular world. William James famously asserts that religion, above all, must be serious and solemn (pp. 38-39, 48), and Tolkien (1988, pp. 10-11; see also, Saroglou, January 12, 2002 and January 1, 2003) similarly claims,

> Faerie itself may perhaps most nearly be translated by Magic—but it is magic of a peculiar mood and power, at the furthest pole from the vulgar devices of the laborious, scientific, magician. There is one proviso: if there is any satire present in the tale, one thing must not be made fun of, the magic itself. That must in that story be taken seriously, neither laughed at nor explained away.

But what, then, is one to think of parody and satire religions that appear to mock, deface, or subvert the certainty of others' ultimate concerns, highest values, and most sacred narratives? Of tricksters and sacred clowns? Of topsy-turvy festivals? From the composition of *Sefer Toledot Yeshu* to the mockeries of Ayn Rand's Objectivist works to the religious parodies of Mark Twain, Terry Pratchett, and *South Park*, there are numerous examples, ancient and modern, of parodies of venerated narratives. Do not such subversions actually charge their objects of critique with augmented but modified significance and power? They encourage critical thought, but they acknowledge – even insist on – the importance of the claims of the narrative world. Shakespeare seems to suggest that the stage is a special, liminal space where norms may be inverted and the powerful critiqued, and he, in the guise of Prospero, amplifies the sovereign enchantment of the playwright while critiquing a hubristic, unlimited sovereignty. Since *The Tempest* was composed in a period in which magic, science, and religion were still being distinguished from each other, this critique has interesting implications for contemporary discussions regarding the limits of technoscience and biopolitics.

Venerated narratives, even those that are not considered religious, are intensely religion-like due to their political power inspire parody, and parody is a key sign of power and political significance. It is noteworthy that ideologies as robust as the religion of love and the religion of sovereignty called forth Shakespeare's dramatic critique. Such critiques,

again, need not be considered insulting. Instead, they call for people to remain humbly open to the complexities, uncertainties, and contradictions of life.

**An Excursus: Latin Elegist as Magician-Priest**

The Latin erotic elegist is a man possessed by immortal deities, moved to speak by the Muses and driven mad by Love. If the courtly religion of love finds its origin here, it finds it in what was already a parody or fictional magico-religious complex. As a priest (*cf.* Tibullus 1.4.61-66; Propertius 3.2.15; 3.24.4), the elegist can invoke the powers of heaven, but, being an elegist, he is free of and often opposed to social constraints and can also, if he so chooses, take on the mantle of the magician and bend supernatural forces to his will. By his love magic, he would curse his beloved with the madness of love, binding her to himself and – a happy curse – even making her immortal. If she would be his, he can foretell idyllic bliss; if not, he can propound oracular curses of apocalyptic doom.

The magician and the priest are identical in that, in ritual settings, the priest *is* the god and, in ancient magic, the magician also might be, be in unity with, or possess a god. Ovid recognizes that, in a sense, the poets beget the gods (*P.* 4.8.57-64.); indeed, the elegists effect the apotheoses of friends, lovers, emperors,[11] and even strands of hair (Catullus 66). If god is begotten of god, then might not the poet, the begetter of gods, claim to be one himself?[12] In short, yes. In *The Tempest*, Miranda is deified as the daughter of divine Prospero (*cf.* 1.2.390-391) and in Ferdinand's (1.2.423-424; 3.1.46-48) eyes of love.

At 1.4.73 Tibullus expresses the conviction that the god impelled him to speak: *haec mihi, quae canerem Titio, deus edidit ore*. This claim that gods speak through the poets is not unusual. Invocation of the Muses is pious and proper. But consider the case of Propertius. In Propertius 2.30, he imagines himself (*demens*—more on this notion below) attempting to flee the god *Amor*. He is caught and bound, now a willing servant of the gods. Their possession of him leads to Cynthia's apotheosis (Nethercut, 1971, p. 415):

> 2.30 sees Cynthia accepted among the Muses as Propertius' special inspiration [....] With Propertius' rejection of Apollo thus fresh in our minds, we find him paying only passing service to the god's temple in 2.31. For Propertius, the important religious participation has already taken place in 2.30.

Though the lover was mad when he fled Love, his having been captured and possessed by Love does not portend the onset of sober reason—in fact, just the opposite. This parody or blasphemy religion, in which the beloved is adored to the neglect of Apollo, is insane. Yet, the insane were thought to have privileged access to supernatural realities. Cairns (1974, p. 104) observes, "[I]n 3.24 when Propertius has declared himself free of love, it is to *Mens bona* (line 19) that he dedicates himself. Thus also he shows that he now considers his former state, which he claims a *Thessala saga* was employed to cure, was a mental disorder." He states that he was cured by a *Thessala saga*, Thessaly being the land of witches.[13] In Propertius 1.1, we find a particularly vivid example of madness brought about

---

[11] *E.g.*, Propertius' equation of Apollo and Augustus in 4.6; as Nethercut (1971, p. 194) observes, Propertius Callimachus' hymn in doing this. See also, *e.g.*, Ovid *P.* 4.9.127 *ff.*

[12] *Cf.* Ovid *P.* 4.2.25. But contrast Catullus 68a.141, which says that men should not be compared with gods, with the notion, never realized, that he could be better off than Jupiter in the eyes of a faithful lover (70; 72).

[13] Cairns (1974, p. 106) provides further insight into Propertius' treatment, drawing on Celsus' remedies for madness: "The three remedies mentioned by Propertius can all be illustrated from Celsus as remedies for madness [....] Foreign travel is also referred to by Celsus as a remedy for madness as well as being a standard remedy for love."

by love magic and possession by Love. Disorders or unusual states of the mind were thought to be caused by the influence of spirits, including the drunkenness of Dionysus, the poetic inspiration of the Muses, and even the spirit of lust or good conscience (*cf.*, Caliban's response to alcohol and, *e.g.*, *The Tempest*, 4.1.27-28; 2.1.270-273). However, just as spirits could be both benevolent and malevolent, so too a mind influenced by the spirits could be regarded as having been graced with divine favor or as having been assaulted by an evil being. Any kind of possession would produce atypical behavior in a person. When Propertius portrays himself as being caught up in the spirit of Love, he may call it madness, but he, being as it were inside the madness, nonetheless delights in it.

Tibullus 2.5.1 *ff.* is a good example of the elegist in his role as priest of Apollo and the Muses. He explicitly prays the god to inspire his art, to come upon him and guide his actions. The prayers of the poet-priest are accompanied by ritual actions. Burriss (1930, p. 106) summarizes the ritual described in Ovid's prayer found in *Fasti* 4.747-776 in the following way: "The words of the prayer are to be uttered three times while the worshipper, facing the East, washes his hands in a running stream." Prayers are common in the elegists. One of the primary things to observe about ancient prayer is that one could supplicate the gods for both good (Catullus 35.21-24; 76.17-26 (freedom from the sickness of love); 109; Tibullus 2.1.17-20; Propertius 4.4; Ovid *Fasti* 1.287-288; 2.451-452; 2.525-526; 4.747-776) and *evil* (Catullus 28.14-15; Tibullus 1.9.49-50; Propertius 3.8.13-14), rendering somewhat anachronistic the Renaissance distinction between *magia* or theurgy and *goēteia* (see Frank Kermode's argument in his edition of *The Tempest* (Shakespeare, 1958)) – *goēteia* being thought to be "witchcraft" involving *maleficium*.

If prayers could request both good and bad things and the classical cosmos was not divided, like the Christian, into clearly angelic and demonic supernatural realms, what was the distinction between ancient priests and magicians? Primarily, the description had to do, not with certain practices, but with the speaker's approval or disapproval of the person being labeled. The words for "priest" carried positive associations, while a miasma of potent semantic stigmas surrounded witches and magicians; as in Durkheim (1995), the priest has official or communal sanction, whereas the magician or witch has not yet achieved that and works outside the accepted order. However, elegy blurs this distinction and subverts accepted assumptions by connecting the witch to positive words, ideas, and rituals. For example, Cairns (1974, p. 99) notes: "The appeal [to the witches] is couched in terms of a prayer formula: it begins with the *at precantis* (line 19) and is divided into three typical clauses of such a formula." To supplicate the witches with a prayer formula is to acknowledge them as priestess-like representatives or embodiments of the divine. In his prayer to the witches in 1.1.20, Propertius connects the words *sacra* and *piare* with them. Of these words, Cairns (1974, p. 101) states, "The words *piare*[14] and *sacra* do occur once in Roman elegy in a context of purification [he cites Ovid, *Heroides* 19.193-4]." Likewise, O'Neill (1998, p. 74) provides evidence that "the *sacra* of [Propertius] 4.6 are not too different from magic rites performed elsewhere" in elegy (*cf.* Prop. 3.3.51-52), and Sandbach (1938, pp. 211-212) discusses the expression, which refers to the "unofficial practitioners who undertook the expiation of supposed offenses against religion," and he concludes "that *sacra piare* has the same meaning as *sacrum expiare* in Cicero, namely to expiate religious offense." While the application of the expression to witches is somewhat unorthodox, in that it does not fit the literary stereotype of witches, it probably does reflect

[14] When applied to madmen, Sandbach observes that *piare* means "make sane" (211).

the sentiments of ordinary people who turned to witches, like priests, for good and for evil. "Now one would expect that the superstitious persons who resorted to witches would employ them not only for the 'offensive' magic of love-philtres, destruction of neighbours' crops, etc., but also for the 'defensive' magic of *piatio*" (Sandbach, 1938, p. 212). Again, distinctions between offensive and defensive magic are highly artificial and polemical. Witches, like priests, satisfied desires for purification, absolution, and forgiveness and appealed to many of the same beliefs and practices.

The elegists use magic (*cf.* Tib. 1.2.41-64; Prop. 1.1.19-24, 2.1.47-56, 3.3.47-50; Ovid *Ars*. 2.327-30)[15] and generally seem proud of their powers. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that, in Propertius 4.5, the lover's "moral outrage at Acanthis' use of magic proves to be a sham" (O'Neill, 1998, p. 52). Who is Acanthis? O'Neill (1998) argues that a variety of notions are at play in this elegy. The acanthis is both a bird (*cf.* Ovid *Am*. 1.8.13-15)—birds having a long magical association with witches (Ovid *Fasti* 6.139-143) and magicians—and a bush (O'Neill, 1998, pp. 52-53). However, O'Neill concurs with Myers, who "argues persuasively that the *lena*'s role as erotic expert reveals her to be an alter-ego to elegy's first-person narrator" (O'Neill, 1998, p. 51). Propertius subverts all the negative associations he creates for the *lena*. For example, her cursed grave turns out to be a funeral monument (O'Neill, 1998, p. 60). More importantly, while the lover accuses the *lena* of evil magic, O'Neill (1998, pp. 66, 67) observes that it is he, not the *lena*,

> who cuts the throat of a dove, and then describes the death of Acanthis, spitting up blood (4.5.65-70) [....] These lines have usually been interpreted as a description of the lover's thank-offering to Venus for the death of Acanthis, followed by a description of that death. Yet it has also been suggested that Acanthis dies in answer to the lover's prayers [....] Although the sacrifice of the doves functions as a thank-offering, it is also colored by the suggestion that the lover is indulging in his own brand of sympathetic magic.

The death of the bird causes the death of the *lena*. This is an interesting blending of licit, priestly ritual and "offensive" magic. Note that the *lena* is, in this case, magically associated with a new bird, the dove. Not only does the lover perform a magic ritual to kill the *lena*, but the language[16] of the poem itself seems to be modeled after magical texts, perhaps one in particular[17]. On the subject of language, one might further observe that the confusion of tenses, or, rather, a different use of tenses, is present in magical and prophetic texts. O'Neill (1998, pp. 68, 69, 77) states,

---

[15] Likewise, "in 2.28, the Propertian lover employs a *carmen magicum* (35) and a *carmen sacrum* to Jupiter (43) to save Cynthia from illness" (O'Neill, 1998, p. 67, n. 63).

[16] Both poets and magicians believe, albeit in different ways, in the power of word and sound. As O'Neill (1998, p. 71, n. 80) states, "Alliteration and assonance of te-, tu-, ti- and to- in these four lines may reflect a debt to incantatory language. See Sharrock (1994: 68-69); McClure (1997: 134-135)." And O'Neill (1998, p. 71, n. 81) similarly notes, "Morgan (1977: 60) observes that the grave, thirst and lack of peace for the dead recur at the end of the poem (4.5.75-78). Curse repetition is typical of magic spells."

[17] "In describing the various ways that erotic spells aimed to torture the victim, Faraone quotes an erotic spell which has several striking similarities with the lover's curses (PGM XXXVI.147-154) [....] [T]he combination of these rare torments, thorns and coarse blankets, raises the intriguing possibility that Propertius may have had access to a version of this particular spell. We may note in passing that the word for thirsty in the Greek spell is [*dipsosan*]. The inspiration for the names Acanthis and Dipsas (*Am.* 1.8) has received considerable attention, and it has been suggested that both names go back to a common source. This spell provides another possible common source " (O'Neill, 1998, p. 71).

The shift from present to past tense may actually reflect the influence of magic on 4.5. Such shifts in tenses are found in the magical papyri [....] When the lover declares, *vidi ego*, we may see these words as equivalent to the performative aorist and deictic language of magic ritual. His words echo an imaginative or ritual attempt to effect a successful outcome for a sympathetic magic rite [....] The use of performative utterance in magic ritual explains the mix of tenses in 4.5, and allows us to think of Acanthis as the living object of the lover's vicious fantasy

The lover can be seen throughout the elegy to be working dark magic and to be lying about the true character of the *lena*[18]. She is not a witch. But Propertius goes further. By a clever use of another poem, he transfigures the *lena* into the goddess Calliope, as O'Neill (1998, p. 63) demonstrates:

> These lines [3.3.47-50] have significant verbal and thematic similarities with 4.5. Calliope tells the poet he must sing of the *exclusus amator*; Acanthis advises her young listener to keep the poet outside her door (47-48, 53-58). Calliope tells the poet to sing of drunken nights (*ebria*); Acanthus urges the woman to get drunk and join in the lover's songs (*ebria*, 45-46). Calliope tells the poet to teach men to trick their girls' husbands (*austeros...ferire viros*); Acanthus is accused of having the power to corrupt the quintessential wife, Penelope (7-8), blinding husbands (*intentos...maritos*, 15) and teaching girls to employ trickery (*ferit astutos...Getas*, 44). Finally, Calliope says that the lover will teach men to charm forth their girls with magic (*excantare*, 49); Acanthus is accused of using witchcraft against the lover (5-20).

O'Neill goes further. Propertius does not limit his spell-casting to 4.5; rather, magic is ubiquitous. He (O'Neill, 1998, pp. 70, 71) suggests that the poet's summoning, as it were, of the shades of the dead in his poetry is a utilization of necromantic technique:

> It is also interesting that magic spells are frequently[19] associated with those who have suffered an untimely or violent death [....] Book IV is full of characters who meet an untimely or violent end: Tarpeia, Cleopatra, Antony, Cynthia, Cornelia, and the enemy chiefs in 4.10. The lover in Book IV is surrounded by the untimely and violent dead.

As with the Propertius' ability to revel in illicit union and yet invoke the venerable languages of marriage and male social contracts, he is able to shift between the spheres of accepted and outlaw magic. This behavior is not unique to him. Propertius makes the *lena* a goddess; Tibullus 2.4.55 *ff.* connects the goddess Venus to two of the greatest witches, Circe and Medea.

---

[18] Even this is magic. Compare the passage to a spell discussed by Winkler (quoted. in O'Neill, 1998, p. 70), who states,

> The conceptual or imaginative source of the witch fantasy in men's erotic rituals is revealed in a poetic *diabole* at [PGM] IV 2574-601, where the agent accuses his victim of distinctly witchy behavior [....] Yet no secret is made to us of the fact that this is a lie, deliberately concocted as a strategy to discredit the victim and the enlist the goddess' dread powers on the side of the lover. Further the lie is a version of the lover's own truth, for the macabre handling of charnel material that regularly features in witch fantasies is all of a piece with" the erotic rituals designed to compel someone by torment to go to the agent of the spell.

[19] O'Neill (1998, p. 70, n. 79) cites the following spells: "PGM IV.335-345; IV.1390-1495; XIXa15-16 [sic]; XIXb.5-6; XXXVI.361-371" and various secondary sources.

Whether one agrees with the suggestion above that Propertius uses necromancy or not, the goal of all magic in elegy is clear: this is love magic. The goal of love magic was to bind another's life to one's own (*cf.* Tibullus 1.5.9 *ff.*; 1.8.5 *ff.*; 2.2.17 *ff.*). For an example of this, consider Burman's (1972, p. 174) comments on *Amores* 2.13:

> In [the elegy], Ovid prays for Corinna's life, which is endangered owing to a self-inflicted abortion. After stating the situation (1-6) and calling on certain Egyptian deities (7-14), he attempts to strengthen his case *by linking his own life with that of his mistress* (15-18) [....] These lines contain some very clear references to Prop. 2.28b.41-46.

In the Propertius passage, note the words *vivam, si vivet*; similarly, "Sharrock also interprets Cynthia's capture of the lover with her eyes (1.1.1) as a binding spell" (O'Neill, 1998, p. 65, n. 58). After the desired binding is accomplished, the poet's divine nature can be shared with his beloved Miller (1983, p. 292) states, "After Propertius 3.1 declares his impressive status as a poet and his resultant immortality, he turns in the second poem to the power of his elegy to win the beloved and to win immortality for her." Ovid, like an Egyptian priest or magician breathing life into a statue to animate or activate it, performs the magic of breathing his own life into his poetry, so that he may be immortal (*Met*. 15.871-879).

One of the primary deities with whom elegists think of themselves as being united is Apollo (*cf.* Tibullus 2.5.11), the god of prophecy. This lends additional strength to their curses, for they could be prophecies (Tibullus 2.5.51 *ff.*). Propertius speaks of a potentially universal apotheosis and of a Golden Age (Nethercut, 1971, p. 413):

> [I]f men could know the joys he experienced upon his reunion with Cynthia, anyone could be a god (2.15.40) and there would be a Golden Age in which no iron (*ferrum crudele*, 43) would exist, nor would any ship of war (*bellica nauis*, 43) cross the sea.

Weapons and ships represent, not only war, but also a technological departure from nature and a physical departure from one's native land. He promises a return to Paradise, when lovers were as gods and lived in idyllic bliss with their beloveds.

Such union, of course, signals the end of elegy, for the entire art is dependent on the passion arising from separation and on the magic of that passion.

Because the magician-priest elegist can be identified as a kind of deity, a solution can be proposed to Musurillo's (1970, p. 396) question: "[W]ho is the *ignotus amator* [of Tibullus 1.5]?" Musurillo (1970, p. 396) admits that one of the possibilities would be that the figure is "the god himself, *furtivus Amor*" but that, given certain humble, human traits, "Whoever he is, he is human and not divine." For this reason, Musurillo concludes that the figure must be Tibullus himself. Both answers are correct. The poet is the god. Given the poet's role as an "enthusiastic" magician-priest, one might call into question Sandbach's (1938, p. 214) statement concerning Propertius 3.1.1-4:

> He is making a claim to be on the same footing as [Callimachus and Philitas] are. If he does not enter the grove as a worshipper the only alternative is that he enters as an object of cult along with his two Alexandrian masters. Conceited though he may have been, he is hardly likely to have claimed, while still living, honours such as were paid only to the dead.

That Propertius would have no trouble thinking of himself in such a way and claiming for himself such lofty honors is supported by Marquis's (1974, p. 500) concluding observation in his discussion of Propertius 4.2,

Finally, it is difficult to shake the conviction that the god [Vertumnus], in some mystical manner, represents the poet as well. They are in fact very similar: both are naturalized Romans, both have Etrusco-Umbrian affinities, and both are intensely proud of their adoptive homeland. What caps the identification is the seeming pun on his own name which Propertius makes at l. 59: '*properanti falce dolatus*.'

The "mystical manner" by which a Latin erotic elegist may become a god is through the mediation of his role as magician/priest.

## Works Cited


Adelman, J. (1992). *Suffocating mothers: Fantasies of maternal origin in Shakespeare's plays, Hamlet to the Tempest*. New York: Routledge.

Bakhtin, M. M. (1984a). *Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics*. (C. Emerson, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Bakhtin, M. M. (1984b). *Rabelais and his world*. (H. Iswolsky, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Beauregard, D. N. (1997). New light on Shakespeare's Catholicism: Prospero's epilogue in The tempest. *Renascence*, 49(3), 159-174.

Benjamin, W. (1986). Critique of Violence. *Reflections: Essays, aphorisms, autobiographical writing*. (P. Demetz, Trans.). New York: Schocken Books. 277-300.

Bernthal, C. (2003). *The trial of man: Christianity and judgment in the world of Shakespeare*. Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books.

Bevington, D. (2015). The debate about Shakespeare and religion. In D. Loewenstein & M. Witmore (Eds.), *Shakespeare and early modern religion*. New York : Cambridge University Press.

Birch, W. J. (1848). *An inquiry into the philosophy and religion of Shakspere*. London: C. Mitchell.

Bowden, H. S. (1899). *The religion of Shakespeare*. London; New York: Burns & Oates.

Bowman, M., & Valk, U. (2012). *Vernacular religion in everyday life: Expressions of belief*. London; Oakville, CT: Equinox Pub.

Bouchard, L. D. (2011). *Theater and integrity: emptying selves in drama, ethics, and religion*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

Boyarin, D. (2004). *Border lines: The partition of Judaeo-Christianity*. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Burman, K. (Jul., 1972). Some Propertian imitations in Ovid's Amores. *Classical philology*, 67(3), 170-177.

Burriss, E. E. (Feb. 3, 1930). Objects of a Roman's prayers. *The classical weekly*, 23(14), 105-109.

Cairns, F. (May, 1974). Some observations on Propertius 1.1. *The classical quarterly*, 24(1), 94-110.

Campbell, J. (1968). *The hero with a thousand faces*. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.

Carlyle, T. (1840). *On Heroes, hero-worship and the heroic in history*. London: Chapman and Hall.

Carlson, T. A. (2008). *The indiscrete image: Infinitude & creation of the human*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
Caroti, S. (2009). Science fiction, Forbidden planet, and Shakespeare's The tempest. In A. C. Y. Huang, & C. S. Ross (Eds.), *Shakespeare in Hollywood, Asia, and cyberspace*. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press.
Carter, T. (1897). *Shakespeare, Puritan and recusant*. London: Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier.
Deloria, V. (1969). *Custer died for your sins: An Indian manifesto*. New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Company.
Diala, I. (2012). (De)stabilising the European classic: Sycorax , Esiaba Irobi's The tempest. *Iseasosa Shakespeare in Southern Africa*, *24*, 25–43.
Durkheim, E. (1995). *The elementary forms of religious life*. (K. E. Fields, Trans.). New York: Free Press.
Faraone, C. A. (1999). *Ancient Greek love magic*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Fleming, E. M. (1965). The American image as Indian princess 1765-1783. *Winterthur Portfolio Winterthur Portfolio*, *2*, 65–81.
Fredrickson, N. (in press). Designing a course integrating critical pedagogy, fantasy literature, and religious studies. In M. A. Fabrizi (Ed.), *Fantasy literature: Challenging genres*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Frey, C. (1999). Tempest and the new world. In S. Orgel & S. Keilen (Eds.), *Shakespeare and the literary tradition*. New York: Garland Pub.
Gill, S. D. (1987). *Mother Earth: an American story*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gillies, J. (2000). The figure of the New World in The tempest. In P. Hulme & W. H. Sherman (Eds.), *"The tempest" and its travels*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Griffin, D. H. (1994). *Satire: A critical reintroduction*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky.
Hall, G. R. W. (1999). *The tempest as mystery play: Uncovering religious sources of Shakespeare's most spiritual work*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co.
Hamilton, D. B. (2000). Re-engineering Virgil: The tempest and the printed English Aeneid. In P. Hulme & W. H. Sherman (Eds.), *"The tempest" and its travels*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Harrision, H. (1980). A fragment of manuscript. In I. Asimov, M. H. Greenberg & J. D. Olander (Eds.), *Microcosmic tales: 100 wondrous science fiction short-short stories*. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co.
Hassel, R. C. (1980). *Faith and folly in Shakespeare's romantic comedies*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Hughes, T. (1992). *Shakespeare and the goddess of complete being*. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.
James, W. (1936). *The varieties of religious experience: a study in human nature*. New York: Modern Library.
Jeffery, T. (2007). Islands, wizards, monsters and masks: intertextual relationships between Shakespeare's "The tempest" and David Lambkin's "Night jasmine man." *Shakespeare in Southern Africa*, *19*(7), 37–48.

Jewett, R., & Lawrence, J. S. (1977). *The American monomyth*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press.
Jones, T. O. (1995). *Renaissance magic and hermeticism in the Shakespeare sonnets: Like prayers divine*. Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press.
Joughin, J. J. (2005). Bottom's secret. In E. Fernie (Ed.), *Spiritual Shakespeares*. London; New York: Routledge.
Kaufmann, W. A. (1960). *From Shakespeare to existentialism*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
Kelleghan, F. (2002). *Classics of science fiction and fantasy literature*. Pasadena, Calif.: Salem Press.
Kierkegaard, S. (1968). *The concept of irony: With constant reference to Socrates*. (L. M. Capel, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Knight, G. W. (1967). *Shakespeare and religion: Essays of forty years*. London: Routledge & K. Paul.
Levin, R. (1996). Flower maidens, wise women, witches and the gendering of knowledge in English renaissance drama. In W. R. Elton, J. M. Mucciolo, S. J. Doloff, & E. A. Rauchut (Eds.), *Shakespeare's universe: Renaissance ideas and conventions: Essays in honour of W.R. Elton*. Brookfield, VT: Scholar Press.
Lewis, C. S. (1936). *The allegory of love: A study in medieval tradition*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
Lewis, C. S. (1954). *English literature in the sixteenth century, excluding drama*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lincoln, B. (1989). *Discourse and the construction of society: Comparative studies of myth, ritual, and classification*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mannoni, O. (1950). *Psychologie de la colonisation.* Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Marquis, E. C. (1974). Vertumnus in Propertius 4.2. *Hermes*, 102(3), 491-500.
Mayer, J.-C. (2007). *Shakespeare's hybrid faith: History, religion, and the stage*. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mebane, J. S. (1989). *Renaissance magic and the return of the Golden Age: The occult tradition and Marlowe, Jonson, and Shakespeare*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Mignolo, W. (2000). *Local histories/global designs: Coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Miller, J. F. (1983). Propertius 3.2 and Horace. *Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-)*, 113, 289-299.
Mowat, B. A. (2000). 'Knowing I loved my books': Reading The tempest intertextually. In P. Hulme & W. H. Sherman (Eds.), *"The tempest" and its travels*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Musurillo, H. (1970). Furtivus amor: The structure of Tibullus 1.5. *Transactions and proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 101, 387-399.
Nethercut, W. R. (1971). Propertius 3.11. *Transactions and proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 102, 411-443.
O'Neill, K. (Oct.-Nov., 1998). Symbolism and sympathetic magic in Propertius 4.5. *The classical journal*, 94(1), 49-80.
Parker, T., Lopez, R., & Stone, M. (2011). *The book of Mormon.* New York: Newmarket Press.

Patterson, O. (1982). *Slavery and social death: A comparative study*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Pigafetta, A. (1995). *The first voyage around the world (1519-1522): an account of Magellan's expedition*. (T. J. Cachey, Trans.). New York: Marsilio Publishers.
Pillinger, H. E. (1969). Some Callimachean influences on Propertius, book 4. *Harvard studies in classical philology*, 73, 171-199.
Retamar, R. F. (1997). Caliban: A question. In I. Stavans (Ed.), *The Oxford book of Latin American essays*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Richmond, V. B. (2000). *Shakespeare, Catholicism, and romance*. New York: Continuum.
Roach, J. (2000). The enchanted island: Vicarious tourism in restoration adaptations of The tempest. In P. Hulme & W. H. Sherman (Eds.), *"The tempest" and its travels*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Stapleton, M. L. (1996). *Harmful eloquence: Ovid's* Amores *from antiquity to Shakespeare*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Sandbach, F. H. (Dec., 1938). Notes on Propertius. *The classical review*, 52(6), 211-215.
Santayana, G. (1957). The absence of religion in Shakespeare. *Interpretations of poetry and religion.* New York: Harper.
Saroglou, V. (January 1, 2003). Humor appreciation as function of religious dimensions. *Archive for the psychology of religion*, 24(1), 144–153.
Saroglou, V. (January 12, 2002). Religion and sense of humor: An a priori incompatibility? Theoretical considerations from a psychological perspective. *Humor: International journal of humor research*, 15(2).
Scott, D. W. (July 2011). Religiosity in South park: Struggles over institutional and personal piety among residents of a 'redneck town. *Journal of Media & Religion*, 10(3), 152–163.
Scott, J. C. (1992). *Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sebesta, J. (March 2012). The book of Mormon. *Theatre Journal*, 64(1), 99–101.
Shakespeare, W. (1958). F. Kermode (Ed.), *The tempest.* London: Methuen.
Shell, A. (2015). Delusion in a Midsummer night's dream. In D. Loewenstein & M. Witmore (Eds.), *Shakespeare and early modern religion*. New York : Cambridge University Press.
Sheppard, C. (June 2013). The book of Mormon – musical: By Trey Parker, Robert Lopez, and Matt Stone. *Religious Studies Review*, 39(2), 98–98.
Starks, Lisa S. (2007). Latin love and lovesickness in Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis. In G. Bradshaw, T. G. Bishop, & T. Kishi, *Special section: Updating Shakespeare.* Aldershot: Ashgate.
Suvin, D. (1979). *Metamorphoses of science fiction: On the poetics and history of a literary genre*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Szakolczai, A. (2007). Image-magic in A midsummer night's dream: Power and modernity from Weber to Shakespeare. *History of the Human Sciences*, *20*(4), 1–26.
Taussig, M. (1999). *Defacement: Public secrecy and the labor of the negative*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Taves A. (2015). Reverse engineering complex cultural concepts: Identifying building blocks of "religion." *Journal of Cognition and Culture*, *15*(1-2), 191–216.

Taylor, D. (1958). Carib, Caliban, cannibal. *International Journal of American Linguistics*, *24*(2), 156–157.
Taylor, D. (2003). *The archive and the repertoire: Performing cultural memory in the Americas*. Durham: Duke University Press Books.
Tolkien, J. R. R. (1988). *Tree and leaf: Including the poem Mythopoeia*. London: Unwin Hyman.
Vaughan, A. T., & Vaughan, V. M. (1991). *Shakespeare's Caliban: a cultural history*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Vaughan, A. T. (2000). Trinculo's Indian: American natives in Shakespeare's England. In P. Hulme & W. H. Sherman (Eds.), *"The tempest" and its travels*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Vlasopolos, A. (1978). The ritual of midsummer: A pattern for A midsummer night's dream. *Renaissance quarterly*, *31*(1), 21–29.
Warner, Marina. (2000). 'The foul witch' and her 'freckled whelp': Circean mutations in the New World. In P. Hulme & W. H. Sherman (Eds.), *"The tempest" and its travels*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Warner, M. (2003). *Signs & wonders: essays on literature & culture*. London: Chatto & Windus.
Wilson, R. (2004). *Secret Shakespeare: Studies in theatre, religion and resistance*. New York: Manchester University Press.
Yates, F. (1964). *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*. London: Routledge.
Yates, F. (1972). *The Rosicrucian Enlightenment*. London: Routledge.
Yates, F. A. (1975). *Shakespeare's last plays: a new approach*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Yates, F. (1979). *The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age*. London: Routledge.

# Appendix 21: Bibliography of Humor, Satire, and Parody Religion Literature


Adams, Doug. "Humor in the American Pulpit: From George Whitefield through Henry Ward Beecher." Sharing Co., 1976.

Al-Raheb, Hani. "Religious Satire in Rushdie's Satanic Verses." *JFA Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts* 6, no. 4 [24] (1995): 330–39.

Anselment, Raymond A. *"Betwixt Jest and Earnest": Marprelate, Milton, Marvell, Swift & the Decorum of Religious Ridicule*. Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1979.

Athans, Philip. *How to Start Your Own Religion: Form a Church, Gain Followers, Become Tax-exempt, and Sway the Minds of Millions in Five Easy Steps*. Avon, MA: Adams Media, 2012.

Bugbee, John Stephen. "God's Patients: Suffering and the Divine in the 'Canterbury Tales'." Ph.D., University of Virginia, 2008.

Bingham, Shawn Chandler, and Alexander A. Hernandez. "'Laughing Matters': The Comedian as Social Observer, Teacher, and Conduit of the Sociological Perspective." *Teaching Sociology* 37, no. 4 (October 1, 2009): 335–352.

Bruna, Katherine Richardson. "Addicted to Democracy: 'South Park' and the Salutary Effects of Agitation (Reflections of a Ranting and Raving 'South Park' Junkie)." *Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy* 47, no. 8 (May 1, 2004): 692–697.

Bryant, John. "Poe's Ape of UnReason: Humor, Ritual, and Culture." *NCF Nineteenth-Century Literature* 51, no. 1 (1996): 16–52.

Bryant, Mark. "Lutheran Lampoons." *History Today* 60, no. 3 (March 2010): 44–45.

Capps, Donald. "Religion and Humor: Estranged Bedfellows." *Pastoral Psychology* 54, no. 5 (May 1, 2006): 413–438.

Casement, William. "Religion, Satire, and Gulliver's Fourth Voyage." *HEI History of European Ideas* 14, no. 4 (1992): 531–44.

Collinson, Patrick. "Ecclestiastical Vitriol: Religious Satire in the 1590s and the Invention of Puritanism" (1995).

Cooper, Joel, Russell H. Fazio, and Frederick Rhodewalt. "Dissonance and Humor: Evidence for the Undifferentiated Nature of Dissonance Arousal." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 36, no. 3 (1978): 280–285.

Crawford, Alison. "'Oh Yeah!': Family Guy as Magical Realism?" *Journal of Film and Video* 61, no. 2 (July 1, 2009): 52–69.

Cusack, Carole M. *Invented Religions: Imagination, Fiction and Faith*. Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010.

Davis, Kathryn Eileen. "Setting a Rival Good to God's: Evelyn Waugh's Satire as Victorian Criticism," 2008.

Davis, Richard Beale. "The Colonial Virginia Satirist: Mid-Eighteenth-Century Commentaries on Politics, Religion, and Society." *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 57, no. 1 (January 1, 1967): 1–74.

Day, Amber. *Satire and Dissent Interventions in Contemporary Political Debate*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.

Epperson, Eric Daniel. "Nothing's Sacred: a Study of Carnival and Satire in European Christian Traditions," 2007.

Feltmate, David. "It's Funny Because It's True? The Simpsons, Satire, and the Significance of Religious Humor in Popular Culture." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 81, no. 1 (March 2013): 222–248.

Finlayson, John. "Chaucer's Summoner's Tale: Flatulence, Blasphemy, and the Emperor's Clothes." *SP Studies in Philology* 104, no. 4 (2007): 455–70.

Foulkes, Simon, and Gary Jenkins. *Laughing at Unbelief: Is There a Place for Satire in Evangelism?* Cambridge: Grove Books, 2004.

Gauna, Max. *Upwellings: First Expressions of Unbelief in the Printed Literature of the French Renaissance*. Rutherford, N.J.; London; Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press ; Associated University Presses, 1992.

Hyers, Conrad. *The Spirituality of Comedy: Comic Heroism in a Tragic World*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007.

"Iran's 'Blasphemous' Play." *Middle East Quarterly* 6, no. 4 (December 1999): 83.

Joeckel, Samuel. "Funny as Hell: Christianity and Humor Reconsidered." *Humor - International Journal of Humor Research* 21, no. 4 (January 2008).

Kantra, Robert A. *All Things Vain: Religious Satirists and Their Art*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1984.

Lindvall, Terry. *Surprised by Laughter: The Comic World of C.S. Lewis*. Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 2012.

Lund, Roger D. *Ridicule, Religion and the Politics of Wit in Augustan England*. Farnham [etc.]: Ashgate, 2012.

Narizny, Laurel. "Ha Ha, Only Serious: A Preliminary Study of Joke Religions." 2009.

Neal, Lynn S. "'They're Freaks!': The Cult Stereotype in Fictional Television Shows, 1958–2008." *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 14, no. 3 (February 1, 2011): 81–107.

Paulson, Ronald. *Hogarth's Harlot: Sacred Parody in Enlightenment England*. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.

Polhemus, Robert M. *Comic Faith: The Great Tradition from Austen to Joyce*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Sands, Kathleen M. "Ifs, Ands, and Butts: Theological Reflections on Humor." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 64, no. 3 (October 1, 1996): 499–523.

Scott, Virgil. "Topical Nonconformist Satire in Restoration Comedy, 1660-1685," 1945.

Shaw, George. *Our Religious Humorists*. London: Published for the Author at the Wesleyan Conference Office.

Spaans, Joke. *Graphic Satire and Religious Change the Dutch Republic, 1676-1707*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2011.

Steadman, John M. "'Teeth Will Be Provided': Satire and Religious or Ecclesiatical Humor." *Thalia Thalia: Studies in Literary Humor* 6, no. 1 (1983): 23–31.

Wagner, Eloise R. "The Mask of the Satirist," 1964.

Wagoner, Walter D. *Bittersweet Grace; a Treasury of Twentieth-century Religious Satire*. Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1967.

Walker, Nancy A. *Feminist Alternatives: Irony and Fantasy in the Contemporary Novel by Women*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1990.

Waters, D. Douglas. *Duessa as Theological Satire*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970.

William, Conrad. "'If Your God Has Really Spoken to You…Then All the World Must Hear It': The Discourses of Revelation and Satire in Salman Rushdie's The Satanic

Verses." *ReconstructionS Reconstruction: Studies in Contemporary Culture* 6, no. 2 (2006): [no pagination].

Wilson, Douglas. *A Serrated Edge: a Brief Defense of Biblical Satire and Trinitarian Skylarking*. Moscow, Idaho: Canon Press, 2003.

**anti-Catholic**

Carter, Michael Steven. "A 'Traiterous Religion': Indulgences and the Anti-Catholic Imagination in Eighteenth-Century New England." *Catholic Historical Review Catholic Historical Review* 99, no. 1 (2013): 52–77.

Murray, Sophie, University of Oxford, Humanities Division, University of Oxford, Faculty of History, and Merton College. "Mockery and Mirth in the Early English Reformation," 2008.

Povoledo, Elisabetta. "Satirical Humor Aimed at the Vatican Strikes a Nerve." *New York Times* 156, no. 53767 (November 18, 2006): A3–A3.

**anti-Puritan**

Holden, William P. "The Religious Controversy and anti-Puritan Satire, 1572-1642." 1948.

**Carroll**

Higbie, Robert. "Lewis Carroll and the Victorian Reaction Against Doubt." *Thalia Thalia: Studies in Literary Humor* 3, no. 1 (1980): 21–28.

Zadworna-Fjellestad, Danuta. "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Gravity's Rainbow: a Study in Duplex Fiction." Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1986.

Whitehead, George. *Bernard Shaw Explained; a Critical Exposition of the Shavian Religion.* Folcroft, Pa.: Folcroft Library Editions, 1972.

**liberal**

Kercher, Stephen E. *Revel with a Cause: Liberal Satire in Postwar America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

**Lovecraft**

Geeraert, Dustin. "Spectres of Darwin: H.P. Lovecraft's Nihilistic Parody of Religion," 2010.

Price, Robert M. *H.P. Lovecraft and the Cthulhu Mythos*. San Bernardino, Calif.: Borgo Press, 1990.

**Milton**

King, John N. *Milton and Religious Controversy: Satire and Polemic in Paradise Lost*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

**Shaw**

Berst, Charles A. *Shaw and Religion*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1981.

Brody, Jean. "A Passion for Perfection: Shaw as Job." Yale University, 1991.

Carpenter, Charles A. "Shaw and Religion/Philosophy: A Working Bibliography." *ShawR Shaw: The Annual of Bernard Shaw Studies* 1 (1981): 225–246.

Corporon, Lewis L. "George Bernard Shaw's Religion as Reflected in Five of His Plays and Prefaces." Kansas State Teachers College, 1939.

De Silva, Claude Ivor. "Bernard Shaw: Iconoclast and Crusader," 1977.

DeVries, Ella Mae Scales. "Thomas Carlyle and Bernard Shaw as Critics of Religion and Society," 1979.

Ellis, Kathleen A. "George Bernard Shaw, the Playwright, as Critic of Organized Religion," 1973.

Fennell, Mary Lu. "George Bernard Shaw and the Protestant Ethic." 1970.

Heretics Society (University of Cambridge). *"The Religion of the Future": Mr. Bernard Shaw on Heresy. [and] Mr. Bernard Shaw as Heretic.* Cambridge, Eng.: Heretics Society], 1911.

Hubenka, Lloyd J. *The Religious Philosophy of Bernard Shaw*, 1966.

Kelley, Heather Anne. "Worldly Mysticism: a Study of Bernard Shaw's Religious Expression in Man and Superman, Major Barbara, Back to Methuselah and Saint Joan," 1982.

Nelson, Raymond S. "Religion and the Plays of Bernard Shaw," 1968.

O'Sullivan, Timothy. "The Religion of Bernard Shaw," 1949.

Smith, Warren Sylvester. *The Religion of Bernard Shaw: At Least Part of Shaw's Effectiveness Derived from His Ability to Sound Disarmingly Orthodox and Shockingly Radical at the Same Time*. Chicago, Ill.: Christian Century Co., 1963.

Smoker, Barbara. “God and GBS.” *Shavian Shavian: The Journal of the Shaw Society* 10, no. 5 (2008): 2–9.

Spector, Ann. “The Religion of George Bernard Shaw,” 1962.

Strahan, Eula Moon. “Shaw’s Religious Statements in Drama: The Stage Is a Pulpit,” 1974.

Sundell, Carl. *Shaw Versus Chesterton: Their Last Public Debate*. Worcester, Mass: Sund Pub., 1994.

**Simpsons**

Lewis, Todd V. “Religious Rhetoric and the Comic Frame in The Simpsons.” *Journal of Media and Religion* 1, no. 3 (2002): 153–165.

**South Park**

Scott, David W. “Religiosity in South Park: Struggles Over Institutional and Personal Piety Among Residents of a ‘Redneck Town’.” *Journal of Media & Religion* 10, no. 3 (July 2011): 152–163.

Sebesta, Judith. “The Book of Mormon.” *Theatre Journal* 64, no. 1 (March 2012): 99–101.

Sheppard, Christian. “The Book of Mormon - Musical. By Trey Parker, Robert Lopez, and Matt Stone.” *Religious Studies Review* 39, no. 2 (June 2013): 98–98.

Winokur, Mark. “Costume Jewry: ‘South Park’s’ Holocaust of the Passion.” *English Language Notes* 44, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 253–257.

**Swift**

Kallich, Martin. *The Other End of the Egg; Religious Satire in Gulliver’s Travels.* Bridgeport, Conn.: Conference on British Studies at the University of Bridgeport, 1970.

Ketcham, Mary Diana. “Twain and Swift: A Comparative Study in Satire,” 1966.

Parker, Todd C. *Swift as Priest and Satirist*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009.

**Tolstoy**

Donnelly, Jerome. “Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilych: Satire, Religion, and the Criticism of Denial.” *Logos Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture* 16, no. 2 (2013): 73–98.

Aldridge, Douglas J. “A House Divided: Adventures of Huckleberry Finn as Religious Satire : a Thesis,” 1988.

Barrett, Lewis S. “A Study of the Treatment of Biblical Religion in The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn,” 1959.

Berkove, Lawrence I, and Joseph Csicsila. *Heretical Fictions: Religion in the Literature of Mark Twain*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2010.

Brahm, Gabriel Noah. “The Jester and the Sage: Twain and Nietzsche.” *NCF Nineteenth-Century Literature* 60, no. 2 (2005): 137–62.

Burns, Rebecca Sue. “Mark Twain and Biblical Fundamentalism after 1880 ...,” 1963.

Bush, Harold K. *Mark Twain and the Spiritual Crisis of His Age*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007.

Caldwell, Kristene Gail. *Mark Twain: anti-Christian Moralist*, 1974.

Capers, Suzana Glass. “Mark Twain’s Loss of Faith: Religion and Technology in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court,” 1994.

Cross, Randy K. “Religious Skepticism in Selected Novels of Mark Twain,” 1984.

Ensor, Allison. *Mark Twain & the Bible*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969.

Flowers, Frank C. “Mark Twain’s Theories of Morality,” 1941.

Fulton, Joe B. *The Reverend Mark Twain: Theological Burlesque, Form, and Content*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006.

Halel, Denise. “Defying Convention: Mark Twain and Religion,” 2001.

Hamann, Erika M. “Religion, Evolution and the Individual Divine: Contexts for Mark Twain’s ‘The Mysterious Stranger’ Manuscripts: A Thesis in English,” 2006.

Harnsberger, Caroline Thomas. *Mark Twain’s Views of Religion.* Evanston, Ill.: Schori Press, 1961.

Hays, John Q, and Rodewald. *Mark Twain and Religion: a Mirror of American Eclecticism*. New York: P. Lang, 1989.

Julier, Ann L. “Mark Twain’s Religious Odyssey,” 1964.

Ketcham, Mary Diana. “Twain and Swift: A Comparative Study in Satire,” 1966.

Maristuen-Rodakowski, Julie. “Mark Twain and Religion,” 1977.

McClay, Adam. “Mark Twain’s Hidden Religion: Evidence and Effects of the Latent Spirituality in Mark Twain’s Works,” 2003.

McDermott, John Francis. *Mark Twain and the Bible*. Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University, 1968.

Miller, Joyce T. “Mark Twain’s View of God in ‘Reflections on Religion’ in Relation to His Former Works.,” 1970.

Mott, Bertram Leroy. “The Residual Calvinism of Mark Twain Its Evidence in His Post-1892 Work.” s.n.], 1968.

Nielsen, Veneta Leatham. *The Savage Prophet, or, Who’s Afraid of Samuel Twain?* S.l.: s.n., 1966.

O’Conner, Michael Levine. “Mark Twain and the Missionary,” 1997.

Perrino, Anthony Friess, and Calif.) Unitarian Society (Santa Barbara. *The Irreverent Faith of Mark Twain: a Sermon*. Santa Barbara, CA: Unitarian Church, 1980.

Pfeiffer, Benjamin. “Religious, Moral, and Social Ideas in the Works of Mark Twain,” 1965.

Phipps, William E. *Mark Twain’s Religion*. Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 2003.

Reimer, Earl. “Mark Twain and the Bible: An Inductive Study,” 1970.

Robinson, Forrest G, Gabriel Brahm, and Catherine Carlstroem. *The Jester and the Sages: Mark Twain in Conversation with Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx*. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2011.

Samat, Anna J. “Mark Twain and Religion.,” 1980.

Schindley, Wanda. “Mark Twain’s Sociology of Religion: a Hermeneutical Analysis of Selected Writings,” 1997.

Shapiro-Zysk, David J, State University College at Buffalo, and Dept. of English. “The Separation of Church and Twain: Deist Philosophy in the Writings of Mark Twain : a Thesis in English,” 2006.

Twain, Mark, and Maxwell David Geismar. *Mark Twain and the Three R’s: Race, Religion, Revolution--and Related Matters.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973.

Vetter, John M. “A Study of Religious Hypocrisy in Selected Writings of Mark Twain.,” 1974.

Ward, Percy. *Mark Twain, the Tragedy of a Humorist: a Lecture*. [Chicago]: T.J. Mead, 1920.

Watkins, E. Maureen. *Mark Twain’s Religion*, 1967.

Weinandy, Thomas G. (Thomas Gerard). “Huckleberry Finn and the Adventures of God.” *Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture* 6, no. 1 (2003): 41–62.

Werge, Thomas. *Images of Eden: The Family as Sacrament and the Pain of Loss in Mark Twain*. [Notre Dame, Ind.]: University of Notre Dame, 1979.

**Vonnegut**

Abadi-Nagy, Zoltan. “‘The Skilful Seducer’: Of Vonnegut’s Brand of Comedy.” *Hungarian Studies in English* 8 (1974): 45–56.

Abádi-Nagy, Zoltán. “An Original Look at ‘Origins’: Bokononism.” *The Origins and Originality of American Culture*. Ed. Frank Tibor. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1984.

Allen, Claire. “Wampeters and Foma? Misreading Religion in Cat’s Cradle and The Book of Dave” (2009).

Baker, Barry Hollis. “The Criticism of Religion in Four Novels by Kurt Vonnegut,” 1999.

Barrett, Geo*ff*. “The Lies That Bind: An Analysis of Bokononism in Vonnegut’s Cat’s Cradle,” 2006.

Bastel, Joan E. *Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s View of Religion as Expressed through His Fiction*, 1977.

Bertram, Ute H. *Die Rolle des Religiösen in den Romanen von Kurt Vonnegut*. Frankfurt [am Main]: R.G. Fischer, 1989.

Crump, G. B. “Magic, Foma, Madness, and Art in the Fiction of Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.” *Pleiades Pleiades* 12, no. 1 (1991): 64–82.

Dye, Scott Allen. “The Concept of Dignity in the Early Science Fiction Novels of Kurt Vonnegut.” M.A., University of North Texas, 2003.

Freese, Peter. “Vonnegut’s Invented Religions as Sense-Making Systems” (1996).

Hardin, Miriam. “Absurd America in the Novels of Vonnegut, Pynchon, and Boyle.” Ph.D., Lehigh University, 2001.

Goldsmith, David H. *Kurt Vonnegut, Fantasist of Fire and Ice*. Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1972.

Grieb, Steven E. *Vonnegut’s Religions: Or Why Vonnegut Means Something and the Rest of This World Doesn’t*. Cedar Rapids, IA: Mount Mercy College, 1993.

Huddleston, Jeffrey R. *Religion and Messiahs in the Works of Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.*, 1976.

May, John R. “Vonnegut’s Humor and the Limits of Hope.” *Twentieth Century Literature* 18, no. 1 (January 1, 1972): 25–36.

Mazow, Lauren A. “Religion in the Contemporary American Novel: a Study of Vonnegut, Bellow, and Morrison,” 1988.

Miller, Gavin. “Literary Narrative as Soteriology in the Work of Kurt Vonnegut and Alasdair Gray.” *Journal of Narrative Theory* 31, no. 3 (October 1, 2001): 299–323.

Nimcz zu Caldaha, Helena Bertram von. *There is no why Religion und Gottesbild im Werk von Kurt Vonnegut anhand ausgewählter Romane*. [Alzenau: Hebe-Verl., 2009.

Sigman, Joseph. “Science and parody in Kurt Vonnegut’s The sirens of Titan.” *Mosaic: Journal for the Comparative Study of Literature and Ideas* 19, no. 1 (1986): 15–32.

Simmons, David. *New Critical Essays on Kurt Vonnegut*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

St. Germain, Amos Joseph. “Religious Interpretation and Contemporary Literature Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Robert Coover and John Barth.” Graduate College, University of Iowa, 1974.

Vasbinder, Sam. “The Meaning of Foma in Cat’s Cradle.” *Riverside Quarterly* 5 (1973): 300–02.

Welsh, Patrice A. “The Interdependence of Theology and Literature as Reflected in the Writings of Paul Tillich and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.,” 1975.

Zins, Daniel L. “Rescuing Science from Technocracy: ‘Cat’s Cradle’ and the Play of Apocalypse (Sauver La Science de La Technocracie: ‘Le Berceau Du Chat’ et Le Jeu de l’Apocalypse).” *Science Fiction Studies* 13, no. 2 (1986): 170–181.

Fritze, Ronald H. *Invented Knowledge False History, Fake Science and Pseudo-religions*. London: Reaktion Books, 2009.

Henderson, Bobby. *The Gospel of the Flying Spaghetti Monster*. New York: Villard Books, 2006.

Kirby, Danielle. *Fantasy and Belief: Alternative Religions, Popular Narratives and Digital Cultures*. Bristol, CT: Acumen Publishing, 2013.

M., R. D. "The SF Writer as Demiurge." *Science Fiction Studies* 20, no. 1 (March 1, 1993): 128–130.

McGrath, James F. "Religion's Future and the Future's Religions Through the Lens of Science Fiction." (2015).

Possamai, Adam. *Handbook of Hyper-real Religions*. Leiden: Brill, 2012.

———. *Religion and Popular Culture: a Hyper-real Testament*. Brussels; New York: P.*I.E.*-Peter Lang, 2005.

Severin, Dorothy Sherman. *Religious Parody and the Spanish Sentimental Romance*. Newark, Del.: Juan de la Cuesta, 2005.

Shamel, Andrew T, Dartmouth College, and Department of English. *Not Glass to Break: The Fictional Religions of Ursula K. Le Guin*, 2005.

Spencer, Jamie. *Fictional Religion: Keeping the New Testament New*. Salem, OR: Polebridge Press, 2011.

Standish, David. *Hollow Earth the Long and Curious History of Imagining Strange Lands, Fantastical Creatures, Advanced Civilizations, and Marvelous Machines Below the Earth's Surface*. Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Books, 2006.

Thomas, Jolyon Baraka. "Horrific 'Cults' and Comic Religion: Manga after Aum." *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 39, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 127–151.

Wolf, Mark J. P. *Building Imaginary Worlds: The Theory and History of Subcreation*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Young, Joseph. "Secondary Worlds in pre-Tolkienian Fantasy Fiction: a Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of English, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand," 2010.

## Appendix 22: Kairological Charts for Rand's *Atlas Shrugged*

[remember to paste from Excel sheet]

*Looters*

| **Looters (James Taggart, Lillian Rearden, Dr. Floyd Ferris, Balph Eubank, Tinky Holloway, Lee Hunsacker, Fred Kinnan, Paul Larkin, Lee Hunsacker, Eugene Lawson, Mort Liddy, etc.) – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Orren Boyle's Associated Steel; National Alliance of Railroads; Twentieth Century Motor Company; James Taggart's Taggart Transcontinental Railroads*

| **Orren Boyle's Associated Steel; National Alliance of Railroads; Twentieth Century Motor Company; James Taggart's Taggart Transcontinental Railroads – Allomythic Family:** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*People's States*

| **People's States – Allomythic Family:** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Strikers, Men of the Mind, Talent, Prime Movers, People of Atlantis*

| **Strikers, Men of the Mind, Talent, Prime Movers, People of Atlantis (Galt's Gulch) (*e.g.*, John Galt, Ellis Wyatt, Richard Halley, Francisco d'Anconia, Hugh Akston, Quentin Daniels, Ragnar Danneskjöld, Dagny Taggart, Hank Rearden, Calvin Atwood, Ken Danagger, Lawrence Hammond, Dr. Thomas Hendricks, Owen Kellogg, Pat Logan, Dick McNamara, Midas Mulligan, etc.) – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | Oath: "I swear, by my life and my love of it, that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine." |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The Taggart Transcontinental Railroads of Dagny and her father, Nathaniel; Rearden Steel; Ellis Wyatt's oil fields*

| **The Taggart Transcontinental Railroads of Dagny and her father, Nathaniel; Rearden Steel; Ellis Wyatt's oil fields – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*United States*

| **United States (with its "National Legislature" and "Head of State"), State Science Institute (Dr. Robert Stadler), Bureau of Economic Planning and Natural Resources (Wesley Mouch) – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Overall Allomythology*

| **Overall Allomythology – Allomythic Family:** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

## Appendix 23: Kairological Charts for Pierce's *The Turner Diaries*

[remember to paste from separate file]

*"Blacks," "Negroes," the N-word*

| **"Blacks," "Negroes," the N-word – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Conservatives*

| **Conservatives – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Jews, "Satan's Seed"*

| **Jews, Satan's Seed – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Libertarians*

| **Libertarians – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Non-Whites that are neither Black nor Jewish (e.g., mixed-race, Asians)*

| **Other Non-Whites (*e.g.*, mixed-race, Asians) – Allomythic Family:** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The Order*

| **The Order – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The Organization*

| **The Organization – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Race Defilers & Race Traitors*

| **Race Defilers & Race Traitors – Allomythic Family:** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The System*

| **The System (United States government) – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*The Washington Post*

| **The Washington Post – Allomythic Family:** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

*Overall Allomythology*

| **Overall Allomythology – Allomythic Family: *The John Franklin Letters* (1959; published anonymously but likely by Revilo P. Oliver, who shared the novel with Pierce in 1974.** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | in this situation? | |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | is a real issue? | |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | How do I know? | |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | |

# Appendix 24: On Allomythoi in Martin's *A Song of Ice and Fire*

*Introduction*

In this appendix, I use *A Song of Ice and Fire* to model a comparative worldview studies approach to fictional worldviews. I apply the categories of worldview studies (*ontology, cosmology, epistemology, axiology,* and *praxeology*)[1] to the fictional worldviews in *A Song of Ice and Fire*. These categories refer to fundamental problems encountered by even the simplest forms of life. Specifying the nature of a fictional worldview through the use of these categories facilitates comparison not only between fictional worldviews (including those that might typically be neglected because they are not "religious") but also with the extradiegetic worldviews on which they are modeled of which they thus constitute an extended part of worldview families.

The study of fictional religions has tended to reflect biases evident in the comparative "world religions" paradigm – for example, privileging certain highly popular works and interpreting them primarily through the lenses and categories of (almost exclusively Protestant Christian) theology and (Western) philosophy. In the field of religious studies, the world religions paradigm – together with the more general project of comparing religions – has been intensely criticized for its bias in favor of Christian (especially Protestant) categories, its privileging of certain traditions (the "big five") and neglect of others (indigenous religions, non-elite forms, secular worldviews, etc.), its connections to colonialist projects, its abstraction and neglect of particularity, and its conceptual incoherence (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Owen, 2011; Stroumsa, 2015; Masuzawa, 2005; Idinopulos, Wilson, and Hanges, 2006; Patton and Ray, 2000; Paden, 2010; Hughes, 2017; King, 1999). However, the power and value of comparison and the importance of the kind of cultural literacy intended to be promoted by studying and teaching the "world religions" has led scholars to try to respond to the critiques and propose solutions (*e.g.*, Patton and Ray, 2000; Cotter and Robertson, 2016; Tite, 2015; Murphy, 2016; Jackson, 2016). One of the most effective solutions has been a proposed return to Ninian Smart's (1981) call for "religious studies" to reformulate itself as "worldview studies," but on a more solid evolutionary foundation (Paden, 2006; Droogers, 2014), so that scholars might comparatively study a fully inclusive range of worldviews with categories that do not privilege some over others (Taves, Asprem, and Ihm, 2018).

Again, as stated above, these categories are *ontology*, *cosmology*, *epistemology*, *axiology*, and *praxeology*. "Ontology" refers to the problem, faced by all living things, of identifying what exists in one's environment, and "cosmology" extends this, being a response to the deeper question of the nature of what exists: How do things relate to each other? What is their nature? Where do they come from? What is their purpose or end? In its fully developed sense, the category of cosmology seems to require the ability to communicate symbolically, but all animals need to come up with basic answers, implicit in

[1] As can be seen, this appendix draws on an earlier framework of worldview categories developed by Taves et al. (cite). For an extended discussion of my current approach to the worldview categories, see Chapter 1 and Appendix 10. As is described there, there exists a diversity of perspectives in the relevant disciplines regarding the primary categories or "Big Questions" (BQs). This appendix is an earlier draft of a chapter published by Rowman & Littlefield in *Theology and Game of Thrones* (2021), edited by Matthew Brake. See the published version for the more extended argument I make there.

their behavior, to the question of the nature of relevant things in their environment. An animate being will have different properties, a different nature – such as potentially being a predator – from an inanimate being, for example. "Epistemology" reflects the need to know, to answer the question of how relevant information about one's self and one's world may be discovered, and even to interrogate that knowing, to ask and answer the question of whether one's knowledge is valid.[2] "Axiology" answers the vital question of what matters to a living thing. What is important, valuable, special, or worthy of pursuit? And, finally, "praxeology" is a creature's answer to the question – emerging in relation to its knowledge of what exists and what matters for it – of how it should behave, what it should do. All together, an animal's responses to these questions constitute its "worldview and way of life," and the questions are deeply interrelated. For example, reflecting on the epistemic problem of knowledge in *A Song of Ice and Fire*, particularly relative to the maesters, Cowlishaw states,

> In [...] Foucauldian terms, maesters are central to Westeros's edifices of power. Maesters are the individuals designated to *know*, when very few others know much of anything. Knowing is their raison d'être. They know more than the kings and lords they serve. By the authority of their state-approved knowledge, they define the ontology and status of nearly everything and everyone in the kingdom. (2015, pp. 59-60)

Thus, in the case of the maesters, power over the central problem of knowledge leads to power over other basic questions of existence, meaning, and value that structure behavior. Although "worldview" may be used as a shorthand for the expression "worldview and way of life," one should keep in mind the full expression, thus helping one avoid an overly cerebral, vision-based, abstract, or belief-oriented interpretation of the worldview studies approach, which always includes the body, the environment, behavior, and unconscious cognitive processes.

Though all animals *implicitly* respond to the important questions that underlie the main categories of worldview studies, humans are able to explicitly articulate their answers. This capacity for symbolic representation, however, allows humans to externalize, criticize, and reform their worldviews, leading to a proliferation of worldviews, including fictional worlds and worldviews (and other "fictional" conceptual tools), that are available to humans to entertain and use (*cf.* Bellah, 2011; Saler, 2011; Harari, 2015). Because human creativity is cumulative (*cf.* Eagleman & Brandt, 2017), using available worldviews to fashion new ones, human worldviews possess family resemblances.[3] In the context of American religious multiplicity, Melton's (2003) approach to the problem of categorization in his *Encyclopedia of American Religions* rather effectively groups religions according to their family resemblances, but his work is limited to "religions," ignoring many of the influential worldviews that Americans adhere to. The worldview studies approach both encompasses the full range of philosophies, ideologies (*e.g.*, political and economic), mystical systems, academic theories, spiritualities, magical systems, and so on that are included in the

---

[2] *Cf.* Baldwin, 2017.

[3] The idea of "family resemblance" was first used by philologists to talk about relationships among languages (regarding the Martin's use of language families, see Peterson, 2015, pp. 18-19), and it is helpful to keep in mind the fuzziness and bleeding, the mutual interdependence and continuity, suggested both by the metaphor of "family," with its genetic and, ultimately, evolutionary reference, and by its application to languages, to which human worldviews, as symbolically represented systems (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Geertz, 1965), may be compared. These are not stable, fixed categories defined by a necessary and sufficient essence; they share dynamic, overlapping similarities.

comparative project and supplies useful categories for comparison and identification of family resemblances that do not privilege certain worldviews over others.

The inclusion of *fictional* worldviews in the already ambitious worldview studies project complicates things in interesting and uniquely challenging ways, opening the field of inquiry to the vast array of other fictional worldviews that may be potential contributors in the making of a given fictional worldview. Additionally, reflecting a complication that has become increasingly relevant in considering religious innovation relative to globalization (*e.g.*, consumption of mass media representations of other worldviews, interaction of worldviews due to cosmopolitan pluralism, etc.), the makers of fictional worlds and worldviews innovate in a highly unconstrained fashion. A given novel worldview may be, say, a synthesis of (1) a fictional worldview from another influential fictional storyworld, (2) an academic theory of "religion," and three "real" religions— (3) one Asian, (4) one an American New Religious Movement, and (5) one from ancient Mesopotamia. Unlike a real-world religion that may have a clear historical lineage that helps identify its familial relationship to a worldview family, identifying a fictional worldview's membership in a worldview family or families requires a broad literacy in both "fantastika" (an umbrella term for non-mimetic genres like SF, fantasy, and horror, in which the making of novel fictional worldviews tend to occur) and the range of "real" human worldviews.

The following analyses of worldviews and ways of life in the storyworld of *A Song of Ice and Fire*/*Game of Thrones* is not comprehensive, but it does endeavor to be robustly representative of Martin's elaborate worldmaking. It draws heavily on Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson's (2014) *The World of Ice and Fire: The Untold History of Westeros and the* Game of Thrones.[4]

**1. The Giants** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 5-7, 145, 169, 175, 195, 204, 222, 237, 257, 296)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Unknown |

[4] This is comparable to a few other works made by or in close cooperation with series authors—notably *The Silmarillion* (Tolkien & Tolkien, 1977), *The History of Middle-earth* (Tolkien, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2002), and *The Rivan Codex* (Eddings & Eddings, 1998)—that give background storyworld information for successful fantastika series (the above works elaborating on, respectively, the storyworlds of Tolkien's *The Hobbit* (Tolkien, 1937) and *The Lord of the Rings* (Tolkien, 1954. 1954, 1955) and David and Leigh Eddings's *The Belgariad* (Eddings, 1982, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1984), *The Malloreon* (1987, 1988, 1988, 1989, 1991), *Belgarath the Sorcerer* (Eddings & Eddings, 1995), and *Polgara the Sorceress* (Eddings & Eddings, 1997)). Other related works include *The World of Robert Jordan's* The Wheel of Time (Jordan & Patterson, 2001), *The World of Shannara* (Brooks & Patterson, 2001), *The Witches' Companion: The Official Guide to Anne Rice's* Lives of the Mayfair Witches (Ramsland & Rice, 1994), and a host of other "unoffical" or fan-produced handbooks and companion manuals for popular storyworlds. *A Song of Ice and Fire* functions as an excellent example of robust mythopoeic worldmaking, perhaps even more so than these other works, including Tolkien, whose works profoundly shaped the genre of fantasy. As Wittingslow observes,

> Instead of the totalizing mythology of Tolkien's account, we find in Martin a vision of the world that is fractured. For unlike Tolkien, there is no grand narrative, and certainly no single coherent oral history; whereas the main dispute in Tolkien is fundamentally a difference of opinion about how to order a commonly agreed-upon universe, the denizens of Westeros and beyond are incapable of even agreeing upon the boundary conditions of the debate. (2015, p. 113)

| | |
|---|---|
| Epistemology | Bodily senses; language (simplified version of the Old Tongue, called *Mag Nuk*) |
| Axiology | Natural resources, including the foundational resource of their own lives and bodies; simplicity (minimal tools like clubs made from branches, homes in caves, riding mammoths,[5] Mag Nuk); the dead |
| Praxeology | Competition and combat with the children of the forest to defend their lives and material interests; burials |

**Worldview Family:** Unclear ("primitive" humanoid)

**Commentary:**

"Of the giants in the Dawn Age, little and less can be said, for no one has gathered their tales, their legends, their histories" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 5). One might speculate whether, although constructed by outsiders within the storyworld and by Martin's narrative itself as "caveman"-like primitives, on the racially problematic model of "subhuman" species like Big Foot, there may be a conflict of worldviews operative between the children of the forest and the giants that is reflected in their conflicting ways of life. Given their capacity to help Bran the Builder make the Wall and other signs of being able to use technical abilities when necessary, might their simplicity reflect an axiology that values the natural (a value shared by the children of the forest, though in a different degree and manner), rather than simply epistemological limitation? One might also note that their practice of cherishing the dead reflects the prominence of death throughout Martin's storyworld.

**2. The Children of the Forest** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 5-12, 19, 145, 175, 195, 204, 211, 222-223, 226, 235, 237)[6]

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Details unknown (perhaps some account of the nature of the children themselves, the giants, and the old gods?) |
| Epistemology | Empirical perception; greenseeing—for the greenseers, time is known in a non-linear fashion as a totality of past and present, with also a degree of prophetic foresight |
| Axiology | Nature; the "old gods" of nature, especially the weirwoods; song; simple technology |

[5] The giants' riding mammoths to battle finds a suggestive parallel in the tall "Hairy Men [...] who rode to battle on unicorns" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 287). Likewise, one might wonder whether the giants are related to "the Jhogwin, the stone giants, massive creatures said to have been twice as large as the giants of Westeros" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 299).

[6] The children of the forest are possibly the same species as the "woods walkers" of Essos (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 287). See the discussion below of the southern Lengii.

| | |
|---|---|
| | (simplicity?); magic; blood; the children of the forest themselves |
| Praxeology | Working dragonglass, wood, and bone to fashion tools and weapons; using weirwood and grass to make bows and flying snares; making clothing from leaves and bark; making simple homes, including tree towns; singing and playing music; worship of natural features ("the innumerable gods of the streams and forests and stones" (WIF, p. 6); carved faces in the weirwoods; blood sacrifice; magic of the greenseers (warging, communication with ravens; knowledge of past and future, telepathy, the Breaking, and the making the Others); fighting the giants and, later, the humans |

**Worldview Families:** Native American; Druid and Norse religion and myth; animism; influences from other fantasy storyworlds containing American Indian-related cultures; Tolkien's elven religion (with its underlying Christian-Norse elements)

**Commentary:**

The manner in which the children of the forest's worldview singularizes or centers on the weirwoods evokes the theme of the tree in Tolkien and, more generally, the environmentalist theme in seminal figures like Tolkien and Lewis that has exercised a powerful influence on fantastika in general (see DiPaolo, 2018). The fact that the trees of the children of the forest are also associated with the sacrifice of blood and life points to a similar synthesis of Christian crucifixion and Norse conceptions of, for example, the world tree, the association of gods with trees, Óðinn's sacrifice of himself to himself by being hanged on the world tree,[7] and so on that may also be noted in Tolkein's worldmaking. In Tolkien, the light of the cosmic trees,[8] Laurelin and Telperion, captured by Fëanor in the

[7] This powerful image is referenced in Robert Jordan's depiction of Matrim Cauthon's being hanged by the Eelfinn as the price for the supernatural gifts they grant him and in the construction of Brynden, as Larrington notes:

> Brynden's one-eyed status, his connection with ravens and crows, and the tree system into which he seems to be physically incorporated link him suggestively with Odin. The god is a master of magic and wisdom. He knows spells and charms and the wisdom of giants and men, which he has gained through his wandering. And by hanging himself on the world-tree Yggdrasil as a sacrifice, 'himself to himself' as the Norse poem 'Sayings of the High One' tells us, suffering for nine days and nine nights with neither food nor drink, he wins the runes. These are not just a writing system, allowing the preservation and communication of knowledge; they also have magical properties over the material world. Odin knows much of the past, the present and of the future too. (2016, p. 92)

Odin's knowledge is, indeed, tied to the two features Larrington points out at the beginning of the above passage: his "one-eyed status," having sacrificed one of his eyes to drink from Mimir's well, and his ravens, who bring him knowledge. Brynden also resembles the Greco-Roman god Hypnos/Somnus.

[8] This image of a luminescent cosmic tree is suggestive of a much older Jewish (and Christian and, before both, ancient Mediterranean and West Asian) motif. The Tree of Life is generally known as an element of the story of Adam and Eve in Paradise, the garden of God on his cosmic mountain (*cf.* Ezekiel 28:13-14). It is a symbol

silmarils, is intimately related to the light of the one God, Eru Ilúvatar, and there is a strong association of the descendants of Telperion, such as Nimloth, the White Tree of Númenor, and the four successive White Trees of Gondor, with divine favor of righteous human kingship. Tolkien's elves' close relationship with trees and trees' strong association with divine communion and favor, then, seem to have played a role in the construction of the children of the forest's worldview and way of life and, perhaps, help account for the fact that the death of the trees is linked to their doom. And Tolkien's deployment of sacred trees reflects an old European pagan-Christian synthesis. Cusack's (2011) *The Sacred Tree: Ancient and Medieval Manifestations* may be the most useful work for reflecting on the primary source for the dynamic Martin describes between the children of the forest and the First Men and, later, between the First Men and the Andals, for Cusack explains how important sacred trees were to pre-Christian European peoples, how Christians attempted to destroy such "pagan idols," and how they were eventually syncretized with Christian cosmology and worship.

The manner in which the children of the forest have melted away and – with sadness and regret, but not anger – have surrendered to the inevitability of human ascendance aligns with the trope of the vanishing Indian as part of the American frontier myth, as described in Michail Zontos's (2015) essay, "Dividing Lines: Frederick Jackson Turner's Western Frontier and George R.R. Martin's Northern Wall." Zontos states:

> As Tom Holm argues, "by the early nineteenth century, many white Americans ... adhered to the idea that American Indians were mystically in tune with the wonders of the natural world." For this reason they used to call them "children of the forest." This connection was for many Americans the reason that Native Americans, "along with the forests and streams, would be crushed under the advance of a 'civilized' society" (Holm 54). (Zontos, 2015, p. 105)[9]

---

of the wife of YHWH, Asherah, who may survive in the Hebrew-Christian-Jewish tradition, among other things, as the divine figure of Wisdom (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Proverbs 3:18), the Gnostic Sophia, Israel and the Church as the bride of God, the notion of the Shekhinah in Rabbinic Judaism, and the Virgin Mary, whom Tolkien references in figures like Galadriel and Varda due to his special devotion to her. Asherah and her symbols' (*e.g.*, snakes and trees/poles) banishment from the Temple (*cf.* 2 Kings 18:4) could even be part of the background for the Genesis narrative. In any case, the Tree of Life was symbolized in the Temple (and the Tabernacle—a portable shrine that functions in the sacred narrative to assure God's presence even in exile in the wilderness—both of which were understood as the dwelling of YHWH), which was located on the peak of Mount Zion (understood as the cosmic mountain, Zaphon (*cf.* Psalms 48:2))), by a lampstand with almond-blossoms at the ends of its branches, the Menorah. The comforting image of its enduring light as confirmation of God's continued presence and favor, even in exile, is symbolized in the story of the burning "bush" (Exodus 3:1-4:17; *cf.* Wyatt, 2005) and resurfaces more explicitly in the story of the Maccabees celebrated in the festival of Hanukkah. The expectation of two messiahs, or "anointed ones," that may be found, for example, in some Qumran documents and the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, derives from an image in Zechariah 4 of a lampstand fed by two olive trees (*cf.* Revelation 11:3-4). Thus, the image of the lampstand became associated with messianic-royal ideology, and it may come as no surprise that Christians, too, draw on the symbols of the lampstand, the tree, and other related images, associating them with ultimate cosmological realities like the cross and the church (*e.g.*, Revelation 1:20; 22:1-5). And the Tree of Life as a cosmological metaphor or map becomes explicit in Kabbalistic thought. Tolkien's association of divinely approved human kingship with the vitality of the White Tree on the heights of Minas Tirith seems to draw on aspects of this complex tradition, which, as noted above, resonates with other mythic notions like Yggdrasil.

[9] Compare how the culture of the children of the forest is contrasted with the first (human) "civilization," that of the Fisher Queens and others, followed by the Tall Men – called the Sarnori by the Westerosi, a remnant of

Zontos's focus is on the wildlings, whose worldview and way of life is discussed below, but the children of the forest, the giants, and the wildlings all evidently participate in the American narrative tradition that has constructed the colonized first peoples of the U.S. as savages (though, as in the case of the children of the forest, noble ones) who necessarily fade out of existence as "civilization" (*i.e.*, white colonization) advances. The romanticized role played by the children of the forest relative to Bran resembles that played by the Indian spirit guides and guardians who appeared to Spiritualist mediums from the mid-1800s through the end of the century, consoling them and counseling them (McGarry, 2008).

Though many aspects of the concern with blood and its power in fantasy fiction have far more to do with its functions in the Christian worldview (discussed in more detail below, under the section on the First Men; *cf.*, *e.g.*, Anidjar, 2016; Larrington, 2016, p. 15) than with its role in indigenous worldviews, the conflation of ideas of druidic human sacrifice and ideas of Indian blood magic[10] and human sacrifice may also be observed in fantastical works like Madeleine L'Engle's (1989) *An Acceptable Time*, the final volume of her *Time Quintet*, which begins with the far more famous *A Wrinkle in Time* (1962). It describes druids as having come to America and produced a hybrid culture with the Native Americans. (Orson Scott Card's fantasy of an alternative colonial U.S., *The Tales of Alvin Maker* series, likewise emphasizes Indian use of blood magic, sacrifice, and animistic oneness with nature—including Indians' ability to hear the "greensong.") Martin similarly seems to have syncretized ideas of druidic tree worship and Native American "children of the forest," perhaps even drawing on Native American ideas of giants and magical little people (Bierhorst, 1998; Mann, 2016; *cf.* Larrington, 2016, p. 95 regarding the children of the forest's similarity the Icelandic *huldufólk*, the elf-like "hidden people"). Concerning the children of the forest's potential for destruction, see below under the sections on the merlings and the southern Lengii.

---

whom still survive in Saath – and their hero-king, Huzhor Amai, who lived in the Palace With a Thousand Rooms in the city of Sarnath of the Tall Towers:

> It was here amid these grasses that civilization was born in the Dawn Age. Ten thousand years ago or more, when Westeros was yet a howling wilderness inhabited only by the giants and children of the forest, the first true towns arose beside the banks of the river Sarne and beside the myriad vassal streams that fed her on her meandering course northward to the Shivering Sea. (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 287)

The text reflects the biases of its fictional author, Maester Yandel. The northward flowing river probably draws on the concept of the Nile, and Sallosh, the City of Scholars, the great library of which is burned in the Dothraki conquest, is obviously based on the burning of the library of Alexandria. But most other aspects of the construction draw on ancient Mesopotamia. The Fisher Queens seem to be inspired by the popular idea of an ancient matriarchal phase of civilization, and the hero king, Huzhor Amai, whose name sounds intriguingly like that of Azor Ahai, seems to be modeled after the epic story of Gilgamesh, which has exerted a powerful influence on a vast number of subsequent hero myths. Indeed, the messiah-story and Christ-figure may be understood as part of this narrative tradition (*cf.* Rosa, 2017). Was Azor Ahai named after Huzhor Amai, the son of the last Fisher Queen (perhaps alluding to the legend of Sargon of Akkad's birth, with the name *Sarnath* playfully evoking Sargon, the Buddha as Chakravarti (he gave his first sermon in Sarnath), and Lovecraft's mythos), or vice versa? Or should they be identified as the same person?

[10] For a more responsible scholarly discussion of blood magic in the cosmologies of indigenous North American peoples, see Mann, 2016. This source, though at times overly syncretistic, also provides a great deal of emic insights into various Native American peoples' ideas regarding the giants, little people, human spirits' movements and relations with other living beings, and other mythic supernatural beings.

The children of the forest, who call themselves "those who sing the song of earth,"[11] venerate nature, particularly the weirwoods. Warging[12] and skinchanging resemble the use of the "wit" in Robin Hobb's *The Realm of the Elderlings* series, and the capacity of weirwoods to retain memory and extend consciousness displays suggestive similarities to Hobb's wizardwood (*i.e.*, sea-serpent/dragon cocoon) and memory stone[13] in *The Realm of the Elderlings* series and, more importantly, similarities to the Eldar Trees of the Speck people in Hobb's *Soldier Son Trilogy*,[14] who, like the children of the forest, fight the colonizing humans to defend their way of life. The tragedy of the destruction of the weirwoods parallels the cultural genocide of the many Native American peoples who were displaced from the lands in which their stories were anchored and their ways of life located. The weirwoods literally give the children of the forest access, through their greenseers, to the memory of the world, so their destruction by careless, greedy humans is a threat to their very being, all their ancestors' "histories and prayers, everything they knew about this world" (Martin, 2011, p. 452).

Racial essentialism, ubiquitous in fantastical texts and subjected to much scholarly analysis and critique, poses distinct problems for worldview studies. As illustrated by the apparent homogeneity and opacity of the giant and children-of-the-forest worldviews and ways of life, racial essentialism flattens and obscures the answers peoples themselves might supply to worldview questions. Othering and dehumanization (*i.e.*, the reduction of humans to "animals") frequently accompany racial projects (*cf.* Omi & Winant, 2015) that incline toward essentialism and racism. The most extreme and obvious case of this in Martin's storyworld is the Others (*cf. cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 11-12, 146), whose worldview and way of life may be surfaced only by observation of behavior.[15] The

[11] Is this a reference to the world as a whole, as a *coincidentia oppositorum*, rather than simply soil? Ice and fire, as correlated terms, are sometimes used by Martin as a way of referring to the world as a whole, in both its good and evil (and other mutually conditioned) aspects, and this might be an interpretation of the "song of ice and fire," that the children of the forest's worldview encompasses and even venerates both light and dark, the positive and negative aspects of reality. The "song" that "the prince that was promised" is said to possess may, then, be a harsh knowledge, perhaps of a cosmological character, preserved by the children.

[12] See Larrington, 2016, pp. 58-64; White, 1991.

[13] The similarity of black stone and dragonstone in Martin's world to Hobb's memory stone invites a more extended comparison, which may be found below under the section on the Valyrian worldview.

[14] The lifecycle of the Speck people and the Eldar Trees is quite similar to that of the Pequeninos, with their Mothertrees and Fathertrees that are capable of "philotic" (*i.e.*, supernatural) communication, in Orson Scott Card's *Speaker for the Dead* (1986).

[15] For example, they seem to value conversion and conquest through the death of all outgroups, including the children of the forest, to whom one might speculate they would relate in complex ways; given the effects heat and cold have on them, they may have strong beliefs about ice and fire, winter and summer, but, again, one may only guess; they use tools, including magic, to advance their goals; they have natural and supernatural means of knowledge; and so on.

dragons (like the wyverns,[16] ice dragons of the Shivering Sea,[17] sea dragons,[18] stone giants,[19] ice spiders,[20] centaurs,[21] tiger-people,[22] shrykes,[23] ghouls,[24] direwolves,[25] shadowcats,[26] basilisks, selkies and walrus-men, krakens and leviathans, grumkins and snarks, and most other intelligent supernatural beings), similarly, possess only an unarticulated (though perhaps not inarticulate[27]), implicit worldview and way of life.

**3. The Merlings and the Deep Ones** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 65, 164, 169, 175, 214)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Hypothetical: Drowned God vs. Storm God? Opposed to or supportive of the Pattern? |
| Epistemology | Unknown |
| Axiology | Hypothetical: Drowned God; Merling King; the Pattern; the kraken (as suggested by the shape of the Seastone Chair); reproduction |
| Praxeology | Legendary: serving the Drowned God; blowing into seashells to honor the Merling King; making thrones (*i.e.*, the Driftwood Throne and the Seastone Chair); mermaids getting impregnated by sailors |

**Worldview Families:** Unclear—worldview seems to be focused on concepts of order and chaos, death, and kingship; draws on elements of H. P. Lovecraft's Cthulhu Mythos, Robert

[16] *Cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 285.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 294.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 299.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 287.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 301.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 303.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 286.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[27] In a vision, Daenerys is tempted by the Undying of Qarth with a promise to teach the secret speech of dragons (*cf.* Martin, 1999), and there are suggestions that ravens, too, have a secret language, the True Tongue, but this may be a memory of the use warging on ravens by the children of the forest to convey messages (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 7; *cf.* Martin, 2011).

Jordan's *Wheel of Time* series, and possibly Roger Zelazny's *The Chronicles of Amber* series

**Commentary:**

Because, unlike the giants and the children of the forest, the merlings have not yet appeared in Martin's storyworld, their nature and even existence is rather hypothetical, based primarily on archeological evidence and folklore. They seem to be used to support the worldviews and ways of life of others, such as the Ironborn ideal of kingship, human and divine. If the merlings are the Deep Ones, as Martin et al. (2014) have hinted, the indications regarding their worldview and way of life are further confused. Like the children of the forest, they seem capable of great power for good or ill, and like the children of the forest, they have faded into the depths of the world. One might here remember that the children of the forest are said to have enormous power over water, as in the case of their use of the Hammer of the Waters. There are hints of the merlings/Deep Ones having allied themselves with humans in the past and of their being associated with the Pattern and the lost labyrinth-making, seafaring civilization. If so, they, again like the children of the forest, may have conflicted with the giants, in this case the giant-associated Lorathi mazemakers. The possible veneration of the kraken, associations with human sacrifice, possession of a hybrid, possibly grotesque nature, and other details link them to the Cthulhu Mythos, which accentuates the dystheistic, maltheistic, or nihilistic themes in Martin's storyworld. See below under the southern Lengii.

**4. The Southern Lengii** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 306-307)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Unknown—perhaps focused on the god-empress and the Old Ones |
| Epistemology | The god-empress is a special source of revealed knowledge—for example, that all strangers should be put to death |
| Axiology | Privacy and independence; the Old Ones and the god-empress |
| Praxeology | Worshiping and serving the god-empress and the Old Ones |

**Worldview Families:** Japan; H. P. Lovecraft's Cthulhu Mythos

**Commentary:**

The Empress of Leng, who takes two male consorts, is suggestive of a long line of exotic female rulers in works of fantastika, noteworthy for their being fully developed independent characters in some of the influential series published in the years leading up to *A Game of Thrones*, including Robert Jordan's Empress of Seanchan (as well as the Amyrlin Seat, leader of the Aes Sedai, and the Queen of Andor), Raymond Feist's Servant of the Empire, and David and Leigh Eddings's Queen Ce'Nedra, but present from the outset as fantastic reversals of the naturalized order of male hegemony, ranging from Amazonian queens to Edgar Rice Burroughs's character La, the queen and high priestess of Opar, an African colony of ancient Atlantis, to a wide range of constructions ranging from the misogynistic to the robustly feminist. Any analysis of Daenerys Targaryen must wrestle with

this complex intertextual tradition. As god-empress of an isolationist island off the coast of the China-inspired Empire of Yi Ti, the Empress of Leng no doubt is modeled after the Emperor of Japan.

The short, golden-eyed children of the forest, who venerate the old gods, may be compared to the tall, golden-eyed Lengii of the south, who worship the Old Ones (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 307). Such a comparison would be suggestive of groups of a related species adopting different worldviews and ways of life, as otherwise is only the case of humans in Martin's storyworld. [28] If this were the case, it would mean that wood walkers adopted a worldview valuing technoscientific and magical development and that, rather than avoiding humans, mingled with them. The ruins on Leng, which contain labyrinths (as in the foundation and lowest levels of Hightower in Oldtown and the remains of the mazemakers on the Lorathi islands—"labyrinth" is a word in Linear B, suggesting an allusion to the Bronze Age civilization that existed throughout the Mediterranean before the Greek Dark Ages, but also referencing either Robert Jordan's or Roger Zelazny's concept of the Pattern) and are able to drive people mad (alluding to the Cthulhu Mythos, which is frequently referenced relative to the lost seafaring civilization, the people of K'dath,[29] the Church of Starry Wisdom, the populace of Asshai, etc., but also perhaps drawing on Robin Hobb's concept of the elderling civilization's use of memory stone—which is more obvious in the Valyrians' use of dragonstone) are suggestive of the remains of a lost magical civilization scattered across the south of Essos (*e.g.*, the buildings of Asshai) and the lands off its southern coast (*e.g.*, the Toad Stone on the Isle of Toads and the ancient city of Yeen in Sothoryos), the far northwest (*e.g.*, the labyrinths of Lorath and Lorassyon) and northeast of Essos (*e.g.*, the Five Forts[30] in northeast Essos, which function somewhat like the Wall in

---

[28] This might also be suggested by the Naathi (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 282), whose "large, soft amber eyes, oft flecked with gold" are also reminiscent of the children of the forest, while their god, the Lord of Harmony, "as a laughing giant, bearded and naked, always attended by swarms of slender maidens with butterfly wings," could imply the development of a worldview of harmonious nonviolence between the giants, the children of the forest, and humans. Like the children of the forest, the Naathi make music, but unlike the children of the forest "[t]he Peaceful People [...] will not fight even in defense of their homes and persons. The Naathi do not kill, not even beasts of the field and wood; they eat fruit, not flesh." The worldview and way of life of the Naathi might be compared to that of the Lhazareen. In keeping with the potential for different representatives of a given race to develop in very different directions, it is worth recalling that the ancient Valyrians were, like the Lhazareen, originally shepherds.

[29] "[E]ven the Shrykes supposedly live in terror of K'dath in the Grey Waste, a city said to be older than time, where unspeakable rites are performed to slake the hunger of mad gods" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 303).

[30] Who introduced the Valyrians to blood and fire magic, the highest expression of which is dragons? The fact that some think the Five Forts were made by the Valyrians (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 303) may be a clue supporting the idea that members of the sinister worldview family of the Shadow Lands (possibly also responsible for the relics discussed above) tutored and converted the Valyrian shepherds:

> In Asshai, the tales are many and confused, but certain texts—all impossibly ancient—claim that dragons first came from the Shadow, a place where all of our learning fails us. These Asshai'i histories say that a people so ancient that they had no name first tamed dragons in the Shadow and brought them to Valyria, teaching the Valyrians their arts before departing from the annals. (*ibid.*, p. 13)

This could make aspects of the Valyrian dragonlord worldview a member of the Shadow Lands worldview family. One could further ask, Might the fact that these people had "no name" relate in some way to the worldview of the Faceless Men?

Westeros), as well as the western shore of Westeros (*e.g.*, the Seastone Chair). Most peoples associated with the lost civilization, other than the Lengii, do not resemble the children of the forest, however. They tend to have Lovecraftian qualities.[31] The dark deeds of the children of the forest (blood sacrifice, the Breaking, the making of the Others) suggest their potential for great violence and destructive power, so one can imagine their species falling under the influence of a civilization (the Old Ones?) that elsewhere led to more typically Lovecratian hybrids (the Deep Ones?). One might note that the Crannogmen of the Neck are said to have intermarried with the children of the forest, and they are said to have frog-like qualities (webbed hands, frog feet, ability to breathe underwater, etc.). Are these the people that the "Asshai'i histories say [... are] so ancient they had no name [who] first tamed the dragons in the Shadow and brought them to Valyria, teaching the Valyrians their arts" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 13)? This would make them, in a sense, proto-Valyrians, connecting them to that family of worldviews.

**5. The First Men** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 6-12, 19-20)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Abandoned previous cosmology focused on divine sexual union or combat between sky and sea for the animistic cosmology of the children of the forest |
| Epistemology | Ordinary means of knowledge (*e.g.*, perception, inference, reliable sources) and supernatural means—greenseeing and warging/skin-changing (use of ravens to convey knowledge over long distances); runes |
| Axiology | Life and livelihood; old gods (especially godswoods and heart trees); guest right; the dead; freedom to elect rulers; sacred orders of the Green Men and the Night's Watch |
| Praxeology | Practices and techniques to support life and combat others; free worship of the old gods—without ritualism; having the heart trees of the godswoods observe significant life events; sharing bread and salt with guests and giving them gifts; burying the dead; electing leaders and respecting each person's voice; maintaining the life of the |

[31] For example, consider the green-skinned, hairless people of the Thousand Islands who live on a "scatter of bleak windswept rocks believed by some to be the last remnants of a drowned kingdom whose towns and towers were submerged beneath the rising seas many thousands of years ago" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 298). These people

> [...] are said to sacrifice sailors to their squamous, fish-headed gods, likenesses of whom rise from their stony shores, visible only when the tide recedes. Though surrounded by water on all sides, these islanders fear the sea so much that they will not set foot in the water even under threat of death. (*ibid.*)

| | |
|---|---|
| | weirwoods by supporting the Green Men and protecting the living from the dead by supporting the Night's Watch |

**Worldview Families:** the children of the forest (and thus, as discussed above, the kind of hyperreal Druidism and stereotyped Indian culture circulating in popular fiction); Tolkien's unfallen Númenóreans; American colonists; Pragmatism

**Commentary:**

The First Men's [sic] eventual participation in the worldview of the children of the forest and, indeed, the worldview of the children itself suggest parallels with Tolkien's Númenóreans and the elven worldview they embraced (though in other respects the Númenórean worldview, drawing on the model of the Roman Empire, is more obviously a model for the Valyrians). The situation illustrates Tolkien's lasting influence on the fantasy megatext.[32]

Contact and alliance with magical beings is transformative in Martin's world. Valyrian interaction with dragons, as discussed below, gives their people unique powers and properties. Similarly, some special individuals among the First Men and their descendants, such as the northern people of Westeros above and below the Wall, seem to be able to skin-change due to their association with the children of the forest and their participation in the way of life that involves some people, as rare among skin-changers as skin-changers are among ordinary people, uniting with the immortal weirwoods as greenseers. This way of life destabilizes the separation of human and non-human life, opening up new epistemic possibilities. Such an ability to take on multiple perspectives would tend to destabilize any dogmatic, totalizing tendencies (note the absence of ritualism) and encourage pragmatism and mutual respect (as in the case of guest right and free election of leaders). Leederman, in an essay entitled "A Thousand Westerosi Plateaus: Wargs, Wolves and Ways of Being," argues,

> Increasingly, *A Song of Ice and Fire* suggests that hegemonic knowledge alone cannot solve our problems; we must look back, to earlier eras now wreathed in legend, and sideways, to other species, for new conceptual tools and ways of being in the world. This supposition has in-canon support from the often incomplete (though admittedly dutiful) hegemonic monopoly of knowledge and specialization practiced by the maesters, whom Marin often portrays as unprepared and even dismissive of the world's greatest threats. (2015, p. 193)[33]

The ludic capacity to entertain multiple perspectives (*cf.* Droogers, 2013), which is vital for worldview studies, is cultivated by interacting with multiple stories, different narrative perspectives. The First Men stopped killing the children of the forest and started listening, and from the children they gained access to many other perspectives. Pragmatism has been described as the distinctively American philosophy. It is closely allied with the perspectivist capacity to entertain multiple viewpoints since different perspectives, like other conceptual instruments and models, may deal more effectively than others with various situations and problems. Pragmatism has been linked Native Americans (*e.g.*, Pratt, 2002; Wilshire, 2000;

[32] On the meaning of "megatext," see Appendices 29, 30, and especially 33, as well as Chapter 2, §2.2.2.
[33] Regarding the limited knowledge of the maesters, see Cowlishaw, 2015.

Larson, 1997), and one might note a robustly ludic element in (both Afrodiasporic and) indigenous American worldviews, with their trickster figures, masks, sacred clowns, and other cultural technologies that perhaps helped them remain resilient and adaptive in the face of adversity. Whatever the case, the pragmatism of the First Men seems to draw on an American ideal.

The First Men – though possessing "cowboy" settler qualities (evident especially in the people of the North) – come to be identified far more strongly with the "Indian" traits of the children of the forest, eventually functioning as the wild natives themselves when the quasi-Catholic Andals invade (and, again, in the conflict between the wildlings and the Seven Kingdoms and in the case of lesser groups like the Vale mountain clans).[34] Whereas the First Men took on the worldview of the children of the forest with a modified agrarian way of life adapted to their new worldview, the Andals, after military conquest, eventually tolerated minor expressions of the First Men's worldview (without adopting it) and intermarried, resembling Spanish colonization patterns in America in contrast to British, which more closely resemble the Seven Kingdoms' dominant mode of relation to the wildlings (*cf.* Zontos, 2015).

The worldview of the First Men has been largely retained by a number of groups, though modified somewhat by interaction with other worldviews and by changed ways of life. Such groups include the peoples of the Kings of Winter/Kings in the North (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 135-138) and, later, the Lords of Winterfell (*ibid.*, pp. 141-143), the mountain clans of the Vale (*ibid.*, p.139), the "stoneborn" of Skagos (*ibid.*, pp. 139-140), the Crannogmen of the Neck (*ibid.*, pp. 140-141), and the wildlings/free folk (*ibid.*, pp. 147-149).

**6. The Dothraki** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 288-293, 296-297, 304)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Born from the Womb of the World (compare the goddess(es) Mother Earth and/or the Mother of Mountains (moon is also a goddess and *khaleesi* of the sun)); the model of the ancient great *khals* of all the Dothraki; the horse god, whom the Dothraki worship and whom the *khals* join after death, lives as *khal* in heaven, and the stars are fiery horses ridden by his *khalasar* of the noble dead; there is a hell |
| Epistemology | Much special knowledge is preserved by the *dosh khaleen* and the barren female and eunuch male healers; prophecy |

[34] Martin has long been interested in such themes. See, for example, the fascinating parallels in his early short story, "And Seven Times Never Kill Man!" (Martin, 1975), which features a dark parody of Christianity, the religion of Bakkalon, a god also referenced in *A Song of Ice and Fire*. Martin enjoyed reading westerns as a child (and much early SF recapitulates the themes and motifs found in westerns), which leads Zontos to argue that the similarities between the Night's Watch and their conflict with the wildlings, Jon Snow's narrative of captivity beyond the wall, the problem of wildling assimilation, and other features of how the wildlings are represented and the themes found in westerns are not accidental (*cf.* 2015, pp. 95, 106, 108).

| | |
|---|---|
| Axiology | Mother Earth; the Mother of Mountains; the sacred city of Vaes Dothrak; the *dosh khaleen*—the widows of dead *khals* who rule Vaes Dothrak; being manly; having and riding horses; *khals*; the foretold "stallion who mounts the world"; conquest—signaled by braided hair and bells; gifts; the bloodrider vow and relationship;[35] honor |
| Praxeology | Gift economy; conquest; important acts like marriage and sex should happen under an open sky; burning the dead |

**Worldview Families:** Mongolians; Plains Indians; some influence from Frank Herbert's Fremen culture in the *Dune* series and Tolkien's Rohirrim; Jogos Nhai?

**Commentary:**

Maester Yandel states, "[T]he Dothraki consider the earth to be their mother and think it sinful to cut her flesh with plows and spades and axes" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 289). An extended (and widely contested—*cf.*, *e.g.*, Churchill, 1988; Talamantez, 1989; Weaver, 1996; Mann, 2016) analysis of the concept of Indians worshiping a Mother Earth goddess as an invention of Western scholarship may be found in Sam Gill's (1987) *Mother Earth: An American Story*, focusing on a famous quote very similar to Maester Yandel's above. The Dothraki's gift economy, their devotion to horses, and other customs are modeled after plains Indians. In other respects, they are modeled after Mongolians (see Larrington, 2016, pp. 192-198).

Like Paul Atreides as messianic "Mahdi" of the Fremen under the guidance of his Bene Gesserit mother, Lady Jessica, the ancient Khal Mengo was advised in is conquest by his mother, the witch queen Doshi, uniting the khalasars and leading them in conquest of the Sarnori kingdoms.[36] The fact that the sacred city is governed by the widows of the khals similarly resembles the Reverend Mothers of the Bene Gesserits and the Fremen—an idea that has influenced much fantastical worldmaking,[37] such as, for example, Robert Jordan's Aes Sedai and Aiel Wise Women. Still, one may not need to resort to fantastical texts to account for this aspect of the Dothraki worldview. Larrington notes that Mongolian "widows had a great deal of authority on the death of their husbands and that the Emperor's mother was given the power 'to execute justice' in his absence" (2016, p. 194).

The Dothraki march of the defeated people of Sathar, in which three-quarters of them died, strikes one as an odd reversal of the Trail of Tears, and the inability of the Sarnori kingdoms to unite against the existential threat of the Dothraki until it was too late seems to be based on European colonization of Native Americans. Again, the Dothraki

[35] The intensity of devotion to and identification with the life of the *khal* is unusual, and it involves a number of distinctive practices, comparable to the vows made by same-sex Christian saints and warriors to each other, with the relationship's suicidal end reminding one of *sati*.

[36] The similarity to the word "Sardaukar" is likely accidental—see n. 8 above

[37] Perhaps Martin also alludes to *Dune* in his representation of the Ancient Guild of Spicers in Qarth, or perhaps Herbert and Martin simply developed their representations independently, with both drawing on history and Orientalist stereotypes (*cf.* Larrington, 2016, pp. 220-222).

transforming from wild natives into a great, civilization-conquering force (n.b. the allusions to the way Josephus describes the Roman siege and destruction of Jerusalem in the description of the Dothraki conquest of Mardosh—Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 290) parallels Frank Herbert's Fremen.

Since the Dothraki ultimately came from further east, past the Bone Mountains, one might speculate that their worldview developed out of one that was, in ancient times, the common ancestor of the present worldview of the Jogos Nhai (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 304-305). Though their physical form and preferred mounts are different, the Jogos Nhai share with the Dothraki a proud warrior culture and a tradition of gender-distributed roles (*e.g.*, the *jhat* (war chief) and the moonsinger (priestess-healer-judge)). The Jogos Nhai seem to have been constructed in key ways as contrasting with the Dothraki, in part by adding features of the Huns (*e.g.*, the head binding) and in part by adding other features of Native American cultures (*e.g.*, the two-spirit or third- and fourth-gender roles). One should note that the Temple of the Moonsingers in Braavos is the foremost house of worship there due to the role moonsingers played in prophesying the location of Braavos, making the people who are the apparent standard-bearer of American values in Essos dependent in their founding history on the help of a people who sound a lot like wise Indians.

**7. The Night's Watch** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 12, 145-146)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Originally possessed the cosmology of the children of the forest and the First Men: opposed to death, cold, and the Others, the men of the Night's Watch are "the sword in the darkness [...] the watcher on the walls [...] the fire that burns against the cold, the light that brings the dawn, the horn that wakes the sleepers, the shield that guards the realms of men"; lately, this self-understanding of being opposed to darkness and cold in the service of the realms of men [sic] has devolved into anti-wildling bigotry |
| Epistemology | The rangers bring knowledge from beyond the Wall, and the maesters who serve each castle provide received knowledge |
| Axiology | The realms of men [sic], understood as Westeros |
| Praxeology | The activities of the stewards, builders, and rangers |

**Worldview Family:** Catholic military orders (n.b. the anachronism of this pre-Andal group, founded at the end of the Long Night; this is true also of the Green Men and the "knights of the mind," the Maesters); Jewish messianism(?)

**Commentary:**

The fact that each member of the Night's Watch, in his vows, identifies himself with sword, fire, and light is reminiscent of "Azor Ahai" and his burning sword, "Lightbringer."[38] And indeed the Night's Watch seems to play a critical role in the mythic history of Westeros in ending the Long Night. A distributed or collective messianic role, played by the Night's Watch as a whole, could be suggestive of liberal Jewish understandings of messianism and would align with Martin's having characters state that prophecy is often distorted.

Finally, relative to the Night's Watch being a religious military order, one might note that the vows of the order of the Kingsguard are said to have been modeled after the Night's Watch, not, say, one of the military orders of the Faith (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 50). The vows of the maesters, who themselves have a distinctive worldview and way of life founded in the Age of Heroes by King Urrigon Hightower in honor of his brother Peremore's quest for knowledge (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 216), are intriguingly similar to those of the Night's Watch and the Kingsguard, and the maesters' sometimes being referred to as "knights of the mind" expresses well how they may be broadly understood as part of the same worldview family.

**8. The Ironborn/The Iron Kings** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 175-193; Larrington, 2016, pp. 68-)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Eternal combat of the Drowned God and the Storm God (associated with ravens), mirrored in the Age of Heroes by the Grey King's combat with and defeat of the sea dragon, Nagga, and his making the first longship from Ygg, a demon tree; the ironborn understand themselves to descend from the Drowned God, who drowned for them and was born again from the sea, and the Grey King and his mermaid wife;[39] their nature as reavers derives from the Drowned God |
| Epistemology | Oral tradition maintained by itinerant priests—literacy actively discouraged |
| Axiology | Being strong like iron; the sea; conforming to the sacred models of the Drowned God and the Grey King |
| Praxeology | Ideally, following the Old Way (staying close to the sea; fishing; plundering non-ironborn peoples and taking them as thralls; sacrificing thralls to the Drowned God; electing a king; taking a rock wife |

[38] The "horn that wakes the sleepers" may refer to the horn of Joramun, the Horn of Winter, which woke the sleeping giants when the "Night's King" betrayed his vows as the Lord Commander of the Night's Watch, embracing the very opposite of his proper worldview and way of life.

[39] Is she the Moon-Pale Maiden worshipped by some sailors?

| | |
|---|---|
| | and salt wives), but increasingly following the New Way of accommodating to the dominant way of life of the Seven Kingdoms |

**Worldview Families:** Vikings; Christianity; *Chaoskampf* motif; Cthulhu Mythos

**Commentary:**

Like some Native Americans who reject the Bering land bridge hypothesis regarding their origins in America, adhering instead to myths of ascent from the earth and descent from heaven, Martin has the ironborn assert that they came from beneath the seas. (See the section on the merlings and Deep Ones.) The evil Storm God keeps curious company—ravens, who are intimately associated with the children of the forest. The Drowned God's royal representative, the Grey King, defeats a sea dragon, and the pale "demon" tree Ygg (an allusion to Yggdrasil) that feeds on humans, from which he makes the first longship, sounds a lot like the weirwoods to whom the children of the forest make blood sacrifice. It is not hard to discern the Crucified God of Christianity in the Drowned God, with a dark Lovecraftian twist. Martin's use of the ancient *Chaoskampf* motif resonates powerfully with the Christian, Viking, and Lovecraftian elements. As Larrington notes, the idea that the Ironborn heroes will feast with the Drowned God while served by mermaids "does have some affinities with the Viking belief that warriors would enjoy an afterlife of fighting by day and feasting by night; the Valkyries would serve them mead and ale at a feast presided over by Odin" (2016, p. 73).

In the Hebrew Bible, YHWH divides the waters and pierces Leviathan with his sword, just as, in older West Semitic myth, Ba'al Hadad defeats Lotan, the serpent of the sea god, Yam, and in the *Enûma Elish*, the Babylonian epic of creation, Marduk similarly defeats Tiamat. Jesus' miracle of walking on the waters seems to allude to divine mastery over the watery chaos, and the combat myth appears more explicitly in the book of *Revelation*. Other instances of the motif include the Norse story of Thor and Jörmungandr and the Greek story of Zeus and Typhon. In the context of the theme of combat between ice and fire, it is worth noting that in Martin's variation, it is the representative of the *sea*, the Grey King, who fights the sea dragon, who, though a "sea" dragon, is a fiery agent of the Storm God, and the dead who cannot die, the worshippers of the Drowned God, sound curiously like the wights and the Others. Martin further adds to the complexity of the history of the Ironborn worldview and his storyworld in general by having instances of syncretization with the Faith, as in case of King Harmund II Hoare, and a minor tradition of messianic figures calling themselves "Lodos," who claimed to be the living son of the Drowned God.

**9. The Andals** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 17-20, 53-58, 151-152, 163)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | The Seven Who Are One (Father, Warrior, Smith, Mother, Maiden, Crone, Stranger) dwelt among the ancient Andals and made Hugor of the Hill the first king, taught them to forge iron, and promised King Hugor |

| | |
|---|---|
| | and his descendants a great kingdom; faith in the Seven protects one from the wights |
| Epistemology | Sacred knowledge contained in *The Seven-Pointed Star*; High Septon speaks for the gods; the Father and the Crone are especially associated with granting wisdom; ecclesiastical court |
| Axiology | The number seven (as in the colors of the rainbow, an important symbol, and the seven sacred "wanderers" in the sky); kinship (kin-slaying is the gravest sin, and incest is especially repugnant); guest-right;[40] kingship; warfare (*e.g.*, the Faith Militant) and trial by combat; light |
| Praxeology | Worshiping the gods, the seven faces of the one deity, using candles, crystals, song, and prayer; individuals focus on the aspect of the deity most relevant to their concern, and some gods have groups that are specially devoted to them (for example, the Silent Sisters tend the dead and are devoted to the Stranger; the Faith Militant are especially devoted to the Warrior); septs are the sacred seven-walled buildings wherein the gods are worshipped; septons preside over weddings (*i.e.*, kinship-making), knighting (*i.e.*, warrior-making), and the High Septon anoints the king; though much of the Faith supports the way of life of the aristocracy, other aspects of the Faith promote a simple way of life and service to the poor (*e.g.*, the wandering septons, the holy brothers and sisters, the members of the monastic septries and motherhouses, and the reform movement of the "sparrows") |

**Worldview Families:** Catholicism; Gnosticism; Neopaganism; Protestantism

**Commentary:**

The worldview of the Andals contains an inherent tension between this-worldly and otherworldly values. The Faith of the Seven promises and ratifies material prosperity, but at the same time it expects to be the ultimate concern of the faithful. Over time, members of the Andal ruling class have exhibited varying degrees of devotion to the Faith. In the moment revealed by Martin's narrative, many—perhaps a majority—of the aristocracy have

[40] See Larrington, 2016, pp. 34-38.

fallen into decadence and varying degrees of unbelief, and, as Larrington observes, in many ways Martin's representation of "the Faith resembles the corrupt late medieval Church as seen through the eyes of satirists such as Chaucer" (p. 134). That said, the Faith is of central importance in the lives of most ordinary people of Andal descent.

Martin has expanded the Christian notion of the Trinity, drawing on a distinctly Gnostic-Neoplatonic understanding of the one godhead (the pleroma), who in his ultimate oneness is, like the Stranger, unqualified and unknowable, and who emanates a gender-balanced array (syzygies) of male and female gods (aeons). The female deities are taken from the Neopagan "Triple Goddess,"[41] and the male gods affirm the central values of Andal civilization: the hierarchical relationship of obligations that secure justice, which are embodied in the ideal of righteous kingship, technoscientific power, and its military application. The decadence of many of the leaders of the Seven Kingdoms and of the Faith of the Seven has led to a Protestant-like reform movement of humble "sparrows" that is popularizing the kind of discipline that the Faith had typically concentrated in its religious orders. The Faith Militant, with its Warrior's Sons and Poor Fellows, is modeled after the Catholic military orders.

Wittingslow suggests, in essence, that the seven-faced god of the Faith of the Seven has been designed to reflect the structure of the psyche and its individuation in the social world of the Andals:

> Indeed, the seven figures [...] seem far more akin to primordial images or character archetypes such as one would find in the work of Carl Jung or, more strikingly, Joseph Campbell in his landmark analysis *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*. [...] [T]he two sexed triads in the Seven may be reflective of mankind's relationship with itself, as each triad preserves the gendered aspect of social rules apparent in Martin's universe. [...] Moreover, these norms are sufficiently pervasive that any perceived threat to those norms is treated with confusion, if not outright hostility. These roles are both socially informative and world-constituting. (2015, p. 115)

The structure of the pleroma in the Neoplatonic-Gnostic worldview family may be read as a kind of cosmological map, and knowledge of the ultimate reality—the divine mind in both its finite divisions and its ineffable infinitude—is both salvific and therapeutic due to the correspondence of the divine macrocosm and the divine soul as microcosm. As Wittingslow proposes, thinkers like Carl Jung and Martin Heidegger, who secularized the core logic of the Neoplatonic-Gnostic worldview, have promoted its enduring influence.

If there were space, one might consider the worldviews and ways of life of each of the orders of the Faith, the tensions and struggles between the Faith and the Crown, and related issues. Likewise, individual Andal peoples have variations of the basic Andal worldview and way of life that a more fine-grained analysis could unpack. For example, one may note a parallel with the myth of Hugor of the Hill in the way Garth Greenhand, the legendary High King of the First Men, is described as the father of many noble houses, and at the same time the story of Garth Greenhand promotes the values of the children of the forest and the First Men in that Garth is tied to the fertility of the natural world (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 207-209). This synthesis of Andal-First Men worldviews seems to have flowered in the Reach (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 209-213), the realm of House Tyrell of Highgarden (*ibid.*, pp. 217-219), where the ideals of

[41] *Cf.* Larrington, 2016, p. 132.

chivalry are celebrated in song. Other diverse Andal groups include House Tully of Riverrun (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 156-160), House Arryn of the Eyrie (*ibid.*, pp. 169-173), House Lannister of Casterly Rock (*ibid.*, pp. 196-205), and the Stony Dornish (*ibid.*, pp. 236-241).

**10. The Valyrian Dragonlords** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 13-27, 32, 214, 253, 257, 268)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Descent from dragons, who themselves were born from the volcanic mountains called the Fourteen Flames |
| Epistemology | Natural means of knowledge as well as supernatural:[42] prophecy, glass candles |
| Axiology | Dragons; precious metal; magical power—blood and fire related; conquest; slaves; blood purity |
| Praxeology | Using magic to rule dragons and dragons and magic (*e.g.*, Valyrian steel[43]) to conquer and enslave other humans in order to force them to mine for ore; incest to preserve the blood of the dragon |

**Worldview Families:** the Ghiscari (compare the cities of Slaver's Bay); Rome; Tolkien's fallen Númenóreans; Feist's Valheru; Hobb's elderlings

**Commentary:**

It is significant that the only known names of pre-dragonlord Valyrian deities survive as names given to dragons: *e.g.*, Balerion, Meraxes, Vhagar, Syrax. The Valyrian dragonlords thought of themselves as being part dragon, an idea embodied in the popular Valyrian symbol of the sphinx, which in its Valyrian variety is half dragon and half human. One might speculate that the prominence of bloodmages in the Valyrian Freehold had to do with the use of blood magic to produce both the dragons (from wyverns) and the Valyrians themselves.[44] The Valyrian obsession with blood purity, in order to preserve the blood of the dragon, led to the practice of incest. The worldview of the Valyrian dragonlords is one of self-worship, prizing wealth, power, and mastery above all, and their magic-subjugated dragons perfectly embody this ideal of violent domination.

[42] The dragonlords seem to have access to special dragon-related knowledge. Cox notes an interesting example of this in the case of Daenerys: "Daenerys's perception of warmth in her dragon eggs is not available to others. She feels them as warm, nearly hot, and comes to believe that they are ready to hatch if they can be placed in a hot enough fire; but Ser Jorah Mormont attests that the eggs feel cool to the touch" (2012, p. 136).

[43] The suggestion that the "last hero" (at the end of the Long Night following the Age of Heroes) defeated the Others with a blade of dragonsteel may imply that the forging of Valyrian steel may draw on the kind of blood magic suggested by Azor Ahai's murder of his wife, Nissa Nissa. This draws on a long tradition, in fantasy literature and more broadly, of ensouled swords and other objects.

[44] Compare their practices on the Isle of Tears, Gorgossos (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 283).

I suspect the name "Valyrian," which designates Martin's Dragon Lords, may allude to Raymond Feist's "Valheru," the godlike race of violent dragon riders[45] known for their conquest and enslavement of peoples throughout Feist's cosmos. Robin Hobb's elderlings, in her *The Realm of the Elderlings* series, are transformed from humans to become a new magical race due to their interaction with dragons. Like Valyrians, they are able to use magic to manipulate stone, but their relationship with dragons is not one of mastery, but, rather, service and adoration.

With their dragon roads and instrumental use of religious tolerance to pacify their subject peoples, the Valyrians are obviously modeled after Rome[46]—though with a political organization (the "Freehold") more like during the Republican rather than the Imperial period. The Doom of Valyria and many aspects of Valyria itself seem to be modeled after Tolkien's Númenóreans[47] and the destruction of their homeland, the island of Elenna, which involved not only the island being swallowed up by the sea but also fire erupting out of the peak of the sacred mountain, Meneltarma. Tolkien's adaptation of the Atlantis myth, like Martin's, evidently also references the fall of Rome.[48]

The Valyrian dragonlords seem to have adopted much of the worldview and way of life of the Ghiscari Empire that they defeated (the Ghiscari axiology evidently included the founder of Old Ghis and the lockstep legions, Grazdan, the mastery of slaves (including their use in fighting pits), the number 33, the harpy and graces, and the making of pyramids, and their cosmology included a concept of a fiery hell populated by demons (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 278); the Ghiscari way of life continues in some form in the slaver cities of Astapor (who created the Unsullied as a synthesis of the ideal of the ancient lockstep legions with the use of castrated slaves[49]), Yunkai, and Meereen[50]—*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 13-15). Their pursuit of wealth and power and subjugation of other living things reflect a materialistic, egocentric worldview. Though

---

[45] Popularization of the trope of dragon-riding should probably be traced to Anne McCaffrey's "dragonriders" of Pern.

[46] See Larrington, 2016, p. 214-215.

[47] For example, the Valyrian glass candle is very similar to the Númenórean palantír.

[48] For a number of other historical and legendary parallels and potential sources, see Larrington, 2016, pp. 211-214.

[49] It is worth noting that the Unsullied have special knowledge (the true name of their special (axiology) existent (ontology), namely, the great goddess, called by many titles such as Lady of Spears, Bride of Battle, and Mother of Hosts, which may suggest her nature (cosmology)) and practices (such as purification in sea water (praxeology)); theirs constitutes a distinct and complex worldview and way of life in its own right. It seems to draw on the *Galli*, the eunuch priests of the ancient goddess Cybele.

[50] The Ghiscari worldview-family religion practiced in Meereen, with its valorization of harpies and graces, recalls the complex ideology of bloodguilt (*e.g.*, the Furies) and justice (or even gracious mercy), the ancient concern with blood-pollution or miasma of which the Ghiscari are so infamously illustrative, and its interest in refuge, salvation, and rectification. An array of ancient Mediterranean stories, from Aeschylus' *Oresteia* to the story of Cain and Abel and the entangled Hebrew legal ideals of the cities of refuge and the avenger of blood, evoke this problem and its attempted resolution. The Ghiscari seem to fear and venerate the Harpy while seeking the mediation and intervention of Graces.

having intimate knowledge of magic as an instrument of power, the Valyrian dragonlords stopped worshipping their traditional gods, became self-obsessed, and thought of religion as an opiate to pacify and divide the subjects of their domination.

Eight of the Free Cities (excluding Braavos) should be included as members of the Valyrian worldview family, though in the case of the Lorathi, the Norvoshi, and the Qohorik one perhaps gains insight into the pre-dragonlord Valyrian worldview (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 253-260). The Lorathi worldview retains some slight influence from the extinct eunuch-ascetic priests of Boash, the Blind God, who taught the equality of all living things and the value of darkness and negating the self. The Norvoshi have a theocracy, being ruled by the bearded priests of their god, whose name is a secret kept by initiates; their way of life includes wearing hair shirts and self-flagellation, and all Norvoshi are regulated by the three bells of the city, which tell them what to do and when. Thus, the bells are important sources of knowledge, as are the revelations from the priests. The Qohorik also descend from religious dissidents who rejected the religious tolerance and skepticism of the dragonlords, but their practice of blood sacrifice (to their god, the Black Goat) and blood magic (including their ability to work with Valyrian steel) seems to preserve Valyrian ways. The cities of Myr, Lys,[51] and Tyrosh – like the Pentoshi[52] and the Volantenes[53] – reflect the more mercantile, "secularized" worldview of the Valyrian dragonlords (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 261-270), but the priesthood of R'hllor is also powerful (see below). The

The Targaryen rulers of Westeros adopted the Faith of the Seven from the Andals, but with some modifications (*e.g.*, the Doctrine of Exceptionalism permitting Targaryen incest), and one might see a survival, though much diminished, of their ancient skill in fire magic in the Alchemists' Guild.

**11. The Braavosi** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 271-276)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | The Braavosi story of its origin and nature marks it as both opposed to Valyrian slavery and yet connected to the Valyrian way of life shared by the diverse slaves of Valyria who escaped to found Braavos |
| Epistemology | Pluralistic acceptance of many perspectives and sources of knowledge |

[51] Reflecting their values and practices, "many Lyseni worship a love goddess whose naked, wanton figure graces their coinage" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 264). Likewise, the Lyseni venerate Yndros of the Twilight, a deity who alternates sex and whose acolytes are capable of the same transformation, reminding one of the great creativity and influence of Ursula K. Le Guin's (1969) *The Left Hand of Darkness*, and, as with the love goddess and Yndros, the other Lyseni deities and their cults, such as Saagael (the Giver of Pain) and Pantera (the six-breasted cat goddess) seem to function primarily as decorative, exoticizing, Orientalist gestures.

[52] The Pentoshi prince seems to be based on Sir James George Frazer's *The Golden Bough* (1890), with its concept of a sacrificial priest-king, the embodiment of a dying-and-rising god who is the consort of an earth goddess (*cf.* Larrington, 2016, p. 165). This is a fine example of an academic theory of magic and religion feeding into the construction of a fictional worldview.

[53] See Larrington, 2016, pp. 168 *ff.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Axiology | Freedom and anti-slavery; tolerance; prosperity; the Uncloaking |
| Praxeology | Trading (including sex work) and banking; war in defense of people and values (especially anti-slavery); celebration of the Uncloaking; diverse worship |

**Worldview Families:** Venice, Italian banking, and a general evocation of Renaissance and Enlightenment values; capitalism; the United States

**Commentary:**

In such Braavosi institutions and achievements as the Iron Bank, the Arsenal, and the Titan one observes the great power – economic and military – Martin attributes to a free people whose representative elect a Sealord to rule them. As a young nation, a melting pot of the world's cultures, that is at the same time the wealthiest and most powerful, with suggestions of global influence through its powerful Iron Bank and the threat of its great military strength, the model of an idealized United States is unmistakable, a U.S. that is the standard-bearer of Enlightenment values clothed in the garb of medieval and Renaissance Italy. (Regarding medieval models for the Iron Bank, see Larrington, 2016, pp. 152 *ff.*) In fact, the Iron Bank may be regarded as the primary embodiment of the Braavosi worldview and an expression of the growing power of transnational banks and corporations in the contemporary world. Giles Gunn in his recent work, *The Pragmatist Turn: Religion, the Enlightenment, and the Formation of American Literature* (2017), has provided a fine analysis of how the spiritual imaginaries of Protestant religion and Enlightenment thinking shaped both the idea of America and the formation of the American canon of literature. Martin's work is an important contribution to this ongoing conversation.[54]

**12. The Faceless Men** (*cf.* Van Eyghen, 2017; Wittingslow, 2015, pp. 122-130; Jacoby, 2012)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | The Many-Faced God is Death, the ultimate necessity, to whom all the slaves of the Valyrian Freehold (unknowingly) prayed, and his faceless servants gave the gift of death, first to the slaves themselves |

[54] Along these lines, Larrington notes in passing regarding Daenerys's efforts to abolish slavery:

> Can Daenerys win the battle for hearts and minds and establish a democratic, just rule in the cities whose populations she has liberated? In this respect the liberal dilemmas which she faces, with her superior military power and above all the growing threat from her dragons, are more reminiscent of contemporary flexing of American political and military muscle in the Middle East than of the kinds of experiences faced in the medieval world. (2016, p. 200; *cf.*, *ibid.*, pp. 201-202)

It is not hard to critique Daenerys as an earnest "white savior," taking up the burden of giving freedom and justice to benighted savage peoples who do not seem ready for the responsibility of self-government, and perhaps that is Martin's intention: to promote such a critical response. Still, privileged points of view in the narrative tend to mute the critical voices.

| | |
|---|---|
| | and ultimately to the Valyrian dragonlords[55] |
| Epistemology | Knowledge is arrived at through self-negation |
| Axiology | Death is the "gift"; the gift of Him of Many Faces may be found in the House of Black and White; self-negation (becoming "No One") and submission to fate |
| Praxeology | Devotees of the Many-Faced God may take the gift of death by drinking from the poisoned black pool in his temple; the gift may also be purchased for others from the Faceless Men at a price that is always high but payable; if a death is taken from the Many-Faced God, it must be repaid; practices of transformation and murder are cultivated |

Worldview Families: Zen Buddhism and martial arts[56]

**Commentary:**

Though the goal of self-emptying, self-negation, or self-surrender is hardly unknown in Western traditions like Christianity (*e.g.*, Corrigan, 2015), including both ancient Western traditions like Neoplatonism and a variety of strands of recent philosophy that analyze, deconstruct, and subvert the self and, especially under the influence of Heidegger, attribute a divine logic to death and human finitude (*cf.* Carlson, 1999), it is generally associated with Asian worldviews. Before turning to the Asian worldviews that are Martin's likely models, it is worth noting that the "faceless" deity that is adored in the House of Black and White (albeit through the use of the many faces of a great multitude of icons) in some respects resembles the aniconic God of the great Western traditions. Cataphatic (*i.e.*, ontotheological) Western theological traditions that claim to know the nature of God and of the human often call for the negation of the fallen, prideful, independent self in order for it to conform to and reunite with the divine. In contrast, apophatic theological traditions, which identify the deity as transcendent and ineffably beyond being a mere being among beings, tend to construe both the Western God and the human beings who bear the divine image in terms of self-creative openness (*cf.* Carlson, 2008), actively working to deconstruct or negate the limits of positive attribution.

In this light, one may submit that there is a tension in the worldview of the Faceless Men. As noted by Wittingslow (2015), Jaqen H'ghar – like other devotees of the Many-Faced God when called on to give the gift of death – is unable to choose for himself whom he will kill: "as a faceless device of his god [...] he is but a passive tool acting in the service

[55] *Cf.* Martin, 2005, p. 322.

[56] One might also compare western traditions of assassins (*cf.* Larrington, 2016, pp. 157-160) and fictional works like Lian Hearn's *Tales of the Otori* trilogy, particularly the first book *Across the Nightingale Floor* (2002), to Martin's representation of the Faceless Men, the water dancers, and Arya Stark's narrative development.

of fate or some other profound teleological force" (p. 125); the worldview of the Faceless Men is deeply fatalistic:

> [O]ne must not forget that [the] correct answer to the phrase *Valar Morghulis* ("all men must die") is *Valar Dohaeris* ("all men must serve" [...]). Death and service are thus rendered as relevantly similar concepts (or even overlapping concepts, in the case of the Faceless Men): both are utterly inescapable, and in both cases a person must do their duty. (p. 127)

Therefore, according to Wittingslow, the worship of death leads to fatalism and passivity, an absolute submission to both the ultimate inevitability and to the deterministic forces and factors that condition one's actions.

Wittingslow's interpretation of the worldview of the Faceless Men stresses fatalism because Wittingslow is focused on the question of free will, but this is only part of the picture. I would agree with Wittingslow that "it is the belief of the Many-Faced God that most closely cleaves to the metaphysics of Martin's universe" (2015, p. 129), but the Faceless Men are not simply fatalistic instruments of death. Rather, they are attentive and creative, adaptive but active. For this reason, Jacoby's (2012) interpretation of the Faceless Men is more comprehensive than Wittingslow's, pointing to parallels between the Faceless Men and the water dancers, on the one hand, and Taoism, Zen, and martial arts on the other. Within the storyworld, elements of the Confucianism- and Taoism-related YiTish worldview seem to resemble the apparent worldview of the Faceless Men.

In this context, I shall return briefly to commenting on the worldview of the children of the forest and their equanimity in the face of their doom. First, I think it is pertinent that the symbol of Ser Brynden Rivers (*i.e.*, "Lord Bloodraven") is a red-eyed, fire-breathing white dragon on a black field—the combination of white and fire with black and of a dragon with what seems very much like a weirwood may suggest, not the sinister fall into darkness of a Targaryen who should be allied with fire, but a nondualistic worldview like the Faceless Men.[57] Melisandre's interpretation of her vision – and other textual clues linking Brynden, Bran, and the children of the forest with darkness and the Others – would, then, be a dualistic flattening of a more complex worldview. Many Western critics over the years have accused Asian worldviews like Buddhism of pessimism and death-worship, but Martin seems to suggest that worldviews that it is worse to deny death (and the approaching cold) than to accept and even venerate it. Martin's foil to exhibit this truth seems to be Qarth, the decadent city that, in sharp contrast to Braavos, highly values slavery and blood-purity, with its Sorrowful Men and Undying Ones being the very antithesis of the Faceless Men.

**13. The Rhoynar, the Salty Dornish (*e.g.*, House Martell) and the Sandy Dornish, and the Isle of Women** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 11, 21-25, 235-236, 240-248, 280)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Mother Rhoyne, the great river, produced the Rhoynar themselves and the lesser gods |

[57] The association of the Naathi "Lord of Harmony" – the giant god of a golden-eyed people – with a "black-and-white" butterfly that brings a violent death (very similar to the Red Death that ended the abominations of Gorgossos—*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 283) to all non-Naathi without the Naathi needing to engage in any violence may reflect a similar nondualistic worldview (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 282).

| | |
|---|---|
| | like the Crab King and the Old Man of the River, and, in the Long Winter, she had the lesser gods all join in song to restore the day |
| Epistemology | Mother Rhoyne whispered knowledge of threats to the Rhoynar, and they knew a form of water magic; as an ancient civilization, their technical knowledge was more advanced than other Westerosi when they finally arrived in Westeros |
| Axiology | Mother Rhoyne and her song; later, the memory of Mother Rhoyne; the model of Princess Nymeria; different environments of Dorne relative to the different Dornish people |
| Praxeology | Surviving in the challenging environments of Dorne; being led by the eldest child of the last ruler, whether male or female; taking paramours of whatever sex one is attracted to |

**Worldview Families:** Egypt and Queen Zenobia?

**Commentary:**

A way of life and worldview organized around a great river combined with a powerful female military and political leader may be inspired by Palmyrene Queen/Empress Zenobia, and her military conquests, including Egypt, as well as her reputation for learning and tolerance. That said, Princess Nymeria may be modeled after earlier Egyptian female rulers, such as Cleopatra or even Hatshepsut, but I think Zenobia is the best fit for her *character*, though there are many excellent parallels at this point in fantasy and science fiction. Her *narrative*, of course, as a leader of exiles from an Nile-like culture to a desert wilderness where the native inhabitants are conquered recapitulates the Exodus, with Nymeria playing the combined roles of Moses and Joshua.

The water magic of the Rhoynar witches seems to resemble in some respects the power over water possessed by the children of the forest, as does the value placed on music—though in this case the music of water rather than of earth. The generous, learned, and tolerant Rhoynar cherish the fresh water of Mother Rhoyne in sharp contrast with predatory, anti-intellectual, and intolerant ironborn. Both the Rhoynar deities and the children of the forest are said to have worked to restore the warmth and light at the end of the Long Night, and Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson explicitly liken the Dornish to the peoples of the North (2014, p. 235).

**14. The Summer Islanders** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 277-281)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | *Hieros gamos* of the god and goddess of love, beauty, and fertility; stories of |

| | |
|---|---|
| | legendary rulers like Malthar the Mapmaker and Princess Xanda |
| Epistemology | Priestesses carve the maps, songs, and stories of the Summer Islanders into the Talking Trees of Tall Trees Town; secret knowledge of the world is kept by princes and captains; auspicious times for ritualized combat are determined by priests |
| Axiology | Sexual union (n.b. heterosexual union, in the manner of the divine couple) and pleasure; trade and discovery; preserving the lives of fellow Summer Islanders |
| Praxeology | Sacred prostitution; trade and discovery; fighting off slavers and fighting each other in highly ritualized ways to avoid killing |

**Worldview Families:** Haitians; Amazons; Falmari

**Commentary:**

In contemplating Martin's construction of Princess Xanda, I am reminded of the role of Cécile Fatiman in fomenting the Haitian Revolution.[58] The Summer Islanders, as free black people who banished slavery from their isles, which functioned as an important nexus of trade, resemble the peoples of the Caribbean and especially the Haitians, though mixed with other island peoples from around the world. The powerful role played by women in the Summer Islanders' cosmological narratives and way of life recalls the long history of associating the New World with fantasies about the mythic Amazons[59] (and other legendary peoples in European storytelling).

Two aspects of the Summer Islanders' worldview and way of life suggest the inspiration of Tolkien. The Summer Islanders are strongly opposed to killing their own

[58] Might the Talking Trees that record the story of Princess Xanda's overthrow of slavery be an allusion to the "Bois Caïman" (the *Bwa Kayiman* in Haitian Creole), the grove of trees that were the site of the Vodou ceremony that sparked the Haitian Revolution?

[59] The exotic motifs of female warriors and gelded men, as in the case of the Sarnori and the Unsullied (compare, too, the Nine Eunuchs, "the pearl-white emperors who gave Yi Ti 130 years of peace and prosperity. As young men and princes, they lived as other men, taking wives and concubines and siring heirs, but upon their ascent each surrendered his manhood root and stem, so that he might devote himself entirely to the empire" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 302)), are creatively combined in the remnants of the Patrimony of Hyrkoon ("Hyrkoon" being one of the names of the messianic hero figure of the ancient world and a literary allusion). The female warriors of the fortress cities of Bayasabhad, Samyriana, and Kayakayanaya, who, like the Unsullied (regarding whose conflict with the Dothraki see Larrington, 2016, pp. 202-204 for a possible historical parallel) but unlike the Sarnori, are able to stand against the might of the Dothraki, may be intended to problematize misogynistic, patriarchal, or otherwise male-supremacist worldviews, as may the humorous comment that Addam of Duskendale's tales of Bayasabhad, Samyriana, and Kayakayanaya provides little insight into matters that "scholars are interested in, and instead spends most of its time finding ways to remind readers that the warrior women walk about bare-breasted and decorate their cheeks and nipples with ruby studs and iron rings" (*ibid.*, p. 293). If so, this critical effect is dampened by the fact that, ultimately, the Patrimony is ruled by the Great Fathers. They are more obviously a kind of reverse-Dothraki, with interesting connections to the association of women with enclosed, "private" space (*i.e.*, the fortress cities) and men with open, "public" space (*i.e.*, the open grasslands of the Dothraki sea).

people, and their great ships are known as "swan ships." This seems to allude to the Falmari, the group of elven Teleri who made the trip to Valinor and dwelt on Tol Eressëa and in Alqualondë ("Swanhaven") and who were murdered by their kin for their swan-ships in the event known as the First Kinslaying.

**15. The Sothoryi/the Brindled Men** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 284-286)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | Unknown; said to worship "dark gods" |
| Epistemology | Unknown; said to be stupid |
| Axiology | Unknown; said to value cannibalism and obscene rites |
| Praxeology | Unknown—claims of cannibalism and obscene rites |

**Worldview Families:** white supremacy and anti-African racism; Lovecraftian allusions (*e.g.*, the ancient city of Yeen)

**Commentary:**

Note that whereas it would be challenging to describe a single worldview and way of life for all of Westeros or Essos, Sothoryos presents no such difficulties; rather, all the challenges come from its being so dominated by the gaze of the fictional author of *The World of Ice & Fire* that almost no worldview and way of life is revealed at all—and the one that is described is highly problematic.

Reflecting on the way Sothoryos is constructed, one immediately calls to mind critical works like Achille Mbembe's (2001) *On the Postcolony* and Charles Mills's (1997) *The Racial Contract*. Africans and Africa are often constructed and deployed as part of racial projects that function to create the white, Euro-American West – its identity, its natural supremacy, its positive presence and value – through its opposite and negation, and part of this work is accomplished through a discourse that conceals the constant operation of race, making itself instead about abstracted "human" nature: this complex project of identity formation and maintenance insists on its universal character as enlightened, rational, compassionate, free while elsewhere *proving* this through the representation of its opposites. Classic works like Edgar Rice Burroughs' Tarzan stories well illustrate how fiction has participated in this racist undertaking, which organizes commerce, law, politics, and other domains as powerfully as any other worldview one can think of.

Sothoryos is an endless wilderness populated by exotic beasts and countless diseases:

> Whatever its true extent, the southern continent is an unhealthy place, its very air full of foul humors and miasmas [....] Blood boils, green fever, sweetrot, bronze pate, the Red Death, greyscale, brownleg, wormbone, sailor's bane, pus-eye, and yellowgum are only a few of the diseases found here, many so virulent that they have been known to wipe out whole settlements. (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 285)

And its subhuman inhabitants are savage and bestial, having strong bodies with weak minds, and miscegenation[60] with them is fundamentally unnatural:

[60] The Ibbenese are similarly described as being unsuitable mates for other humans:

> [...] And the native races grow ever more savage and primitive the farther one travels from the coasts.
>
> The Sothoryi are big-boned creatures, massively muscled, with long arms, sloped foreheads, huge square teeth, heavy jaws, and coarse black hair. Their broad, flat noses suggest snouts, and their thick skins are brindled in patterns of brown and white that seem more hoglike than human. Sothoryi women cannot breed with any save their own males; when mated with men from Essos or Westeros, they bring forth only stillbirths, many hideously malformed.
>
> The Sothoryi that dwell closest to the sea have learned to speak the trade talk. The Ghiscari consider them too slow of wit to make good slaves, but they are fierce fighters. Farther south, the trappings of civilization fall away, and the Brindled Men become every more savage and barbaric. These Sothoryi worship dark gods with obscene rites. Many are cannibals, and more are ghouls; when they cannot feast upon the flesh of foes and strangers, they eat their own dead.
>
> [...] Tales of lizard men, lost cities, and eyeless cave-dwellers are commonplace. (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 286)

Can such an appalling construction be justified in an age that knows better? Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson's *The World of Ice & Fire* is framed as the work of Maester Yandel, thus reflecting Westerosi biases—indeed, such a use of a limited, individual, Westerosi point of view is ubiquitous in *A Song of Ice and Fire* (becoming more problematic when translated into the medium of TV). And perhaps the heavy-handedness in the case of the way the Sothoryi and Sothoryos are described is intended to provoke critical reflection. Throughout this comparative worldview analysis, I have noted how *A Song of Ice and Fire* variously "plays Indian" (see Deloria, 1999), draws on Orientalist tropes and fantasies (*cf.* Said, 1979),

---

> Though the men of Ib can father children upon the women of Westeros and other lands, the products of such unions are often malformed and inevitably sterile, in the manner of mules. Ibbenese females, when mated with men from other races, bring forth naught but stillbirths and monstrosities. (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 296)

This description seems to follow the anxious logic of Christian concern about Jewish blood taint. The Ibbenese – though in other respects modeled after the indigenous peoples of the northern circumpolar region of the world – are a disturbingly anti-Semitic creation, drawing, too, on the long history in fantasy literature of dwarves being depicted in ways that reference anti-Jewish tropes. The short, strong, hairy, bearded Ibbenese are further "characterized by sloping brows with heavy ridges, small sunken eyes, great square teeth, and massive jaws, seem[ing] brutish and ugly to Westerosi eyes, an impression heightened by their guttural, grunting tongue" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 295), and they "are a cunning folk—skilled craftsmen" (*ibid.*). "The Ibbenese [are] a notoriously avaricious and, yea, even niggardly people" states Maester Yandel (*ibid.*, p. 297). In general, they voluntarily isolate themselves from other peoples—indeed, they are so antisocial that they avoid even each other whenever possible. And though once ruled by a God-King, now they "are governed by the Shadow Council, whose members are chosen by the Thousand, an assembly of wealthy guildsmen, ancient nobles, priests, and priestesses" (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 296). The idea of a "Shadow Council" government in this context already charged with anti-Semitic elements seems to play rather lightly with the old (and dangerous) conspiracy theory of a secret Jewish cabal orchestrating the fall of Christian civilization and the institution of a communist/globalist/atheist order, and any implicit critique of the Israeli treatment of Palestinians suggested by the idea that "the Ibbenese extinguished [the] gentle race" of the indigenous Ifequevron, as the "woods walkers" (the children of the forest) are known, thus becomes hopelessly entangled in anti-Semitism.

and otherwise indulges in an uncritical touristic delight in exoticism and spectacle, in which diversity and individuality is abstracted into essentialized homogeneity.

Historically, this has been a persistent problem with the various subgenres of fantastika, but it is also illustrates a challenge unique to fictional worldview studies. Narrative focalization is an issue of enormous importance. Because almost all access to non-Westerosi worldviews and ways of life is filtered through Westerosi perspectives, they all must be thought of, first and foremost, as aspects of the Westerosi worldview—though this is not to say that no access to other worldviews is possible.

**16. The Empire of Yi Ti** (*cf.* Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, pp. 40, 300-303)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | God-on-Earth lived and ruled for 10,000 years as the first God-Emperor, the only-begotten son of the Maiden-Made-of-Light and the Lion of Night; each new emperor and empress had a shorter lifespan, until the heretical Bloodstone Emperor, in an act known as the Blood Betrayal, murdered his sister, the rightful Empress, turned his back on humanity by taking a tiger-woman as a wife and by practicing cannibalism; he also turned away from the veneration of his ancestors, the Maiden-Made-of-Light and the Lion of Night, instead worshipping a black stone that fell from the sky; the Maiden-Made-of-Light then turned away from the world, and the Lion of Night's unleashed wrath produced the Long Night, from which humanity was saved in some fashion by a woman with a money's tail[61] or a hero with a flaming sword |
| Epistemology | Ancient records of priest-scribes; competing God-Emperors; prophecy |
| Axiology | Maiden-Made-of-Light; Lion of Night; God-Emperor; Leng |
| Praxeology | Trade and taxation; war; led by various competing God-Emperors, governors, and generals; |

**Worldview Families:** Confucianism; Taoism; Orientalism

**Commentary:**

Insofar as the first God-Emperor's longevity and wise, benevolent rule seems to be a result of his being the son of the Maiden-Made-of-Light and the Lion of Night, he seems to express the Chinese doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, for his virtuous rule (compare the

[61] *Cf.* Martin, 1996, p. 627.

Confucian-Taoist value of *te*) reflects his being in harmony with and an expression of the harmonious union of co-constitutive opposites (compare the Confucian-Taoist ultimate principle of the *Tao* and the goal of identifying with its boundless vitality and wisdom by harmonizing the opposing energies or qualities of *yin* and *yang*). The Blood Betrayal represents a shocking violation of and rebellion against the social hierarchies and relationships of mutual respect and responsibility (rooted in the value of "filial piety") that constitute the social order and that should be reflective of the cosmic order.

The YiTish worldview is also shared by the northern people of Leng (*cf. ibid.*, pp. 306-307), and one might speculate regarding why Leng is regarded by the YiTish as "the great and holy isle" (*ibid.*, p. 300). It might be significant that the Lengii have a God-Empress and that the Blood Betrayal centered around a brother's (the Bloodstone Emperor's) refusal to submit to his sister, the YiTish Empire's first God-Empress, the Amethyst Empress. Even before the Amethyst Empress, each of the preceding God-Emperors' reigns were "shorter and more troubled" (*ibid.*, p. 301); could this have been due, at least in part, to an overly masculine imbalance, a turning a way from the feminine rule of the Maiden-Made-of-Light? Taoism has a noteworthy preference, in contrast to Confucianism's patriarchal inclinations, to value feminine forces and symbols. That said, as discussed under the section on the southern Lengii, their worldview and way of life has Lovecraftian qualities that may suggest that the cult of the Bloodstone Emperor (and, by extension, the Church of Starry Wisdom) that ushered in the Long Night and ascendance of the Lion of Night may have been an extension of tendencies within the YiTish worldview, rather than a complete heretical innovation. Thus, in the form of the Church of Starry Wisdom, a form of the YiTish worldview "persists to this day in many port cities throughout the known world" (*ibid.*, p. 301).

A great deal of "Westerosi" Orientalism is evident in how the YiTish are represented. For example, consider the following passage about one of the God-Emperors:

> **Lo Tho**, called Lo Longspoon and Lo the Terrible, the twenty-second scarlet emperor, a reputed sorcerer and cannibal, who is said to have supped upon the living brains of his enemies with a long pearl-handled spoon, after the tops of their skulls had been removed. (Martin, García Jr., & Antonsson, 2014, p. 302)

This representation resembles an infamous scene in *Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom* (1984), a film widely critiqued for its Orientalist excesses, but its voyeuristic horror seems to have been enhanced by making it an expression of cannibalism, blending it with a scene in the movie *Hannibal* (2001). As Larrington states in another context, "This exoticising attitude to the inscrutable east is by no means restricted to modern, or even colonial-era, Western thinking. Its roots go a very long way back, into the early romances about Alexander the Great and his campaigns of conquest in Asia" (2016, p. 7). One might contest distinguishing modernity and the colonialist project of mastery, but the use of oppositional identity formation and domination-through-definition are ancient tools.

**17. The Worship of R'hllor** (*cf.* Larrington, 2016, pp. 176 *ff.*).)

| **Big Question** | **Worldview and Way of Life** |
|---|---|
| Ontology and Cosmology | R'hllor, the god of light, fire, and (especially sexual) vitality, is in eternal conflict with the Great Other, the god of |

| | |
|---|---|
| | shadow, cold, and death; his messianic champion is Azor Ahai, with his flaming sword, Lightbringer, containing the sacrificed life of his wife, Nissa Nissa, and Azor Ahai is foretold to come again |
| Epistemology | Prophetic knowledge of past, present, and future may be discerned in flames by trained priests |
| Axiology | Fire; light; blood; innocence; sexual vitality; sacrifice |
| Praxeology | Red priests often specialize as warriors (*e.g.*, the Fiery Hand) and sacred prostitutes; marriage is consecrated as a sharing of fire; the dead are given a last, fiery kiss; fires are burned at sunrise and sunset; priests gaze into flames for knowledge, and they practice blood sacrifice; in Volantis, all priests were acquired as slaves by the Temple of the Lord of Light and are thus tattooed |

**Worldview Families:** Manichaeism; Zoroastrianism; sacred sexuality; the worldview seems to be connected to the Asshai'i and to the shadowbinders' practices

**Commentary:**

Though there is complex debate in the history of the study of Zoroastrianism regarding whether Zoroaster's reforms of the ancient Iranian worldview were originally dualistic in character or ultimately monistic and monotheistic (as in *Second Isaiah* (45:1, 7), written under the powerful influence of the Persian liberator and "messiah," Cyrus, or in the form of Zoroastrianism known as Zurvanism), Manichaeism, with its highly Gnostic dualism, in this respect seems more similar to the religion of R'hllor. Given the medieval character of Martin's storyworld, Larrington (2016) may be correct that Martin's primary Gnostic model is the Cathars (see pp. 176 *ff.*). However, Gnostic worldviews and ways of life (such as Mandaeanism, which still exists, and Manichaeism, which is most comparable to the religion of R'hllor in terms of its geographic extent in the ancient world) tend to be intensely ascetic, precisely due to their dualism that regards the world and the flesh as a corrupt and evil trap. Martin's construction of the Lord of Light as encouraging sex and bloody sacrifice (something the Gnostics found particularly repugnant and further proof of the Hebrew God's derangement and delusion) may be modeled after the representations found in orthodox Christian heresiology. In any case, the name of the messiah (called the Saoshyant in Zoroastrianism) in the religion of R'hllor, that is, Azor Ahai, seems to intentionally sound a bit like the name of God of Zoroastrianism, Ahura Mazda.

*Conclusion*

Having surveyed some of the worldviews and ways of life in Martin's *A Song of Ice and Fire* storyworld, one may make at least three general observations relative to the project of worldview studies.

1. A complex work of mythopoeic worldmaking like this invites the kind of on-the-ground comparative worldview studies thinking that has long been promoted by "comparative religion." And it may even encourage readers to develop worldview literacy outside the storyworld.
2. Fictional worldview studies demands of scholars a broad worldview literacy that encompasses familiarity with contemporary, ancient, fictional, and academic-theoretical worldviews.
3. As a study of representations, fictional worldview studies cannot evade the problem of power and its relationship to symbolic expression and meaning making, a problem that resurfaces constantly as one attempts to analyze fictional worldviews.

This last point, the question of Martin's representation of racial and ethnic essentialism—a problem that is perhaps an even more serious or obvious issue in Tolkien—invites one to return to the Tolkienian worldview as a foil for Martin's project and ask the question: Does *A Song of Ice and Fire* have an overarching worldview that promotes some way of life, a mode or manner of responding to or being in the world?

Yes. Under the section on the Faceless Men, I expressed my agreement with Wittingslow that "it is the belief of the Many-Faced God that most closely cleaves to the metaphysics of Martin's universe" (2015, p. 129). I then argued for a more nuanced reading of how Martin constructs the worldview of the Faceless Men than that advanced by Wittingslow; however, Wittingslow's argument is quite relevant to the question of what manner of being in the world is promoted by exposure to Martin's storyworld.

Gierzynski's (2018) *The Political Effects of Entertainment Media: How Fictional Worlds Affect Real World Political Perspectives* describes, in part, how exposure to *Game of Thrones*' persistent violations of the "just world script" leads to a measurable decline in belief in a just world. *Game of Thrones* evokes some of the most pressing problems of our age—the sense among many of a return to a kind of capitalist-corporate feudalism, the pressing threat of global climate change, etc.—but responds, not with the Tolkienian spectacle and magic of an eucatastrophe, but with the Lovecraftian apocalypse of mortality, of the inevitability of death. One might argue that the overall worldview advanced by Martin's complex storyworld enervates even while it enchants.

In this it may be compared to two recent original words released by Netflix, *Black Mirror: Bandersnatch* (2018) and *Russian Doll* (2019), which illustrate alternative responses to human finitude. Like *Bandersnatch*'s multiverse of possible narrative pathways, Martin's abundance of contradictory worldviews evokes a postmodern sense of the constructedness or fictionality of the various perspectives and ways of being in the world supplied by different cultures. One is left without a metanarrative or master story (*cf.* Lyotard, 1984), and certainly without a "just world script," which lack is accompanied, for many, by a mood of passivity, cynicism, or depression.[62] Like the Tolkienian myth, and unlike the world of *A*

[62] Jameson (1991) makes an argument along these lines in *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, and Martin's evident sympathy with Asian worldviews like Zen (see, above, the section on the Faceless Men) may be accounted for by a similar critique of western Buddhism made by Žižek (2003, 2006).

*Song of Ice and Fire*, *Russian Doll* treats the serious problem of mortality as a reason to cherish life, to make a livable story for oneself, indeed, to have hope. Though both Tolkien and Martin are noteworthy in the degree of realism they bring to their fantastical worldmaking, the former tempers the tragedy of implacable loss and decline with the (Catholic) spectacle of enduring magic (*i.e.*, grace and sacramentality[63]) and the hope of its ultimate resurrection better than before, while the latter, who also is drawn by concern with death to the tragic genre wherein great souls suffer greatly, lives in a godless ("pagan") world in which no *deus ex machina* can realistically intervene, in which all heroes die—and some rise colder and harder.

[63] *Cf.* Greeley, 2000.

## Appendix 25: SPFX – Animation as a Signal of Estrangement

Different media for representing and externalizing worlds have significant cognitive effects that have changed over time due to technical advances. But a discussion of genre would not be complete without also discussing media since both generic form and mediation play and important role in structuring – that is, both enabling and constraining – representations. This first section will review topics and arguments discussed elsewhere in this text. Feel free to jump to the "Conclusion" if such a review is not necessary (see also, Nünning's (2010) *Cultural Ways of Worldmaking*, pp. 103 ff., 137 ff.).

Foundational to consideration of differences between such genres as history, fiction, and fantasy is the fact that people are able to shift between worlds. In daily life, for example, we shift between work and play, sleep and wakefulness, and we share these abilities with other animals. Play and sleep, then, will serve as the points of analogy that the discussion that follows will attempt to link to animation and fantasy in a manner that hopefully helps illuminate their character and enrich our account of them. (Compare Appendix 14.)

In terms of signaling theory, one might be tempted to regard representation of the fantastic or the impossible as an exaptation of the capacity for deceit. By these lights, fantasy is a lie; fiction, even science fiction, may deal with the possible, however improbable, but fantasy is impossible. However, the representation of the fantastic need not be thought of in terms of absolute impossibility, for it is never the pure negation of the received categories of existence. If, instead, it is thought of in terms of a modulation of our always-probabilistic hierarchical predictive coding system (*cf.* Bar 2009; Glimcher 2003), modal play grows out of the necessities of adaptation to a spatially and temporally varied world (*cf.* Bulbulia). Thus, the capacity for deceit is, among other things, a byproduct of the need for temporal cognition, and possible world semantics (*cf.* Martin) proves to be a useful theoretical framework for examining fantasy.

Moreover, this (spatial-) temporal-modal framework for thinking about so-called "deceit" – a rare thing in animal communication that tends to demand a Grice-like honesty from its communicators (*cf.* Searcy and Nowicki) – invites us to think of fantastic representations as "costly signals" that handicap insofar as they are unfaithful to consensus reality but that, like a mutation, open up new possibilities and that nonetheless bear relation to the potentialities of the world or self. My two points of analogy for the fantastic mentioned above, namely, play and sleep, are likewise two of the most costly and extravagant biological adaptations.

Play signals are a familiar and ancient aspect of animal communication. Consider the example of dogs. We've all seen two dogs that want to play with each other. They bow, wag their tails, and hop in a stereotyped fashion that metacommunicates that all subsequent gestures of mock fighting are just that, play, not "real" fighting. Psychologists of religion such as Donald Winnicott and Paul Pruyser have linked religion to the capacity to play, the ability to shift into an intermediate, illusionistic world. Drawing on the work of Alfred Schütz and others, Robert Bellah's 2011 work, *Religion in Human Evolution*, likewise in part traces to play our capacity to make religious representations and shift into religious worlds.

In terms of thinking of the mind as processing Bayesian probabilities, it is clear that in a world made up of many worlds the mind would require cues, just like the dogs' bowing

and wagging, to know to adjust its priors when shifting between modeling real and fantastic worlds. Religions use a variety of techniques and tools to signal to their members that they have shifted into sacred space or time. Similarly, in screenwriting the abbreviation SPFX is used to signal to the world makers translating text into film that special effects will be required. I find it stimulating to consider how stereotyped features of animation might serve a similar function to a dog wagging its tail, allowing people to know that they may want to be receptive to the fantastic and leave behind the assumptions of the "real" world. In fact, this more permissive cognitive state might help explain why otherwise unacceptable representations of sexuality, violence, and ideology are tolerated in animated works like *South Park* and anime.

Huizinga, in *Homo Ludens* (1939), suggests that play ground must be marked off, that the space in which different rules apply must be signaled. This he calls the "magic circle," which resembles what Riis and other drama theorists call a "fictional contract" that sets the fictional world apart. Now, when I say "different *rules* apply" on the play ground, I mean to suggest something of the essential character of games. Juul (2005) defines games, in part, as *a rule-based formal system, with variable and quantifiable outcomes*. The enjoyment of playing a game consists, then, partially in the process of learning, intuiting, and predicting novel rules. Recreation therefore is fun because it is re-creation; playful representations are enjoyed because they are active re-presentations. Certainly, the variable and quantifiable outcomes matter to players. They are emotionally attached to those outcomes—but only within the teleological, axiological framework of the game's reconstructed formal world.

So play signals allow us to know to shift into a receptive mode in which we can experiment with and learn the novel rules of the game space, and this beneficial activity is rewarded and incentivized, as is fitting with such a healthful thing, by being enjoyable. Children, who after all have a great deal to learn, love to play. Gopnik (2020) makes a compelling argument that "distinctively long, protected human childhood, allows an early period of broad hypothesis search and exploration, before the demands of goal-directed exploitation set in" (p. 1). And members of our neotenic species continue exploratory playing their whole lives, especially in fictional worlds and games, even after shifting into the more exploitative phase of adulthood.

Early considerations of the "magic circle" and the distinction between play-ground and the ordinary world resemble the supposedly absolute distinction between the profane and the sacred that one finds, for example, in theories of religion like those of Durkheim and Eliade. These early theories of the fantastic regard it as *breaking* with consensus reality, modulating and exploring alternate possibilities, even to the point of re-presenting the non-presentable, the impossible. This break with mimetic representation of "reality" has even been called "apocalyptic" (Ketterer), making an analogy to the biblical and extra-biblical genre that explores other worlds and times.

However, this absolute distinction may remind one of the distinction I objected to above, namely, the one that defines the fantastic in terms of the impossible. That was an extreme position that made fantasy hard to understand in terms of its continuity with our evolved mental capacities and presence in healthy, sane humans. Can we likewise understand the play-ground, marked off by the magic circle, in a way that is not absolutely discontinuous with the "ordinary" or "real" world? Yes. As it turns out, more recent studies, such as those of Castronova (2005) and Nardi (2010), have pointed out ways in which the

magic circle is permeable. Similarly, works such as Yee's (2014) demonstrate that certain human cognitive biases and social prejudices prove to be quite robust in translating into the play environment. This makes sense. Learning is cumulative, and new worlds are not fashioned *ex nihilo*, but rather from the materials and with the tools one already possesses.

Let's consider now the case of dreaming. What we call "daydreaming" in important respects resembles dreaming proper. In cognitive terms, when we daydream our Default Mode Network, or DMN, is activated. The DMN has sometimes been called the "Dark Energy" of the brain because it accounts for the majority of our brain's activity (*cf.* Raichle 2010). As it happens, the DMN does not pertain to processing external reality. When we attend to the empirical world or exert self-control by means of the executive network, the DMN is inhibited. It is sometimes said that the DMN regulates self-referential thought. However, it is more elaborate than that. The DMN appears to sustain our whole model of the world. It probabilistically projects our experience of world and self, both what is thought to be in light our schemas derived from what has been as well as what is anticipated to be—in Bayesian terms what are called our "prior probabilities" or "priors."

How does the experiential world model that the DMN sustains come to develop in infants and children? Certainly, sensory input from the world is required, and humans naturally process much of that input by means of and in accord with innate cognitive structures. But this world-building process appears to continue while they are asleep. J. Allan Hobson (2009), in a paper entitled "REM Sleep and Dreaming: Towards a Theory of Protoconsciousness," notes that the REM sleep of infants and young children is different in character from that of older humans. Hobson proposes that during this period REM sleep is used to continue consolidating, constructing, and reinforcing the child's model of self and world. Interestingly, the mind during REM sleep is almost identical to what we call waking "consciousness." One of the key differences, apart from our usually being paralyzed so that we do not act on our dreams and harm ourselves, is that the prefrontal cortex is inhibited, allowing the mind to project, entertain, and explore possibilities that in waking life would be excluded as, for example, physically impossible or socially immoral.

Above, I already likened fantastic possibilities to mutations. In the defense of a democratic society, a culturally liberal space in which competing and alternative perspectives are permitted to flourish, one may invoke, à la Dewey, an evolutionary argument. Such an ecosystem of diverse ideas is the best preparation for an uncertain future, in which, for example, a novel possibility proves to be suited to a new environment. Sleep not only gives us a chance to consolidate our memories of the past as well as forget or abstract away the unneeded, but it also allows our nervous system to play with new possibilities. It aids us in preparing for an unknown future.

With the exception of animated video games, animated and CGI media are, like sleep, relatively passively experienced. This is not to diminish the manner in which all cognition is rooted in embodied and enactive experience, but animation does tend to share a quality, also present in reading literature, of diminished planning for action (*cf.* Holland). Since action is not demanded of one who watches an animation, one may more passively and comfortably entertain improbable cognitive events with diminished intrusion of the governing priors of consensus reality or folk ontology.

*Conclusion*

Tolkien writes, "Drama is naturally hostile to Fantasy"; I would claim that animation (and kindred media like graphic novels and CGI-supplemented films) is a visual format uniquely suited to the fantastical, the "genres of estrangement" (Suvin). It permits one to represent in a compelling and "immediate" manner events that would be very improbable in the physical world characterized by the material and mental regularities we all know so well and to which our nervous system has been adapted by long evolution. That is, the images in an animated or CGI text do not refer, indexically, to an external impression of or impact with an "objective" world as in the case of straightforward photography and cinematography; rather, they cue spectators to reconfigure their self-and-world model in novel ways, to, as Tolkien would say, dream another's dream.

The non-mimetic features of animation can function as play signals, inaugurating a receptive cognitive state, analogous in some respects to REM sleep, a receptive or "free" state in which novel rules (*cf.* Juul) or, in Bayesian terms, priors may be entertained – potentially even radical modulations of core cognitive principles (*cf.* Gregersen). This free, playful, even dream-like state that permits violation of the consensus (even so-called innate) ontology therefore not only makes animation a fitting medium for the fantastic, in particular the contemporary genres of estrangement known as fantasy, horror, and science fiction, but also suggests that stereotyped traits of animation might be retained as situationally useful in spite of technical advances in mimetic representation because of their value and function as play signals appropriate to this type of storytelling.

Animation permits intense and spectacular violations of the constraints imposed, in particular, by physics. It still remains, however, a human art, determined by the evolved cognitive architecture of its artists and percipients as well as by the nature of its media of embodiment. Increasingly, the special effects of animation, claymation, and animatronics have been giving way to CGI, but although this has represented a change, it has also been characterized by continuity in style and form. The consistent successes of PIXAR may serve as an example. In those films one may observe an animation that has made strategic and intentional use of increased capacity for realism, but at the same time there is a self-aware retention of cartoonish traits—smoothness, distorted anthropomorphic features, bright colors tending toward the monochromatic, and so on. These master storytellers know, whether explicitly or intuitively, that a certain level of cartoonishness (or, in a darker mode, "morbidity") liberates world-makers to tell stories that are less bound by consensus and convention.

Consider the following passages in Tolkien's "On Fairy-Stories":

> In human art Fantasy is a thing best left to words, to true literature. In painting, for instance, the visible presentation of the fantastic image is technically too easy; the hand tends to outrun the mind, even to overthrow it. Silliness or morbidity are frequent results. [...] Drama is naturally hostile to Fantasy. Fantasy, even of the simplest kind, hardly ever succeeds in Drama, when that is presented as it should be, visibly and audibly acted. Fantastic forms are not to be counterfeited. (Tolkien, 1966, p. 70)
>
> . . .
>
> Now "Faërian Drama"—those plays which according to abundant records the elves have often presented to men—can produce Fantasy with a realism and immediacy beyond the compass of any human mechanism. As a result their

> usual effect (upon a man) is to go beyond Secondary Belief. If you are present at a Faërian drama you yourself are, or think that you are, bodily inside its Secondary World. The experience may be very similar to Dreaming and has (it would seem) sometimes (by men) been confounded with it. But in Faërian drama you are in a dream that some other mind is weaving, and the knowledge of that alarming fact may slip from your grasp. (Tolkien, 1966, p. 72)

When Tolkien writes that painting the fantastic is technically too easy, one may surmise why he would make that claim. A drawing or painting might break with photographic realism with more ease than the technical expertise needed to achieve realism. But not necessarily. Some painters of fantastic, surreal, or non-mimetic scenes have drawn on extensive technical expertise and extended effort to achieve spectacular results. More generally, any observer of the credits at the end of contemporary films making extensive use CGI and other special effects may be impressed by the sheer quantity of technical and artistic skill required to make such a work of art; such films are more like cathedrals built by a community of artisans than paintings made by individual artists.

Now, Tolkien's point about Secondary Belief rings true when one thinks of, say, more conventional animated films, graphic novels, and similar media. "Silliness or morbidity," so common in cartoons and horror flicks, are indeed common effects of such works—usually desired, sometimes not. And Tolkien refers to a familiar evasion of rendering the fantastic "visibly and audibly" on the dramatic stage—generally, by having fantastic events occur off-stage and be reported or reacted to after—because any counterfeit of stagecraft would disappoint.

But contemporary technical expertise has, as Arthur C. Clarke might say, become sufficiently advance that it is indistinguishable from the magic of Faërian drama. The degree of realism and immediacy has become another factor artists may control, deciding when they wish to emphasize the medium and when to render it invisible by making it possess so much of the richness or informational density of experienced reality that, like dreaming, one goes beyond Secondary Belief. Sometimes a poet might want to stress the constructedness and artificiality of things—perhaps to promote critique, cynicism, sarcasm, irony, or some other flavor of detachment. But for other artistic projects, the sincerity of realism is desirable. Tolkien had a decisive impact on the character of fantasy as a genre by using the rhetorical tools of "realism and immediacy" to write of the fantastic; Peter Jackson's film adaptations of his works, by adopting and adapting the Tolkienian approach in film had a similarly influential impact on the visual form of the fantasy genre.

I stated above that such CGI and related works do not refer in an indexical fashion, but it is more that they are made, as dreams woven by other minds, through a recursive taking up and recombining of elements derived from culture and experience. A skilled actor's body, covered with reference points, might provide a foundation, captured by film and computer, for the application of a CGI skin; natural phenomena like waves and ripples of water or flickers and bursts of flame might be studied, modeled, and applied in the novel simulation space of a fantasy film.

As a final comment relevant to religious studies as one thinks about going beyond Secondary Belief, it is interesting to note that the meta-communicative function of animation, which allows people to consider possibilities they would ordinarily reject because the entire narrative world has been bracketed or tagged as fantasy, may function as

an imperfect magic circle. It may, as it were, let the spirits past its threshold. It so happens that researchers have noted as a feature of human memory that people may lose track of cognitive metadata that brackets a piece of semantic knowledge as fictional or fantastic (Appel and Richter 2007; Kumkale and Albarracin 2004; Garcia-Marquez and Mackie 2001). In this way, knowledge of a fantastic or fictional world may simply become familiar knowledge, shaping one's sense of reality. This is of particular interest to scholars who study new religious movements and social formations, or even members of traditional religions, who use fantastical works as religious affordances. And, to take up the mutation metaphor, it suggests that animation, as a ludic signal of dream-like estrangement, may function like the protein around a virus, eventually falling away and depositing its novel possibilities in its hosts.

# Appendix 26: On the Evolution of Language and Worldviews as Rhetorical

Καὶ πάντες ἐμαρτύρουν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις τῆς χάριτος τοῖς ἐκπορευομένοις ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔλεγον· οὐχὶ υἱός ἐστιν Ἰωσὴφ οὗτος;

*And all testified favorably about him and were amazed by the charming words coming out of his mouth, and they said, "Isn't this Joseph's son?"* – Luke 4:22

*Rhetoric, Worldviews, and Evolution*

Rhetoric is a technology for modulating, governing, and constituting others' perception and experience. Experience is, as is said, the best teacher; thus, the evolution of our storytelling capacity, depending on language, was a dramatic advance for our species, permitting us to learn by means of simulated experiences. The term *rhetoric* is primarily used to identify language's basic persuasive function (and sometimes an amplification thereof); with Arnett (2022), I would agree in part with the claim that "our ability to create 'imaginary worlds' is a reflection of a broader human tendency to create and share a version of reality that is compelling, comprehensible, and largely fabricated. As cultural animals, we create stories that explain why things happen as they do. However, in order for these stories to retain their full psychological power, we must believe they are not merely stories but descriptions of The Way Things Really Are" (p. 19). I say *in part* because the notion that there is one really real reality is highly culturally contingent—a concern of Greeks, theologians, and science nerds, one might say, but not of all people everywhere and everywhen, and Arnett seems very focused on the etiological role stories can play. But of course they can play many roles, and many cultures, from Buddhist to Native American, cultivate an awareness of the fictionality of stories that are nonetheless important.

Rhetorically persuasive language plays a central role in the origination of "new religious movements" (NRMs) and other worldviews and ways of life, NRMs often being associated with charismatic, charming leaders who are known for their winsome ways with words, and this is suggestive of its underlying the emergence of novel worldviews in general. That is, if the conditions of emergence of novel religious systems and other worldviews at all resemble the "original" conditions of emergence of traditional worldviews, one feels justified entertaining the idea that rhetoric—persuasive communication (in the hands of a charismatic leader or leaders)—played a vital, originary role in the development of "religions."[1]

To invoke fantastical examples of this idea, science fiction texts like Greg Bear's *Darwin's Radio* (1999) and Orson Scott Card's "The Elephants of Poznan" (in *Keeper of Dreams* (2008)), the evolution of new hominid species from *homo sapiens* together with their new worldviews and ways of life is linked to development of new, supplementary modes of communication. Likewise, in Heinlein's (1961) *Stranger in a Strange Land*, the protagonist's messianic function, announcing a new worldview and initiating people into its

[1] To be clear, I think this perspective on "religion" gets at a core capacity that can help account for the phenomena to which we apply the specific worldview-predicate *religious* (as well as other worldview predicates). I am not trying to provide a categorical definition, either in functional or reductive terms, of what religion is in some *sui generis*, essential sense.

apparently supernatural powers, is primarily exercised through his instructing his followers in the Martian language. In Le Guin's *Earthsea* books, too, one encounters a language-based magical system that is of a variety relatively common in fantasy texts, though generally the primordial language of dragons or elves or some such sacred being takes the place of the Adamic or angelic language of traditional Christian speculation. The power of speech to act, that speech may itself be power, is similarly captured in Eddings's "will and word" formula. (*Cf.*, too, *The Long Price Quartet*, by Daniel Abraham, in which the magical system is poetry-based; the *Spellwright* trilogy, by Blake Charlton, which explores linguistic themes in some detail; the *Magic 2.0* books, by Scott Myers, in which magic is based on manipulation of computer code; and so on.) Perhaps most significant, given the likely evolution of music before "language," are those fantastical works that emphasize the power of music and dance, such as the Shannara children's power to warp reality by singing (in Terry Brooks's *Wishsong of Shannara*), the film *Kubo and the Two Strings*, L. E. Modesitt, Jr.'s *Spellsong Cycle* series, the video game *The Legend of Zelda* (among others that might be cited), Margaret Weis & Tracy Hickman's *The Death Gate Cycle* (Sartan singing and dancing), *The OA* TV series (dance), the *Symphony of Ages* series by Elizabeth Haydon, the *Bardic Voices* series by Mercedes Lackey, Tanya Huff's *Quarters* series, Orson Scott Card's *Songmaster* (1980), Katherine Roberts's *The Echorium Sequence*, Kate Constable's *Chanters of Tremaris* trilogy, Alan Dean Foster's *Spellsinger* series, and others.

Bellah (2011, p. xiv) paraphrases and endorses Clifford Geertz's definition of religion as follows:

> [R]eligion is a system of symbols that, when enacted by human beings, establishes powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations that make sense in terms of an idea of a general order of existence […. Religion] becomes possible only with the emergence of language. The idea of a prelinguistic religion, as in the notion of 'chimpanzee spirituality,' seems implausible to me, though there are developments among some nonhuman animals that provide resources that could contribute to what would become religion among human beings.

I join with Bellah and Geertz in affirming the necessarily linguistic character of "religion" and other worldviews, but I object to the characterization of chimpanzees and other primates as prelinguistic. Rather, the foremost development in our nonhuman ancestors that served as the condition of possibility for religion was the emergence of the capacity for language. Less developed forms of animal signaling are continuous with (and even forms of non-animal signaling are comparable to) the human achievement, and humans have continued developing the capacity as part of their "dual inheritance" of genes and cultural forms (worldviews and ways of life). The arms race of persuasion and suggestibility in communicative social animals that opened up a whole new domain for the play of power drove the development of cognitive capacities that are central to "religion" and other worldviews.[2]

Müller (1866) was perhaps the first to think of religion in terms of linguistic evolution and of myth (see Chapter 3 and its appendices) as a sort of exaptation of language,

[2] I would further propose that those aspects of persuasive rhetoric that humans find most compelling are closest to the innate and environmental factors that drove and constrained the evolution of language. Finally, I would clarify that when I endorse the idea of "religion" as a "symbolic system" I am not endorsing an amodal interpretation of what those symbols mean.

in which human concepts become beings. In this anthropological tradition we may also locate Feuerbach, and Marx's sociological and materialist modifications in some important respects anticipate other aspects of the rhetorical perspective on worldviews that shall be endorsed here. This rhetorical perspective allows one to confront aspects of worldviews – and in this case specifically those designated "religious" – that otherwise tend to be overlooked by the pious and courteous eye. For example, good rhetoric is entertaining, and thinking of the rhetorical nature of religion allows one to regard religion as entertainment and entertainment (*e.g.*, the alternative possible worlds presented by speculative fiction) as religion. Rhetorical techniques are central to advertisement, marketing, and business growth. In this light, we can acknowledge the fact that although "religions" are generally classified as nonprofits, they resemble businesses in important respects (*e.g.*, The Church of Scientology, The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, Universal Life Church, etc.). Rhetoric is fundamentally political and plays an important role in pedagogy. Thus, through rhetoric we are able to find religion-like phenomena outside of those areas that are typically regarded as religious. It becomes obvious that there is a great deal of sematic overlap among fiction, magic, religion, culture, politics, and economics. A discourse-analytic rhetoric is honest about its concern with the play of power, with the social context of a speech event, with the location, disposition, and *situation* of the audience, with the intentions and abilities of the speaker, subjects which are of great interest to scholars of religion.

Any notion about how "religion" originated must be consistent with evolution; it must be grounded in our biological and evolutionary reality. We cannot know for certain how we evolved, but the evolutionary framework can act as a control. Therefore, I shall consider perspectives on the evolution of language, of which I tend to think of our distinctly human "worldviews" a byproduct.[3] I draw heavily on Johansson's (2005) review of the subject, *Origins of Language: Constraints on Hypotheses* (with related works (*e.g.*, Donald, 1991; Bellah, 2011) influencing me implicitly or explicitly as well). This evolutionary story is consistent with Durkheim's (1912) characterization of religion as fundamentally social because communication is the medium of social communion. Similarly, this perspective on "religious" and other worldview leaders as rhetoricians who are good at persuasion may be seen as the other side of Luhrmann's (2012; 2011) proposal that the religious "experts" she studies who are good at having religious experiences score highly on the absorption scale (*cf.* Holland, 2009, especially pp. 47 *ff.*). Suggestibility and the ability to imagine what others describe are prosocial abilities,[4] but for the survival and increased power of

[3] This is not to utterly reject the idea that human "religions" and other worldviews, after they arose, might not serve adaptive functions. For example, the ability of a persuasive leader to propose a worldview so compelling that it closes off questions that otherwise would cause existential distress, thus making a person happier and healthier, seems likely. And it is central to this argument that religion is an extension of a symbolic system's ability to bind its users into a community with shared interests, thereby promoting the social good. In these ways, what was a byproduct could serve adaptive purposes. There is of course a vast literature on this debate.

[4] Although absorption is legitimately called a skill, capacity, or ability, this does not necessarily mean it involves the presence of a novel mental structure. Holland (2009) concludes his discussion of "confabulators, the victims of dysnarrativia, the patients with dysexecutive function who cannot plan, and ourselves, when 'transported' as we respond to works of literature" and notes that "the three with brain damage all suffer from some form of frontal lobe deficiency. It seems reasonable to me to conclude that the fourth, the person transported by media or literary work, has also shut down or bypassed those same frontal lobe systems for generating counterfactuals preparatory to acting" (p. 71). (Phillips and McQuarrie (2010) examine the role of narrative transportation in persuasive ads.) Though the absorption scale was intended initially to test for hypnotizability and proved not to be useful for that purpose (perhaps confounded by the difference between

individuals, they must also be able to defend against the thoughts of others and promote their own. Language fosters both capacities; it anoints magician-kings à la Frazer, with their awed subjects, and it empowers French critical theorists. For an eloquent leader to gain influence over others through the use of things like entertaining narratives (see, *e.g.*, S. Sugiyama's (1996) "On the Origins of Narrative: Storyteller Bias as a Fitness-enhancing Strategy" in *Human Nature* 7(4), pp. 403–425), participatory activities, gestures of appeal and command, and so on, people need to have the ability to be drawn in by entertaining narratives and related phenomena. Likewise, this perspective is consistent with (although it does not require) [1] the notion of Minimally Counterintuitive Concepts of Boyer and Barrett (see also, Holland (2009, pp. 67-68)), which suggests that certain conceptual formations will be more memorable than others—a subject of great rhetorical interest, [2] the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device, whose plausibility has much to do with our evolution being strongly shaped by social factors, [3] the debate about folk psychology of souls – theory of mind being rooted in social life, [4] the ostensive cues of natural pedagogy of and the studies on "motherese,"[5] which may remind us both of the gestural theory of the origin of language and of the fact that the cultural evolution of sophisticated technologies like language required an extended period of parental instruction, and [5] the other arguments for religion's being a prosocial adaptation or byproduct culturally adapted to prosocial ends.

In addition to testing this hypothesis about "religion" by making sure it is consistent with what we know from cognitive, linguistic, and evolutionary studies, I have endeavored to test it against two of the religious systems I know best: ancient "Judaism" (one must be careful in applying this term to the pre-Rabbinic period) and early "Christianity" (which did not immediately differentiate itself from "Judaism" and of which there were, of course, many competing forms), with contemporary fantastical allomythoi as my steady background concern.[6] Christianity especially shows the rhetorical character of what Whitehouse calls the "doctrinal" or "routinized" religions that depend on semantic, as opposed to imagistic, memory.[7] About them he states (Whitehouse, , p. ),

---

fantasizers and dissociaters?), the goal-directed modulation of attention so as to reduce peripheral awareness, concentrate attention and suggestibility, and facilitate as-if roles like that of the uncritical, childlike learner (*i.e.*, natural pedagogy) is clearly a (likely composite) capacity that promotes sociality, but may be at odds with other capacities that promote individuality. A recent model designed to explain what is variously called "absorption," "flow," "immersion," "transportation," and "presence," argues that "subjects are present where they are able to enact intuitively (i.e. without the involvement of reasoning) their implicit (predictive coding) and explicit (intentions) embodied predictions (Kukkonen, 2020; Riva, 2018; Riva et al., 2015)" (Pianzola, Riva, Kukkonen, & Mantovani, 2021, p. 2).

[5] The intimacy of child-directed speech may remind one of the use of cant, argot, jargon, and other sorts of private or semiprivate dialects or ethnolects to signal one's in-group status and to exclude outsiders. One of the characteristics of NRMs seems to be the development of neologisms and the appropriation of old terms by giving them novel meanings. That is, a new worldview frequently coincides with a new form of language, a new use of rhetoric (*cf.* Mack, 1990, pp. 94-95). See Chapter 3.

[6] The theory is also consistent with the business-like structure of the Jehovah's Witnesses—the other religious system in which I have a very strong background—and with the emphasis they place on acquiring rhetorical ability, although other faiths are more explicitly entertaining. Much of their weekly meetings are specifically devoted to rhetorical education.

[7] There is now a large body of literature testing, contesting, and elaborating Whitehouse's ideas. Interestingly, the ancient rhetoricians devoted much effort to the mastery of memory through a number of mnemonic devices. Most notably, they developed the technique called the *method of loci* of building a mental "Palace of Memory," through which one might imaginatively journey and recollect previously associated things one

> In order for people to believe in a set of doctrines, they have to be cast in a highly persuasive fashion. This is commonly achieved, at least in part, by special techniques of oratory established over time through processes of selection. Routinized religions tend to be associated with highly developed forms of rhetoric and logically integrated theology, founded on absolute presuppositions that cannot be falsified. All of this is commonly illustrated by poignant narratives, that can easily be related to personal experience (see, for instance, Whitehouse 1995: chap. 7 and 2000a: 60-63).

Because the religious systems I will deal with here are what Whitehouse terms "doctrinal," their more ordinary experiential basis will be focused on, rather than spectacular and unusual experiences. Although doctrinal religion uses "highly developed forms of rhetoric" that take advantage of the extended and externalized storage capacities of written language, both the doctrinal and imagistic modes of religion depend on rhetoric. Interestingly, recent studies in advertising rhetoric have given more attention to the rhetoric of images and visual metaphors as evocative of experiences (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Forceville, 2008; Scott & Vargas, 2007; Wang & Peracchio, 2008). Similarly, both forms of religion – indeed, all worldviews – are necessarily experiential, and rhetoric, as I stated above, is a technology for modulating, governing, and constituting others' perception and experience.

*Language and the Manipulation of Perception and Past Experience*

As Schjødt (2007, p. 119) notes, cognitive processes—including language—are based on the senses:

> Experiments using fMRI scannings and single-unit recordings show how modality-specific cortices represent the body and its surroundings topographically; different somato-sensory information, colors, shapes, and audio frequencies all seem represented by topographically organized parts of the brain. Broadly speaking, the perception of the color red activates the same area of the primary visual cortex as when semantic knowledge of concepts featuring red is being processed, *e.g.*, Ferrari, rose and strawberry. Again, cognitive processes appear to utilize the same cortical systems that underlie perception. The fact is inconsistent with the amodality hypothesis of clear distinctions between modality-specific input systems and amodal processing of discrete symbols in propositional representations.

New studies show that the modal nature of concepts is not limited to perceptual representations. Rizzolatti *et al*. [year] extend the modal aspect of concepts to the motor systems by the discovery of so-called mirror neurons. Watching a hammer automatically excites the motor systems corresponding to the behaviour associated with the handling of the tool (Rizzolatti *et al.*, in Barsalou, 2002, p. 10). Likewise recent MR studies and neurobiological findings support the idea that emotional content in concepts are represented by the actual visceral and somato-sensory systems involved in primary emotions (Damasio, 1994, p. 139).

Since the distributed (*cf.* Johansson, 2005, p. 109) activation of concepts is *perceptually* based, their manipulation is the manipulation of perception—including emotion

---

desired to recall in a specific order. This illustrates in a rather dramatic fashion the link between spatial cognition and memory, which is to be expected given the fact that both cognitive processes involve the parietal cortex and the hippocampus. For much more detail, see Appendix W2.1.

(*cf.* Damasio, 2005; Holland, 2009, pp. 84-94, 100-104), which, again, is fundamentally perceptual. Based on a number of converging lines of evidence, Schjødt endorses theories like that of Lawrence W. Barsalou, who suggests that "cognitive" processes are simulations or reenactments of perceptual experience.[8] This perspective requires that one regard cognition from a phenomenological perspective that affirms, with figures like Merleau-Ponty (1964), the primacy of perception, in which, in Heidegger's (1927) terms, the mind works, not so much with abstract present-at-hand entities, but with ready-to-hand *beings*.[9]

That the concepts of language are determined by culturally-contingent experience is well illustrated by Heath's (1983) study of the two nearby communities of "Roadville" (a white community) and "Trackton" (a black community):

> In the first years of preschool, teachers set up their classrooms with centers for various activities: block-building, reading, playing with puppets and dolls, painting, and playing with puzzles. Children were to read in the book corner, engage in water play at the sink in the back of the room, and keep puzzles at the table near the shelf where they were stored. Children from Roadville and

---

[8] Perhaps because present-day pedagogical techniques treat things like math and logic as amodal and because modern computers are so sophisticated, we forget their basis in bodily experience and mechanical activity in a way that people of past ages raised with the abacus, the counting board, Napier's Bones, the slide rule, the water clock, the planimeter, the automatic loom, and even the Antikythera Mechanism and other manipulatives would be less likely to. Recall again (n. 5) the ancient rhetoricians' use of the Palace of Memory, by means of which they were able to display great feats of memory through the use of perceptual mental simulation and spatial cognition, and think, too, of the astonishing mathematical abilities Chinese children can display who are trained to visualize the abacus. See Burr et al. (2010), who discuss the manner in which the perception of magnitude of space, time, and number all arise from a common source: saccades.

[9] Although language is grounded in perceptual and social experience and is not amodal in the sense of being purely "mental," whatever that would mean (it clearly implies some sort of unsustainable substance dualism), Johansson (2005, p. 173) notes that

> Language *per se* is basically modality-independent, as long as the modality used supports a sufficiently rich structure. In modern society, a large fraction of all language use is written rather than spoken. If anything, the written modality supports more complex language than the spoken. Other alternative modalities can easily be imagined, and quite a few have been used, both in ape language experiments (see Chapter 7) and in the teaching of severely retarded [sic] non-speaking children (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994).

Likewise, he states that neuroimaging studies suggest interesting similarities between speech and sign language (Johansson, 2005, p. 174, n. 20),

> Including the surprising observation that brain areas normally used for auditory processing are involved in sign processing in congenitally deaf individuals (Nishimura et al., 1999; Hickock et al., 1998b). Petitto et al. (2000) make the same observation, and conclude that the brain areas traditionally believed to handle auditory speech processing are in fact more general modality-independent language modules. An alternative explanation could be that these brain areas are indeed auditory in hearing people, but lie fallow in deaf people and are recruited [or, as some say, "modularized"] for sign processing.

Holland (2009) quotes a striking example of neural plasticity in an experiment with blind people that involved

> attaching to their backs a patch driven by a video camera that the subject controls, a camera whose output to the patch causes the stimulation of multiple points on the skin. Each point represents one small area of the image captured by the camera. Within hours, some subjects can learn to recognize common objects such as cups and telephones, to point accurately in space, to judge distance, and finally to use perspective and parallax to perceive external objects in a stable three-dimensional world.… After a few hours, the person no longer interprets the skin sensations as being of the body but projects them into the space being explored by the body-directed "gaze" of the video camera. (qtd. in Holland, 2009, p. 26)

> similar communities found these rules linking particular functions to special places familiar; adults in their communities also demanded that certain activities take place only in certain areas. Children from Trackton and similar communities were, however, puzzled by the space-function ties that teachers expected them to recognize and obey. When told to "play," they interpreted play as improvisation and creation, and these called for flexibility in the mingling of materials and the mixing of items from different parts of the room. A truck which had detachable parts and was kept in the puzzle corner was to be taken to the sandbox where water and sand could be mixed, the tires changed, and spare truck parts hauled. If a particular piece of a puzzle looked like a wrench or a jack for a truck, or a spoon for feeding a doll, Trackton children went to the puzzle shelf to incorporate it in their play. Teachers despaired when they found what they classified as *puzzles* in the sandbox or the doll corner. They said repeatedly: "Put the puzzle pieces where they *belong*." "When we finish our puzzles, we put them up [or away]." These directives seemed to have no meaning to the Trackton children, and in the first few weeks of school, the most well-intentioned teachers found themselves making invidious comparisons between the Trackton children and those from Roadville who were "so obedient and so neat with their toys." (pp. 273-274)

"Trackton" adults sought to inculcate a pragmatic worldview in their children, one in which a stable, fixed order could not be expected. In order to do this, they shaped the children's linguistic experience:

> At one moment, Darett might accept without comment Lem's "no"; on another occasion, he might use it as the stimulus for a long teasing interaction. There are no prescribed or invariant phrases necessary for given occasions which Trackton children must learn or can offer, for which the response will be predictable. If a child says "bye-bye," an adult may respond by a wave and "bye-bye," or he may grab the child roughly and say "You tryin' to make me go home, boy?" The only communicative certainties, once a child is beyond a year old, are high, piercing screams which indicate real pain and bring adult response, or high pitched whines, which bring a scolding or even a smack on the buttocks. (Heath, 1983, pp. 83-84)

One "Trackton" resident, called "Annie Mae" by Heath, explains what is going on in the following way:

> He gotta learn to *know* 'bout dis world, can't nobody tell 'im. Now just how crazy is dat? White folks uh hear dey kids say sump'n, dey say it back to 'em, dey aks 'em 'gain 'n 'gain 'bout things, like they 'posed to be born knowin'. You think I kin tell Teegie all he gotta know to get along? He just gotta be keen, keep his eyes open, don't he be sorry. Gotta watch hisself by watchin' other folks. Ain't no use me tellin' 'im: 'Learn dis, learn dat. What's dis? What's dat?' He just gotta learn, gotta know; he see one thing one place one time, he know how it go, see sump'n like it again, maybe it be de same, maybe it won't. He hafta try it out. If he don't he be in trouble; he get lef' out. Gotta keep yo' eyes open, gotta feel to know. (Heath, 1983, p. 84)

This dialog alludes to the fact that "Trackton" adults do not regard children as potential sources of information and generally do not ask them questions. Children are permitted to observe adult conversation and may be talked about by adults, but they are not addressed, unless for what Heath calls "fussing," "teasing," and "playsong" exchanges. Notably, this cultural feature includes a rejection of parentese:

> Neither simplifying aspects of baby talk (such as reducing the phonological structure of words, substituting easier sounds for more complex ones, reducing inflections, and using special lexical items) nor clarifying features (such as slowing down speech, using special pitch or intonation patterns, and substituting names for pronouns) are used by Trackton adults, though they recognize them as part of a phenomenon which exists outside their way of bringing up their children. (Heath, 1983, p. 95)

As Heath documents, the "Trackton" children's experiences with their parents and other adults shaped the way they understood and perceived the world.

*Evolution of Language*

When one thinks of language, one may first think of its verbal/auditory mode. Evolutionarily, our species' unusual breath control, which plays a significant role in our ability to modulate sound, seems to be linked to bipedal walking having decoupled gate and breathing (Provine, 2001), so freeing up our hands for tool use and increased command of vocalization seem to have coincided. The range of sounds humans can make is largely due to the versatility and structure of our vocal tract, which depends on the location of our larynx. Concerning the larynx, Johansson (2005, pp. 78, 80) states the following:

> In adult humans, the larynx has descended further down the throat, compared with its position in other primates, increasing the space available for articulation. Furthermore, the supralaryngeal tract in humans is bent almost 90 degrees, with the bend dividing it into two almost-equal pieces, unlike the fairly straight tube of most other mammals. This shape, together with our ability to manipulate the shape further, broadens the spectrum of articulatory possibilities (Lieberman & McCarthy, 1999; Aiello, 1998) [….] In this particular case, ontogeny does recapitulate phylogeny (Haeckel, 1897), as human babies are born with the larynx in the ape position (Lieberman & McCarthy, 1999), which is better suited for breast-feeding. The larynx then descends as the baby graduates from breast-feeding to talking, gradually from age 3 months to 3 years or so (Fitch, 2000b) [….] The human vocal tract in its current form is exquisitely adapted for speech, at considerable evolutionary expense (Pinker & Bloom, 1990; Spangle & Menzel, 1991; Pinker, 1995; Fitch, 2000b; Deacon, 2000). This makes it somewhat problematic to argue for its origin as a rather marginal improvement for some other purpose, or just a byproduct of some other adaptation. If the modifications of the vocal tract did evolve for the purpose of facilitating speech, as appears highly likely, this implies that our ancestors had some other form of spoken language before they had a human vocal tract – evolution does not plan ahead!

One can bracket for a moment the question of whether our ancestors would have required *spoken* language at all. Johansson (2005, pp. 85-86) elaborates on what he means by "some other form of spoken language," stating,

> Speech does not strictly require the full modern human set of speech sounds, but could well make do with a smaller number of phonemes, emitted by a simpler and more primitive vocal apparatus. In fact, no modern language uses the full capacity of our speech organs – there are languages that use as few as 11 sounds out of the hundreds that we are capable of producing (Vaneechoutte & Skoyles, 1998). It is thus not difficult to imagine proto-speech, that could be spoken with a proto-human larynx with a much smaller repertoire of sounds. And the vocal apparatus of apes and monkeys does appear capable of producing a non-negligible number of phonemes that are usable for communication (if subtle to human ears), with a richer structure than has often been believed (Rendall et al., 1999; Fischer, 1998). This structure includes features like fundamental frequency declination (Hauser & Fowler, 1992), which has sometimes been claimed as a human language universal, as well as others (Maurus et al., 1988).

The fact that the human vocal tract is so specifically adapted to speech (but see De Boer, 2009) introduces a problem (Johansson, 2005, p. 164):

> There is a chicken-and-egg problem at the very beginning of language evolution—with no language at all there will be no selection pressure towards adapting our bodies and minds for language use, and without such selection pressure we won't be adapted for language use—implying that the first steps towards language had to be based on pre-existing features that had originally evolved for some other purpose.

This suggests that our ancestors first used a pre-existing simple vocal apparatus or gestures or both in combination to communicate with each other, as we know is the case from related animals that engage in sophisticated signaling. With regard to the theory of the gestural origin of language, Johansson (2005, p. 175) favorably notes,

> Even among people using spoken language, gesturing is firmly wedded to language use (Goldin-Meadow, 1999; Bates & Dick, 2002) [….] Normal hearing children acquire the use of communicative gestures in parallel with speech acquisition (Acredolo & Goodwyn, 1988; Bates & Dick, 2002), and there is some evidence that gesturing actually precedes speech in acquisition (Goodwyn & Acredolo, 1993; Goldin-Meadow, 1999) [….] Apes also have the cortical control of their hands needed for sign language (Corballis, 1999), while lacking the corresponding vocal control [….] Accordingly, wild chimpanzees can communicate voluntarily and flexibly with gestures, whereas their vocalizations are mainly involuntary (Tomasello, 2003). Interesting in this context is that in chimpanzees fine motor movements of the hands are frequently accompanied by sympathetic mouth movements, hinting at a possible path from gestures to speech (Waters & Fouts, 2002). The transition to bipedalism may nevertheless have been an important exaptation in this context (Corballis, 2002), as it in the short run freed the hands for gesturing even while moving around, and in the long run freed the hands

> from selection pressure for locomotor efficiency. (*cf.* Corballis, 2015, pp. 93-94)

Let us imagine that language was originally gestural. Why, then, would speech have evolved? Johansson (2005, p. 177) lists several possibilities in the literature:

> —Speech is more efficient, using less time and energy (Knight, 2000).
> —There is no need to see each other, an advantage in the dark, or in heavy vegetation (Rousseau, 1755).
> —Speech calls attention to the speaker in a way that gestures do not (Rousseau, 1755).
> —The hands are not needed for communication, making it possible to work or carry things while communicating (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1996).

He further suggests, "An alternative possibility is that gestures and speech were used in parallel in the beginning, while the production and reception of both modalities were still in their infancy (Bickerton, 2003). According to Rowe (1999), such multicomponent signaling improves detectability and discriminability beyond that possible with either component alone" (idem). The converging picture is one of almost over-determined pressures for information transferal and conceptual manipulation, via both gestural and vocal modes, together with environmental manipulation primarily by means of the hands.

Regarding the free use of the hands, notice the function other than communication mentioned in Carstairs-McCarthy (1996): work. Tool manufacture and use in work requires specific skills. Other animals, including "lower" primates, use tools. Johansson (2005, pp. 201-202) states,

> Ambrose (2001), citing earlier work by among others Greenfield (1991), discusses another possible role for tool making in the origins of language. The making of composite tools is a sequential and combinatorial activity – but combining multiple elements into a structured sequence is characteristic also of language. In this model, tool making coevolves with syntactical language, but one may also consider the possibility that composite tool making evolved first, and provided mental tools that were perfect exaptations for language (Wildgen, 2004).

Because of the importance of sequencing for tool manufacture and use and other sophisticated, rapid motions, "The evolution of a sequencing module may possibly, as argued by Calvin (1993), have been a crucial step in human evolution. It may originally have been an adaptation for improved throwing or other motor sequences, driven by straightforward natural selection for better hunting skills [….] But once established, for whatever reason, such a sequencing module would be a vital exaptation for language, making the eventual evolution of speech much easier (Wilkins & Wakefield, 1995; Calvin, 1993)" (Johansson, 2005, p. 85). In the larger body of this work outside this appendix, I note how the spatial capacity for retaining cognitive maps or routes of spatial "events" is closely linked to how narratives are composed and recalled, but one can see how the complex sequential capacity exhibited in tool construction and use – as well, one might note, as in dancing, sports, and music[10] – points to a sequential-compositional adaptation that was highly spatial. Tests of spatial capacities approach spatial cognition as the complex phenomenon it is. The abilities to visualize, mentally rotate, combine and abstract are just as crucial to spatial cognition as are the capacities to navigate and recall locations. As both

[10] See Bellah (2011) on music and dance—pp. xviii, 20, 24, 128-129, 131, 572, 87, 42, 473, 92.

vocal and instrumental, that is, as a coincident use of mouth and tool-using hands, Mithen (2009) likewise argues that music and language coevolved. The link between musical ability and mathematical ability is common knowledge, and it is clear that as soon as sequentiality (so closely linked to hierarchy) is present so too is number. Indeed, the ancients first represented number by using the alphabetic sequence.[11] *Thus, the picture that emerges in my mind is one of mutually-reinforced increased command over social (hierarchical) and physical (sequential) space, depending on increased spatial reasoning, which implicitly includes capacities that may be isolated or abstracted as "mathematical" but which also includes important rhetorical applications, hand and tool use, and vocalization. All of these novel* ***combinatory skills****[12] (for tools, for mental maps, for arrangements of sounds and movements of the body, and so on) involve a fantastic* ***openness*** *or indeterminacy.*

Therefore, another important human trait related to the emergence of language is our neoteny. Our extended childhood and retention of infantile traits—especially play[13] (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Bellah, 2011; and especially Ragir and Savage-Rumbaugh (2009), who connect language evolution to primate play structure)—coincides with an enhanced early learning ability that seems to also be present in other primates such as chimps and bonobos (*cf.*, Johansson, 2005, pp. 133-134). The pedagogical use of language for social animals in social contexts cannot be overstated.

Further support for the social hypothesis comes from the various experiments attempting to teach language to non-humans, reviewed in Chapter 7 above. The only species having any kind of success in these experiments, apes, dolphins and parrots, are highly social with complex group relations. Additionally, teaching experiments are significantly more successful if they take place in a social setting (Pepperberg, 2001; Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994). (Johansson p. 213)[14]

---

[11] N.B., I here distinguish between sequence and magnitude. *Cf.* n. 7.

[12] Indeed, the essence of "meaning" seems to be the combinatory building of *relations* among things—feelings, semantic knowledge, events, etc. (*cf.* Baumeister 1991, p. 15).

[13] "Knight (2000) and Ragir (2001) return to the idea of childhood play as an exaptation for language, particularly its creative and combinatorial aspects, and support it with a much better understanding of evolution than Foster [1991]. In Knight's version, it appears fairly plausible that play contributed at some level to the origin of language" (Johansson, 2005, p. 214; about play, cognition, and literature, see also Holland (2009, pp. 57-58)). Note that play sets up a kind of alternate reality, which has clear relevance to religion and other worldviews, but social play has the precondition of requiring that animals be able to signal and mutually understand that the play-state is being invoked. See the section on "play" in Chapter 2.

[14] Johansson (2005, p. 193) summarizes the "patterns observed in direct comparison between human and non-human language acquisition" as follows:

1. Systematic training of apes within a conditioning paradigm has met with very limited success
   *but*
   language acquisition in a social communicative context works much better.
2. Adult apes who were not exposed to language at a young age, are poor language learners
   *but*
   apes immersed in language from a tender age are much more successful.
3. Non-human acquisition is often a slow and tedious process in the beginning
   *but*
   after some threshold is passed, learning can be much more rapid and human-like (Pepperberg, 2001; Lyn & Savage-Rumbaugh, 2000).
4. When an ape (Kanzi) was directly compared with a human child with similar communicative and general cognitive skills, the human child out-performed Kanzi on list-type sentences ('Get the apple and the orange and the banana')
   *but*

For species that are open but in continuity with a past of fixed roles, what would be instinctually known in other species must be learned (via signaling) from members of the social group, and this openness in tension with fixity may develop into what Maurice Bloch calls "transcendental" as opposed to merely "transactional" categories of social life (*sensu* Bloch, 2008). That is, imaginary, essentialized social categories that retain their significance apart from individual members.

*Social Pressures and Capacities*

All of this gets at what seems to be the primary driver of language (and worldview) evolution: the social environment, the situation of sociality (*cf.* Steels, 2009; Turner, Maryanski, Petersen, and Geertz, 2017). What produced the pressure for such increased mastery of social and environmental space? Social interaction of children with their parents plays a vital role in their acquisition of language during the critical period. Johansson (2005, p. 97-98) states,

> Most primates live in complex social groups, where relations with (and manipulation of) conspecifics play a major role. Unlike most social mammals, where a rather straightforward dominance hierarchy is the rule, politics and coalition-building are important for a primate's success (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2002), driving the evolution of social intelligence (de Waal & Tyack, 2003). This has been called the social brain hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998) or, more colorfully, 'Machiavellian intelligence', a label introduced by Byrne & Whiten (1988, cited in Tomasello (2000c)), though the general concept was first proposed by Alison Jolly (Small, 2000). And humans live in larger and more complex societies than other primates, so this selective force would be unusually strong for us (Flinn, 1997). This can indeed lead to a runaway 'arms race' of brain power, but begs the question of where the social complexity came from in the first place. An interesting parallel is the evolution of similarly large brains in dolphins and related whales, who have comparable social complexity (Connor et al., 1998; Lusseau, 2003).

Along these lines, he further observes (Johansson, 2005, p. 138),

> In language teaching experiments, impressive progress has been made in establishing the capacity for at least rudimentary forms of 'uniquely human' cognitive and communicative skills in both apes and dolphins and possibly parrots. The dolphins and parrots, however, are phylogenetically distant from us, and the Mesozoic common ancestors that they share with us clearly did not have anything remotely resembling their current cognitive capacity. This implies that their communication abilities are the result of parallel evolution, and thus tells us little directly about the origins of human language. However, it is interesting to note that all animals that have any kind of success in this

---

> the ape out-performed the human on word-order sensitive sentences, where syntax would appear to be the key.

As with apes, so too with parrots—they do much better when taught language through social interaction, especially competition (Johansson, 2005, p. 137). And even dogs have developed gaze-following, empathetic, and moderate linguistic skills due to the domestication process as companions of human social groups (*cf.* Johansson, 2005, p. 150). Conversely, "humans such as Genie (Goldin-Meadow, 1982) who are not exposed to language in early childhood also fail to acquire normal human language" (Johansson, 2005, p. 140).

> [sic] type of experiments belong to highly social species with complex group interactions [….]

Complex group interactions – that is, spaces requiring intersubjective coordination, persuasion, defense, etc. – necessitate increasingly sophisticated signaling techniques. Johansson (2005, pp. 235-236) suggests that the evolutionary sequence of grammar could have been (1) a one-word stage involving "semantics with no syntax," (2) a two-word stage containing structure, then (3) a hierarchical structure, followed by (4) a partially recursive syntax, and finally (5) a full human grammar. The early features of grammar[15] seem to be rooted in primate social realities. For example, primates are good at sequences, and have limited abilities to work with hierarchical structures (see also Ragir and Savage-Rumbaugh (2009) on the normative function and structure of primate play). Their limitations can be accounted for by the relative simplicity of their social environment compared to the vast and complicated social world of humans resulting from our unlimited group size.

Johansson (2005) reviews how syntactical ability might arise from social pressures, drawing on primates' structured and hierarchical social lives and exapting their capacities to model them (*cf.* pp. 231, 238-239). Let me quote him at some length to illustrate the "Machiavellian" hypothesis before also addressing the more benevolent and caring aspects of language:

> What really leads to a cognitive arms race is when the simple hierarchiy based on one-on-one dominance relationships is abandoned, and the possibility of status based on friendships and coalitions and negotiations is considered. In this case you have to keep track of not only your own position in the hierarchy, but also the social networks of everybody in the group – who is friendly with whom, who might consider an alliance with whom, and so on. You must be able to solve social equations like what happens if you attack individual A, when B, C, and D are also present – B might side with you, since you did him a good turn last week, but that might cause C and D to gang up on him, in which case …
>
> The possibilities are endless, and grow exponentially with increasing group size. In the simplest case, social networks are based on blood relationships, so that kin form permanent alliances. This is fairly common

---

[15] That is, excluding recursion, which even humans are only capable of in a limited fashion but which may emerge from the ability to conceive of nested predicates, an ability whose nascence can be observed in primates and perhaps other mammals (*cf.* Johansson, 2005, pp. 237-238). *Nested predicates may be thought of as an instance of the sort of cognitive "worlds within worlds" that are one of the major themes of this framework for understanding allomythoi in fantastika.*

In response to the Chomskyan idea that humans would not be able to acquire language (let alone acquire it so rapidly) without an innate Language Acquisition Device and a Universal Grammar, some have argued that the principles of Universal Grammar are necessary *a priori* based on logico-semantic and pragmatic constraints of any workable symbolic form of communication (*cf.* Johansson, 2005, pp. 180-180). This is a provocative suggestion, but it's somewhat puzzling given the fact that there are many types of logics, geometries, and, in sum, language games of all sorts. Even if we did have Universal Grammar, there is cause to think, according to Deacon (2004b, cited in Johansson (2005, p. 189)), that such mechanisms "would be evolutionarily unstable […] subject to 'devolution'. Even if we were somehow miraculously endowed with a full innate genetically specified Universal Grammar, if at the same time we had efficient learning mechanisms, which we do, this would relax the selection pressure needed to weed out random mutations in the 'grammar genes', which would eventually ruin them, much the same way that our unnecessary genes for vitamin C production have been ruined (Nishikimi et al., 1994; Ohta & Nishikimi, 1999)."

> among *e.g.*, baboons (Strum, 1989) and various other mammals. Kin networks are permanent, making them easy to keep track of, limiting the cognitive demands, but also limiting the political possibilities. DNA testing on chimpanzees has shown that their politics is not limited in this way – coalitions of non-relatives are common (Goldberg & Wrangham, 1997; Mitani et al., 2000). They are not totally unknown among baboons either (Byrne, 2000), though less common.
>
> Here we have the basis for the hypothesis of 'Machiavellian intelligence' mentioned earlier. Considering that both humans and chimps spend a major fraction of their time and cognitive abilities pondering intra-group relations, and considering that humans do it in much larger and more complex groups than chimpanzees, the hypotheses appears highly plausible – we hardly need such an enormous brain to outwit Nature, but we might well need it to outwit our fellow humans (Pinker, 1994), in order to win the game that we might call 'social chess' (Andrews, 2001).
>
> […] Agreements, formations of alliances, trading of favors, coalition building, all aspects of politics place heavy demands on the communication between the parties involved. A better communicator is a better politician, and a better politician can gain higher status in the group, and reap the associated reproductive benefits for his communicator genes and memes – and spread them in the tribe. Dessalles (2000; 2003a; 2003b; 2004) discusses this further, also invoking a direct role for speech in gaining status. (ibid, pp. 210-212)

The quote above returns to the theme of what I called above humans' *fantastic indeterminacy*, including the possibility of a open, or at least quasi-open, social structure. As soon as group size exploded, great pressure would be placed on the "conventional" affordances or "social facts" of social life – the roles and norms that make social coexistence predictable (see Ramstead, Veissière, & Kirmayer, 2016).[16] This flux would increasingly pressure social animals – in this case, hominids – to have flexible rather than fixed categories as well as retained fixed categories that endure, in imagination, in spite of flux (*cf.* Taves, Asprem, & Ihm, 2018). The rough game of politics is hardly the playfulness of childhood, but it does draw on the neotenic character of our species. The passage concludes by noting the possibility of reproductive benefits. Again, this political framework is not very romantic, but the charisma of a leader, as mentioned at the outset of this appendix, may be related to being quite "charming." Johansson continues,

> If one observes (or participates in) the mating rituals of *Homo sapiens* today, it is obvious that language plays a non-negligible role. The possibility that this may have been true also for early hominids is considered by many authors, *e.g.* Cziko (1995) and Wildgen (2004). In this scenario, the selective advantage that drove language evolution may simply have been that the better speakers were preferred as mates, and so got more offspring (Miller, 1999, cited in Dunbar (2003b)). A variation on the same theme is the hypothesis of

[16] Even trees have been demonstrated to engage in providing *conventional* affordances typical of sociality for each other – communicating danger, sharing resources, and so on, so one must be cautious regarding one's assumptions about the lack of sophistication of biological signaling among non-humans (see, *e.g.*, Wohlleben, 2015).

> sexual conflict as a driving force (Aiello, 1998), as is the observation that verbal skills can be translated into political power, which in turn enhances reproductive success (Pinker & Bloom, 1990) – as Henry Kissinger reputedly expressed it: "*Power is the strongest aphrodisiac*". (2005, p. 202)

The opinion of Henry Kissinger aside, sexual selection as a factor in language evolution (and its related sequential capacities like human music and dance) is compelling. And erotic union is but one mode of a more general use for language for communion: "In order to maintain friendships in very large groups, a more time-effective method is needed. Dunbar (1993; 1996) proposes that language evolved for this purpose, as a tool for 'verbal grooming'" (Johansson p. 213; *cf.* Holland, 2009, p. 252).

This "verbal grooming" conception is consistent with the pro-social theory of the evolution of "religion" (*i.e.*, worldviews; *cf.*, *e.g.*, Norenzayan, Shariff, Gervais, Willard, McNamara, Slingerland, & Henrich, 2016) – which of course is much debated – and of meaning-making systems as aids for dealing with anxiety, absurdity, and related stressors. Again, the "social pressures" of unbounded tribal size among early humans would produce all sorts of challenges and stressors, compelling both the formation of "global meaning"[17] that addresses and integrates the challenges in new *relations* relative to "global goals" (*i.e.*, meanings).[18] As Park (2010) states,

> (a) People possess orienting systems, referred to here as global meaning, that provide them with cognitive frameworks with which to interpret their experiences and with motivation; (b) When encountering situations that have the potential to challenge or stress their global meaning, individuals appraise the situations and assign meaning to them; (c) The extent to which that

---

[17] Park defines "global meaning" as follows:

> Global meaning refers to individuals' general orienting systems (Pargament, 1997) [*cf.* Poplin, 2014], consisting of beliefs, goals, and subjective feelings (Dittman-Kohli & Westerhof, 1999; Reker & Wong, 1988). Global beliefs comprise broad views regarding justice, control, predictability, coherence, and so on, as well as individuals' self-views (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Leary & Tangney, 2003; Parkes, 1993; see Koltko-Rivera, 2004), and form the core schemas through which people interpret their experiences of the world (Janoff-Bulman & Frantz, 1997; Mischel & Morf, 2003) [….] A subjective sense of meaning refers to feelings of "meaningfulness" (Klinger, 1977), a sense that one has purpose or direction (Reker & Wong, 1988), and is thought to derive from seeing one's actions as oriented toward a desired future state or goal (*cf.* King et al., 2006; McGregor & Little, 1998). Whether this subjective sense of meaning should be considered an aspect of global meaning or a derivative thereof is currently in dispute (see Steger, in press). Global meaning is assumed to be constructed early in life and modified on the basis of personal experiences (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Singer & Salovey, 1991). The extent to which people are aware of their global beliefs and goals has not been established (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Klinger, 1998; Martin & Tesser, 1996; Uleman, 1996), but global meaning nonetheless appears to powerfully influence individuals' thoughts, actions, and emotional responses. (Park, 2010, p. 258)

[18] Park defines "global goals" as follows:

> Global goals are internal representations of desired processes, events, or outcomes (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). Goals can be desired end states (Karoly, 1999) or states already possessed that one seeks to maintain, such as health or relationships with loved ones (Klinger, 1998). Among the most commonly reported global goals are relationships, work, religion, knowledge, and achievement (Emmons, 2003). Goals are organized hierarchically, with superordinate higher level goals determining midlevel and lower level goals (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). (*ibid.*)

> appraised meaning is discrepant with their global meaning determines the extent to which they experience distress; (d) The distress caused by discrepancy initiates a process of meaning making; (e) Through meaning-making efforts, individuals attempt to reduce the discrepancy between appraised and global meaning and restore a sense of the world as meaningful and their own lives as worthwhile; and (f) This process, when successful, leads to better adjustment to the stressful event. (pp. 257-258)

Park notes that some aspects of this framework have more empirical support than others, but this general framework is consistent with the present understanding of how probabilistic self-and-world modelling works. The default probabilistic self-and-world model functions smoothly without the intervention of executive and other reappraisal processes until a conflict between stimuli and model occurs; then, at various hierarchical cognitive levels attempts are made (moving from the *automatic* to the *deliberate* and ranging from the highly affective to the more abstract and propositional—*cf.* Park, 2010, pp. 259-260) to explain away the discrepancy, ether by *assimilating* one's perception to one's default model or by *accommodating* the model to the novel situation (*cf.* Park, 2010, p. 260). Seymour Fisher and Rhoda Fisher (1993), in *The Psychological Adaptation to Absurdity: Tactics of Make-Believe*, rightly use rather Existentialist language to describe the sensation of "discrepancy"; incoherence, as a failure of one's capacity to predict reality (*cf.* Fisher and Fisher, 1993, pp. 49 *ff.*), casts a pall of absurdity over experience, accentuating the world's unfairness, unreasonableness, or injustice. The subtitle, *Tactics of Make-Believe*, points to the vital role of the imagination relative to meaning-making. As a review of the literature at the time on the defensive, buffering, or mollifying function of make-believe, it well illustrates what might be called the pleasantly mystificatory use of fiction and the rhetoric thereof. They argue, for example, that

> A majority [of the defensive maneuvers in the literature] seems to take religious or quasireligious forms [….] The defensive value of belief systems rooted in religion for countering concerns about death has been demonstrated with particular precision by Osarchuk and Tatz (1973). They showed, with a clarity that is unusual in this area of research, that an upsurge of death anxiety [*i.e.*, what is more commonly now termed *mortality salience*] can trigger a compensatory increase in a religious type of faith" (Fisher and Fisher, 1993, pp. 31, 33).

They further quote Rosenblatt et al. as stating:

> According to terror management theory, the beliefs and values that make up an individual's cultural worldview serve the vital function of buffering the anxiety that results from awareness of human vulnerability and mortality. The theory posits that the cultural worldview espoused by any given individual is a fragile construction that needs persistent social validation if the individual is to maintain faith in it. Those who deviate from cultural standards are responded to with disdain because such behavior threatens the values that underlie the individual's source of security. Similarly, those who uphold cultural values are admired because such behavior validates the individual's values. (1989, p. 688; qtd. In Fishere and Fisher, 1993, p. 34)

Those who supply and maintain global meaning for others aid them in confronting the many stressors and discrepancies of life. Those who do so persuasively, with rhetorical and educational skill, are often rewarded with cultural and material capital.

Holland (2009) states, "I believe that what literature required was one specific instance of a general ability that cognitive scientists call 'metarepresentation.' We have a variety of mental states: desires, percepts, beliefs, memories, knowledge, thoughts, intentions, feelings, and so on. What the meta- adds is that we humans can have *mental states about mental states* [….] That ability combines with another, the assumption that we acquire early in life and hold deeply, that others' minds work like our own" (pp. 323-324). Urban (2002) suggests that metasignaling may find its precursor in the strategic vocal deceptions of earlier primates. Functionally referential symbolic representation, metarepresentation, intentionality, and theory-of-mind seem to be present to some degree in language-using primates (Johansson, 2005, pp. 121-123, 149-154, 169), but Johansson claims that they are present only in "human-reared participants in language-learning experiments" (Johansson, 2005, pp. 152-153). Similarly,

> initially healthy children who for some reason are deprived of early social interaction and linguistic input, display theory-of-mind delays reminiscent of autism. Deaf children of hearing (and non-signing) parents is a case in point (Garfield et al., 2001; Peterson & Siegal, 2000). This would seem to indicate that a theory of mind grows out of early social and verbal interactions, something which children sharing no modality with their parents might be deprived of, and which autists don't participate normally in (Peterson & Siegal, 2000). (Johansson, 2005, p. 148)

The role culture can play in inhibiting language acquisition may be illustrated by Heath's (1983) study of African-American children in "Trackton." With regard to little girls, Heath notes that they are treated as well as boys while infants, but states,

> However, girls in Trackton begin participation in the third stage – that of entering conversations and adding new discourse topics – later than the boys. Boys sometimes begin to do this by about fourteen to sixteen months and consistently interrupt adults with these attempts by the age of eighteen months. No girls begin the participatory stage before the age of twenty-two months, and when they do so, they are successful in sustaining conversational roles far less frequently than boys. Adults do not pick up on either what the girls mean when they bring up a particular topic or how that topic relates to the current situation. When boys make these interruptions, they often refer to events or objects connected with challenges and ensuing interactions from the public stage. Girls, however, are restricted from engaging in such challenges, since they are not issued to them. Thus the major occasion in which boys practice nonverbal and verbal communication with substantial reinforcement is denied to girls [….] By the age of twenty-two months and often continuing beyond their early school years, however, it is common to see girls setting up their own practice-interaction sessions. (Heath, 1983, pp. 95-96)

Social interaction is critical for healthy formation of a sense of self and a theory of mind, and subjectivity may even be influenced by the internalization of external speech. But this does not necessarily mean that one need embrace a Vygotsky-like form of language internalization (*cf.* Jones, 2009). Similarly, although this account of worldviews bases them

in language and language in society, this does not mean that private "religion," religion in one's solitude, is to be *reduced* to some internalization of a group-practice. We can think things that have never been said by others. Language's infinite combinatorial potential, although the gift of society, allows us to surpass its inherited form.

Sounds reminiscent of Foundryside. In that book, magic is a matter of inscribing words and sentences in an ancient language that convince objects to act in a certain way, so a cart to roll on a flat surface as it's rolling downhill. If similarly treats magic like programming, If-then-esque statements that can mold and bend the properties of items and nature

Let's consider one other factor before concluding this review of possible evolutionary pressures, capacities, and trajectories. Communicative intention is often stressed when it comes to language. In fact, the emphasis placed on the coercive or manipulative use of communication in persuasive rhetoric is a central theme of the present argument. Nonetheless, as Johansson (2005) notes, "Comprehension of the signals of others is possible even without there being any communicative intent on the part of the sender—very likely our pre-linguistic ancestors were already trying to figure out each other's intentions (Bickerton, 2003)" (p. 19). By attending and responding to the warning signals of non-conspecifics, for example, animals can dramatically improve their fitness and chances of passing on their genetic traits. "Diana monkeys," for instance, "respond not only to their own alarm calls, but also to the alarm calls of other species living in the same area, notably guinea fowl (Zuberbühler, 2000a), chimpanzees (Zuberbühler, 2000b), and Campbell monkeys (Zuberbühler, 2000c)" (Johansson, 2005, p. 124). This is a striking instance of cross-species freeloading. Alarm calls for conspecifics might be accounted for by kin selection, but this example shows how costly to others and how truly beneficial to oneself the ability to interpret others' signals is.

What makes the Ancient Language (also the language of the elves) in the Inheritance Cycle unique is that it is a language that affects the universe, but does not allow the universe to read the intent of the caster. So if a character wants to heal a broken shoulder, they can't simply incant "Heal!" in the Ancient Language. Rather, the caster must be very specific in what it wants the universe to do–move this muscle back into place first, then fuse these two bones, then move that fused bone, etc.–in order to use magic in any useful sense. Where simpler language magics are about finding the correct key for an existing lock, language magics of intermediate complexity add interaction and negotiation with a third party into the mix. In essence, it's not enough to know the language and its terms, you have to be able to converse in that language, as well.

The above review paints a compelling but incomplete picture. The various arguments considered above tend to stress certain aspects of social life to the neglect of others. For example, the Machiavellian emphasis makes one focus on social competition, rather than cooperation.[19] Also, in the passages above, the assumed gender is male, and the foundational social interplay between mothers and children is neglected. A male might find an advantage in lying and using false or misleading signals to manipulate others in a group, as indeed

[19] "But the fact that apes succeed in competitive tasks, but fail in simple cooperative tasks that appear obvious and natural to humans, is interpreted by Tomasello et al. (in press) as a sign of another type of difference between us and the other apes. It is argued that, while all apes have the basics of a theory of mind, humans alone are motivated to cooperate and share emotions and activities, and use their theory of mind for collaborative rather than competitive purposes" (Johansson, 2005, p. 152).

might a female. But the deep value of information transmission is starkly evident in the educative interaction of the parent and the child. Again, when the literature touches on this topic, it seems to assume adult-adult interaction: "Dessalles (2000) proposes the interesting idea that while speech in itself may be cheap, relevant information-laden speech is not – and talk containing valuable information, unlike lies or empty chattering, can gain you status in the group" (Johansson, 2005, p. 126). Yes, information and verbal skill can give one status in a species that values verbal talent and that recognizes that knowledge is a form of power, but would not the first use of such a talent by a species that wanted to give its cherished children fitness advantages be to inculcate in them that knowledge-power? If, as seems quite possible, all our larger friendship and non-kin ('fictive' kin) cooperative alliances are extensions of the capacity for parental cherishing, this would have played an important role in the evolution of language. In the discussion above, the importance of sequencing, multimodal coordination, and hierarchical structures for the emergence of syntax has been mentioned. All of these functions seem to be implicated in the functioning of Broca's area, which also processes musical rhythm (Johansson, 2005, pp. 84, 106-107, 110).[20] As it happens, Broca's area in humans is also one of the locations of mirror neurons, which also exist in monkeys and apes (Johansson, 2005, pp. 176-177) and which may play an important role in things like mimesis and empathy (*cf.* Holland, 2009, pp. 94-97).

Finally, given our similarities to other primates, why do we have language (and religion) and they don't? Lewin (2004) points out how it is common for savannah-dwelling terrestrials to live in larger groups than their forest-dwelling arboreal relatives (*cf.* Johansson, 2005, p. 216); thus, African climate change may have driven our ancestors to adapt to the savannah, increasing their group size which produced the social pressures that drove language development.[21]

*Thinking Otherwise*

In this discussion, I am stressing the manipulative, hypnotic, or Machiavellian aspect of religious rhetoric because I desire to highlight that feature of it, which I think is often neglected because it makes all "religion" sound coercive and cultish. But although language acts to constrain thought and determine the limits of what thoughts are possible, it is one of (but not the only) the conditions of the possibility of thinking in certain sophisticated ways. Moreover, as Johansson (2005, p. 144) states,

> It is certainly true that language is routinely used as a 'mental tool' in our thinking – but does that mean that we can only think thoughts for which we have words? Obviously not, as we are demonstrably capable of coming up with new concepts and coining new words for them. The strong over-simplified Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is effectively dead – but more subtle forms of Whorfian influence are pervasive, inserting linguistic relativity into our conceptual structures and thoughts (Pütz & Verspoor, 2000; Bowerman & Levinson, 2001), and even in our perception (Davidoff, 2004). Language provides new tools for conceptualizing and thinking about the world, and while the shape of the tools might not *prevent* us from thinking certain thoughts, it does affect what's easier or more difficult to think about.

[20] There are good reasons to think that humans communicated musically long before

[21] It is interesting that climate also seems to have played a role in bees' developing their dance communication (Dornhaus & Chittka, 2004).

We have defensive abilities by means of which we can shield ourselves from the power of rhetoric (*cf.* Holland, 2009, pp. 153-163), and slow discursive processes through which we can overcome the hasty mistakes of quick analogic, pattern-completion, or emotional thought. The fact that we can have representational systems to represent conditions vastly different from those in which we evolved—as at relativistic speeds, on cosmic scales, or on quantum mechanical levels—in part by availing ourselves of analogy and symbolism, illustrates this in a dramatic way.

Evolution is profoundly conservative (*cf.* Johansson, 2005, pp. 101, 171; Shubin, 2009). Our large-scale brain architecture seems to be innate and genetically encoded, but, once capacity for cultural transmission could support cumulative cultural evolution, the development of symbolic systems in humans would be rapid (*cf.* Johansson, 2005, pp. 109, 111-112, 164, 227-228, 239, 241). After referring to Euclid and Kant, Johansson (2005, pp. 22-23) comments,

> It is argued in this context by Herbert Spencer (1883), William James (1890), and most influentially Konrad Lorenz (1941), as well as more recently by *e.g.*, Vollmer (1987), Shepard (2001) and Schwartz (2001), that knowledge that for us is perceived as *a priori* self-evident, is actually evolutionary adaptations of our cognition to the world around us, so that Kant's synthetic *a priori* knowledge is really evolutionarily *a posteriori* (Campbell, 1997; Red'ko, 2000).

Thus, our closest primate relatives have the initial linguistic elements that form, I think, the basis of religion and other worldviews as an experientially-manipulative symbolic system, but they lacked the correct selective social environment. This argument tends to support the notion that religion is a byproduct, piggybacking especially on the cognitive adaptations to the primate social environment that made language possible, as opposed to a distinct adaptation. If this is the case, it would mean that insofar as religion promotes social and internal wellbeing, it serves the ends of the capacities that are the conditions of its emergence.

The one in Broken Crescent is pretty interesting, both with how it's presented and how the main character abuses it. The magic system is based on writing in the "God's Language", which has the ability to warp reality, and is so powerful that just thinking the Words is enough to tap into their power. It's so dangerous that the wizardly upper class, the College of Man, teach spells by rote, not even understanding the words or how they work together to cause the spell effects of the currently hundreds of years old spells, and attempting to experiment to make new spells is a serious crime. Magical items in the world are created by engraving spells into the item, a very difficult thing to do with the level of technology, and low level members of the College are frequently tattooed with specific spells useful for their jobs.

The novel follows a hacker who ends up transported to this world from modern Earth. He eventually falls in with the rebellious "Shadow College" and learns just enough of the Language to first experiment and eventually comes up with the idea of creating a interpreter between God's Language words and English shorthand to get around the limitation of activating the magic just because he thought of a word. He uses this method to break the rote spells down and learn how the God's Language works and the words interact, to the point that he can create his own complex spells.

He eventually comes up with a "Compiler" spell that transforms the shorthand he's using into God's Language and weaponizes it as the Shadow College goes into open rebellion. Remember how I said magical items are hard to make? He teaches a couple of rebel low levels who have access to an acid spell specific English Word versions of spells (one is even bold enough to magically tattoo the writing on his arm so he can't lose it) and basically sets up a little factory where the low levels acid etch the shorthand spells into the rebels armor and weapons and once they're done, he uses his Compiler spell to switch the engravings into active "God's Language" spells, allowing every soldier and wizard of the Shadow College to have magically reinforced arms and armor. This gives gives them a massive advantage over the College of Man and it's army of mostly mundanes with a few high rankers blessed with magical equipment.

*Metaphor and Worldmaking – Ancient and Contemporary*

The important role of metaphor in literature as well as religion, philosophy, and science can hardly be overstated. Darsey (1997) points out how common metaphors are in the rhetoric of Hebrew prophets (see also, *e.g.*, Doyle, 2000; Lundbom, 1975; Moughtin-Mumby, 2008; Yehoshua, 1981; Zulick, 1992; etc.). The ability to map from one conceptual domain to another, to think of one thing as analogous to another, seems to be uniquely human (Johansson, 2005, p. 229). Johansson, however, does propose an evolutionary path – notably rooted in spatial cognition – from our primate ancestor's cognitive abilities to our ability to use metaphor:

> The image-schemas of Lakoff (1987) are used as a link between perception and reason [….] McNeil (1996) invokes image-schemas as the first step in her narrative model of language origins, with scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) as the second step. Concerning this transition, it is noted by Marcus (2004c) that mental maps and other tools for spatial cognition are present in many animals, and that spatial metaphors are ubiquitous in human language. Image-schemas, commonly spatial as well, may form a bridge between the mental maps of animals and the spatial metaphors of humans. (Johansson, 2005, p. 230)

From making models of the world using spatial cognition, the combinatory capacity (moving from mental maps to image-schemas) enabled the formation of distinctly novel mental spaces (metaphors). This proposal is interesting, but speculative. Holland (2009, pp. 97-99) cites research linking metaphor to mirror neurons, already mentioned above and elsewhere. However the capacity for metaphor arose, the precise evolutionary story is not required at this point for one to discern the plausibility of language's fundamentally social origin and function. We actively construct our reality, rather than perceiving the things-in-themselves directly. It is a curious paradox of human existence that the "objective" world is only known and perceived through its internal construction. And language has a lot to do with the way we construct it. This makes it possible to make and inhabit imaginary worlds, in part because all so-called objective reality is known internally so that as soon as it became possible for alternative worlds to inhabit us through language they automatically enjoyed the status of ordinary reality for as long as they might be entertained. This reminds one of Richard Gerrig's reversal of Colerdge's "willing suspension of disbelief." Holland (2009) states,

> [Gerrig] notes that we take away only some information from a fiction. That is, if I am reading Sherlock Holmes stories, I will take away information about hansom cabs and gazogenes as part of my permanent knowledge. But I will not believe there was a Sherlock Holmes [….] Spinoza believed that, in order to comprehend what we perceive, we must first believe it true. Only then, if necessary, do we disbelieve it. Following Daniel T. Gilbert and Spinoza, Gerrig asserts that *simply comprehending something automatically includes beliefs*.

We may here return to Geertz and say religion and rhetoric are symbolic systems that act "to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence *and clothing those conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic*" (emphasis mine). They do indeed.

Rhetorical forms direct attention and shape experience.[22] We have defensive abilities, and, in fact, rhetoric can be used defensively. But let's continue to attend primarily to the more "coercive" use of rhetoric. Darsey (1997), in his introduction to his study of radical social rhetoric in America,[23] points out that in the case of the Hebrew prophet, who strives to alter the course of a world gone awry, "Contrary to the assumptions of the traditional Graeco-Roman rhetorical theory," the speaker does not represent his own will: "*Inventio* and *action* are not products of the same agent. Prophecy is in a significant respect a performance from a script" (p. 16). This curious rhetorical situation and the resulting complexities it produces in interpretation are explored at some length in Zulick's (1992) paper, which Darsey cites, entitled "The Agon of Jeremiah: On the Dialogic Invention of the Prophetic Ethos." More recently, Stern (2008) appeals to an Aristotelian link between rhetoric and drama in her study of the advertising strategies in soap operas that she terms "rhetrickery" and "rhetruth." This collapsing of the distinction between rhetoric and drama that one finds in the prophet and in soap opera advertisements reinforces the blending of entertainment, politics, and economics in religion that was mentioned at the outset. Indeed, the Hebrew prophet is not only the actor speaking the words of YHWH and the orator seeking to persuade his people, "The prophet is an accuser and judge; he is called into being when the law has been violated" (Darsey, 1997, p. 24). The prophet's own identity vanishes into his social roles and into the person of God. In order to direct his people, to shape their lives, his life must be sacrificed. Hebrew Wisdom literature treats Wisdom as a divine companion of YHWH and the teacher of humanity, especially the king. She has much advice about how to use language properly, and she, like the Logos in later thought, helped give order to the world itself. Likewise, the divinely ordained Torah directs correct speech and activity. Although the Hebrew Bible does not have a tradition of sophists or rhetors who taught linguistic techniques to oratorical persuasion, it clearly reflects the traditions of people who knew the power of language to shape reality. The figures of the prophet and the Torah (and the Wisdom expressed therein and thereby) step into the situation of discrepancy, incoherence, chaos and help – often through metaphorical reformulations of received realities – persuade people to enter into a more meaningful cosmos.

Turning to Second Temple Judaism and the texts that came to form the New Testament, we may begin by considering what Mack (1990) states, "From the beginning it

[22] In fact, Ketelaar et al. (2008) find evidence that "open ads" that do not strongly guide audience interpretation and link to the product and brand have a poor consumer response.

[23] Similarly, for a study of prayer as a form of rhetoric and performance, see Fitzgerald (2012).

was taken for granted that the writings produced by early Christians were to be read as rhetorical compositions. Origen, for example, or Augustine, knew no other school for making sense of written compositions but the school of rhetoric" (p. 10). A number of studies have been done, for instance, on the rhetorical training[24] and techniques of Paul (*e.g.*, Classen, 1992; White, 2003; Stowers, 2003). Krentz (2003) points out that even though Paul uses many rhetorical forms, he "argues for a wisdom superior to that taught by rhetoric, in a fashion similar to that argued by the proponents of philosophy over against rhetoric" (p. 282). Just as Plato demonstrates great mythopoeic (and oratorical) talent and yet condemns myth and poetry, so too Paul uses rhetorical skill to dismiss that very skill. But the *concept* of rhetoric is central to Christianity. Kinneavy (1986) points out that the Greek word *pistis*, generally translated "faith" or "belief," actually also refers to "persuasion," both in the sense of that which one has been persuaded to believe and the means of persuasion. His examination of the number of New Testament passages in which aspects of rhetoric can be found in uses of *pistis* and his consideration of Paul's rhetorical training are provocative and fascinating. Thus, one can make a strong argument that Christian "faith" means "rhetoric." It is a robust example of Whitehouse's doctrinal mode of religion, and its rhetorical nature is indisputable. This does not mean, however, that no one disputes it. C. S. Lewis famously states, "The Bible is so remorselessly and continuously sacred that it does not invite, it excludes or repels, the merely aesthetic approach" (cite). But rhetoric is not merely style, the superficial adornments of rhyme, rhythm, repetition, and other flourishes.

The profound power and utility of metaphor has already been discussed; Olbricht (2003) points out how important it was in early Christian rhetoric. Rhetoric in its deep sense takes account of the needs, motives, and conditions of both the speaker and the audience. The rhetorical features that make language compelling and memorable likely often relate to the environmental factors that drove language's evolution. Recall how easily chimps' memories were swamped by long sequences—short sentences, which tend to strike us as more rhetorically vigorous, would not do that, although we do have a greater tolerance for long sequences than other primates. On the other hand, certain types of complexity fulfill other evolutionary functions, such as costly signaling that excludes outsiders, provides a challenge, proves one's seriousness, and so on (*cf.* Bulbulia, 2004; Henrich, 2009; Kim & Labroo, 2011; Murray & Moore, 2009; Sosis, 2002). Recall that many capacities that support language seem to be located in Broca's area, which also processes musical sequences and rhythm (see also, Phillips-Silver et al., 2010). Might this relate to the power of rhythmic rhetoric? The social origin of language would account for the power of rhetoric that makes people feel embraced, connected, and included (Sela et al, 2012). Grice's rules, the advice of Strunk and White, and the techniques of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and later authors may contain traces of our evolutionary history. Advertising rhetoric research has investigated many features of language with respect to their effects on consumers (*cf.* McQuarrie & Mick, 1996; McQuarrie, 2008), such as, *e.g.*, complexity (Lowrey, 2006, 2008; Munch, 2003; Stella & Adam, 2008; Toncar & Munch, 2003), schemes vs. tropes (Mothersbaugh et al., 2002), empathy (Escalas & Stern, 2003; Argo et al., 2008), narrative transportation (Phillips & McQuarrie, 2010), directed processing vs. incidental exposure (McQuarrie & Mick, 2003), metaphor and analogy (Ang & Lim, 2006; Roehm & Sternthal, 2001), repetition (Malaviya, 2007), probabilistic logic (Areni, 2002), questions (Ahluwalia

[24] Paul's rhetorical training does not seem to be that found in the great ancient theorists of rhetoric, but that found in the moralists and philosophers.

& Burnkrant, 2004), specificity (Feldman et al., 2006), etc. And books like Michael Tierno's (2002) popular *Aristotle's Poetics for Screenwriters: Storytelling Secrets from the Greatest Mind in Western Civilization* help entertainers take advantage of these techniques. Yet, DeRosia (2008) points out that many ancient rhetorical figures that might plausibly shape audience response still have not been investigated by researchers.

Johansson (2005) states, "As soon as our species-unique capabilities for cultural transmission (in which idiolect transmission is included) had reached the threshold needed for cumulative cultural evolution (Tomasello, 1999a), this cultural evolution of language would pick up speed as well, growing from whatever primitive communication systems were in use at the time […] towards modern human language" (p. 38). Even birds have demonstrated some degree of cultural transmission (MacDougall-Shackleton & MacDougall-Shackleton, 2001; Lachlan & Servedio, 2004). The studies of Indo-European languages that revealed their connection to each other and gradual evolution "significantly influenced Darwin (1859) as he transferred the concept of descent with modification from linguistics to biology (Gatherer, 1997). In *Descent of Man* (1871), Darwin further developed the parallels between language evolution and biological evolution (Radick, 2002)" (p. 23; see Image 1). Textual critics exert great effort and skill in their efforts to create stemmas of manuscript traditions of individual written works. Recently, the burgeoning field of memetics has studied the cultural evolution of larger cognitive elements (*cf.* Butts & Hilgeman, 2003; Norenzayan et al., 2006). I am reminded of Campbell's (2008) monomyth, the structure of which first seems to have emerged in societies governed by a king. Heroic-royal ideology reinforces the hierarchical social situation that produced it, and our evolutionary past that shaped the structure of human language helps account for its continued appeal, as illustrated by the success of Volger's (1998) *The Writer's Journey: Mythic Structure for Writers*.





Image 1

Seeing "religion" and other worldviews through the lens of rhetoric is illuminating. It allows us to look at a given worldview from other worldview perspectives, for example, religion as an economic system or as entertainment, as a distraction from questions and a method of ending inquiry, and so on; it allows us to link various levels and fields that tend not to be in communication with each other—evolution, physiology, linguistic/cognitive, sociology; it brings to the forefront ethical questions of location and intent of religious leaders and religions. As Kennedy (1984) states, capturing the sort of reverent attitude toward rhetoric that one finds in Longinus (*cf.* O'Gorman, 2004):

> If the Bible is in a sense mythical, it is even more necessary to regard it as rhetorical, again not in the sense of 'false' or 'deceitful,' but in the sense of 'purposeful,' as a form of communication, perhaps between God and man, certainly between biblical writers and ourselves. All religious systems are rhetorical: they are attempts to communicate perceived religious truth, just as political discourse is an attempt to communicate perceived political doctrine and is necessarily rhetorical. Philosophical systems are equally rhetorical: some, like Platonism or the philosophy of Leibniz, create a grand myth as a vision of truth; others, like logical positivism, are more modest in their goals but still seek to convey an impression of reality. Even science needs rhetoric and resorts to myth-making, for example in picturing general hypotheses such as those relating to the origin and nature of the universe or the evolution of life. (p. 158)

More generally, one may state that worldviews are rhetorical, with all that that implies: that they are adapted to situations; that they are persuasive; that they draw on feelings and authority as well as reason; that they are constructed.

*Worldviews and Language—An Inconclusive Conclusion*

Language is a social tool, driven by the evolutionary pressures of social life. This helps to account for the useful lie at the heart of language: name and number falsify multiplicity and diversity by positing unity and homogeneity. Capitalism, as has often been noted, reduces all things to capital; it makes everything countable. But let us not pretend that number does what names do not. The name, too, reduces the dynamism of the internal community of thoughts and impulses, desires and experiences, and memories that constitute an "individual" to a stable unity. The word essentializes. And the most potent entity that name creates is that which language evolved to serve: the social group. The family name, the name of the language group, ethnicity or sovereign nation, in which the individual and the individual's sovereignty are absorbed and from which the individual receives the gift of language itself—the very tool whose essential function is to bind one to the group and coordinate private thought and action with the collective—is the most potent and sacred of names, as Durkheim (1912) argues.

The unique problem of modern humanity is not that people have been reduced to homogeneity by capitalism, the nation state, or special identity politics (*cf.* Badiou 2003), but that the culture that is evolving in us, the greater organism whose cells we are, is hosted by a social body that has nearly been overrun by a cancer of petty selfishness, shortsighted individualism, and pseudo-sovereignty. Humanity could surpass itself, but before that, it may use its new power of its clumsy infancy to destroy itself, for humanity is an orphan raising itself in the wilderness. The great religions, whose success in large part owed to their rhetorical power, are not as convincing as they once were. Their myths sound to many ears too much like fictions. And so the old religions lose their power to balance the forces of nationalism and capitalism, other social organs which are, like "religion," culturally evolved emergent consequences of language's social basis, and are, like "religion," themselves overflowing with destructive potential. At the level of human life, there is no one, stable truth, no unity. Yet, confronting this leads most to retreat into whatever worldview lies at hand, and perhaps individuals should be left to the smallest truth that satisfies them. What I call PPP polytheism should only be exercised by those large enough to contain multitudes.

Durkheim, like Marx and Fauerbach, is a theorist of alienation. All abstraction is alienation, and so masters of abstraction, unless experience recalls them to the world, tend to be servants of alienation. Durkheim sees in the social something truly transcendent and in the categories of social life the basic categories of thought. That these things are transposed from their real setting and translated into a symbolic system fascinates him, but causes him no great distress. Whereas Marx, Fauerbach, and Nietzsche are iconoclasts, using philosophy like an idol-smashing hammer, it should come as no surprise, though I write this half in jest, that the theorist of the totem is an idolater. Durkheim's thesis that categories of (especially religious) thought and language are derived from social life is consistent with the above review of the evolution of language and argument that worldviews are rhetorical exaptations of the linguistic capacity.

Bibliography

Ahluwalia, Rohini, and Robert E Burnkrant. “Answering Questions about Questions: A Persuasion Knowledge Perspective for Understanding the Effects of Rhetorical Questions.” *J CONSUM RES Journal of Consumer Research* 31.1 (2004): 26–42. Print.

Alcorta, Candace, and Richard Sosis. “Ritual, emotion, and sacred symbols.” *Human Nature* 16.4 (2005): 323–359. Print.

Areni, CharlesS. “The Proposition-Probability Model of Argument Structure and Message Acceptance.” *The Journal of Consumer Research* 29.2 (2002): 168–187. Print.

Argo, Jennifer J, Rui (Juliet) Zhu, and Darren W Dahl. “Fact or Fiction: An Investigation of Empathy Differences in Response to Emotional Melodramatic Entertainment.” *The Journal of Consumer Research* 34.5 (2008): 614–623. Print.

Atran, Scott, and Ara Norenzayan. “Religion’s evolutionary landscape: Counterintuition, commitment, compassion, communion.” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 27.6 (2004): 713–730. Print.

Bellah, Robert N. *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011. Print.

Boyer, Pascal, and Brian Bergstrom. “Evolutionary Perspectives on Religion.” *Annual review of anthropology* 37 (2008): 111. Print.

Bulbulia, Joseph. “The cognitive and evolutionary psychology of religion.” *Biology and Philosophy* 19.5 (2004): 655–686. Print.

Burr, D.C et al. “Saccades compress space, time and number.” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 14.12 (2010): 528–533. Print.

Butts, Carter T, and Christin Hilgeman. “Inferring Potential Memetic Structure form Cross-Sectional Data: An Application to American Religious Beliefs.” *Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission* 7.2 (2003): n. pag. Print.

Campbell, Joseph. *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*. Third. New World Library, 2008. Print.

Classen, C. Joachim. “St. Paul’s Epistles and Ancient Greek and Roman Rhetoric.” *Rhetorica.* X.4 (1992): 319. Print.

Damasio, Antonio. *Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. Penguin Books, 2005. Print.

Darsey, James. *The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America*. NYU Press, 1999. Print.

De Boer, Bart. “Why women speak better than men (and its significance for evolution).” Rudolf Botha and Chris Knight, eds. *The Prehistory of Language*. First ed. Oxford University Press, USA, 2009. Print.

De Divitiis E. “The magical power of music.” *World Neurosurg. World Neurosurgery* 73.5 (2010): 454–455. Print.

DeRosia, Eric D. “Rediscovering Theory: Integrating Ancient Hypotheses and Modern Empirical Evidence of the Audience-Response Effects of Rhetorical Figures.” *Go Figure!: New Directions in Advertising Rhetoric*. Ed. Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips. M.E.Sharpe, 2007. Print.

Dornhaus, Anna, and Lars Chittka. “Why do honey bees dance?” *Behavioral ecology and sociobiology.* 55.4 (2004): 395. Print.
Doyle, B. *The Apocalypse of Isaiah Metaphorically Speaking A Study of the Use, Function and Significance of Metaphors in Isaiah 24-27*. Peeters Publishers, 2000. Print.
Durkheim, Emile. *Elementary Forms Of The Religious Life: Newly Translated By Karen E. Fields*. Simon & Schuster, 1995. Print.
Escalas, Jennifer Edson, and Barbara B Stern. “Sympathy and Empathy: Emotional Responses to Advertising Dramas.” *J CONSUM RES Journal of Consumer Research* 29.4 (2003): 566–578. Print.
Feldman, Daniel C, William O Bearden, and David M Hardesty. “Varying the Content of Job Advertisements: The Effects of Message Specificity.” *Journal of Advertising* 35.1 (2006): 123–141. Print.
FitzGerald, William. *Spiritual Modalities: Prayer as Rhetoric and Performance*. Penn State Press, 2012. Print.
Forceville, Charles. “Pictoral and Multimodal Metaphor in Commercials.” *Go Figure!: New Directions in Advertising Rhetoric*. Ed. Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips. M.E.Sharpe, 2007. Print.
Gitay, Yehoshua. *Prophecy and Persuasion: A Study of Isaiah 40-48*. Lingustica Biblica, 1981. Print.
Goldenberg, Jacob, Donald R Lehmann, and David Mazursky. “The Idea Itself and the Circumstances of Its Emergence as Predictors of New Product Success.” *IEEE engineering management review.* 29.2 (2001): 105. Print.
Graham J, and Haidt J. “Beyond beliefs: religions bind individuals into moral communities.” *Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc* 14.1 (2010): 140–50. Print.
Heath, Shirley Brice. *Ways with Words: Language, Life and Work in Communities and Classrooms*. Cambridge University Press, 1983. Print.
Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Reprint. Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2008. Print.
Henrich, Joseph. “The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion:credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural evolution.” *ENS Evolution and Human Behavior* 30.4 (2009): 244–260. Print.
Holland, Norman N. *Literature and the Brain*. The PsyArt Foundation, 2009. Print.
Jason R. Stella, and Stewart Adam. “A Reinquiry Into the Influence of Simple and Complex Tropes in the Advertising Context.” *The Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice* 16.2 (2008): 163–172. Print.
Johansson, Dr Sverker. *Origins of Language: Constraints on Hypotheses*. John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2005. Print.
Jones, P.E. “From ‘external speech’ to ‘inner speech’ in Vygotsky: A critical appraisal and fresh perspectives.” *Language and Communication* 29.2 (2009): 166–181. Print.
Kennedy, George A. *New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism*. The University of North Carolina Press, 1984. Print.
Ketelaar, Paul, Marnix S. van Gisbergen, and Johannes W.J. Beentjes. “The Dark Side of Openness for Consumer Response.” *Go Figure!: New Directions in Advertising Rhetoric*. Ed. Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips. M.E.Sharpe, 2007. Print.

Kim, Sara, and Aparna A Labroo. “From Inherent Value to Incentive Value: When and Why Pointless Effort Enhances Consumer Preference.” *Journal of Consumer Research Journal of Consumer Research* 38.4 (2011): 712–742. Print.
Kinneavy, James L. *Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith: An Inquiry*. First ed. Oxford University Press, USA, 1987. Print.
Lachlan RF, and Servedio MR. “Song learning accelerates allopatric speciation.” *Evolution; international journal of organic evolution* 58.9 (2004): 2049–63. Print.
Lewin, Roger. *Human Evolution: An Illustrated Introduction*. 5th ed. Wiley-Blackwell, 2004. Print.
Lloyd, Keith. “Culture and Rhetorical Patterns: Mining the Rich Relations Between Aristotle’s Enthymeme and Example and India’s NyÄ±ya Method.” *Rhetorica* 29.1 (2011): 76–105. Print.
Lowrey, Tina M. “The Relation between Script Complexity and Commercial Memorability.” *Journal of Advertising* 35.3 (2006): 7–15. Print.
---. “The Case for a Complexity Continuum.” *Go Figure!: New Directions in Advertising Rhetoric*. Ed. Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips. M.E.Sharpe, 2007. Print.
Luhrmann, T. M. *When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship with God*. Reprint. Vintage, 2012. Print.
Lundbom, Jack R. *Jeremiah: A Study in Ancient Hebrew Rhetoric*. 2nd ed. Eisenbrauns, 1997. Print.
Lyon, Caroline, Chrystopher L Nehaniv, and Angelo Cangelosi. *Emergence of Communication and Language*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007. Web. 19 Mar. 2013.
MacDougall-Shackleton, Elizabeth A, and Scott A MacDougall-Shackleton. “Cultural and Genetic Evolution in Mountain White-Crowned Sparrows: Song Dialects Are Associated with Population Structure.” *Evolution* 55.12 (2001): 2568–2575. Print.
Mack, Burton L. *Rhetoric and the New Testament*. Fortress Pr, 1989. Print.
Malaviya, Prashant. “The Moderating Influence of Advertising Context on Ad Repetition Effects: The Role of Amount and Type of Elaboration.” *J CONSUM RES Journal of Consumer Research* 34.1 (2007): 32–40. Print.
Masataka, Nobuo. *The origins of language unraveling evolutionary forces*. Tokyo: Springer, 2008. Web. 19 Mar. 2013.
Maynard-Smith, John, and David Harper. *Animal Signals*. 1St ed. Oxford University Press, USA, 2004. Print.
McQuarrie, Edward F, and David Glen Mick. “Figures of Rhetoric in Advertising Language.” *The Journal of Consumer Research* 22.4 (1996): 424–438. Print.
---. “Visual and Verbal Rhetorical Figures under Directed Processing versus Incidental Exposure to Advertising.” *The Journal of Consumer Research* 29.4 (2003): 579–587. Print.
---. “A Visit to the Rhetorician’s Workbench: Developing a Toolkit for Differentiating Advertising Style.” *Go Figure!: New Directions in Advertising Rhetoric*. Ed. Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips. M.E.Sharpe, 2007. Print.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. *The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics*. 1st ed. Ed. James M. Edie. Trans. William Cobb. Northwestern University Press, 1964. Print.

Mithen, Steven. “Holistic communication and the co-evolution of language and music: resurrecting and old idea.” Rudolf Botha and Chris Knight, eds. *The Prehistory of Language*. First ed. Oxford University Press, USA, 2009. Print.
Mothersbaugh, David L, Bruce A Huhmann, and George R Franke. “Combinatory and Separative Effects of Rhetorical Figures on Consumers Effort and Focus in Ad Processing.” *J CONSUM RES Journal of Consumer Research* 28.4 (2002): 589–602. Print.
Moughtin-Mumby, Sharon. *Sexual and Marital Metaphors in Hosea, Jeremiah, Isaiah, and Ezekiel*. Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.
Müller, Friedrich Max. *Lectures on the Science of Language: Delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in April, May, and June, 1861*. Adamant Media Corporation, 2001. Print.
Murray, Michael, and Lyn Moore. “Costly Signaling and the Origin of Religion.” *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 9.3 (2009): 225–245. Print.
Norenzayan, Ara et al. “Memory and Mystery: The Cultural Selection of Minimally Counterintuitive Narratives.” *Cognitive Science* 30.3 (2006): 531–553. Print.
Norenzayan, Ara, and Azim F Shari*ff*. “The Origin and Evolution of Religious Prosociality.” *Science* 322.5898 (2008): 58–62. Print.
O’Gorman, Ned. “Longinus’s Sublime Rhetoric, or How Rhetoric Game into Its Own.” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 34.2 (2004): 71–89. Print.
Olbricht, Thomas H. “Analogy and Allegory in Classical Rhetoric.” Fitzgerald, John T., Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White, eds. *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe (Supplements to Novum Testamentum*. Society of Biblical Literature, 2005. Print.
Phillips, BarbaraJ, and EdwardF McQuarrie. “Narrative and Persuasion in Fashion Advertising.” *The Journal of Consumer Research* 37.3 (2010): 368–392. Print.
Phillips-Silver, Jessica, C. Athena Aktipis, and Gregory A. Bryant. “The Ecology of Entrainment: Foundations of Coordinated Rhythmic Movement.” *Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 28.1 (2010): 3–14. Print.
Provine, Robert R. *Laughter: A Scientific Investigation*. Penguin Books, 2001. Print.
Ragir, Sonia and Sue Savage-Rumbaugh. “Playing with meaning: Normative function and structure in play.” Rudolf Botha and Chris Knight, eds. *The Prehistory of Language*. First ed. Oxford University Press, USA, 2009. Print.
Roehm, Michelle L, and Brian Sternthal. “The Moderating Effect of Knowledge and Resources on the Persuasive Impact of Analogies.” *J CONSUM RES Journal of Consumer Research* 28.2 (2001): 257–272. Print.
Schjødt, Uffe. “Homeostasis and Religious Behaviour.” *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 7.3/4 (2007): 313–340. Print.
Scott, LindaM, and Patrick Vargas. “Writing with Pictures: Toward a Unifying Theory of Consumer Response to Images.” *The Journal of Consumer Research* 34.3 (2007): 341–356. Print.
Sela A, Christian Wheeler S, and Sarial-Abi G. “We are not the same as you and I: Causal effects of minor language variations on consumers’ attitudes toward brands.” *J. Consum. Res. Journal of Consumer Research* 39.3 (2012): 644–661. Print.
Shubin, Neil. *Your Inner Fish: A Journey into the 3.5-Billion-Year History of the Human Body*. 1 Reprint. Vintage, 2009. Print.

Steels, Luc. “Is sociality a crucial prerequisite for the emergence of language?” Rudolf Botha and Chris Knight, eds. *The Prehistory of Language*. First ed. Oxford University Press, USA, 2009. Print.
Stern, Barbara B. “Retrickery and Retruth in Soap Operas: Genre Conventions, Hidden Persuasions, and Vulnerable Audiences.” *Go Figure!: New Directions in Advertising Rhetoric*. Ed. Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips. M.E.Sharpe, 2007. Print.
Stoddard, PHILIP K et al. “Strong Neighbor-Stranger Discrimination in Song Sparrows.” *The Condor.* 92.4 (1990): 1051–1056. Print.
Stowers, Stanley K. “Apostrophe, ΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΠΟΙΙΑ and Paul’s Rhetorical Education.” Fitzgerald, John T., Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White, eds. *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe (Supplements to Novum Testamentum*. Society of Biblical Literature, 2005. Print.
“The Influence of Metaphors and Product Type on Brand Personality Perceptions and Attitudes.” *Journal of Advertising* 35.2 (2006): n. pag. Print.
“The spatiotemporal representation of dance and music gestures using topological gesture analysis (TGA).” uuuu . Web. 19 Mar. 2013.
Tierno, Michael. *Aristotle’s Poetics for Screenwriters: Storytelling Secrets From the Greatest Mind in Western Civilization*. 1st ed. Hyperion, 2002. Print.
Toncar, Mark F, and James M Munch. “The Influence of Simple and Complex Tropes on Believability, Importance and Memory.” *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice* 11.4 (2003): 39–53. Print.
Urban, Greg. “Metasignaling and Language Origins.” *American Anthropologist* 104.1 (2002): 233–246. Print.
Vogler, Christopher. *The Writers Journey: Mythic Structure for Writers, 3rd Edition*. 3rd ed. Michael Wiese Productions, 2007. Print.
Wang, Kai-Yu and Laura A. Peracchio. “Reading Pictures: Understanding the Stylistic Properties of Advertising Images.” *Go Figure!: New Directions in Advertising Rhetoric*. Ed. Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips. M.E.Sharpe, 2007. Print.
Warren J. “How does the brain process music?” *Clinical medicine (London, England)* 8.1 (2008): 32–6. Print.
White, L. Michael. “Rhetoric and Reality in Galatians: Framing the Social Demands of Friendship.” Fitzgerald, John T., Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White, eds. *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe (Supplements to Novum Testamentum*. Society of Biblical Literature, 2005. Print.
Wilson, David Sloan. “Testing Major Evolutionary Hypotheses about Religion with a Random Sample.” *Human Nature* 16.4 (2005): n. pag. Print.
Zulick, Margaret D. “The Active Force of Hearing: The Ancient Hebrew Language of Persuasion.” *Rhetorica.* X.4 (1992): 367. Print.
---. “The agon of Jeremiah: On the dialogic invention of prophetic ethos.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech Quarterly Journal of Speech* 78.2 (1992): 125–148. Print.

# Appendix 27: What are genres, and how does this help us to understand fantastika?

> *[I] use Fantasy for this purpose: in a sense, that is, which combines with its older and higher use as an equivalent of Imagination the derived notions of "unreality" (that is, of unlikeness to the Primary World), of freedom from the domination of observed "fact," in short of the fantastic.* (Tolkien, 1966, p. 69)

I have repeatedly commented that allomythoi tend to occur in genres like fantasy, science fiction, and horror—the subgenres of the umbrella genre known as "fantastika." Thus, to understand the nature of allomythoi one must examine the nature of genre.

## Genres—What Are They?

In his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein (1967) argues that there is an intimate connection between the determinate characteristics of a given language-game and its associated form of life.[1] And I am making a related argument: that the determinate, structured form of symbolic expression called a "genre"[2] responds to the determinate, situated needs of an allomythic worldview and way of life. Dewey, in his *Art as Experience* (1934), states,

> And this fact [….] indicates the source of the failure of even the best of judicial criticism:[3] its inability to cope with the emergence of new

[1] Indeed, the neologies of fantastika play a vital role in producing its allomythoi.

[2] This is true of "medium" as well. Dewey put it this way: "Because objects of art are expressive, they are a language. Rather they are many languages. For each art has its own medium and that medium is especially fitted for one kind of communication. Each medium says something that cannot be uttered as well or as completely in any other tongue" (1934, p. 106).

[3] Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s legal-realist kinship with Dewey's pragmatist-instrumentalist worldview is obvious just from how he begins his famous work on the common law:

> *The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience*. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. *The law embodies the story of a nation's development* through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. (emphasis mine, 1881, p. 1)

Holmes responded along Deweyan lines to the art criticism of actual judges in the 1903 Supreme Court case, *Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.*, where he states,

> It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value — it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value — and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt. (pp. 251-252)

> modes of life—of experiences that demand new modes of expression [….] An environment that is changed physically and spiritually demands new forms of expression [that convey] some new mode of interaction of the live creature with his [sic] surroundings, and hence the release of powers previously cramped or inert. (pp. 303-304).

To describe the connection between genres and worldviews-and-ways-of-life (WWLs) it is helpful to think about the process of evolution. Biological structures have determinate forms, with variations. One may describe these forms taxonomically, like Linnaeus, in rather structuralist terms,[4] and this might be likened to the simplest understanding of genre as a kind of fixed symbolic form or structure of representation. As a recipe or template for composition and interpretation, this level of understanding of genre has utility. Internalization of the structure of a genre – its typical features and their relations to each other – will be sufficient for basic use. A feature-based understanding of fantasy, for example, might attend to the presence of supernatural agents like dragons and wizards (*cf.* James and Mendlesohn, 2012), and Farah Mendlesohn, in her *Rhetorics Of Fantasy* (2008), categorizes fantasies structurally in terms of rhetorical strategies as falling into four different types focusing on world-boundary issues: the portal-quest fantasy (which may on occasion be distinguished), the immersive fantasy, the intrusion fantasy, and the liminal fantasy. Again, such feature- and structure-based understandings of genre are useful.

However, great progress is made in fluency of composition and comprehension – in short, in the effective use of genre – when one adopts an "evolutionary" understanding of how genres work.[5] Like generic regularities, organisms may be observed to have regularities in their bodies and ways of life – their typified behavioral responses to their environment, including other conspecifics and allospecifics. But why?

When one realizes that the power and utility of these biological regularities emerge from their evolutionary adaptation to regularities in their environment, recurring situations,[6] one is able to comprehend why conservative biological systems – as living ones indeed are, for life is in a sense the attempt to conserve information, complexity, and organization – preserve the structures they do. Non-human animals have no such pressures as veneration for tradition to enforce the preservation of their ways of life; they are what we call

---

[4] Lévi-Strauss states that "the final aim of anthropology is to contribute to a better knowledge of objectified thought and its mechanisms" (1969, p. 13). I argue in this work that, as forms of objectified thought and as tools for thinking, genres and texts – and the storyworlds they cue – are cultural expressions that both enable the study of cognitive structures and tools and, in fact, constitute externalized cognitive mechanisms. I would, however, stress (in addition to the obvious openness of all texts to reinterpretation and appropriation by readers) the importance of recognizing that each particular text and storyworld are responding to particular historical situations and problems, both internal and external to themselves, in addition to whatever commonly recurring features a genre might have due to environmental regularities.

[5] I place "evolutionary" in quotes because, as Lem (1974, p. 228) illustrates in his ruthless criticism of Tzvetan Todorov's (1975) structuralist book, *The Fantastic*, and as Kundt (2015) argues in *Contemporary Evolutionary Theories of Culture and the Study of Religion*, scientific concepts, especially in this case the concept of evolution, lose their rigor and precision when transferred into contexts different from the ones they were designed to explain. Texts and text types, like other cultural productions, are subject to a variety of non-"natural" "selective" forces; they are clearly themselves artificial, "intelligently designed"; they are not subject to biological death; they do not replicate in the same way as living things; etc.

[6] This is suggestive of Blumenberg's argument that "the stability of the narrative kernels" of myth are rooted "not so much [in] preformed and innate models as with the limited multiplicity of those human circumstances, needs and situations that are reflected in mythical configurations" (1979, p. 273).

"instinctual," innate behavioral responses characterized by automaticity—reflex without the metacognitive reflexivity we associate with human reflection. The reason animals have the ways of life that they do is the same as the reason they have the biological forms they do: they work. By means of the long and violent information-transferal process of being adapted to their environments through the elimination of forms and ways that were unsuited thereto, they developed ingenious solutions to the problems that they were confronted with by their environment.

Like biological forms and ways of life, in fact, *as biological forms* (the distinction between artifice and nature being useful only in some contexts for illuminating some questions), genres solve problems. Genres emerge as typified effective responses to recurring situations (*cf.* Devitt, 1993, p. 576; Bitzer, 1968; Dewey, 1924[7]). Like claws and mating dances, they are actions or tools that solve, with varying degrees of effectiveness, certain problems (Devitt, 2004).[8] At the same time, as forms of discourse, they are also types

---

[7] Dewey (1924) discusses a pragmatic understanding of "logic" in similar terms:

> It follows that logic is ultimately an empirical and concrete discipline. Men [sic] first employ certain ways of investigating, and of collecting, recording and using data in reaching conclusions, in making decisions; they draw inferences and make their checks and tests in various ways. These different ways constitute the empirical raw material of logical theory. The latter thus comes into existence without any conscious thought of logic, just as forms of speech take place without conscious reference to rules of syntax or of rhetorical propriety. But it is gradually learned that some methods which are used work better than others. Some yield conclusions that do not stand the test of further situations; they produce conflicts and con- fusion; decisions dependent upon them have to be retracted or revised. Other methods are found to yield conclusions which are available in subsequent inquiries as well as confirmed by them. There first occurs a kind of natural selection of the methods which afford the better type of conclusion, better for subsequent usage. (p. 19)

"Forms of speech" have a logic, or are analogous to formal logic, in that they respond to and are tested by their suitableness to situations; Dewey rightly identifies this as "a kind of natural selection" because it is a precritical (that is, preceding critical causal analysis of the reason(s) for effectiveness) but intentional (*i.e.*, living) activity. The habitual character of forms of thought, speech, and action is practically economical, but the sense of stability thus produced by regularity may be comforting but illusory (Dewey, 1924, p. 20), not necessarily reflecting environmental certainties. The conservational will-to-consistency will, in such cases, be unfaithful to the new situation.

Dewey's essay cited above is reflecting more generally on "Logical Method and Law," and it in turn is responding to the unreformed and cumbersome situation before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by the Supreme Court in 1937 and adopted the following year. Adjective or procedural law was at this time vexed by remnants of frozen legal genres, ultimately dating back to Medieval English law. The forms of action, the original writs, developed out of the centralization of power in the king's court from the complex network of local courts – of the shires and of the hundreds, of the feudal courts, of the ecclesiastical courts. Each form of action, each writ, constituted in a sense its own legal jurisdiction, its own world, with specific procedures, legal precedents, and even substantive law that emerged in particular moments dominated by specific political struggles, legal philosophies, and social problems. The problems of the Writ System played a significant role in the development of the Court of Chancery and the body of law known as equity, though it too eventually developed similar problems. In the United States, the federal courts were long burdened by a policy that not only bound them to the recitation and rules of the Writ System's magical incantations and procedural shackles but also trapped each federal court in the procedural norms of the State that it was located in *at the time of that State's joining the Union* even as the state courts were able to develop in response to changing situations. The federal courts were forced to invent all sorts of epicyclical legal fictions and rationales to try to induce, as if against their will, legal genres and corresponding activities that had long ago ceased to reflect contemporary situations to keep serving useful ends.

[8] It is due to the fact, which should now be quite clear, that the ontic and the ontological cannot be abstracted from each other because the embodied way of life is the primordial expression of each being's worldview, that

of worlds humans inhabit as symbolic, meaning-making beings; thus, genres are like niches and like the biological structures that evolve in response to niche conditions.

The situation is complex and recursive due to the nature of the linguistic capacity and the human ability to make new environments and thereby directly affect the world's selective pressures. There is (a) a physical and social world that impacts on discourse communities who develop (b) typified responses to the recurring situation. But that typified response (b) is also (A) a textual world that can be inhabited. Allomythoi as other worlds or environmental niches may be understood as another instance of *heterocosmoi*, "different worlds"; as externalized discursive-cognitive tools or adaptations of a specific sort, they may rightly be distinguished as *allomythoi*, "other myths."

There are some very narrow definitions of fantastical genres like "science fiction," for example, or "horror," that limit the texts that truly count as members of the genre to those recognized by the fandom community or academic elites.[9] Suvin's (1979) understanding of "science fiction" is a great example of this. But consider the following arguments Bazerman (cite, p. 323) makes regarding the feature-based understanding of genre:

> First, it limits us to understanding those aspects of genre we are already aware of. Second, it ignores how people may see each text in different ways, because of their different knowledge of genres, the different systems they are part of, the different positions and attitudes they have about particular genres, or their different activities at the moment [....] Third, such a collecting of features may make it appear that these features of the text are ends in themselves, that every use of a text is measured against an abstract standard

---

the absence of the body is so bizarre in philosophers like Kant and Heidegger. The transformation of the human being into one of pure language or discourse has great liberatory power due to its attention to the constructedness of things that people are socialized to regard as natural, essential, given. But in emphasizing language's seemingly boundless potential – the "infinite use of finite means" – it often neglects the conditions that enable, by limiting and determining, that potential. The limit condition of death is itself, quite clearly, a fate of the embodied, and being-with and relating to "things" (including one's own body) as ready-to-hand are embodied relations with bodies. "One" (*e.g.*, Mills, 1997, pp. 53, 70-73) might argue that the disembodied fictional person (*e.g.*, the "reasonable person" so often invoked in legal discourse) is a construction that powerfully and implicitly favors persons with white, male bodies. (And one might further trace the so-called Cartesian bifurcation of body and mind to Plato's own elitist worldview.) Because so many contemporary worldviews are – and have been forced (by coercive political forces designed to privilege certain bodies) to be – based on ways of life anchored, both practically and conceptually, to certain superficial bodily features, this point is nontrivial. Apart from historical conditions of production (*i.e.*, ways of life) that led to the systematic exploitation of certain peoples and the transformation of their bodies into mechanized components in a global economic circuit of industrialized technoscientific capitalism, distinctively "Black" (in contrast, say, to Fon, Yoruba, Igbo, etc.) worldviews and ways of life, as expressed in, for example, Afrofuturist allomythoi, likely would not exist because "black" is an invention, first designed for "white" supremacy but also "reclaimed" for "black" liberation.

[9] For example, Steven Hrotic's (2014) *Religion in Science Fiction: The Evolution of an Idea and the Extinction of a Genre* makes a distinction between "mainstream science fiction" ("mSF") and "genre science fiction" ("gSF"), the latter only being recognizable by a member of the in-group of the SF fandom, within which Hrotic locates himself. His cognitive anthropology of the SF fandom's relationship to the idea of religion (and science) depends on the existence of a distributed discourse community whose transmitted and shared cultural schemas or mental representations constitute the "metanarrative" of religion or "myth" of modernity that interests him. When the sharp distinction between "religion" and "science" (like, one might note, that between "religion" and "secularity") dissolves as the metanarrative he traces evolves, so too does his gSF community and its "genre" that is constituted by its metanarrative's clear distinctions.

> of correctness to the form rather than whether it carries out the work it was designed to do [....] Fourth, consequently, the view of genre that simply makes it a collection of features obscures how these features are flexible in any instance or even how the general understanding of the genre can change over time, as people orient to evolving patterns.

To examine the full range of allomythoi generated in fantastical secondary worlds, one needs to adopt a level of generality that does not exclude certain people from the outset, allowing one to understand how different people might relate to and use different genres to represent alternative worldviews over time. People tied to a specific, stipulated definition of a genre like "science fiction" and of a worldview like "religion" (often meaning simply "Christianity") are less able to examine the range of world-making, to see the different functions alternate worlds and worldviews may perform, relative to both primary and secondary worlds.

Chapter 3 considers the world-historical problems addressed by allomythoi in fantastika that constitute the phenomenon's social and historical conditions of emergence, but, although this social understanding of the phenomenon's nature must be postponed, it is valuable to realize, in the context of this appendix's primary-chapter-of-reference's consideration of the narratological and cognitive nature of allomythoi, that genres and texts relate to their worlds in problem-solving terms. That is, allomythic W&WoLs within storyworlds are actions and tools responding to the environment of the storyworld, and the storyworld itself, structured by its genre(s) conventions, is a tool and action responding – in various degrees and ways – to the extradiegetic world and its many human worlds, worldviews, and ways of life.

Genres implicitly supply answers and styles of answers to the Big Questions. For example, one genre may appeal to the importance and validity of personal experience while another appeals to logic. This stylistic difference suggests differing epistemological notions of what counts as valid knowledge. Similarly, a genre that tends to describe narratives in rural settings promotes a different praxeology than one typically set in an urban environment.

To illustrate further how genres relate to worldviews (and continuing the above reflection on evolution), one might consider Brian Stableford's *Scientific Romance in Britain, 1890-1950* (1985). Stableford, both a sociologist and an author of sf, argues in his historical analysis of British sf, that the "scientific romance" was a distinctly British genre, in contrast to American "science fiction," that focused on different problems. Whereas American sf focused on, one might say, the anthropological problems produced by new technologies, Stableford argues that British scientific romance, while also assuming and addressed to an audience with a disenchanted worldview, concerned itself with storyworlds constructed according to the logic of evolution and exploring the problems raised thereby.[10] One can easily see how the more fraught response to evolutionary theory in the American context might lead to its relative avoidance in American science fiction's effort at self-

[10] Luckhurst (2005) similarly traces the different trajectories of SF in the United States and Britain, noting that the Gernsbackian-Campbellian technocratic elitism and wonder at the technological sublime characteristic of the American "engineer paradigm" contrasts with but eventually absorbs the British "evolutionary paradigm," with the engineer expressing human evolutionary advancement.

legitimation.[11] And this same point – that distinctive formulations of the sf genre and other subgenres of fantastika emerge from the specific concerns and conditions of various localities – may be illustrated by the recent profusion of nation-state-based genre studies (*e.g.*, such recent issues of *Science Fiction Studies* as 42.2 (July 2015), 40.1 (March 2013), 103 (November 2007), 94 (November 2004), 91 (November 2003), 29 (November 2002); see also, Isaacson, 2017; Page, 2016; Stableford, 2016; Vas-Deyres, Bergeron, Guay, Plet-Nicolas, and André, 2014; Vas-Deyres, 2013; Condry, 2013; Tanaka, 2013; Ginway and Brown, 2012; Bréan, 2012; Lyau, 2011; Ferreira, 2011; Bolton, Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., and Tatsumi, 2008; Leroux and La Bossière, 2004; Bell and Molina-Gavilán, 2003). The fantastical Chinese genres of *wuxia* and *shenmo xiaoshuo*, for example, draw on very different cultural elements and assumptions – that is, W&WoLs – from those exhibited in Anglo-American English fantasy novels that appeal to elements drawn from the European Middle Ages.

In his guest of honor speech, "The Necessity of Science Fiction," delivered at a science fiction conference and published in the work *Space, Time, and Infinity: Essays on Fantastic Literature*, Stableford (2006, pp. ) uses the expression "worldview" – and, more importantly, many of the categories of worldview studies – to talk about science fiction and its relevance to contemporary human ways of life, and his understanding of science fiction bears productively on the cognitive understanding of fantastika elaborated in the following section:

> Nevertheless, true science fiction – which is to say, fiction which attempts to build logically coherent imaginary worlds based on premises licensed by the worldview of contemporary science – does exhibit some unique and interesting features in its relationship to moral order and questions of meaning. [...] Science fiction is essentially a kind of fiction in which people learn more about how to live in the real world, visiting imaginary worlds unlike our own, in order to investigate by way of pleasurable thought-experiments how things might be done differently. If we are to come to a proper understanding of the kind of beings we are, and the kind of universe we live in, and what opportunities we may have for shaping our place within that universe, we cannot do so without appropriate fictions.

Put differently, Stableford regards sf as a mode of worldmaking especially suited to exploring axiological, anthropological, cosmological, and praxeological questions grounded in a scientific ontology. This scientific ontology is itself a worldview, as is obvious in the sense in which Darko Suvin uses the term "cognitive" in his (1979, pp. 7-8) famous definition of science fiction as a,

> fictional tale determined by the hegemonic literary device of a *locus* and/or *dramatis personae* that (1) *are radically or at least significantly different from empirical times, places, and characters* of "mimetic" or "naturalist" fiction, but (2) are nonetheless—to the extent that SF differs from other "fantastic" genres, that is, ensembles of fictional tales without empirical

[11] SF's construal of itself as a pedagogical genre as part of a much broader history of American accommodation of entertainment to its understanding of "religion" and "spirituality" and development of an understanding and expectation of religion as something that not only can but should be entertaining is discussed in Appendix x.

> validation—simultaneously perceived as *not impossible* within the cognitive (cosmological and anthropological) norms of the author's epoch.

Suvin[12] here draws on what he regards as the obvious consensus *norms* (see below) of the scientific worldview's construal of the nature of humanity and the cosmos.[13] Similarly, Ted Chiang (2010, n.p.) has more recently observed in an online interview on the website Boing Boing,

> Science fiction is very well suited to asking philosophical questions; questions about the nature of reality, what it means to be human, how do we know the things that we think we know. When philosophers propose thought experiments as a way of analyzing certain questions, their thought experiments often sound a lot like science fiction.

The hypothetical and indeed fictional character of the thought experiment will be considered in more depth in Appendix 30, but the point that should be stressed here is that all of these sophisticated theorists and practitioners of sf regard the genre as reflective of and as a medium for reflection on worldview questions (see SF, 2015, p. 42).

I would conclude this section by engaging with Besson's (2015) contribution to thinking about the meaning of fictional "worlds" and how that might relate to "genre." Besson's attention is primarily directed outside the texts themselves, in their many media, to their transmediality, seriality, and enactment in individual, social, and embodied dimensions. At the outset of her work, she expresses what I would call my "common sense" understanding of "world," namely, that it reflects the vast probabilistic universe of spaces in which humans can "imagine," that is, simulate configurations of quasi-, pseudo- or semi-perceptual and -motor elements (see Hogan, 2013; 2017).

> *Que les produits de l'imagination humaine dessinent des états de choses possibles si vastes qu'il faille les concevoir comme des mondes: cette promesse de pouvoirs de la création fictionnelle, nous faisant allégrement franchir les limites de notre finitude existentielle,*

---

[12] In Suvin's definition of the sf genre above one finds another useful and illustrative provocation for reflection on the profound link between genre and worldview because sf scholarship is itself a large genre produced by a discourse community (really, a variety of discourse communities) with a variety of shared practices and concerns and because Suvin has played a prominent role in forming that discourse. Note, in Suvin's definition, the Marxist, and thus Hegelian, genealogy of his terms, *cognitive* and *estrangement*. Though a more extended genealogy might trace his terms' more immediate significance to Russian formalist theories and especially the influence of Bertolt Brecht, one might more succinctly note that *cognitive* is expressive of the "scientific" ambitions of both Hegel and Marx to achieve a systematic – that is, total and rational – representation of reality and that *estrangement* expresses the problem of alienation that the application of (Hegelian or Marxist) science will overcome. Mark Bould and China Miéville's (2009) edited volume, *Red Planets: Marxism and Science Fiction*, explores and illustrates science fiction scholarship's enduring, persistent, and productive engagement with (and often domination by) the Marxist worldview (see also, Nuruddin, Rogan, and Wallis, 2006; Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., 2003; Freedman, 2000). If a significant subset of sf scholarship and sf texts themselves reflect and express Marxist worldviews, it should also be noted that many sf storyworlds and scholarly interpretations do not, and the range of worldviews one finds represented in sf is but a subset of those represented in the far broader domain of fantastika. Much of Chinese literary history – with recently ever more abundant exceptions – exhibits Suvin's biases on a grand and sometimes violent scale. The genre known as *shenmo* (*i.e.*, fantasy drawing on the supernatural beings and "magical" systems of Chinese myth, medicine, and "religion") was rejected as reactionary, feudal, and superstitious following the May Fourth Movement and the Cultural Revolution, in favor of realism, which was regarded as more consistent with scientific modernity.

[13] My use of the word "consensus" above reflects Hume's (1984) definition of *fantasy* as "any departure from consensus reality" (p. 21).

> *est si littéralement merveilleuse qu'il ne faut sans doute pas s'étonner de la fascination ancienne et durable qu'elle exerce, sous des formes toujours renouvelées.* (Besson, 2015, p. 29)
> ["That the products of the human imagination represent possible states of affairs so vast that they must be conceived of as worlds: this promise of the powers of fictional creation, making us cheerfully cross the limits of our existential finitude, is so literally marvelous that one should doubtless not be surprised by the ancient and lasting fascination it exerts, in ever-renewed forms."]

But then she draws on an argument made by Ruth Ronen (1996) to argue that the possible "worlds" of philosophy (especially modal logic) are distinctly different from the fictional "worlds" of cognitive narratologists and that "world" is a mere poetic metaphor used in these different areas with irreconcilable meanings (Besson, 2015, pp. 33-34). (I will concede that some thinkers slip into a dualist, Cartesian trap, whereby some think of worlds in more ontological terms as possible states of affairs (i.e., being, reality) while others think in more epistemological terms, in which worlds are information spaces, quasi-perceptual states of knowing. But these ways of thinking are not disciplinarily universal or necessarily bound to using the insights of the philosophers and the narratologists.)

Besson uses this move to then redefine "world" to refer to a specific class of fiction that interests her. She stresses vastness as a core feature of the world-metaphor (Besson, 2015, pp. 35, 48 ff., 59-62, 121-122), suggesting that the world-metaphor has acted back and forth on fiction-makers, fiction-scholars, and the public (Besson, 2015, pp. 42, 141) and that the contemporary abundance of vast storyworlds, her title's "constellation" (see Besson, 2015, p. 46) wherein we live and that affects our contemporary worldview, in her view, so strongly, stressing vastness, again, to argue that the meaning and actualizations of fictional "worlds" as found in the "genres of the imaginary" have been growing. Because she is more interested in the culture industry and fandom activities (i.e., their complex virtual, participatory, social worlds),

> *ici il s'agira ici de s'intéresser aux œuvres qui se qualifient ou sont qualifiées de « mondes » par cette vulgate diffuse que les constructions théoriques contredisent et alimentent dans un même mouvement. Les œuvres-mondes et univers fictionnels de la culture populaire contemporaine regroupent des réalités distinctes mais entremêlées : des œuvres qui représentent des mondes (alternatifs, multiples, fictionnels au second degré), en science-fiction et* fantasy *au sens large ; des mondes qui émergent d'ensembles d'œuvres (Marvel ou DC* universe*), et d'autres qui servent d'arrière-plan contextuel à une pratique ludique (Pokemon par exemple).*
> ["here it will be a question of being interested in the works which qualify themselves or are qualified as 'worlds' by this diffuse vulgate that theoretical constructions contradict and feed in the same movement. The works-worlds and fictional universes of contemporary popular culture bring together distinct but intertwined realities: works that represent worlds (alternative, multiple, fictional in the second degree), in science fiction and *fantasy* in the broad sense; worlds that emerge from sets of works (Marvel or DC *universe*), and others that serve as a contextual background for a playful practice (Pokemon for example)."]

Besson notes that the fictional universes or worlds that people engage with and that artists contribute to are often supported by data compilations like author- and fan-made encyclopedias and story bibles for TV and movie series that enable serial, cyclical, multimedia expressions (in books, videos, games, merchandise) and that, based on this, "[n]ous avons minoré (relativement) le rôle joué par l'intrigue et les personnages dans la caractérisation des mondes, dans la mesure justement où ceux-ci se donnent comme débordant les récits qui s'y déroulent" ["we have (relatively) reduced the role played by plot and characters in describing worlds, precisely insofar as these are given as going beyond the stories that take place there"] (Besson, 2015, pp. 48-52).

I have some doubts about her characterizing fantastical genres like SF and fantasy ("les genres les plus explicitement cosmogoniques" (Besson, 2015, p. 53)) as being world-fictions *in contrast to* character- and, especially, plot-fictions—these elements can still be fully developed in a robustly realized alternative world or worlds. But her point that characters may function as "les meilleurs hérauts du monde" is well taken (Besson, 2015, p. 53; see also p. 71; compare Besson's argument that authors themselves tend to vanish into their monumental works, which become like mausoleums—p. 121-122; *cf.* Ures, 2023, who essentially argues that massive corporate investment in the world or universe of a film franchise has reduced actors from movie stars to celebrities, familiar faces that are called on to take on fictional avatars, interchangeable embodiments of characters in valuable, cross- and multi-platform intellectual properties). And it aligns with her insight that, insofar as fictional worlds become – and corporations, money-motivated authors, and estates actively push to transform them into – social worlds with cross-platform, serially- and cyclically-embodied, paid-for points of access, characters and plots are frequently evacuated of distinctive qualities that get in the way of corporate goals relative to the storyworld they monopolize. (Besson, 2015, p. 71: *On fustigera le manque d'imagination des scénaristes et l'apathie du système hollywoodien ou, sans que les explications soient exclusives, on verra dans le règne du réemploi une manifestation caractéristique de notre « âge de la fiction >, du rêve d'une constellation de mondes connectés où circuleraient en toute fluidité des signaux culturels reconnus par tous.* "We will criticize the screenwriters' lack of imagination and the apathy of the Hollywood system or, without the explanations being [mutually] exclusive, we will see in the reign of reuse a characteristic manifestation of our 'age of fiction,' of the dream of a constellation of connected worlds where cultural signals, recognized by all, circulate fluidly.")

A work may be an *ensemble sollicitant* (Besson, 2015, p. 74), calling out to others to participate in its elaboration and evolution. For Besson, such a work is more appropriately called a *world* than one that has no such effect. "World" signals a "status" among fictional worlds (Besson, 2015, pp. 82-83):

> *D'abord, on l'a dit, de plus en plus d'ensembles postulent au statut de monde, les possibilités d'expansion s'étant à tel point multipliées que tout succès les suscite. Pour peu qu'ils se rattachent au fantastique ou au merveilleux, et à plus forte raison s'ils abordent la question ou suscitent la réflexion sur une coexistence de mondes, chacun tend même à générer sa propre désignation: ainsi de « Buffyverse » ou « Xenaverse », pour les mondes fictionnels respectivement projetés par les séries* Buffy the Vampire Slayer *(*Buffy contre les Vampires*) et* Xena Warrior Princess *(*Xéna la guerrière*).*

> "First, as we have said, more and more ensembles are applying for world status, the possibilities of expansion having multiplied to such an extent that any success inspires them. As long as they are related to the fantastic or the marvelous, and all the more so if they address the question or arouse reflection on a coexistence of worlds, each even tends to generate its own designation: thus 'Buffyverse' or 'Xenaverse,' for the fictional worlds projected respectively by the series *Buffy the Vampire Slayer* (*Buffy contre les Vampires*) and *Xena Warrior Princess* (*Xéna la guerrière*)."

Besson regards neologisms like "Buffyverse" as indicative of this status. Works seek world status from the outset through intentional, usually corporately-directed expansion or through the shared, participatory world-making efforts of fandoms, with the "world" functioning to unify such efforts, but they may also be constructed post hoc by creators' seeking to unify already-made storyworlds as part of a universe (Besson, 2015, pp. 112-113).

And with this background in mind, one may now address Besson's argument regarding "genre" as a term of art in her argument: *La pulsion expansive des univers de l'imaginaire contemporain les amène, et nous avec eux, à repousser les frontières de l'œuvre jusqu'à déborder sur la notion de genre* ("The expansive impulse of the worlds of the contemporary imagination leads them, and us with them, to push the boundaries of the work to the point of spilling over into the notion of genre") (Besson, 2015, p. 123). I will elsewhere discuss the microgenres that are addressed to smaller, more specific questions of subgroups; Besson cites as her first example of the phenomenon she seeks to identify as this kind of world-genre the *surgenre « fantastique contemporain »*. The supergenre of the contemporary fantastic *fait signe vers un idéal de circulation absolue : mise en commun de réservoirs encyclopédiques* ("points toward an ideal of absolute circulation: pooling of encyclopedic reservoirs") (Besson, 2015, p. 124), such as the blending of fictional encyclopedias in steam punk, where one might encounter together *H. G. Wells, sa machine à remonter le temps et son homme invisible, Frankenstein et sa créature, Dorian Gray, Peter Pan, Dracula, Lewis Carroll et la petite (ou grande) Alice, Sherlock Holmes bien sûr, mais aussi les héroïnes de Jane Austen* (pp. 126-127). In this vast popular culture supergenre,

> *les univers syncrétiques, « mixant » des données hétérogènes dans un mélange chaque fois nouveau, sont devenus absolument omniprésents ; ils constituent même la norme des créations ludiques, pour lesquelles la notion de genre (narratif) n'est en conséquence plus véritablement opératoire. Si, dans ces fictions, le « savoir des genres » joue un rôle indirect mais important dans l'enrichissement des univers c'est en effet en se fondant dans l'espace plus vaste et mouvant d'une « culture populaire » dont le système de citations, références, clins d'œil, semble arrivé à maturité.* (p. 127)
>
> "Syncretic universes, 'mixing' heterogeneous givens in an each-time-new mixture, have become absolutely omnipresent; they even constitute the norm of ludic creations, for which the notion of genre (narrative) is therefore no longer truly operative. If, in these fictions, the 'knowledge of genres' plays an indirect but important role in the enrichment of the universes, it is in fact by blending into the vast and changing space of a 'popular culture' whose system of quotations, references, winks, seems to have reached maturity."

This supergenre of the shared folklore or pop culture milieu that includes Fankenstein, Dracula, and Peter Pan is very much like what Besson would call a *genre-universe* (p. 129)

or genre-world. She argues that *la coexistence, la prolifération, d'univers dans un même territoire générique entraîne leur possible fusion par les usagers* ("the coexistence, the proliferation, of universes in the same generic territory leads to their possible fusion by the users") (Besson, 2015, p. 129). This fusion of things leads, perhaps unsurprisingly, to Besson's invoking the concept of hyperreality, drawing on Eco and Baudrillard, with real world and fictional universe as genre becoming indistinguishable in spaces like the theme – or, one dares say, genre – park (pp. 138-139).

Ultimately, arguing that *world* should be limited to a storyworld or transtextual fictional universe so vast, compelling, and influential that it constitutes a sort of *genre* does not seem necessary. It suits Besson's project, but it cuts it off from others. Instead, some worlds, understood in the sense typically intended and studied by philosophers and cognitive narratologists alike may have the properties of being highly elaborated and complex and widely shared among a population. Because they are conventionalized and shared among many actualizations that are transtextual translations, I don't see any great harm in also characterizing them as genres. Albeit these are genres in a sense of genre unusually decoupled from medium, but this is not without parallel when one thinks of the large genres. Science fiction manifests in novels, movies, video games, etc. Each medium tends to foreground specific aspects of the umbrella genre, but one has no inferential trouble perceiving the genre in its various transtextual embodiments. But in any case, this area of convergence does not delegitimize the usual understanding of *world* or *genre*. (Besson seems to recognize the value of keeping relevant concepts functionally distinct: *Au-delà d'un certain degré d'expansion cependant, la mise en relation s'inscrit davantage dans un régime d'intersémioticité que de transfictionnalité, cette différence recoupant largement celle qu'il faut maintenir entre genre et univers* (p. 128).) Besson's universe-genre-world-work is an interesting subset of the more general phenonmenon, in which social forces complicate the cognitive and representational.

## Fantastika—What Is It?

As suggested above, in attempting to develop a framework for comparison among and analysis of different worldviews in different fictional genres, having a robust understanding of what genres are is important. A central feature that characterizes the genres in which alternative worldviews are represented is, to use Suvin's (1979; 2000) term, "estrangement." They are all "estranged" in Suvin's sense, involving strong departures from consensus reality as typically represented in realist literature; they are non-ordinary worlds, *heterocosmoi*. The genre hybridity one finds in fantastika – the essence of why it is essentially misguided to attempt to provide an essentialist genre definition for any of the subgenres of fantastika – is demanded by its being responsive to the dynamic variety of changing situations both in the source worlds we dwell in together and in the novel target worlds of fantastical authors.

Bazerman (, p. 322) notes,

> Most genres have easy to notice features that signal you about the kind of text it is. And often these features are closely related to major functions or activities carried out by the genre [....] Because genres are recognizable by their distinctive features and those features seem to tell us so much about the function, it is tempting to see genres just as a collection of these features.

In terms of the feature of non-ordinariness, of the norm of expecting the abnormal, Bazerman is right, and this points to a major function of fantasy, science fiction, and horror as examples of "fantastika" or "speculative fiction": they permit (and are instances of) extreme experimentation with and departures from existing cognitive world models, as in dreams, and they permit this because they are, as fiction enjoyed as recreation, socially and practically detached from this world, as in the playful spaces of games. This combination of recreation and experimentation is reminiscent also of tourism.

This recreational social context in which fantastika is situated – as leisure entertainment – needs to be taken seriously. Interestingly, McHale (2009), in "Science Fiction, or: The Most Typical Genre in World Literature," argues that sf often makes its worldmaking explicit in a way that highlights the worldmaking process. I agree, and this is part of the reason I think makers of allomythoi tend to use fantastical genres, like science fiction, for their worldmaking projects. The above comparative terms – dreams, games, tourism, the leisure industry – are considered in more detail elsewhere, so for now, let me continue providing an explanation of the term "fantastika" drawing on its primary wellspring, the fertile mind of John Clute.

Clute (2011), in his work *Pardon This Intrusion: Fantastika in the World Storm*, defines "fantastika" as the umbrella genre encompassing all contemporary fantastical[14] literature—primarily, science fiction, fantasy, horror, and their subgenres. By "contemporary," I mean to suggest the shift in global consciousness – Clute (2011, 2014, 2017) connects this to the Enlightenment and, more broadly, to what is known as the "Anthropocene" (*cf.* Davies, 2017) – related to a number of new human problems and powers characteristic of modernity: empirical science, new technologies applying scientific knowledge, vast economic and communication networks, collapse of traditional plausibility structures ("disenchantment") in the face of criticism and pluralistic competition, and so on.

As Hans Robert Jauss (1982) argues, readers understand genres in terms of their "horizon of expectations." For people to understand non-realist or non-mimetic texts as all being a kind, as all being part of a genre, they require a context in which a genre feature or features became salient, leading to the ascription of a category term. Even in the absence of a term, the market classification (and consumption) of fantasy, horror, and science fiction together suggests that people are aware of these different genres as all being related and different from the typical literary "novel." As Orson Scott Card states, "Science fiction and fantasy are one literary community; while there are many who read or write just one, there are many more who read and write both, and it's foolish to divide them in the store" Card et al., 2013, pp. 22-23).

"Fantastika," therefore, may be thought of as an umbrella genre (1) that emerged in contrast with realist, mimetic literature as part of a historical shift into global, Anthropocene modernity and post-modernity, (2) that is created and consumed by a broad discourse community under the influence of economic forces, and (3) that is characterized by a robust

[14] Before Clute in introduced the term "fantastika," critics tended to use terms like "fantastic" (*e.g.*, Bleiler, 1948), "fantastical" (*e.g.*, Kelleghan, 2002), and "speculative" (and sometimes "estranged") to refer to the same class of texts. Genre terms like "slipstream" (Sterling, 1989; *cf. Science Fiction Studies* 38.1 (March 2011)), "fabulation" (Scholes, 1975), "science fantasy," and "magical realism" refer to liminal (*cf.* "water margins" in Clute and Grant's (1997) *Encyclopedia of Fantasy*) texts with their own distinctive social and historical conditions – indeed, these particular genre terms point to fascinating resonances between pre-modernity and postmodernity – that are located in the borderlands between more central genres like fantasy and science fiction, but they are not as capacious as "fantastika."

break with or estrangement from this world or consensus reality. One may gain a richer understanding of the nature of fantastika, however, by exploring further the cognitive character of this “robust break.” (See the following appendix.)

# Appendix 28: What evolved human cognitive capacity does the genre of fantastika exploit?

> *Fantasy is the impossible made probable. Science Fiction is the improbable made possible.* (Rod Serling, *The Twilight Zone, "The Fugitive"* (03-09-1962))

> *My thesis, paradoxically, and a little provocatively, but nonetheless genuinely, is simply this:*
> *PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST*
> *The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of the Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time, ... or Fairies and Witches was an essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our true probabilistic beliefs.* (de Finetti, 1970/1974, p. x)

To set the stage for the following discussion of the probabilistic character of fictional representation, and particularly fantastical fictional representation in fantastika (*i.e.*, that fantastika's dominant cognitive trait is the robust modification of one's probabilistic world model), I would again (picking up on a theme in Appendix 27 and Chapter 2) return to the topic of evolution in order to illustrate why the nervous system evolved to model probabilities.

The nervous system is fundamentally a tool for moving through and among the multiple dynamic worlds that constitute our adaptive environment. Imagine an amphibious creature that shifts from aquatic to terrestrial situations; imagine a bird that hunts fish, diving out of the sky into the sea; imagine a nesting animal that crafts its own, buffered environment, taking a hand in its own evolution—"self-domesticating" itself—but also still needing to brave a variety of undomesticated environments. Each of these cases illustrates the manner in which animate life moves between worlds, natural and artificial, massively multiplying the uncertainty and irregularity of the conditions with which it must contend. And probability is the formal symbolic (that is, abstracted) system by which we represent uncertainty. Thus, perhaps it will come as no surprise to find that the nervous system, which must cope with the uncertainty inherent to movement between worlds, is widely thought by cognitive scientists to be a Bayesian probability engine, a system characterized by hierarchical *predictive* coding (*e.g.*, Clark, 2013), which generates a probabilistic world model. What is this?

**Probabilistic World Model**





**Figure 2.** Event cognition as hierarchical predictive system. Event models receive information from event schemata (prior knowledge) and from prediction error signals that are created by the model's active predictions tested against input flowing from the body and the senses. Error monitoring is an appraisal process. Increased error signal (i.e., partial or complete appraisal failure) causes the current model to be revised or replaced by a new model that explains away the bottom-up signals. Based on Kurby and Zacks, 2008.

## Figure II. Event Cognition, from Taves and Asprem (2017), based on Kurby and Zacks (2008)

The above figure, taken from Taves and Asprem (2017) and, as its caption states, based on Kurby and Zacks (2008), illustrates the structure of "event cognition,"[1] in which one's probabilistic self- and -world model (PWM) is generated and updated.[2] This must be

[1] Martin Marty presciently observed Taves's early interest in and use of "events" as a bridge category:

> [T]he sharp division that has produced much conflict in the profession between "narrative" and "theory" is much reduced in Professor Taves's work. Must one determine whether to treat the past as only a set of "social constructions of reality" or can one propose that there is some sort of approachable reality behind the constructions? The author of *Fits, Trances, & Visions* is highly aware of the issues that went into the debate behind that question, but is not stunned by it. Is historical writing about "mentalités" and emotions chancy, or does it have its place alongside consideration of "events"? Taves treats successive unfoldings of emotions *as* events, and thus contributes to another form of synthesis. (2000, p. 493)

[2] It's worth noting that event cognition builds on a long tradition of study of how human's segment experience, keep track of time, and retain different kinds of knowledge. Effective memory use requires segmentation and, ideally, a dynamic, affective event structure (Person-Action-Object); this is mirrored in effective narration. Back in 1860, Karl Ernst von Baer delivered his lecture on the "life moment," which ultimately is tied to the electrical and chemical rhythms of the brain. We now know a lot about the basic constraints of human temporal perception (*e.g.*, the "now" of present experience cannot extend much beyond a 3-second interval (*cf.* Wittmann, 2011; Lloyd, 2012), and the chunking of sensory stimuli into "life moments" is tied to brainwave

understood in technical terms, but it seems to me ultimately to be what Robert Browning in his "Essay on Shelley" is saying when he writes, "For it is with this world, as starting point and basis alike, that we shall always have to concern ourselves; the world is not to be learned and thrown aside, but reverted to and relearned" (cite). Artists make experiences, which are art (Dewey, 1934), by using the same evolved systems that enable lively engagement with the world's varied environments. The PWM is generated in working memory as a top-down prediction of the state of the self-and-world from "priors," that is, prior probabilities—one's past simulated experience of the world-and-self. This complex repertoire of expectations takes a long time for young humans to build up, but, like an application on a cell phone, it facilitates rapid information processing since the mind does not have to make sense of everything afresh each moment. Rather, its inferential world model, like a mobile app that already contains the aspects of a platform that remain constant, simply needs to be updated or modified to adjust to what is new. Bottom-up sensory input is monitored ("Error Monitoring") for inconsistency with the PWM, and if an error cannot be explained away it moves up the cognitive processing hierarchy (hence the "hierarchical" aspect of "hierarchical predictive coding") until an inferential modification can explain it away. Breaks in the PWM – that is, instances of significant modification to the PWM – constitute "events," observed experiences, segments that may be retained in episodic memory, narrated, and recalled.

Event cognition is founded on the study of how readers spontaneously chunk or segment narratives into comprehensible parts. Vera Nünning, summarizing Herman (2003) in "Stories as a Tool for Thinking," explains the process as follows: "narratives order our ongoing stream of consciousness by providing [...] 'chunks' (172-73), and therefore presenting 'cognizable, and thus usable structures' (173), by offering classifiable, recognisable and memorisable units" (V. Nünning, 2010, p. 220).

*Fantastika and World Modeling*

Fantastika generates new possible worlds by exploiting humans' evolved capacity for probabilistic world modeling (*cf.* Dewey, 1934, p. 242).[3] But before exploring the

---

rhythms (generally ranging between 10 Hz to 40 Hz), consisting of intervals of 25 to 100 milliseconds (equivalent to a Flicker Fusion Frequency of 10 fps to 40 fps), but these vary widely among animals (*cf.* Healy, McNally, Ruxton, Cooper, and Jackson, 2013)).

[3] As signaled by the first epigraph of this appendix, the umbrella category "fantastika" presents something of a challenge to the shorthand genre distinction between "fantasy" and "science fiction" as participating in that between supernature and nature, or, more commonly and precisely, between the "impossible" and the "improbable." (The religion/secularity distinction obviously also lurks close to the surface of this definitional debate.) By setting up a more general category, fantastika points to a basic cognitive capacity. What happens if one considers fantastical narrative events as acting on the mind's hierarchical predictive coding (HPC) system (Clark 2013; Bar 2009; Friston, 2005; Glimcher 2003; Rao & Ballard, 1999)? Quantum fiction may foreground some of these issues. Bartter (1990) argues that some contemporary science fiction reflects the insights of quantum mechanics, and quantum mechanical states are of course represented by probabilistically (*cf.* Barnouw's (1979) "Science Fiction as a Model for Probabilistic Worlds: Stanislaw Lem's Fantastic Empiricism"). The significance of this is variously interpreted in the philosophy of science literature, and these different philosophical interpretations have various representatives in hard SF texts. In any case, Bartter points out the interesting fact that SF texts may be organized based on the scientific worldview paradigm they endorse:

> Writers cannot *not* reflect their world-view, consciously or unconsciously; this does not depend upon their "understanding." The Newtonian writer *knows* what is going on and informs the reader directly; the Relativistic writer perceives cause-and-effect and expects the

fantastical *how-to – i.e.*, the methods used by authors of fantastika to make new worlds that significantly differ from the consensus world model – one does well to consider the more general *how-does* – that is, how language cues the probabilistic world modeling system to shift among and generate new worlds. The contemporary understanding of how this works grows out of an interdisciplinary narratological framework called "text world theory," drawing on modal logic, the concept of "possible worlds," and their application to narrative and semantics.

Because I take robust possibility-modification as constituting fantastika' distinctive function, I fundamentally agree with the thrust of Sefler's early (1986) paper, "Science, Science Fiction, and Possible World Semantics," which argues that the categories of aliens in fictional storyworlds are not rigid designators (*sensu* Kripke's modal theory) but, rather, must be understood in terms of what I would call the aliens' worldview (*i.e.*, what Sefler calls the aliens' epistemology).[4] Sefler was picking up on and applying to science fiction a trend in the study of narrative that began in the 1970s, with figures like Thomas Pavel,[5] Marie-Laure Ryan, Ruth Ronen, Lubomír Doležel, and Umberto Eco applying possible world theory[6] to the study of fiction and proposing fictional possible worlds as a coherent

---

> reader to work out the interlocking actions (given the unreliability of point of view, position, etc.); but the Quantum writer literally constructs the meaning of the text by constructing the text itself, expecting readers to repeat the process for themselves. The counter-intuitive physical phenomena described by quantum mechanics thus underlie post-modernist literature, where any term can stand as a meta-fiction, referring not to "reality" but to another kind of fiction depending on "the essentially *unstable* nature of signification. The sign is not so much a unit with two sides, as a momentary 'fix' between two moving layers" (Selden: 73). (1990, pp. 326-327)

If one takes seriously the question of "possibility" as instantiated in human cognition, what does this mean for a literary theory of fantastika (*i.e.*, the various fantastical genres)? Taking possibility seriously may supply a cognition-based definition for sf, fantasy, and related genres, but doing so also makes cognition-based genre distinctions between "fantasy," "science fiction," and other genres of fantastika harder to sustain.

[4] Rigid designators, in Kripke's causal theory of reference, fix the transworld identity of something or someone thus designated by an original "baptism." One may see Kripke, the founder of modal logic (at least in its contemporary axiomatic and symbolic form—Leibniz likely deserves credit as the true founder), seeking a refuge from the flux of possibility (◊) in the fixity of necessity (□). In this, as in, for example, Kripke's refutation of the equation of "pain" with the firing of C-fibers, one runs against Kripke's deeply abstract (and abstracted) mode of thinking, a quest for certainty that obviously also vexes him in his *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1892). Pain as a complex physico-phenomenological experience requiring an empirically-grounded, multi-level, cognitive-evolutionary-cultural account is not really in view. His causal theory of reference, though admirably situated in the world in so far as it is causal, takes its leave of the world as soon as it introduces the *a priori*. Like St. Anselm's appeal to the modal in his proof of God's existence as that than which nothing greater may be conceived, Kripke's refutation of the transworld identity of pain and C-fiber firing is a (rather delightfully entertaining) semantic magic trick invoking possibility to support the intuitively compelling.

[5] In *Fictional Worlds* (1986), Pavel explicitly links his discussion of fictional worlds to the human ability to the divide the world into profane and sacred and includes the various primary and secondary religious and mythic worlds among those that a literary work may access.

[6] It is worth stressing that modal theory should be distinguished from the theory of fictional possible worlds. It productively uses the analytical rigor of possible world theory and the very useful expansion of the universe (or perhaps multiverse) of discourse to embrace an unbounded multiplicity of postulated but not actualized worlds, but modal theory is not identical to the theory of fictional possible worlds. To attempt an illustration, one might note that Leibniz' restriction on possible worlds, that only those exist that do not imply a contradiction, would seem to rule out a large number of humorous, magical, experimental, drug-related, and other forms of fiction that intentionally represent internal contradictions as a central feature of their worldmaking.

and powerful instrument for narratology, while at the same time unknowingly moving analysis in the direction of the kind of worldview-studies approach advocated in this work.

**How does fantastika exploit the PWM?**

The modal interpretation of fiction in terms of fictional worlds and possible world semantics is quite useful for analyzing fiction in general, but it is still more so a literary theory uniquely suited to fantastika (*e.g.*, Martin, 2004; Werth, 1999; Gavins, 2007; Gavins and Lahey, 2016).[7] This perspective has also been advanced by Kukkonen in such papers as, "Bayesian Narrative: Probability, Plot and the Shape of the Fictional World" (Kukkonen, 2014) and in her recent book (2019). Sefler, whose thinking is suggestive of the direction narratology would take as it has come to understand the probabilistic character of cognition, states,

> The world does not provide an independent foundation to either language or experience; it is not independently intelligible [....] [F]ollowing from the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, indications are that languages carve up the world in different ways [....] One can see the attractiveness of Kripke's rigid designators. The assumption is that rigid designators insure an interlanguage bridge for translation [....] The language of science is systematic and open-ended in the sense that it has a predictive quality and can incorporate newfound data. A rigid designator, on the other hand, is closed, or fixed, in scope. (1986, p. )

This project is deeply concerned with what sort of language and method one may use to "translate" among fictional worlds and worldviews for scholarly purposes. (See Appendix 6.) Here, I would highlight the manner in which modal logic, under the influence of Kripke and others, served as a provocation for reflection on the issues of probability, possibility, and necessity relative to fictional worlds and science fiction scenarios. This would develop into a robust theoretical framework for the study of fictional texts.[8] For example, Riyukta Raghunath, in first issue of *Fantastika Journal*, illustrates use of fictional world theory and possible world theory in recent study of fantastika

---

[7] Above, probabilistic reasoning was interpreted as a solution to the uncertainty arising from moving between multiple and diverse environments, spaces, or worlds. It is also worth mentioning that modal logic—even in formal logic simply a modification of temporal logic and in the development of many languages apparently an extension or specification within temporal verbal systems—has been linked to the necessities of adaptation to a temporal world. The ability to travel into, among, and between fictional and religious worlds has been argued to be an extension or exaptation of our capacity to mentally travel between possible worlds and times (Bulbulia, 2009). That this capacity to shift into a different mental space/time with different rules is also *ludic* – *i.e.*, that it is at least a precondition for play – is another important aspect of the theory of worldviews promoted by this project. See Appendix 14 and *passim*.

[8] My "Pyrrhonean Pragmatist Perspective" (PPR, as opposed to realist, "analytic," or positivist) orientation is obviously reflected in my endorsement of Sefler's skepticism regarding Kripke's rigid designator (and disproof of mind-body dualism). Again, I regard possible world semantics and Text World Theory as providing a rigorous, disciplined, careful language for analysis without regarding it as mapping onto "objective" reality—in fact, it liberates one from having to know the one, true, objective reality in a world of competing probabilistic models. My PPR pragmatist-constructionist approach is typical of most scholars' use of possible world theory. In contrast, Leibniz's formulation was explicitly metaphysical and ontic, grounding the *existence* of possible worlds in the mind of God.

Efforts to use cognitive science to explain the *content* of fiction (*e.g.*, Zunshine 2006, 2008) have so far focused primarily on two things: (1) representation[9] and (2) cognitive capacities such as "theory of mind" (ToM).[10] Certainly, many features of sf and fantastika more generally may be understood through the application of theories like these that have been applied to other forms of fiction. Research has also looked into fiction's psychological *effect*, for example, on the emotions, as well as other phenomenological qualities like fiction's entrancing, absorbing, hypnotic nature (*e.g.*, Holland, 2009), which many argue is emphasized in "escapist" texts.[11] Indeed, typologies of fictional genres sometimes make certain affective states intrinsically characteristic of specific genres, such as sf's "sense of wonder"[12] associated with conceptual breakthrough[13] and, more obviously, horror's evocation of horror and romance/erotica's stimulation of arousal proper. One might recall that "emotive fantasy" (pp. 90 *ff.*) is one of Manlove's (1999) primary categories. Affective states provide relevant interoceptive input on the HPC system, meaning that the embodied nature of all cognition and, thus, the embodied character of reading makes certain possibilities – those possibilities that accord with the felt sense of emotional arousal – more compelling (*cf.* Pezzulo, 2014). Rhetorical appeals to *pathos* combined with embodied descriptive details act with persuasive power on the hierarchical predictive coding (HPC) system because their combined effect gives the storyworld a perceptual and interoceptive richness more like the experiential reality to which we evolved to respond.

Still, relative to other kinds of fiction, fantastika seems to act with peculiar intensity in modifying our Bayesian priors.[14] As noted in Appendix 14, fantastika's effects on the

---

[9] For example, studies of cognitive representation focus on concepts like (1) ontologically intuitive and counterintuitive things; (2) memetics, cognitive attractors, and related epidemiological models of transmission of representations; and (3) metaphor theory and conceptual blending.

[10] Note that this capacity is itself one that involves the ability to represent certain things, namely, the mental states of others. In addition to ToM, other capacities such as "absorption" and "decoupling" have been given attention.

[11] A variety of people have argued that (and contested whether) fiction's use of the capacity for ToM has the effect of strengthening it and, thus, promoting empathy.

[12] *Cf.*, C.S. Lewis's Romantic *Sehnsucht*. Indeed, Csicsery-Ronay Jr.'s consideration of the sublime and the grotesque certainly calls to mind Otto's *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. But one might push back on the attempt to separate the art of sf (or even of fantastika more generally) in terms of a horrified or awed response to the robustly non-ordinary. Dewey at one point writes, "Philosophy is said to begin in wonder and end in understanding. Art departs from what has been understood and ends in wonder" (1934, p. 270). What I find most valuable in this claim is the observation that wonder is always and everywhere a feature of art, not the special property of the fantastical. If it possesses the "sense of wonder" or of horror in greater measures, this is a side-effect of its unusual departure from the consensus norms of accepted reality. About 20 years ago, "awe" came to be studied in more detail, and though I wonder to what degree it is being universalized as a brain state the way the "Holy" was in the past, it has been described as an experience that is so vast, powerful, or complex that it violates one's world model, causing one to update it (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). That is, it is a more robust version of the non-ordinary that becomes salient and compels modification of one's default model.

[13] *Cf.* Csicsery-Ronay's (2008) focus on the sublime and the grotesque as related, respectively, to horror's and sf's characteristic states of horror and wonder.

[14] My immediate focus here is on the way experience is generated by fantastical texts' interaction with and exploitation of the human HPC system. New textual possibilities are supplied, and they are made even more compelling through the rhetorical evocation of sensory details and emotional appeals that feed into the embodied hierarchical predictive coding system. However, since this work always keeps in view the novel social formations organized around the novel worldviews generated by fictional worlds, the potential of fiction to modify Bayesian priors in a *lasting* manner that persists long after a work of fiction is set aside is one that

human probabilistic world-modeling system is comparable in interesting respects to REM sleep,[15] which suggests resonances of this work with McNamara's recent arguments in *Dreams and Visions: How Religious Ideas Emerge in Sleep and Dreams* (2016).

The idea that allomythoi are analogous to dream consciousness obviously sounds quite Freudian; however, as one can see by this point, it rests on a solid foundation of experimental evidence. Whereas Freud thought that dream consciousness exhibited the outworking of fundamental, universal tendencies and tensions (*i.e.*, libidinal desires and fears and internalized regulatory forces) of the human psyche, though shaped by individual experience and wish fulfillment, cognitive science in contrast suggests that dreams, like other self-and-world modeling events, are situational. Just as one might understand a genre like history in extended-cognition terms as an externalization of memory, the genre of fantastika, as a cognitive tool, may be understood, in a sense, as an externalization of or cognitive tool for mind-wandering and dreaming—though also ordered (mapped) by the application of executive control to the material of imagination. Bielik-Robson, in "Dreams of Matter: Ernst Bloch on Religion as Organised Fantasy," makes the interesting argument that, for Bloch, dreams are not irrational, subjective, regressive escapes, but instances of a material system rebelling against the tyranny of the present with a possible utopian future. Dewey makes a similar argument:

> Only imaginative vision elicits the possibilities that are interwoven within the texture of the actual. The first stirrings of dissatisfaction and the first intimations of a better future are always found in works of art. The impregnation of the characteristically new art of a period with a sense of different values than those that prevail is the reason why the conservative finds such art to be immoral and sordid, and is the reason why he resorts to the products of the past for esthetic satisfaction [….] Change in the climate of the imagination is the precursor of the changes that affect more than the details of life. (Dewey, 1934, pp. 345-346)

Such new visions of possibilities latent in the elements of life may crash upon one's awareness with a disorienting force.

"Conceptual breakthrough," "estrangement," "defamiliarization"—familiar expressions such as these from the academic study of sf point to the fact that sf narratives involve potent changes within the human cognitive system for world modeling and decoupling from the normative or consensus reality typically depicted in mimetic forms of literature. Suvin himself, though in a Hegelian-Marxist register, has emphasized that both science fiction *and* fantasy are literatures of estrangement (2000). SF creates other possible worlds, and since any exploration of alternative priors must be cognitively instantiated using the same reality-modeling system used to construct the event model[16] of daily experience,

---

requires further consideration. How do fictional possibilities become "hyper-real" possibilities that can lead to the development of new worldviews (Davidsen, 2014; Possamai, 2012; Cusack, 2010)?

[15] Hobson, 2009; *cf.* Hinton et al., 1995 and Dempster et al., 1977. Along these lines in sf theory, see Hunt, 2005—compare Scholes, 1975.

[16] Von Wright (1968), in his logic of action, makes the concept of "event" central to his possible-worlds theory of action; that is, an agent of an action transforms an initial situation or state into one of a range of possible end states over a period of time, which constitutes an event. Herman's (2013) *Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind*, consistent with the arguments made in this work, likewise notes that stories are grounded both in situations and reasons for actions—that is, they are goal- and action-oriented within a determinate environment.

distinguishing the degree or mode in which these alternative possibilities differ from consensus reality as more or less "cognitive" seems both infelicitous and perspectivally arbitrary. The ideological function of "cognition" as a category in Suvin's work is quite evident (*cf.* Appendix 27, n. 8).

I wish now to point to the unity of this probabilistic critique of the sharp distinction between the subgenres of fantastika, such as science fiction and fantasy, with that advanced by Busto (2014) and others on the grounds of diversity. Both probabilistic cognition and genetic diversity are adaptive responses to an uncertain world. Indeed, diversity is both a resource for coping with uncertainty and, due to its basis in genetic recombination and mutation, a consequence of it.

Life's resistance of entropy is accomplished on multiple levels and in myriad ways. As Clark (2013, p. 186) argues, development of hierarchical predictive coding reduces Shannon entropy by supplying us with a more useful world model that allows us to reduce thermodynamic entropy—that is, to stay alive. Similarly, in an uncertain world, diversity is the best preparation for the unforeseen. The different perspectives and abilities both innate to and cultivated by different populations such as women, gay people, African Americans, and Chicanx people are positive assets to our species as we attempt to respond to environmental uncertainty.

Busto (2014, pp. 400, 401) makes his argument for the instability of the generic notion of "science fiction" in the light of racial considerations in the following fashion:

> African American science fiction criticism has effectively undermined the traditional "cognitive estrangement" mechanism that maintains the putative wall between science fiction and fantasy, that is between what is conventionally accepted and recognized as "scientific" and not "magical," "superstitious," or "religious." The African American arguments against traditional science fiction are as eloquent as they are trenchant, especially the frightening reminder that what passes as science fiction for whites actually happened to black people [….] Viewed in the harsh light of history, is it any wonder that African American writers have rejected the traditional assumptions about science as objective and neutral? This problematic history of science and technology opens up science fiction to alternate ways of knowing (including myth and religion), that have equal value in terms of making sense of and explaining the world. That is, "science" is a contested notion, and it requires new thinking outside of any narrow scientism and blind sensory empiricism.

One might contest Busto's characterization of science as supplying a single, objective point of view by pointing out that this reflects realist-positivist technoscientific assumptions. One might alternatively adopt a philosophy of science that is more skeptical-pragmatic (*e.g.*, my PPP "polytheism"), but, then, this would simply reaffirm Busto's deeper perspectivalist critique. And the argument might be extended, not only by pointing to indigenous,[17] feminist, Black, and queer criticism of dogmatic scientism, but also by observing, as has long been noted by scholars of religion, that the contrast between "religion" and "magic," which mirrors the distinction that currently obtains between "science" and "magic" and "science fiction" and "fantasy," is itself deeply implicated in early power contestation between, on the one hand, both Protestants (rational, Enlightened, scientific) and Catholics

[17] *Cf.* Sharp (2014) in *Black and Brown Planets: The Politics of Race in Science Fiction*.

(Neoplatonic, pagan, magical—leading to the occult and esoteric) and, on the other hand, the West and the "Orient" (consider, too, the co-construction of "black" and "white").[18] Again we see the truth of Wittgenstein's observation: we develop different language games reflecting different life-worlds.

Later in his article, Busto points to Giordano Bruno's proposal – perhaps emerging from Bruno's extensive experience with shifting among imagined spaces in developing and using his arts of memory, another primary focus of this work (Appendix 9 and Appendix 11; *cf.* Yates, 1964, 1966) – of an endless universe of infinite worlds as characteristic of science fiction, which we might interpret as suggesting the harmony of his argument with that advanced here: namely, that science fiction and fantasy and the host of related genres constituting fantastika all may be regarded as modifications and extensions of our panhuman, species-typical probabilistic reasoning, whereby we explore alternative possibilities that, though they differ from the consensus norms of the worlds that constitute conventional "reality," are nonetheless *possibilities* (see also, *e.g.*, Eizykman's (1983) "Chance and Science Fiction: SF as Stochastic Fiction" and Lambert-Beatty's (2009) "Make-Believe: Parafiction and Plausibility"). They may form internally consistent (or even intentionally inconsistent) worlds and worldviews governed by alternative logics.

As Damasio (1999) notes, cognition is structured by and composed of activations of sensory-motor patterns and perceptions. That is, to reiterate the event cognition model described above, our probabilistic mind has taken sensory experience and organized it in accord with body- and environment-based schemas that are themselves being modified by new sensory input. As we learn from the metaphor theory and conceptual blending literatures that attempt to make sense of representation both in terms of how it constrains thought and enables novelty (*e.g.*, Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Fauconnier and Turner, 2003), these schemas may be used to project or map across domains, to move, as it were, between worlds, and, by means of conceptual blending, create new ones. Indeed, possible world semantics points out the harmony of metaphor and conceptual blending theory—a central area of research in the study of representation—and modal thought based on probability (Martin, 2004—see especially Chapter 5: "From Models to Metaphors: Possibility, Aesthetics, and Literary Theory").[19] And so one can begin to see how a probabilistic interpretation of fiction may fit with other branches of cognitive science research on fictional representation mentioned above.

This might be taken as another way of saying that fiction is consubstantial with history, or, as Ricoeur would say, "a prefigured time . . . becomes a refigured time through the mediation of a configured time" (year, p. 54). And this model captures the features – so evident in theorists' wrestling over the nature of "myth" – of allomythoi being, on the one hand, intertextual and conservative and, on the other hand, performative and innovative. As

[18] Smith, 1998; Asad, 2003; Masuzawa, 2005; Nongbri, 2013; *cf.* Fleming et al., 2015; Taves, 2014.

[19] The unity of conceptual blending and probabilistic accounts seem to be best supported by a connectionist framework for understanding cognition although such a framework still permits some degree of modularity and modularization or treatment of folk psychology elements as behavioral accounts reflecting a particular level or degree of granularity (Clark, 1993). Above all, it points to the need to move beyond the computer metaphor of a deterministic system for a wet, probabilistic, embodied nervous system: "Trying to understand the relationship between behavior and brain by studying reflex arcs simply cannot be done. In order to understand how the brain solves sensorimotor problems, we have to understand, we have to have a theory of, the sensorimotor problem posed by the environment to the organism. Bayesian economic mathematics is that theory" (Glimcher, 2003, p. 203).

one example of this, in her recent work, *To Boldly Go: Marketing the Myth of Star Trek*, Djoymi Baker (2018) engages fluently with past scholarship on *Star Trek* as myth (e.g., American frontier myth, mythic transformation of and response to U.S. history, a site of mythic resolution of contemporary cultural contradictions, etc.), and she demonstrates how ideologies or worldviews – including their more sinister and contradictory possibilities – are mediated through narrative representations like *Star Trek* title sequences, supplying viewers with a cosmos to inhabit. But one might even draw on works like W. Warren Wagar's *Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things* (1982), which focuses on what Wagar regards as the secularization of Western eschatological myths in sf dystopias. Even such dark expressions of the apocalyptic imagination, which express lost faith in a culture that permits things like atom bombs and the Holocaust, may serve as attempted interventions to make a livable future by describing an unlivable future history.

**What are the implications of the above understanding of fantastika?**

The observation that fantastika differs in degree, but not in kind, from other forms of narrative has important implications. (1) An allomythos is not *sui generis*, not radically different and distinct, relative to other forms of narrative. This is in contrast to the sort of claims made regarding "fantasy" by many past genre theorists. Because our capacity to shift into other worlds is very common and seems to be rooted in basic functions like sleep and play, the marking of some worlds as special depends on their being explicitly (as by terms like "religion") or implicitly (as with neologies and novums) marked as such, not on some inherent property of the worlds themselves. (2) This is a common process. Although fantastical texts are often at pains to break with the "real" world and distinguish themselves from realist texts, the representation of other worlds, both internally and in texts, is not unusual. (3) In other words, creativity is a paradoxically conservative process, using familiar materials and methods to fashion something novel. (4) Finally, I submit that, like fictional storyworlds, the allomythoi ("religious" and otherwise) imbedded in them and the human capacity to shift into and among a variety of worlds are very common and ordinary, seeming to be rooted in things like sociality (the indefinite openness of human social groups and the need to model human minds) and play (the need for animals that learn to have safe spaces for practice and experiment). This has important implications for "religion" and "sacred" narratives, in that religious worlds and narratives are not *sui generis* and not nearly as "individual" and as "serious" as, say, proposed by figures like William James. Along these lines, Doležel makes this point:

> Walton developed a more sophisticated pragmatics of pretense by blending it with ludic aesthetics. He sees fictional representations as "continuous with children's games of make-believe." "Representational works function as props in such games, as dolls and teddy bears serve as props in children's games" (1990, [p.] 11). The crucial concept here is "props," objects that "prescribe imaginings, generate fictional truths" ([1990, p.] 51). Being "caught up in a story" means "to participate *psychologically* in a game in which the story (or play or painting) is a prop" (1984, [pp.] 181-82). (Doležel, 1998, p. 11)

Texts are cues to play; they must be re-created to be recreationally enjoyed. This is special, liberatory, and yet quite ordinary. Cognitive narratologists point out that world-making within heterocosmic worlds – *i.e.*, the non-ordinary – is very common, and they supply tools

for analyzing how they are generated—*e.g.*, such "ways of worldmaking" as bending, breaking, and blending elements of existing worlds. Allomythoi are a particular, important subset of world within worlds. Importantly, *allo*mythoi do this in a *new* way – they are not simple, direct (though fictional) depictions of "real" or established worldviews.

Again, the field of narratological study known as text world theory (TWT; see Appendix 30), which draws on the philosophical field of modal logic and its application in possible world semantics, supplies part of the vocabulary required to talk precisely and productively about allomythoi in fantastika. In particular, it understands texts as containing a huge number of *world-switches* from the primary text-world to other worlds such as *modal-worlds, metaphor-worlds,* and *fantasy-universes*. Each of these – and perhaps, *fantasy-universes* in particular – is in varying degrees non-ordinary relative to the text-world. But a key insight from TWT and cognitive narratology in general is that the *non-ordinary* is ordinary and ubiquitous; though past thinkers (and many current theorists of SF, fantasy, and horror) would contrast the fantastic and the aesthetic with the actual and as the *opposite* of the real, cognitive science and TWT demonstrate how normal and natural this proliferation of worlds is. (Again, this appears to be closely related to attempts to define magic, religion, and science oppositionally.) As Doležel notes,

> Fictional worlds do not have to conform to the structures of the actual world, just as the world of non-Euclidean geometry does not conform to the world where Euclidean geometry is valid. There is no justification for two semantics of fictionality, one designed for "realistic" fiction, the other for "fantasy." (1998, p. 19)

One example of what used to be the more common development of two semantics of fictionality would be Anne Wilson's (1983) *Magical Thought in Creative Writing: The Distinctive Roles of Fantasy and Imagination in Fiction*. Her contrast between "fantasy" and "imagination" is, essentially, the Freudian distinction between "primitive" or "magical thinking" and the poesis of a more self-controlled, rational agent. While there are many excellent studies of fantastical works and fantasy in general within the broad psychoanalytical tradition, the problem-oriented focus of this work does not attempt to uncover and analyze the psychological depths of the unconscious and the deep roots of fictional worldmaking in libidinal drives and familial relationships. Rather, in a manner similar to the contrast between psychoanalysis and cognitive behavioral therapy, my focus is on how fictional worlds, worldviews, and ways of life are problem-oriented cognitive tools or patterns that, though unreal, may be realistic or helpfully productive responses to situations in the environment.[20]

---

[20] This approach suggests a different response to the accusation, which one might level against this proposed framework, of being guilty of the intentional fallacy. Though evading the "biographical fallacy" which a psychoanalytical approach might seem to be more obviously prone to, this framework does seem to be highly attentive to authorial intention. That is, is not the attempt to locate, in allomythoi, proposed solutions to the Big Questions an instance of the quest to uncover and reduce the independently existing text to a given author's intended solution to situations and problems in the author's environment? Individuals and groups may draw on fictional worlds and worldviews as part of an ongoing process of identity formation, and a major factor in their finding given works persuasive and relevant in their own creative, identity-formation processes is their evocation of and relevance to situations and problems that interest and concern *them*. This includes – and by no means forecloses – the possibility that individuals and groups may discover in a fictional world and worldview responses to situations and problems that the author was unaware and did not intend. The manner in which a fictional world develops independently of authorial intent is complicated. In some ways, the discursive conventions of a language, a genre, a subculture, and so on can start writing itself – what is probable within a

Key, then, to specifying certain worlds as distinctively allomythic is their being distinguished as such by attributive signals in the text, either explicitly by designating the allomythic element as "religious," "magical," and so on or implicitly through the use of neologisms and novums that signal a new world by their inherent novelty. Although having worlds within worlds is, according to TWT, a feature of all narratives, allomythoi represent a robust case of this world-within-a-world structure. They are non-ordinary worlds relative to the text-world, a particular kind of fantasy-universe. The central power-play in this persuasive world-making act is (1) modeling and (2) setting things off as non-ordinary and then (3) as non-ordinary relative to that (diegetically non-ordinary) world. This requires the capacity to (i) model alternate possibilities, (ii) tag them as non-ordinary or attribute non-ordinariness to them, and (iii) engage in recursion. Other useful vocabulary from narratology for talking about allomythoi in fantastika include the expressions for talking about levels of diegesis and the crossing of diegetic boundaries (metalepsis). Drawing on Bellah, Cusack and others, I identify the shifting into these non-ordinary worlds as ludic in nature. And drawing on Durkheim and others, I regard these world-shifts as also related to the problem of intentionality (see the excursus below and also the excursus in Appendix 14), the "hard problem" of consciousness, and sociality; that is, intentional agency makes behavior less predictable, which is an advantage to the individual, but in order to live together socially, conspecifics must be able to model behavior—they must know each other's stories—and coordinate behavior through shared stories. Just as unlimited reproduction placed enormous new cognitive loads on humans, so too the externalization and proliferation of narrative worlds and worldviews have generated new pressures and problems.

### *An Excursus on the Pragmatic Reality of Individual and Social Agents and the Hard Problem of Consciousness*

> Durkheim states in his Conclusion to *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* that "collective consciousness is something other than a mere epiphenomenon of its morphological base, just as individual consciousness is something other than a mere product of the nervous system" (emphasis added, 426). His opposition to reductionistic account of religion is rooted in this objection to making religious phenomena mere byproducts of mental confusion. Such explanations are unfaithful to the phenomena they claim to study, transforming reality into appearance and illusion. Bellah's chapter "Religion and Reality" in his work *Religion in Human Evolution* also stresses, in the tradition of Durkheim, the *reality* of religious phenomena. This excursus will attempt to look at how Bellah's and Durkheim's arguments

semiotic system tends to be actualized and the intersubjective, "cultural" aspect of language can exceed an author's conscious control; likewise, as characters, settings, and other features of a storyworld develop, their determinate qualities grow a kind of probabilistic momentum, generating likely trajectories of further development, mutually interacting tensions and amplifications, and, in short, a dynamism that exceeds conscious, calculated authorial intent. The situations and problems internal to the storyworld are of central importance, and the text exists independently of its author as a complex semiotic arrangement. This proposed framework for the study of allomythic worldmaking does not deny any of this. But it does insist that authors are provoked to engage in the laborious task of fantastical worldmaking, not *ex nihilo*, but by problems and situations to which their storyworlds relate and respond and with cultural resources and ways of worldmaking at hand.

against reductionistic theories in support of the reality of the organism, the religious, the social, and the categories of thought that emerge from the social are comparable to arguments against eliminative reductionism or epiphenomenalism made against monistic materialism by emergentist dualists in the philosophy of mind. It draws on a pragmatist style of thinking (PPP polytheism) that has no trouble acknowledging the reality of intentionality and purposefully conscious agents; Dewey states, "[P]urpose implicates in the most organic way an individual self. It is in the purposes he entertains and acts upon that an individual most completely exhibits and realizes his intimate selfhood" (1934, p. 277). An individual conscious, intentional self is a pragmatic *reality*, but at the same time this means it may be, in other pragmatic contexts, dispensed with. A term that I generally use critically may, in the Dewean light, be recovered, namely, *essence* (which I use negatively as "essentialism"). Dewey writes,

> In common speech ["essence"] denotes the *gist* of a thing [….] We eliminate irrelevancies and retain what is indispensable. All genuine expression moves, in this sense, toward "essence." Essence here denotes an organization of meanings that have been dispersed in and more or less obscured by incidents attending a variety of experiences. What is essential or indispensable is also so in reference to a purpose [….] [T]he sense we now have for essential characteristics of persons and objects is very largely the *result* of art, while the theory that is under discussion holds that art depends upon and refers to essences already in being, thus reversing the actual process. If we are now aware of essential meanings, it is mainly because artists in all the various arts have extracted and expressed them in vivid and salient subject-matter of perception. (1934, p. 293, 294)

My PPP-polytheist framework resists both eliminative reductionism and essentializing realism, but there is instrumental utility in the eliminativism of effective aesthetic abstraction and the shaping by purpose of an aesthetic essence from the chaos of unformed elements and materials.

Let me begin with Durkheim. He spends most of the body of his *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* engaged in a positive account of how rooting the elements of religious life and the categories of thought in the social reality explain features of those elements and categories that are otherwise left unaccounted for, but his argument also contains a negative and critical assessment of other, reductionistic explanations.

In his "Introduction," Durkheim describes the conflict between empiricists and apriorists. Both epistemological theories seem to account for important aspects of the problem of knowledge, and Durkheim refuses to support any effort to account for one in terms of the other such that one is reduced to an illusion. Instead, he posits another reality that accounts for the reality of both (12-18). Locating the origin of the elements and categories in "ever-present" social life allows him, in his opinion, to escape the problems

that vex both the attempts of the empiricist and those of the apriorist by thinking of the human in a new way, not merely as an *individual mind* in a *body*, but as a member of a social group.

Durkheim discusses at some length his reasons for providing an alternative to animism and naturism. With regard to animism, he finds it unlikely and insulting to think that "this amazing dupery [could] have perpetuated itself through the whole course of history" (Durkheim 66). If religion were founded on animism and if animism were founded on misinterpretations of dream states, Durkheim finds it unreasonable to believe that such strong interest would be devoted to the shadowy experiences of dreams (55), that contradictory evidence would be ignored for so long (53-4), and that religious conviction could be founded on such an error (65 *ff.*). A belief whose very foundation is illusion and confusion could not endure for ages, nor could it seem to carry in itself a sense of its own confirmation and necessity (*cf.* Durkheim's explanation of the inherent sense of necessity in the notion of a causal "force" (368-371)). Furthermore, although the theory of animism is rooted in a cult of worship of the dead, "far from tending to increase the vital energies, death should actually have sapped them" (Durkheim 57). The cults of the dead fail to meet his criterion of being found in sufficiently primitive societies, but, far more importantly, their object of devotion, the dead, inherently lacks the very properties that need to be accounted for—the transcendent vitality and effervescence of religious life.

Naturism, according to Durkheim, argues that religion arises, not because of misunderstood dream states, but because language is so fully saturated with the elements of human life that it forces us, when we apply it to nature, to anthropomorphize it. The limits of our thought are determined by our language, and so we are primed to see the patterns of human life even though they are not there. Thus, there is a sort of epistemological limitation—or at least dangerous tendency—that inclines humans to project human life onto the phenomenal world. Durkheim's response to naturism follows the pattern of his response to animism: if religion were meant to give an accurate account of the natural world, its failure to achieve its end would have been recognized far earlier (Durkheim 77, 80), and so, again, its survival would be "incomprehensible" (Durkheim 79). However, one might argue, in defense of naturism, that the same systemic anthropomorphizing and reifying properties of human language that produced the confusion in the first place would tend toward their maintenance. More importantly for a consideration of the structure of Durkheim's larger argument, as well as for the purpose of comparison to emergentist dualist arguments in philosophy of mind, he points out that the general uniformity of nature does not account for the primitive division of the world into the *absolutely* distinct categories of the profane and the sacred. The character of the sacred is essentially different from the ordinary, profane series of impressions that one experiences in succession in daily life, just as a third-person account of the nervous system is essentially different from a first-person/subjective and phenomenal/qualitative representation of mental experience. Bellah's definition of religion

throughout his work, while drawing on Durkheim's notion of the sacred, or non-ordinary, and on Durkheim's social emphasis, centers around Clifford Geertz's understanding of religion as a system of symbolic representation, dependent, therefore, on the capacity of representation. This notion will prove to be important, not only for the construction of religion, but also for contemporary theories of the constitution of self.

Early in his work, Bellah takes issue with Dawkins's interpretation of evolution as being "rigidly deterministic and reductionist" (xii), quoting a passage in *The Selfish Gene* in which Dawkins states,

> We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behavior. (qtd. in Bellah xii)

Bellah replies by observing that "it is the organism that evolves, not just the genes" (Bellah xii), and we shall consider his arguments in support of this claim momentarily. However, we first would like to dwell on the word "selfishness" which recurs so frequently in the Dawkins quote. The capacity to be selfish, to look out for one's own interests, is related to the capacity to be conscious of one's self. Thus, the very motive of self-interest that Dawkins emphasizes would seem to lead to the development of awareness, not only of one's self, but also of one's external environment, for it is in the organism's vital interest to work to maintain a certain constellation of relations between its self and its world.

In defense of the notion that organisms participate in their own evolution, Bellah draws on the work by Odling-Smee et al., *Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution*, and basically argues that the process of evolutionary adaptation consists both of organisms' adapting themselves to their environments (due to the information-transferring process of natural selection by those environments) and of organisms' modifying the very environments they inhabit by engaging in activities that promote their survival. Odling-Smee et al. state, "If natural selection is *blind*, yet niche construction is *semantically informed* and *goal-directed*, then evolution must comprise an entirely *purposeless* process, namely, natural selection, selecting for *purposive* organisms, namely niche-constructing organisms" (qtd. in Bellah xiii). "Consciousness" is an exceedingly fuzzy word, but even in some of the most basic of organisms we can observe a *reaction* to external stimuli, that is, to information, and this reaction is, as Odling-Smee et al. note, "goal-directed" in that it is oriented toward their own preservation and flourishing.

One does not find in such a primitive response to stimuli, however interesting a phenomenon it may be, what David Chalmers has called the "hard problem" of consciousness. William Seager, after describing various forms of consciousness or senses in which the term is used, describes the hard problem thus: "Consciousness is distinctive for its subjectivity or its

first-person character. There is 'something it is like' to be in a conscious state, and only the conscious subject has direct access to this way of being" (10). Surely a bacterium, however "selfish," has no subjective experiences to speak of. Yet, one does sense, even in the "selfishness" of such primitive life, the hard problem to come. The hard problem of consciousness, we would suggest, arises together with and is constituted by certain cognitive capacities, especially those which Bellah calls the "mythic" and the "theoretic" capacities, but also present in the "enactive" and "mimetic." Narrative representations of subjective experience and second-order conceptualization of the self and its sensations are central to the nature of consciousness, robustly understood. And even animals that lack our hyperdeveloped capacity for representation nonetheless evidently behave in a manner that suggests they are capable of mental representation and even self-representation. The emergence of these capacities is a *real* emergence of something ontologically distinct from and, therefore, irreducible to lower structures and capacities. Nonetheless, even in them "nothing is lost," and the signs of their material and structural base can be observed.

Bellah devotes much energy to describing alternative or "off-line" states of consciousness and the capacities that make them possible, such as language use (*i.e.*, representation), sleep, and play. These capacities are *real*, not only because they occur, but also because they are rooted in and emerge from the evolution of material systems (*i.e.*, living organisms) in the material world. Thus, the states of consciousness facilitated by these capacities are also founded on reality, although conscious beings may be mistaken in the way they correlate mental states to empirical phenomena.

Alfred Schutz proposed understanding humans as operating "all the time in a series of non-ordinary realities" (Bellah 1). The everyday world of practical life is characterized by goal-oriented "working" (Bellah 2), "operates in *standard time* and *standard space*" (Bellah 2), "is based on a *fundamental anxiety* […] arising from the knowledge and fear of death" (Bellah 2), and involves "the suspension of disbelief in the world as it appears" (Bellah 2). Concerning the variability and cultural-constructedness of the everyday reality, Bellah states,

> I do not mean that the world of daily life even in its cultural variability is not real—it is real enough. But it lacks the unique ontological reality, the claim to be perfectly natural, that it seeks to secure when it puts in brackets the doubt that it could be other. It is one of the functions of other realities to remind us that that bracketing is finally insecure and unwarranted. (Bellah 4)

Some of the other realities Bellah mentions that challenge the everyday reality and liberate humans from it are religion, play, art, and science. Most of Bellah's chapter on reality and religion discusses different forms of *representation* of the multiple realities human minds inhabit: the unitive (14-18), the enactive (18-20), the symbolic (21-22), which he subdivides into iconic symbolization (22-24), musical symbolization (24-27), poetic

symbolization (27-32), and narrative (32-37), as well as the conceptual (37-43). We again observe that the idea of "representation" plays a key role in several current theoretical attempts to confront the problem of human consciousness.

According to Durkheim, the soul is "none other than the totemic principle incarnated in each individual" (251). Thus, the concept of the individual self, apart from the material body, is made possible by the transcendent reality of the social group, whose reality is instantiated in each member thereof. Indeed, one is only able to form a narrative of self by means of the systems of representation bequeathed one by society. Similarly, Somers, in her article "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach," links personal narrative identity construction to social conditions, defending the utility of attempting to reconfigure "the study of identity formation through the concept of narrative" (605). She argues that one can "avoid the hazards of rigidifying aspects of identity into a misleading categorical entity [….] by bringing to the study of identity formation the epistemological and ontological challenges of relational and network analysis" (606). That is, instead of regarding the "self" as an essentialized category, as in such constructions as "I am a laborer," "I am a woman," "I am a homosexual," or "I am black," identity is understood as a narrative, both constructed from socially received categories in specific relations that constitute emplotment and saturated with one's remembered life history. This accounts for observed social realities that are otherwise inexplicable. Why would people act and vote against their evident "self-interests"? It is because they do not understand themselves in isolated categorical terms, but as situated in identity-constituting stories in which they seek to realize more perfectly their narrative selves (*cf.* Somers 608, 610, 616). In a sense, they act in personally disadvantageous and non-utilitarian ways *because the narrative requires it*. Somers characterizes recent narrative studies as having suggested that

> narrative is an *ontological condition of social life*. Their research is showing us that stories guide action; that people construct identities (however multiple and changing) by locating themselves or being located within a repertoire of emplotted stories; that "experience" is constituted through narratives; that people make sense of what has happened and is happening to them by attempting to assemble or in some way to integrate these happenings within one or more narratives; and that people are guided to act in certain ways, and not others, on the basis of the projections, expectations, and memories derived from a multiplicity but ultimately limited repertoire of available social, public, and cultural narratives. (613-614)

While information science calls a system or network of entities in specified relations a "knowledge ontology," Somers's term for this reality is a "relational setting" (625-627). Somers notes an institutional bias in the social

sciences, which regard narrative as a fundamentally descriptive activity, to be contrasted with a causal explanation (613-614). However,

> While the older interpretation of narrative was limited to that of a representational form, the new approaches define narrative and narrativity as concepts of *social epistemology* and *social ontology*. These concepts posit that it is through narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities. (Somers 606)

The self-representational modality identified by the term "narrative" serves as a bridge between the means by which one knows one's self and the constitution of that very self. The plot that unites the sequential episodes of one's life and gives some weighted significance over others produces a narrative whole that has *significance* (*cf.* Somers 617-618). Interestingly, one may compare the way Robert Bellah finds something like the emergence of the conceptual or theoretic capacity in ancient Israel's construction of a metanarrative to an observation of Somers: "Perhaps the most paradoxical aspect of metanarratives is their quality of *denarrativization*. That is, they are built on concepts and explanatory schemes […] that are in themselves abstractions" (619; *cf.* Bellah 322-323). Indeed, Somers names "conceptual narrativity" as the fourth of her abstract formulations of narrativity, directly following the metanarrative. This focus on the importance of narrative in identity construction on a social level parallels and anticipates recent developments in the philosophy of mind.

Recall Bellah's response to Dawkins described above, in which Dawkins described humans as blindly programmed survival robots. This may remind one of the extensive body of literature on the philosophical zombie (*cf.* Kirk).[21] Seager, instead of asking us to imagine the zombie, suggests we imagine alien biologists observing the evolution of life on earth, especially the moment in which the first spark of consciousness arose (11). Further, he stipulates that these alien biologists are "non-conscious beings," "advanced machines well programmed in deduction, induction, and abduction" (Seager 12). In such a situation, he asks,

> Given that creatures capable of fairly complex behavior were evolving without consciousness, why is consciousness necessary for the continued evolution of more complex behavior? [Why would these aliens] ever posit consciousness

[21] The Buddha might be thought of as a special kind of philosophical zombie. The Buddha resembles the zombie in that it is unclear whether he has qualia. He lacks a sense of self, and particularly that narrative-based linguistic sense of self that accounts its odd boundless thusness. But he is a zombie in another respect, for, having arrived at his final end, he lacks caring. He possesses compassion, but not love. This relates to Frankfurt's example of the one who does not care, but it also pertains to what he says about God, who loves all without distinction. This suggests, according to Frankfurt, that God is purposeless. But perhaps it also suggests the logic of alienation—e.g., the Hindu notion that God generates a separation or an illusion of separation between himself and the beloved, who as the beloved nonetheless possesses identity with him, so that he can enjoy the activity of loving as well as the end of love. Can the End ever come without betraying its promise?

> in addition to, or as a feature of, complex sensory and behavioral control systems? (Seager 12)

This story and these questions ask us to make a number of assumptions. We are asked to believe that such advanced machines with such capacities could exist without being conscious. Furthermore, all questions contain implicit assertions. No question is propositionally neutral, and Seager's questions are no different. Nonetheless, he has done a good job of making his assumptions explicit, and his question really does seem to get at a (but perhaps not *the*) key point. If such aliens (and whether or not such beings could exist does not seem terribly important) were to be compelled to posit first-person phenomenal consciousness in order to account for complex behaviors, the reality of first-person phenomenal consciousness would rest on solid ground. The existence of first-person phenomenal consciousness would be affirmed as having emerged from increased blood flow to a specific neural configuration. This would mean that a non-conscious being could deduce from behavior that certain brain states must correlate to what we call "consciousness"—that is, to the determinate subjective quality that is assumed as the condition of our conviction that we can transcend subjective isolation and connect with others (even higher-order animals) who participating in a common conscious reality and whom we dignify with the use of the second person. Quite simply, a zombie would act differently. Indeed, Nicholas Humphrey argues that, although even in principle "*philosophical* zombies do not and could not exist" (emphasis added, 70)[22], psychological ones could. He defines a "psychological zombie" as "physically identical to a normal human being *except in one crucial respect*: namely, that he or she lacks just those evolved circuits in the brain that yield the phenomenal quality of conscious experience" (70). Such a zombie, in Humphrey's view, would most emphatically *not* act like a conscious human: "If consciousness is an evolutionary adaptation, […] a psychological zombie would *do* [things] differently *precisely because all is dark inside*" (71). Humphrey links consciousness to the presence of a mental representation of experience (19). There are a variety of mental processes and drives that occur without subjective awareness, and these unconscious phenomena may even produce behaviors. Nonetheless, they play no role in self-awareness; such behaviors, if consciously recognized, will be integrated into the existing narrative, the higher-order mental self-representation that constitutes the self.

That knowledge is limited by a variety of factors is clear. Our positive efforts to represent reality with various forms of third-person, objective accounts are limited by physical and conceptual constraints. The conceptual limits, themselves, are a complex result of the physical limitations of our brains and the historical and socially constructed limitations of our sciences, philosophies, and cultures. And these efforts are limited, on a more basic level, by the natures of math and language. Although we live in an age that can make us feel ever more ignorant because our species is constantly

[22] David Chalmers, like Saul Kripke (*cf.* Kripke 142), serves as an example of a thinker who asserts that "two systems *can* be exactly the same physically, but have different phenomenal properties" (Krigel 39).

learning so much, many of our mathematical, scientific, linguistic, and philosophical discoveries have dealt with the indefinite character of the most primitive elements of our thought. Because we are forever bound by our subjectivity to access the world in a relational and mediated way, because our logical axioms and our words must rest on a foundation of arbitrariness and indefiniteness or be lost in an unending series of referentiality, because on the level of the primitive units of existence uncertainty becomes an intrinsic principle, we have come to have an ever clearer knowledge of what we do not know and of what information lies beyond our power of representation. Colin McGinn has asserted that consciousness is one of the things that lies beyond our powers of representation; it is cognitively closed. The mind's "concept-forming procedures […] cannot extend to a grasp of consciousness" because "we do not have a single mechanism, or faculty, that can access *both* consciousness and the brain" (Kriegel 37). Again, McGinn claims, "We cannot introspect neurons, and so could never introspect the neural correlates of consciousness" (Kriegel 37). However, Kriegel notes that, in addition to McGinn's argument presenting itself as an epistemological claim but implicitly assuming ontological dualism (Kriegel 38), "The fact that certain questions about consciousness do pose themselves to humans may therefore indicate that humans are *not* cognitively closed to consciousness" (Kriegel 38). The fact that we can ask the question suggest the possibility, but not the necessity, of an answer.

One word often used to designate the subjective quality of "what it is like" to consciously experience something such as the "redness" of red is *qualia* (singular, quale). Note that this term reifies the subjective experience, helping one to identify and dwell on it, but implying, too, that it is conceptually primitive. Qualia are curious epistemological simples. The danger in them is that one moves from an epistemological state that calls out for explanation to an ontological claim, namely, that qualia exist. If one is a thoroughgoing materialist who *identifies* brain states with illusory phenomenal experiences such that they are eliminated by the account of brain states, such a move would seem suspicious: the problem posing as its own solution. As Kriegel puts it, "from the acquisition of a new piece of knowledge one cannot infer the existence of a new fact" (40). Understood as a conceptual tool, most scholars agree that qualia help to clarify the discussion.

The "redness" of a particular red, however, is not best understood as an atomic simple. Its conceptual texture, tone, and flavor, its body and bouquet, as it were, are "only introspectively accessible" insofar as they are mentally represented (Kriegel 44). Thus, narrative construction would seem to suggest a model that accounts for the emergence of the distinctive qualitative content of individual mental objects. Just as words in isolation lack sense, mental objects are qualified uniquely by the specific contextual relations that obtain between themselves and other entities in the network, which are themselves thus uniquely qualified. The privacy of subjectivity may remind one of Derrida's *il n'ya pas de hors-texte*, Quine's

"indeterminacy of translation," and Wittgenstein's private language argument. Derrida and Wittgenstein focus on the extreme cases—neither can one find an absolutely stable, acontextual expression, nor can one have an intelligible language that is completely untranslatable. As Quine notes, there is a basic "indeterminacy" in representation, and this relates to the private character of qualia. But consciousness itself, in the sense of self-awareness or subjectivity, seems to still not be fully accounted for, even when qualia are found to be accounted for by the contextuality and indeterminacy of representation. However, when another level of conceptualization is applied and the consciousness as a whole is thought of reflexively as an object being represented, we seem to arrive at subjectivity. Thus, a higher-order monitoring capacity acts on its own environment, or niche, and reconstitutes it. There is something inherently recursive about first-person consciousness. Kriegel at first calls the three approaches to consciousness just invoked above, namely, "the representational, higher-order monitoring, and self-representational," "reductive," but then he clarifies that they "can readily be refashioned as accounts not of consciousness itself, but of the *emergence base* (or *causal basis*) of consciousness" (Kriegel 53). This would seem to be the approach most consistent with Durkheim and Bellah's method. To reduce consciousness to mental system of representation does not eliminate the reality of phenomenal experience. It emerges as a distinct reality as soon as the brain state we correlate with higher-order mental self-representation is present.

Max Weber famously observed,

> We live as did the ancients when their world was not yet disenchanted of its gods and demons, only we live in a different sense. As Hellenistic man at times sacrificed to Aphrodite and at other times to Apollo, and, above all, as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city, so do we still nowadays, only the bearing of man has been disenchanted and denuded of its mystical but inwardly genuine plasticity. (Gerth and Mills 148)

In order to talk about the mind-brain problem coherently, the reality of both must be affirmed. An account is possible in which the mind emerges from the brain's activity, but it emerges at its own level, as its own reality, with its own distinctive, "irreducible" properties, in the sense that they cannot be eliminated. We arrive at a pragmatic or instrumentalist approach to the mind that is content to inhabit a "polytheistic" world in which different methods and models are suited to different domains. Durkheim's invocation of the social to account for the transcendent character of the sacred and the *a priori* imperative necessity of the logical does not *explain away* these things; Bellah's affirmation of the causal, evolutionary role of the *organism* acting on its environment as well as the role of the gene affirms the ontological reality of both; so too, finding the distinctive qualities of phenomenal consciousness in the capacity of representation, and especially higher-order

self-representation, supports the *emergent reality* of those very mental qualities from the material base, the nervous system.

## Appendix 29: On Probability Design

> *SF is a controlled way to think and dream about the future. An integration of the mood and attitude of science (the objective universe) with the fears and hopes that spring from the unconscious. Anything that turns you and your social context, the social you, inside out. Nightmares and visions, always outlined by the barely possible.* (Benford, cite)
>
> *Therefore, no matter how the world makes out in the next few centuries, a large class of readers at least will not be too surprised at anything. They will have been through it all before in fictional form, and will not be too paralyzed with astonishment to try to cope with contingencies as they arise.* (Sprague De Camp, cite)

Where are we so far in the reference chapter's argument? The mind processes narratives using the same Bayesian probability system that it uses to process the "real" world. Kukkonen (2014, pp. 721-722), in a paper entitled "Bayesian Narrative: Probability, Plot and the Shape of the Fictional World," asks, "What does it mean, then, to think of narrative in Bayesian terms? When readers open a book and encounter a new fictional world, this might be understood as a process of establishing and revising beliefs about the environment of the fictional world on the strength of the evidence at hand." Just so. In recreation, one might say with figures like Dewey, one re-creates worlds. Doležel explains this in terms of revising one's internal semantic "encyclopedia":

> Fantastic fiction provides us with numerous examples of fictional encyclopedias that contradict the actual-world counterpart, as any visitor to the nonnatural or supernatural worlds quickly discovers. As he or she crosses from the natural into the nonnatural world, his or her encyclopedia has to be modified. The visitor has to learn the encyclopedia of the alien world. [...] As the protagonist-narrator [of Bruno Schulz's story "Sanatorium under the Sign of the Hourglass"] becomes fluent in the encyclopedia of the sanatorium world, his reasoning leads to correct conclusions. Now he can explain the most bizarre events. (1998, pp. 178-179)

This process of modifying one's probabilistic world model, updating one's priors based on new evidence, leads to what Kukkonen refers to as the "probability design" inherent in narratives:

> Considering narrative from a Bayesian perspective thus posits the fictional world as a work in progress. As readers move through the narrative, they revise their beliefs about the shape of the fictional world and (usually) get a progressively better grasp of its probabilities. Everything they read, from small-scale bodily movement to general propositional statement, contributes to the predictive thinking of the Bayesian reader. It feeds into the loop between prior hypotheses about the probabilities of the fictional world and the new observations which the plot presents to readers [....] A Bayesian perspective on narrative therefore investigates what I call 'probability design' – the ways in which the feedback loop between the probabilities of the

> fictional world and the pacing of new observations through the plot is constructed so that it keeps readers involved in making sense of the events of the narrative. (2014, p. 725)

What Kukkonen calls "probability design" takes advantage of the self- and world-interested reward system that motivates action. We constantly seek to stabilize our world model, but authors introduce constant disruptions into their storyworlds, motivating revisions of readers' models. Translating the narrative effects of curiosity, suspense, and surprise into probabilistic terms, Kukkonen states,

> A Bayesian perspective on surprise, curiosity and suspense, on the other hand, focuses on the possibilities which readers see and, more particularly, on the predictive power which they assign, turning possibilities into probabilities. [...] As readers learn more about the fictional world, these possibilities are weighted to yield different predictive probabilities which develop with the observations that readers are led to make in the course of the narrative. [...] In Bayesian terms, surprise ensues whenever we make a new observation that enforces a reconfiguration of the prior probabilities we work with. Theories from the cognitive sciences which model human interaction with the world in terms of Bayesian inferences, such as Friston's 'predictive coding' (2003; 2012; and Friston et al. 2010), suggest that the mind strives to minimise surprise in order to establish a stable sense of the probabilities of the world. The probability design of a fictional narrative, however, is often engineered to overthrow readers' predictions and the new observations force them to reconsider its probabilities. [...] If curiosity, as outlined above, describes the process of exploring new possibilities, then suspense refers to the process in which one of these possibilities gains distinctly in probability, be it through the active exclusion of other possibilities [...] or through the approach of a deadline [....] As related to Bayesian inference [...] all three cognitive effects can be seen as part of a continuous probability design: surprise arises from new observations, which force readers to reassess previous probabilities; curiosity is the process of reconsidering these possibilities in the Bayes' net and their respective weighting; and suspense ensues when one probability gets weighted more and more strongly in this process. (2014, p. 726, 727, 729)

The dynamic movement among possibilities that is orchestrated by an author and re-created in a reader's mind is understood in terms of text world theory as a movement among possible worlds: the attempt to reconcile dynamic conflicts among the worlds within a character, a character's world(s) and the storyworld, the characters' worlds, and so on (*cf.* Ryan, 2006). Since the mind interprets narratives – as indeed it interprets the world – probabilistically, creators of narratives must appeal to an intuitive or even conscious understanding of how this works: of what people desire, of how to stimulate that desire (not only by satisfying it, but also by delaying or thwarting it), and even of how to manufacture desire and consent.

"Neuroeconomics" is – as its name announces – is an approach with distinct neoliberal assumptions that attempts to use the nature of the mind to appeal to it to give it what it wants or, in a marketing setting, at least convince it that it wants what the advertiser

wants it to want. How might we think of authors (and readers) as neuroeconomists?[1] The lessons of neuroeconomics are largely consistent with those of standard rhetoric and effective communication theory. For example, the mind's model is seeking to explain away sensory data as efficiently as possible; thus, it favors short, simple, visual representations.[2] Since our probabilistic models are norm-based, they are value-centered and goal oriented (Glimcher, 2003; *cf.* Taves, 2015; Bender and Taves, 2012).[3] The objective is, not to represent reality in its absolute fullness of rich detail (*cf.* Hoffman, 2009), but, rather, to find the simplest model that achieves the ecological objectives.

Since the mind is motivated by emotion[4]—feeling its way by acting based on rapid emotional assessments of modeled possibilities—effective communication should appeal to the emotions, again, by appealing to values. Good authors, then, however much training they have received, may be understood at least in part as intuitive neuroeconomists. Likewise, readers must deduce the norms, the rules of the novel worlds they encounter,[5] such detective work being part of the pleasure and play of interacting with such worlds (Juul, 2005). Angenot (1979, p. 15) describes the process as follows:

> The reader of a realistic novel proceeds from the general (the commonplace, the ideological *topos*) to the particular (the specific plot governed by this ideological structure). The SF reader follows the reverse path: he induces from the particular some imagined, general rules that prolong the author's fantasies and confer on them plausibility. The reader engages in a conjectural reconstruction which "materializes" the fictional universe.

The first half of this quote aptly describes the general way in which the mind works in accord with hierarchical predictive coding. Norms derived from past experience with the world supply the event model that explains away sensory input and constitutes experience (Taves and Asprem, 2017). However, when there is conflicting evidence that makes one's priors unsuitable for explaining away the data, one is shifted into an open, attentive state that allows modification of one's world model or even generation of a novel one. In the case of science fiction, Angenot (1979, p. 15) notes that this new model, too, is usually not built from scratch; instead, one draws on elements from sf's "absent paradigm," what has subsequently been called by sf theorist its "megatext:"

---

[1] There is at the heart of this interaction a sort of communicative arms race.

[2] But what about extended, complex, abstract representations that challenge working memory and rapid heuristics? In some contexts qualities like these are sought out and enjoyed, suggesting that the neuroeconomic implications of probabilistic cognition are not as simply expressed as one might assume from reading popular neoliberal and rational-choice articles on "hacking" the brain using neuroeconomics for marketing purposes (*i.e.*, "neuromarketing"). Indeed, the existence of allomythoi and the fact that people would spend so much time creating them and recreating by means of them challenges basic neoliberal assumptions of neuroeconomics. Treating the mind as a rational agent functioning in accord with free market principles has some utility relative to some situations, but it basically treats it as a deterministic system, not a probabilistic one. As a connectionist association-engine, the brain develops novel patterns, actively looks for disconfirmation of its models, and entertains a range of priors. The conscious narrative mind is only aware (largely after the fact) of an artificially stabilized subjective self that is useful for coordinating action (*cf.* Metzinger, 2003, 2009).

[3] The concept of value-laden norms naturally raises the question of power (*cf.* Bush, 2014).

[4] *Cf.* Wynn (2005).

[5] Of course, induction of rules is always uncertain (Kripke). Similarly, determinate mathematical representation runs against fundamental logical limits (Gödel). An author like S. W. Burroughs with his cut-up method, for example, forces the reader's critical awareness of the truth that the reader must co-create the narrative (*cf.* Sperber), which will always be fragmented, full of gaps, uncertain.

> The SF narrative always assumes a "not-said" that regulates the message. The rhetoric of credibility aims at having the reader believe not so much in what is literally said as in what is assumed or presupposed. Emphasis is not placed primarily on the characters and events of the future or extraterrestrial world but on types, models, norms, and institutions that are only summarily and allusively represented by these characters and events.

So even when one engages in robust world-building, as in the case of science fiction and fantasy, and is forced to shift into an attentive and even critical state of awareness to develop a new event model, one nonetheless assumes (as an author) and imports (as a reader) expectations or priors derived from past experience (*cf.* Yee, 2014).

Consider the following excerpt from McCloud's (2006, p. 35) *Making Comings: Storytelling Secrets of Comics, Manga, and Graphic Novels*, which though it does not reflect training on McCloud's part in cognitive narratology or event cognition (as far as I know) well illustrates Zunshine's point that "[w]riters work with perfect assurance our evolved cognitive tendencies because constructing their stories this way makes intuitive sense to them" (2008, p. 85):





**Figure VII. From McCloud (2006)**

The above represents a fine intuitive explanation of both the cognitive process of event cognition – the chunking of the flow of experience into meaningful events that can be retained in memory – and its rhetorical exploitation in building persuasive narrative worlds.

If we think of authors and readers as neuroeconomists, how might this practically change how we study fantastical texts that we designate by terms like "science fiction"? Glimcher (2003, p. 177) states,

> In the mid-seventeenth century mathematics branched into two related but independent areas: determinate mathematics and probability theory. Descartes identified determinate mathematics as the central tool for the study of behavior and brain, and since then neurobiology has largely followed his lead. While probability theory became the central tool for understanding efficient decision making by humans, markets, and corporations, the relationship between probability theory and neural function has, until recently, remained largely unexplored.

Interestingly, a similar divide may be observed in genre theory as illustrated by the case of science fiction. On the one hand, we have the structuralist tradition descending primarily from Darko Suvin's influential work (1979), in which science fiction is dogmatically defined according to proposed essential necessary and sufficient conditions. On the other hand, we have much of the work that came before Suvin—as well as the anti-theoretical (or "theoretically illiterate") work that came after him—that described science fiction's themes, elements, stylistic traits, and so on without prescribing any as essential. I would argue that although probability theory is norm-based, it does not propose a single governing norm. That would imply a deterministic and certain universe. But if there is any certainty in the world, it's that the probability is never actually zero or one. Instead, because probability theory is inherently pluralistic, assuming a variety of prior probabilities going into a situation and revising subsequent priors based on the posteriors that eventuate, it lends itself to a pragmatic, endlessly experimental approach, one that may be adapted to the different perspectives of those facing different environmental pressures. Therefore, a neuroeconomic approach to the study of "science fiction" (and fantastika more generally) would above all accept the genre as a marketing category (Spinrad, 1990) and would devote energy to isolating and examining the elements, facets,[6] or building blocks that go into the production of its texts—the governing metaphors, schemas, prototypes, exemplars, themes, character types, styles, and so on that are creatively combined to make new narratives. Also, the classification of genres with rigid stipulated definitions of essential characteristics resists and inhibits perception of the historical continuity and development, dynamism and activity that shape the making and creative reception of all art: "Perception is obstructed and cut short by memory of an influential rule, and by the substitution of precedent and prestige for direct experience" (Dewey, 1934, p. 299; *cf.* pp. 301-302).

This does not mean that the categories developed by genre theorists are not useful, but it does mean that they should be regarded as tools, not essential traits. In a sense, all fictions in all genres estrange us from the world that at the same time is thereby revealed. Some narrative worlds depart more wildly from the norms of consensus reality, and these may productively be identified by terms like "fantastical," "estranged," and "speculative." Under this umbrella, communities of likeminded people are able to locate narratives that include valued elements and respond to particular concerns by using subgenre terms like

[6] Corpus linguistics supplies some promising methods for locating these.

“cyberpunk,” “quantum fiction,” or “epic fantasy.” At a certain level of granularity, terms like these do cut the narrative world at its joints, but we must always keep in mind that because these narratives are thoroughly human constructions the joints are never purely “natural” and do not demarcate discrete kinds. By stressing the border cases and the instances of border contestation, by allying our theory with the multiplicity of perspectives of the marginalized, we may retain a detached, skeptical, and pragmatic stance toward genre terms even as we may use them. Indeed, we may remain cognitively estranged or alienated, seeing as with the multifaceted eyes of insectoid aliens from other worlds.

# Appendix 30: On Text World Theory

In the reference chapter and appendices 28 and 29 especially, I mention that possible world semantics and text world theory provide a useful framework for studying the storyworlds and worldviews of allomythoi and allomythologies in fantastika. In literary theory, possible world semantics, which draws on the insights of modal logic, is useful for tracking these various worlds and W&WoLs and talking more precisely about their relations to each other. For example, Csicsery-Ronay (cite) notes,

> With each sentence we have to ask what in the world of the tale would have to be different from our world for such a sentence to be uttered—and thus, as the sentences build up, we build up a world in specific dialogue, in specific tension with our present concept of the real. Possible-worlds theorists maintain that most readers tend to follow the principle of "least effort" or "minimal departure," treating new sentences as if they were similar to ones they are already familiar with.

The subgenres of fantastika push against the principle of minimal departure in various ways, but they all are characterized by a significant departure from contemporary consensus reality. Because allomythoi have a distinctly recursive or nested structure, the body of narratological theory on metalepsis is also very useful for talking about allomythoi.

Metalepsis, in its narratological sense, is when the boundary between real and fictional worlds is crossed. I tend to think of the shift from the primary, ordinary, probable, diegetic storyworld into a nonordinary, improbable allomythic aspect of the storyworld as metaleptic. And, as discussed previously, I, with Dissanayake (cite) and Taves (cite), regard all world-, art-, and culture-making as an act of setting things apart as special or non-ordinary. Allomythoi are doubly set apart. In the real world, this would be analogous to the shift from profane to sacred space, from serious space to the playground, and related situations.

This metaleptic structure, as an amplification of probabilistic divergence, encourages an even stronger sense of cognitive distance, making these kinds of texts especially well-suited-to or affording-of critical thinking. This unusual degree of bracketing from the concerns of the primary reference world produces a sensation of detachment and distance from consensus reality and provides authors with a relatively free space in which to develop persuasive, entertaining alternative worlds as touristic escapes from the day-to-day, advocate for novel worldviews as interventions in reality, or even condemn existing worldviews. Along these lines, Csicsery-Ronay (cite) states regarding science fiction,

> SF is both an institution of mediation for a real historical moment, and also a free space for deconstructing those values. As a free space, it invites many different constituencies with varied interests, and inspires a great variety of styles. It imagines a universe of discourse held together by its constantly expanding megatext of neologies, speculations, and counterfactuals.

Due to its significant modification of our probabilistic model, fantastika functions as "a free space" whether one is talking about genres that often serve more conservative or uncritical ends, like many works of horror, fantasy, and "sci-fi," or about highly critical works like pure "SF." Pullman at one point said that "children's books, for various reasons at this time in our literary history, open out on a wideness and amplitude—a moral and mental

spaciousness—that adult literature seems to have turned its back on" (Pullman, 1998, p. 44). How is this spaciousness produced?

An account of text world theory (*cf.* Gavins, 2007) might appropriately begin with Paul Werth's (1999) *Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse*, or even with Saul Kripke, and I'll turn to that account shortly. But I think it fitting to start with Tolkien's (1966) notion of a "Secondary World" in his "On Fairy-Stories." Of fairy-stories, Tolkien states,

> [F]airy-stories are not in normal English usage stories about fairies or elves, but stories about Fairy, that is *Faërie*, the realm or state in which fairies have their being. *Faërie* contains many things besides elves and fays, and besides dwarfs, witches, trolls, giants, or dragons: it holds the seas, the sun, the moon, the sky; and the earth, and all things that are in it: tree and bird, water and stone, wine and bread, and ourselves, mortal men, when we are enchanted. [...] The definition of a fairy-story—what it is, or what it should be— does not, then, depend on any definition or historical account of elf or fairy, but upon the nature of *Faërie*: the Perilous Realm itself, and the air that blows in that country. I will not attempt to define that, nor to describe it directly. It cannot be done. Faërie cannot be caught in a net of words; for it is one of its qualities to be indescribable, though not imperceptible. It has many ingredients, but analysis will not necessarily discover the secret of the whole. (1966, pp. 38-39)

In this early passage, Tolkien already invokes the notion that fairy-stories are linked by their being about, connected to, or located in a different realm, state, or country. Later in the essay, he suggests that what he calls *literary belief* is a function of effective storytelling that feels "true" due to its depth, richness (compare Wolf, 2017a, 2017b, on saturation and overflow in world-building), and consistency (Wolf, 2017c, p. 32: "To produce plausible new cultures, there needs to be a unifying worldview and outlook that shapes the customs and designs of everything in the culture, so that whatever glimpses the audience gets of that culture will be consistent and appear to have a cultural logic behind them"):

> That state of mind [literary belief] has been called "willing suspension of disbelief." But this does not seem to me a good description of what happens. What really happens is that the story-maker proves a successful "sub-creator." He [sic] makes a Secondary World which your mind can enter. Inside it, what he relates is "true": it accords with the laws of that world. You therefore believe it, while you are, as it were, inside. The moment disbelief arises, the spell is broken; the magic, or rather art, has failed. You are then out in the Primary World again, looking at the little abortive Secondary World from outside. (Tolkien, 1966, p. 60)

In Tolkien's theory, a Secondary World is a "world" because one dwells within it and relates to it as true. It has laws; it is known; it exists. Within text world theory (TWT), storyworlds *all* are regarded as "existing" on the same ontological level, as fictions,[1] but they are also,

[1] It is important, in thinking about possible worlds, to distinguish between the non-actuality of possible states that might obtain in the world and the non-actuality of fictional worlds. Philosophers and literary theorists, however, hotly debate the details of how one might go about making such a distinction. Because the "actual" world is experienced as a world model, because the world, in other words, is always constructed or mediated, the nature of its noumenal essence must always remain provisionally and pragmatically expressed.

significantly, regarded as ontologically distinct "worlds" unto themselves, novel environments.

As Gavins and Lahey briefly (2016, p. 2) explains the history of the worlds-based approach to the study of narrative as follows:

> The roots of all the varying analytical frameworks which regard language as world-building can be traced to the possible worlds theories of modal logic pioneered by philosophers such as Saul Kripke (1972), Nicholas Rescher (1975) and David Lewis (1986). Their view of language as an ontological system able to refer to and create accessibility relations between a plurality of worlds was of immediate and direct interest to theorists attempting to describe the imaginative ontologies of literary discourse. It was widely adapted for this purpose, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s (see Maître 1983; Pavel 1986; Ronen 1994; Ryan 1991; Semino 1997). The influence of possible-worlds logic extends far beyond the literary and narrative theory of the late twentieth century, however, and continues to lend its ontological structure and terminology to more recent cognitive-linguistic models of literary and non-literary discourse processing, such as Text World Theory (see Gavins 2007; Werth 1999), as well as to worlds-based approaches to contemporary narratology (Herman 2002).

Goodman's (1978) *Ways of Worldmaking* should certainly also be regarded as a foundational part of this genealogy, but let me here summarize some of the key concepts of Text World Theory (for a full explanation, see Gavins, 2007).

Text-worlds[2] are constituted by world-building elements that ostensively signal, in a highly contextual (*i.e.*, indexical, deictic) manner, existents, such as objects and enactors[3] ("characters"). Attributes are applied to these elements, and all such elements are framed by spatial and temporal boundaries, as well as by modal conditions. Thus, a different version of an enactor – say, a younger or older version – would be located in a different text-world. Modal-worlds include the *boulomaic* (wishes and fantasies), *deontic* (obligations and allowances), and *epistemic* (degrees of knowledge). Epistemic world-shifts include, according to Gavins (2005), focalization, free indirect discourse, indirect speech and thought, conditionality, and hypotheticality. In Ryan's (2006) system, these are designated, respectively, *W-World* (*i.e.*, Wish-World), *O-World* (Obligation-World), and *K-World* (Knowledge-World); importantly for the purpose of studying allomythoi, she also introduces the concept of the *F-Universe* (Fantasy-Universe). Whereas in Ryan's system W-, O-, and K-Worlds all exist in relation to specific enactors, an F-Universe sets up a new universe

[2] The text-world is sometimes called the "textual actual world" (TAW) because, in a process called "recentering," we respond to the text-world as an actual world (*cf.* Ryan, 1991, pp. 21 *ff.*).

[3] This term may refer to characters in a narrative, but it reflects awareness of the fact that by referring to a "character" one may be talking about the full development of a person in a narrative. Such a perspective involves integrating a number of enactors from different text-worlds because a single character may be described in a number of times, locations, and modes. Furthermore, the author may also be an enactor in text world theory. This raises the complicated problem of the "heterodiegetic" or "omniscient" narrator with godlike powers. Ryan (1981, p. 530) refers to the author's ability to make "world-creating statements," and this is clearly the case. But others point out that often – indeed for most of history – no supernatural author-character was imagined by the real-world author, and it is anachronistic to project onto texts whose authors had no idea of an authorial figure who could penetrate the dreams, thoughts, and possibilities of her creations such an "enactor."

within a storyworld that is itself a story, dream, hallucination, vision, etc. (*cf.* Ryan, 2006, p. 649). Just as the text-world has a number of direct accessibility relations to other possible worlds and may, in that sense, be thought of as a kind of universe, so too an F-Universe tends to consist of a primary text-world and other related worlds. TWT, by drawing on conceptual blending theory, also notes that a blended world of a narrative text is often composed of a variety of *metaphor worlds*. The progression of the narrative is propelled by what are called "function-advancing propositions" (*cf.* Gavins, 2007, pp. 56 *ff.*); these are narrative actions and events, and they are designated in text-world diagrams in TWT by vertical arrows. Such diagrams allow one to analyze a narrative's elements (*e.g.*, time, location, objects, enactors, attributes, function-advancing propositions) quite precisely. Shifts in the spatiotemporal and modal boundaries are called "world-switches," and most texts contain huge numbers of worlds generated by world-switches—even an individual paragraph of a narrative may contain a large number of world-switches as enactors engage with the complexities of time and space, desire, obligation, and knowledge and as authors use metaphors and others textual worldmaking tools. Each metaphor generates a new text-world, however simple, that blends with the discourse-world while the discourse-world generally remains primarily in view. This may clarify the probability design inherent in plot, as discussed above. World-switches, occasioned by the (surprising) introduction of novel model-worlds, metaphors, and so on, raise new possibilities and cause the readjustment (re-weighting of priors) of the primary text-world model as a reader endeavors to integrate and stabilize the text-world.

In Appendix 27, relative to the popular conception of science fiction as a form of "thought experiment,"[4] I promised further consideration of the idea relative to the now more complete understanding of the cognitive capacities that enable such thought experiments (and, more broadly, with the understanding of worldview studies and kairological analysis developed previously). Dewey argues that all artists are experimenters because they have

> to express an intensely individualized experience through means and materials that belong to the common and public world. This problem cannot be solved once for all. It is met in every new work undertaken. Otherwise the artist repeats himself and becomes esthetically dead. Only because the artist operates experimentally does he open new fields of experience and disclose new aspects and qualities in familiar scenes and objects. (1934, p. 144)

Elgin (2006), in "The Laboratory of the Mind," argues that certain genres like science fiction are essentially "world-building genres" because they engage in "extended, elaborate thought experiments" (p. 48). Similarly, Rukmini Bhaya Nair's (2002) *Narrative Gravity: Conversation, Cognition, Culture* more generally argues, in part, that narrative itself is a kind of natural theory, constantly provoking questions (like, *Why?*) and providing answers that are, in essence, causal accounts (*Because*). Doležel, in his preface to *Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds*, argues, "The universe of possible worlds is constantly expanding and diversifying thanks to the incessant world-constructing activity of human minds and hands. Literary fiction is probably the most active experimental laboratory of the world-constructing enterprise" (1998, p. ix).

TWT as outlined above well illustrates the "constantly expanding and diversifying" character of human worldmaking. Human exploitation of the capacity to model different

[4] The quotes that open this section are suggestive of this theme.

possible worlds, to postulate fictions, has provided tools for many different aims. Doležel supplies some examples of this (*cf.* Toon, 2012):

> For various cognitive aims various kinds of possible worlds can be stipulated. Possible worlds of logical semantics are *interpretive models* providing the domain of reference necessary for the semantic interpretation of counterfactual statements, modal formulas, intensional contexts, and so on. Possible worlds of philosophy are *coherent cosmologies* derived from some axioms or presuppositions. The scope of possible worlds of religion is equally ambitious, but they are constructs of communal beliefs and usually given the form of *cosmological narratives*. Possible worlds of natural science are *alternative designs of the universe* constructed by varying the basic physical constants (see Rees 1989). Possible worlds of historiography are *counterfactual scenarios* that help us to understand actual-world history. Similarly, possible worlds of action theory explain human acting by envisaging different *possible courses* of the agent's life history (see von Wright 1963b). (1998, p. 14)

In *Art as Experience*, Dewey likewise links art and science in a mutual recognition of the rhythmic (that is, ordered) patterns of existence and experience, as known cognitively, represented aesthetically, and recreated by aesthetic percipients. His argument in *Art as Experience* in many ways, though less systematically and without the empirical foundation in experimentation on human narrative processing, anticipates the event cognition model of experience described above.

***An Excursus on Dewey's Aesthetic Theory***

> To restore and explore the connection between "art" (dignified, glorified, refined, intensified, exceptional) and ordinary "experience," Dewey first turns to the "vitality" of things "not take[n] to be arts" such as jazz and popular movies (1934, p. 5). He points out the explicit ties of "art" as a rarified construct to "the rise of nationalism and imperialism" and to the "growth of capitalism" (Dewey, 1934, p. 8; *cf.* p. 27), as well as to "the conditions that have brought about contempt for the body, fear of the senses, and the opposition of flesh to spirit" (Dewey, 1934, p. 20; *cf.* p. 82); "Oligarchical control from the outside of the processes and the products of work is the chief force in preventing the worker from having that intimate interest in what he [sic] does and makes that is an essential prerequisite of esthetic satisfaction" (Dewey, 1934, p. 343). These historical developments have in turn shaped the identities of artists:
>
> > Industry has been mechanized and an artist cannot work mechanically for mass production. He is less integrated than formerly in the normal flow of social services. A peculiar esthetic "individualism" results [….] In order not to cater to the trend of economic forces, they often feel obliged to exaggerate their separateness to the point of eccentricity. Consequently artistic products take on to a still greater degree the air of something independent and esoteric. (Dewey, 1934, pp. 9-10)

And so Dewey resists the impulse to "spiritualize" or set apart art as something radically different from ordinary experience, like Heaven.

His observations that follow could almost be describing event cognition and probabilistic world-and-self modeling:

> Where everything is already complete, there is no fulfillment. We envisage with pleasure Nirvana and a uniform heavenly bliss only because they are projected upon the background of our present world of stress and conflict. Because the actual world, that in which we live, is a combination of movement and culmination, of breaks and re-unions, the experience of a living creature is capable of esthetic quality. The live being recurrently loses and reëstablishes equilibrium with his surroundings. The moment of passage from disturbance into harmony is that of intensest life. (Dewey, 1934, p. 17)

Probability design generates suspense, according to Kukkonen (2014), as the buildup of inferred possibilities develops into increasing likelihood; similarly, Dewey defines "form" as a characteristic of art as experience as being "*the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, and situation to its own integral fulfillment* [….] [T]o secure the needed continuity, the accumulated experience must be such as to create suspense and anticipation of resolution" (Dewey, 1934, p. 137). However, Kukkonen also emphasizes the importance of expectations being resisted, overturned, delayed; Dewey states, "[I]n art the resistance encountered enters into the work in a more immediate way than in science. The perceiver as well as the artist has to perceive, meet, and overcome problems" (Dewey, 1934, p. 138). Art as event, art as experience, is precisely the sort of moment that is not lost in simulations of the past or the future; it partakes of these in a state of decision rooted in the present environment that recalibrates the PWM:

> Because of the frequency of […] abandonment of the present to the past and future, the happy periods of an experience that is now complete because it absorbs into itself memories of the past and anticipations of the future, come to constitute an esthetic ideal [….] Art celebrates with peculiar intensity the moments in which the past reënforces the present and in which the future is a quickening of what now is. (Dewey, 1934, p. 18)

Through interaction with environmental situations, one is rewarded with the satisfaction of one's self-and-world model again being illuminated with coherence and meaning (*cf.* Dewey, 1934, p. 103). But before arriving at this state, one must overcome problems.

Fantastika confronts head on the problems of our age; with its host of new worlds in new genres, it seeks the forms of experiential representation – characters with natures (Dewey, 1934, p. 243) – that answer to situational provocations. Dewey states, "Significant advances in technique occur, therefore, in connection with efforts to solve problems that are not technical but that grow out of the need for new modes of experience" (Dewey, 1934, p.

141). And fantastika certainly responds to the, as Dewey puts it, live creature's demand for novelty[5] and variety, even temporary disorder and conflict insofar as they may become productive exigences (Dewey, 1934, p. 167-169).

The enhancement of lived experience by art leads to Dewey's reflecting on the properties of "myth" that contribute to its existence and persistence:

> Myths were something other than intellectualistic essays of primitive man in science. Uneasiness before any unfamiliar fact doubles played its part. But delight in the story, in the growth and rendition of a good yarn, played its dominant role then as it does in the growth of popular mythologies today. Not only does the direct sense element—and emotion is a mode of sense—tend to absorb all ideational matter but […] it subdues and digests all that is merely intellectual. The introduction of the supernatural into belief and the all too human easy reversion to the supernatural is much more an affair of the psychology that generates works of art than of effort at scientific and philosophic explanation. It intensifies emotional thrill and punctuates the interest that belongs to all break in familiar routine. Were the hold of the supernatural on human though an exclusively—or even mainly—intellectual matter, it would be comparatively insignificant. Theologies and cosmogonies have laid hold of imagination because they have been attended with solemn processions, incense, embroidered robes, music, the radiance of colored lights, with stories that stir wonder and induce hypnotic admiration.

The non-ordinary of fantasika (*cf.* Dewey, 1934, p. 139) may be thought of as a producing a situation of "resistance that calls out thought," that calls the self into self-awareness by generating "curiosity and solicitous care, and, when it is overcome and utilized, eventuat[ing] in elation" (Dewey, 1934, p. 60). This process is one of abstraction, still always bound to prior elements of experience, but shaped decisively by the values and goals of the artist, whose interests lead both to exclusions and amplifications (*cf.* Dewey, 1934, pp. 94-95, 208).

The same sort of sub-personal processes that build toward the realization of a new event model in a percipient are, Dewey notes in more poetic language, present in the artist bringing to expression a new experience:

> Materials undergoing combustion because of intimate contacts and mutually exercised resistances constitute inspiration. On

[5] Dewey rejects the philosophical treatment of "beauty" and "imagination" as "special and self-contained" faculties, "in possession of mysterious potencies" (1934, p. 267); rather, imagination

> is the large and generous blending of interests at the point where the mind comes in contact with the world. When old and familiar things are made new in experience, there is imagination. When the new is created, the far and strange become the most natural inevitable things in the world. There is always some measure of adventure in the meeting of mind and universe, and this adventure is, in its measure, imagination.

> the side of the self, elements that issue from prior experience are stirred into action in fresh desires, impulsions and images. These proceed from the subconscious, not cold or in shapes that are identified with particulars of the past, not in chunks and lumps, but fused in the fire of internal commotion. They do not seem to come from the self, because they issue from a self not consciously known. Hence, by a just myth, the inspiration is attributed to a god, or to the muse [*cf.* Dewey, 1934, p. 72]. The inspiration, however, is initial. In itself, at the outset, it is still inchoate. Inflamed inner material must find objective fuel upon which to feed. Through the interaction of the fuel with material already afire the refined and formed product comes into existence. The act of expression is not something which supervenes upon an inspiration already complete. It is the carrying forward to completion of an inspiration by means of the objective material of perception and imagery. (Dewey, 1934, pp. 65-66; *cf.* pp. 87-88, 89-90)

Almost all of the prior experiences an artist brings to bear in making something new, over the period and through the interactive, transformative process of expression (*cf.* Dewey, 1934, p. 111), belong "to the common world" of cultural elements and embodied experience (Dewey, 1934, p. 107), but each artist – and perhaps more importantly, each percipient – re-creates them anew every time it is experienced (Dewey, 1934, pp. 108-109, 274).[6]

Another way of expressing one of the core truths of Dewey's aesthetic theory, which returns to another major theme of the framework supplied here, is to say that all human arts of worldmaking generate metaphors, translations.

In sum, what Dewey calls the esthetic experience of art has a strong dextral disposition, the right hemisphere being the architect of metaphor:

> A work of art elicits and accentuates [the] quality of being a whole and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole which is the universe in which we live. This fact, I think, is the explanation of that feeling of exquisite intelligibility and clarity we have in the presence of an object that is experienced with esthetic intensity. It explains the religious feeling that accompanies intense esthetic perception. We are, as it were, introduced into a world beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live in our ordinary experiences. We are carried out beyond ourselves to find ourselves. I can see no psychological ground for such properties of an experience save that, somehow, the work of

[6] To gesture at Chapter 4, such experimental "impulsions" are likewise, for Dewey, the engine of educational growth; education is a balance between instilling in the next generations or, even, initiating them into, past knowledge, experiences, and worldviews and, on the other hand which is yet part of the same body, creative, innovative growth motivated by the "impulsions" of living response to experience. Teaching and research are, in a progressive, inquiry-based education, conceptually distinguishable but always co-implicated.

art operates to deepen and to raise to great clarity that sense of an enveloping undefined whole that accompanies every normal experience. (Dewey, 1934, p. 195)

# Appendix 31: General Ways of Worldmaking

> οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ (φησὶ) λῆρός εἰσιν· οὐδὲ ἓν
> καινὸν γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ μεταφέρει
> ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ταὔτ' ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω. — Xenarchus[1]

When authors create allomythoi, they draw on both general procedures that humans use to construct worlds as well as more specific techniques used to generate fictional, and within that fantastical, worlds.

*General Ways of Worldmaking*

Nelson Goodman's (1978) *Ways of Worldmaking* attempts to consider the general means by which humans make worlds. His categories are as follows:

- **Composition and decomposition**: That is, humans break things into parts and, possibly, go on to reintegrate or blend them together in new ways. Goodman notes that this capacity is deeply connected to the ability to apply labels or signs, to identify. One might note, too that decomposition does not have to lead to composition. It is a way of worldmaking in its own right, but analytically dividing worlds into parts may lead to new ways of seeing how things might be combined differently. These ways of worldmaking correspond roughly to Brandt and Eagleman's (2017) "blending" and "breaking" functions of human creativity, with Goodman's other "ways" addressing their category of "bending" with far more fine-grained specificity. The fundamental importance of decomposition – obviously linked to abstraction and the symbolic capacity – and composition – pointing to the vast literatures on connectionism, metaphor theory, and conceptual blending and their relevance to creativity – for fictional worldmaking cannot be overstated.
- **Weighting**: A new world can be made by changing the salience and significance of a part or parts of a world. A shift in relevance, emphasis, importance, or value (including making something irrelevant, unimportant, or worthless) makes a new world.
- **Ordering**: Parts of a world exist in determinate relations; changing these likewise makes a new world.
- **Deletion and supplementation**: Deletion might be taken as the extreme end of de-weighting. Supplementation – the addition of new material into a world – may happen both explicitly and through implicit completion of gaps or otherwise indeterminate aspects of a world (*cf.* Grabes, 2010, pp. 48-49) based on a percipient's knowledge of the script, schema, model, genre, and so on being referenced.
- **Deformation**: This category overlaps most fully with the generic character of Brandt and Eagleman's (2017) "bending." In making world-versions, one abstracts, warps, softens, extends, and otherwise distorts one's material.

---

[1] "Poets are ridiculous. For they never invent anything new—each one of them simply remixes the same things again and again."

Regarding these ways of worldmaking, Goodman states, "These then are ways that worlds are made. I do not say *the* ways. My classification is not offered as comprehensive or clearcut or mandatory" (1978, p. 16). Because Goodman's ways of worldmaking are so generic, intended to pertain to scientific models, works of art, and other worlds with equal applicability, it is worthwhile to think more specifically about how *fictional* and *fantastical* worlds are made.

*Fictional Worldmaking*

As noted in the previous chapter and above, "events" constitute the essence of narrative, but as Ansgar Nünning (2010) states in "Making Events – Making Stories – Making Worlds," "whilst the terms 'event' and 'media event' are indeed omnipresent in both historiography and the media, they are used 'without ever systematically following up on the question of what events actually are, and how occurrences and incidents become events' (Rathmann [ p.] 4, [Ansgar Nünning's] translation)" (A. Nünning, 2010, p. 193). The situation has certainly improved since A Nünning wrote the above, and "event" is now, as discussed before, a highly specified category relative to HPC. A. Nünning's discussion of the nature of events helps locate event-formation as a specific application of more the more general worldmaking processes identified by Goodman:

> [T]he constitution of an event is an act of worldmaking in and of itself in that it is the result of a complex set of procedures involving selection, deletion, and, even more so, the kind of privileging Goodman called "weighting" (Goodman 10-12), which implies "ratings of relevance, importance, utility, value" (12) through which what is regarded as substantial is highlighted while the irrelevant elements are disregarded. All of these procedures reflect, but arguably also yield or even generate, cultural hierarchies of norms and values (see Erll, Grabes, and Nünning). The fact that these distinctions and hierarchies are neither given nor found, but are rather a matter of attribution, valuation, and assigning meaning becomes even clearer in the case of historical key events and transnational media events which are considered as 'big' or 'epoch-making.' (A. Nünning, 2010, p. 198)

The weight A. Nünning gives to weighting recalls Dissanayake's claim, which Taves (2009, 2010) has drawn on to help make sense of "religion," that "making special" lies at the heart of culture-making in general, and Nünning's observations regarding the role of selective and attributive processes in myth- and history-making resonate powerfully with important themes in this project.

So making fictional storyworlds involves applying the general processes of worldmaking to the selection and arrangement of narrative events (*i.e.*, emplotment) that constitute the situations both that are and that evoke actions from characters; these in turn produce a sense of "character" in its deeper sense as a person's inner nature or essence. Specific plots or narrative forms – that is, again, specific ways of selecting and structuring events – are rooted in and reflective of worldviews and ways of life, and specific characters can embody worldview ideals, both positive and negative. Because selves, including fictional selves, are composed of structured events (*i.e.*, narratives) that are themselves constituted by the actions of determinate characters in specific environments, fictional narrative storyworlds possess a metaleptic structure: they are worlds within worlds.

Drawing on Jerome Bruner's (1991) essay, "The Narrative Construction of Reality," Vera Nünning (2010) has extended Goodman's ways of worldmaking to specify additional features of fictional narrative worlds. Like the worldview studies/writing studies (*i.e.*, rhetorical) approach described in the previous reference chapter, she first emphasizes the importance of "situatedness" (2010, p. 223), that fictional narratives are located within time, space, and cultural context. Taking up another central feature of worldview studies (axiology), she also notes the importance of "[e]mbedded values":

> Narratives create a world with an inherent set of values and beliefs. Stories that are 'tellable' in Bruner's sense—that is stories that are interesting in that they do not simply repeat well-known schemata—construct their own morality; they establish text-internal norms which supply the reference to which the behaviour of the characters and/or narrators is to be judged. (Nünning, 2010, p. 230)

Thus, fictional narratives situate one in a determinate environment (or world of interrelated environments) that includes cultural features like norms and values; this, at a large scale, may be compared to another feature of fictional narratives that V. Nünning calls "[p]erspectivisation and experientiality" (*ibid.*, p. 234), which refers to the viewpoint or worldview, not of groups, but of individual characters.

Characters' individual worldviews are revealed through their actions (including their spoken and narrated thoughts), and the totality of their emplotted actions reveals an overall worldview or worldviews for the storyworld. Wesley A. Kort's (1975) *Narrative Elements and Religious Meanings*, though limited by its narrow focus on "religious" meanings, provides a useful reflection on how the elements of fictional narratives – especially character and plot[2] – relate to worldviews and ways of life. Kort states regarding "character" that "Character in narrative is an image of human possibilities, either for good and creativity or for evil and destruction, and the rise of modern narrative is very much tied to the effort to explore or to render paradigms of those possibilities" (1975, p. 40) and, elsewhere, that as "a paradigm of what man [sic] is, can be, should be or must be. As such, [character] plays a role analogous to the heroes, saints, and deified beings who are images of human possibilities in stories within religious communities" (*ibid.*, pp. 56-57). Though Kort is not thinking in terms of probabilistic world modeling, his subjunctive construal of characters as optional self paradigms – as providing, one might say, scripts for actions in situations one might confront in one's own life (though a comparison and translation process would inevitably be required) – is helpful and consistent with contemporary cognitive science. Likewise, he states regarding plot, "Plots, when they are dominant, tend to be mimetic of [the] recurring temporal processes in which individuals and groups are involved and by which, willy-nilly, they are carried along" (*ibid.*, p. 79). Again, Kort is not thinking in terms of event cognition, but his insight is sound. Humans chunk the flow of experience in relatively predictable ways in accord with experiential regularities and cultural norms. A. Nünning observes that emplotment, a term introduced by Hayden White, draws on "what

[2] His discussion of "atmosphere," which focuses on the "otherness" of nature and other selves, resonates especially well with Chapter One's treatment of spatiality relative to worldviews and worldmaking. Some narratives – including many fantastical stories – are much more powerfully determined by their setting (a spaceship or building, a city or forest or island, etc.) than by, say, their characters or plot. Indeed, in a postmodern world in which the coherence and stability of the self (*i.e.*, character) and history (*i.e.*, plot) have been rendered problematic and comprehensible only in terms of fictionality and pragmatic efficacy, a focus on setting is sometimes appealed to as a more stable narrative ground.

Goodman calls 'ordering' (12), *i.e.* the structuring of events through narrative procedures" (A. Nünning, 2010, p. 203), and Nünning further stresses that plot is not value-neutral: "Any account of narrative ways of worldmaking would be simplistic if it did not take into consideration what Fredric Jameson felicitously called the 'ideology of the form' (141), which implies that 'form is immanently and intrinsically an ideology in its own right'" (*ibid.*, p. 204). Genres (*i.e.*, typified ways of structuring plots, tropes, characters, and so on), character types, and other story elements imply worldviews, and knowledge of them is in some sense expected of readers.

As Grabes states regarding the cognitive function of scripts,

> Such scripts make it possible that someone who "decides to tell a story that references a script, (...) recognizes that he need not (...) mention every detail of his story" (38), because due to the largely collective nature of scripts, readers will have no problem filling in what seems to be lacking. (2010, p. 55)

Marie-Laure Ryan's (1991) *principle of minimal departure* therefore applies not only to the consensus model of reality that readers share – *e.g.*, folk intuitions about physics,[3] minds, and so on – but to the repertoire of scripts like *how people act on public transit* and *how people act in restaurants* and *how fairytales go*. This relates to how novel worldviews are made; "[j]ust as secondary worlds use the Primary World as a template, changing world defaults until a unique imaginary world is achieved, invented cultures often are inspired by actual world cultures of Earth and then are changed and fictionalized with the addition and subtraction of various cultural traits" (Wolf, 2017, p. 33). Once one has encountered sufficient textual cues to activate a known script, one becomes naturalized or habituated to the context of the new storyworld. Background knowledge of scripts allows people to easily fill in inevitable and necessary narrative gaps—and also makes them unlikely to easily depart from their expectations for the script and genre, including, most significantly, the narrative forms that confirm one's worldview and way of life. As Abbott states,

> To the degree that one or another of these masterplots tends to shape our view of the world, we may find it difficult to weigh the evidence dispassionately. Some would argue that our identities are so invested in our personal masterplots, that when these masterplots are activated it is impossible to break out of the vision they create. (2008, pp. 48-49)

In a sense, one's repertoire of genres, scripts, and narratives can thus contribute to a kind of essentialistic thinking: the tools one has that empower one for activity in the world also inherently limit one's field of action. Orson Scott Card describes a less charged example of inflexibility in categorization relative to genre distinctions within examples of fantastika. Once one has located oneself in an "sf" story, one will tend to remain there and be unlikely to revise one's background script to that of, say, a "fantasy" story.

> If a story is perceived as fantasy, the reader must be told as soon as possible the "natural laws" that apply in this fantasy world, whereas if the story is perceived as science fiction, the reader will assume that the natural laws of *this* universe apply until he [sic] is told otherwise.

[3] The laws of folk physics tend to track with expectations about magic: Lewry, C., Curtis, K., Vasilyeva, N., Xu, F., & Griffiths, T. L., 2021, "Intuitions About Magic Track the Development of Intuitive Physics," *Cognition*, 214; McCoy, J., & Ullman, T., 2019, "Judgments of Effort for Magical Violations of Intuitive Physics," *PLoS ONE*, 14.

> Note that this applies only to the beginning of the story. Your "fantasy" might end up with all seeming magic explained away as perfectly natural phenomena; your "science fiction story" might end up being a tale of witchcraft or vampirism in space. Indeed, this is exactly what Sheri Tepper did in her nine-volume *True Game* series. The story deals with people who spend their lives acting out an elaborate chesslike game, discovering and using innate magical abilities like shape-changing. Never mind that by the third volume you learn that these people are all descended from colonists who came to this planet from Earth. Don't be distracted by the conclusion, which explains in perfectly natural terms where all their seemingly magical powers came from. The story begins with a fantasy feel, so that Tepper has to unfold the laws of the universe very early in the first volume, the way a fantasy writer must.
>
> On the other hand, David Zindell's brilliant science fiction novel *Neverness* ends up with almost as many gods and mythical, magical events as the *Illiad* [sic] and *Odyssey* combined. Yet because it begins with a science fiction feel, the reader assumes from the start that the laws of the known universe apply *with exceptions*. The book is correctly marketed as science fiction, and that's how it's received. (Card et al., 2013, pp. 24-25)

One's sense of a genre as a member of a discourse community[4] may limit one's cognitive options just as it may facilitate others. Because scripts, as in a sense ways of living, are not just probabilistic but also prone to being normative, they may explicitly or implicitly advance particular worldviews.

[4] Swales (1990, pp. 24-27) defines a discourse community as consisting of the following six features: (1) common public goals, (2) means of intercommunication among its constituents, (3) a distinctive genre or genres that promote its goals, (4) use of its participatory mechanisms to provide information to its members, (5) a distinctive lexis, and (6) a minimal level of members with relevant expertise relative to the above.

# Appendix 32: Worldmaking Metaphors and Fractal Patterns of Recursive Self-Similarity

This appendix takes up some points made elsewhere (e.g., Appendix 7, n. 1; Appendix 26, subheading "Metaphor and Worldmaking – Ancient and Contemporary") and seeks to make several important points that could and should be further developed but, for lack of time and space, must be treated in mere outline form here.

Werth (1994, 1999) uses the term "megametaphor" for an enduring, extended metaphorical logic that governs a large body of text. I have noted that powerful metaphors may be particularly closely tied to a text's overall allomythos, its allomythology, playing distinctly cosmogonic and sense-making roles. As Nünning and Nünning state,

> As Zoltán Kövecses [2005] has convincingly shown, metaphors not only reflect prevailing cultural models, but they also fashion or even constitute cultural models. Like media, narratives and other ways of worldmaking, metaphors, too, play a constitutive rather than just reflective role in determining the perception of culture and theories, making worlds rather than just representing them. (2010, p. 21)

Just so.

Some root metaphors with a *cosmological-ontological* or cosmogonic function in fantastika are familiar from ancient myths: the mountain; the island; the cave; the home; the temple; the tree, garden, or forest; the elements; the directions; the ship, space station; the body; the couple united in sex and marriage; the family; the playground or game. The major encyclopedias of fantasy, SF, and horror will offer many, many examples under these and synonymous or related categories of stories that take up these metaphors to build and structure their storyworlds. And there are larger treatments that focus on such themes in specific genres and authors that often read like extended encyclopedia articles. Some worldmaking metaphors are more *epistemological*, foregrounding knowledge, perception, and physical-mental states, while often still having an ontological-cosmological dimension. These include stories governed by the idea of dream or nightmare, of madness, of drugs, of music and dance, of memory, and of discovery through travel, play, writing. Again, examples in any of these areas abound.

What I would stress is that for all that one might be tempted to lose oneself in the details, in the fascinating elements of texts that call out for identification and analysis, a world, to be a world, consists, not only of the elements isolated by attention and concern, but also of the relations that obtain among them. That is, the question of how things are structured or organized is one of central importance. And humans structure or organize themselves, both as individuals and as groups, by fashioning narratives, frequently ones that exhibit a kind of megametaphoric unity.

In this context, Campbell's monomyth has played an outsized role in contemporary worldmakers' structuring stories according to the logic of the "hero" (messiah, chosen one, superhero, cowboy, &c. – one sees it even at work in Csicsery-Ronay's analysis of sf, which is more critical and provides some tools for transcending the monomyth; see also https://www.salon.com/2018/04/28/how-superhero-films-became-the-guiding-myth-of-neoliberalism/). The person of the king, earthly manifestation of a high god, is an ancient root cosmic metaphor, and the trials of the hero may serve to ratify the naturalness and

rightness of his subsequent kingship. And so on. But I would say it is probably more helpful, in thinking about the worlds within worlds of fantastika, to think about fractal whorls within whorls, of recursive movements of worldmaking-metaphoric self-similarity as authorial concerns motivate metaphors large and small.

I must express gratitude for Donald Palumbo's (2002) book on the fractal aesthetic of epic science fiction in Isaac Asimov and Frank Herbert for first helping me see what was so obvious when pointed out, in life and in the art of fantastical worldmaking, but so easy to neglect in a culture trained to see things along Euclidean lines rather than by way of the regular irregularity of Mandelbrotian florets, branches, clusters, folds. One need not accept Palumbo's specific claims about Asimov and Herbert—nor, still more so, his ideas about the monomyth—to appreciate the value of applying and watching out for fractal logic as part of kairological analysis. For a useful overview for future research along these lines, see Polvinen, 2003.

King's *Dark Tower* epic offers a fine example of fractal worldmaking. He repeatedly returns (ka is a wheel) to the core metaphors that run through his extended oeuvre. The seething, murmuring, whispering magic of the Prim spawns Gan/the Dark Tower but also the monstrous Great Ones, who, like the Prim, cozened and diddled and spawned. Gan/the Dark Tower generated the multiple parallel worlds of the Tower, full of good and evil. The White and the Outer Dark sing or make discordant noise, as the case may be, embodied as beings and places or as spaces, portals, doorways, etc.

The Imperium of the Old Ones itself, at the height of its achievements, birthed its own doom of madness and mutation. But the wounded god-tower released not only death, but also the Rose and the field of singing roses. But even in their efforts to repent and heal, the Old Ones, in creating the cyborg Guardians, set up the madness of Shardik and the fall of the rest. Arthur Eld and his knights, for a time, restored order. But Maerlyn (who is ambigious as well—see *The Wind Through the Keyhole*) and the Great Ones corrupted him and his court, as well as the symbols of his loyalty to the tower, turning them into metaphors of addiction-and-madness, and from Arthur Eld was born the Crimson King (just as from Roland and the Crimson King and Susannah-Mia is born Mordred), committed to destroying the Tower. (The whole era of the Affiliation and its fall echoes what comes before and after.) Roland is also of the line of Eld and darkles and tincts like a being from the Prim. In the incarnation depicted in the *Dark Tower* series, Roland lacks the Horn of Eld, and he falls into axiological errors like those of the Imperium and Arthur Eld (addiction, obsession, failures of love and grace). But his story especially takes up the theme of the child who faces too much too early and of children sacrificed who should not be. He has learned, and, with the aid of artists like Patrick Danville and Stephen King, he enters into his next incarnation with cause for hope if he stand true. This simply gestures at some of the patterns King establishes—within the *Dark Tower* and his works more generally—and returns to throughout the *Dark Tower*, but once one thinks about his work in terms of fractals, texts like *The Talisman* and *Black House*, *The Eyes of the Dragon*, *Insomnia*, and many others, and the attraction of cosmological metaphors like towers and roses, make a great deal more sense.

## Appendix 33: Fantastical Ways of Worldmaking

Consistent with the framework already outlined and the emphasis it has placed on the category of "genre" and uniquely relevant to the issue of *fantastical* worldmaking, V. Nünning notes the importance of genre awareness both for creators and interpreters (*i.e.*, re-creators) of fictional narratives (V. Nünning, pp. 231-234). An author must be aware of the relevant fantastical megatext in order to engage in effective fictional worldbuilding in the subgenres of fantastika (for a recent work on this, see, *e.g.*, Lissauer, 2015).

But relative to Appendix 31's discussion of situatedness, perspectivization, and values, it is noteworthy that most guides to writing in the subgenres of fantastika, such as Orson Scott Card, Philip Athans, and Jay Lake's (2013) *Writing Fantasy & Science Fiction: How to Create Out-of-This-World Novels and Short Stories* also prominently feature worldview issues as central to fantastical worldmaking, with the aforementioned work, for example, including chapters such as "Traditional Fantasy Cultures" (Varhola, 2013), "World Cultures" (Varhola, 2013), "Magic" (Maurer & Wright, 2013), "Witchcraft and Pagan Paths" (Maurer & Wright, 2013), "Commerce, Trade, and Law in Contemporary Fantasy" (Kenyon, 2013), "Fantasy Races" (Miller & Clark), and others. In fact, a worldview studies approach, by not being limited to the category of "religion," makes immediately apparent the relevance of magical, economic, politico-legal (see, especially Cover's (1983) "*Nomos* and Narrative"), gender-sexual, and racial worldviews as aspects of fantastical worldmaking, bringing all such worldviews into its comparative scope.

To cite another example of the prominence of worldview issues as a component of fantastical worldmaking, David Eddings's (1999) *The Rivan Codex*, a work comprised primarily of background material (*e.g.*, religious texts, histories, and so on) the fantasy author composed before writing his bestselling fantasy series, *The Belgariad* and *The Malloreon*, contains in its introduction a 10-element formula for making a fantasy storyworld, and its very first element is the creation of an underlying "theology," which he rather simplistically reduces to a choice between Christianity and paganism. Sharon Spencer, in *Space, Time and Structure in the Modern Novel*, observes the following regarding fictional worldmaking:

> The creator of a world will want to put in people, but much more besides: streets; buildings; parks; stores; cars; animals; systems of thought; replicas of art works; religious attitudes; theories of economics, government, psychology; and so on. The character becomes, then, but one of many elements of the total world. (1971, p. 2)

A realist or mimetic novel might seek to replicate, with minimal departures, the religions and other worldviews of consensus reality just as it represents this world's streets, buildings, and parks, but a fantastical text seeks to break with consensus reality in a more decisive fashion, with dragons and spaceships and allomythoi. So to pull together much of the above, fantastical worldmaking involves robust modification of the consensus probabilistic world model, often including modifications focused on major worldview categories, but in doing so the process is able to draw on established regularities like genres and tropes.

I find Csicsery-Ronay, Jr.'s "seven beauties" – though intended to characterize science fiction (both SF and "sci-fi") rather than fantastika as a whole – to be effective categories for describing some of the most salient features of fantastical worldmaking. Of them, Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. states,

> I am not entirely sure how my "beauties" should be understood in rationalistic terms. They are perhaps *cognitive attractiors*, intellectual gravitational fields that draw our attention. They are perhaps *mental schemes*, through which we organize our thinking. They are perhaps *tools for thought*, so well made that we admire their design at the very moment we are using them. (2008, p. )

Though he claims not to be sure how his beauties should be understood, his characterization above – especially his implicit recognition that cognitive attractors and mental schemas develop and endure because of their utility as cognitive tools or "gadgets" (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Heyes, 2018) – is quite sound. Csicsery-Ronay, Jr.'s focus on SF means that his analysis excludes most fantasy literature, attending far more to storyworlds (and worldviews) that concern themselves with technoscience than with magic, but, again, he rightly notes how,

> It is from sf's thesaurus of images that we draw many of our metaphors and models for understanding our technologized world, and it is as sf that many of our impressions of technology-aided desire and technology-riven anxiety are processed back into works of the imagination. It is impossible to map the extent to which the perception of contemporary reality requires and encourages science-fictional orientations. (2008, p.)

Fantastical texts provide cognitive tools for orienting and locating one's self relative to the new problems of modernity and postmodernity, many of which are rooted in technoscience. He further states,

> SF is both an institution of mediation for a real historical moment, and also a free space for deconstructing those values. As a free space, it invites many different constituencies with varied interests, and inspires a great variety of styles. It imagines a universe of discourse held together by its constantly expanding megatext of neologies, speculations, and counterfactuals. (2008, p. )

Genres, tropes, scripts, schemas, and related narrative regularities are instituted norms that reflect and reinforce established configurations of power, but fantastika is motivated – in part under a capitalist imperative – to constantly expand its subgenres' megatexts of speculations.

This leads to what I regard as the two most useful categories for understanding fantastical worldmaking, Csicsery-Ronay, Jr.'s first two beauties, *neologies* and *novums*. Whereas his *Technologiade*, like other "masterplots" (*cf.* Abbott, 2008, pp. 46-49) such as the influential "monomyth" so common in fantasy texts, is rooted in traditional story scripts that work more to reinforce, sedimentize, and naturalize received ways of living and seeing, and whereas his *future history* and *imaginary science* relate more specifically to SF, his *neologies* and *novums* (with his *science-fictional sublime* and *science-fictional grotesque* being SF-specific subsets thereof—and in fact, broadly understood, *imaginary science* and *future history* are also *novums*) capture what is distinctive of fantastical worldmaking: the creation of novel world and worldview elements and the designation of them by new words or new uses of old words.

Novums constitute dislocations or estrangements from consensus reality by introducing robustly novel inferential possibilities. Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. points out that Darko Suvin abstracted from Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch's idea of the *Novum* (Bloch capitalized the term, reflecting its metaphysical-historical importance as a utopian-

apocalyptic intervention in history) its eschatological-messianic role in history but attributed to it a similar function in texts. Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. further, one might say, "secularizes" or moderates the category by pluralizing it – Suvin treats the novum as singular and totalizing – and ludicizing it:[1]

> For me, the underlying satisfaction of the novum is not primarily critical analysis or utopian longing, but a vertiginous pleasure, more ludic than cognitive, more ecstatic than disciplinary, in accommodating new relationships under controlled and friendly conditions. Of course, this ludic consciousness has its cognitive dimension; thinking craves stimulation and novelty, and learning thrives on intellectual pleasure. In this sense, I also employ Suvin's model of the novum as a tool for cognitive estrangement, with the caveat that estrangement is not always and necessarily theoretical and critical. (2008, p. )

The preceding analysis of fantastical storyworlds and, within them, of allomythoi has likewise emphasized the importance of play in understanding the nature of the phenomena. Fantastical worldmaking may be serious, may be oriented to very important, even ultimate concerns and problems, but it also seeks the satisfaction of realizing the creative fulfillment of novelty and touristic escape from the world of consensus reality.

Above, in my brief discussion of Goodman's category of *composition*, I mention the relevance of the study of "conceptual blending." It is worth noting, now, in the context of fantastical worldmaking, that certain types of blends or conceptual hybrids are more noteworthy, fascinating, and memorable. Lisa Zunshine locates her (2008) work, *Strange Concepts and the Stories They Make Possible*, relative to other recent studies of such conceptual hybrids:

> In the already-discussed *The Essential Child*, Susan A. Gelman [2003] looks briefly at such boundary-violating entities, from crying statues and works of art to children's toys and cartoons. Two other recent books, Pascal Boyer's *Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought* (2001) and Scott Atran's *In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion* (2002), focus on the role played by such conceptual hybrids—for example, artifacts whose special magical powers imply sentience—in the world's religions. In what follows, I build on Gelman's, Boyer's, and Atran's studies to explore the categorical violations that abound in our fictional narratives. (p. 56)

Though Zunshine does not use the term "novum" to describe her object of analysis, its semantic domain clearly overlaps heavily with her category of interest. Many of her primary examples of "strange concepts" come from science fiction, fantasy and fairy stories, nonsense poetry and children's verse, and other subgenres of fantastika, including multimedia examples like sci-fi movies and surrealist paintings.[2] Zunshine draws on a large

---

[1] My expansion of "novums" above to include, for example, a novel historical branching that produces a "future history" or some new form of "imaginary science" configures "novums" more generally relative to HPC: novums are robustly novel possibilities.

[2] Abbott notes that humans experience even apparently static works of art like paintings and photographs through a narrative-based consciousness, which indeed shapes all human knowledge and meaning-making:

> Narrative is so much a part of the way we apprehend the world in time that it is virtually built in to the way we see. [...] Even when we look at something as static and completely spatial as a picture, narrative consciousness comes into play. [...] This human tendency to insert

body of cognitive science research to argue that humans have inherited a basic ontological categorization system into "natural kinds" (*e.g.*, plants, animals, people), "artifacts," and "substances," each of which facilitate rapid and generally-effective inferences in different domains (*i.e.*, the folk-psychological and folk-biological for people and animals, though in different degrees and ways, the functional (which draws in limited ways on the folk-psychological) and folk-mechanical for artifacts, and the folk-mechanical for substances). But her interest is in the stories generated by violations of these intuitive ontological categories, what Boyer has called the "counterontological."[3] This resonates powerfully with the preceding chapter's discussion of boundary crossing relative to fantastical worldmaking; as Zunshine states,

> Quite a number of cultural representations thrive—that is, attract our attention and interest—precisely because they suggestively *violate* some sort of important conceptual "boundary" between an artifact and a natural kind, perhaps by forcing on us inferences that we generally are not prepared to associate with even a somewhat anthropomorphized artifact. (2008, p. 19)

Such ontological hybrids as robots and trees that talk – that is, the stuff of fantastika – fascinate because they violate the comfortable assumptions of one's typical world model.

Zunshine's work proposes some interesting possible functions for fantastical storytelling, rooted in the creation of strange, counterintuitive things. One might note that although the essentialistic way of thinking is often useful and effective – helping humans make complex ontologies and taxonomies – essentialization has also promoted a tendency to ridged, dogmatic, substance-metaphysical ways of thinking that have hampered the progress of science and supported all sorts of bigotries. So it is not always good to think in the rapid, easy, intuitive mode. Zunshine observes,

> Our language itself is quite sensitive to our domain-crossing tendencies, supplying us with such terms as "objectification," "commodification," "anthropomorphization," "personal teleology," and "fetishization." (Although in also could be argued that the reason we have such terms is that we need some special vocabulary for describing less habitual cognitive operations.

---

> narrative time into static, immobile scenes seems almost automatic, like a reflex action. [...] [W]henever we look in this world, we seek to grasp what we see not just in space but in time as well. Narrative gives us this understanding; it gives us what could be called the shapes of time. Accordingly, our narrative perception stands ready to be activated in order to give us a frame or context for even the most static and uneventful scenes. And without understanding the narrative, we often feel we don't understand what we see. We cannot find the meaning. Meaning and narrative understanding are very closely connected. [...] [Narrative] is a universal tool for knowing as well as telling, for absorbing knowledge as well as expressing it. This knowledge, moreover, is not necessarily static. Narrative can be, and often is, an instrument that provokes active thinking and helps us work through problems, even as we tell about them or hear them being told. But, finally, it is also important to note that narrative can be used to deliver false information; it can be used to keep us in darkness and even encourage us to do things we should not do. This too must be kept in mind. (Abbott, 2008, pp. 6, 7, 10, 11)

Regarding the narrative "shapes of time" and their use for creating knowledge in response to problems, see the following chapter.

[3] "Counterontological" is more precise than "counterintuitive" because many counterontological representations are common in a given culture but still, as Zunshine puts it, "resist ontological closures" (2008, p. 67).

> After all, we do not use the term "objectification" to describe our perception of an artifact—for *of course* we objectify artifacts.) (2008, p. 15)

I would note regarding the above domain-crossing terms that they are all *critical*. One of the central qualities of critical thinking – and, with Rosemary Jackson one might add, of the fantastical as "literature of subversion" – is that it is counterintuitive. And perhaps the presence of novums as counterintuitive objects helps encourage such a critical mode of thinking. Having a world model is a great asset, permitting fluent automaticity in action and quick response to novelty due to prior familiarity with what is relatively constant and stable in the world, but the illusion of stability also needs to be challenged. Frozen, essentialistic, inflexible thinking is unsuited to a dynamic world.[4] Along similar lines, Zunshine argues for the value of "strange concepts" as follows:

> This leads me to suggest our strange concepts are not merely superfluous fancies, the imaginative surplus that we can afford in our idle moments but could as well do without. On the contrary, I believe that both the making and the interpretation of such concepts are crucial to our cognitive well-being. For our cognitive architecture often carves the world at joints that are not there, for instance, insisting on "essences" that separate one species from the other and on the rigid distinction between animated and nonanimated entities. Contemplating concepts that challenge our cognitive biases may help the mind to retain its flexibility and its capacity for responding to its infinitely complex and changing environment [....] One possible reason that it might be good for us to be confronted now and then with *really strange concepts* is that they force us to be aware of our own processes of categorization. (Zunshine, 2008, p. 144)

This is the strongest argument I know for an inherently "progressive" pedagogical function in fantastical texts that, by their very nature, trade in strange, non-ordinary concepts. And later in her work, she succinctly reiterates this point:

> Our appetite for strange concepts is, and perhaps should be, insatiable because every shade of cognitive uncertainty induced by such concepts teases and flexes and trains our categorization processes. Those processes are, at least on some level, not particularly flexible (again, I am referring here to our tendency to essentialize and hierarchize living beings and to see them as categorically different from nonliving entities), so it is good for them to be teased, and flexed, and trained by various species of nonsense. (Zunshine, 2008, p. 164)

Given this work's concern with the problem of categorization – within the discipline of "religious" studies as a subset of worldview studies, within academic conversation about the genre and subgenres of fantastika, within dialog about history, myth, and the way stories relate to identities – Zunshine's hypothesis that stories using very strange concepts promote awareness of and flexible modes of relation to categorization processes reinforces this

[4] Zunshine's focus on essentialism is very much a nominalist critique of realism while at the same time—as a form of conceptualism—assuming the Kantian (and one could press this as far as Jung and Campbell) *a priori* existence of internal, innate cognitive structures characteristic of cog sci, whether one believes in massive modularity, a more moderate version of modularization, or stresses plasticity. Recognizing the idealist character of any cog sci-style conceptualism helps one see how such ways of knowing assume the deep ties between history, society, and the material world and the mind that are presumed by any evolutionarily-informed theory of cognition.

project's assumption that such stories may be particularly useful for examining the central questions and categories of religious and worldview studies.[5]

By resisting ontological closure, novums place one into a state of hesitancy, unsettledness, or alienation that calls for resolution – the violation or predictive "error" needs to be explained, provoking storytelling:

> By failing to be assimilated by the category that it has initially activated [...] a counterontological entity remains a promising source of new interpretations or, to make the same point somewhat differently, a fruitful source of new stories [....] Violations of ontological expectations thus seem to be ripe with narrative possibilities. Turn to any realm of ordinary human experience (social, emotional, ethical), and consider it in the light of such a violation—and there is a story waiting for you. (Zunshine, 2008, p. 67, 69)

Above, while discussing the probabilistic structure of stories, I noted that uncertainty enflames curiosity—in fictional worlds decoupled from the anxious world of day-to-day concerns, this form of uncertainty and even fear (as in a horror novel) is titillating and enjoyable rather than debilitating. Fantastika satisfies and encourages "the adventuresomeness of our cognitive architecture" (Zunshine, 2008, p. 131).

As Wittgenstein would say, a new form of life – a novum – produces a new language-game, a neology, and I would argue that neologies are vital conditions for the generation of allomythoi (on invented languages and imaginary worlds, see Fimi and Higgins, 2017).[6] The inferential norms that one must internalize in order to use a language and different text types – note that one becomes socialized to understand the linguistic meanings that structure experience through shared social practice, though lower-level inferential processes may be rooted in evolved responses to environmental, bodily, and social regularities (Bush, 2014; *cf.* Taves and Fredrickson, 2017) – structure and stabilize the identities of individuals and groups. Hence the role of policing language in maintaining established worldviews and of neologies in founding new worldviews.[7] The "transcendental" quality of language (*cf.* Bloch, 2008), its abstract generality that facilitates

---

[5] This idea – that fantastically counterontological concepts promote critical thinking and cognitive flexibility – runs counter to, for example, Darko Suvin's anti-fantasy bias, in which the counterontological concepts like ghosts, dryads, and flying carpets typically encountered in fantasy reinforce a superstitious, mystified, uncritical, and, most importantly, unscientific worldview and way of life. I have discussed Suvin's biases elsewhere above, but here, in response to such a critique, I would simply note that Suvin's scientistic-materialist worldview that frames his anti-fantasy stance itself might be accused of a dogmatic inflexibility that might benefit from engagement with the flavors of fantastika that he holds in contempt. But Zunshine's enthusiasm for fantastical stories might lead her to overstate her case somewhat. Fantastical narratives may certainly be used, especially in the N- and O-modes, to reinforce essentialisms and hierarchies.

[6] I have elsewhere compared the virtual inhabitation of an allomythic world by a fandom to the lifeworld of a diasporic community. Tweed states, "[T]he displaced share a language, even if some members of the group also speak another tongue as well, and they appeal to common symbols […] even if they struggle among themselves over their meaning" (1997, p. 85). In light of this work's engagement with allomythoi like those of Pullman and Pierce, the diasporic model may enhance understanding of online groups like atheists and white supremacists who are minorities in their local community. And one may observe in this context that the emergence of new media has been a vital factor for emergence of new, allomythos-based social formations.

[7] Implying the prophetic and even charismatic or esoteric cultural-capitalistic function of neologies, Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. states, "Neologies call attention to themselves; they are artful. They also call attention to the linguistic power of their users. A new word is a new source of power, which may originate from artistic invention, technical gnosis, or from the user's privileged access to new things at the leading edge of history" (2008, p. ).

its function of intersubjective coordination and cultural continuity, always contains the potential that, in making a new language or configuration of language, one may found a novel world decoupled from those known so far.

Of neologies, Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. states,

> All fantastic genres make some use of fictive neology. Heroic fantasy invents words to evoke the archaic origins of its worlds. Phantasmagoric satire delights in wordplay that simultaneously makes and insinuates the objects of its derision. Gothic and supernatural tales invoke esoteric and folkloric terms to create the sense of a concealed or forgotten past. SF is distinct, in that its fictive neologies connote newness and innovation vis-à-vis the historical present of the reader's culture. (2008, p. )

Neologies are common to all fantastical texts; like the effect of "estrangement" and as, in a sense, short-hand encapsulations of the estrangements of fantastika, they are not limited to specific subgenres like sf. Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. points out that neologies may be "neosemes, semantic shifts of words and sentences that remain familiar in structure and appearance, but have been appropriated by imaginary new social conditions to mean something new" (2008, p. ). Through interaction with the fantastical storyworld, including its characters and environments, one arrives at new inferential norms even if the words, expressions, and so on used to refer to these new inferential norms possess very different meanings in extradiegetic consensus reality. The ludic pleasure of deducing these new inferential norms is a significant part of the charm and challenge of travelling in the storyworlds of fantastika.

## Appendix 34: A Note on the Liminal-Liminoid Distinction

Allomythoi, as novel recombinations of cultural elements (often elements themselves modified using the ways of worldmaking), as worlds-within-worlds, are liminal (or "liminoid") and ambivalent, but they may be used to support conventions and maintain complacency, not always promoting rupture and critique. The mythic achievement often has been put to dark purposes, frequently directed against others rather than turned critically upon one's own worldview (Lincoln, 1999; cf. Masuzawa, 2005), but it is a powerful instrument.

Above and in the main text, the danger of using the liminal/liminoid distinction is that it maintains Turner's structuralist temporal periodization. But the "liminoid" is not, even in Turner, merely a secular version of the pre-modern, religious "liminal" (though it is certainly this), but it is also an in-between space-time characterized by idiosyncrasy, experiment, personal (as opposed to collective) meaning, and revolutionary potential. One might use the distinction liminal-liminoid to identify – a very common preoccupation of critics – either whether a given allomythos is structured by a predetermined narrative (e.g., one that maintains the identities, values, practices, and so on of an established worldview), thus falling on the "liminal" end of the spectrum, or whether a storyworld is more intertextual, dialogic, heterotopic, disruptive, or, in other words, "critical," and therefore being more "liminoid," in reformed senses of the terms to avoid the trap of presentism (see Spiegel, 2011). Any such attempt must maintain the more important distinction of the liminal and liminoid as both being "subjunctive" while the ordinary, non-ritual moments and spaces are "indicative" (see Turner, 1982, pp. 82-83).

## Appendix 35: Diasporic Mythistory-Making – Its Value and Peril

In *Our Lady of the Exile: Diasporic Religion at a Cuban Shrine in Miami* (1997), Tweed makes an argument regarding the function of "religion" similar to what I – with Lobdell – would make regarding WWLs and allomythoi. After engaging in rich and extended ethnographic study, Tweed concludes the following regarding Cuban pilgrims to the Our Lady of the Exile shrine in Miami:

> [A]lmost all Cuban American visitors to the shrine in Miami see it as a place to express diasporic nationalism, to make sense of themselves as a displaced people. There, exiles map the landscape and history of the homeland onto the new urban environment. Focusing on the ways they do this in rituals and artifacts, I suggest that through transtemporal and translocative symbols at the shrine the diaspora imaginatively constructs its collective identity and transports itself to the Cuba of memory and desire. (1997, p. 10)

The entanglement of alienation and nationalism evident in the diasporic Catholicism Tweed studies is also a characteristic of Romanticism and the use put to fairy tales and related forms of fantastika by authors like Tolkien. Charles Butler (2006), in *Four British Fantasists: Place and Culture in the Children's Fantasies of Penelope Lively, Alan Garner, Diana Wynne Jones, and Susan Cooper*, demonstrates how all four of these British authors who attended Oxford while J.R.R. Tolkien and C.S. Lewis were teaching there use their fantastic storyworlds to explore complex questions related to place and identity. Unlike the Cuban-Catholic nationalists whom Tweed studied, these authors are more critical of Britain's colonialist and mythic past, but they still seek to use history, myth, and locations like Oxford and Britain more generally to encounter the past and inhabit present "Britishness" in new ways.

Expressing a sensed alienation from consensus reality or responding to alienation due to a sense of a reality without consensus, many people turn to the mythical histories known as conspiracy theories and pseudosciences. As Introvigne observes, using the example of Dan Brown's *The Da Vinci Code* to explore fictional globalist conspiracies and the internationalization of popular culture, people may form their own vernacular "hyper-real" religions and spiritualities using the conspiracy-theory-inflected "mythical histories" of specific groups and as found in fictional works like Brown's:

> Readers of Dan Brown, and occasionally Brown himself, confuse 'mythical' and 'authentic' history with respect to the Priory of Sion, the Illuminati, and Freemasonry itself, thus adding to this hyper-real phenomenon. Of course the creation of a mythical history has been the practice, not only of religious or esoteric groups, but of their enemies as well. (2012, p. 270)

Feigned, pseudo-, imagined, or mythical history (*cf.* Fritze, 2009) can be used as refuge to reinforce a worldview or provide escape in a new one (*i.e.*, providing a livable history), but it may also be used in the negative, O-mode (*i.e.*, maintaining one's world as inhabitable and usable through attack of others').

As an example of how a novelist might intervene to fashion a "livable history" (see main text p. 129), I would reference Gary Daily's (cite) essay, "Toni Morrison's *Beloved*: Rememory, History, and the Fantastic." Daily states that "The weight of recollection ("rememory" in the language of the novel) is what haunts the world that Morrison creates"

(year, p. 141).[1] Daily begins with a brief historiographical survey of histories of U.S. slavery, noting how it was differently emplotted in different decades, from apologetic approaches focused on the white slave owners to revisionist approaches that foregrounded the intentionality and activity of the slaves. "But," argues Daily, "there has been an unintended result stemming from this research agenda. The crucial understanding of the psychic toll exacted by slavery has been diminished and obscured" (year, p. 142). Morrison's critique of the worldview advanced by the historical narratives she researched led to her positive intervention: "she talks about making the ghosts in the form of Beloved 'real' as a way of making 'history possible, … memory real' (Darling, [1988,] 5). How the injuries of slavery live on in the lives of the former slaves (in rememory, individually and collectively) is what Morrison wants us to understand" (Daily, year, p. 144). The historians' realist focus on slaves' behavior and actions neglected the experiential depths of their suffering. The fantastical spectral element in Morrison's *Beloved*, thus, endeavors to be faithful to a vital historical reality. This seems to bear out Andrew Smith's (2010) argument, in *The Ghost Story 1840-1920: A Cultural History*, that the ghost story as a genre has been consistently used to address a specific kind of problem: making visible the invisible contradictions in society (e.g., class, gender, coloniality, etc.) as the "ghostly political possibilities that are silenced or made absent" (p. 2; cf. Cooper, 2010, pp. 40-46; Oziewicz, 2007, p. 46). *Beloved* rests firmly in the ghost story genre's historical function of revealing repressed aspects of dominant historical narratives—though many ghost stories only permit such revelation in a form that remains stigmatized and necessarily defeated.

Consider still another example. Wagner's and Tolkien's ring-centered stories have frequently been compared (for recent treatments, see Vink, 2012; MacLachlan, 2012; and Fisher, 2015); Tolkien's romantic, national mythmaking on behalf of England parallels Wagner's *völkisch* mythopoeic efforts,[2] and their myths draw from overlapping sources and share various narrative features that strongly suggest Wagner's influence on Tolkien's own artistic (sub)creation. Wagner's appropriation by the Nazis seems to have promoted attempts to deny any such influence, and it illustrates the more sinister (e.g., fascist, essentializing, anti-Semitic, etc.) potential inherent in mythmaking, perhaps especially of the nationalist or ethnocentrist variety. The concept of "cultures" belonging to peoples – particularly culture of the sort deemed "high" – has long possessed complicated associations with essentialized understandings of race and ethnicity.[3] Still, Wagner, like Tolkien, rejected simplistic allegorical interpretation of his work and achieved great psychological insight and realization of a complex artistic vision that both spoke to its historical context and to general human concerns. And, like Tolkien, it is important to appreciate Wagner as a translator, a transmitter, and, thus, a transformer of traditional mythic elements to and for a modern audience. He too tried to supply a livable history, a mythic home.

---

[1] I am struck, too, by the evident influence of *Beloved* on Ta-Nehisi Coates's (2019) *The Water Dancer* and by the different argument he makes there regarding the embodied power of memory, story, and (implicitly, the fantastical retelling of) history.

[2] See, e.g., Williamson's (2004) *The Longing for Myth in Germany: Religion and Aesthetic Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche*.

[3] See Young, 1995, whose work also contributes to reflection on the colonialist desire to consume such cultures and peoples while simultaneously fearing such hybridity. Fritze's (2009) work, cited above, provides many examples of racist and racial-supremacist "pseudo-histories" invented to support what he identifies as "pseudo-sciences" and "pseudo-religions."

That history is, in an important sense, fictional (Latin, *fingere*, "to form, shape") and poetic (Greek, *poiein*, "create"), may be understood in a negative sense by those who desire a transcendent anchor (e.g., 'everything is fictional; therefore, everything is meaningless'), but it has generally been understood in a positive sense by the artists and philosophers who, in the tradition of Nietzsche, regard fictions as indispensable for human life, the means by which humans generate a virtual reality that shields them from meaninglessness. Nietzsche states:

> The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it. . . . The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing; and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments *a priori* belong) are the most indispensable to us; that without a recognition of logical fictions . . . man could not live. (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 384)

Indeed, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche explicitly designates the symbolic, world-constituting categories of thought (as in Kant and contemporary cognitive science) "mythological" (p. 404). As an example of the poetic, worldmaking and worldview-making[4] function of the artist, holding back the meaningless forces of Lovecraftian chaos with his creative word, one might think of Stephen King's *Dark Tower* series, in which King himself, in a delightfully postmodern reflexive move, writes himself into his narrative, hinting that he may be Gan, the divine spirit of the Dark Tower, creating and maintaining his vast cosmos (see especially King's (2004) *Song of Susannah*).

The constructivist (cf. von Hendy's (2002) discussion of the "constitutive" approach to myth) position I advance relative to myth as "poetic" tries to avoid, on the one hand, the radically postmodern position that all experience, including the experiences stored in and induced by mythic narratives, is purely "discourse" as well as, on the other hand, the universalist claim that "human" experience, especially that found in myth, is invariable. Again, as von Hendy (2002) notes, "myth" lies heavily under romantic influence (cf. Lincoln, 1999); it has largely been constructed as a category that embodies the romantic transcendentalist worldview. And this means, as with the familiar critiques of "religion" and "secularity" as categories that naturalize specific ideologies and power configurations (e.g., Asad, 2009; Barton and Boyarin, 2016; Masuzawa, 2005; McCutcheon, 1997; Nongbri, 2013; Saler, 2000), that systems of myth and their study are ideological. Consider, as a brief example, what von Hendy (2002) states regarding the argument of Campbell's *Masks of God* series:

> The work is built, in fact, upon a complex of rather startlingly regressive cultural presuppositions whose cumulative effect suggests a mind dominated almost exclusively by the stereotypes of late romanticism. The most fundamental of these appear in a series of diacritical contraries—hunter/planter, shaman/priest, male/female, exaltation/submergence of the individual, West/East, Aryan/Semite—in which the left-hand concepts are assimilated to one another and valorized over the comparably associated right-hand terms [….] [His] This distinction between foreign, Semitic religions and indigenous Indo-European or "Aryan" ones betrays with particular directness the extent to which Campbell's metahistorical fancies are dominated by the racist doctrines of the late nineteenth century that grew

[4] On Nietzsche's constructivist, perspectivist understanding of worldviews, see Naugle, 2002, pp. 98 ff.

> in particular out of German romanticism and are transmitted to Campbell through a number of his most formative enthusiasms. (2002, pp. 198-199, 200)

Given the peril of the genealogy of "myth," can one speak of contemporary innovative-but-vital narratives that are known to be fictional as being continuous with ancient "myth"? See Appendix 40.

## Appendix 36: Allomythoi as Metaphors and Translations

Ricoeur frames the relationship between history and reality as metaphorical, "being-as," and this blended, metaphorical space is what Gadamer calls "encounter." One may argue that this relates to the cognitive understanding of "translation," which is explained cognitively in terms of conceptual blending (conceptual blending being an extension of metaphor theory in part intended to account for novelty, as opposed to the cognitive constraints that are the focus of metaphor theory). Conceptual blending describes new concepts as being generated by the networked mapping and integration of inputs from prior mental spaces into a new blended space (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). Reflecting on the pedagogical aims of religious studies as a discipline, Erricker points to a very similar understanding in Geertz (as interpreted by Jackson [1997]):

> If I understand Geertz's approach and Jackson's explication of it, correctly, here we have the basis of a pedagogic model based on conceptuality illustrated with regard to narrative that influences the way in which we engage students with conceptually distinctive cultural and religious systems that are 'distance far' or at least to a certain extent dissimilar to their own. The hermeneutic circle in these terms is determined by this engagement with 'distance far' concepts and bringing them into an encounter with our own 'distance near' ones, the result being to be open to, grapple with and reflect upon different cultural grammars without reducing another's to our own or dismissing it as alien and therefore of no interest or simply impenetrable, peculiar and irrational. Both Geertz and Jackson also use the term 'translation' with respect to this, the point being, it seems to me, that what must be avoided is the tendency to translate out another's grammar into the conceptual confines of our own. The rigour of such a conceptually based pedagogic model, which involves both rational and affective engagement, is laudable, clear and eminently suited to religious material, both at a conceptual and narrative level. (Erricker, 2010, p. 47)

Note the Gadamerian language of "encounter." This understanding of distance near and distance far concepts closely resembles Wendy Doniger's (2011) defense of comparative mythology, in which she argues that myth brings together distant and near views as a form of metaphor, expresses cross-cultural experiences, and responds to fundamental questions. And Doniger likewise treats metaphor and translation as comparable processes that help illuminate the nature of comparison itself (2011, p. 4, 5):

> I might have used another metaphor for comparison instead of metaphor: translation. In fact, *metaphor* and *translation* are English derivatives from related Greek and Latin words for the same thing: "bringing across" (Greek *phor*, Latin *fero, latus*—"to bring"; Greek *meta*, Latin *trans*—"across"). We are always translating when we speak to someone else, and of course dramatically more so when we speak to someone in a foreign language; as every translator knows, we can't really translate, but we do. The belief that we can't translate some things at all, or compare them, seems to me [...] idiotic. [...]Translation requires a leap of faith very much like the leap that, I will soon argue, is required by comparison. We are always moving between

> worlds, trying to make sense of and orient our lives, and the trick of comparison is the trick of translating between these worlds.

This conceptual movement between and among worlds found in the act of comparison is a powerful tool, one worthy of some suspicion.

Like the technologies that increased the human capacity for travel and transferal of people and goods, translation was part of the European project of conquest and colonization and a major aspect of its success. As Nietzsche writes of the Romans' appropriation of Greek culture, "They did not know the delights of the historical sense; what was past and alien was an embarrassment for them; and being Romans, they saw it as an incentive for a Roman conquest. Indeed, translation was a form of conquest" (*apud* Robinson, 2015, p. 262). A translation-theoretic understanding of mythology, comparative religion, and historiography compliments a translation-theoretic interpretation of globalization. The construction of history, like the comparative study of "myths" and "religions," forms others and dominates them through acts of knowledge production (again, see works like Lincoln, 1999; Masuzawa, 2005). Translation helps make the world smaller, "flatter," more interconnected, but it also is a major arena of power contestation:

> The globalization of world society, in particular, demands increased attention to mediation processes and problems of transfer, in terms of both the circulation of global representations and 'travelling concepts' and of the interactions that make up cultural encounters. Here, translation becomes, on the one hand, a condition for global relations of exchange ('global translatability') and, on the other, a medium especially liable to reveal cultural differences, power imbalances and the scope for action. (Bachmann-Medick, 2012, p. 23)

Because the following discussion in the main text will foreground global issues and the emergence of fantastika relative to "global" mixing in cultural borderlands, one does well to keep in mind the non-innocent character of comparison. Translation studies and theorists of translation have occasionally drawn on religion – both as a potential alternative language to reach outside existing terms (Fuchs, 2009) and to call for religious people to translate themselves into secular terms (Habermas, 2006), and religious studies scholars occasionally draw on translation theory (e.g., Bräunlein, 2009). My efforts here may be understood as an attempt to do something similar within an expanded "worldview studies" framework focused on fictional worldviews. (For further discussion of a translation-theoretic understanding of globalization, see Cronin, 2003; see also Bassnett, 2002, pp. 5-6.) The category of translation highlights both the attempt to build bridges between worlds and the inevitable gaps, silences, infidelities, and differences between worlds and worldviews that every effort at translation will embody and negotiate. A critical awareness of translation in this era of concerns regarding globalization (what Apter (2013) calls "Oneworldnessness") properly leads to attentive consideration of the untranslatable (see Apter, 2013).

# Appendix 37: Fantastical Representations in Ancient Borderlands Situations

Allomythoi represent interesting examples and products of border situations. They bring together the real and the fictional, the past and the contemporary. Given this situation, borderlands theory enhances analysis of allomythoi in a variety of ways. The main text argues that, in creating a fictional storyworld and its allomythos or allomythoi, an author metaleptically transfers non-ordinary and ordinary components from the extradiegetic real world into the diegetic storyworld. Recognizing this hybrid blend – including interpreting it, in many situations, as "hybrid" in the postcolonial sense – as a borderlands situation helps foreground how those who inhabit such in-between storyworlds, who metaleptically cross over into them, will inevitably face tensions and contradictions evoked by and obtaining between the source worlds; yet, they may also find there – in their state of estrangement and "diaspora" – resources for dealing with such tensions (cf. Vila, 2003).

In Chapter 1 and Appendix 13, I note that Thomas Tweed (2006) and Catherine Albanese (2007, 1997) both developed border-oriented theories of religion in response to the American religious situation. Their approaches can be extended to non-religious worldviews as well by noting that all people, religious and otherwise, create, cross, and defend boundaries as part of their identity-forming and -maintaining processes. Borderlands theory helps stress the fact that boundary-crossing is sometimes a feature of dwelling inside one's homeland.

Borderlands theory may also be related to the contestation and maintenance of important identity-related categories like "myth," "religion," and "secularity." Relative to this work's discussion of myth and history, as well as the critical analyses of secularization and globalization (and the underlying "myth" of absolute epochal ruptures—*cf.* Latour, 1993), one might note that even in classical antiquity "myth" and "history" and the specific narratives themselves were understood in a variety of sophisticated ways, ranging from situational improvisation to elaboration of and derivation from linguistic, historical, and other kernels of "reality" to cynical manipulation by those in power (Honko, 1972, pp. 10-12; ).

In Bellah's (2011) final book before his death, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*, he creates a parallel between child-development and psychology-of-religion theories regarding stages of consciousness (i.e., ontogeny), which he links to modes of religious representation and the stadial cultural evolution of specific modes of representation (i.e., phylogeny), in the latter case drawing on Merlin Donald's (1991) *Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition*. One may note that such a stadial metahistorical approach could be traced back at least to the tradition of Vico (see White 1978, pp. 208–209) and is hardly unusual (cf., e.g., many of the works of Walter J. Ong). Importantly, Bellah proposes that Axial Age cultures' critical, theoretical reappraisals of their received sacred narratives and creation of new ones – i.e., in an important sense their transformation into myth (Bellah calls it "mythospeculation," following Donald in largely attributing "myth" only to earlier humans) – was an application of a new kind of cognitive capacity enabled by a novel modes of representations: graphic invention and the external storage of memories in texts. But I would further stress the intertextual, hybrid nature of Axial Age innovation and critique, which

would be connected to the increased development of sophisticated imperial and trade networks, that is, borderlands situations.

Bakhtin's (1963) work in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* is particularly useful in this context and may be regarded as a primary feature of (at least most) allomythoi—that is, the tendency to contribute to dialogism. In *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion*, Rosemary Jackson (1981) states, "The fantastic exists as the inside, or underside, of realism, opposing the novel's closed, monological forms with open, dialogical structures" (cite). I would avoid understanding the realist novel and fantastika in purely oppositional terms, but Jackson does well to stress the dialogic character of fantastic narratives. Even if a given fantastical text is relentlessly monologic – which is unusual given the nature of the genre of the novel – it contributes to the polyphonic, dialogic character of the culture we inhabit. The dialogic (Bakhtin) is closely related to the heterotopic (*i.e.*, Foucault's worlds within worlds, which disrupt, innovate, and challenge the settled and received); the intertextual, polyphonic Axial Age cultures – in which translation was a persistently required skill due to borderlands pressures – naturally produced innovative intertextual texts. And polyphony and dialogism likewise promote critical reflection.

There are studies of Homer's allusive intertextuality (e.g., Heiden, 2008; Currie, 2016), for example, and classicists and the classically-trained have continued engaging in what are sometimes scholastic or byzantine efforts of tracing and creating intertextual works of lacelike complexity.[1] However, I would focus on the critical, creative efforts of Hebrew authors. Dexter Callender's (2014) edited volume, *Myth and Scripture: Contemporary Perspectives on Religion, Language, and Imagination*, is a fine example of how Hebrew Bible authors drew on and adapted the "myths" of surrounding cultures (as well as their own West Semitic mythic inheritance) (compare, e.g., Batto's (1992) *Slaying the Dragon: Mythmaking in the Biblical Tradition*).

Laura Feldt's (2012) work on the fantastic in the Hebrew Bible (see, too, Cupitt, 1980, 1991) is illuminating, in that she notes that "the fantastic elements of the religious narratives that I treat are sites of ambiguity, uncertainty and mutability" (p. 1). Indeed, she notes that increasing interest in the fantastic (in our era) is linked by many to the secularization process:

> The fantastic appears, as it were, because religion (gradually) disappears (Sandner 2004a: 6-7; Frenschkowski 1999, 2005, 2006). The fantastic is seen as tied to the 'age of skepticism,' to secularization, to the post-Enlightenment era and its particular concerns: 'Fantasy is a necessarily skeptical literature' (Sandner 2004a: 6-7). This view assumes that a fundamental difference separates the two fields of fantasy and religion. (Feldt, 2012, p. 3)

Her work systematically undermines the plausibility of such a fundamental difference. She cites Frenschkowski's (2005) work relative to the common claim that contemporary consumers of fantastic texts do not "believe" in them while ancients were perpetually credulous:

> In premodern cultures, too, people would believe different things in different contexts, and a narrator may insist that his or her narrative was ture in one context, and in another insist that it is not; humans simply do not believe the same things at all times and in all contexts, nor with the same intensity, he

[1] There is also, for example, recent relevant work on Old Norse myth and religion that applies fantasy theory (McKinnell, Ashurst and Kick, 2006).

> says (Frenschkowski 2005). Frenschkowski also acknowledges that because myths in general are historical, artfully made products, there is thus no fundamental difference from the 'artificially' created myths of fantasy literature (Frenschkowski 1999: 52).

This is all consistent with my position. Transitioning now from the world of the Hebrew Bible to the formative period of Christianity and Judaism (i.e., Rabbinic/normative Judaism—that is, as distinguished from the worldview(s) reflected in the Hebrew Bible), one may first note, with Robyn Walsh (2015), the heavy hand of Romanticism that still shapes understanding of the origin and interpretations of early Christian texts. That said, texts like, for example, Oegema and Charlesworth's (2008) *Pseudepigrapha and Christian Origins* well illustrate the complex "stew" of intertextual sources and influences that shaped the formation of early Christian texts and worldviews.

**Pseudepigrapha, Apocrypha, and Apocalypse**

Russell (1964) heavily influenced Sacchi's (1996) broad understanding of "apocalyptic" as embracing most of the so-called intertestamental Jewish literature that has survived. While terms like *pseudepigrapha* and even *apocrypha* possess negative associations of false attribution and secretive or potentially dangerous texts that must be reserved for the spiritually mature, *apocalypse* captures, with a positive connotation, the revealing of new knowledge.[2] This term also may be appropriately applied to most so-called Gnostic texts. And indeed McConnell (2009) explicitly identifies science fiction as an expression of Gnosticism, and Kreuziger (1982, 1986) advances an understanding of SF as secular apocalyptic (cf. Wagar, 1982), using theological categories and methods to interpret SF texts.

Of the family of worldviews and texts characterized as "Gnosticism" (see Williams, 1996), Pearson states,

> One of the chief characteristics […] is *mythopoeia*, the construction of elaborate myths through which revealed gnosis is transmitted. In giving expression to their basic beliefs, the Gnostics put into story form their insights into the human predicament and means of salvation. Mythopoeia was an ongoing activity of many Gnostic teachers, who recorded and elaborated their mythology in revelatory literature (apocalypses, revelation dialogues, etc.). The main themes of Gnostic mythology are *theosophy*, elaborating on the transcendent God and the divine world; *cosmogony*, how the world came into being; *anthropogony*, involving the origin and imprisonment of human beings; and *soteriology*, how the human self can be saved [….] [T]he main building blocks of Gnostic mythology consist of innovative reinterpretations of biblical and Jewish traditions. (2007, 14)

This quote may be used to introduce and reiterate a number of points. First, creative myth-making emerged in an imperial (i.e., the "globalized" situation of the Roman Empire—and, further back, the more global awareness of the Axial Age (e.g., the Stoics)), colonized (i.e., the Jewish[3] people under Roman domination and conditions of diaspora), borderlands (e.g.,

[2] Apocalypse (and the related genre of testament) can, of course, also be defined more narrowly.

[3] It is sometimes helpful to distinguish between the "Jewish" peoples of the biblical periods (themselves under different conditions of cultural mixture and negotiation due to powerful imperial influences (e.g., Egyptian, Babylonian, Iranian) and diasporic dispersion), the variety of worldviews and ways of life that existed under the umbrella of "Hellenistic" Judaism, "Second Temple" Judaism, and "Rabbinic" Judaism. If Rabbinic

the blending of biblical, Iranian, apocalyptic-messianic-millenarian (often tapping into old West Semitic mythic resources in addition to Zoroastrianism's decisive influence[4]), and Hellenistic (esp. Platonic) resources) context. Second, this mythmaking activity was performed by means of specific genres. And third, it was addressed to certain problems of central importance (the nature of the divine, the origins of the cosmos and humanity and how these define their natures, and the primary human goal and the way it can be achieved). Finally, much of my thinking focuses on the genres of myth and history, that is, forms of "memory," but as cognitive research has shown,

> [E]pisodic memory and episodic future thought (*prospection* as it is known) are processes that depend on the same neural systems. This view is supported by evidence that damage to neural circuitry known to be essential for episodic memory also impairs imagination. What this means is that in the case of episodic memory we simulate a past experience (more or less accurately), and in imagination we simulate a possible experience cueing the same machinery in different ways (Botzung, Denkova, and Manning 2008; Maguire and Hassabis 2011; Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, and Hassabis 2010; Spreng, Mar, and Kim 2009; Hassabis, Kumaran, and Maguire 2007; Hassabis et al. 2007; Hassabis and Maguire 2007). We reexperience the past to preexperience the future. As Schacter, Addis, and Buckner put it, "The medial temporal lobe system which has long been considered to be crucial for remembering the past might actually gain adaptive value through its ability to provide details that serve as building blocks of *future event simulation*" (2007, 659; my italics). (Gerrans, 2014, p. 70)

Thus, a shift in this appendix to the generally future-oriented concerns of the prophetic[5] and apocalyptic genres (one may think in this context of much science fiction compared to fantasy) helps illustrate the continuity of human experiential worldmaking (and the underlying cognitive systems that enable it) whether tagged as "present" (as is common in works of horror), "past" (as is common in fantasy), or "future" (as is common in science fiction).

Pearson makes another point that is worth reflecting on as one considers not only the diverse mythmaking of the "Gnostics" but also the variety of other (proto)Jewish and (proto)Christian[6] mythopoeic works relevant to understanding the 1st century milieu (e.g., those now called the "apocrypha" (e.g., apocryphal gospels, acts, lives, histories, epistles, prayers, odes, psalms, apocalypses, testaments, prayers, etc.) and "pseudepigrapha" of the Old and New Testaments, the Dead Sea Scrolls, the Nag Hammadi library, the works of Philo of Alexandria, the Aramaic targums, the Jewish magical papyri, the Hermetic corpus, the rabbinic writings, and so on) and related ancient borderlands milieus of mixture and creativity. Pearson notes that Gnostic texts in particular show the sign of strong Platonic

---

Judaism is understood as "Judaism" proper, then some scholars use alternative terms to designate peoples and worldviews of earlier periods.

[4] See Cohn (1993), *Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyptic Faith*.

[5] On the ethical and prophetic function of SF in a manner that specifically responds to the contemporary situation see Scholes (1975), and on the prophetic function of speculative texts from 1644 to modern SF, see Clarke (1979).

[6] Again, the "parting of the ways" literature on the complex identity formation processes involved in Christians' and Jews' coming to know themselves against each other as distinct groups seems to show that it took longer and happened later than is generally assumed.

influence combined with biblical and Jewish elements, and then he notes the following regarding Plato:

> One interesting feature of Plato's works is his mythopoeia, his creation of various myths as vehicles for the transmission of his philosophical ideas. As we have seen, mythopoeia is a prominent feature of Gnosticism, too. But in Gnosticism the myths are considered to be divine revelation and certainly not vehicles for the transmission of human philosophy. (2007, p. 17)

The genre category of "pseudepigrapha" expresses a common aspect of Jewish-Christian worldmaking creativity—the effort to conceal its innovative quality, its novelty, under the names and identities of past authorities with which the author aligns themselves and identifies and to whom they often regarded themselves as submitting as part of a tradition or school. Plato himself appealed to the power of narrative – in dialogs and myths – to avoid speaking outright in his own name. The Jewish-Christian mode of pseudonymity, which one might imagine ending with a humble *p.p.s.n.* [*per procurationem sine nomine*], is a recurring feature of texts that sought alternatives for self- and group-formation: new possible ways of being in a complicated world. Regarding the much later *Corpus Dionysiacum* of the late 5th to early 6th century, in which the author adopts the name of Dionysius the Areopagite, the first Athenian converted to Christianity by St. Paul, Stang argues that adopting of the name of Paul's famous convert mirrors Paul's mystical effort to be no longer himself but Christ. By adopting this neither/nor and both/and mode of composition, pseudonymity "becomes for this author an erotic and ecstatic practice in the service of breaching the integrity of the singular self, unsaying that singular self, and thereby soliciting a deifying union with the unknown God" (Stang, 2012, p. 260). The movement of kataphasis-and-apophasis is, according to Stang, enacted in the composition practice itself. Not all pseudonymity performed the same function, of course, but the practice seems to be rooted in a respect for one's tradition as both received and as needing to be lived—transformed in order to be made relevant and responsive to one's situation. A livable history.

J.Z. Smith introduced a distinction between "locative" and "utopian" religions or religious modes, that is, religions (or elements thereof) that provide one with and promote a stable, ordered reality and those that encourage things like openness, critique, playfulness (see Smith, 1978, 147–151). He too notes that the "utopian" style is not a unique property of modernity; Puett notes the following regarding Smith's argument:

> Referring to Hans Jonas , Smith argues that the emergence of Gnosticism in the Hellenistic period marked a moment when a "radical revaluation of the cosmos occurred." The emphasis shifted from one of order to one of liberation – a "utopian" vision, in Smith's terminology. Another example of a utopian vision rejecting an earlier locative one would be the modern world: "Such a locative view of the cosmos seems foreign to our tendency to idealize openness and mobility." (Puett, 2011, p. 121)

Of course, the successes of fundamentalisms in the contemporary world show that the locative tendency is also present. But even in such locative worldviews and ways of life, a utopian or apocalyptic orientation with respect to other worldviews is common. Rather than trying to characterize the spirit of the age as either locative or utopian, one might better characterize this era as exhibiting a proliferation of expressions of both—sometimes even within the same group or work. As Collins (1998) demonstrates in his *Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature*, even ancient apocalyptic

texts display a wide range of qualities responding to different contexts and situations (e.g., some are more spatially oriented, describing the structure of the cosmos, while others are more temporally focused on history and its impending culmination; some are more mystical, seeking transcendence and union, while others are oriented to immediate historical concerns; while some are explicitly linked to crises, others show signs of no such exigence; etc.).

As with the Romantics – one thinks of the poetic apocalypses of Novalis, Blake, and Shelley – one may broadly say that imaginative, apocalyptic, fantastical texts and storyworlds seem to be generated when people live in combinatory cultural contexts, often but perhaps not necessarily always under conditions of oppression, dislocation, and alienation (*beati pauperes spiritu, quoniam ipsorum est regnum caelorum*), and seek to draw on their milieu of cultural resources to fashion new responses to the problems or questions that concern them. Marina Warner (2013), for example, in *Stranger Magic: Charmed States and the Arabian Nights*, well illustrates this borderlands, combinatory quality relative to modern creativity, showing the powerful influence of the East, in this case the *Thousand and One Nights*, on Western imagination (see too, Jullien, 2009). Technologies like translation and mass media have made borderlands encounters, as provocations for further creative hybridity, virtually inescapable in the modern world.

# Appendix 38: On the Reality of Myth and the Fictionality of History

*I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colors which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.*
—Plato, *Republic*, Book 10

*Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?*
—Rowling, *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows*

This appendix engages with myth theory and philosophical dismissals of myth in order both to defend the meaningfulness of "myth" – indeed, its centrality in human existence – and to explore the significance of history's mythic or fictional character, particularly in this work's overall context of people's composition of new myths, new (hi)stories, new worlds for themselves: allomythoi. The term "mythopoeic," which specifically refers to myth-making, is used to suggest, too, the relatedness of myth and poetry and more fundamentally of myth and meaning-*making*. The sort of language Frege graciously dismisses in "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry" and "On Sense and Reference" falls under the umbrella of the mythopoeic. In considering the mythic, focus will be placed on the *substance* or *content* of mythic or fictional language. With regard to the poetic, more attention will be given to language's *form*, its logical structure and its physicality, which are understood to be pragmatically related to and characteristic of poetic language. History, grounded in the material traces of the past and yet shaped as an ordered and compelling symbolic representation, is thus an excellent exemplum of the mythopoeic. While their possessing some degree of reality means they should be taken seriously, the fact that both are fictive may be interpreted as offering liberatory potential – including liberation from their discursive and rhetorical bounds.

## I. The Mythic

In discussing the mythic in "On Sense and Nominatum," Frege argues that one could merely "be satisfied with the sense," and exclude the question, for example, of "whether or not the name 'Odysseus' […] has a nominatum" (year, p. 220), but, in doing so, one would discount the mythic as having a bearing on "the question of truth" and "scientific considerations" ("On Sense" 221)[1].

[1] Frege's distinction between sense and reference sets up a division between the content of one's mind and the truth of the world. Within the mind, however, a further distinction is made. The cognitive, propositional component, the sense, is not to be identified with personal memories of sensory impressions and feelings, which are called images or ideas. This distinction solves various problems. Because it is based on faith in (and even scientific reverence for) the truth of the objective existence of the world, it avoids the problems to which solipsism is subject. Because two senses bearing the same truth-value (reference), although perhaps called by different signs, can bear the same reference (e.g., Hesperus and Phosphorus can both refer to Venus), expressing their identity ceases to seem inherently contradictory. It should be pointed out that because Frege ultimately defines "reference" as referring to truth-value, and not simply to what obtains in the material world itself, there are instances, such as in the case of the reference of "that" clauses in indirect discourse, in which

He comes to this conclusion after arguing that a (non-poetic) declarative sentence contains a proposition that must be regarded as the sense (i.e., thought or connotation) rather than as the reference (or, denotation) of the sentence because two declarative sentences with different senses could bear the same objective reference. Frege himself points out that concern with the external reality is not alone what actuates humanity's interest; we generally strive, not for a truth exceeding the limits of what can be epistemologically digested, but for truth as it can be known *to us* when the world has been integrated into our experience and life history: "What interests us can therefore never be merely the nominatum; but the proposition alone does not give knowledge; only the proposition together with its nominatum, i.e., its truth-value, does" ("On Sense" 221). If all "true" propositions could be listed, in accord with Frege's notion that the truth-value of a proposition is its reference, the world described thereby would, according to Frege, exclude the mythopoeic. However, one contention of this appendix is that the mythic should be included among the narrative circumstances or possible worlds whose propositions have reference,[2] have truth values. As in Thomasson, the *existence* of fictional objects will be emphasized, not merely as possibilities which might obtain under certain counterfactual conditions, but as subsistent realities, created by intentional communicative acts and sustained in language communities by means of records or oral traditions. Interestingly, Frege's first example of a reference is, not an empirical reality, but a mathematical object, a point ("On Sense" 218). Likewise, in one of his examples of something possessing a sense but lacking a reference, he cites "the series with the least convergence" ("On Sense" 218), and it lacks reference, not because it is a series, but because the property attributed to the series is falsifiable.[3]

---

"reference" (his more precise term is "indirect reference") means the proposition of the "that" clause; similarly, in his mathematical example of the identical reference of the expressions "the point of intersection of a and b" and "the point of intersection of b and c," "reference" is an abstraction. Frege uses this distinction between complete sentences and their constituent clauses and between their respective references, on the one hand to truth-values and on the other hand to propositions, commands, requests, etc., to explain apparent failures of his account, as when, for example, clauses with identical truth-values cannot be substituted.

[2] This does not mean that thoughts should be *identified* with references. The two concepts should be kept distinct, for such a distinction is useful. However, mythic thoughts bear complex, culturally contingent references—although, as with other natural language thoughts, more precision could be desirable.

[3] I shall discount examples like "square circles," for I do not see how such expressions can even be said to bear a sense that can be dissented from. They bear the form of language, but evoke no judgment, nothing but the wordless sensation that accompanies bewilderment. And on the subject of "falsifiability," a brief comment: The verification theory of meaning, in its most robust form, is expressed by Hempel as follows: "[A] sentence is empirically significant if and only if it is not analytic and is capable, at least in principle, of complete verification by observational evidence" (51). The strength of this theory of meaning primarily lies in its respect for empirical evidence. It does not encourage, indeed, it does not permit, airy speculation to grow out of control. The focus on *capability*, too, demands that one come up with a method, rule, algorithm, recipe, or test, by means of which a proposition can be confirmed or falsified. This sort of austere criterion of truth is solid and satisfying; however, it is also impractical and excludes phenomena that most are unwilling to do without. In the first place, the theory itself does not admit of "complete verification by observational evidence" and so seems to invalidate itself. But let's set that case aside. What else? Mental life seems almost immediately excluded, throwing one back into a behaviorist black box situation regarding cognition. Human activity can be observed, but, without reference to our own subjective insights into human life, we can imagine countless mental states and dispositions consistent with given actions, much like the famous rule-following paradox. Hempel mentions other weaknesses of the verification theory. For example, he points out that the theory "denies cognitive significance to […] all sentences whose formulation calls for mixed—i.e., universal and existential—quantification" (52); this excludes the induction and formulation of general scientific laws from finite observations. Hempel also mentions a criterion of "reducibility" as being "characteristic of the liberalized

Indeed, his whole theory, if it is to be taken seriously, has thoughts as its references. Consequently, my argument for the inclusion of the mythic in the category of things bearing reference is not fundamentally at odds with Frege, who does include abstract things, but is rather a case for the expansion of his category.

Myth is at the very least used to give a descriptive account of what is considered to have been a historical reality (Geertz's "worldview" or "model of" – Frege does admit that myth in this sense can be evaluated), to dispose its hearer to think and act in a determinate way (Geertz's "ethos" or "model for" – the persuasive power of myth is grounded in the listener's evaluation, ultimately, of a declarative statement, but one extended over a unit of meaning much larger than a sentence), and to express internal states. It is because myths continue to have utility in the lives of people that they persist and reoccur in the language of a community[4] (cf. Quine's pragmatic "universal" ("Translation and Meaning" 550). They point to recurring elements of experience, within a social order that seeks to perpetuate itself, and it is worth stressing in this context that much of human experience is mental or psychological. The question of myth often becomes fixated on the question of the historical "kernel"[5] or the normative "moral," but often what is communicated is a method or disposition, to which the listener can assent or dissent. Giving a name to an internal state or strategy allows one to process and command it. Furthermore, one's identification with a character like Odysseus and participation with him in specific life struggles allows one to imaginatively experience and process them and to absorb known strategies for dealing with them[6]. The pragmatic reasons for regarding myths as bearing reference involve, then, more

---

versions of positivism and physicalism which […] have superseded the older, overly narrow conception of a full definability of all terms of empirical science by means of observables" (55). That is, reduction of non-observational terms to terms that can be verified or falsified observationally is held up as an ideal, but it, too, seems to be not only impossible in practice, but also unreasonably exclusive of important phenomena and conceptual tools that emerge from lower orders with novel and unprecedented properties. Hempel further notes: "[R]eduction sentences do not seem to offer an adequate means for the introduction of the central terms of advanced scientific theories" (55). Finally, since the verification theory of meaning tends to focus on the evaluation of individual sentences, we do well to recall Quine's argument in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" to the effect that any single proposition proves to be unfalsifiable as long as the entire system of which it constitutes a part can be adjusted to account for it; Hempel likewise states, "In the language of science […], a single statement usually has no experiential implications." Thus, for these and other reasons, although the verification theory of meaning has much to recommend it and performed a valuable function in advancing the philosophies of language and science, it is burdened by insuperable weaknesses.

[4] In a deeply traditional society, one may be able to speak comfortably of a single community, but, in reality, a community consists of a variety of associations just as a "single" mind consists of a complicated array of processes. This destabilizes the notion of a "thought" as that which is common to all.

[5] Kripke's discussions of Moses and Jonah are fixated on the question of historicity in this way (65-68). For example, Kripke argues that Jonah, although none of the works attributed to him were historical, is thought to have been a real person: "[T]he name 'Jonah' really has a referent" (87). The modern inclination is to anachronistically project genre categories into the past and privilege "history," attempting to recover a basic, empirical description from the epics and legends of the past and to neglect their other intended functions. Thus, "Jonah" would have a referent even if there were no historical kernel, but "merely" a communal narrative with determinate social, ideological, and psychological functions. As even Kripke observes, "Unless we assume that some particulars are 'ultimate', 'basic' particulars, no type of description need be regarded as privileged" (51). Indeed, in no area of inquiry has a reductionist account arrived at ultimate simples whose individual properties allow the prediction of all those that emerge on different levels of granularity and specificity.

[6] Cf. Bettelheim, Bruno. *The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales*. New York: Vintage Books, 1989, pp. 3-6. Although he discusses the way fairy tales can allow a child to recognize and resolve internal states, Bettelheim also stresses the ethical nature of folkloric communication. Normative

than the possibility of a historical kernel. Mythopoeic statements are powerful and useful forms of language concerning which one may assent, dissent, or suspend judgment. Contrary to Frege's claims ("The Thought" 39), a playwright (and even an actor) is making a serious assertion, not merely fantasizing or emoting. Only an analysis whose granularity takes as the significant units of thought not merely words and expressions but whole sentences (e.g., Van Leuven Zwart's "transeme") and even paragraphs is suited to giving an account of such assertions.

One reason to avoid complicating a linguistic ontology by treating thoughts as having positive truth-values or as being "real" (i.e., by holding a thought as the referent of a thought) is that a criterion of non-circularity is inevitably violated. This "violation" is not surprising, for self-consciousness is a recursive process. In order to get a handle on its own workings, it has availed itself of metaphor, allegory,[7] and myth so that it might detach itself from itself, as it were. Circularity is a manifestation of dualistic thinking, which can be a useful tool, but is not an ultimate insight into the nature of things. Thus, it is not "wrong" because it does in fact have utility in some contexts. And, in other contexts, such dualistic systems of circular relations can be thought of as unities. In light of the above, the idea of the soul merits consideration. Frege states, "I have an idea of myself but I am not identical with this idea. What is a content of my consciousness, my idea, should be sharply distinguished from what is an object of my thought." ("The Thought" 45). The object of one's thought when one thinks about one's own consciousness is the fullness of one's mental life, of which one can sense, attend to, and name only a small portion (cf., e.g., Metzinger, 2011). Frege observes that there is a ground to consciousness below the self of which one is aware: the ego "is an idea among other ideas and I am its bearer as I am the bearer of the other ideas" ("The Thought" 45). He does not even call the notion of the self a "thought," perhaps because he thinks each individual's idea of himself is too subjectively individual to participate in the generality characteristic of thought. Surely, however, humans do have a general thought of the self, mind, or soul. The myth of the soul, while not profitably identified with the mind in its entirety and not necessarily associated with the properties attributed to the objects of the logico-mathematical discourse, can be a useful conceptual instrument, and, in this instrumental sense, the soul can bear assent, dissent, or suspension of judgment. More importantly, the self as a story, a myth, a personal history participates in the reality myth possesses (on the utility of the self as an integrative cognitive tool for organizing unpredictable action, see McNamara, 2009; on the narrative nature of consciousness, see, for example, Lodge, 2002 and Appendix 28, Excursus).

When we discuss our thoughts, when thoughts are, as it were, the referents of our verbal signs, we have a sensation of immediate access in a way that we generally

---

claims derive their power not only from an inborn awe of law and authority, but also from the fact that ethical systems encode rational (i.e., effective and efficient) methods of promoting valued features of the world in social environments—though also of course often advancing the interests of some over others.

[7] Tartar notes, "In fairy tales, the hero escapes the tiresome clichés of reality by entering a world where the figurative or metaphorical dimension of language takes on literal meaning. Ideas become matter [….] Unlike the private symbols found in literary works of a modernist turn, the symbols of folkloric art are highly accessible to the public imagination, in large part beacause they are shaped, if not created, by a collective body" (80, 81; cf. Lewis, C. S. *The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition*. London : Oxford University Press, 1951, pp. 44-46). As has been discussed elsewhere in this work, "genre" fiction texts are accessible only to smaller communities, subgroups that have been initiated into the conventions and structures of the genre.

acknowledge to be impossible with respect to physical objects. We may never know things-in-themselves, but surely we can know ourselves! Even here, however, skepticism is called for because the conscious part of our mind with which "we" identify is but a small component of a distributed and dynamic cognitive-neurological system that breaks down under analysis; our dispositions toward events are frequently determined before the self-aware component justifies and rationalizes them, and their habit of shifting, as Heidegger notes, we call "moods." Quine – sounding a bit like Hans Vaihinger – rightly points out that the physical objects, forces, and models of science, the objects of mathematics, and the gods of Homer are all akin to each other ("Two Dogmas" 74-75): "Total science, mathematical and natural and human, is similarly but more extremely underdetermined by experience. The edges of the system must be kept squared with experience; the rest, with all its elaborate myths or fictions, has as its objective the simplicity of laws" (75). Experience sometimes impacts on the edges of the system that are explicitly called "folklore" or "myth."

Maria Tartar observes, "According to those who hold that similar tales arise all over the world by a process of spontaneous generation, something about the texture of life exercises a limiting force on the folkloric imagination" (65; cf. Lewis 119-120). As the independent evolution of a similar biological structure in two animals whose common ancestor lacked it signals a similarity in the structure of the animals' environments or in their modes of life that resulted in a certain adaptation of the organisms to their environments, so too what is common in the life of humanity may be addressed and communicated in folklore, legend, and myth in a similar form among disparate peoples. The search for positive verification, for a certain and stable truth value as the conclusion of a kind of iterative, alethic reductionism, which can only arrive, finally, at unqualified being-in-itself[8], is rooted in the intuitions of the mathematical mind, whose objects of inquiry seem, at least superficially, amenable to direct reference. However, there are other sorts of intuition. Explanation in the form of reductive mathematical laws as in physics excludes other modes of knowing and explaining. The inclination to regard proper names as references to fixed, stable essences, found implicit in much natural language and ubiquitous in logic and mathematics, is not the only intuition present in thought and language. For those who regard the character of the world as being, for all that it is determinate, also dynamic and probabilistic, language is better evaluated in terms of what is assertable (cf. "Translation and Meaning" 548) or evident, what is indeterminate or unknown, and what is contraindicated, rather than in terms of the fixed values, "true" and "false." The boundless knowability of the world,[9] which might be dismissed as a question of epistemology rather than ontology, is

[8] Cf. Kripke 110.

[9] One might recall Wittgenstein's 5.521, in which he disassociates the universal quantifier from truth-functions. Indeed, belief in the uniformity of nature and one's ability to shift inductively from particular to universal claims, is an act of faith. The universal quantifier ranges over everything; it is thus intimately related to the notion of necessity, for true law is categorical and refuted by a single counterexample. This sort of language illustrates the way systems of representation permit the stating of more than what is thinkable or knowable. In fact, the positing or fixing of anything as an atomic simple (i.e., as stable and essential in itself, apart from any property) likewise assumes something beyond human knowledge. The ability of our mind to abstract from what is something that is not (e.g., a pure property), to entertain what is not, to negate what is, and to set these alternatives against each other, is the foundation of the conditional and the possible at the heart of this work's larger phenomenon of interest. As Wittgenstein observes, as long as something has qualities, we have not arrived at a simple. When we arrive at the level a radical reductionist would call "real," we are compelled to be silent, for there is nothing about which to speak. When properties vanish, we arrive at the opposite of Kripke's baptism, inquiry's eschaton; not its telos, but its ekpyrosis.

intimately related to the fundamental differences between languages that hamper perfect translation (i.e., the different life histories of language communities and the resulting vocabularies of uniquely ordered collections of descriptions in accord with their causal histories of use). It is also implicated in what Quine calls the "indeterminacy of correlation:" "There is less basis of comparison—less sense in saying what is good translation and what is bad—the farther we get away from sentences with visibly direct conditioning to non-verbal stimuli *and the farther we get off home ground*" (emphasis mine, "Translation and Meaning" 572), for any extended inquiry into the full range of what exists will quickly leave home ground behind. Kripke's doctrine of a causal chain of reference that traces a name back to a fixed reference gets at the social nature of language (94), but the life history of a people varies as does the life history of an individual, for whom sense impressions are laden with unique associations. It is not Kripke's causal claims that one doubts, although those could be expanded, but it is rather with his notion of direct reference to stable objects (cf. 138) that the intuition of a skeptical and pragmatic mind feels discomfort. The stress he places on the causal chain that binds a word's present usage to its history and origin parallels Thomasson's assertion that a fictional entity is "necessarily tied to its particular origin" (6), its creation by an author or even by a community (cf. Thomasson 7).

If an instantaneous simulacrum of the world could be made, then something stronger than the relation of similarity would obtain between the world and its simulacrum. We would have true identity. Although the foundation of the common idea of stable entities is the relation of identity obtaining between a thing and itself, no true persistence over time is known (cf. Kripke 43). Because of change and flux, all identity seems to be more precisely thought of as similarity. And the world of the possible, which seems to be an uncertain realm of story, of possible narrative worlds, of the stipulated (*de dicto*; cf. Kripke 44), is scarcely more unstable and uncertain than the world as it is, the world that necessarily is in itself (*de re*), for, in the end, our knowledge of the world is largely mediated by language, which consists of successive arrangements of words, each of which are themselves rich with history, like an Arabian story within a story within a story within a story (*mise-en-abîme*). Quine puts the case as follows: "My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement" ("Two Dogmas" 73). The account of language described above reminds one of Kripke's causal chain of words, but it is not his doctrine of direct reference. There can be no "is" of identity, save as an instrumentally valid convention. There can only be an "is" of predication. Kripke's names-as-histories are like Frege-Russell bundles of predicates, only with an emphasis placed on the specific relations they bear to each other due to their causal history. This emphasis reminds one of Wittgenstein's early "picture theory," in which the relations obtaining between the elements of true language correlate to the relations that obtain in the world; it also recalls Thomasson's interest in how fictional worlds relate in very specific ways to the times, places, and contexts of their composition (8-9). Where Kripke seems least in touch with the world as it is, is where he describes most accurately the philosophy that seems to be implicit in a certain myth of natural language, which assumes that words directly refer to static, stable, fixed, rigid, enduring, persistent entities. Logic depends on the internal consistency of a system of symbols and their rules for being manipulated. Thus, a word system or language game that is internally consistent but insane (i.e., in the sense of not corresponding to the world in an important respect) is still perfectly logical. That at our level of being it is useful to speak of stable entities, of essences

that persist in being identical to themselves and existing in accordance with a principle of bivalence[10] that denies all paradox and superposition, is intuitive, obvious, "natural," but it is not the ultimate ground of things that we might wish it to be. It is ideological.

In a passage that seems to anticipate Kripke's language of baptism (cf. 96, 135), Frege describes how the sense of a proper name "illuminates" its reference, but, in the same paragraph, he rejects the possibility of knowing the true essence of a thing because it would require complete knowledge of every potential property of a thing in all possible situations ("On Sense" 218). Not only does no sense fully correspond to its reference, but, in Frege's view, "the grasping of a sense does not with certainty warrant a corresponding nominatum" ("On Sense" 218). It is with respect to this view that I would stress an instrumentalist approach. When, as in Frege's discussion, the image is being excluded from an ontology in order to simplify the question and increase the precision of one's analysis of the empirical domain of inquiry, then such an approach is useful. However, let us consider the reasons Frege gives for dismissing the idea or image as differing "essentially from the connotation of a sign" ("On Sense" 219). He goes on to distinguish image from sense, stating that the "latter may well be common property of many and is therefore not a part or mode of the single person's mind; for it cannot well be denied that mankind possesses a common treasure of thoughts which is transmitted from generation to generation" ("On Sense" 219). Thus, the image is purely subjective and lacks all that is normative and common[11] to the thought of a language community; earlier in the discussion, Frege links the image to "feeling:" "Frequently this image is suffused with feelings; the definiteness of its various parts may vary and fluctuate" ("On Sense" 219). Frege's "images," then, may be compared to the contemporary idea of "qualia." Mental phenomena do have a private, subjective component. That certain feelings or sensations attend judgments of a particular sort, namely, those that pertain to one's self and those aspects of the world to which one's self has been expanded to embrace, does not mean that those judgments can be discounted. And the fact that the "definiteness" of an idea may "vary and fluctuate" over time hardly distinguishes it from the entities Frege regards as having senses correlating to references. The claim that sense-thoughts themselves are the "common property of many" is unverifiable, and, given the frequent instances of confusion and misunderstanding in social interaction, in which signs do not produce the responses they are assumed to dispose others to have, the claim is subject to doubt. Rather than there being some core "sense" common to members of a language community, one might do better to say that "sense," although never actually being present in any individual mind, is a useful way of talking about an idealized mean of the varying dispositions evoked by a sign in the members of a relatively persistent subgroup of speakers—effective shared linguistic practices lead to certain normative, probabilistically likely uses of words in specific environments characterized by regularities or norms. Concerning the empirical entities Frege regards as bearing reference, a statement of Russell's, found in his response to Strawson, is pertinent: "The subject-predicate logic to which we are accustomed depends for its convenience upon the fact that at the usual

[10] Cf. Quine's statement: "Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics" ("Two Dogmas" 73).

[11] Frege's recurring claim that, if one could compare an idea and a thing ("The Thought" 37) or one person's idea and another's ("On Sense" 219), one could determine whether they "correspond perfectly" suggests that he believes that an identity that is more than similarity is really possible—a questionable proposition.

temperature of the earth there are approximately permanent 'things'. This would not be true at the temperature of the sun, and is only roughly true at the temperatures to which we are accustomed. My theory of descriptions was never intended as an analysis of the state of mind of those who utter sentences containing descriptions" (Russell 388). Russell, therefore, also rejects the application of his theory to the subjective (or "egocentric") and points out that, if his theory of descriptions is correct, then the objects that natural language regards as fixed and stable would be regarded as having dissolved if their associated properties ceased to apply to them.

Frege connects thoughts, which are the "common treasure" of humans, with the possibility of translation, a recurring interest of this work given its attempt to provide a comparative framework. Frege states, "We have found that the truth-value of a sentence remains unaltered if an expression within the sentence is replaced by a synonymous one" ("On Sense" 222; cf. 219). The sensations evoked by and which characterize poetry are precisely the kind of things that should not be translatable, according to Frege: "The more exactly scientific an exposition is, the less will the nationality of its author be discernible and the easier will it be to translate" ("The Thought" 39). However, mythic structures and poetic sentiments, generally detached from the musical properties of their articulation in a specific language, *are* communicated from language community to language community; the general or universal, which is thought to be characteristic of the "true," is found in myth and folklore. That myths do survive translation from language to language and from cultural setting to cultural setting is evidence of the fact that they bear meaning (cf. "Translation and Meaning" 546-547, 549) and reference to the human reality. Again, when translation is understood pragmatically and not absolutely, it is at the heart of the allomythic worldmaking process.

Frege's practical simplification of the category of phenomena that are to be regarded as seriously intended as having references excludes myths, an important aspect of reality if the philosophy of language is to contribute, not only the domains of mathematics and science, but also to the domains of the mind and society. What he does pragmatically, Kripke seems to do dogmatically—i.e., that names like "Pegasus" are empty of reference under all *possible* circumstances. Thus, the argument in this section also has had Kripke in view,[12] although it was first provoked by a reading of Frege.

---

[12] See further discussion in the main text: . On this topic, compare especially his attitudes toward computational machines, minds, and brain-states on pages 35, 100, 142, and 146-153. Kripke radically divorces the results of computational instruments from the human process of ratiocination, as if the human mind were not implicated in "the construction of the [computational] machine" (35; but cf. his *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition*, pp. 33ff., including n. 24 and n. 25 ). This is related to his considering the mind and the brain as "actually different" (100). Because he believes the mind could be "*qualitatively in the same epistemic situation*" in response to ontologically different stimuli (142), not only does he conclude that the properties we associate with objects do not really constitute their meaning for us, but he also concludes, in his consideration of the mind-brain problem, that, for example, "it is at least logically possible that *B* should have existed (Jones's brain could have been in exactly that state at the time in question) without Jones feeling any pain at all, and thus without the presence of *A*" (146). If Kripke means that some other region of the nervous system that is ordinarily involved in the sensation of pain might be stimulated (cf. his subsequent discussion of C-fiber stimulation) without an attendant alteration of the distributed regions of the brain that is the locus of consciousness, then he seems to have misrepresented those who state that subjective mental states and brain states are to be strongly identified. The stimulation of C-fibers (or some other stimulation that provokes a replication of the brain state caused by C-fiber stimulation) is causally continuous with a brain-state of the region of the neural system that is self-aware, and *this* brain-state (the mind

It is astonishing to observe that our natural languages, our mathematics, and our logics that seem to so imperfectly represent reality—especially insofar as it is conditioned, contextual, dynamic, relative, probabilistic, and uncertain—have been so successful. The mind, which of all things perhaps knows itself least, has, by means of instruments that seem in varying degrees not to reflect the nature of things, come to have a measure of knowledge both of itself and of its world. Mythic language plays a role in this. Somehow, although it seems in some respects like the essence of madness (cf. Gerrans, 2014), we project our mind onto the world and apprehend thoughts that bear reference to our reality (and that sometimes don't). Language proves to be both a valuable tool for and a mere illusion of possession and control. Yet, having briefly begun a consideration of the mythic, the question still remains whether or not the criticisms leveled against it are misdirected but still valid. Is it perhaps the poetic form of much mythic language that obscures meaning and introduces the bodily confusion of feelings?

## II. The Poetic

Etymologically, a poet is a "maker." Poetic language is often accused of being imprecise, hard to pin down, ambiguous, fluid, emotional, "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Do the poets, in fact, *make* anything of substance? Some of the characteristic features of poetry have already been considered above in relation to "myth"—its seeming duplicity or infidelity to declarative truth, its use of metaphor, and its contextually bound, endlessly referential nature. But what of fluidity? How best can we examine this feature of language? Concerning the Greek language, Denniston states, "The meanings of particles, more than those of any other part of speech, are fluid" (lvi). A consideration of some of the key features of the natural language *function words* or *closed-class words* variously identified by terms such as "particles" (usually uninflected, free-form morphemes—though bound morphemes, as prefixes and suffixes, may be treated as particles too) and "syncategoremata" will aid in the defense of the poetic and lead to the conclusion that they perform vital communicative functions, although they embody many of the difficulties found in trying to understand and translate the poetic. Their content can often be communicated, however, through other means, such as vocal emphasis, facial expression, and gesture, and, in print, similar effects can be achieved through things like visual signs, marks, and spaces. This reminds one of the physicality of music and poetry. Online publishing, by means of its markup language and other audio-visual features, has, in some respects, improved on the logical, rhetorical, poetical and fundamentally pragmatic and physical powers of oral communication's particles and written communication's signs and spaces, so this section will afford an opportunity to think briefly about the nature of some new media.

The Islamic grammatical tradition divides language into three primary categories: noun, verb, and particle (Owens 238). One Arabic grammarian defines particles as having "a meaning by virtue of their referring to another word" (Owens 238), in a sense being an explicit illustration of an important aspect of Derrida et al.'s critique of language in general. The phonological dependence on surrounding words exhibited by clitic (Classical Greek, for

---

telling itself the story of pain), not the stimulation of C-fibers, is to be identified with what is subjectively experienced by the percipient as pain. The common intuition that these subjective states can exist apart from their material conditions is, one suspects, an error of reified abstraction produced by a community of speakers, probably due in part to a shared fear of death (cf. Kripke 148).

instance, has examples of both proclitic and enclitic forms) particles evokes the relational dependence of particles on their rhetorical, semantic, and grammatical context. Because their significance is so contextually bound, they are hard to define. Interestingly, some Islamic grammarians supply only negative definitions for "particles," to the effect that particles are what verbs and nouns are not (Goldenberg 314). This "apophatic" method of elimination finds a parallel in Quine's resolution method of testing for syncategorematicity.[13]

Concerning Latin particles, Kroon states that they are "those invariable words which have in common that they fit their host unit into a wider perspective, which may be the surrounding verbal context and its implications, or the communicative situation in which the text is integrated" (qtd. in Langslow 537). The considerations emphasized by Kroon are pragmatic, taking context, reception, and rhetorical intent into account. These pragmatic features are stressed in order to round out the "traditional semantic/logical classification" (Langslow 538) with an exploration of the particles' "side-effects," functions they acquire through long association with particular uses and contexts. As Denniston states of Greek particles, "It may be objected that the particle merely emphasizes, while the emotional nuance lies in the context. But the particle, from constant use in a particular kind of context, acquires a specific emotional tone" (xxxviii).[14] However, Langslow, while not fully

---

[13] Cf. the explanation found in Dorrough 285. Simply put, a sentence like "He is a philosopher king" can be resolved to "He is a philosopher" and "He is a king;" whereas the sentence "He is a good king" cannot be resolved to "He is good" and "He is a king." Thus, "philosopher" is categorematic, but "good" is syncategorematic. Once syncategorematicity has been illustrated, it is easy to recognize, especially in basic logical operators. Examples like "good" do tend to muddy the waters, however, leading to the notion that the fundamental characteristic of the particle is adjectival or adverbial specification. Particles, in modulating thought and emotion, frequently function adverbially, and adverbs are used to modify adjectives; thus, it is not surprising that Bloemen's Aristotelian definition (in response to Sampson and to Carstairs) of syncategorematic words as "specifications of attributes" has some utility (682). However, since researchers into particles have identified numerous non-adverbial particles, Neto's criticisms of Bloemen's definition are, if surprising at all, only surprising in terms of restraint, economy, and brevity.

[14] Many syncategorematic terms are normative or axiological (cf., e.g., Carstairs: "[S]yncategorematic adjectives form a large class, including (besides *good* and *mediocre*) *brilliant*, *efficient*, *incompetent*, *poor*, *fake*, *putative*, and many others" (108). Humans (and other non-human animals) naturally assign value to things in the world. That reasonable humans can be expected to be disposed to respond in certain ways to situations and propositions that bear special reference to themselves and those people and things with which they identify, and that particles and syncategorematic expressions function to signal such dispositions, are not surprising. This is not the place to discuss axiological language in depth, but one collection of useful papers on the subject is *The Language of Value*, edited by Lepley.

But I would assert that scientific truth, when fully realized and integrated, should involve the physicality of poetry, pulling on the totality of a person and evoking a feeling, a sensation, a sentiment. This sort of proposition, felt as it were "in the gut," although weighted, might still, of course, be incorrect. For example, it has been said by some (e.g., Plato) that God is the Good. It has also been said that the concept of God, like the idea of the Good, is obscure, if not completely void of meaning. God, understood in this case as the harmonization of a humanity's highest ideals (cf. Dewey), may not exist; such a harmony may not (may not even possibly) obtain. But the power of the idea of such a harmony, its potential to organize and inspire human activity (for good or ill), is as true and real a force in the world as whatever the consequences are of the actions it provokes.

Many thinkers have wanted to exclude from logically rigorous language words that they felt were too "semantically contaminated." For example, Frege states, "This explains why it is that nothing seems to be added to a thought by attributing to it the property of truth" (39); similarly, with regard to the meaning of "true," Wittgenstein's dismissal in the *Tractatus* of the metalogical "judgment stroke" is interesting (4.442). Likewise, recall his strict standards for the "introduction of any new device into the symbolism of logic"

disagreeing with Kroon's pragmatic conclusions (cf. 549), states, "[T]here is considerable *prima facie* evidence that in Latin generally non-pragmatic grammatical […] features of the context correlate with the choice between *nam* and *enim* [….] Given this, I wonder how 'real' a status a synchronic discourse-pragmatic account of a particle can have—compared with either a diachronic or a standard 'dictionary' account" (559). That is, Langslow suggests that Kroon goes too far in focusing on particles' rhetorical and contextual associations and that their enduring, "dictionary" meaning must remain dominant. This sort of faith in the dictionary's power to transcend time and context would certainly simplify matters. However, with regard to giving an account of particles, one of the foremost difficulties is that their meanings are frequently dependent on those pragmatic features Kroon stresses, such as context and rhetorical intent.

German and Greek possess an abundance of particles in comparison to other related tongues, and the difficulties their particles make for translators are notorious (cf. Stede and Schmitz 125; Abraham 2; Denniston xxxix, n. 2). Stede and Schmitz find that "[s]poken language, especially spoken German, is rich in particles that do not contribute to the propositional content of utterances, but play important roles in steering the flow of the dialogue and in conveying the various attitudes and expectations of the speaker" (125). That many particles "do not contribute to the propositional content of utterances" recalls Frege and will be discussed in more detail below, but what are the practical consequences of this situation for translators? "We conclude that particle translation cannot be performed directly by lexical correspondence rules. Instead, we opt for first providing an abstract characterization of their impact in discourse. Then, the translation process can decide on the means suitable for conveying this impact in the target language" (Stede and Schmitz 130). The character of particles leads one to conclude that formal equivalence (i.e., "literal" or "word-for-word") translation is inadequate in such instances and that an effective translation process should be founded on the principle of dynamic (or "functional") equivalence (i.e., "free") translation and *skopos*. This would seem to corroborate Quine's conclusions concerning the indeterminacy of translation, the notion of synonymy, and the value of a pragmatic approach to translation.[15] Consider the example of the definite article, regarded as

---

(5.452): "The introduction of any new device into the symbolism of logic is necessarily a momentous event. In logic a new device should not be introduced in brackets or in a footnote with what one might call a completely innocent air." Can a given particle, when intentionally embedded by a sane person in an arrangement of other words, have no truth-conditional content? In taking the fullness of reality into account, including the impact and intent of a speech act in its context, even the most apparently vacuous particle, bearing some causal relationship to a situation—unless Grice's rules are undergoing a deep violation, a speaker has ceased to abide by the conventions of her language community, and is truly speaking a "private language" (even mere "bullshit" is used with a function in mind (Frankfurt, 2005))—must have a condition under which its use is assertable.

[15] Likewise, Kripke's interpretation of the "skeptical paradox" in his *Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*, would seem to be relevant in this context, especially with regard to the invalidity of "private language." According to Kripke, Wittgenstein's "skeptical paradox" is that, when one implements a rule in a novel situation, a skeptic can accuse one of having misunderstood which rule one ought to have (or intended to have) implemented. In Wittgenstein's words, "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" (§201a). Because any number of rules can account for a finite set of data, what justification can one have for inferring one rule, as opposed to another, after a finite number of example instances? Even if one falls back on other explanatory rules, they are subject to the same paradox, which at some point demands an answer. Although Kripke points out the superficial similarity between Quine's notions of the indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference and the skeptical paradox, he takes care to point out that Quine's concern is with behavior, as

a particle and as syncategorematic by many ancient Arabic and Greek grammarians.[16] Its use in those languages that possess it is invariably distinctive, and difficult for non-native speakers to learn. Like accent, indeed as a kind of accent, "misuse" of the article tends reveal that the arthrous language is not the speaker's own. Wilson's *Emphatic Diaglott* translation of the New Testament, for example, uses special signs of emphasis to highlight the presence of the Greek article. Wilson states in his introduction, "The Greek article often finds its equivalent in the English definite article *the*, but in the majority of cases it is evidently only a mark of emphasis [….] This peculiarity of the Greek language cannot be properly expressed in English except by the use of typographical signs" (8; cf. Denniston vi). Although Wilson should not be regarded as a grammatical authority, his words are cited here for at least two reasons: (1) his point about the definite article's often being untranslatable yet emphatic is in fact valid and does not depend on his authority for its establishment; (2) his translation illustrates the use of visual signs of emphasis to reflect the function of particles and thus anticipates the second half of this essay.[17] Stede and Schmitz's example translations of *doch* similarly illustrate both the impossibility of translating some German particles into English and the need to resort to intonation or visual emphasis to convey the sense (127-128).

Recall the Islamic grammarian's notion of particles as having meaning in reference, or in relation, to other words. Note, too, the sort of language Denniston's *The Greek Particles* uses concerning the apodotic particles: "In both its varieties, the apodotic use

---

observed by an objective agent, not with the inner life of a human and the justifiability of an instance of rule-following, which is, in his view, is Wittgenstein's interest. Thus, by Kripke's lights, what is sought is, not a "straight" account that rejects the premise of the paradox and establishes that a person will be disposed to act in a certain way in a situation (perhaps because of communal influence and the capacity to think probabilistically or normatively) but a justification (a truth-condition that can be pointed to in the world) for asserting that one ought to behave in a certain way in that situation. What is sought is not a pragmatic description, but truth. A "straight" solution to the paradox, then, would involve rejecting coherence of what is being sought, of not accepting that the normative power of a rule, which dictates that one should do one thing even if one should be disposed to do another, is an illusion produced by the psychological force of habit and communal pressure, that private convictions can be true. In contrast, the skeptical solution accepts the validity of the skeptical paradox: "What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases" (§201). This would mean that rules are not known or obeyed privately and that the functions of language are socially constructed and should, consequently, be understood in a pragmatic sense. Again, to this skeptical solution a critic might reply that such a response shows a disregard for truth, failing to address a legitimate and important question by closing oneself off to inquiry about a whole region of human experience, and that, when the internal life is admitted as evidence, certain aspects of what is understood by the term "rule," such as, for example, the private conviction that addition refers to a specific function whose meaning extends to numbers whose size exceeds anything that could be implemented in practice by any machine whose program embodied the function, prove to betrayed by such a definition. To such a "straight" solution, Kripke's Wittgenstein would reply that there is no condition, even in the internal world, that can be pointed to that can overcome the skeptical argument; conviction is not enough: "[I]t is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it" (§202).

[16] Indeed, Dorrough categorizes "the" among his primary syncategoremata (287); cf. Guillaume 263; Barth *passim*.

[17] I also (3) just think it's fun – forgive me, Gentle Reader – to reference this example as a gesture to all the ink that has been spilled by Jehovah's Witness apologists and opponents since, as someone who grew up in that religion and then learned to read Greek, I have spent a rather absurd amount of time – ah, my misspent teens and early twenties! – reading discussions of the function of the article and its absence in Greek, particularly with regard to John 1:1.

possesses a structural function in the architecture of the sentence, serving to stress or clarify the relation between clauses" (xli). Likewise, about corresponsive particles, Denniston observes, "Coherence of thought is adequately secured by the presence of a backward-pointing particle. The reader or listener, when he has reached a certain point, meets a particle which looks back to the road he has traversed, and beckons him on in a certain direction. But greater coherence is attained if in addition a forward-pointing particle warns him in advance what path he will soon have to travel, the connexion being expressed reciprocally, from rear to van and from van to rear" (xli-xlii). Clearly, structure and relation are fundamental aspects of the function of particles. We see here the great degree of nuance, sophistication, and logical delicacy the particle afforded the Greek speaker. What other speakers could only communicate, if at all, by means of imprecise theatrical gestures and alterations of vocal qualities, or by lengthening their statement to explicitly announce the relation, the Greek could signal with two particles. This relational function of particles may help to account for the difficulties observed in translation and the need to use pragmatic methods. Although words like nouns and verbs are often felt to have specific, stable, even ridged senses, the other words that are used to modulate and organize them display far less consistency. The absence of a connective particle is known as asyndeton, and it, too, can have a strong effect on a listener who is accustomed to a language, like Greek, that is rich in such particles. Denniston explains one feeling asyndeton can produce in a Greek listener: "Stylistic, as distinct from formal, asyndeton is used, sparingly by some writers, freely by others, for emotional effect: the impression given is that the speaker's or writer's feelings are too deeply engaged to allow him to trouble about logical coherence" (xlv). The absence of a particle requires the reader or listener to supply her own interpretation of the logical relation between semantic elements. And this case of their absence makes the relational function of particles more evident; the presence of particles tends to produce language (and perhaps discourse communities) that values logical coherence. (Perhaps it is not a historical accident that Greeks and Germans played such prominent roles in the development of logical philosophy, but I raise this idea reluctantly and reservedly.[18])

Quine explicitly links the categories of particles and syncategorematic expressions in his *Philosophy of Logic*. He states, "The distinction is this: the words classed in the categories comprise the lexicon, whereas the words or signs that are not thus classified but are handled only as parts of specific constructions are the particles" (26-27); he goes on to list certain particles represented in symbolic logic, and then he asserts, "The distinction between lexicon and particles is yet more venerable in the West than in the East. It is identifiable with the Scholastic distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words" (27). Thus, Quine supports the identification of particles and syncategorematic terms. Indeed, William of Sherwood's *Treatise on Syncategorematic Words* discusses those Latin words that roughly correspond to the sorts of logical operators mentioned by Quine (e.g., *omnis* ("every," "all"), *dictiones numerales* ("number words"), *non* ("not"), *necessario*

[18] The use of typographical expedients to render the force of particles is discussed in more detail elsewhere, but, in the context of the development of typography and logic, Heim cites provocative studies by Ong that concern "the connection between the ascendancy of typography and the inauguration of modern logic" (63); likewise, "Havelock's thesis on Plato posits the connection between philosophical abstraction and the growing capacity to pull back from immediate language usage in order to grasp more general and formalized meanings" (*ibid.*; cf. the quote by Marshall McLuhan, qtd. in Riley 70; and compare, of course, the discussion of systems of representation in the chapter to which this appendix bears primary reference).

("necessarily"), *si* ("if"), etc. (Kretzmann)).[19] Having established the logical function of particles, perhaps it will come as some surprise to learn that their function is often to convey sentiment and emotion. Greek particles are divided by Denniston into two primary categories: modes of thought and moods of emotion, which I find quite suggestive of the different possible worlds a text may move between and among. Even the former category may contain words too semantically contaminated to satisfy strict logicians, although we have seen that the class of syncategorematic terms does embrace the accepted logical operators; however, the latter category would surely meet with the criticism of logicians such as Frege as being meaningless with regard to the question of a proposition's truth-value:

> An indicative sentence often contains, as well as a thought and the assertion, a third component over which the assertion does not extend. This is often said to act on the feelings, the mood of the hearer or to arouse his imagination. Words like "alas" and "thank God" belong here. Such constituents of sentences are more noticeably prominent in poetry, but are seldom wholly absent from prose. They occur more rarely in mathematical, physical, or chemical than in historical expositions. What are called the humanities are more closely connected with poetry and are therefore less scientific than the exact sciences which are drier the more exact they are, for exact science is directed toward truth and only truth. (39)

In the first part of the above passage, Frege singles out for consideration the category of words known as "exclamatory particles." Informal Chinese is especially rich in these, and they function, like emoticons, to express a wide variety of emotional states and rhetorical intentions. He then argues for a very limited notion of truth, one which has no room for such particles expressive of the affective life. And note how he connects their use to poetry. (This denial of the role of feeling and affect in cognition, which is profoundly embodied, has happily been overcome be recent developments in cognitive science, as discussed elsewhere throughout this work.)

Similarly, but in a positive light, Denniston's observes, "[T]he particles may be compared to the marks of expression in a musical score, which suggest interpretation rather than dictate it. To carry the analogy further, a page of Thucydides bears somewhat the same relation to a page of Plato as a page of Bach to a page of Beethoven" (xxxix). Indeed, Denniston goes on to state that the study of particles' "stylistic features and their distribution over the field of Greek literature, taking into account the distinctions which spring from differences of period, differences of genre, and the individual preferences of various writers," not only aids readers' appreciation for "the colour of various styles," but also reveals characteristics so distinctive that they can even assist the philologist "in establishing the text of a passage, and […] in determining, within broad limits, the date and authorship of a work" (lxi). Frege recognizes the pragmatic utility of such language: "Much of language serves the purpose of aiding the hearer's understanding, for instance the stressing of part of a sentence by accentuation or word-order [….] The word 'but' differs from 'and' in that with it one intimates that what follows is in contrast with what would be expected from what

[19] For another interesting discussion of the Medieval use of "categorematic" and "syncategorematic," see the chapter on infinities and infinitesimals in Zellini (pp. 66-76). Categorematic infinities were thought to be practically or potentially "infinite" in a qualified, kindred way, while syncategorematic infinities were pure abstractions.

preceded it" (39). This relation does not seem to be void of content. Rather, it emphasizes the need to think about meaning on more than an atomic, word-by-word scale. When one ceases to be concerned with words' having fixed, isolated, *dictionary-prescribed* senses, one is free to consider their meanings as they emerge in larger contexts of discourse and entwined meaning (cf. Wallace, 2001, who would identify the political, worldview-based assumptions being made here).

A poor philosophy of language leads to pedagogical difficulties, which ripple throughout culture, politics, entertainment, family life, and so on. O'Dowd, in her work *Prepositions and Particles in English: A Discourse-functional Account*, connects pedagogical deficiencies in textbooks to the pragmatic sort of picture of language discussed above: "I propose that grammar textbooks have never satisfactorily addressed such questions because they have always treated prepositions and particles as 'fixed' elements within a static model of grammar. They take little account of how P's meanings can vary, depending on its interaction with other elements in the same utterance, or on its use in different communicative contexts" (7). In harmony with this statement, Winn's article, "Visual Information Processing: A Pragmatic Approach to the 'Imagery Question,'" points out that different modes of thought seem appropriate to different information-processing and learning tasks. In some cases, information is encoded as a percept (a thought that has strong sensory-spatial associations); in other cases, as a verbal sequence, or as a logical proposition. The use of different mental processes seems to have much more to do with the pragmatic nature of a specific mental activity (e.g., whether it requires detailed work with the constituents of the world as it is or more work with more general abstractions). There seems to be no justification for disregarding the sensuous, holistic, embodied nature of percepts as being less true than, as Frege says, "drier" propositions; if truth is valued, the percept's trait of immediacy, what one might call (with some awareness of its infidelity to the Stoic attitude toward the passions) its cataleptic force, should be respected. Again, a theme of this work has been the inescapably embodied, affective character of cognition, especially in its modal and moody modalities.

The above has focused on particles and syncategorematic words as exemplary instances of the poetic. However, there are related phenomena. The importance of word order, the sequence in which ideas are made to impact on a reader or listener,[20] especially in inflected languages that do not grammaticalize word order to bear a heavy syntactic function, has been stressed by some translators (e.g., Rotherham 16; Wilson 8).[21] Rotherham, in his introduction to *Rotherham's Emphasized Bible*, states, "Idiom alone would have been utterly inadequate to the attainment of the object in view. In many instances the endaeavour to preserve in English the order of the words in the original would have resulted in obscurity" (11). Another feature of inflected languages whose verbs contain the subject is the ability, which Rotherham rightly links to the force of repetition, to use also, for emphatic purposes, an independent pronoun. How could a translator attempt to reproduce these effects if his target language were to lack "equivalent" features? "It follows that either numerous tokens of stress contained in the sacred tongues must have been lost [in translation], or else artificial means were necessary to give them effect" (Rotherham 12).

[20] This includes not only the sequence of words in an individual sentence, but also larger sequences and orderings—e.g., the conceptual parallelism that emerges as one reads Hebrew poetry, the order in which arguments or narrative events are presented, etc.
[21] See n. 17.

And, in fact, the "artificial means" to which Rotherham resorted are the same means commonly used by all writers to improve the clarity of their communication. One has perhaps heard that in ancient times manuscripts lacked punctuation. Thus, at various times in the histories of the print traditions, punctuation was introduced. The common signs familiar to readers of English are some examples. Instead of the brief and long pauses one might use to divide thought units like clauses and sentences in spoken language, marks like the comma and period are supplied. Other signs are encountered more rarely, such as § and ¶. These signs, like the marks of interrogation, exclamation, etc., signal linguistic phenomena that are sometimes explicitly announced in spoken language. In ancient Hebrew, for example, that a series of sentences were part of a continuous narrative would be signaled by a phenomenon called the *waw*-consequtive.[22] Similarly, with respect to paragraph division, Denniston makes a suggestive comment about the "progressive sense" of certain Greek particles: "In this progressive sense particles mark something of a new departure in the march of thought. They convey an effect approximating to that produced by paragraphing, though not usually denoting quite so strong a break" (xlviii). Tools of written communication such as paragraph division have intensified the clarity and vigor of language's semantic functions.[23] So too online publishing, by means of its markup language and other audio-visual features, has improved on the logical, rhetorical, and poetical functions of oral communication's particles and written communication's signs and spaces.

The ancient Greeks' fondness for logical expression has already been mentioned. By means of the art of rhetoric, they sought to instruct their sons (the sorry treatment of their daughters is now infamous) in the art of effective communication. Interestingly, as stressed by a scholar named Debra Hawhee, rhetoric devoted extended consideration to the *physicality* of speech: bodily gestures, facial expressions, vocal rhythm, volume, pausing, and repetition. In this work, I have also stressed its em*placed*, as well as embodied, character (especially in relation to the canon of memory (*memoria*)). Although a prominent part of the art of rhetoric, Hawhee observes that "the canon of delivery has been most neglected in modern eras, simply because of the prevalence of logic in rhetorical training" (Arroyo 25). But focusing on the canon of delivery (*pronuntiatio*) helps one to recall that reason is acquired through *activity* in the world; "[F]rom this spatial intermingling of practices there emerged a curious syncretism between athletics and rhetoric, a particular crossover in pedagogical practices and learning styles that contributed to the development of rhetoric as a *bodily art*: an art learned, practiced and performed by and with the body as well as the mind" (Hawhee, qtd. in Arroyo 25).

There is a tendency in the consideration of online composition and communication to set up a strict definition of HTML as performing solely a logical function: "Originally, HTML tags were designed wholly for logical data display: the heading <h1> is larger than <h2> to signify relative importance and nesting, not to give the letters a nice fat 16-point

[22] Because of this feature of the Hebrew language, something comparable to asyndeton can occur when *waw* is **not** used: "Owing to the extraordinary facility with which the consecution of facts and thoughts can be carried forward by the peg-letter *waw*, it follows that when more formal and precise connecting particles are employed, some emphasis can generally be felt" (Rotherham 16).

[23] For example, some claim URIs and URNs seem to satisfy Kripke's picture of unique proper names more perfectly than any natural language (but see Hayes and Halpin, "In Defense of Ambiguity," and Halpin, "Sense and Reference on the Web"), and the ostensive or demonstrative role of URLs is in many respects superior to that found in ordinary oral and written communication—though a broken link well illustrates a potential inferiority.

Times New Roman look" (Burgess 174). If the effectiveness, efficiency, and power of communication are enhanced through the involvement of the senses, this sharp division seems artificial and counterproductive. Its conceptual foundation seems clear enough: "These guides [to HTML composition] assume the superiority of defining objects over providing visual direction, thereby recreating the split found in literate culture that values print over the pictorial" (Arroyo 23). To reiterate, "logic" is set up in contrast to physical appearance and sensory experience: "Appearance and concern with how something looks are commonly viewed as shallow and non-intellectual. Accordingly, most HTML instructional guides caution against using  , because the tag does not provide any hints about semantic meaning [….] We will see   set up in direct opposition to its logical counterpart,  " (Arroyo 22). The physical ground of thought and communication is ignored by such guides; as Arroyo states, "What is missing is the visual or physical element necessary for human interaction to be successful" (30). Burgess compares HTML tags to *pecia*, or printers marks, that instructed printers in the reconstruction of a text from divided text units (Burgess 169, 171), but his evidence contradicts his philosophical bias in favor of HTML's purely logical function. The printers marks had to do with the *physical* arrangement and ordering of the text, and this bore an important relation to the text's semantic content.

Online communication – wherein people compose identities, market them, generate alternative selves and worlds, and consume and transform the worlds and selves of others, among other things – is an integrated whole, in which markup language's elements and identificatory tags (as well as things like emoticons and audio-visual content) function to improve on the logical, rhetorical, and poetical functions of communication through the use of the senses. Like particles, markup language sets up relations between online entities and communicates both modes of thought and moods of emotion. Its function, like that of the particles it resembles, is best understood when one adopts a pragmatic approach. As Denniston states, "The more I study the Greek particles, and the Greek language as a whole, the more I feel that the ultimate decision in each case rests with the instinctive judgement: an English prejudice, perhaps, but one I cannot rid myself of" (vi). This aspect of poetic language, although it does not coddle readers, demanding of them a holistic approach to interpretation that takes large units of text and the full range of the senses into account, thus communicates with great sophistication. Mythopoeic language communicates *real* aspects of the lived world of experience. As J.R.R. Tolkien's poem, "Mythopoeia," argues, a simplified account of the world, such as we find in early Wittgenstein's "picture theory," betrays life and the world. Indeed, even as early as the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein guesses as much (6.52; 6.522).

## III. The Reality of Myth and History as Story

The central question above might be framed as follows: What degree of reality can one attribute to fictional or logical symbols of objects or beings or operators? This question may initially strike one as a trivial linguistic game. Obviously, one might say, fictional characters and places do not exist. They are not *real*. If someone seems to talk about fiction as if it is real, she is either crazy or using some sort of shorthand to communicate the fact that the story exists as a record on a shelf, was produced by someone, and may even generate behavioral changes in someone who watches, reads, or listens to it—yet, Bilbo Baggins never played his game of riddles in the dark with Gollum. Luke Skywalker never

used the Force to fire the shot that destroyed the Death Star. The prophet Jonah never lived for three days inside an aquatic beast. It is not reasonable to expect people to believe in such things. And yet, while reading *The Hobbit*, watching *Star Wars*, or attending to a sermon from *Jonah* on judgment, humiliation, and mercy, we are *moved*. We *feel*. Our behavior may change after we watch *Star Wars*, but this is because an internal change has been effected. The events are *real to us* because, as it is said, "disbelief" is suspended. However, surely the barrier between fiction and reality is something more robust than simple disbelief. The figure of Jonah is suggestive, for there are some who regard his life, not as fiction, but as history. And by means of his case I would also interrogate history. In what sense are its objects real?

The past is gone, but, as Ricoeur notes, something of it persists in the present in traces, in memory. What is memory? History – whatever it is – is far more than the bare, uninterpreted traces themselves. History-as-past moves beyond, or rather before, the traces, and history-as-record attempts to restore, reconstruct, and refigure the past that *was*. Because fiction and history resemble each other so closely,[24] an analysis of the nature of the reality of the fictional may also serve as a defense of the reality of the historical, and an appreciation of the fictionality of history may help one both develop a more nuanced, critical understanding of historiography and appreciate the allomythic creation of new histories, myths, homes, and selves.

"Was" above suggests that what concerns me here is *ontology*, the study of being. Ontology possesses two primary senses,[25] oriented toward two very different modes of existence, two different modes of knowledge.[26] I am reminded of Ricoeur's "Preface to Bultmann," which focuses on disclosing three senses of "demythologization" operative in Bultmann, the first two of which are of particular relevance to my present question. In the process of demythologization, first the ancient and erroneous ontology that has been disproved by the advance of science is eliminated. That is, ontology can mean simply the material entities and the relations obtaining among them that are investigated by scientific inquiry. The mythic ontology was an inaccurate factual account of the nature of things. The second level of demythologization is, really, a mythologization, in that it involves a reinscription of the mythical on phenomenal life. Mythic "factual" events are analogically connected to human experience; they are given an existential significance. I shall discuss the

[24] For one example among many, Nietzsche refers to history in its monumental sense as "fiction" (p. 15; cf. p. 29).

[25] See Appendices W2.2 and W2.3.

[26] Even von Humbolt distinguishes between two dimensions in history: the raw events and their inner truth or causal nexus, the latter of which can only be known through humanistic intuition (5-7), and both von Ranke and von Humbolt recognize that history is a human construction, a work of art, that possesses an inner essence. Following Hegel, they both (although von Ranke more explicitly so) find God at the heart of things. One might say, quite roughly, that God is replaced in phenomenological thinkers by human experience and by the play of power in thinkers like Nietzsche and Foucault. With regard to genealogical thinkers like Foucault, one freely admits that history, as an inquiry, is motivated by a will-to-truth. The fact that historical discourse is constructed, with motives and strategic relations of power, does not mean it is unreal or that its referents are unreal. Rather, as in the sciences, a realism that presumes a God's-eye point of view must give way to a skeptical-pragmatic perspectivism.

analogical relation at more length below, but first I shall briefly return to the category of "myth" because Ricoeur regards it as a category of indistinction between fiction and history.

Barthes argues that all things can become aspects of myth by being transferred into speech (109), and that all mythic speech possesses a "historical foundation" because it "is a type of speech chosen by history" (110). Myth, however, is not ordinary language. Barthes calls it a *metalanguage* "because it is a second language, in which one speaks about the first" (115). Again, he states that "the signifier can be looked at, in myth, from two points of view: as the final term of the linguistic system, or as the first term of the mythical system" (Barthes 117). This means that, as Barthes notes, the units of myth are different from those of ordinary language; they are not necessarily words and could, rather, be entire books (120). Indeed, myth swallows up everything and attempts to become a totalizing system. In Barthes' language, whereas poetic speech attempts to constitute itself as the essentialization of phenomenal, subjective experience, myth *naturalizes* or *factualizes* itself as the objective description of reality (cf. 129-134). In Ricoeur's formulation, myth mingles both physical ontology and phenomenal ontology, returning to a state before they were distinguished. He states,

The split between these two narrative modes [that is, between epic and historiography] has already occurred when our analysis begins. Mythic time takes us back before this split, to a point in the problematic of time where it still embraces the totality of what we designate as, on the one hand, the world and, on the other hand, human experience [….] We rediscover mythic time at the origin of the constraints that preside over the constituting of every calendar [….] Indeed, it is through the mediation of ritual that mythic time is revealed to be the common root of world time and human time. Through its periodicity, a ritual expresses a time whose rhythms are broader than those of ordinary action. By punctuating action in this way, it sets ordinary time and each brief human life within a broader time. (Ricoeur 105)

Ricoeur is in this passage deeply evocative of Eliade and related thinkers like Lévi-Strauss. The calendar's starting point is founded on an event of phenomenological significance, a time of mythic or legendary importance. From this point, time is divided into regular intervals, largely based on celestial events, but the periodicity of the liturgical calendar, of course, would be an example of calendrical time becoming infused with and sacramentalized by mythic narrative.[27] Thus, the calendar mingles the phenomenological and the physical, and locus of this mingling is mythic. Eliade argues that when one engages in ritual activity, one returns to mythic time, the eternal realm. Put differently, one inhabits Heidegger's they-self, and the anxieties of individuality and history fall away; we participate in the eternity of Saussure's *langue*, of Plato's forms. Although Ricoeur is careful to distinguish between myth and fiction, he observes that fiction can, like myth, swallow everything up into itself. Fiction "because it remains fiction even when it projects and depicts experience" can restore the unitary condition of myth (Ricoeur 137). Indeed, fiction even allows us to explore the limit-experiences of phenomenology, death and eternity (cf. Ricoeur 141). In sum, "myth, which we wished to set outside our field of investigation, has, in spite of us, made two appearances: once at the outset of our investigation of historical time, in connection with calendar time, and a second time here at the end of our investigation of the time of fiction"

[27] On the civil-religious liturgical calendar of the United States, which is so widely influential due to mass culture, see, for example, Albanese.

(Ricoeur 138). Ricoeur's discussion of mythic time, with its imprecision and fluidity, is very much like the situation White seems to claim is always the case.

Unlike Ricoeur and Barthes, who more carefully distinguish between two modes of being, two ontologies, White argues that, although authors of history and fiction write about different events, their forms, aims, and techniques are the same: "There are many histories that could pass for novels, and many novels that could pass for histories" (121). He explains his reasoning concerning their shared "aims" as follows:

Both wish to provide a verbal image of "reality." The novelist may present his notion of this reality indirectly, that is to say, by figurative techniques, rather than directly, which is to say, by registering a series of propositions which are supposed to correspond point by point to some extra-textual domain of occurrence or happening, as the historian claims to do; but the image of reality which the novelist thus constructs is meant to correspond in its general outline to some domain of human experience which is no less "real" than that referred to by the historian. (White 122)

White asserts that both history and fiction must meet criteria of correspondence to reality (which includes human experience) and coherence (either logical or aesthetic). Thus, by expanding his notion of reality to embrace the complete domain of human experience and by expanding "coherence" to include the aesthetic, White seeks to assert that the referents of both forms of discourse are equally "real" and that there are alternatives to logical coherence. The claim that both kinds of literature refer to the same reality seems manifestly false. The realm of history exists continuous with our own present; severed from the causal chain of history, the realm of fiction subsists in a different manner—these possible worlds even permit logically incoherent objects to roam the wilds of their Meinongian jungles.

Interestingly, White's discussion of "how this notion of the opposition of history to fiction arose and why it has remained unchallenged in Western thought for so long" returns one to the subject of myth (122). White explains that before the French Revolution history was considered a form of rhetoric and availed itself all the poetic techniques of rhetoric; however, "the nineteenth-century historian's aim was to expunge every hint of the fictive, or merely imaginable, from his discourse, to eschew the techniques of the poet and orator, and to forego what were regarded as the intuitive procedures of the maker of fictions in his apprehension of reality" (123). What caused this change in perspective? According to White, "Both the political Right and the political Left blamed mythic thinking for the excesses and failures of the Revolution" (124). Eliminating the dangerous mythic mode of thinking came to mean eliminating the fictive, especially from all scholarly domains of inquiry and discourse. Due to what White regards as a failure to perceive the "distinction between myth and fiction" (124) nineteenth-century historians labored in a period of intense cognitive dissonance, composing histories whose forms and techniques reflected all the diversity of the fictional literature of the period while being convinced that what they were doing had nothing to do with fiction. But, of course, "the historians must utilize precisely the same tropological strategies, the same modalities of representing relationships in words, that the poet or novelist uses" (White 125). It is true that the techniques and forms of the historian are also those of the fiction writer, and that both types of writers bring their own perspectives to their tasks is incontestable. White states concerning language, "It appears that Stalin was right when he opined that language belonged neither to the superstructure nor

the base of cultural praxis, but was, in some unspecified way, prior to both" (125), and language is "neither a free creation of human consciousness nor merely a product of environmental forces acting on the psyche, but rather the instrument of medication [sic] between the consciousness and the world that consciousness inhabits" (126). These comments also seem to be relatively incontestable.

However, does the fact that the elements and relations found in linguistic systems, as well as the laws that determine their usage, occupy the curious ontological status of all information, namely, of being both the stuff of individual "consciousness" and the quantifiable stuff of the determinate world of empirical science and human activity, mean that all uses of language are of the same sort? Pragmatically, yes and no. Inasmuch as language is both an instrument whose purposes are determined by its users and, as White, Gadamer, and others observe from a different perspective, the very material of which its "users" and their world consist, it is everything. Our minds are real, and they bestow their reality on whatever they read. But perspectivism also shows that White obliterates a distinction—namely, the distinction between the two ontologies with which we began—that is quite useful. As an instrument, language can be used for different purposes in different contexts to work with different aspects of reality. The second level of demythologization in Bultmann that Ricoeur identifies, which is really mythologization, might remind us of White as well as of the pagan allegorical interpretations of myth that Ricoeur contrasts so sharply with the Christian use of allegory (Ricoeur 51). Myth uses physical description to communicate existential meaning relating to the phenomenological concerns of "the foundation and the limit" of human life (Ricoeur 60-61; cf. 70 ff.). White aids us by stressing the similarities between fiction and history and, in particular, by raising the subject of rhetoric, but Gadamer and Ricoeur are more useful because they attend more carefully to distinctions.

Gadamer argues that the linguistic turn in philosophy is due to its attempt to resolve the relation between the objective ontology of science and the phenomenal ontology of ordinary experience. His basic premise seems to be that philosophy is performing a mediatory role between language, which he regards as "the fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the constitution of the world" (Gadamer 3), and "the pronouncements of the sciences, which are fixed in nonverbal signs" (Gadamer 3). It is true that the mathematical signs used in the sciences are alienated from normal human discourse and communicate only in third-person, objective terms. Gadamer claims that by turning to language philosophy attempts to bridge the gap, to translate between the two ontologies. Science is successful due to its exclusion of many aspects of subjective human life, but it needs to be reconnected, rehumanized.

The division so far described between the two kinds of ontology relates not only to history, but also to human consciousness. Insofar as history is founded, as Ricoeur states, on the "traces" of the past, the little remnants of what was, and yet, as the narrative by means of which communities possess collective identities, constitutes the modality of being which is most intimately real and most closely resembles individual identity, it is worth reflecting on the degree to which individual consciousness is also built on a humble foundation. If we conceive of the world in terms of information, our senses are awash in a sea of data. Of these data, however, only those at our particular granularity of existence have any chance of stimulating the few senses we have evolved within their ranges of sensitivity. Our senses

themselves, in turn, only deliver a modest amount of information to the brain for processing.[28] Our "reality" is only experienced inside our heads, made from our humble sensory input and our active probabilistic construction of a world-model therefrom. Therefore, the hard problem of consciousness, the question of how first-person subjective knowledge of being-as is related to third-person objective knowledge of being, is intimately related to the problem of history. Indeed, Ricoeur, drawing on White, points out that the various types of metaphor are comparable to different levels of consciousness (154).

Fiction has a present-oriented constraint, namely, that of being faithful to the phenomenal experience the author wishes to express (cf. Ricoeur 177). However, history's constraint is perhaps more serious. Whereas fiction is free from the obligation to "reinscribe lived time upon cosmic time" and can thus explore "the resources of phenomenological time that are left unexploited or are inhibited by historical narrative" (Ricoeur 128), history has a different calling: "Unlike novels, historians' constructions do aim at being *re*constructions of the past. Through documents and their critical examination of documents,[29] historians are subject to what once was. They owe a debt to the past, a debt of recognition to the dead, that makes them insolvent debtors" (Ricoeur 142-143; cf. 152, 156). Thus, history is constrained by the past and its reverent orientation to the dead that leads it to unite cosmic time and phenomenological time. This debt is impossible to repay, not only because the dead no longer exist to be paid, but also because the dead and their world has passed away and all that remains is traces. Abbott makes a similar point though in a far less ethical register. To overcome this gap, Ricoeur argues that the relation between history and reality is a metaphorical one, being-as: "Between a narrative and a course of events, there is not a relation of reproduction, reduplication, or equivalence but a metaphorical relation. The reader is pointed toward the sort of figure that likens the narrated events to a narrative form that our culture has made us familiar with" (153-154). In the analogous, the being-as, we have the magical contact between the past and the present, Gadamer's "encounter" (cf. 6-7).

Heidegger's thinking regarding the meaning of the "world" may help clarify Ricoeur's point above, namely, that he is addressing an ontological question: the *reality* of fiction, of myth points to the linguistic and narratological aspects of the construction of the self-and-world models humans inhabit, of being-in-the-world. Languages and cultures, Heidegger would say, in a manner recalling one of Durkheim's key insights, are received as "gifts" by means of which existence is made intelligible, by means of which humans are able to be as Dasein and in whom Being may thereby unfold. In other words, they supply plausibility structures through (and – I would emphasize – sometimes against) which the sense-making activity characteristic of human life – the "taking-as" – may take place.

In the context of the above discussion of history, one might briefly and preemptively move to correct against the potential *tyranny* of myth and history. Here one might invoke Frazer's ideal – though his own cultural chauvinism is hard to ignore – of the magician god-king:

---

[28] To be precise, the visual cortex receives about 20 kilobytes/second, and the other sensory modalities receive, in total, another 10 kilobytes/second. For the purpose of comparison, an old dial-up modem transmitted 56 kilobytes/second. However, of the 30 kilobytes/second of information delivered to the brain for processing, only a small fraction informs actual conscious awareness, which operates at its peak at about 100 bytes/second.
[29] Cf. von Ranke.

For after all there is more liberty in the best sense—liberty to think our own thoughts and to fashion our own destinies—under the most absolute despotism, the most grinding tyranny, than under the apparent freedom of savage life, where the individual's lot is cast from the cradle to the grave in the iron mould of hereditary custom. (cite)

Frazer's claims are no doubt exaggerations, but his key point, namely, that the hereditary custom of a (relatively isolated) culture can be tyrannical and that the introduction of novelty – in this case through the agency of a magician god-king – may be liberatory, is strikingly similar to Nietzschean thinking regarding the Overman that Heidegger so decisively takes up and inverts in his idea of "a god" who alone can save.

The fact that myth and fiction are real – and that history as a story is thus also real and of vital importance – does not mean that one is bound to submit to them. Consider Heidegger's conservative notion of Dasein's obligation, if it would live authentically, to resolutely take up its historicality and "historicize"; that is, one should neither fall into simply, unthinkingly doing what "one" does, but neither should one attempt to reject one's cultural-historical heritage and embrace mysterious "alien" worlds. Rather, Heidegger thinks one should resolutely take up one's inherited culture as one's own. Indeed, his Augustinian logic becomes quite apparent here: one becomes free by submitting one's self, not to God, as in Augustine, but to the divine heritage of one's (and really, here, the academic language of "one" is inappropriate since Heidegger's belief in Germany's special spiritual calling is central and the major factor in his promotion of Nazism) culture and language, with its potential heroic ideals. This cultural-historical ontotheology produces a deterministic anthropology. Thus, Heidegger's "poetic" dwelling, which is meant as an alternative to the unthinking dissipation and inauthenticity of calculative modernity, proves to be a nostalgic going-back to a world that, though quite comfortable for a white, straight man, for many was no home. Allomythoi may operate in the N-mode, which is similar to historicizing, and they may, in the defense of an explicit or implicit home-world, function in the O-mode of opposition. But they also reflect and satisfy people's desire to find and dwell in new worlds.

Works Cited


Abraham, Werner., eds. *Discourse Particles: Descriptive And Theoretical Investigations On The Logical, Syntactic, And Pragmatic Properties Of Discourse Particles In German.* Amsterdam : J. Benjamins Pub. Co., 1991.

Arroyo, Sarah J. ": Exploring Rhetorical Convergences in Transmedia Writing."

Dilger, Bradley J.Rice, Jeff., eds. *From A To <A>: Keywords Of Markup*. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2010.

Barth, E. M. *The Logic Of The Articles In Traditional Philosophy: A Contribution To The Study Of Conceptual Structures*. Dordrecht : D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1974.

Bloemen, Johan. "Syncategorematic Words." *Linguistic Inquiry*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Autumn, 1982): 681-682.

Carstairs, A. "Syncategorematic Words." *Linguistic Inquiry* 2 (1971): 107-110.

Denniston, J. D. *The Greek Particles*. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1966.

Dorrough, D. C. "A Note on Primary and Secondary Syncategoremata." *Foundations of Language*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May, 1969): 285-288.

Frege, Gottlob. "On Sense and Nominatum." *The Philosophy of Language*. Ed. Martinich, Aloysius. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Frege, Gottlob. "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry." *The Philosophy of Language*. Ed. Martinich, Aloysius. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Goldenberg, Gideon. "Subject and Predicate in Arab Grammatical Tradition." Ba'labakkī, Ramzī., eds. *The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition*. Aldershot : Ashgate/Variorum, 2007.

Guillaume, Jean-Patrick. "'Speech Consists Entirely of Noun, Verb and Particle': Elaboration and Discussion of the Theory of Parts of Speech in the Arabic Grammatical Tradition." Ba'labakkī, Ramzī., eds. *The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition*. Aldershot : Ashgate/Variorum, 2007.

Halpin, Harry. "Sense and Reference on the Web." *Minds & Machines* (2011) 21:153–178

Hayes, Patrick J. and Harry Halpin. "In Defense of Ambiguity." *International Journal on Semantic Web & Information Systems*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April-June, 2008): 1-18.

Heim, Michael. *Electric Language: A Philosophical Study Of Word Processing*. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1999.

Hempel, Carl G. "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes." *The Philosophy of Language*. Ed. Martinich, Aloysius. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Shirwood, William,Kretzmann, Norman.*William Of Sherwood's Treatise On Syncategorematic Words*. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1968.

Kripke, Saul A.. *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Kripke, Saul A. *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Langslow, D. R. "Latin Discourse Particles, 'Medical Latin' and 'Classical Latin.'" *Mnemosyne*, Fourth Series, Vol. 53, Fasc. 5 (Oct., 2000): 537-560.

Lepley, Ray. *The Language of Value*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957.

Neto, José Borges. "Syncategorematic Words Again." *Linguistic Inquiry*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter, 1985): 151-152.

O'Dowd, Elizabeth M. *Prepositions And Particles In English: A Discourse-functional Account*. New York : Oxford University Press, 1998.
Owens, Jonathan. “The Syntactic Basis of Arabic Word Classification.” Ba‘labakkī, Ramzī., eds. *The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition*. Aldershot : Ashgate/Variorum, 2007.
Quine, W. V. *Philosophy of Logic*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986.
Quine, W.V.. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” *The Philosophy of Language*. Ed. Martinich, Aloysius. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Quine, W.V.. “Translation and Meaning.” *The Philosophy of Language*. Ed. Martinich, Aloysius. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Riley, Brendan. “A Style Guide to the Secrets of <style>.” Dilger, Bradley J.Rice, Jeff., eds. *From A To <A>: Keywords Of Markup*. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2010
Rotherham, Joseph Bryant,eds. *The Emphasized Bible: A Translation Designed To Set Forth The Exact Meaning, The Proper Terminology And The Graphic Style Of The Sacred Original*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel Publications, 1959.
Russell, Bertrand. “Mr. Strawson on Referring.” *The Philosophy of Language*. Ed. Martinich, Aloysius. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Sampson, G. "Good." *Linguistic Inquiry* 1 (1970): 257-260.
Stede, Manfred and Birte Schmitz. “Discourse Particles and Discourse Functions.” *Machine Translation*, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, Spoken Language Translation (2000): 125-147.
Tatar, Maria M.. *The Hard Facts of the Grimms' Fairy Tales*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987.
Thomasson, Amie L. “If We Postulated Fictional Objects, What Would They Be?” *Fiction and Metaphysics*. Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Wilson, Benjamin. *The Emphatic Diaglott: Containing the Original Greek Text of What Is Commonly Styled the New Testament, (according to the Recension of Dr. J.j. Griesbach) with an Interlineary Word for Word English Translation; a New Emphatic Version, Based on the Interlineary Translation, on the Renderings of Eminent Critics, and on the Various Readings of the Vatican Manuscript, No. 1209 in the Vatican Library; Together with Illustrative and Explanatory Footnotes, and a Copious Selection of References; to the Whole of Which Is Added a Valuable Alphabetical Appendix*. Brooklyn, N.Y: International Bible Students Association; Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1942.
Winn, William. “Visual Information Processing: A Pragmatic Approach to the ‘Imagery Question.’” *Educational Communication and Technology*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer, 1980): 120-133.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*. Trans. C. K. Ogden. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1999.

## Appendix 39: Two Tensions – Realism/Fictionality and Generality/Particularity

In thinking about allomythoi (and avoiding explicitly identifying allomythoi in fantastika as new "myths"), I try to hold two primary tensions in productive balance, of which the categories of history and myth are suggestive of the first. The first tension is that between *realism* and *fictionality*. In the camp of realism, one might locate genres such as history and "literature," in the sense of the realist novel; in the realm of the more obviously non-mimetic and fictional, one finds "myth" as generally understood and contemporary genres like fantasy, science fiction, and horror, which, as noted above, Clute (2011) has referred to with the umbrella term, "fantastika." One may note, as Saler (2011) does, that an important feature of contemporary works of fantastika is the combination of the realist methods of literature and history (cf. Mark J.P. Wolf's (2012) discussion of the use of paratexts in *Building Imaginary Worlds*) with extrapolative or supernatural matter.

The second contrasting categories that I would focus on are *generality* and *particularity*. That is, in speaking about the mythic, is there a panhuman, diachronically valid sense in which the creative world- and worldview-making found in contemporary fantastika and the mythmaking of traditional societies may be referred to by the same general term? I think so. But it's worth noting that focus on particularity would involve a synchronic focus on this era and attention to the constructed, power-inflected character of categories like "myth" and "religion." I attempt to address the generality/particularity issue in part through the BQ/BP distinction in Chapter One vs. Chapter Three.

I would destabilize any easy realist assumption, rooted in a Romantic metaphysics of presence, that a historical narrative gives one unmediated access to the really real. History is made; it is constructed. And it performs a vital function in forming collective identity. However, myth (and more broadly, fiction) and history are often contrasted in terms of one being untethered from an ontic referent while the other bears such a reference (sometimes, this is framed in terms of *muthos* vs. *logos*). I do not want to reject utterly the realist (some would say positivist) goals of those who investigate history, but I would, again, with historiographical theorists like Hayden White, stress the necessarily narrativized, emplotted character of history. This understanding of history goes hand-in-hand with an "ideological" analysis, a hermeneutic of suspicion that sees narratives that make claims to historicity as being shaped by values, interests, and perspectives (that is, they are applications of power under the application of power).

## Appendix 40: Myth, a Category of Continuity or Rupture?

One might think of Laura Feldt's (2012) application of fantasy theory to narratives in the Hebrew Bible.[1] She finds in fantastic elements in biblical narratives sites of disorientation, disruption, and interpretive possibility. As discussed above, allomythoi may provide new, livable histories that challenge established, normative narratives (compare theoretical works like Rosemary Jackson's (1981), *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion*). More broadly, one might draw on works like Eric Gould's (1981) *Mythical Intentions in Modern Literature*, which introduces the term "mythicity" to describe, in very Heideggerian terms, "the condition of filling the gap with signs in such a way that Being continues to conceal Nothing as a predication for further knowledge" (p. 43).[2] Fictions, one might say, make the world intelligible and to some degree controllable, but simultaneously conceal its mystery (compare Blumenberg, 1985, pp. 5-6). One might think of the recent popular works by Yuval Harari, particularly his (2011/2014) *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind*, and think of something like Gould's "mythicity" as referring to the fundamental human capacity for fiction that has so decisively shaped our evolution (cf. Fuentes, 2017; Brower, 2013). The capacity for fiction is neither inherently critical nor necessarily unthinking, and it is certainly not unique to this era.

If, unlike thinkers like Feldt, one favors a theory of rupture, rather than continuity, in which, in its simplest form, "myth" is what ancients did and what unthinking moderns fall into, in contrast to our hard-won enlightened, critical modes of thought, one follows the line of thinking laid out in critical works like Horkheimer and Adorno's (1944) *Dialectic of Enlightenment*,[3] Roland Barthes's (1957) *Mythologies*, Frank Kermode's (1967) *The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction*, and so on, all of which follow a long tradition of critical thinking. The elegant twist of many such critics is to note that even the enlightened, secular, disenchanted subject remains enchanted and lost in his or her own myth or ideology. As an example of this critique, consider von Hendy's summary of Derrida's concept of "white mythology":

> Metaphysics is not only "anemic" or pale mythology; it is also the mythology of the white Eurocentric male: "the white man takes his own mythology . . .

---

[1] This scholarly move is conditioned on and reflects a broader shift in contemporary culture. Nelson (2012) states,

> These days the material of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures (not to mention the apocryphal gospels, which are proving a bountiful resource for the new Gothick) has now become what Greek and Roman mythology was for Western culture through the eighteenth century: a compelling imaginal system of the distant past to be refashioned to the mythic needs of the present day. Or, simply put, more great superhero story lines to riff on. (p. 242)

Popular TV shows like *Supernatural* illustrate the ease with which artists appropriate and the public enjoys the Bible as myth.

[2] Cf. nothing and romantic and mystical notions of the "night."

[3] As suggested by the word "dialectic" in the title, Horkheimer and Adorno do not simply understand premodernity and modernity as contrasting: enchanted and disenchanted, mythic and rational. As Saler states, "Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947) indicts Western modernity as a globalizing enchantment whose reliance on instrumental reason abolishes individuality, distorts human nature, and represses autonomy. Modernity becomes a self-legitimizing force that trumps its own capacity for self-criticism" (2012, p. 11).

> for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason" (213). And metaphysics is a "white" mythology in yet a third, deprivative sense; its basis in myth, no longer recognized, works covertly. It is written in invisible ink. "White mythology—metaphysics—has erased within itself the fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest" (213). This sequence itself manifests the faded trace of a history; first the mythology of metaphysics is bleached out, then naturalized, then rendered invisible, the more effectively to carry out its "active and stirring" role in the grounding of Western "rationality." (2002, pp. 299-300)

This tradition of contemporary ideological critique, which is quite complicated, is evident in Russell McCutcheon's (2001, pp. 94, 202; cf. 1998) understanding (derived most immediately from Barthes and elsewhere contextually synonymous with "romantization") of "mythification" and Darko Suvin's (1979) contrast between true SF and lesser, mystificatory works of fantasy, popular "sci-fi," and myth. The contrasting (or "binary," as Saler (2012) puts it) approach is closely related to the more critical "dialectical" approach, which involves a more nuanced understanding of how contrasting categories arise (including how they are used for purposes of domination—colonialist, capitalist, etc.) but still maintains the binary. An interesting case of this way of thinking, in the context of a discussion of how "myth" might be defined, is Hazard Adams's (1983) *The Philosophy of the Literary Symbolic*, which uses the term "myth" to refer to the fundamental mythopoeic capacity for fiction-making[4] and "antimyth" to refer to its dogmatic or metaphysical ossification (cf. Blumenberg, 1979/1985). Attempts to use "myth" as part of a scheme of periodization run against, if nothing else, the problem of a huge diversity of such schemes and resulting terminological confusion, and it runs the risk of implying that ancients were not critical of their received stories. Hence, my adoption of a problem-based approach. Enchantment-and-disenchantment, premodernity-modernity-postmodernity, and so on are not stable processes or categories, but are ongoing contested questions.

[4] In James Burton's (2015) *The Philosophy of Science Fiction: Henri Bergson and the Fabulations of Philip K. Dick*, Burton uses to Bergson's concept of "fabulation"—the open-ended human capacity fashion and treat as actual the non-actual—to interpret central Gnostic themes in Dick such as his simultaneous hope for the possibility of salvation in the power of fiction and worries about technology and the instrumentalization of people (cf. Simkins, 2016; Dunst and Schlensag, 2015; Gregory, 2015; McKee, 2004).

## Appendix 41: Dominant Narratives of Fantastika

Most contemporary accounts of the emergence of fantastika participate in the same Romantic tradition that has so heavily influenced accounts of myth and religion (see Hanegraaff, 2012, especially his fourth chapter). I note elsewhere that Kripal's may be the most confident expression of the conviction that fantastical stories are re-enchanting the world, moving (in a kind of Hegelian evolution) from a premodern, narrow, naïve "religion" (though even in ancient times contested by "gnostic" responses) to a modern, critical, Feuerbachian "reason" to a postmodern, global "gnosis" (Kripal, 2006, pp. 61-85). Likewise, his Eranos-esque understanding of religious studies and mythography (together with an implicit historiography) may be characterized as deeply Romantic, very much in sympathy with experiences and perspectives that have long been derided by self-identified intellectuals as pagan, enthusiastic, superstitious, foolish, or insane, though with a critical awareness lacking in figures like Eliade. Kripal finds the gnosis of an Esalen-style "religion of no religion" exemplified in the (mystical) practice of comparative religion, in which resides the hope for global, cosmopolitan unity and renaissance and for human transcendence:

> [N]ot so long ago, intelligent and pragmatic people could hope for a global worldview and even a global spirituality to emerge. It is worth remembering. It is worthwhile resisting the cynicism that comes from knowing that cosmopolitan hopes were at their highest during the colonial era. But however unwelcome the contact (unwelcome, often, on both sides), colonialism brought divergent cultures into intimate relationships whose results were not wholly or finally negative [….] The positive results tended to be scholarly and to center on religion, not surprisingly of a distinctly mystical or heretical sort. In 1950, the postcolonial turning point, Raymond Schwab argued that the human venture had been ennobled and transformed during an Oriental Renaissance (1680–1880) when scholars labored diligently, if imperfectly, at the project of translation and religious interpretation [….] Schwab locates the beginnings of this "conversion" in the mid-eighteenth century and observes how its rise and development coincided not just with colonialism but also Romanticism. (Kripal, 2006, pp. 91-92)

Kripal resists the "cynicism" of only focusing on how the technology of translation and the practice of comparative religion was deployed in the service of unwelcome colonialist interests seeking mastery through knowledge and representation. Instead, he would stress how the resulting Oriental Renaissance – and later efforts of comparative religion like his – empowered some people on both sides of the information transfer and inspired mystical and romantic worldviews. The global spirituality for which Kripal hopes is one of the "perennialist" variety, involving the defeat of dogmatic assertions of ultimate truth (of either the religious fundamentalist or reductivistic materialist kinds) but, within a postmodern, pragmatic context of all knowledge being contingent and constructed, giving access to real mystical contact with the sacred core (though of a distinctly amoral kind) of all religions: future human divinity. However qualified, critical, pragmatist, and humanist, it is this claim of contact with the real transcendent through the mythic language of speculative fiction and the practice of comparative religion that makes Kripal the most robust representative of the dominant narratives of fantastika relative to "religion" and other worldviews. He is

admirably aware of the deep cognitive links between the entrancement of fiction, the dissociative states dismissed as madness, and the supernormal experiences deemed religious or mystical, but he, again in a quite Romantic spirit, insists on the reality of the phenomenon at the heart of these varied expressions, well representing Taves's (1999) mediating "chain of interpretation" of unusual experiences. His position is a minority one within the context of the religious studies discipline, which (with the exception of the cognitive science of religion) tends to resist comparison and claims to panhuman unity (Kripal willingly draws on psychology and cognitive science, interpreting them as part of the mystical project) and (here even cognitive and psychological approaches to religion tend part ways with Kripal) intentional evaluative advocacy of a particular kind of worldview (i.e., Kripal's global, pragmatic, mystical spirituality of the future).

The idea that a particular language (e.g., Hebrew in some Christian speculations about the original language, Heidegger's notion of Greek) or kind of language (esp. mythic) might give one access to real, primordial Truth and Being is a familiar Romantic concept (n.b. the Romantic "symbol" and its function relative to the imagination; cf. Kripal on the empirical/symbolic: 2014, pp. 245, 251; 2017, p. 236). It is well illustrated by the central concept of *Snow Crash*, by Neal Stephenson (1992),[1] which creatively blends the notion of an ur-language (in this case, Sumerian, likely selected because it is a language isolate), the myth of the Tower of Babel, and the concept of a physical and digital "virus." The quest for access to the pure language (code) of reality is, in this case, part of a plot for mastery over humanity, and, as in Vico (and unlike, say, Rousseau), departure from the literal language of myth enables human progress and liberty.

In *The Secret Life of Puppets* (2001) and *Gothicka* (2012), Victoria Nelson makes an argument very similar to Kripal's, asserting a middle way between what she regards as the two competing worldviews of the West: a Platonism that asserts the reality of the transcendent (which she identifies with *gnosis*) and a materialist Aristotelianism (*episteme*). She starts her narrative in the Renaissance, focusing, as I would also, on its combinatory character:

> The most intellectually exciting and innovative times in our culture have been just these rare periods when the two worldviews overlapped in open conflict and neither was dominant. The Renaissance itself, when the Platonic worldview coexisted with the Aristotelian, is a prime example. From our current Aristotelian mode, we assume that the extraordinary vitality of that period was the result of the gradual displacement of religious "superstition" by the rise of rationality and the scientific method. It might equally be seen as the result of the dynamism of the two points of view vying with each other, contesting territories. (2001, p. 289)

Elsewhere, she argues against Todorov's definition of the fantastic and response to the uncanny, arguing that it lies, not in a hesitation between accessing something as either having a natural or supernatural explanation, but in a simultaneous *comprehension* of both worldviews (Nelson, 2001, p.p. 172-3); such borderlands situations of "contesting territories" do promote creative, combinatory activity. But because she works so hard to recover the "secret" or lost Neoplatonic worldview in popular culture, she overcompensates in the opposite direction. That said, given the Western-white-heteropatriarchal frame through which SF and religion are typically known, as a critical intervention there is a strong

[1] For a fine critique of Stephenson's allomythos, see Rorty, 1998.

intersectional feminist virtue to Nelson's subversion of SF by representing it as the expression of a repressed longing for the transcendent and the divinization of the material world, and there is a lot of merit to her assertion that "Whereas religion up to the Renaissance provided the content for most high visual art and literature, art and entertainment in our secular era have provided both the content for new religions and the moral framework for those who practice no religion at all" (2001, p. vii).

In Nelson's follow-up work, *Gothicka: Vampire Heroes, Human Gods, and the New Supernatural*, she describes Gothick as "showing signs of outgrowing" the "unbalanced worldview" of "dark supernaturalism" she traced in *The Secret Life of Puppets* while still "serving as a vehicle for developing the frameworks of new religious movements" (2012, pp. xi, xii). She confidently states,

> The most striking characteristic of the new Gothick's spiritual framework is what René Girard calls "the metamorphosis of the maleficent into the beneficent," in which antagonist-villains (vampires, werewolves, assorted demons and imps of hell) have become protagonist-heroes who struggle with their darkness even as they incarnate on earth as gods. (Nelson, 2012, p. 8)

Though they came out after the publication of her work, the *Maleficent* movies (2014, 2019), in which the classic Disney villain of *Sleeping Beauty* (1959) is both humanized and deified, well illustrate her thesis.

Clute (2011) claims that "the birth of the genres of the fantastic – they include Gothic, horror, sf, fantasy, supernatural fiction – is intimately connected with the becoming visible of the engine of history, round about 1800, when the future began" (p. 3). Like Nelson, he regards fantastika as "a profoundly anxious literature" that both represented and "allayed the fears" and the "hysterias endemic to a world changing, as it seemed, ungovernably" (Clute, 2011, p. 4; cf. Kripal, 2017, p. 237). But Clute further regards fantastika, as it has grown in cultural influence and impact, as capable of governing the global, in a weakened but still potent sense of "shaping, in the mind's eye, which is all that counts, the planet itself" (Clute, 2011, p. 5). Elsewhere, giving a slightly different date for fantastika's emergence, Clute describes "fantastika as the necessary form of planetary fiction since 1750" (2011, p. 19). It is easy to see in Clute's theory a strong identification with the same Romanticism that so strongly shapes the interpretations of many theorists of "myth" and "religion" – and, too, theorists of the fantastic in the tradition of Tolkien. Clute asserts that

> After [about 1700], in English literature – please forgive my sticking to what I know – a fault line was drawn between mimetic work, which accorded with the rational Enlightenment values then beginning to dominate, and the great cauldron of irrational myth and story, which we now claimed to have outgrown, and which was now deemed primarily suitable for children [….] Before the end of the eighteenth century, stories begin to surface that […] *consciously* subvert the ordered world above; that contradict the closed mundanity of the work produced during the Apollonian Ascendancy. (2011, pp. 20-21)

Clute aligns fantastika with the childish, the irrational, the mythic—and, in particular, with confronting the terror and confusion of what he calls the "world storm":

> Many of the great fantasy writers of the last century were shaped by the experience of World War One; the attitude of J R R Tolkien to the world

> storm of his time is anguish and anger; he and other great fantasy writers of the third and fourth decades of the last century turn away from the world to shame it. (Clute, 2011, p. 25)

Above, I already pointed to research on how Tolkien's Neo-Romantic worldmaking was influenced by Wagner's. Though he started making his storyworld shortly before reading William Blake's prophetic works (see Scull and Hammond, 2006, pp. 107-108; cf. Helms, 1974, pp. 57-59, 69-72; Evans, 1972, pp. 25-26, 45-46), Tolkien's mythopoeic activity also seems to have drawn on his Romanic vision as an influence. And Tolkien's subsequently decisive influence – immediately, in the founding of the contemporary fantasy genre, but also on the way other fantastical stories (e.g., SF, horror, and so on) are constructed – occurred in another combinatory period, the 1960s-1970s, in which America witnessed an explosion of interest in fantastical stories in various media (novels, comics, films, TV, games) and of new "real world" worldviews and ways of life due, in large part, to changed immigration laws and technologies of transferal, both of information and of actual people. Johan Roeland, Stef Aupers and Dick Houtman (2012), in "Fantasy, Conspiracy and the Romantic Legacy: Max Weber and the Spirit of Contemporary Popular Culture," argue as follows:

> The counterculture of the 1960s and the 1970s was in many respects akin to Romanticism, since it shared its critical stance against the disruptive aspects of modernisation, as well as its nostalgic longing for an idealised past and its utopian dreams of a better future (Campbell 2007; Doorman 2004). There were, however, many differences as well. The counterculture, in the first place, was not the product of a relatively small elite of artists, intellectuals and philosophers, as was the case with Romanticism, but a cultural movement that had broad public support among educated middle-class young people. The counterculture was, in other words, a mass manifestation of Romanticism, as Daniel Bell rightly observed (1996). Secondly, the counterculture of the 1960s and the 1970s contained, much more evidently than eighteenth and nineteenth century Romanticism, an explicit, theoretical-sociological articulated criticism with respect to modern society. (p. 404)

Countercultural hippies responded to the anomie, alienation, and homelessness of modernity, in their view, with a critical rejection of "reality" and a retreat into fantastical storyworlds. This is not to say that fantastika is necessarily critical – specific allomythoi can be quite conservative or opposed to the non-normative. But it does suggest that the subgenres of fantastika arose in a condition of hybridity,[2] the blending of the larger cultural currents and perspectives and the pluralization of life-worlds designated by terms like Romanticism, Enlightenment, Nationalism, "Religion" (i.e., normative Protestant "Christianity"), and so on.

Saler (2012), too, identifies contemporary fantastika (he simply calls it "fantasy," which for him includes SF and any form of supernatural fiction) with the rise of New Romance:

> ["New Romance" …] developed in Anglo-American literature during the fin-de-siècle as a direct response to the discourse of disenchantment. In the

[2] Along these lines, Luckhurst (2005) defines science fiction as an inherently *hybrid* genre marked by sensitivity to the connections of what he calls "Mechanism" (the technoscience that in his view constitutes the dominant characteristic of modernity) to cultural history.

> illustrated pages of the New Romance, readers found the wonders and marvels that realist literature and scientific naturalism disavowed. Yet the New Romance did not disdain modern science and rationality, in contrast to Aestheticism, which was the New Romance's contemporary rival in the creation of autonomous worlds of the imagination. Instead, works of the New Romance frequently adopted the rhetorical modes of fact-based science, by including footnotes, maps, photographs, glossaries, and appendices. These were "spectacular texts," combining the tropes of fantasy with those of objectivity. The New Romance of the late nineteenth century became the wellspring for the subsequent marketing genres of science fiction, detective fiction, and fantasy fiction that appeared in the twentieth century. Contemporary critics who used the term New Romance perceived that the diverse works within this classification shared certain family resemblances. These included the combination of realism and romanticism, the creation of logically cohesive worlds intended to reconcile reason and enchantment, and a measure of self-reflexive irony about their truth claims. Robert Louis Stevenson's *Treasure Island*, H. Rider Haggard's *She*, and Bram Stoker's *Dracula* were clearly disparate works, yet all were understood to be New Romance. (pp. 14-15)

Saler regards the practice of turning fantasy worlds into lived, virtual realities as part of a Western project of re-enchantment within a consciously rationalist, secularized framework (Saler, 2012, pp. 6-7); like Nelson (cf. 2012, p. 10), he regards the resulting worldview as being a kind of enlightened return to "animism."[3] The resulting "double consciousness" or "ironic imagination" is a hybrid of wonder and reason, a sort of Enlightened-Romanticism (cf. Owen, 2004). This again accords well with Nelson's perspective, which implicitly invokes the impressive influence of Anne Rice's Romantic, Catholic, homoerotic sensibility of deep-nature as redeemed-and-redeeming:

> *In the Gothick subgenres of the twenty-first century, as we will see, the dark sublime's antithesis— the beautiful— begins to surface, uniting Gothick and Romantic traditions as this hybrid sensibility continues to morph to meet the changing consciousness of our culture.* These key new tributaries of the twenty-first-century Gothick no longer promote supernaturalism as an evil and imaginary dimension outside ordinary human existence, but rather (in the words of Alan Ball, creator of the HBO vampire series *True Blood*) consider it to be "deep nature," integral to our daily lives in the way it was (or we believe it was) in premodern Europe. This trend toward a kind of normative supernaturalism in the Gothick mutually reinforces an equally subliminal activity of new religion building in its contemporary subgenres. "Religion building" is a fancy assertion to make about popular entertainments, but here I follow William James's simple definition of religion as "belief in the reality of an unseen order." And I argue, along with Philip K. Dick, that particularly when the divine has been exiled from the table of serious art and intellectual discussion for well over a century, you have to look for it in what elite culture thinks of as the trash. (emphasis mine, 2012, pp. 17-18)

[3] Compare the turn to "New Materialism."

This hybrid consciousness is present in low and high cultural productions. James Joyce's work, say, may serve as an easy, familiar example of a mythmaker who clearly demonstrates the qualities of reflexivity, intertextuality, and irony so characteristic of postmodern mythopoeic worldmaking and worldview (see Gould, 1981; cf. Campbell, 1968; Von Hendy, 2002, pp. 149 ff.; Carlson, 2001). However, returning again to the stress I would place on continuity, the ironic imagination is cultivated in any combinatory situation of cultural borderlands. In his review of Saler's work, Brian Attebery states, "My own sense is that the ironic imagination has always been a part of the literature of the fantastic, including many branches of folk narrative. Ovid's treatment of the Greek myths is just as ironic as Doyle's treatment of scientific marvels, and a good bit more skeptical than Doyle's spiritualism and faith in fairies" (cite).

As I argued above, Saler also connects the enjoyment of fantasy fiction and the communal activity of fans with the need to make *new* homes and chosen communities:

> If modernity lent itself to deterritorialization, there was a corresponding recourse to new homelands of the imagination. Public spheres of the imagination belied the widely held notion that living in imaginary worlds was solipsistic, an antisocial flight from community. On the contrary: the turn to those worlds was often an act of fellowship, an involvement with and concern for others rather than mere escapism. (Saler, 2012, p. 18)

My own assessment of the phenomenon, which I shall now describe more precisely, is very much in agreement with Saler, including his caution regarding the dangers of essentialist thinking; one may also observe my strong sympathy with Nelson, who rightly stresses boundary crossing and combination while, by my lights, wanting too much to dwell in the essentialist way of seeing.

# Appendix 42: New Narratives and Narrative Forms in a Context of Mixture, Multimedia, and Money

> *It is almost fair and just to aver (although it is profanity) that nine-tenths of all the kindness and forbearance and Christian charity and generosity in the hearts of the American people today, got there by being filtered down from their fountain-head, the gospel of Christ, through dramas and tragedies and comedies on the stage, and through the despised novel and the Christmas story and through the thousand and one lessons, suggestions, and narratives of generous deeds that stir the pulses, and exalt and augment the nobility of the nation day by day from the teeming columns of ten thousand newspapers, and NOT from the drowsy pulpit!* Mark Twain, in a contribution to *The Galaxy* (Twain, 1961, p. )

The notion of the as-if (e.g., the fictionalism of thinkers from Vaihinger to Saler) and the mode/mood of the subjunctive (Turner, Asiedu, Taylor) has been invoked as a unique characteristic of this age. I have argued against its being unique to our era, but I do not deny its being a prominent characteristic in contemporary life and thinking (it's a Big Problem (BP)). I would argue that the being-as manner and method of composition (Ricoeur) that so well suits the as-if mode and mood of knowing found especially in fantastika has generated a universe of fictional worlds containing allomythoi that people today may draw on for the self-composition of individual and collective identities. They thereby create a virtual reality, a livable alternative history[1] for themselves and metaleptically externalize and objectivate (Berger, Luckmann) or naturalize (Barthes) their allomythos – though often in a characteristically (post)modern ironic[2] (Saler), subjunctive (Turner), or ludic (Cusack) mode.

---

[1] For some great examples of and discussions of issues relative to virtual history in video games, see Matthew Wilhelm Kapell and Andrew B.R. Elliott's (2013) *Playing with the Past: Digital Games and the Simulation of History*.

[2] Discussing the function of "irony" as a mode of expression in Vico's stages of human history and consciousness, von Hendy states, "No term, however, not even 'myth' itself, was more radically transvalued by the Romantics and promoted to a position of central significance. Irony becomes not so much a trope of rhetoric as a world-view, the essence of which might be described as a self-conscious awareness of living in a divided or 'fallen' state of experience" (2002, p. 13). Irony, in Vico, is both a sign of falling away from ancient imaginative and (mute, hieroglyphic) expressive power and an achievement—gains in rationality and the capacity for falsehood enable civilization.

The celebration of irony in shows like *South Park* has continued promoting a worldview of irony – a consciousness of many worlds, of fiction, of lies – inviting a mood of ironic detachment from the claims made on one by norms and values, a general awareness of the constructedness or fictionality of such cultural norms, and, at the same time, a sometimes-apparent nostalgia for the immediacy, confidence, and "reality" presumably enjoyed in the past. However, irony need not result in either, on the one hand, cynicism and apathy ("everyone and everything is corrupt, lame, fallen, fake, post-truth"), uncritical self-satisfaction, or annoyed rejection of any earnest efforts for and belief in the possibility of positive change or, on the other, a reactionary, nostalgic clinging to an essentialist assurance of access to certain knowledge of the really-real. As Saler states,

> Max Weber mourned the disappearance of stable and shared meanings that allegedly distinguished the premodern, enchanted world, but that was to see modernity as half-empty. Rather than experiencing disenchantment from the loss of universal meanings, one could find a specifically modern enchantment arising from an outlook that embraced pluralistic,

In the previous appendix, I quoted Nelson as writing, "Whereas religion up to the Renaissance provided the content for most high visual art and literature, *art and entertainment in our secular era have provided both the content for new religions and the moral framework for those who practice no religion at all*" (2001, p. vii). If one grants the claim for a moment, how did art and entertainment acquire this power? The answer both destabilizes the religious-secular distinction Nelson assumes and helps clarify the emergence of a new system of expressive genres (including new media) and new WWLs. I shall focus on the distinctive way this process developed in the United States, which has been a hothouse for both New Religious Movements and entertainment (often of a quite profane variety) within a background of intense "religiosity," nationalism, and devotion to capitalism—that is, Americans support a variety of worldviews fervently and simultaneously while also actively consuming a constant stream of novel fictional worlds and allomythoi.

R. Laurence Moore, in *Selling God: American Religion in the Marketplace of Culture*, traces key foundational aspects of this development in America. When I first read his work, I found one of his most interesting claims to be that the formation of religious denominations and political parties emerged at the same time under the same market pressures in order to answer the modern need for identity (see, e.g., Moore, 1994, pp. 85, 87, 89), reflecting his comparative approach of explicitly not treating "religion" as "inherently different from any other system of belief" (ibid., p. 8). I was reminded of Benedict Anderson's argument in *Imagined Communities* that the novel, the newspaper, and other print media, by producing broad, broadly-homogenous, shared experiences, were conditions for the formation of national "imagined communities" – this is a very different way of seeing the Romantic notion of a people's Geist. A comparative approach that sees worldviews as interrelated and co-arising allows Moore to bring entertainment, religious expression, politics, and other cultural phenomena together productively to better understand how we now dwell in a world where Evangelical Christians can sanctify the corporate globalization of Wal-Mart (Moreton, 2009), together with its aisles of books, movies, and video games.

Moore states the following regarding "secularization":

> A major thesis of this book is that much of what we usually mean by speaking of secularization has to do not with the disappearance of religion but its commodification, the ways in which churches have grown by participation in the market, or more specifically how religious influences established themselves in the forms of commercial culture that emerged in the nineteenth century, turning the United States into a flowering Eden of leisure industries by the middle of the twentieth. This is [….] a study of religious influence in determining the taste of people who were learning to purchase "culture" as a means of self-improvement and relaxation. (ibid., p. 5)

---

> provisional, and contingent interpretations. As Marie-Laure Ryan noted, "If we live a 'virtual condition' . . . it is not because we are condemned to the fake but because we have learned to live, work, and play with the fluid, the open, the potential" [Ryan, 2001, p. 37]. (Saler, 2012, pp. 19-20)

Saler regards this kind of pragmatism as being promoted by fantastical texts and their collective enjoyment in shared imaginative spaces.

Moore's "commercial culture" reflects a transformation of cultural forms and productions specifically into objects of buying and selling in an increasingly indiscriminate ("democratic") mass market context, but Moore knows this was a matter of degree and not of kind: "religion" –insofar as Moore regards it as existing in a panhuman, transhistorical sense—has always been "marketed" in some sense. But in focusing on the American context, he sees religions as having transformed and adapted to modern, global capitalism, both before and after the First Amendment was enacted and then, even more so, when its legal interpretation and impact was gradually transformed after the Civil War.

Moore's narrative of adaptation is not one of a fall or apostasy: "After all, if religion is to be culturally central, it must learn to work with other things that are also central. Previously that might have been feudalism, kings, or Platonic philosophy. More recently it has been market capitalism responsive to consumers with spare time and a bit of money to spend" (ibid., p. 9). And in the early nineteenth century, American religious leaders were successful:

> Once [ministers] understood the challenge, many religious leaders decided to fight fire with fire. They entered the marketplace of reading culture with circumspection but with an eye toward opportunity. Religious societies founded specifically to spread the message of Christianity first demonstrated the possibilities of the new print technology, showing the way for profit-making applications. Ministers became authors, not only of devotional material with greater popular appeal but of books that competed directly with despised forms of fiction. In time they even wrote fiction. The sorts of experiments that ministers and their close allies launched varied by denomination. Unitarians and Methodists did different things. In sum, however, we may credit them with an influence upon popular taste that gave a religious and moral tone to many kinds of print material that did not emanate from the clerical camp or have its approval. In the first part of the nineteenth century, this was largely a Protestant achievement. Protestants solidified a new base for religious authority in the United State that depended heavily on market strategies. In so doing, they crucially affected the nature of commercial culture that came into being in the course of the nineteenth century (ibid., p. 17)

Drawing on an abundance of historical examples – such as Methodists' turning "their chaplains into colporteurs who aggressively sold tracts" (ibid., pp. 18-19) and joining the newspaper marketplace – Moore traces the development of a Protestant reading culture. Notably, Moore observes that these Protestants were at first reluctant to write fiction:

> In one important respect the Tract Society made no concession to popular taste. It refused to print fiction, frequently repeating the well-established Protestant view that fiction degraded morals. The reasons for this bias went beyond the common association of novels with sexually bawdy themes. What bothered religious writers more was the novel's frank departure from "truth," and the pleasure it gave to readers by appealing to the free play of their imagination. A fear of the imagination affected Protestant attitudes toward all forms of "art" well into the nineteenth century. Although most religious objections to "virtuous fiction" disappeared in the latter half of the nineteenth century, clerical opinion in the first half adjusted by stages. In the first stage

> it endorsed “true narratives” or “truthful tales.” [….] It is no small point to note that a "true tale" published as a moral warning to the young might include racy material that made many novels written at the same time seem tame by comparison. They were every bit as made-up, just more report-like in style. However, genuflecting to “truth” was essential, and the formula, if transparent, served a purpose. Religious moralists satisfied popular taste with stories that denounced fiction-reading, gave inexpert readers something almost as entertaining, and taught conventional moral messages. “True narratives” replaced dogmatic treatises and devotional books as the most popular form of religious publishing and one of the most popular forms of any sort of publishing in the first half of the nineteenth century. (ibid., p. 20; cf. p 24)

This cultivated appreciation of realism in a substantial portion of the reading market, even if the content were completely made-up, would have a huge impact on the development of literature in the American context. Eventually, certain kinds of fiction were permitted. Lurid, violent, sometimes almost pornographic depictions in Indian captivity stories and temperance stories, startling disclosures of Catholic, and later Mormon, depravity, vicarious sin tourism in sensationalized narratives about the wickedness of the Great City, all worked to cultivate Americans’ imaginative capacities and enflame their desire to consume more works of the same sort.

As ministers and moralists came to regard fiction as a potential tool and ally, opposition to the novel would eventually dissipate while opposition to “imagination” (i.e., to fantastika) would endure. As Saler puts it,

> From the late eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries, cultural constraints inhibited the transformation of fictional worlds into virtual worlds. During this period, the middle classes tended to view the imagination with ambivalence; overindulgence in fantasy eventuated in the squalid fate of *Madame Bovary* (1857), rather than the joyous liberation found within “The Secret Life of Walter Mitty” (1939). (2012, p. 6)

This bias against imagination but infatuation with reality and reason – with the exception of pious, horrified accounts of the demonic – helps account for why British authors, for example, at first produced most of the non-horrific Anglophone fantasy while Americans tended to express the fantastical through horrific and scientific lenses (compare Nelson, 2001, pp. 79-80).[3]

“Consumers are filled with religious fervor,” writes Debord, in Thesis 67 of *The Society of the Spectacle* (1967/1970),

> for the sovereign freedom of commodities whose use has become an end in itself. Waves of enthusiasm for particular products are propagated by all the communications media. A film sparks a fashion craze; a magazine publicizes night spots which in turn spin off different lines of products. The proliferation of faddish gadgets reflects the fact that as the mass of commodities becomes increasingly absurd, absurdity itself becomes a commodity. Trinkets such as key chains which come as free bonuses with the purchase of some luxury product, but which end up being traded back and forth as valued collectibles

[3] On the different developments in the United States and Britain, see also Luckhurst, 2005, especially pp. 123-124.

> in their own right, reflect a mystical self-abandonment to commodity transcendence.

The revivalist language is telling. In his second chapter, "The Spoken Word, Stage Performance, and the Profits of Religious Spectacle," Moore discusses how enthusiasm itself, in its religious sense, became a commodity. The multisensory carnivalesque experience of revivals, the play of characters and scenes in the morally reformed plays approved and endorsed by religious leaders, the edifying but entertaining lectures in the lyceum, and, later, the performances of mesmerists and spiritualists, all worked together to promote an American taste for novelty – often in the name of a return *ad fontes* that worked hard to remain unaware of its imaginative character – and, as Moore observes, a taste too for liminality:

> What critics of the revivals worried about, and they worried about it for a long time after behavior at camp meetings had settled down, was a prolonged period of what social scientists call "liminality." People are placed in a setting where they lose the bearings of normal everyday life. People return from liminal situations somehow changed. That is the purpose. From the standpoint of the opponents of revivalism, the changes were bad. […] [T]hey viewed the demand for spectacle as an addiction. Having tasted novelty, they wanted more of it. Revivals thus fed the psychology of consumption. (1994, pp. 48, 49)

This transformed how religious leaders engaged with their congregations and how "religion" itself came to be understood and evaluated, but at the same time it powerfully shaped the kinds of entertainment that enjoyed market success, with spillover effects into business and politics (see, e.g., ibid., p. 85). To signal virtue was to broadcast and build cultural, social, and economic capital. Over time, the ever-increasing "consumption" of and escape into entertainment and fictional worlds – worlds of signs and representations – has produced a new kind of economy. Csapo states,

> The emphasis in this new economy is not so much on things as on representations. To begin with, the utility of objects is much less important than the way they are advertised, marketed, and packaged. Vastly more effort is put into creating the right symbolic significance for products, wrapping them in "mythical" glamors, and manufacturing desire, than into developing the intrinsic merits, if any, of the widgets in question. The mass media and the bulk of the resources of postindustrial consumer capitalism are directed to representations whose connection with reality grows increasingly tenuous [….] Since the new economy is an economy driven by representations, and since the economic is the ultimate determinant of social reality – and in this case the base may be said to "generate its superstructure with a new kind of dynamic" (Jameson 1991:xxi) – representations (signs! myths!) have become the reality which they self-reflexively represent. They rehearse in this way the role of the ultimate reality of consumer capitalism, which is, of course, money, itself a mere representation of exchange value. And even money, which has admittedly been around for a long time, is growing more abstract as it grows more important: once precious metals, then paper (still promising emptily to "pay the bearer [gold] upon demand"), now money is itself "represented" by plastic or by mere blips on a computer screen. The goods being purchased are also frequently abstract and invisible, most

> notably in financial markets, where there is normally no interest in the actual goods being purchased, since these are themselves only symbols in an exchange in which money is used to purchase itself, much like signifiers which chase each other in an endless quest for signifieds in the ultimately self-referential economy of the postmodern-postindustrial sign. (Csapo, 2005, p. 286, 287)

Humanity's unique capacity for fiction seems to be building on itself more and more, becoming more virtual, simulated. But again, this situation arose not so long ago from a cultural order that demanded realism and rationality, sobriety and labor. This order, however, itself descended from people who anxiously placed an overcompensatory stress on rationality and purified religiousity after their supposed revival—i.e., the historical myth of recovering antiquity and early Christianity.

Back in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for religious leaders and their congregations to participate in play and leisure – and for entrepreneurs to market themselves to such populations – leisure and play had to be rationalized. Play had to become a duty and look very much like work, and entertainment remained under an imperative to edify. Again, the imagination was suspect, but reality – *nature* – was the handiwork of God, contemplation of which would naturally effect moral uplift. Among many others, Moore uses the example of Jedidiah Morse to illustrate the kind of solutions Protestant artists arrived at.

> Jedidiah Morse, was one of the most creative people in antebellum America. He, too, wrestled with the question of what to paint. Morse's vehement anti-Catholicism told him what he wanted to avoid. After visiting Italy, he condemned Catholicism as a "religion of the imagination. . . . Architecture, painting, sculpture, music have lent all the charm to enchant the senses and impose on the imagination by substituting for the solemn truths of God's word, which are addressed to the understanding, the fictions of poetry, and the delusion of feeling." Of course, it was impossible to separate painting from imagination. If Morse had totally rejected the possibly sublime effects of feeling and sensual enchantment, he would have stuck with telegraphs. Like all talented artists who ever traveled to Italy, he found himself awed by the Renaissance. He painted in the shadow of Raphael and of Michelangelo, men who had labored, gloriously, for the Catholic Church. Morse needed an intellectual formula to get by this uncomfortable but incontestable fact, an aesthetic theory that condemned the iconic painting of religious subjects but justified a religious meaning for the work of Protestant artists. Unlike his mentor, Morse was never comfortable with biblical subjects. For many American artists, the answer to the dilemma of what to paint lay in the American landscape.

In the landscape, which is obviously a material reality, Morse could ignore the richly imaginative and meaningful layers of signification involved in its representation. But resorting to the natural landscape was only one half of the equation. There is also a large body of scholarship on the technological sublime—American awe in response to things like the telegraph and railroads. David Walker, in *Railroading Religion: Mormons, Tourists, and the Corporate Spirit of the West* (2019), shows how corporate executives and religious leaders worked together to manufacture the sublime, religious experience – the fantastic voyage – of railroad tourism in Mormon country. Both artificial spaces like museums and

natural places like national parks can become "secular" or "religious" as needed, through the deployment of discursive practices, legal regulations, and other techniques. Catholics, Mormons, and other sorts of Others were the subject of entertaining, exoticized reports, and at the same time new scriptures, both translated and newly composed, circulated and influenced culture: "In nineteenth-century America, wide distribution of the new scriptures had the subliminally powerful effect of further underlining similarities between their story lines and those of popular fiction" (Nelson, 2012, p. 48).[4] And forms of tourism afforded opportunities for ludic participation in the stories they had read about. Walker describes how practices of reading and writing were promoted to tourists:

> The most popular books for sale along railroad routes in the Americas – not coincidentally also the ones railroads made most available – were railroad guides and travel narratives. Not only did this literature give travelers an opportunity to read about themselves and others like them reading, but it asked travelers to pay attention to specific objects, in the foreground of their voyage, attaching to them special significance and weaving around them certain narratives [….] (2019, p. )

Tourists were aided in making scrapbooks, diaries, and other personal narratives that made the sacred Mormon landscape their own, but the tools supplied "structured simultaneously against innovation by continually delimiting its bounds" (Walker, 2019, p. ). Similarly, today, pop and rock festivals help their attendees construct and contest sacred-secular spaces through texts like festival books (see Kommers and Hoondert, 2014). American Protestants had to rationalize play (e.g., masculine, muscular exercise to foster discipline) and moralize entertainment in order to distinguish and elevate it from the level of mere sensuousness, childishness, or, perhaps worse of all, Catholic enchantment. Other scholars of the emergence of mass culture, too, have traced the sacralization of art in elite spaces like museums and opera halls (e.g., Ohmann, 1996). But Moore favors examples like P. T. Barnum, who marketed his entertainments as wholesome, temperate, and moral while still inspiring wonder and satisfying the desire for endless novelty, to illustrate how artists and entertainers threaded the needle. All of this gradually made forms of entertainment and

---

[4] To this provocative statement, Nelson (2012, pp. 278-279, n. 9) appends an endnote that states,

> To find broad correspondences in antebellum fantastic literature—between Joseph Smith's *The Book of Mormon* (1830) and a work such as, say, Poe's *Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym* (1837)—would be a fascinating scholarly undertaking, something like David S. Reynolds's study of the influence of sensational fiction on "high" literature in his *Beneath the American Renaissance: The Subversive Imagination in the Age of Emerson and Melville* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). For an excellent discussion of Poe's esotericism, see Versluis [2001], *Esoteric Origins of the American Renaissance*, 72– 79.

Regarding the tourist industry in Mormon Utah, which was marketed as a kind of domestic Middle Eastern pilgrimage, Walker asks and speculates:

> What is to be made of an industry that promotes religious observation in the world and that maintains a space for religion – or for peculiar religion – precisely on the grounds of its manifold materiality and visibility? […] [O]one argument would be that […] by presenting Mormonism *in site* and *in stuff*, the tourist industry set up an 'Other' for many Americans, thus forging an opponent for the type of binaries necessary to sustain modernist ruptures from premodern things. (2019, p. )

One might, then, set up a story of continuity in the fantastical discourses of premodern and non-Western Others that sustained the narrative of rupture, superiority, and progress that justified colonialist, imperialist, and other modes of exploitation. For other models of using fantasy theory to analyze (contemporary, NRM) religious texts, see Feldt (2012) and the works she cites.

leisure acceptable products and practices and "religion" another commoditized product and way of spending one's free time. Lofton's (2011) *Oprah: The Gospel of an Icon* captures this new synthesis beautifully.

Similarly, the mass communication efforts of religious organizations like the American Bible and Tract societies (Catholics were also, of course, engaged in similar processes) promoted the development and shaped the nature of emerging global, mass communication and distribution networks (Moore, 1994, p. 76; compare ibid., pp. 220 ff.; Modern, 2011). Moore states,

> [Religion] developed marketing strategies, ways of advertising itself, and distribution networks. Methodist circuit riders by themselves invented forms of religious proselytizing that could be adapted to the selling of virtually any product. They were not alone in their innovative cleverness, not in a land of fierce denominational competition. Religious entrepreneurs made aggressive use of technological changes in the media that were later copied by businessmen and politicians. Religion's systematic and expansive complicity in mechanisms of market exchange is surely the most important aspect of the particular kind of secularization that has characterized the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (1994, p. 91)

New ways of life find – indeed, demand – new modes of expression, new genres. The new situations produced by the formation of vast networks of people, goods, and information necessarily generate novel typified rhetorical actions.

John Rieder's (2017) *Science Fiction and the Mass Cultural Genre System* begins with the observation that the classical-academic genre system (tragedy, comedy, satire, etc.; "literature") and the mass cultural genre system (detective, western, etc.) exist in a state of tension that extends into the way science fiction is understood. But "since SF takes shape within the milieu of mass culture, its generic form is 'determined' by mass culture insofar as generic form is itself the cumulative effect of economic and ideological pressures upon artistic production" (Rieder, 2017, p. 10). SF arose in a context of mass-marketed periodicals, many of which operated under pressure to inform, educate, and uplift young audiences to achieve technical and managerial careers. Gernsback, for example, reassuringly tries to describe science fiction as educational in a June 1929 issue of *Science Wonder Stories*: "Wise parents, too, let their children read this type of story, because they know that it keeps them abreast of the times, educates them, and supplants the vicious and debasing sex story" (*apud* Rieder, 2017, p. 89). The forces that secularized and democratized reading in general – producing the genre of the novel, for example – and, as discussed above, that legitimized entertainment and even construed religion as entertainment are important background conditions for the emergence of contemporary fantastika. Even before science fiction itself arose, Gothic and the marvelous romance developed out of conditions of mixture: "The marvelous romance performed this role [of challenging norms] more by providing a location for the mixing of generic codes than by establishing a strict formal paradigm. In fact, mixing genres rather than aiming at purity is one of the key elements of the Gothic challenge" to high culture and the literary academic genre system (ibid., p. 72).

In the case of science fiction, those texts that are judged to be sufficiently critical, literary, and sophisticated are deemed "SF" by academics and other experts and therefore regarded as worthy of cultivated readership and academic analysis—such texts are "canonized" (Rieder, 2018, pp. 60-61; cf. pp. 126-127), but mere "sci-fi" is mass cultural

junk food. Rieder points out that this difference in genre identification may be identified with what Todorov calls "theoretical genres" (formally defined by a theorist) in contrast to "historical genres" (collectively and anonymously agreed upon as part of ever-shifting historical processes). The historical approach to genre is more responsive to complexity and contingency. It does not identify genres as having specific origins, because genres are always intertextual and systemic. And the historical approach to genres helps illuminate neglected aspects of the mass cultural genre system of which the fantastical are a major component and SF a substantial subset. Just as Moore observed the way new genres like stories of Indian captivity and Catholic clerical depravity produced an appetite, a never-satisfied desire for more stories of the same kind, so too Rieder argues,

> That fiction should in the mass cultural milieu become both episodic and formally predictable fits very well with the part it was called upon to play as a "variety act" in the interstices between commercial ads. Insofar as the logic of encouraging habitual consumption, the raison d'être of advertising, guided editorial selection, it also influenced artistic practice. (2017, p. 49)

Within the mass cultural milieu, seriality and predictable regularity of form are encouraged.[5] Fans know what to expect and are often quite protective of genre boundaries, and these shared expectations become "worlds":

> [G]enres themselves, within the mass cultural milieu, attain a certain quasi-archetypal quality, so that "romance" or "the fairy tale" or "science fiction" come to operate as signifiers not so much of a category of fiction as of an imaginary realm, a domain of possibilities, a collective fantasy. Genres become worlds, not just in the sense John Frow ascribes to all genres—"a relatively bounded and schematic set of meanings, values, and affects, accompanied by a set of instructions for using them" (*Genre*, 85-86)—but also in a sense cognate with the utopianism of the commercial, an endemic otherworldliness that pervades mass cultural entertainment. (Rieder, 2017, p. 56)

But in response to the hegemonic, homogenizing norms of generic mass cultural worlds, Rieder notes that science fiction (and, one might add, contemporary fantastika more generally) has always been an international phenomenon full of subversive and diverse potentials. As special effects improved and became more affordable, the fantastical has become increasingly accessible for artists and accepted by the public. Its generic megatext has been and is being actively recoded by all sorts of resistant, counter-hegemonic subgroups, as in Afrofuturism and Indigenous futurism. Fantastical texts have been generated all over the globe and then transmitted along global networks—a multicultural stew surpassing the Hellenistic Mediterranean with its fantastical works ranging from the Greek novels to the *Dionysiaca* of Nonnus; Nelson asserts (2012, p. 197),

> Rule 3. *As a result of horror movie imports, the supernaturalism of other cultures has begun to reshape the classic Anglo-American Protestant Gothick.*
>
> Not just Asian folk and religious tradition but also the popular beliefs of non-Protestant-majority countries from Russia to Spain inform the new Gothick.

[5] On this, compare Nelson, 2001, pp. 133-134.

Corollary a: *Among the many reverse imports from the former colonies, perhaps the most notable is the supernatural female hero or antagonist who is immortal, undead, or monstrous.*

New fantastical worlds from cultures and subcultures around the world proliferate, rooted in an abundance of different situations and concerns, and these new worlds, in turn, constitute an enlarged potential milieu from which artists may fashion still other possible worlds.

I would conclude by commenting that a case can be made for the new genre system introducing primarily fantastical genres. Pushing against the trend to regard mystery or detective stories as examples of rationalist, disenchanted modernity, Saler (2022) includes that genre under the "re-enchanted" umbrella of the "fairy tale" or the "fantastic" and gives Sherlock Holmes his rightful place in the history of fantastika (2012; 2003). Westerns are clearly dominated by a romantic spirit, and of romance, see Chapter One, n. 36 and Appendix 20.

# Appendix 43: The Call to Canonization

The invention of Christianity may be fruitfully compared to contemporary "invented religions" (Cusack, 2010), such as Jediism, and their broader milieus and narrative expressions. And similarly the gradual development of the Christian canon through authoritative lists and the declarations of influential figures and groups within the early Christian communities might be compared to the recent controversy over the demotion of most Star Wars texts from canonical to mythic status (cf. McGrath, 2016, pp. 11 ff.), helping one reflect on how "myth" and "history" may and have transformed into each other as part of canon creation processes.

After the Star Wars universe was acquired from Lucasfilm by Disney, the vast storyworld whose continuity was monitored and maintained in the database known as the "Holocron" and expressed in numerous novels, comics, and other narrative expressions was declared noncanonical. First called the "Expanded Universe" and then "*Star Wars* Legends," what had been authoritative, "historical" narratives became something much more comparable to authorized fan fiction.

Let me provide a comparable example of demotion from canon to fiction from a relatively recent development in the theology of Jehovah's Witnesses. Scriptural interpretation has sometimes in the Christian tradition been divided into four classes, named the *quadriga* after the Roman chariot drawn by four horses abreast. These are (1) the *literal interpretation*, rooted in historical context and authorial intent, (2) the *tropological interpretation*, which refers to the moral, practical application, (3) the *allegorical* or *typological interpretation*, which might be explained in terms of Plato's Cave—the original *type* being a "shadow" fulfilled in the "reality" of the antitype (e.g., texts in the Hebrew Bible are considered by Christians to have been fulfilled in Jesus and the history of the Church), and (4) the *anagogical interpretation*, which discovers the mystical, transcendent significance of a biblical text (e.g., in the deity, the afterlife or afterworld, the prophetic future). Jehovah's Witnesses have in recent years shifted from being heavily engaged in typological interpretation and, to a lesser degree and in a distinctively-JW fashion tied to the "Faithful Slave" doctrine, anagogical interpretation to a focus on tropological interpretation (see "Questions from Readers," *The Watchtower—Study Edition*, March 2015).

Noted JW apologist, Rolf Furuli, who has long been interested in translation-theoretic issues (see Furuli, 1999), has registered strong disapproval of this turn and has rightly connected it both to a changed approach to translation as reflected in the latest (2013) revision of the Jehovah's Witnesses' Bible translation, the *New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures*, and to a broader shift in worldview, power distribution, and way of life in the Witness community (Furuli, 2020). Furuli observes that the new Bible translation shifts from being as literal and as nuanced as possible to being far more interpretive and idiomatic; in this, the Governing Body asserts their newly revealed power as the "Faithful Slave," the mediator, with God's active force[1] (i.e., the Holy Spirit), between Christians on earth and Jesus and Jehovah in heaven (see "Who Really Is the Faithful and Discreet Slave?" *The Watchtower—Study Edition*, July 2013).[2] In Furuli's book on translation (1999), he argues

[1] For example, see "Loyally Submitting to Theocratic Order" (Song 123) in *"Sing Out Joyfully" to Jehovah* (2013).

[2] Furuli objects to the Governing Body's increasing arrogation of power and exercise of legalistic control over members' lives (cf. Stafford, 2002), but he encourages Witnesses to remain in the religion and wait for change

that the previous edition of the *New World Translation* was to be admired because its literal approach left more interpretive decisions up to its readers, forcing but also enabling them to confront the temporally and culturally alien texts of the Bible as students. Furuli identifies this as part of a Bible Student and Jehovah's Witness culture of Bible study, especially evident in the early Bible Students and among Jehovah's Witnesses under N. H. Knorr's presidency (2020, pp. 215 ff.).

As the Witnesses have become an ever more global religion, they have repeatedly faced the challenge of translation, which as a communicative technology struggles with particularity and nuance. One solution is to simplify—throw out the challenging, hard-to-communicate details and focus on an identified core message. The shifts in JW way of life and worldview Furuli identifies (from Bible study to "meditation"; from complex, typological interpretation to associative, moral reflection; from monetary and interpretive authority residing with local congregations and elders – and the anointed as a class – to its investiture in the Governing Body and the Watchtower Society) may be partially explained as accommodations to contemporary pressures (cf. Furuli, 2020, pp. 324-325); other international corporations have, under the forces of globalization, similarly found it useful to consolidate power and resources and simplify their messaging and marketing tools.

In the context of this discussion of canon formation and demotion, Furuli's response to these changes is illuminating. As a 77-year-old man, who spent much of his life carefully studying and teaching the intricacies of JW hermeneutic methods and conclusions, his disappointment at the loss of so many meaningful texts is understandable. He writes as follows:

> According to the life histories of the present members of the GB, none of them know Greek, Hebrew, or Aramaic—no member of the GB can analyze a single verse in the Bible in its original language. But these persons claim to be more discreet than previous leaders. And now, they have discovered the *true* meaning of the text of the Bible, which has "the hallmark of divine teaching." This is something that none of the previous leaders, from C. T. Russell to N. H. Knorr, some being scholars knowing the Biblical languages, had discovered! There is a dramatic consequence of the new view of the Bible regarding types and antitypes: The books, *You May Survive Armageddon Into God's New World* (1955), dealing exclusively with types and antitypes, a part of *"Let Your Name Be Sanctified"* (1961), and a part of *"The Nations Shall Know That I Am Jehovah"—How?* (1971), and hundreds of articles in *The Watchtower* are just bogus—the prophetic applications are fiction. As a person who has been a part of this organization for 59 years, and who has an intimate knowledge of the Bible and its original text, it is impossible for me to accept this view. (2020, pp. 297-298)

In addition to turning beloved texts like *You May Survive Armageddon Into God's New World* into "fiction," Furuli argues that the shift in JW interpretive approach also leads to the "devaluation" of biblical texts like the *Song of Solomon* (Furuli, 2020, pp. 245-247), *Leviticus* (ibid., pp. 247-248), and others.

When I found out that Disney's acquisition of Lucasfilm meant that the huge number of *Star Wars* novels I had read over the years had been demoted from "canon" to "legend," I

---

(unlike Stafford, who has attempted to support JW's who continue to believe but who have trouble with the religion's hierarchical and authoritarian qualities by founding the "Christian Witnesses of Jah").

will admit to being angry. But it is interesting to reflect on the challenge Disney faced in making the most recent film trilogy, as well as other works like *The Mandalorian* series: if they wanted to make a new start, they had to throw out the complex history created by so many artists and thinkers who came before, but they also needed to maintain continuity with the tradition, the sense of heritage, that inspires such loyalty and energetic fandom.

When one reflects on the anachronistic way the concept of "canon" and even "scripture"[3] is projected onto the past as part of what might rightly be called the "intersubjective sedimentation" process whereby a worldview naturalizes or "objectivates" itself (Berger and Luckmann, 1991, p. 85 ff.; cf. Schmid, 1981, p. 68), one immediately confronts the fiction-history distinction, with myth as an intermediate grade. Power is a central factor in this process. But it is also a genre-theoretic issue. In fiction, a "canonical" text bears a relation to the storyworld universe comparable to the relation that obtains between a "historical" text and reality; in contrast, "fan fiction" often displays extravagant adaptability, reflecting fidelity to other concerns than storyworld continuity and, instead, responding to specific authorial concerns with rhetorical re-compositions that generate alternate-universe branching. Myth and history both participate in the intersubjective sedimentation process whereby their narratives constitute public memory, so the vexed question of "canon," which attempts to distinguish between the two, helps illuminate genre and power issues.

Regarding the canonical *Gospel of John*, C.S. Lewis drew on his genre experience to argue that the gospel possessed the undeniable flavor of history, in contrast to myth and romance (cf. Lewis, 1967, pp. 154–55):

> I have been reading poems, romances, vision-literature, legends, myths all my life. I know what they are like. I know that not one of them is like this. Of this text there are only two possible views. Either this is reportage—though it may no doubt contain errors—pretty close up to the facts; nearly as close as Boswell. Or else, some unknown writer in the second century, without known predecessors or successors, suddenly anticipated the whole technique of modern, novelistic, realistic narrative. If it is untrue, it must be narrative of that kind. The reader who doesn't see this has simply not learned to read. I would recommend him to read Auerbach.

Lewis's second, disdained possibility – that John anticipates the realist, historical novel – raises a variety of interesting questions relative to attempts to distinguish between myth and history and the process of canonization. The Christian Gospels are not in fact unique among ancient texts in possessing the qualities Lewis observes (see, e.g., Thomas, 2007), inviting productive comparisons between ancient and contemporary texts and contexts.[4] Saler (2012)

---

[3] Compare the pre-ecclesiastical Latin meaning of *scriptura* or the Greek of 2 Timothy 3:16, for example, to how it is almost universally translated in English—with the only exception, as far as I know, of *Young's Literal Translation*.

[4] With Auerbach, one might agree that the forms of 20th-century Western literature are extensions of Medieval vernacular combinations of high and low conventions and see this as a continuation of more ancient practices of situational creative re-combinations, as in the gradual formation of early Christian texts, Greek mythic narratives, and so on. Nelson draws on the work of Douglas Cowan to state, "The crowd searches, restlessly, for spiritual ideas that capture its imagination. In examining the way [horror] movies rewrite Christian theology and fabricate new versions, Douglas Cowan has noted that sacred narratives themselves adapted and mutated in much the same way [Cowan, 2008, p. 11]" (2012, p. 41; compare Baker, 2018). One might further note – in contrast to the reality of robust continuity – that the broad genre-worldview relational dichotomy of

argues that part of how certain contemporary novelists were able to develop imaginary worlds so compelling that communities formed to enable their members to continue inhabiting them was by combining fantastical content with features of realism—e.g., paratexts like maps, glossaries, genealogies; similarly, Davidsen (2014, 2017) has proposed other "veracity mechanisms" Tolkien used in his narratives to produce this effect (compare the literatures on the gospels' historical "kernels," use of genealogies, and so on). And in his *Mallorn* article, "Realism in Fantasy: *The Lord of the Rings* as "History . . . Feigned," Lawrence Krikorian has proposed other mechanisms, such as the inclusion of minor details (2018, p. 14); the explicit mention within the narrative of its being recorded as a historical record (2018, p. 15); the use of reiteration, adumbration, and revisiting scenes (ibid.); eyewitness accounts (ibid.); the presence of objects from the distant past (2018, pp. 15-16); the addition of appendices, including family trees and linguistic information (2018, p. 16); the construction of intra-textual and inter-textual confirmations of the historical details of Middle-earth (ibid.); the paratextual provision of maps (2018, pp. 16-17); the inclusion of old documents (2018, p. 17); and the realistic depiction of race relations (2018, p. 17).

Corporate power, mass media, and other factors work with the more intrinsic properties of texts to produce contemporary canonization processes.

religion/magic/fantasy vs. science/science-fiction parallels and supports the hyperreal-Medieval construct (Romantic) vs. modernity construct (Enlightenment) that we all inhabit in popular fictional worlds. Much of – indeed, one almost dares say, most of – what is popularly imagined of the "Middle Ages" and depicted in popular fiction is simulated through the enduring stadial mythic imaginations of the "Renaissance" and the "Enlightenment."

## Appendix 44: Virtual, Ludic Homelands and Telling Their History

> *The world he offers us has been constructed by reading beyond the lines of what men said; and what he finds beyond the lines is so far beyond, so wrenched from the context, and so at odds with empirical evidence, that his world, to this reviewer at least, partakes more of fantasy than of history.* (Morgan (1967) reviewing Heimert (1966), *apud* Goff, 1998, p. 700)

> *As I understand it, man is always sustained by his mythico-poetic core. . . . Is not the Good News the instigation of the* possibility *of man by a creative word?* (Ricoeur, 1978, pp. 237–238)

> *The final belief is to believe in a fiction, which you know to be a fiction, there being nothing else. The exquisite truth is to know that it is a fiction and that you believe it willingly.* (Stevens, 1957, p. 163).

Though the "fictional" character of myth is frequently overstated, it does matter. In C.S. Lewis's (1936) *The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition*, Lewis spends a portion of his work tracing a genealogy of how "myth" came to refer to and function as a different religious culture that could be used as a poetic resource. As the gods of Graeco-Roman religion[1] were defeated and debunked and, thence, "decline[d …] into allegory" (Lewis, 1936, p. ), they became for poets a unique resource—a richly realized network of narratives and meanings that were fictional: "the marvelous-known-to-be-fiction" (Lewis, 1936, p. ). Lewis calls this Europe's "'third world' of romantic longing" (1936, p. ). In addition to highlighting its "romantic" character, Lewis locates the full realization of myth in this sense (as a third world and as marvelous-known-to-be-fiction) as an achievement of the Renaissance, but his argument is that allegory preserved the gods of Greece and Rome as a mythopoetic resource: "For poetry to spread its wings fully, there must be, besides the believed religion, a marvellous that knows itself as myth. For this to come about, the old marvellous […] must be stored up somewhere [….] Such a sleeping-place was provided for the gods by allegory[2] […] for gods, like other creatures, must die to live" (1936, p. ). Lewis's understanding of myth as known-to-be-fiction thus does capture an important aspect of how I would define "allomythos," but not as a liability so much as a real achievement and resource. In this, I am stressing the same feature, relative to narratives, that Cusack stresses at the level of social formations when she designates as "invented religions" what others call "fiction-based religions" or "hyper-real religions": "In the West little scholarly attention has been paid to those religions that announce their invented status. That is understandable, as they are openly defying the web of conventions that surround the establishment of new

[1] The mythic world of allegory may also have drawn on and preserved so-called Gnostic, Hermetic, Neoplatonic, and other esoteric currents in Western culture; for example, in *Love in the Western World* (1990), Denis de Rougemont links the tradition of romantic love to the heresy and mysticism of the Cathars.

[2] One might observe that von Hendy appropriately describes the early examples of robust mythopoeic creativity of Blake and Novalis, in which both artists confidently assert the artist's power to overcome self-alienation and fragmentation in creative reintegration and unification by the poetic imagination, as "allegories of fable" (2002, pp. 26-30). These relatively early works found in allegory the capacity to express new myths.

religions" (2010, p. 1). The Arthurian romances, like allegory based on Greek and Roman myth, seem to have similarly offered Europeans a "third world," between the historical and religious realms, with a number of other fantastical, in-between categories. This is the theme of Sullivan's (2018) *The Danger of Romance: Truth, Fantasy, and Arthurian Fictions*:

> [T]he knights of the Round Table are said to return to Arthur's court to dine with their fellows, especially for the great feast days of Advent, Easter, and Pentecost, and, when they have finished eating, "to recount" (*conter*) under oath what has happened to them since they were last here, whether it be to their honor or to their shame. Because knights are honorable men, there is presumed to be an exact correspondence between the adventures they experience and the account they provide of these adventures. If these works are "stories" (*contes*), they are also "histories" (*estoires*), written down by clerics who heard these knights' testimony. Before the knights begin to speak, four clerics— identified in the *Prose Lancelot* as Arodian of Cologne, Tantalides of Vercelli, Thomas of Toledo, and Sapient of Baghdad— are summoned "to put into writing" (*metre en escript*) what they say, "just as" (*ensi come*) they say it. Because clerics are learned men, there is presumed to be an exact correspondence between what they hear during these sessions and what they write down. Just as the knights function as witnesses to the events they recount, the clerics function as notaries of the words they transcribe: they are not the creators but the transmitters of the tales they produce. As the twelfth-and thirteenth- century authors of Arthurian romances represent the situation, they have consulted the "histories" (*estoires*) of these ancient clerics and have used them as the source of their works. (pp. 7–8)
>
> Yet if Arthurian romance proved to be as popular as it did, it also seems to have been in part because its authors implicitly acknowledged its fictionality. . . . One of the most important themes of Arthurian romance— Lancelot's liaison with Guinevere and the complications it brings about— is thus something that the text admits never could have been spoken of before an audience and therefore never could have been written down in the way in which these stories were said to have been recorded. Not only Lancelot but numerous knights are described in the romances as embarking on love affairs that, according to the conventions of courtly love, should have remained hidden from others. By the same token, though the romances were "histories," supposedly based on oral testimonies transcribed by clerics at court, they could have been derived from no such sources. . . . Confronted with the contradiction between the works' claims to historicity and the evidence of their fictionality, audiences of medieval romance were faced with a fiction that refuses to admit its fictionality and is thus doubly fictional. (pp. 9, 10)
>
> With its account of marvels that can indeed be seen as having occurred, if one opens one's eyes to them; of historical figures who can indeed be seen as having lived, if one knows how to appreciate their greatness; of virtuous people who can indeed be recognized as virtuous, if one expands one's notion of virtue; and of a sacred object that can indeed be perceived as sacred, if one

> expands one's notion of Christianity, Arthurian romance represents itself as good science, good history, good morality, and good religion, though in a way that demands we reconceptualize each of these categories. (p. 14)

Sullivan regards Arthurian romance as a rather critical, subversive genre. Consider what von Hendy writes regarding Liszka's related thinking:

> Liszka responds to the problematic of myth's association with belief by situating it in relation to an antithetical term. "Myth" is for him "that imaginative space in culture which openly transvaluates order" (201). In this Frye-like role it always retains something of the tentative, hypothetical nature of the fictive, and Liszka therefore assigns to the condition of strict belief the labels of "dogma" and "ideology." As his synthesis of Girard and Turner would suggest, Liszka declares that the primary function of myth is to place in a symbolic crisis the values and rules of a given cultural stratum. "In that sense myths are critical, for myths walk the line between the cultural value and its antipode. Rather than being part of a cultural stratum, myths lie at the interstices of the strata; they are in that sense liminal and ambivalent. One might even say they are proto-Socratic: myths act as gadflies to the culture, their purpose in life is to disrupt the conventions of the culture, to dismantle complacency" (181). But Liszka immediately adds, "For this reason they are dangerous symbols and must be quickly put to death through incorporation into the culture by means of interpretations which seek to destroy their ambivalence" (181). As this remark shows, he locates "ideology" in the process of reception. (von Hendy, 2002, p. 254)

Liszka provides an example of a thinker who centers myth's fictive character, but Liszka regards myth as being inherently critical. However, this is not always the case with allomythoi; it is an attempt to valorize myth, and I would resist the simple valorization of allomythoi.

Elsewhere I draw on historiographical theorists like Hayden White to argue that history necessarily uses narratological techniques and is, because it is constructed, consubstantial with other kinds of story.[3] Historiography reveals that history is perspectival (i.e., reflects a worldview and way of life), that it is shaped by power (and the power of certain worldviews and ways of life), that it is rhetorically fashioned, and that it is part of a collective memory- and identity-formation process. As Tweed states,

> [T]he stories that fill history textbooks are important because they negotiate power and construct identity. They situate us in society and tell us who we are. Historical narratives often reflect, and shape, the social and economic order: individuals and groups excluded from narratives are excluded from more than stories. (1997, p. 2)

As suggested by this section's first epigraph, such stories may even strike one as fantasy. Those excluded from histories have tended to be left out of (or at most marginalized in) the lesser stories. Being excluded from voting booths or pulpits or home ownership – that is, being dislocated or located in narrow worlds (e.g., the domestic "sphere") – is a great violence, but truly appreciating stories as important sites from which people may be

[3] For an interesting but confounding critique of "relativist historiography" and its complicity with "religion" in contrast to SF's superior "alternative histories," see Theiss's (2014) *Relativism, Alternate History, and the Forgetful Reader: Reading Science Fiction and Historiography*. On alternative history, see Singles, 2013.

ostracized and as a vital locus for sighting history anew suggests a distinctive historiographical methodology (cf., e.g., Ferguson's (2004) *Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique*, which employed the methodological use of Black fictional texts as sociological sources or Halberstam's (2011) use of fantastical animated stories like those made by Pixar and others to find articulations of the "queer art of failure").

*Allomythic Homelands of Personal Identity*

It should be very evident by now that I understand allomythoi as invoking the spatial dimension[4] of human world-and-self modeling. Allomythoi evoke worlds in their full, embodied spatiotemoral character through the ancient (and new, multimedia) technology of narrative. The spatiotemporal nature of such narratives enhances their memorability (cf. Yates, 1966; Carruthers, 2008) and capacity for persuasion (i.e., motivating action and belief—e.g., Johnson-Sheehan, 2012; see Sentell's (2015) dissertation for a literature review of recent studies of memory relative to rhetoric and composition).

With Lévi-Strauss, I regard the myths and (hi)stories that matter and are memorable to people – that they compose and recreationally re-create[5] and re-member[6] – as being concerned with responding to important problems or questions (as Doniger puts it, myth "reveals—or sometimes conceals—certain basic cultural attitudes to important (usually insoluble) questions" (2011, p. 3)) and the resulting anxiety[7] of contemporary life; for Lévi-Strauss, in many ways that may be compared with the psychological-therapeutic approaches of theorists like Freud, myths are pseudo-logical resolutions of cultural contradictions (especially between nature and culture) that ease anxiety and thereby maintain the cultural order. However, structuralist approaches – while successful in revealing the operation of

---

[4] Temporal experience is deeply tied to spatiality and, under the influence of reading and writing, even to the spatial arrangement of narratives.

[5] My word choice and perspective here is influenced by Walter Kerr's pragmatist, pro-pleasure arguments in his (1962) *The Decline of Pleasure*.

[6] Regarding memory as reconstructive rather than mimetic, see Braun-LaTour, Braun-LaTour, Pickrell, & Loftus, 2004.

[7] The use of the technology or art of memory in Medieval meditational practices, the contemporary use of narratives in guided meditation to, among other things, cope with anxiety, and the familiar use of novels to "escape" from reality all point to an important evolutionary function of the human capacity to become absorbed in representations that are decoupled from the immediate situation: they help one to bracket or at least ease present pain and anxiety. Where a Marxist might say stories mystify and provide symbolic compensation for material wrongs, pacifying people so that they do not change the present order, this view of recreation might suggest stories make life more livable without precluding the possibility of action to change one's situation. This reminds me of a brief conversation Stephen King has a small boy, Bill, have in his novel *The Dark Tower: The Wind Through the Keyhole* (King, 2011), with the great gunslinger, Roland, when Bill requests that Roland tell him the story "The Wind Through the Keyhole" after his father and others have been gruesomely murdered by a shape-changing "skin-walker":

> "There are scary bits in it, too. Those things are all right for a boy such as I was [when first hearing the story]—sitting up in his bed with his mother beside him—but after what you've been through…"
> "Don't care," he said. "Stories take a person away. If they're good ones, that is. Is it a good one?"
> "Yes. I always thought so, anyway."
> "Then tell it." He smiled a little. (cite)

King seems to have Bill claim that even a tragic horror story may help one cope with actual horror and tragedy.

worldview or ideology[8] in symbolic systems like myths – tend to be ahistorical, totalizing, and monolithic, leaving little room for resistance and multiplicity. Again like Lévi-Strauss, I see the allomythic as being concerned with borders and mediation (cf. Lévi-Strauss's "mediators") because myth-making is a world-making process of cultural formation, recombination, and defense (cf. Albanese, 2012; Tweed, 2006). But as a world composed of worlds (situations, characters, cultures, etc.), an allomythos will be expressive of one or more primary worldviews or ideologies (see Lincoln's (1999, p. 147) definition of myth as "not just taxonomy but *ideology* in narrative form") but will seldom (if ever) be a total system; it will rather be a world composed of various subworlds (again, one might say, an *allomythology*[9]):

> Rejecting structuralism's view of ideology as homogeneous and monolithic, most contemporary theorists prefer to view ideology as fragmented and conflicted. Ideology is fragmented because society has divided interests. It is conflicted because ideology is a primary site of social struggle. […] There is a general cultural level at which the function of ideology is to bind the interests of the whole society and create common values and common perceptions. But beneath the general ideology there are also other ideologies which promote the interests of the more important social subdivisions. The largest and most important of these social subdivisions are usually class, race (or ethnicity), religion, and gender. Since everyone belongs to a multiplicity of categories, as well as to the general culture, these subgroup ideologies are rarely expressed by any individual in anything like a pure form. Generally speaking, every individual is the site of many competing and frequently opposed ideologies. (Csapo, 2005, p. 292)

One may rightly respond to the latter part of Csapo's argument regarding identity categories by noting that categories like "race" are culturally constructed while at the same time potentially possessing the naturalized character of one's dwelling-place and identity. This is in fact part of his point: "A vast industry offers ready-made self-representations to quench the thirst for personal identity and distinction which mass culture itself created by alienating, uprooting, and destroying traditional identities" (Csapo, 2005, p. 289). People invested in the category of Blackness or the supremacy of whiteness (not to in any way equate the two projects), the liberation of gay people or the defense of "traditional sexuality," and so on will

---

[8] I accept but avoid the adjective "ideological" – which tends to reflect a Marxist, anti-"myth" (i.e., myths naturalize the ideology of the ruling class) position or a periodization narrative (as in Flood, 2001) in which ancients had "myths" and moderns have "ideologies" – in favor of referring to *myths* and *allomythoi* as expressive of *worldviews and ways of life*.

[9] I prefer to use "myths" to refer to the narratives and "mythology" to refer to theories and theorization of myths, but due to terminological confusion in the use of "mythology," many prefer "mythography" to capture the latter sense. Regarding the sense of "allomythology," one might compare von Hendy's observation regarding Barthes's use of "mythologies":

> Barthes's choice of "mythologies" as a title rather than "myths" contributes to the "network" effect by suggesting that each disparate solar system reveals, when the telescope is focused on it, its own assemblage of conglobed myths. This sense of *worlds within worlds* is closely connected with Barthes's ambitions for the work: "I had just read Saussure and as a result acquired the conviction that by treating 'collective representations' as sign-systems, one might hope to go further than the pious show of unmasking them and account in detail for the mystification which transforms petit-bourgeois culture into a universal nature" (Barthes 1983a, 9). (emphasis mine, von Hendy, 2002, p. 290)

find vast industries of cultural representations to satisfy the problems that concern them (and, as some would say, to keep them from uniting against mutual threats or in common causes). Of the different types of works, Csapo convincingly asserts,

> Just where a particular work positions itself with relation to general and subgroup ideologies is variable. Those which are most conspicuously aligned with a particular subgroup agenda will have messages which come through with a clarity and redundancy which will make most people reject them as shallow, simplistic, or propagandistic. The greatest currency and highest esteem are likely to be reserved for those cultural products capable not only of bridging the divisions in the general ideology, but of remaining open to differential readings from different and even opposed ideological perspectives. Complex, polysemous texts thrive best in fragmented and unstable cultures. (2005, p. 293)

Just as specific myths are composites of perspectives or standpoints (or ideologies) with some predominating over others (cf., e.g., standpoint theorists like Donna Haraway, 1988; Nancy Hartsock, 2004; Sandra Harding, 1993[10]), the sort of comparative historiography and comparative mythology (or mythography), together *mythistoriography*, that I am interested in (that is, the comparative study of fictional worldviews) is itself a compositional – indeed, a metaphorical,[11] translational – practice.

*Allomythoi and Historiography*

Historiography, as the study of the way history is made, of the methods and theories and perspectives that shape the practice of history-making, at advanced levels requires specialized knowledge of a large number of topic-relevant narratives so that one may know the range of dominant (and minority) perspectives. For example, in the study of American religious history, historiography reveals a number of competing metanarratives shaped by the priority given to the role of specific dominant worldviews in U.S. history – e.g., mainline, Evangelical, Catholic, metaphysical, and one might even include the Enlightenment, freethinker, and civil religious tradition(s) – with other narratives focusing more narrowly on the development of subgroups like Native Americans, Black people, Jewish people, NRMs, and so on; this parallels a broader division among American historians between those who would stress consensus (and usually a Whig-history style narrative of progress) and those who attend more to difference, diversity, and dissent. As historians of American religion have developed an attentiveness to the function of systemic structures and rhetorical forms (power) as well as the semantic content of symbolic representations (meaning) in conjunction with a sensitivity to America's great diversity,

[10] The activity of feminist thinkers and other identity- and liberation-oriented theorists played an important role in the contemporary shift, in the study of myth, to a focus on what Csapo and others tend to call "ideology" (i.e., worldview and way of life): "The most significant result of the critical convergence of structuralism, Marxism, and liberation-oriented cultural studies has been a general coalescence of the concept of myth with the concept of ideology [….] It was only a matter of time before the science of mythology abandoned the us-and-them framework which first engendered it" (2005, p. 277).

[11] I do not invoke the concept of "metaphor" in order to posit "religious" language as uniquely different from ordinary language (see Penner 2002; Frankenberry 2002) – just the opposite. Religious studies theorists often appeal to outdated understandings of semantic reference in defense of romantic conceptions of religious language in contrast to the presumed nature of ordinary, profane language.

some have wondered aloud whether coherent stories are possible. Diversity threatens to overcome all narrators who are sensitive to it. If coherent stories *are* possible, can we compose narratives that make sense of the religious past yet draw on new motifs and plots and include a wider range of settings and characters? (Tweed, 1997, p. 4)

I think one can contribute to the project of making sense of past and present worldviews and ways of life by including as part of the history of American (and global, mass cultural) worldviews the wider range of settings and sites, characters and groups found in fictional worlds. History is intimately related to (though, due to its fidelity to evidence, different from) fiction, and bringing fiction into history (as I put it in the main text, sighting history from a site that takes the play of fiction seriously) helps properly recalibrate one's vision to encompass more fully the vast range of stories that need to be included if any coherent, non-reductive story is possible.

# Appendix 45: Secular Stories?

Wood (2008) attributes the novel and novelistic characterization themselves to a secularization process; the religious character of ancient Greek theater is rather well known, so I shall not rehearse his argument about that, but consider what he writes about characterization:

> The novel begins in the theater, and novelistic characterization begins when the soliloquy goes inward. The soliloquy, in turn, has its origins in prayer, as we can see from Greek tragedy, or from Book 5 of The Odyssey, or from the Psalms, or from David's songs to the Lord in 1 and 2 Samuel. Shakespeare's heroes and heroines still use soliloquy to invoke the gods, if not quite to pray to them: "Come you spirits / That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here," "Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks!" and so on. The actor comes to the front of the stage and speaks his mind to an audience, who is both God above and we spectators in the seats. Nineteenth-century novelists like Charlotte Brontë and Thomas Hardy continued to describe their characters as "soliloquizing" when speaking to themselves. . . . The novel has changed the art of characterization partly by changing who a character is being seen by. . . . Macbeth is not being seen by God so much as he is being seen by us, the audience. His prayers, you might say, are soliloquies, and get very close to mental thought, as he agonizes before us over the dilemma he finds himself in. One reason for the play's power has to do with its domestic intimacy, whereby we feel we are eavesdropping on the horrid privacy of the Macbeths' marriage, not to mention the guilt-tainted outpourings of their monologues. At certain moments, the play seems to want to pull away and develop itself into a new form, the form of the novel. . . . Under the new dispensation of the invisible audience, the novel becomes the great analyst of unconscious motive, since the character is released from having to voice his motives: the reader becomes the hermeneut, looking between the lines for the actual motive.

Allomythoi, in the fanastical expressions of the novel (and then other media), give voice to a host of problem-questions relative to secularity, secularization narratives and processes, and the nature of the so-called post-secular. Certainly, pre-modern societies produced expressions of the "religious" imagination that may be compared to contemporary allomythoi; example genres include midrash,[1] apocalyptic, parable, allegory, and epic. Still, the flourishing of robust allomythoi (i.e., that are known and consumed as explicitly "fictional" as part of a mass cultural genre system) is a distinctly modern (or, perhaps, postmodern) phenomenon. I posit that a mature understanding of religiosity, secularity, and post-secularity that is attentive both to their continuities and ruptures as well as to the role of new media and narratives in producing and supplying worlds and identities for people to inhabit should find allomythoi to be useful and productive data for study. They both exhibit the active political contestation of familiar and novel worldviews and contribute to the

[1] Cf. Linda Howell's (2019) essay on the popular TV show, Supernatural, using the concept of midrash: "*Supernatural*'s Winchester Gospel: A Fantastic Midrash."

contemporary proliferation of worlds and identities that constitute the so-called postmodern and post-secular.

The imagination is being used in fiction in new ways to confront pressing contemporary problems, such as environmental concerns and the crisis of meaning as traditional meaning-making systems seem to be invalidated. For example, Cusack notes the following regarding "invented religions": "An unbroken thread of protest, of rejection of the modern Western trajectory of wage-slavery, materialism and consumerism, links Discordianism, the Church of All Worlds and the Church of the SubGenius, though their analysis of and solutions to the problems differ" (2010, p. 3). Fiction also allows authors to articulate more explicitly aspects of traditional religions—e.g., their political character, their playfulness and imaginative character, their emptiness and horror—that could not be so openly discussed in previous eras or in non-fictional modes. Cusack's (2010) treatment of "invented religions" is noteworthy in that she, in her introduction, explores how the phenomenon of invented religions may relate to processes of secularization and re-enchantment.[2] Cusack asserts that,

> [T]he social conditions in which religions come into existence and win converts from the mid-twentieth century were deregulated by the retreat of institutional Christianity and the creation of a religious marketplace that was facilitated by the secular nature of modern public spaces and discourses in the West. The related processes of consumerism and individualism predisposed individuals to experiment with new religions and to understand self-transformation as an ongoing process with no particular terminus. Identity and personality began to be constituted through the consumption of diverse products, and this was linked to the human imagination's capacity to create alternatives to everyday life. Popular cultural forms (particularly science fiction) contributed powerfully to the social understandings of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, and cross-pollinated with religion, resulting in new religions focused on extraterrestrial beings and spaceships. Finally, […] if religion is assessed naturalistically and cognitive science explanations of its function(s) are taken seriously, the fundamental building

[2] In particular, one might note how her narrative of secularization claims that groups and movements like the Beats, UFO groups, the New Age movement, the Human Potential movement, and others participated in and encouraged a culture of individual self-fashioning, in which elements from new and ancient religions of Asia and the West (e.g., Spiritualism, Theosophy, Buddhism, etc.), from science fiction, from psychological theories, and so on could and *should* be eclectically combined, under pressure for the formation of *individuality*, rather than an old ideal of *character*. Cusack states of the resulting consumerist culture, "Invented religions are an inevitable outcome of a society addicted to the consumption of novelties, in which the exercise of creativity and innovation in the development of products is rewarded by wealth and fame" (2010, p. 18; as an example, compare the essay by Adam Possamai and Alphia Possamai-Inesedy, "Battlefield Earth and Scientology: A Cultural/Religious Industry à la Frankfurt School?" (in Cusack and Norman, 2012, p.p. 583–598)). Along these lines, I would note that Jack Zipes, one of the foremost scholars of the fairy tale, argues in his recent book, *The Irresistible Fairy Tale: The Cultural and Social History of a Genre*, that the genre "tend[s] to be secular" and, following the psychological line of interpretation (e.g., Bettelheim, 1976), tends to focus on the transformation of protagonists and their worlds by obtaining powerful instruments and aid (2012, p. 2). This parallels the secularization narrative Cusack describes, drawing primarily on thinkers like Colin Campbell (2005) and David Lyon (2000), but with an important difference—an important feature of his history of the genre is Zipes's disagreement with other historians who identify the genre with upper-class print culture, instead tracing the "secular" genre of the fairy tale to oral culture and the premodern world.

> block of religion is narrative, in which unseen agents are asserted to have caused effects in the physical world. One consequence of these findings is that they render unfair and inadequate dismissals of invented religions that proudly declare their fictional status as 'fake religions', or as not religion at all. All the invented religions treated in this book promote interesting explanatory narratives that replicate the conditions of traditional religious forms (myths, sacred histories). The social process of world construction, as explained by Berger, involves the social creation of culture by humans, and this culture is then externalized and takes on an independent existence, and is then re-internalized by society. This process exactly matches the proposal of a fictional religious narrative by a particular person or group of people, which is circulated and acquires independent status, and is then accepted as 'true' by converts who internalize the narrative. This study will proceed by treating each of the six invented religions, in historical order of foundation, in terms of its narrative and the ways in which that narrative exists in a symbiotic relationship with popular cultural forms (chiefly, though not exclusively, science fiction) and in terms of its oppositional relationship to the mainstream culture of the late modern West. (Cusack, 2010, p. 25)

I would make the following observations regarding Cusack's arguments above:

- She, as I do, draws a parallel between the fictional texts (primarily popular fantastical novels and movies) that become the narrative bases for invented religions and the narrative "conditions of traditional religious forms (myths, sacred histories)."
- I, like Cusack, would agree with Berger's understanding of humans as worldmaking agents, who construct, externalize, and consume/internalize worlds, and, with Cusack and Berger, I would regard the present, "secularized" environment as being characterized by an abundance of narrative worlds compete in a marketplace of worldviews for identity consumers.
- However, I would stress with Berger that this environment would seem to tend to render any given "plausibility structure" less credible, and citing, as it were, Cusack-as-ethnographer somewhat against Cusack-as-apologist, I would with Cusack stress the ludic character of the invented "religions" discussed in her book[3] and push against the notion that narratives' being "accepted as 'true'" need be a characteristic of a fiction-based worldview.[4] This does happen, and there are great pressures on people to defend their worldviews as "true" or "real." But this need not be the approach people take, especially under contemporary conditions.
- With Cusack, I would agree that invented religions and other worldviews tend to emerge from and "exist in symbiotic relationship with popular cultural forms," chiefly those of fantastika. However, I would not claim that fictional worldviews

[3] On this, see especially Cusack's later (2015) work; cf. Kirby, 2012, pp. 55-56; the edited volume by Cusack, Morehead, and Robertson (2019); and Robertson's (2016) "SubGenius vs The Conspiracy: Playfulness and Sincerity in Invented Religions."

[4] My position also would thus resist Davidsen's (2013) distinctions, as expressed in his article, "Fiction-Based Religion: Conceptualising a New Category Against History-Based Religion and Fandom," (*Culture and Religion*, Volume 14, Issue 4), which contrasts (*contra* Cusack's "invented religion") "religion" and the playful engagement of "fandom" and (*contra* Possamai's "hyper-real religion") the difference between "history" and "fiction."

> are only or even primarily created and consumed in the O-mode relative to mainstream culture.

But again, Cusack's argument well illustrates the simultaneous linking of fictional worldviews to secularization and re-enchantment. Similarly, Kripal's (2010, 2011) focus on the paranormal, esoteric, or occult relative to science fiction and superhero comics[5] is consistent with other recent theories of fiction-based religions (and perhaps the most assertive statement of such theories) that make fiction-based worldviews a feature of an occult, esoteric, or "New Age" re-enchantment of the West (e.g., Partridge, 2004, 2005[6]; Possamai, 2005, 2012; McAvan, 2012; Kirby, 2013; Nelson, 2001, 2012; Saler, 2012; Buljan and Cusack, 2015[7]). Identification of the theme of embracing the mysterious wonder of coming super-science in Kripal can be traced back among theorists of sf at least to Panshin and Panshin (1989), who identify SF as modern myth. And the Romantic thinking (and indeed connections to the ancient Neoplatonic and other esoteric worldviews that contributed to Romanticism (see Hanegraaff, 2012) in all this – and, as discussed above, involved in much theorizing of "myth" and "religion" – is obvious; and its criticism is common in reviews of thinkers like Kripal[8] and Panshin and Panshin. Giles Gunn's (2019) recent book, *The Pragmatist Turn: Religion, the Enlightenment, and the Formation of American Literature*, offers a fine corrective to this.

---

[5] Kripal's argument (one might properly state, "Kripal's scholarly myth" regarding what he considers to be our culture's "mythology": "[p]opular culture is our mysticism. [t]he public realm is our esoteric realm. [t]he paranormal is our secret in plain sight" (2010, p. 6; cf. Kripal, 2011a, p. 2).) conveyed through his "mythemes" (that trauma cracks one open to perception of the supernatural (see Kripal, 2017, p. 237; 2014, p. 251; conversely, might not trauma – a threat to stability – produce a recoil attended by a sense of self-ratification (i.e., the noetic, the cataleptic)? there exists a body of literature on how humans seem to use "tactics of make-believe" to buffer themselves from and manage the aspects of life that are terrifying and bewildering (Fisher and Fisher, 1993; cf. Fredrickson, 2018).); that fantastical authors of the paranormal (especially comic books and sf) have and reference mystical and religious – and thus also inevitably erotic – experiences and vocabularies (textual and imagistic) and thereby transmit them more generally; and that the postmodern/mystical perception of the human as both author and text-being-written is a real one, a realization of the "Super-Story" (cf. Campbell's monomyth) of the realization of humanity's divine potential) is, at his own admission, hard to swallow unless one has already experienced its truth (2011b, p. 6). Kripal's optimistic interpretation – that mystic sf authors are helping produce the future human theosis they have glimpsed – aligns with Nelson's (2012) slightly more dispassionately observed shift in fantastika (what she calls "gothicka") from the dark to the light (see below). Like Kripal, I would encourage an understanding of absorption in fictional storyworlds followed by return to consensus reality as initiatory, transformative, and a form of on-the-ground comparative worldview studies, but I would avoid the Romantic or, as Kripal would put it, "Gnostic" conclusion that one's encounter with the fantastical, paranormal, or non-ordinary in fantastika involves (erotic) contact with the really Real, the transcendent More, the Sacred. Like Kripal, I think fantastical texts are great pedagogical resources, but I would promote pedagogical methods, tools, and strategies rather different from his intentionally initiatory framework (Kripal, 2014).

[6] One of the admirable features of Partridge's survey of metaphysical religion (his "occulture") is his correct identification of much "Easternization" as being more accurately characterized as "neo-Romanticism" (cf., e.g., Foxen, 2020; Tweed, 2000).

[7] This is an excellent work on illustrating primarily N-mode worldmaking by anime authors, directors, and studios. It explores their use of Japanese indigenous religion (as well as Buddhism, Christianity, sf, and other worldviews), the resulting diversity of anime genres, and the re-enchantment of the post-religious world by providing alternatives to the afterworlds and afterlives of traditional religions in the other worlds (fantasy and sf) and afterlives (both magical and in the form of digital information stored in cyborgs, robots, the Internet) of anime.

[8] Regarding Kripal's work, his 2007 book, *Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion*, helps one better understand the social and cultural context of his synthetic scientific-mystical-popular-culture project.

Whereas in *A Republic of Mind and Spirit: A Cultural History of American Metaphysical Religion* (2007) Catherine L. Albanese offered a corrective to the typical neglect of "metaphysical religion"[9] or Western Esotericism in histories of American religion (comparable to Butler's (1990) Catholic intervention), which tend to emphasize evangelical/revivalist (e.g., McLoughlin, 1978) or mainstream Christian traditions (e.g., Ahlstrom, 1972) – leaving the diversity of Black, Jewish, Native, and other contributions to specialized studies – most historical accounts of fantastical entertainment seem to do the reverse. They attend almost exclusively to the powerful influence of metaphysical/esoteric/romantic worldviews (including their eclectic borrowings from Native, Black, and other traditions) on the history of American fantastika (i.e., in effect, Albanese's "metaphysical thesis" applied to popular culture), but this is done to the neglect of other potent and dominant worldview families that shape fictional worldmaking in America and, through mass media, globally. (Many of the specialized studies on horror fiction and related genres, particularly as they relate to "religion"[10] might be regarded as taking up a form of Butler's Catholic thesis.[11]) Gunn's work foregrounds two of these "spiritual imaginaries," seventeenth-century (Protestant revivalist/Evangelical/Puritan) religion and the eighteenth-century Enlightenment (e.g., Deism, Unitarianism), and their Pragmatist reconfiguration and response (evident already in Deism and still more so in Transcendentalism). I would note, as many pragmatic thinkers themselves admit, that Pragmatism might be closely identified with Romanticism—e.g., its optimistic re-centering of human creativity and its "negative capability" of accepting as part of this creative license the uncertainty and indeterminacy. All of this is to say, a comparative framework that attempts to embrace the full range of fictional worldviews in fantastika must not limit itself to the "New Age" or esoteric worldview family as, for example, in McAvan's (2012) monograph.

---

[9] Cf. Taves, 1999, which, as Albanese notes in a review article (Albanese, 2001), does give a prominent place to the metaphysical tradition in its narrative of American religious history.

[10] For example, Braudy, 2016; Hoeveler, 2010; Bivins, 2008; Cowan, 2008; Baker, 2007; Matthews, 2002; Nelson, 2001; Ingebretsen, 2016; Geary, 1992; Reynolds, 1989; Sage, 1988.

[11] Cf. Fredrickson (2018), wherein I argue that "if Protestantism is, in a sense, a worldly or (in the old sense of the word) a *secularized* form of monasticism or (in the old sense of the world) the *religious* life, horror has been, in the American tradition, a further secularization of Protestantism's ultimate concern, particularly the negative or apophatic (i.e., "un-saying") mode of the mystic's God" (p. find page in book) Compare, too, Nelson, 2001, pp. viii, xiv, 7, 18-19, 59-60, 129-130, wherein she treats the relegation of the forbidden Transcendent to fiction as a consequence of the Reformation and Enlightenment with its "repressed" character leading to its perverted representation as demonic—Nelson's perspective, whereby the sacred (esp. Catholicism's mastery thereof—see Nelson, 2012, p. 22) is recovered through the sacrilegious, reminds one of Taussig (1999). The persistence, appropriation, and distortion of the Christian concept of God in SF's secularizing discourse and its engagement with the closely related category of the "sublime" (i.e., SF's "sense of wonder") is likewise explored by Alan P.R. Gregory (2015) in *Science Fiction Theology: Beauty and the Transformation of the Sublime* (cf. Stockwell, 2014); compare the use of the concept of "transcendence" in Cowan (2010) and Panshin and Panshin (1989) and the concept of the "sacred" in Grigg (2018) and McAvan (2012), all of which I discuss in other parts of this work. In its most obvious form, the theme of God's secularization in the figure of the scientist (Wagner, 2012) and the function of science (MacWilliams, 2011) has also received some attention.

*McAvan's (2012), The Postmodern Sacred: Popular Culture Spirituality in the Science Fiction, Fantasy and Urban Fantasy Genres*

Weber (1905/1992) famously introduced a particular secularization narrative,[12] in which the this-worldly asceticism of Calvinism (and its radical kin) and its anxious performance of its calling and calculated analysis of its performance transformed the world into the modern, secular, disenchanted order, the capitalist "iron cage." In his Nietzsche-flavored prognostications of modern polytheism, perhaps he hinted at what has come to be called "re-enchantment" and the post-secular. Though taking a dim view of "magic," Durkheim (1912/1995) finds practices and symbols of sacralization – the essence of religion – at the heart of social life and, thus, a permanent feature of human existence (i.e., the disenchanted world remains enchanted), though it will inevitably be transformed, and he importantly notes that the sacred needs to be anchored in material reality (e.g., the totem) in order to be stabilized and endure. One may relate this to McAvan's argument (heavily influenced by Baudrillard) that technologies like CGI collapse "the boundaries between real and unreal, bringing the unreal into the realm of the real-appearing spectacle" (2012, p. 17), and elsewhere she notes, "Ironically, the virtual has a kind of concreteness that the real sometimes lacks" (ibid., p. 25).[13] This is a feature of Baudrillard's *hyperreal*. Luckmann (1967), like Durkheim, defines religion functionally, in terms of world-building and identity-formation, and sees secularization as a transformation of the form of religion.

Certainly, allomythic worlds and identities are shaping how subjectivities and social groups are constructing themselves. In a minority of cases, allomythoi have proven to be so compelling that they have catalyzed the generation of novel social groups, sometimes called "fiction-based religions." However, such metaleptic social formations (cf. Kukkonen and Klimek, 2011), which include the so-called "hyper-real" (Possamai, 2012, 2005), "invented" (Cusack, 2010), and "fiction-based" (Davidsen, 2014, 2013) religions as well as intense forms of fandom (e.g., Erzen, 2012), are the tip of an iceberg. McAvan draws attention to what she calls "popular culture spirituality," which powerfully influences the identities of contemporary individuals and groups, but the range of allomythoi far exceeds even this. Weber's secular marketplace was expected to evacuate itself of the religious, and Marx and other classic theorists of secular development looked expectantly to the United States to support their expectations of religious disestablishment and disenchantment. Instead, the religious, capitalist marketplace resulting from legal secularization seems to have played a role in religions' proliferation and commodification (e.g., Moore, 1994; at the same time, certain types of "religion" still receive special legal privileges (see Sullivan, 2005), which is the point of critical "parody" religions like the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster and The Missionary Church of Kopimism). In their competition, the religions used a variety of new media, including fiction, and these new media necessarily altered their religious messages.

As Modern (2011) and others have noted (cf. M. Taylor, 2007), the resulting networked, distributed culture amplified the uncanny, incalculable, haunted quality characteristic of postmodern existence and the (post-)secular world, in which there are not only a disorienting abundance of narrative worlds and selves to inhabit, but also an

[12] For a recent defense of the concept of "secularization," see Bruce, 2011.

[13] McAvan's point about corporealization links well with Luhrmann's (2012) observations about charismatic Christians.

increasing sense of the self as multiple and arising from psychological, sociological, and technological forces beyond its knowledge or mastery. Our psychological sensitivity, moreover, has combined with neoliberal capitalist cultivation of desire and its satisfaction to produce a therapeutic culture that has transformed and co-implicated entertainment and religion (cf. Rieff, 1966; Lofton, 2011; Carlson, 1999). As McAvan states, however, the use of

> explicitly unreal texts ["unreal" is McAvan's expression for *fantastika*] to gain a secondhand experience of transcendence and belief [….] displaces the need for belief or real-world practice into a textual world, requiring little of its consumers. […] [T]he wonder produced by these texts, however, is only temporary; eventually the consumer must return again and again to purchase another text. (2012, p.19).

This is very much in line with Campbell's (2005) argument in *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism*, to the effect that the proliferation of imaginary pleasures enflames a longing for "the ceaseless consumption of novelty" (p. 205); Cusack extends this, noting the same spirit in the touristic consumption of other cultures and of seekers who consume "religions and spiritualities as products" (2010, p. 12). McAvan further draws on Zygmunt Bauman (1997) to argue the following:

> Paraphrasing Max Weber, Bauman calls this process "this worldly ecstasy" and argues that the postmodern version "abolish(es) the concept of 'non-peakers' altogether and declare(s) peak experience a duty and realistic prospect for everybody" (180). (ibid., p. 29).

Similarly, in a move resembling Löwith's (1949) view of the secular as a confused transformation of the Christian order, scholars of political and juridical theology have traced persistent theological elements in our presumed secular legal order, which is itself influenced by and an influence on the logic of fictional texts. Established religions have deprivitized and politicized themselves in a variety of ways, including through the use of fiction (cf. Casanova, 1994; Bivins, 2008), and Sullivan's (2005) *The Impossibility of Religious Freedom*, in a move resembling Asad's (2003) analysis of the discursive relations between the secular and the religious, has traced the paradoxical logic whereby attempts at disestablishment of religion, by being compelled to provide legal definitions of "religion" in order to defend it, re-inscribe it, generally to the detriment of minority and new religions. "Religion" remains a serious legal category (e.g., for purposes of taxation and free expression) while at the same time being treated as a sort of voluntary recreation, and categories everywhere seem threatened. Some attempt to evade this danger by embracing it, claiming that the postmodern and post-secular (as intensely mediated and virtual, in which real/unreal distinctions become hard to maintain) are characterized by a collapse of religious-secular distinctions as meaningful. This situation is ludic: "[T]he postmodern sacred is willing to *play* with the sacred, albeit situated at a safe distance in a secondary textual world often divorced from the need for real-world commitment and belief" (McAvan, 2012, p. 23). One might suggest that only some enjoy the privilege that allows them to adopt this playful stance.

Given the parallels between McAvan's project and my own work, I should briefly characterize our similarities and differences. Like McAvan, I have found it necessary to focus on broad range of non-realist genres (McAvan is undertheorized in this respect), and I link the phenomenon of a certain type of fiction containing novel imagined worldviews with

its world-historical context (i.e., the "postmodern"). Most importantly, I am in full agreement with McAvan's observation that, in the postmodern context, it has become untenable to provide a metanarrative that explains everything. However, McAvan undercuts this and oversimplifies. My primary divergences from McAvan are (1) that I avoid deploying the "sacred" because it searches – in the tradition of the Romantics – for a transcendent, even if a playful or hyperreal or corporealized one, and because it leads to the neglect of other, non-"religious" worldviews and (2) that I regard McAvan's work as falling perhaps too heavily under the influence of Baudrillard, with his theory of the postmodern as having made a sharp break with the past. McAvan's metanarrative assumes a *process* of secularization, in which the phenomenon of popular culture spirituality is an instance of re-enchantment linked specifically to esoteric (McAvan calls it "New Age"—again, not well defined or theorized—cf., likewise, "Hermetic," "Neoplatonic," "occult," etc.) discourse, excluding the variety of responses to the *problems* of secularization. In contrast, if calling certain things into question and raising certain problems, especially fundamental ones, is the kind of situation that provokes this style of creativity, one need not assert or expect a fundamental discontinuity between postmodernity and modernity and premodernity. The pseudo-real, fantastika-like works of the past, as in the case of apocryphal, apocalyptic, and allegorical works, may be compared to these texts, and that comparison helps one see the fundamental differences (e.g., authorial claims, ontological referents, new media and intensified skepticism) and continuities (e.g., criticism provoked by new representational systems).

*The "Secular" As Option, Not Simply Opposite*

The secular can be a discourse or a set of background conditions that the "religious" participates in, not merely religion's opposite and co-constituent. In fact, the secular, like "disenchantment" (cf. Asprem, 2014; Modern, 2011; C. Taylor, 2007) may be better understood as a problem (with a range of solutions: "secularities") than as a process or achievement (e.g., beliefs and practices that cease to convince and compel or a public sphere evacuated of such beliefs and practices). Charles Taylor's (2007) *A Secular Age* importantly stresses that in the secular age, the religious and the secular have become options; this, as in Blumenberg's (1985) argument, stresses the present order's difference from rather than continuity with the ancient order(s). But Taylor's story neglects how this emphasis on difference functioned in a colonial and racial context of Western European identity formation (see the introduction to Warner, VanAntwerpen, and Calhoun (2010)). The secular age is an age of citizens and nation-states, and, as Asad (2003) notes, secularity as *naturalized* discourse and transcendent political medium powerfully shapes how identity categories like subjectivity and sovereignty are lived and experienced.[14] As categories, however stable or fuzzy, to which one may respond in a variety of ways (cf. Pecora, 2006), both "the secular" and "the religious" signal a new degree of critical objectivity or skepticism, a challenge "plausibility structures" that would have previously been taken for granted as natural (cf. Berger, 1966, 1967, 1969), and many have noted that technological

[14] Asad finds a basis for the idea of the secular in the concept of *natura* (2003, p. 23; cf. Albanese, 1990; on *natura* see, too, Lewis, 2013, pp. 24 ff. Nature in contrast to supernature – and other related contrasting categories like normal vs. abnormal, ordinary vs. non-ordinary, immanence vs. transcendence – are of course at the heart of this topic).

changes, particularly communication media, were important factors in producing the new conditions that enabled increased skepticism. Bellah (2011) stresses the intimate connection between cultural and religious developments and modes of representation (cf. Ong, 1967, 1977, 1982); that is, the increase in critical detachment from received worldviews characteristic of the "secular" (but, much earlier, characteristic of significant past religio-cultural reforms) is linked, Bellah claims, to representational technologies.

Secular assumptions have often led to the neglect of religion in the study of literature (cf. Lundin 2007, 2009; Franchot, 1995), treating almost all contemporary literature as secular. Part of this may be accounted for by recognizing the historical formation of the academic identity and its connections to the production of the "rejected knowledge" of esotericism (Hanegraaff, 2012). As Hanegraaff argues in *Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture*, a process of othering that began with the Christian identification and condemnation of "paganism" (Hanegraaff's narrative begins with its revival in the Italian Renaissance) within Western Christian philosophy and culture (e.g., Catholics' condemnations of it in Greek Orthodox and classical thinkers and Protestant's condemnations of it in Catholics) and that transformed into the rejection of superstition in the Enlightenment and, thence, of esotericism by scholars and academics.[15] In any case, the neglect of supernatural worldviews in the study of literature has been challenged by some recent scholarship on religion and literature (e.g., Modern, 2014; Coviello and Hickman, 2014; Stein, 2013; Coviello, 2013; Warner, 2012; Ogden, 2012; Rivett, 2011; Rosenberg, 2011; Murison and Stein, 2010; Hickman, 2010; Hungerford, 2010; McGarry, 2008; Fessenden, 2007; McClure, 2007; Luciano, 2007; cf. Gunn, 1985). More recent studies that have combined fiction and religion have been notably conscious of the way contemporary literature often embodies a postmodern or post-secular positionality, with its inherent perspectivism, but studies of literature and religion generally operate in a different intertextual universe of discourse from studies of popular culture and esotericism. The formation of secular identity and its ties to co-constitutive terms like "religion" and "superstition" (esotericism) often clouds the scholarly literature.

Regarding secularity, one might consider a few examples of fantastical texts engaging with the concept of "secularization" in its classic, Weberian sense. Keith Roberts's *Pavane* (1968) and Kingsley Amis's *The Alteration* (1976) represent alternate worlds wherein Weber's secularization thesis was not realized and the Catholic world continued, and Philip Pullman's *His Dark Materials* series (as well as its partially-complete follow-up series *The Book of Dust*) responds to the Catholic world and worldview in a distinctly complex, critical, and postmodern (perhaps even *post-postmodern* or *metamodern*) way. These texts are especially interested in the challenging secular use and rejection of elements from tradition and the manner in which the fictional and fantastic relates to realism—historical, scientific, and literary. Roberts's *Pavane* captures both the Roman Catholic Church's global powers and ambitions[16] – for example, as described in "The Signaller," the Church requires a fast, expansive communication network to run its global empire, and this

[15] The tension Hanegraaff traces between pagan and Christian, Romanticism and Enlightenment, low-class superstition and highbrow academia – which categories also relate to the formation of dichotomous racial, colonial, sexual, and gender identities – is well illustrated in Taves's (1999) *Fits, Trances, and Visions: Experiencing Religion and Explaining Experience from Wesley to James* by, for example, dueling experiential-interpretative tendencies within Methodism.

[16] And some of the ways it helped produce globalized modernity (see, for example, Green and Viaene, Eds., 2012; Banchoff and Casanova, Eds., 2016).

need is answered by the creation of a system of semaphore stations – and the idea that Catholicism inhibited Protestant technoscientific and commercial advance. In *The Alteration*, Amis's dystopian world – which, like *Pavane*, bows to the need for globalizing technology (steam engines and air ships, for example) while simultaneously repressing it – critiques the effect of religious dogmatism on artistic creativity; he describes an alternative history wherein the Catholic West is locked in a cold war with a Muslim East, and the Republic of New England lies under the dominion of Protestant sects. Pullman's work, though containing strong SF elements, in many respects reminds me of more fantasy-oriented alternative histories like Susanna Clarke's (2004) *Jonathan Strange & Mr Norrell*, which depicts a magical Renaissance set in 19-century England and capably explores how increased power and rationality in modernity went hand-in-hand with repression, denial, and silencing of non-white, non-male others and their associated irrationality and madness,[17] and Jonathan Stroud's *Bartimaeus Sequence*, which provides a great critique of how the advances of disenchanted modernity rest in many ways on foundations of exploitation and alienation.[18] Pullman's narrative engages critically, in a manner that unites Enlightenment celebration of free thought with Romantic appreciation for imagination, with what might well be called the classic "myths" of the West – from the Bible, the *Iliad*, and the *Aeneid* to *Paradise Lost* and the works of William Blake – as well as contemporary fantastical classics like C.S. Lewis's *Chronicles of Narnia*. A notorious atheist, Pullman's sympathy is with those of his characters who resist the Magisterium theocracy and its Authority (i.e., God and his usurper, Metatron); thus, Pullman valorizes sin[19] (i.e., the Fall into independence, imagination, consciousness, sexuality, physically embodied by Dust in his ontology). But his atheist stance relative to the monotheistic God of orthodox Christianity does not mean he is a cold materialist. One might identify him with new materialism and its postmodern[20] acknowledgment of the self as multiple (e.g., daemons and ghosts), of consciousness as distributed and material (e.g., Dust itself, talking animals), and of the multiplicity of valid perspectives (e.g., the different worlds of the multiverse, the range of sentient beings

[17] Compare Hoiem, 2008.

[18] The issue of slavery is consistently brought up by Bartimaeus, who is a slave himself. He provides Kitty with an instructive (if disheartening) vision of ages of humanity rising and falling, never learning that the subjugation and degradation of others will inevitably have negative consequences. Bartimaeus' horror at the idea of spirits cutting themselves off from the Other Place and turning themselves into ghastly hybrids, neither human nor spirit, speaks to the way people can so easily destroy themselves, becoming what they formerly despised. His gradual disappointment in Nathaniel as the trilogy progresses and as Nathaniel becomes John Mandrake is related to this same issue and insight. The *Bartimaeus Sequence* provides a fine critique of pursuit of power and the ethical compromises made in its pursuit.

[19] For example, two of his main characters are male angels, Baruch and Balthamos, whose love for each other is beautifully described.

[20] Because most of the analyses of postmodernity emerge from Marxist thinkers, the notion of the superstructure still tends to dominate. The illusions and simulacra of culture mystify and enervate, freezing history and foreclosing change; their proliferation stuns and stupefies the mind, and utopian hope becomes impossible because nothing seems plausible (cf. Baudrillard passim). Yet, cultural shifts – new ideas – have been responsible for every significant change in human history. Some of these ideas or "algorithms" (*sensu* Harari, 2011, 2015) have been more obviously material than others – fire, domesticated wheat, the printing press – but the great truth of cognitive science is that all "ideas" are material. What Baudrillard refers to as the ascendant sovereignty of the object may be more accurately understood as the realization of the artificiality of Cartesian dualism. The "schizophrenic" critique and deconstruction of the subject as multiple, dynamic, and fictional, like other deconstructions of powerful shared myths, does not invalidate the potent instrumental utility of the self (see, e.g., McNamara, 2009).

(witches, talking polar bears, fairies and giants, and so on). Pullman resists any totalizing, unitary perspective, including both a materialism that denies emotion and consciousness and a postmodernism that erodes any belief in the possibility of truth. In all of these works and others like them, one can observe authors of fantastika engaging in sophisticated ways with classic ideas of secularity and secularization.

Alternative secularizations and secularities that are not defined by the parameters of European and British categories and worldviews are entertained in works like Kim Stanley Robinson's (2002) *The Years of Rice and Salt* and, to a lesser degree, Orson Scott Card's (1996) *Pastwatch: The Redemption of Christopher Columbus*, both of which imagine secularities emerging from non-European worldviews and ways of life.

# Appendix 46: Technoscience in Tolkien

This appendix draws on Tolkien's life and legendarium to illustrate how modern authors model for their readers problems (which are also sometimes affordances) raised by the technoscientific advances of (and materialist assumptions of technoscientific) modernity and potential responses to such novel problems. When an author encounters a problem in the world, he or she may resort to projecting it into a fictional possible world, and in this secondary world the author may depict a version of its potential catastrophic consequences and, possibly, a resolution.

Modernity has been characterized by an increased human capacity for exploitation of the environment, often in the form of its consumption and the instrumentalization of other sentient beings (fellow humans notably not excepted), and the totalizing ambition of this modern capacity for exploitation has been a feature of what is often called "globalization," facilitated in particular by new technologies for the movement and transferal of information, people, goods, and capital. Information is not only transferred; its processing and manipulation in particular have given humans countless new abilities, while at the same time the systems and processes humans have unleashed exceed their powers of comprehension and mastery in uncanny ways, leading to other potential problems. In addition to powers of transferal, scientific advance and technological application of scientific knowledge have included such fantastic feats of instrumentalization and consumption as the genetic engineering of other living forms in accord with human designs, the regulation of human (and other animal) life through complex manipulations of space and the environment and through nurturing and healing techniques, the systematic killing of humans in war and other animals for food and other industries dependent on the logic of animals-as-products, and so on.

Tolkien had good reason to have concerns about technoscience, the globalizing forces it enables, and other problems of modernity. Tolkien was born and spent the first three years of his life in South Africa and was Catholic in a Protestant country. Perhaps in part because of the reasons some might have called his Englishness into question, he strongly identified with England and opposed the forces of globalization, particularly the cosmopolitanism and industrialization he associated with American influence.

Though Tolkien often regards America as emblematic of and even the primary source of the problem of technology in modernity, Leo Marx's classic work in American studies, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (1964; cf. Erbacher, Maruo-Schröder, and Sedlmeier, 2014), aptly illustrates that American authors also long wrestled with this problem, representing it and its contradictions in fictional form.

Consider the following quote from Tolkien's essay "On Fairy-stories":

> And if we leave aside for a moment "fantasy," I do not think that the reader or the maker of fairy-stories need even be ashamed of the "escape" of archaism: of preferring not dragons but horses, castles, sailing-ships, bows and arrows; not only elves, but knights and kings and priests. For it is after all possible for a rational man, after reflection (quite unconnected with fairy-story or romance), to arrive at the condemnation, implicit at least in the mere silence of "escapist" literature, of progressive things like factories, or the

> machine-guns and bombs that appear to be their most natural and inevitable, dare we say "inexorable," products. (Tolkien, 1966, pp. 81-82)

One might quibble with his suggestion that escapist literature is silent on the topic of factories and machine-guns. Many science fiction texts, certainly, address such technologies – and concerns regarding their inevitability – head on. Still, the quote raises at least two other issues: first, Tolkien's evident "condemnation" of "progressive things" and, second, the question of Tolkien's less condemnatory attitude toward the use of horses for human purposes, the building of artificial environments like castles, the development of transportation systems like ships, and the making of instruments for killing like bows and arrows.

One may observe a tension in Tolkien's relationship to human creativity and technology. On the one hand, Tolkien's allomythology is structured to celebrate and valorize craft, skill, wisdom, and learning. The elves, dwarves, and Númenóreans[1] (and, to a lesser degree, the Númenórean refugees in Middle-earth, the Dúnedain) display great technical creativity, and one of the signs of temporal and spatial distance from the sacred primordial light of Eru Ilúvatar[2] and his representatives is a diminishment and dispersion of subcreative prowess founded on deep knowledge of the nature of things. On the other hand, the simplicity of unmodified nature is consistently valued (e.g., the unadorned summit of Meneltarma[3]), and those beings and worldviews associated with evil are distinctly characterized by their will to exploit and master their environment through the calculative use of technoscientific power.

[1] **Númenóreans** – These were the descendants of the High Men [sic] of Tolkien's First Age, who became elf-friends and fought beside the elves against Melkor. For this, they were granted to live on the island of Elenna, also called after the name of their kingdom, Númenor. The Númenóreans, in a narrative that combines features of the story of Babel and the Flood with features of the fall of Atlantis, fell from the pure worship of Ilúvatar to sacrificing humans and the Tree of the Kings (descendent of Telperion (see below under "*silmarilli*")) with fire to Melkor, and they ultimately broke the ban of the Valar (see below) in an effort to become immortal.

[2] **Eru Ilúvatar** – Eru refers to God's oneness; he is "The One." Ilúvatar, like one of the primary divine names of Odin, means "All-father."

[3] **Meneltarma** – This is the sacred mountain at the center of Númenor. It is the *axis mundi*, and its name literally means, "Heaven-pillar." It was the center of Númenórean worship. No structures were built on it, and absolute silence was observed, with the exception of the monarch, who, during the three annual holidays, prayed on its summit. It may be the only part of Númenor that was not drowned after the violation of the ban of the Valar.

One might explore this tense relationship to technology in Tolkien by setting up a series of contrasts. Among the Valar,[4] one might contrast Melkor[5] and Aulë;[6] among the Maiar,[7] Sauron and Gandalf; and among the elves, Fëanor[8] and Celebrimbor.[9]

*Melkor and Aulë*

Like Fëanor among the elves, Melkor is described as the greatest of the Valar. But though his technical, creative ability is great, his primary applications of it are monstrous deformations – bioengineering – of other creations and beings—the physical and mental instantiations of the discordant theme he introduced into the Music of the Ainur. Of this theme, one may recall, Eru Ilúvatar states,

> And thou, Melkor, shalt see that no theme may be played that hath not its uttermost source in me, nor can any alter the music in my despite. For he that attempteth this shall prove but mine instrument in the devising of things more wonderful, which he himself hath not imagined. (cite)

In contrast, to Melkor, who sought to conform the music of reality and reality itself to his will and found his will exceeded by the incalculable providential will of Ilúvatar, Aulë supplies an example of a Vala with great – one might say "scientific" – knowledge and technical skill, who does not seek possessive mastery of his creations. By not clinging to the things he made, by giving them freely, Aulë models Tolkien's technoscientific ideal—that subcreators delight in their creations and in the praise they may receive for their work, but that they create with a humble expectation that their creations cannot be possessed and mastered by them, that they will be used by others in incalculable ways. Aulë's more balanced and moderate approach may also be signaled, in Tolkien's mythos, by his union with Yavanna,[10] who certainly creates and cultivates but also consistently advocates for the preservation of unmodified nature, as in the story of the creation of the Ents.[11]

---

[4] **Valar** – The are the "Powers," the primary expressions of Ilúvatar's thought, each of which is responsible for creating and governing different features of the world.

[5] **Melkor** – The mightiest (this is the meaning of his name) of the Valar, Melkor spent time apart from the others and developed the prideful desire to create apart from the will of Ilúvatar. He introduced evil into the song of creation and then into reality itself, and his crimes against the elves, in particular, led to Fëanor's naming him "Morgoth" (Dark Enemy).

[6] **Aulë** – His name means "Invention," and, as the Smith god in Tolkien's mythos, his nature is in many respects similar to Melkor.

[7] **Maiar** – Together, the Valar and the Maiar, are part of a class of beings called the Ainur, the "Holy Ones." The Maiar are associated with particular Valar and serve them.

[8] **Fëanor** – Like Melkor, he was the mightiest of the elves. He was a great (sub)creator of things like the *palantíri* and *silmarilli*, but his pride and possessiveness led to great tragedy for his followers and for other elves, as in the case of the Kinslaying.

[9] **Celebrimbor** – Grandson of Fëanor, Celebrimbor he was a great smith who created the three elven rings of power. He was tortured to death by Sauron but never surrendered the identities of the ring-bearers to whom he surrendered the rings.

[10] **Yavanna** – She is the "Giver of Fruits" and the consort of Aulë.

[11] **Creation of the Ents** – Aulë became restless, waiting for Ilúvatar to create the elves and the humans, and so he fashioned the dwarves apart from any other Valar. This Melkor-like act, however, did not spring from a desire for power. When questioned by Ilúvatar, he responds as follows:

> I did not desire such lordship. I desired things other than I am, to love and to teach them, so that they too might perceive the beauty of Eä [the cosmos], which thou hast caused to be. For it seemed to me that there is great room in Arda [the earth] for many things that might rejoice in it, yet it is for the most part empty still, and dumb. And in my impatience I have fallen into folly. Yet the making of thing is in my heart from my own making by thee; and the child of little understanding that makes a play of the deeds of his father may do so without thought of

*Sauron and Gandalf*

Sauron, servant of Melkor but initially a Maiar of Aulë and, thus, a master of craftsmanship, embodies the will to mastery and the illusion of certainty, with which he infects those who fall under his influence: for example, convincing the Númenóreans to violate the Ban of the Valar[12] – to use the technology of sailing to go to the immortal lands forbidden to them and, thereby, attempt to violate their nature as mortal beings. Through the use of the *palantíri*,[13] Sauron convinced both Saruman and Denethor II of the *certainty* of defeat. And under the sway of the knowledge of Sauron and the quest for mastery, Saruman broke the white of his original nature into many colors. Throughout the *Lord of the Rings*, however, Gandalf rejects not only power that is forbidden to him but also the very idea of certainty, the idea that one can possess the power to determine the future or even oneself.

*Fëanor and Celebrimbor*

Fëanor is perhaps the most powerful and skillful elf ever to live—the potency of his life drained his mother, Míriel, of her own vitality, leading to her voluntary death and, in his death, incinerated his body as his fiery spirit departed. He created many objects of power and beauty, such as the *silmarilli*[14] and the *palantíri*, but he was corrupted by desire to keep

---

> mockery, but because he is the son of his father. But what shall I do now, so that thou be not angry with me for ever? As a child to his father, I offer to thee these things, the work of the hands which thou hast made. Do with them what thou wilt.

This humble defense of subcreation echoes points made in Tolkien's essay "On Fairy-stories" and his poem "Mythopoeia." In response, Ilúvatar gives life to the dwarves. However, because they were created apart from Yavanna, she expresses the following concern:

> Because thou hiddest this thought from me until its achievement, thy children will have little love for the things of my love. They will love first the things made by their own hands, as doth their father. They will delve in the earth, and the things that grow and live upon the earth they will not heed. Many a tree shall feel the bite of their iron without pity."

She took her concern to the king of the Valar, Manwë, asking if any of her creations might be saved from the dominion of humans, dwarves, and elves.

> "If thou hadst thy will what wouldst thou reserve?" said Manwë. "Of all thy realm what dost thou hold dearest?"
>
> "All have their worth," said Yavanna, "and each contributes to the worth of the others. But the kelvar [animals] can flee or defend themselves, whereas the olvar [plants] that grow cannot. And among these I hold trees dear. Long in the growing, swift shall they be in the felling, and unless they pay toll with fruit upon bough little mourned in their passing. So I see in my thought. Would that the trees might speak on behalf of all things that have roots, and punish those that wrong them!"
>
> "This is a strange thought," said Manwë.
>
> "Yet it was in the Song," said Yavanna. "For while thou wert in the heavens and with Ulmo [the god of waters] built the clouds and poured out the rains, I lifted up the branches of great trees to receive them, and some [i.e., the Ents, the Shepherds of the Forest] sang to Ilúvatar amid the wind and the rain."

Thus, one of the functions of the Ents is to set a limit on technical domination of nature, punishing those that wrong the olvar.

[12] **The Ban of the Valar**: Númenor was raised out of the sea near the Undying Lands (Valinor), where the Ainur and the elves dwelt, but the Númenoreans were forbidden to sail there. Unfaithful usurper and last king of Númenor, Ar-Pharazôn, under the influence of Sauron, gave into the fear of death and attempted to take immortality by waging war on Valinor. For this, Númenor was destroyed, and the host of Ar-Pharazôn was buried in the Caves of the Forgotten until Dagor Dagorath (the Last Battle).

[13] ***palantíri*** – Orbs created by Fëanor for discovering and transferring information across great distances.

[14] ***silmarilli*** – These three gems were crafted by Fëanor to hold the light of the Two Trees, Telperion (male, silver) and Laurelin (female, golden), who waxed and waned in alternating brilliance throughout the day and

possession of his precious creations, particularly the silmarils. He could not surrender his silmarils even for the sake of helping Yavanna restore to life the very trees from whose light the light of the silmarils originated. One might contrast this possessive attitude toward objects of technical skill, power, and beauty with Bilbo's treatment of his gem-adorned mithril coat of mail, which he regarded as a mere "mathom" (in Hobbit culture, a kind of white elephant party gift) and loaned to the Mathom-House (i.e., museum) in Michel Delving. His technical achievements and terrible deeds – such as the kinslaying and the stealing and burning of the ships of the Teleri[15] – may be interpreted as heightened expressions of elven nature. As Saler notes,

> Despite his professed distaste for allegory, Tolkien outlined in a 1951 letter the symbolic correspondences between the Elves and human creativity:
>
> > The Elves represent, as it were, the artistic, aesthetic, and purely scientific aspects of the Humane nature raised to a higher level than is actually seen in Men [sic]. That is: they have a devoted love of the physical world, and a desire to observe and understand it for its own sake as "other" ... not as a material for use or as a power platform. They also possess a "subcreational" or artistic faculty of great excellence. [cite]
>
> The Elves's weakness is that, as immortals, they resent temporal change and want to preserve the status quo: a form of possessiveness. (2012, p. 185)

Resisting this weakness is part of the "test" Galadriel passes. Though she uses the ring Nenya to preserve Lothlórien in the purity and vitality of the past, she is willing to allow both her land and herself to diminish rather than permit either to be corrupted (cite). Celebrimbor's relationship to technology, like that of Galadriel's, contrasts with that of Fëanor. Celebrimbor possesses great technical skill, but like Aulë he shares his creations. He freely gave Nenya to Galadriel, as he freely surrendered the other two great rings to keep them from Sauron, and he endured horrible torture without confessing to whom he surrendered them.

The Ents, like the Hobbits and Tom Bombadil, capture Tolkien's ideal relative to humanity's technoscientific power—they are makers but also nurturers, shepherds rather than owners, setting limits to the degree to which they attempt to know and control the world, limits that permit other things to continue to operate independently. The Ents are contrasted, in Tolkien's legendarium, with the Entwives and the Dwarves. The entwives did not teach the plants they ruled to learn their own voices, and they closely regulated their growth. The tragedy of their passing seems to be, in part, symbolic of Tolkien's conviction that the two attitudes toward the technoscientific capacities that empower people are irreconcilable. And much of Tolkien's earlier thinking on the nature of Dwarves – unfortunately marred by anti-Semitic bias – construes them as crafty, even marvelously creative, but prone to possessiveness.

---

whose dew retained their light. Melkor had the giant spider Ungoliant poison them (their last fruits became the sun and the moon), and the only way to restore them would be for Fëanor to give the silmarils to Yavanna. He refused, and then Melkor murdered his father and stole the silmarils, leading to his tragic pursuit of Melkor to Middle-earth.

[15] **The Kinslaying and the stealing and burning of the ships of the Teleri** – Fëanor, in pursuit of Melkor, requested the use of the ships of the Teleri, but just as he selfishly retained the silmarils, they possessively refused to lend him their precious ships. Thus, he murdered them, stole their ships, and sailed to Middle-earth. He then burned the precious swan-ships so that no one could return.

Like the ent Fangorn, Tom Bombadil is also marked as one of the most ancient beings in Middle-earth. And ancientness generally means closeness to the pure creative light and song of Ilúvatar. Tom is a maker and a singer, primarily of his name and that of his beloved. If the Ring were to have fallen into Sauron's hand, Bombadil would have been the last to fall. How does Tolkien explain his nature?

> "Fair lady!" said Frodo again after a while. "Tell me, if my asking does not seem foolish, who is Tom Bombadil?"
>
> "He is," said Goldberry, staying her swift movements and smiling.
>
> Frodo looked at her questioningly. "He is, as you have seen him," she said in answer to his look. "He is the Master of wood, water, and hill."
>
> "Then all this strange land belongs to him?"
>
> "No indeed!" she answered, and her smile faded. "That would indeed be a burden," she added in a low voice, as if to herself. "The trees and the grasses and all things growing or living in the land belong to themselves. Tom Bombadil is the Master. [...] He has no fear. Tom Bombadil is master." (cite)

Goldberry's language implies Bombadil's unfallen retention of divine nature, the divine name of "He Is." As Bombadil's interaction with the Ring shows and Gandalf later explains, "The Ring has no power over him. He is his own master" (cite). Tom, like Gandalf and the other wise ones of Tolkien's universe, rests in a mastery consisting of self-knowledge and loving surrender that does not seek calculative mastery of others. John Lardas Modern's reading of Herman Melville and of early 20th century American history similarly attends to the paradoxical manner in which the will to calculative mastery can lead to its own doom:

> In *Moby-Dick* Melville explored, via Captain Ahab, how the relentless pursuit of spiritual autonomy, epistemological clarity, and ocular dominion could eventually result in submission, confusion, and blindness. Cursing his "inter-indebtedness" to technology Ahab became infused with its logic, admitting that "the path to my fixed purpose is laid with iron rails, whereon my soul is grooved to run." His madness rendered him incapable of appreciating the spectral dimensions of material existence—first and foremost the "looming" presence of the white whale but also the specters within himself and those generated on board the most advanced technology of its time—the self contained industrial apparatus of the whaling ship. Ahab became unhinged by the "message-carrying air"—precisely those material effects that resisted observation and calculation (Melville 1925: 422, 149, 402). (Lardas [Modern], 2006, p. 5)

Unlike allegorical works like C. S. Lewis's Narnia series, Tolkien attempted to (sub)create a mythic world that would offer itself to readers as a place in which they might find their own meanings, rather than being overdetermined by authorial intent. As Saler states,

> Tolkien's famous dislike of allegorical interpretations of *The Lord of the Rings* reflected his discomfort with unitary points of view, manifested in the epic by the mesmeric eye of Sauron and the overly confident rhetoric of Saruman. (2012, p. 163)

Unlike the dwarves of Khazad-dûm who doomed themselves by giving into overconfidence, possessiveness, and the blinkered, myopic fixation on mithril's preciousness, pointing to the dangerous entanglement of technoscience and capitalism, Hobbits show little interest in

creating or possessing anything more than is necessary for a rich and pleasant life. One might argue about the feasibility of the Shire ideal as a universalized condition – surely it would come into conflict with the natural order, as represented by Fangorn and Tom Bombadil. Still, Hobbits embody an ideal of limited technoscientific power. Hobbits are also exemplary in their modest relationship to technology in that they neither study nor practice magic (Tolkien, p. ). Saler states,

> By the late 1930s, Tolkien [...] wanted to protect art from being used instrumentally. In "On Fairy-stores" he carefully distinguished between "enchantment" and "magic," which corresponded to "delight" and "delusion" respectively. Art generated enchantment when it was practiced out of love, with no instrumental aim; its effect was to bring delight to both maker and user. In contrast, magic was utilitarian and beguiling. (2012, p. 185)

Tolkien's legendarium is an elaborate and powerful technical production, and he was well aware of the potential danger of misuse of the technology in the study of which he spent his entire life. In using language, his aim was to give, as an expression of love to his beloved England, an enchanting world for people to inhabit, not to use art as an instrument to dominate and manipulate people. There are tensions in Tolkien – for example, between essentialist understanding of race and language and an openness to indeterminacy and mystery – but in the end, the dominant effect of his art reflects his highest ideals for how the technology of story should be used.

# Appendix 47: Concluding by Way of Some Philosophical Investigations in Kairology

## § 4.1. Relating to Introduction and Chapter 1

***§ 4.1.1. Kairology seeks to replace the old, atomic ("categorematic"—see § 1.2 below) paradigm with one that, being relational, co-dependent, and comparative, intentionally selects categories of sufficient generality and abstraction to clarify and not efface contradiction in assimilative or reductive-eliminative treatment of allomythic particularity (as O-mode allomythoi seek to do in accord with their characteristic sinistral diathesis), maintaining the productively boundary-making, oppositional (i.e., dialogical, dialectical, polyvocalic, and polysemous) aspect of all worldmaking without satisfying that impulse in the service of a particular worldview (other than that of the kairological framework itself which intentionally holds that impulse in abeyance as much as possible in order to disclose allomythic nature within a hospitable frame).***

This work invites a shift to a new paradigm. It may be worthwhile to gaze back at the paradigm *kairology* replaces. The old paradigm has, on the one hand, a large-scale sinistral diathesis, focused on *targeted, partitioned study of atomic systems* – "atomic" in a strong sense, that is, self-identical and incomparable, determinate and irreducible (*sui generis*) – such as "religion" (understood as being, e.g., whatever a given scholar or tradition stipulates they, the authorities over the social formation, or the subjects of inquiry mean by "religion"), which are properly studied apart from and by different scholars in different departments from those who and that study other systems or formations (themselves considered more or less atomic). At the same time, its particularized parsing and synthesis of living ethnographic details, rich nuances of phenomenological experience, and textual subtleties evidence a distinctly dextral diathesis. But as an atomic system, "religion" in such studies has been frequently targeted by and anchored in categories like the "sacred" and the "transcendent" and the *human (i.e., the trans-/post-/super-/sub-/non-/in-human). It both *took certain genres and media very seriously* – emphatically privileging the classes of written and sometimes filmic texts designated "science fiction" and "literature" and, more recently, mass media expressions of "popular culture" – and at the same time generally *neglected genre theory in its broader sense and other genres*. It focused on *texts* and sometimes their *characters*, with *rich, authoritative interpretations unpacking their significance*. This significance might and often did spill beyond the bounds of the atomic system and the specific genre and text—a study on religion in a given SF text might, for example, explore psychological and economic implications and intertextual allusions to other texts—but generally in a manner that reinforced the hermeneutical (and sometimes hagiographic/demonological) frame. And its application in teaching generally focused on *replication of scholars' perspectives and disciplinary concerns and criticism of others'*—one might press the contrast between the paradigms by labelling this pedagogy, with some intentional exaggeration, *catechetical, apologetic, and heresiological*.

For example, the American Academy of Religion's Religion and Science Fiction Unit previously had the following as its official description:

> This Unit connects the study of religion to the limitless possibilities for world-making, soul-saving, god-imagining, community-forming, and human-being posed by science fiction (and broadly, "speculative" fictions). Science Fiction (SF) is a literary and visual medium addressing the most basic existential and teleological questions human beings can pose. As the genre of infinite possible worlds and human and superhuman becoming, SF has a unique ability to ask, examine, and suggest answers to the most profound questions and to envision transcendence beyond traditional realist literature or religious interpretations of the world.

The focus on "profound questions" was a happy one, but many of the questions were obviously intended to be specifically religion-like: *e.g.*, "soul-saving, god-imagining," "superhuman becoming," and "envision[ing] transcendence." Similarly, the Religion and Popular Culture Unit states that it is "dedicated to . . . exploration of religious expression in a variety of cultural settings. . . . to taking popular culture seriously as an arena of religious and theological reflection and practice," and the Arts, Literature, and Religion Unit states that it cares about "both the aesthetic dimensions of religion and the religious dimensions of literature and the arts." Above, "science fiction" is contrasted with "traditional realist literature" in potentially problematic fashion (see, e.g., Wood's (2018) *How Fiction Works*, which has a fine treatment of contemporary criticism of the artificiality and fantasticality of the traditional "realism" of literature). The description does not stress the genre boundaries of SF against fantasy, but the unit itself certainly did historically until its recent change. The new unit description evinces a number of positive trends in contemporary research (in the interest of full disclosure, I had a voice in developing the new unit description as part of the unit's Steering Committee):

> This Unit challenges the study of religion through the infinite possibilities for world-making, "god"-imagining, community-forming, and human/species-becoming posed by speculative fiction (SF). Science fiction, fantasy, horror, slipstream, weird fictions, futurisms, and related genre movements in literary and visual media address basic questions and predicaments traditionally posed and answered by "religion." Through engagement with SF narratives the work of this Unit intends to provoke comparison, exchange with, and mutation in the study of religion.

The relaxed focus on the "human," the explicit acknowledgment of other, non-SF genres, the shift from SF as "science fiction" to "speculative fiction" as an umbrella category, and the clarification of "basic questions and predicaments" as facilitating "comparison, exchange with, and mutation in the study of religion" are all consistent with the worldview-studies paradigm and the kairological framework I have outlined herein.

Recalling the past chapters, in foregrounding things like stasis theory and the *world*liness of world-view studies and text world theory and the embodied character of cognition, this framework has invited researchers to think of stories as revealing not so much world-*views* (ocular, detached, insensitive, distant, even disembodied or abstract) but *world-stances* (postures, disposed and already oriented toward response; situated; revelatory yet mysterious, active-and-latent with meanings and questions; compare Toolan's (2001) "orientation"). Let me return to a portion of what I state in Appendix 5, with some slight changes as this work concludes:

This work attempts to provide **a framework for analysis, interpretation, and even explanation of – or, one might also simply say, a "theory" of** (Asprem and Taves, 2018) **– the making of novel fictional world-stances and ways of life – which is also to say, of new worlds or homelands, new identities or subjects – in fantastical fiction**. Again, in this work of so-called theory and method, I have attempted to systematically organize knowledge from a variety of relevant disciplines in a manner generally applicable to the phenomenon of world-stance-making in fantastika by identifying what I regard as the primary relevant categories or components of the phenomenon and their relations among each other.

As I conclude, I think it may be helpful to review the discourses and disciplines that I sought to engage with and intervene in. I like to think that there has been a harmony of method and argument in this work, that my appeal to interdisciplinarity – indeed, my attempt to make connections between different disciplinary perspectives and theories – and, particularly to methods, approaches, and theories of combination and linkage (e.g., the BBA, translation theory, borderlands theory), is not due to it being a scholarly trend but because it has suited and advanced my evidence and argument. The problems that have motivated it are, yes, internal to specific disciplines (e.g., the problems created by stipulated definitions of categories like "religion" in religious studies, of "science fiction" in literary studies, and of narrow focus on specific "religions" and favored fictional texts), but they are also created by the divisions among the disciplines, often promoted in misguided efforts to defend disciplinary prestige, legitimacy, and even existence by asserted incoherence and division where linkage is possible. In contrast to, for example, figures like Saussure and Chomsky, who seek to shield *langue*, in its eternal, ahistorical, abstract purity, from the contingency and particularity of *parole*, or to the deconstructionists who, conversely, see language as endlessly deferred, a disconnected, free-playing discourse, unable to be systematized and known, or figures like Lévi-Strauss and Eliade, who attempted to protect myth and religion as *sui generis* and autonomous (myth/religion vs. history, paradigmatic vs. syntagmatic, and so on), my project has affirmed and been rooted in what might be called a pragmatist-immanentist belief that, though no ultimate totalizing representation of reality is possible, everything is part of "nature" and admits partial, incrementally-improving naturalistic accounts – though certainly ones including unpredictability and complexity. I see the former styles of transcendent thinking as *creationist* (e.g., humanity, *ex nihilo*, transcends and fundamentally breaks with non-human animals; deity incomparably transcends the natural order; etc.) but, therefore, as inherently (and by hidden or open intent) incapable of explaining how symbolic systems, from languages to worldviews, *are created*.

As signaled by my use of words like "theory" and "explanation" above – the latter in particular being generally avoided in religious studies – this project has interacted with religious studies as a discipline directly and broadly and has argued for various disciplinary expansions or enrichments

that some might regard, more threateningly, as abandonment (see bbhe.ucsb.edu).

"*Novel fictional* world-stances" above obviously suggests an interest in creativity studies. How do humans generate novelty? In what sense is any cultural production new? What motivates this creative activity? What forces, likewise, motivate the production of superficial or illusory novelty? How does fiction relate to life? I hope readers come away from this work with some new ways of thinking about such questions.

"*World*-stances" is my personal preference, but I essentially mean "worldviews," in a certain sense. That is the term I have been relatively content to use throughout this work. This term and the approach it refers to have been deployed to intervene in the discipline of religious studies in multiple ways, infusing it with a number of other disciplinary, methodological, and theoretical influences. First, the "worldliness" of a worldview, to my mind, stresses the materiality and spatiality, the embodiment and corporeality of phenomena that are often treated as abstract, intellectual, and altogether immaterial, disembodied, and incorporeal. Terms like "religion," "spirituality," and even "ideology" tend to suggest that the normative worldview is that of secular, Protestant intellectualism, a matter of ideas and spirit, not of body and place. And certain escapist understandings of what happens when one consumes and is consumed by a work of fiction (sometimes identified by the theologically suggestive term "kenosis") participate in this disembodied and dislocated discourse that has pervaded modernity—often as part of colonialist, racist, patriarchal, Eurocentrist, anti-Catholic, and related projects that, both by pretending a blindness to the particularities of body and place and an understanding of human nature and rights as spiritual and universal and by simultaneously engaging in regulative schemes that attended carefully to the particularities of body and place and attributed to them many, all-too-many meanings, were able to narrate the normative and exclude the abnormal.[1] This work has resisted this by bringing the literatures on, for example, spatial cognition and material religion into conversation with narratives and narratology. Second, "worldview" is meant to align my work with a shift away from certain unhelpful limitations inherent to "religious" studies, in the direction of a more general study of worldviews that includes the secular, the non-religious, the political, the economic, and so on, while recognizing the constant entanglement of the "religious" with the "secular," the "political," the "economic," which entanglement is often concealed by scholars' of "religion" using the terms so boldly and ubiquitously.

A *world* in kairology – including a storyworld that supplies a new possible homeland and identity – is not an impenetrably hard thing, self-identical, fungible, an unwindowed

[1] Whence comes this division of material bodies and ideas, inner and outer self, things as they seem and as they are in themselves, res cogitans and res extensa, and so on? There are many complicated tributaries feeding the river, or, one might say, many elements that constituted the "picture" that has "held us captive" (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015; Taylor, 1989). Contemporary cognitive science ("postcognitivism") has come to resist such binarisms and bifurcations, and in some cases its thinkers have done so under the influence of ancient "religious" worldviews like Buddhism (e.g., Francisco García; Judaism and Catholicism, especially their mystical traditions, have exerted a persistent influence on phenomenological, existentialist, and deconstructionist thinkers, and so when such philosophical traditions have, in turn, influenced cognitive scientists, psychologists, and cognitively-informed philosophers, one may observe a sort of return of the repressed: the spatial and embodied, the emotional and erotic, the intentional, etc. as inseparable from the "cognitive"; cf., e.g., Wynn's (2005) *Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling*).

monad, a Parmenidean atom; like the world we inhabit, it is an interaction, a happening, a relational co-becoming, "simulated" only in the embodied, medium-dependent manner that has ever been the way of things, bounded in a manner that gives context not opacity. Really, the atmosphere is a world of worlds, dynamic, layered; so too is the soil, and so are the waters and forests and our very bodies, and the many other worlds of the world. The hives of bees, their swarms, the inner world of a single bee no less—our world has always been a coming-together that is also a passing-away of worlds within, and its coming-together and its passing-away has always been within the worlds around and without, with which it co-becomes and without which it simply ceases to be possible to imagine. And when our arts of representation build worlds within which to play, to dwell, to dream, to strive, they use the very tools evolved by life in the worlds-within-worlds of the world. I write the preceding four sentences knowing well that some allomythoi, especially those reflective of the sinistral stance, posit themselves as atomic, with adamantine bounds. And such worlds of course respond to and reflect worlds that matter to their worldmakers.

"Fantastical fiction" and "fantastika," above, reiterates the fact that this work interacts with narratology, genre studies, and the literatures on genres like "science fiction," "fantasy," and "horror," as well as "myth" and "history." As a mythological or mythographic and a historiographic intervention, this project has endeavored to stress both the utility of these categories and their fraught genealogy – they are tools of power, shaped by perspective, and inevitably unfaithful to the phenomena even when attempting to serve truth.

### *§ 4.1.2. Concerning the governing grammatical-syntactic category-metaphor structuring inquiry, kairology might improve the study of allomythopoesis and allomythonostos by exploratorily shifting attention from the verbal mood (i.e., the subjunctive in contrast with the indicative) and the comparative-subordinating conjunction that invokes the hypothetical and its mood(s) (the as-if) by generalizing aspects of that prior inquiry—the attention to certain marks of relation—and turning from the subjunctive to the syncategorematic.*

In this work's introduction, I note that within religious studies the *subjunctive* (on which see also Appendix 34) and, to a lesser degree, the *as-if* (see also Appendix 42) have been invoked in construal of the meanings of the religious and the secular in this age; in Appendix 14, I note that the vital concept of *play* has been likewise identified with the subjunctive capacity (Droogers, 1996). All of this is productive since as TWT teaches such lexical signals cue world-switches; indeed, the umbrella of the subjunctive may cover a broad class of world-switches (see Appendix 30; these are the modalizations: the epistemic or K-World; the deontic or O-World; and the boulomaic or W-World). And not only do metaphors produce world-switches, one might note also that modalizations are accomplished in a manner that TWT observes to be fundamentally metaphorical (conceptual blending).

Metaphor is elemental. Metaphorical conceptual blending happens, for example, in the movement of explanation, modification, and completion from simple subject to complete and even compound subject (*Frodo* quested. → *Frodo the bachelor-hobbit and Sam his servant-friend* quested.); from simple predicate to complete and/or compound predicate (Bilbo *quested*. → Bilbo *joined the dwarves, quested abroad, and found his courage in the*

*heart of a dragon-doomed mountain*.); and from subject to predicate. A verbal world, one might say, metaphorically blends with and maps activity from a subject world to an object world. This metaphorical movement between, among, and within "worlds" is that to which I would direct renewed attention by suggesting that narratives are maps, ordered (arranged or emplotted) sequences of *events* understood as meaningful mental spaces (i.e., 'points with accessibility relations' or 'events (or situations) with linking functions'). The use of event cognition helps stabilize inquiry, but it does not and should not fall into the sinistral, essentializing trap. Events, as basic units, are fundamentally dynamic and probabilistic—processes, narratives—not irreducible essences.

As I state in n. 1 in Appendix 7, *special things are used to create fictional special things*. In that footnote, in Appendices 26 and 32, and elsewhere, I stress the value of attending to the root metaphors used in allomythopoesis because certain experiential concepts are uniquely salient and significant to people. Aspects of experience that are noteworthy enough to become grammaticalized are good places to look for potential theoretical tools.[1]

For example, if one considers the cases that have emerged in various languages, one may observe how they reveal the form of certain basic experiences and activities, bodily and cognitive. The experience of being embodied in active, dynamic *relations* that are always *spatial* (see Appendix 9) is expressed by the many cases of *location* (locative, orientative, revertive, adessive, antessive, adpudessive, inessive, intrative, pergressive, pertingent, postessive, subessive, superessive), *motion from* (ablative, adelative, delative, egressive, elative, initiative, postelative), and *motion toward* (allative, illative, lative, sublative, superlative, terminative). The cases of *states or ways of being* are locative-temporal, but they also express *agentive action* (adverbial case, essive case, exessive case, formal case, translative case). One tends to think of agentive action as the basic message and flavor of the sentence, expressing the basic activity of life, but *experience* might be claimed to be almost as important as agency. And both agent and patient can be marked by case as the experiencer. Case may even specify the experience, as when the aversive case communicates *fear*. And one exists not only in material-historical relation to bodies, places, and temporal worlds, but one also lives experientially in a communal relation of *belonging-with* and *-to* (which overlaps, as the sinistral and dextral WWLs work together, with agentive *possession-of* and *-by*). As one thinks about the cases of *belonging/possession/composition*, a core relational concept, one may see that even in them there is inevitably also a locative aspect to them (much like how adverbs of place might also be of *rest*, *toward*, or *away*); the ablative (which is sometimes the locative equivalent to the locative case relative to time) and the dative (indirect object) are somewhat opposites (*taking-source/giving-recipient*) and both are related to belonging/composition/possession (genitive) – think too of the benefactive case, comitative case, sociative case, partitive case, ornative case, distributive case (which itself has a lot to do with agentive action and space/time). The *means or instrument* that is possessed and that belongs to one is not only marked as such by case but *is itself also often an agentive experiencer* in many ancient languages. The substitutive case is an especially interesting example of belonging/possession, and this category finds a sort of contrast or inverse in the privative case and abessive case. TWT takes note of *negation* as producing a world-shift, as does shifting into *direct or indirect speech*, as is signaled for example by the vocative case and sometimes the accusative case, respectively. Concern with *presence or absence* joins with

interest in (instrumental/agentive) *causation*, itself potentially marked by the causal case, in the caritative case. The *way* is important enough that it is sometimes grammaticalized (perlative and prolative cases), and it might be thought of as the instrumental equivalent in motion through space of the instrumental/agentive case relative to agentive action more generically. But I would turn attention back, now, to the cases of states or ways of being and think of the *identical case*, which in turn returns us to *metaphorical conceptual blending* and *comparison* as a fundamental activity of thought, grammaticalized most obviously in the semblative case/similative case and the equative case.

So, to be clear, the past attention given to the subjunctive (standing no doubt for the broad class of kindred moods such as the imperative, cohortative, jussive, optative, and precative, which indeed communicate many of the flavors of worlds one might posit, desire, promote, fear, warn of, or reject) and the particle that signaled it was fruitful. However, this framework has sought to supplement it by deemphasizing the concern with what is really-truly-real (and what is below or less-than (*sub*-) whatever is really-truly-real) in order to attend to the broader class of conceptual moves signaled by particles of all sorts and the fundamental human capacities that enable such moves. Those who enjoy fantastical storyworlds and their allomythoi rarely assert they are *real*, that the storyworld exists as a *thing* somewhere or -when in the universe; instead, they *live* in a *relationship* with the stories, one that often includes a shared relationship with the stories with others, a relationship that contributes to their being constituted as they are.

The *as-if* particle itself in its modal-comparative role also necessarily draws on the metaphorical capacity. And as we have seen one finds this same role in case inflections in some languages. What I propose, in harmony with Part II of Appendix 38 and in harmony with this framework's relaxed and pragmatic approach, is to shift focus away from concern with "reality" and divergences therefrom, with the "subjunctive" (and related modal forms) carrying its implication that such divergences are to be subordinated and looked down upon, as well as away from the self-sufficient categorematic categories altogether (the dynamism of the verb and the stability of the noun may of course participate in each other's natures, and this is appropriate since *all substantives are engaged in* relational *activity*) to the syncategorematic (relationality itself, as it were). Among other things, syncategorematic elements, such as particles, may perform the roles not only of modal cues, but also, as I just described, of cues of case and other modifications—adjectival, adverbial, determinative, etc. I will not here repeat all I state in Part II of Appendix 38, but by shifting from the *subjunctive* to the *syncategorematic*, I seek to give attention to the affective, pragmatic, embodied, relational, and rhetorical nuances of allomythopoesis (that is, making allomythoi) and *allomythonostos* (which I would define, in the light of §3.3.2 of the main text and its supporting material in Appendix 44 as, "journeying to allomythic homelands"). Put differently, in order to understand how allomythic worlds are made and how people journey among them, one may think of authors as making maps of routes of metaphoric mapping – projection from world to modified world – to cue percipients to simulate a similar metaphoric mapping using their own world-modeling capacities. The syncategorematic encompasses all the many forms of metaphoric modification, including the reflexive route of metaphoric mapping-back-upon the world projected-from.

It thus encompasses the subjunctive move of shifting out of consensus reality and the fact that doing so might have a particular mood or attitude associated with it (i.e., the dismissive gaze *down* upon the lesser worlds of fiction), but it moves far beyond this,

inviting consideration of all the attitudes or judgments that might be made about – and even these as but one class of – all the metaphoric-mapping modifications of received worlds an author might make in their metaleptic moves, which kairology aims to identify and interpret.

### *§ 4.1.3. Any responsible kairological inquiry should be aware of the potential of allomythoi to be dangerous and harmful, that is, of allomythoi as a contemporary BP. (See also §§ 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 below.)*

One might liken the world today to the astounding adaptive pressures life knows in a rainforest. Global capitalism enabled by technoscientific advances presents those now living with a disconcerting and stressful situation, living in the complex culmination of accumulated choices, the virtual realities and fictional worlds of others, and the pressure to individuate and specialize in tiny niches by making for sale and marking oneself with novelty. The move to naturalize a fiction allows one to feel that one rests on stable ground, to forget that it is fictional, but fatalism as realism is also resignation. The alternative move of self-loss in the abundance and imperative to consume endless novelty also seems perilous.

One way of thinking about this is to turn to recent concerns about AI-generated art. We now ask AIs to translate ourselves to ourselves, to start telling our stories, amplifying and ossifying the library we use to train them. Will this efflorescence lead to a sclerotic culture? The information economy was already doing this of course, entrenching and normalizing certain people, spaces, ideas. But there has been a measure of truth to the claim that, via the Internet and mass media, the proliferation of storyworlds has allowed unprecedented access to discourses of the oppressed (Lincoln) that decenter the white, male, straight subject. And yet, translation is a great tool of conquest and colonization. Are we – and now still more so the AI we're creating – Leviathans swallowing more than they can and being undone by their appetites? Does absorbing so many WWLs lead to a crisis of the self-centered, self-centering project, or does it entrench the currently-dominant as the norm for all subsequent creation?

Malabou observes, along Hegelian lines refined by cognitive and neuroscientific findings:

> By extension, epigenetics studies also the changes that are due, as is the case in the brain, to experience or education. Nongenetic changes include these kinds of modifications, caused by cultural influences. In a sense, plasticity and epigenetics may be regarded as identical or synonymous. Because of its plasticity and the epigenetic character of an important part of its development, the brain is not a mere biological organ. It can also be considered a historical organ. (Malabou, 2014, p. 214)

The fact that a story can induce an epigenetic change in someone else's brain should inspire a strong sense of responsibility in those who create, market, study, and teach stories.

When one is absorbed in a storyworld, enjoying what is sometimes called the literary effect of *kenosis*, one evidently experiences some degree of desired depersonalization and derealization, perhaps to be contrasted with centered mindfulness. The worlds-within-worlds of stories, including their allomythoi, their fictional world-stances and ways of life, may indeed serve as a consumerist drug supply of supernormal stimuli fueling a self-loss and world-loss, a dissipation, or alienation, concealed by an apparent self-realization or -

possession of one's interests and desires, in a commercial proliferation that invites an anxious consumption of virtual selves and virtual worlds (compare Rosenberg's *Tradition of the New*). We – and I very much include myself in this – often escape to artificial worlds when we should spend more time returning to the natural worlds we evolved in to enjoy the fictions made by other lives making themselves (see, *e.g.*, Mencagli and Nieri's (2019) *The Secret Therapy of Trees: Harness the Healing Energy of Forest Bathing and Natural Landscapes*).

The analogy to drugs is useful (see Ronell's (1992) *Crack Wars: Literature Addiction Mania*: "To gain access to the question of 'Being-on-drugs' we have had to go the way of literature. We have chosen a work [Madame Bovary] that exemplarily treats the persecutory object of an addiction. It does so within a fictional space, according to the fanatical exigency of realism. Few other works of fiction have brought out evidence of the pharmacodependency with which literature has always been secretly associated – as sedative, as cure, as escape conduit or euphorizing substance, as mimetic poisoning."). Another way to frame the issue in a strong form would be to invoke idea of the "fetish" in the Hegelian and Marxist traditions (see also Chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1; Appendix 6; and, below, subsections 4.3.1 and 4.4 *passim*.). "Fetishism" in this context refers to human inventions that have inappropriately become alienated from and escaped human mastery and have, in turn, mastered those who made them. When one worries about how algorithms that are used to determine people's likelihood of recidivism or their credit scores thus shape the opportunities available to people (O'Neil, 2016) or about how people trust the Invisible Hand of the market to providentially (Agamben, 2011) guide the economy, one essentially is engaged in a critique of fetishism. Alluding to Goethe's poem, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice" ("Der Zauberlehrling"), Marx and Engels (1848) wrote:

> Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.

Along these lines, one might argue that Feuerbach's critical interpretation of "God" relates to the idea of the fictional supernormal stimulus as a BP — narrative fiction (i.e., a form of objectivized experience of events—see, e.g., Herman (2009) & Fludernik (1996)) makes possible all sorts of alienation (e.g., virtuality) and, as an externalized cognitive tool, may be a "fetish" (again, it may exceed our control and act on us in undesirable ways). One might think of Winnicott's claim that childhood play and its use of "potential space" develops into, in the adult realm, the "third area" of the abstractions of politics, economics, philosophy, and so on. Since I have repeatedly noted the influence of Romanticism on the formation of many of the central categories I have been engaged with in this work – "myth," "religion," "Gothic," "fantasy," "irony," "mystical," "Gnostic," and even many concepts incorrectly or incompletely subjected to an Orientalist gaze as "Eastern" – it is appropriate to ask whether my emphasis on play in this work has been itself a romantic excess or rationalization of the allomythic fetish.

Heidegger would say that most of us are, in our technoscientific alienation from the wonder of nature and loss in the ceaselessly dissatisfied and curious consumption of entertainment, indifferently suffering "the hidden distress of no-distress-at-all" (*Contributions* 4:8).

Yet, *abusus non tollit usum*. Technology can alienate us from nature, but it can also awaken us to hidden worlds of wonder (see, *e.g.*, Wilson's (1995) *The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope*). And I would agree with Wood (2008), whose work I will now engage with at some length, that the same environment that promotes "consumption" of these stories also promotes their evaluation and criticism:

> When we readers ask, as we invariably do, the important aesthetic-ethical questions—"What's morally at stake here? Does this novel earn its existence? Do I believe in it aesthetically, do I grant its right to exist?"—we are putting fiction through its own paces. In this sense, fiction is a hypothesis that is always testing itself.

And Wood also pushes back on the possibility I raised at the outset of this subsection, that the kenosis of literature is to be contrasted with mindfulness; Wood writes, "literature teaches us to notice":

> Literature makes us better noticers of life; we get to practice on life itself; which in turn makes us better readers of detail in literature; which in turn makes us better readers of life. And so on and on. You have only to teach literature to realize that most young readers are poor noticers. . . . If the history of the novel can be told as the development of free indirect style, it can no less be told as the rise of detail.

In fact, the novel, according to Wood, promotes mindful contemplation of the "self": "In the novel, we can see the self better than any literary form has yet allowed," and this includes the postmodern or Buddhist insight of the emptiness of the fixed, immaterial soul invented by the Socratic-Platonic WWL:

> [Proust's] fiction simultaneously mounts a revolt against the tyranny of fixed, Theophrastan "characteristics." . . . This new approach to character meant a new approach to form. When character is stable, form is stable and linear—the novelist begins at the beginning, telling us about his hero's childhood and education, moving decisively forward into the hero's marriage, and then toward the dramatic crux of the book (something is wrong with the marriage). But if character is changeable, then why begin at the beginning? Surely it would be more effective to begin in the middle, and then move backward, and then move forward, and then move backward again? . . . [T]he novel has become a more sophisticated analyst of deep, self-divided characters.

In addition to a unique capacity to explore the autology-BQ, Wood's analysis of the novel, translated into my terms, likewise argues that it can enable mindful interrogation of contemporary BPs:

> Modernism was born out of an understanding that, since reality has changed, the forms of the stories we tell about that reality must also change. If you trust in marriage, God, the progress of history, and the solidity of character, then the fictions you make about that reality may take complementary forms: stories culminate in the solution of marriage; characters examine their consciences, and wrestle with moral dilemmas; and these moral struggles are represented in finished paragraphs and stable language. Plots may be initially opaque but culminate in clarity. . . . But imagine that these stabilities are crumbling, that they are newly hard to believe in, that faith in them has been

> shattered by the carnage of the Great War or the calamity of the Holocaust. The form of an artwork may then have to reflect that new uncertainty. Now human beings struggle to communicate with each other; so perhaps a familial proliferation of many plots, warmly interrelated, will suddenly seem inauthentic. History does not seem to be progressing so much as stalling, or self-immolating, so perhaps the fictions set amidst that history must break off, or sliver into fragments, rather than sail on toward marriage and harmony and a spreading consensus. Words no longer seem to connect to their referents, because the surety of meaning has been exploded; words have become like an inflated currency—empty, insultingly worthless. So words must be used differently, with less certainty perhaps, and more self-consciousness: a self-conscious difficulty. . . . You could say that form becomes newly important in the modern age. For both modernism and postmodernism, form is where contemporary anxieties, preoccupations, and pleasures are inscribed. The frame comes off the painting, or the frame is itself painted over.

This awareness of structure, of form and of the form or the actual formlessness of life – one might say, an on-the-ground cultivation of awareness of event cognition – that is promoted by attentive engagement with a narrative, may offer an opportunity to mediate on how one's own significance is lit up by the shadow of death, how awareness of (primordially O-mode) boundary-making allows us to think about how we might want to set the bounds of our own stories (Wood, 2008):

> There's an obvious philosophical or metaphysical dimension to this idea. Many of us find it hard to see or think about the shape of our life stories. We live caught up in plot—the rush of day-to-day instances, the full calendar of appointments and obligations, the coincidences and events that are sprung on us by chance. We live in an eternal discovery phase. Perhaps once or twice a year, on some significant day like New Year's Eve or a birthday, we try to reflect on the form of our lives, about what has been and what is to come. At those moments, we try to turn plot (chance) into form (fate, destiny, providence, shape). Something similar occurs at a funeral or memorial service: we gain a reflective sense of an entire life, now finished, we get to think about the shape of a life. We can do so because death has stopped that life: death has imposed its stern type of form, a metaphysical meaning and shape. That is what Walter Benjamin says about fiction in his essay "The Storyteller" (1936). He argues that classic storytelling (he means oral tales, old fables, and suchlike) has always been structured around death. . . . So fiction—here I'm extrapolating from Walter Benjamin—ideally offers us a power we tend to lack in our own lives: to reflect on the form and direction of our existence; to see the birth, development, and end of a completed life. The novel provides us with the religious [later, "Godlike"] power to see beginnings and endings. . . . In a world in which the screen has replaced the window, we know more than Benjamin could possibly have foreseen about the terrible unseriousness of existence amidst futile distractions of information, the too-persuasive authority of data, the allure of rival and generally inferior forms of narrative (TV, YouTube, video games, GIFs).

> When literature competes directly with such attractions, it tends to lose. But think instead of literature as a site of concentration, critique, surplus—concentration as critique: literature as the stillness at the eye of the storm, a kind of prayerful attention. Think of fictional form as something closer to the poem than to the diary. Art insists on concentration by virtue of having form. Life, as I suggested, strikes us as essentially formless; and technology, though full of cute, discrete objects, is essentially formless too. . . . Technology dreams of infinity. . . . Yet literary form, while of course expansive and multifarious, can also possess a certain negative power. It shows us where things *stop*. It places an almost sacred border around the artwork and says, "This is not identical with the claims of the world. This is different from the world. This is a space that demands a certain degree of strangeness, apartness, submission, significance." Form absorbs but can finally resist the world, is superbly autonomous. Really, universally, human relations stop nowhere, said Henry James. And, he went on, "the eternal problem of the artist is to draw a circle within which such relations merely *appear* to stop." The stopping of an endless prolongation may be one of form's most important virtues, the artifice by which everything earns its own perfect justification, the artifice which charges everything inside the charmed circle with chosen meaning.

Just as new words found new worlds that may be new selves; form is fiction is life. In this work, I advanced the idea the allomythoi offer themselves as new homelands for the self, new histories, or, better, "mythistories," that can supply options for self-fashioning. Wood notes postmodern novelists work with a keen awareness of the mythic-ideological character of the realist style of history, and this disruption of pure realism while at the same time drawing heavily on its conventions aids the fantastical genres in exploration of the fictionality-BP:

> Moody's three sentences ["It's quaint to say so, but the realistic novel still needs a kick in the ass. The genre, with its epiphanies, its rising action, its predictable movement, its conventional humanisms, can still entertain and move us on occasion, but for me it's politically and philosophically dubious and often dull. Therefore, it needs a kick in the ass."] efficiently compact the reigning assumptions. Realism is a "genre" (rather than, say, a central impulse in fiction-making); it is taken to be mere dead convention, and to be related to a certain kind of traditional plot, with predictable beginnings and endings; it deals in "round" characters, but softly and piously ("conventional humanisms"); it assumes that the world can be described, with a naively stable link between word and referent ("philosophically dubious"); and all this will tend toward a conservative or even oppressive politics ("politically … dubious"). . . . Barthes argued that there is no "realistic" way to narrate the world. The nineteenth-century author's naive delusion that a word has a necessary and transparent link to its referent has been nullified. We move merely among different, competing genres of fiction-making, of which realism is just the most confused, and perhaps the most obtuse because the least self-conscious about its own procedures. Realism does not refer to reality; realism is not realistic. Realism, said Barthes, is a system of

> conventional codes, a grammar so ubiquitous that we do not notice the way it structures bourgeois storytelling. . . . Postmodern novelists continue to make up fictions, but they want to do so on different terms, the most prominent being that they simultaneously acknowledge that they are making up those fictions. So the metafictional or self-reflexive novel tends to have an atmosphere of confession, of knowing or ironic acknowledgment—admitting to, sometimes atoning for, often knowingly and joyfully delighting in the fact that it is a fiction. . . . Such writers reach back into the novelistic tradition, because one of the first great novels, Don Quixote , is a vibrant, funny, tender, and deeply serious fiction that is also a joyous commentary on the making of fiction, and indeed on the fictionality of reality. . . . Serious artists like Cervantes are engrossed by the ways in which we go about constructing our realities, the fictions that we use to support and propel our often fantastic interior lives; so by implication (and often explicitly), they are interested in their own, analogous methods of such construction.

Wood offers the word *lifeness* to explain why realism, "seen broadly as truthfulness to the way things are," expressive of the novelist's "project of realism, ever-greedy for life," "cannot be mere verisimilitude, cannot be mere lifelikeness, or lifesameness. . . . cannot be a genre," and, rather, is the origin of all genres, "teach[ing] everyone else; it schools its own truants: it is what allows magical realism, hysterical realism, fantasy, science fiction, even thrillers, to exist": "The true writer, that free servant of life, is one who must always be acting as if life were a category beyond anything the novel had yet grasped; as if life itself were always on the verge of becoming conventional."

Heidegger and Wood both take a generally dim view of "technology," in the sense of a calculative thinking that believes in its own mastery of the world, while yet valuing, respectively, poetry and fiction. Heidegger stresses the rather *unitary*, grateful dwelling in a world (an intelligibility structure) that always exists in relation to the mystery (the abundance of unknowable possible worlds, including others, other heritages, and one's death); I would not completely disagree, but I would stress the multiplicity of worlds each human inhabits, the dynamic and imperfectly achieved translation among worlds, the exploration of the mystery, i.e., the value of taking on the risk of losing oneself in curiosity. See also, below, § 4.4.

## § 4.2. Relating to Chapter 2

***§ 4.2.1. Nuttall's absence in this text might be conspicuous to some; Nuttall (2018) is an important compliment to this work and a vital text for future kairological inquiry at the level of individual characters' private allomythoi and sustained close-reading of texts for allomythic qualia that could not be elaborated above, but it seemed best to direct those whose kairological questions are of Nuttall's sort (e.g., what is the individual-allomythic "mind style" of Samwise Gamgee or John Galt? how do the nuances of an allomythos arise from specific syntactic decisions?) to Nuttall and await from someone else's hand a future Nuttall-Fredrickson critical synthesis, which unfortunately must be postponed for now.***

In Chapter 2 (§ 2.3 and n. 24), Appendix 1, Appendix 15, and elsewhere, I note that an allomythos and even an allomythology of allomythoi may be analyzed at the level of an individual character, though this was not the focus of my work here, which has been focused, not on fictional individuals in their solitude, but on fictional WWLs shared (on some level, socially) by fictional characters within a storyworld. This has led to some distortions in my analysis, particularly of resolutely individualist Rand. In Chapter 2, I engaged with cognitive narratology and cognitive semantics, text world theory,[2] and the linguistic phenomenon of neologisms, illustrating how low-level linguistic cues induce world shifts, experiential aspects of narrative engagement, and so on, but I did not delve into the linguistic details and mechanics analyzed by systemic-functional grammar, cognitive grammar, and cognitive stylistics relative to the generation of what is called "mind style," the individualized fictional WWL of a given character. I did not devote the space to close textual readings that some might have expected or desired. Those who know of Nuttall's (2018) work, *Mind Style and Cognitive Grammar: Language and Worldview in Speculative Fiction*, or the bodies of research that underly it (e.g., Halliday's foundational work in systemic-functional grammar (1971, 1973, 1978); Fowler's on "mind style" (1977, 1986, 1996); etc.) may have sensed in these very things the contours of a gap in my proffered framework.

I am reminded of William James:

> Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of a wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term. If the wrong names are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately to negate them. They do not fit into its mold. (1890, p. 251; cf. Mangan, 1993, 2003, 2007)

Because Nuttall's work fills this gap so well, it seems to me best to direct those whose kairological questions are of this sort (e.g., what is the individual-allomythic "mind style" of Samwise Gamgee or John Galt? how do the nuances of a character's allomythos (or, for that matter, a narrator's—Bortolussi, 2011; Kafalenos, 2011; Abbott, 2011) arise from specific syntactic decisions?) to Nuttall. And it would be gratifying to see some someday work on projects integrating Nuttall's work and mine (and by that point, hopefully, others') in closer studies of individual allomythoi.

Let me provide a brief sense of Nuttall's work on *mind style* (Nuttal, 2018, p. 23 ("'mind style is to do with how language reflects the particular conceptual structures and cognitive habits that characterise an individual's worldview' (Semino 2002: 95)."), beginning with the following passage (2018, p. 19):

> Differentiating 'mind style' from 'style' is the reader's attribution of . . . linguistic patterns to an individual mind. . . . [D]iscussions of mind style have argued that its relevance is best seen where foregrounded linguistic patterns also suggest an unorthodox or 'deviant' view of the world (Semino and Swindlehurst 1996: 145; McIntyre 2006: 144; Hoover 2016: 338). Taking this further, Stockwell's (2009: 125) argument that 'only those viewpoints that are regarded as non-normative and idiosyncratic are actually noticed in natural reading' contributes to a restricted definition of mind style as 'the presentation of a highly deviant or at least very unusual worldview'.

> Following this view, applications of mind style reveal a tendency to focus on examples at the 'unorthodox' end of Leech and Short's cline, and the mind styles of characters which are 'more readily discernible as odd' (Leech and Short 2007: 162), than those observed at other levels of narrative structure. More specifically, mind style has become 'associated with those narratives in which narrator and/or characters display certain unconventional psychological traits' (Montoro 2010: 31) and often those which seemingly represent identifiable cognitive conditions such as autism, schizophrenia and depression (Bockting 1995; Semino and Swindlehurst 1996; Montoro 2010; Semino 2011, 2014; Demjén 2015), or the 'special mental tendency' associated with criminal minds (Gregoriou 2003: 125; see also Semino 2002; Fanlo Piniés 2005).

One thinks immediately of those stories that describe subjectively a character experiencing the development of new supernatural cognitive abilities or monstrous desires or a new embodied experience. But Nuttall (2018, p. 20) rejects this restricted use of "mind style":

> While agreeing with the basic need for both conceptual and linguistic deviation in the recognition of a mind style (or the need that the mind be 'individual' and expressed through linguistic patterns that are 'distinctive'; Fowler 1977: 76), restricted application to just those minds we are able to define or diagnose in psychological terms risks losing some of the critical value and attractiveness of the original model.

Instead, Nuttall focuses on how the new worlds of speculative fiction have novel effects on minds (2018, pp. 20–2):

> In Chapters 4 to 7, I investigate the application of mind style to the minds of characters encountered within the strange worlds of speculative fiction. Though analysed from a cognitive perspective, the deviation which foregrounds these mind styles in readers' attention is not associated with specific cognitive conditions, but rather the effects of the characters' physical and social environment and their individual personality traits. . . . While Fowler presents 'ideological point of view', 'worldview' and 'mind style' as synonymous, such terms can be usefully distinguished (Semino and Swindlehurst 1996; Semino 2002). Semino argues for a distinction between the aspects of worldviews represented by 'ideological point of view' and 'mind style' in the following terms:
>
> > The notion of 'ideological point of view' is most apt to capture those aspects of world views that are social, cultural or political in origin, and which an individual is likely to share with others belonging to similar social, cultural and religious groups. [. . .] The notion of 'mind style', on the other hand, is most apt to capture those aspects of world views that are primarily personal and cognitive in origin. (2002: 97)
>
> [The term] 'mind style' [tends to be] preferred for idiosyncratic worldviews (e.g. Bockting 1994; McIntyre 2005) and 'ideological point of view' for worldviews with wider sociocultural relevance (e.g. Simpson 1993; Hoover 2016). . . . This distinction is related to the question of normality and deviation. Stockwell (2009: 124) models a 'cline of viewpoints', ranging

> from those naturalized, socially shared ideological points of view which appear 'normal', to those idiosyncratic, 'deviant' viewpoints which we attribute to a mind style. . . . [A] distinction between mind style as *cognitive habit* and *rhetorical strategy* might be described in systemic-functional grammar terms as a privileging of the ideational or interpersonal metafunction in the interpretation of a mind style, respectively. . . . The ways in which the patterns giving rise to mind style are evidenced by stylisticians is highly variable, with some analyses providing textual examples and others drawing on corpus methodologies to provide quantitative data of varying complexity (McIntyre and Archer 2010; Semino 2011; Stockwell and Mahlberg 2015).

What are some of these patterns?

> Alongside the use of vocabulary and syntax described in its early applications, features identified as contributing to a character or narrator's mind style include foregrounded patterns in the use of metaphor (Black 1993; Semino and Swindlehurst 1996; Semino 2002, 2006) and the representation of speech and thought (Bockting 1995; Semino 2011). The communicative behaviour of characters, or the pragmatic features of their interactions with others, have also been found to be an important source of inferences regarding mind style (Culpeper 2001; Fanlo Piniés 2005; McIntyre 2005, 2006; Semino 2007, 2014; Bousfield 2014). Finally, initial steps have been taken to explore the contribution of paralinguistic and nonverbal features to the creation of mind style (Montoro 2010). (Nuttall, 2018, p. 23)

Nuttall's work should be consulted by anyone who seeks to trace how bottom-up syntactic and linguistic choices[3] accumulate to cue a reader to generate a distinctive individual allomythos.[4]

The detailed study of narrative effects one finds in Nuttall's immersion in the poetry of linguistic details, resembles, by placing far more emphasis on particularity and the nuances of a specific medium, Hayles's use of detailed narratives to contest the metanarrative of virtuality, disembodiment, and reduction-to-information-as-pattern that pervades the "posthuman." In this work, I stressed the value of translation and the importance of keeping in mind ultimate untranslatablity for similar reasons: general, abstract categories are powerful conceptual bridges that bring together a lot of fact and theory. But though I am in a great deal of sympathy with the cognitive insight that we and our environments are information systems, cognition and information are always material-energetic configurations in which their material-energetic particularities (i.e., medium) are irreplaceable, untranslatable, incapable of abstraction without loss of meaning or message. Another way of saying this would be that a worldview or worldstance (the more easily abstracted but always embodied "message") is inherent in its correlative way of life (again, its "medium"), and a different way of life, even one that is said to be a translation or version of the same worldview, is a different worldview—although the experiential difference may require subtle analysis to surface. As Hayles states, "[A]bstract pattern can never fully capture the embodied actuality, unless it is as prolix and noisy as the body itself."

***§ 4.2.2. A substantial gap in this work, simply because it is beyond my expertise, is fantastical worldmaking, including the making of allomythoi, in video games.***

The participatory engagement with storyworlds afforded by video games may help to make them more persuasive.[5] Because William Luther Pierce knew this, for example, he actively promoted the use of video games to draw young white people, especially white boys, into the white supremacist worldview. In 2002, National Alliance, under his direction and through its record label, which more generally produced neo-Nazi, antisemitic, racist, and white nationalist music (another aspect of worldmaking that is beyond my expertise), issued the video game *Ethnic Cleansing: The Game*. A player can choose to be either a Ku Klux Klan member, a neo-Nazi skinhead, or White Will (a character tribute to Timothy McVeigh, whom the character is designed to look like), and the objective of *Ethnic Cleansing* is to, first, murder the "sub-human" minions of the Jewish cabal that controls them (Black people make monkey noises when they die; Latinos say things like *¡Ay, caramba!*), culminating in their boss, Big Nig; then, one descends into the subway to confront the Jewish masters, with the final boss being Ariel Sharon, the prime minister of Israel. In the background, as one "Celebrate[s] . . . a virtual Race War," racist music from the record label plays, and the urban environment aboveground and the underground "Lair of the Beast" are adorned with racist slogans developed by Pierce's organization and affiliated groups. As Rachel Aviv writes,

> [*Ethnic Cleansing*] meticulously teaches the specifics of its worldview (why we should kill, who we should kill, and the history of white "victimization") through repetition, hands-on participation, and a series of escalating challenges. The natural instructive potential of video games—currently enjoyed by mostly religious and military groups—has caught the attention of educators willing to try anything that gets a student to become obsessive about mastering a system of thought. As James Gee, a professor at the University of Wisconsin and author of *What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), sees it, [*Ethnic Cleansing*] is a persuasive example of how games can be used to convey ideological messages. "Modern video games are profoundly motivating, certainly much more so than textbooks," he tells the *Voice*. "They're about taking on an identity, making choices and looking at the world a certain way. We can only hope that people with better philosophies than the National Alliance make some games." (2005, n.p.)

The next game was intended to be an adaptation of *The Turner Diaries*, but instead *White Law* was released the following year, 2003. It's a sequel set in 2021 in which white police officers have been abolished and one takes on the role of a vigilante ex-SWAT team member, Michael Riley, as white police systematically murder minorities. "More weapons, more levels, much more challenging than *Ethnic Cleansing*!"

*White Law* and *Ethnic Cleansing* are hardly the only hate-based, racist video games (*e.g.*, *Muslim Massacre*, *Zog's Nightmare*, etc.), and racist gamers use "mods" to conform popular games to their worldview. And sadly other games exist to celebrate things like "rape culture" – *e.g.*, *Rapelay*, in which a male character's task is to stalk and rape a mother and her two daughters, or *Custer's Revenge*, in which a cowboy's goal is to overcome obstacles and rape a Native American woman tied to a pole. Others allow people to be a school

shooter (*e.g.*, *V-Tech Rampage*, based on the Virginia Tech shooting, and *Super Columbine Massacre RPG—cf. Postal* and *Postal 2*), a serial killer who lingers over the "creative" torture and murder of a virtual victim, and other appalling things. *Grand Theft Auto* is probably the most famous series pandering to crude violence, but *Sociolotron*, *Bully*, and similar works made it into the news and congressional debates over the years.

Many popular fantastical books and series with elaborate worldmaking involving creation of robust allomythoi have been turned into video games. *El Shaddai: Ascension of the Metatron* is a fine example of contemporary allomythic worldmaking that is explicitly comparable to (and even based on) ancient mythopoesis—as are the many games based on the *One Thousand and One Nights*, on the *Bible*, and on many sacred East and South Asian narratives. Of the central texts used as examples in this work, in addition to Pierce's video game propaganda, Rand's O-mode Objectivist work has itself been responded to oppositionally in the *BioShock* series; there are many games based on Tolkien's work and some on King's; *Discordia* specifically allows one to further explore King's *Dark Tower* universe; and *The Golden Compass* video game was released with the first filmic adaptation. I sense that much can be done (and no doubt has already been done) to understand how, in a video game, behavior might be rhetorically structured, how space and music might evoke mood, how what is valuable might be communicated as such and measured, how information might be flagged as trustworthy or not, and so on.

Moreover, the gamification of work, learning, and culture more generally means that gamification appears as a BP in many fantastical texts, related to BPs like virtuality and fictionality. Like sleep and other mental states in which we and other animals shift between worlds, games are not merely useful structuring metaphors for storyworlds that foreground a metaleptic shift out of or away from this one. They are foundational. Those with expertise in this area would no doubt be able to make great contributions to kairology. And one can easily imagine collaboration in this area with projects like the Institute for the Bio-Cultural Study of Religion's (IBCSR) Simulating Religion Project (SRP), the Modeling Religion Project (MRP) under IBCSR's SRP but also coordinated by the Center for Mind and Culture, the Virginia Modeling and Simulation Center of Old Dominion University, and the Center for Modeling Social Systems at the University of Agder, Norway, and related endeavors.

Appendix 25 engages with the audiovisual, as does Appendix 50, but research focused on allomythoi in movies and TV would also be welcome.

## § 4.3. Relating to Chapter 3

***§ 4.3.1. Taking allomythoi seriously as a BP, metareflecting on this framework to make its WWL explicit, a "philosophy of kairology" may be articulated, and it may tentatively be summarized as follows: (1) kairology is fundamentally oriented toward the allomythoi-BP but situated within worldview studies, taking its concern with BQs as fundamental to its own practice; (2) kairology is a conceptual blend drawing on diverse explanatory research and hermeneutic methods to supply a framework for understanding allomythoi; (3) kairology is deeply dialogical and dialectical, reflecting the natures of the relevant constitutive elements that produce allomythoi; and (4) a philosophy of kairology should be critical and adopt a high level of generality, but individual kairological inquires, even if philosophical, need not.***

A conclusion invites one to metareflect on one's work, on this metareflective framework, toolkit, technique, or heuristic for studying allomythoi. "There is no such thing as a pure technique that isolates itself completely from the insight that decides what that technique is about and what it is for. Technique has no meaning apart from some informing vision" (Barrett, 1979, p. 88). What "vision" informs this work's technique(s)?

Kairological hermeneutics, like Hermes, the god of boundaries and boundary crossing, invites its own metaleptic world switch. The kairological framework might be likened to (again, this is a metaphor) an unformalized mapping function that translates a targeted aspect of a living fiction (its allomythoi) into an abstracted model that allows one to better understand that aspect of fictional worlds relative to their broader contexts of production. All kairological exegesis, then, is also eisegesis. Fantastical worldmaking is itself interpretive, asking and answering, asking and responding, of and to traditions of genres, of and to current events, of and to histories, of and to traditions of story elements, of and to prior WWLs and allomythoi, and so on, in a dialogic dialectic of worlds within worlds. Kairology, drawing on tools of interpretation (e.g., rhetoric, historiography, science fiction studies, etc.) and explanation (e.g., cognitive science, cognitive narratology, etc.), treats the worlds-within-worlds of such interpretive *fiction* as coming from and returning to the worlds-within-worlds of *life*—but not inevitably in the old historicist sense that the art of an epoch transparently expresses the spirit of a people or an age (N-mode). A work need not have or express a single, unified vision—of a people or of an individual—for peoples and individuals are themselves worlds within worlds. The fictional worldmaker may, for example, set up a dislocative or disorienting jumble of world-fragments or an ironic saying of a world simultaneously unsaid.

So fiction comes from and returns to life. Life relates to itself both instrumentally (my embodied self implements my will, *real*izes my goals, makes (*fictio*) *things* happen (i.e., "real" or "present" in actuality)) and finally (it makes itself happen; itself as its own medium is also always expressing its meaning or nature). Storyworlds are, on the one hand, mechanisms, tools, instruments, "things" that are made to do things, but they are "instruments" of a relatively unique kind, *worlds*, participating in the nature of the various systems of representation we use as media, both to (instrumentally) store and cue their re-creative re-presentation that is only possible in reference to the worlds-within-worlds of life, and, more profoundly, to *inhabit* a world of meaning. Storyworlds – including their allomythoi – have a life and "agency" of their own; language itself no less than the fund of past stories, events, images, these have an open, relational depth of meanings and "agency" that exceeds any poet's conscious instrumental objective.[6] Because the events in a story relate internally to each other and the story itself (as narrative) to itself (as storyworld), while also relating "externally" to the context and situation of its making, while also relating to and drawing more fundamentally on the relations and interconnections that obtain in the "real" world language seeks to re-present, while also, in reception, cueing relations to novel situations of interpretation, a referential density arises that challenges any kairological hermeneutic to make sense of its mystery without abstracting or reducing away the seriousness of that density.

Any philosophy of kairology should partake of the critical, so that it is not merely a mythology or theology of allomythoi—a celebratory naturalization of them or faith in them seeking a rationalization. At the same time, it must adopt the hermeneutic posture of "faith"

at the stage of reception; that is, hermeneutics of faith and suspicion, of taking in the whole and of analyzing parts, should alternate. I have been so busy, in developing this framework, in the task of understanding the techniques, aims, and applications of allomythic illusion, that I have worried whether I have been sufficiently critical of the phenomenon. (See above, § 4.1.3, and below, § 4.4 *passim*.)

I am, as I am sure many of us are, worried about my screen time, anxious that I do not spend enough of my precious moments of life swimming, enjoying my husband, cooking and eating good things, playing with my niece and nephew, walking in the mountains and along the beach with my dog, forest bathing with my sister, listening to my mother sing. I neglect so many worlds within this world for the mirages of mass media.

And yet.

The divide between our nature and our fictions, as between life and fiction, is itself an artifice; life is itself matter engaged in fiction, and we are fiction-making animals through and through. And we who know the sweet fruit of this tree will not willingly be parted from the garden. When I swim, in an artificial pond of clear, clean water, I shift among worlds—from breath to breath, with synchronous motion, I sometimes imagine myself a dolphin in the sea or contemplate my goals for the day: a possible life world or possible worlds my life might become. When I make love to my husband, the element of fantasy is present, layering the experience, not only with the memories of over a decade together, but also with fantasies that go far beyond what is possible or even, actually, desirable in "reality." And ah! the fiction of cooking—the supernormal stimuli I craft, the ways I can manipulate texture and color, the spectrum of flavors and smells, temperature, layering the experience and, even, how it may unfold in time, and the whole network of signification that specific foods are embedded in. And oh! how much of the fun of playing with children is making fictional worlds with them; my niece and nephew have never seen *The Lord of the Rings*, but they could tell you, just as well as any ancient Greek children could tell you about Heracles' labors or the Trojan horse, the story of Ungoliant poisoning the Two Trees with her venom, of the theft of the Silmarils and the terrible vow of the elves, of Beren and Lúthien's love and courage—and all Huan, the Hound of Valinor, did to ensure their success, and, yes, of Bilbo and Frodo and the Ring. Each choice makes and moves into a new world. The addition of sweet, a new stroke of blue, a spin with a leg kick. I pass through the worlds of mountain, beach, and forest, but at the same time, I move among so many other worlds, the ever-present past and future, the worlds of conversation with companions, worlds like those my mother's songs leap among.[7]

The tools described in Chapter 2, used to make worlds responsive to the fundamental questions in Chapter 1, under the conditions described in Chapter 3 and responding, too, to the world-historical concerns there identified, are truly powerful techniques. This is part of why intentional instruction regarding them, as discussed in the following section, would be so worthwhile as part of an evidence-based GE curriculum. But their artifice is not so far from the fictional worlds that saturate our daily life without ever picking up a book, activating a video game, or going to a movie. Many of our fantastical worlds are themselves, as Chapter 3 illustrates, critically concerned with technique's exploitative, globalized power and the virtuality of ubiquitous fictionality. The new homes we try to rest in are all-too-aware of their foundations and their setting.

The peril for us is that the worlds we move among, the worlds we take into ourselves by extending our self-and-world to project them, are potential truths for us. We may be lost

in them, value them above their worth because they seem so real. Corresponsive, correlative, instrumental, disclosive—the philosophers may debate the nuances, but the terror of Descartes's Demon, as this son of a schizophrenic mother and a bipolar father, raised in a devout household and congregation of "true" Christians, may bear Witness (wink, wink), is that we may all here be, or become, mad. And any world one might project to gaze down upon another to evaluate its veracity is working within the same system, which itself has been called into question.

I believe we evolved to live in this world and that, at our granular level of reality, our self-and-world modeling system is adapted to adapt or "modularize" itself, generally, to the range of situations it has so far survived. Part of this adaptive process has been the modification of its adaptive environments, and this resulting self-domestication has exceeded (indeed, always exceeded) our grasp. But many of our culture-bearers have deployed the fictional capacity on vast world-building scales to explore critically the problems of exploitative power, fictional virtuality, and their increasingly comprehensive, global extent.

I of course invoked our hemispheric lateralization in this project. Let me quote from Barrett:

> What leads us to the philosophies we eventually adopt for ourselves? Or, more simply, what makes us as individuals see things as we do? There is no sure answer to this question, but one amusing anecdote about Whitehead and Russell may shed a little light on the question. The incident occurred during days of their collaboration on the *Principia*. Whitehead had been puzzled and fascinated for some time that in almost all matters Russell came at a different angle from his own. Finally, he observed to his friend: "You know, there are two kinds of people in the world: the simple-minded and the muddleheadeded." [How fine the use of the hyphen here.] And when Russell waited for the application, Whitehead immediately gave it: "You, Bertie, are simple-minded, I am muddleheaded." The terms are playful and ironic, but their intent is serious and their perceptiveness acute. (1979, p. 17)

Let me attempt a contemporary illustration and say, trans-exclusionary "feminism," in its J. K. Rowling-style concern for *women*, is simple-minded and essentialist (one thinks of her careless and appropriative taking-up of Native American sacred stories, whose sacred spirits, tricksters, and embodied tribal leaders were often creatures who mingled and occupied multiple gender spaces, both grammatically/linguistically and ontologically), and the *queer* advocacy for gender-nonconforming people, who are in general themselves often simple-minded and essentialist about gender (witness how, consequently, queer thinkers like RuPaul and Judith Butler have been at times at odds with transgender people's sincere self-understandings), is muddleheaded—in its defense intentionally so and, to be redundant, in accord with queer theorists' capacious and plural comprehension of worlds. Barrett continues,

> We are reminded of William James' classification of "tough-minded" vs. "tender-minded" thinkers. But "tough" and "tender" connote certain factors of aggressiveness and of the will, while Whitehead's distinctions is more purely intellectual. The "simpleminded" fasten upon the clear fragments of fact that lie in the foreground of reality against which those facts emerge. The "muddleheaded," on the other hand, are so engrossed in this complexity of

> background that enters into every atom of fact that clarity of expression emerges dimly if at all. (pp. 17-18).

I would note in Barrett this clear awareness of what we now know are lateral biases, but I would stress, too, our typical integration. Our worldviews are generally a mixture of simple-minded and muddleheaded attempts to answer the questions and concerns that press upon us. Kairology is both simpleminded and muddleheaded.

So, again, what might be a philosophy of *kairo*-logy?

I chose to call the study of fictional worldviews and ways of life *kairology*, from the Greek rhetorical concept, *kairos*, in part because this dissertation engages so extensively with philosophers' and cognitive scientists' findings about *space* (in this respect, see Marramao's (2006) *Kairós: Towards an Ontology of 'Due Time'*), a correction, I think, of the sometimes overly temporal focus of many philosophers (e.g., early Heidegger (see Malpas's compelling arguments drawing on Kant), Ricoeur's understanding of narrative, etc.). From early Greek usage, it is helpful to note that *kairos* originally has a spatial dimension (Rickert, 2007), the vital or lethal place on a body, and a strong association with the appropriate time for ritual killing, sacrifice. Kairos as timeliness, as sensing the situation, the zeitgeist, the atmosphere – apparently foregrounds time, but time is an abstraction: time is for us always spatialized and embodied. Making or selecting situations or events, so as to constitute episodic chains or maps of such events, a new situation – this poetic act emerges from a specific, typically complex, situation and leaves it transformed.

But I selected *kairology* for other reasons as well. Part of my reasoning has to do with keeping my eye on research on fiction-based WWLs. When one thinks about why people turn to fiction, they might simply seek *catharsis* or *kenosis*, to release powerful emotion or lose themselves in other worlds, but some turn to fiction as seekers, desiring that it transform them. This is sometimes called *kairosis*.

Of course, Cærus (Kairos) the god and *kairos* as a concept has a long "religious" and philosophical genealogy in addition to the meanings assigned to it in rhetoric. It is a CCC. In this respect, it is much like "worldview," which, apart from its disciplined use in academic circles, has contemporary associations with Evangelical Christianity and old associations ranging from its troubling (mis)use by the Nazis to a variety of philosophical formulations (see Appendix 10; *kairos* has been much used in the critical interrogation of Nazism). This raises concerns, but it is still the most general, neutral term available without resorting to a neologism.

The conceptual blend[8] I would endorse for the meaning of *kairology* would draw from aspects of the complex networks of metaphorical blends in the long history of *kairos*. Here are some primary ones:

1. In response to the Christian tradition of *kairos* (from the NT to Tillich) and its use by Marxist, Continental, and related philosophers, as *kairos* and as Event (e.g., Benjamin, Agamben, Negri, Žižek, Jameson, Badiou, Bloch), I do not quibble with particularity, nor even *kairos*'s association with reading history and/or myth, nor even with the contrast set up between *chronos* as calendar time and *kairos* as meaningful time, but I would explicitly reject the radical, apocalyptic singularity of *kairos* as the coming of the cosmic moment or ultimate significance rooted in a specific WWL and its distinctive reading of history and/or its distinctive myth (e.g., the Kingdom, the reunion of the human and the divine, the messianic Event, the

Revolution, the new dispensation, the moment of existential decision, the cosmic law, etc.).[9] I do enjoy the way Bloch links kairos to the miraculous, given this work's interest in the fantastical, and of course the way it relates in his system to the *Novum* and the *Ultimum*. (See, e.g., Boer, 2013; Ó Murchadha, 2013; Taubes, 2009; Marramao, 2007; Kermode, 2000; Kittel, Friedrich, & Bromiley, Eds.,1985; Barr, 1969; )

2. From the pre-Socratics and the Sophists, I find it productive to understand *kairos* in terms of flexible, even spontaneous, adaptation to circumstance, in which relative, socially conditioned responses to BQs (e.g., the epistemological and axiological question of "truth") and BPs (e.g., the significance of and effective or expedient response to fictionality) are created (Covino & Jolliffe, 1995). This approach has much in common with Eskin's (2002) Hippocrates, who used *kairos* in the medical context to refer to active, timely intervention that takes into account the environment, the individual patient as they undergo their crisis, and other particularities of a situation. And the Hippocratic sense may be seen to emerge from and be closely related to its sense in war and hunting and its close ties to the crisis of mortality as well as its use in agricultural contexts to refer to tending to the details of life to promote growth and flourishing (season, weather, soil, and so on). Miller's (2012) Gorgian *kairos* is another useful account. I particularly like Miller's observations about the *magic* of language and how poets and rhetors not only put words to the occasion but also, in their words, are active mouthpieces of the situation; unlike Plato's invention, the rational soul that directly apprehends the one, universal Truth, "[i]n Gorgias there is no concept of the soul or other essence of the self to provide a privileged position or perspective."
3. Therefore, with Boer (2013), I have reservations toward the Pythagorean-Platonic-Ciceronian alternative that is more akin to its Christian successors, as the "appropriate," the "conventional" or "predictable," the "decorous," the "harmonious, balanced, or proportionate," the "moderate," even the "Good" (see, e.g., Harker, 2007; Sutton, 2001; Kennedy, 1980; Burke, 1969). Let me quote Boer at some length:

> [I]t becomes possible to identify the economic and class dimensions of kairós and ákairos. In order to do so, we must ask: due measure, timeliness, harmony and universal law for whom and for what purpose? The answer begins with Wood, who has made clear in regard to Plato that he embodies the thought of an aristocratic and anti-democratic elite, in short a ruling-class ideology (Wood, 1997: 142–143, 2008: 50–98). A characteristic feature of such an ideology is the claim that its own particular perspective is applicable to all, that it is a universal law. A further dimension in our search for the class dimensions of kairós involves an unwitting insight by Kinneavy, who was instrumental in recovering kairós as a term in recent debates over ethics and rhetoric. Asked whether kairós is a political term, Kinneavy responds:
>
> > In its origins it was. As a matter of fact, you may remember that the symbolic reference was to kairos as a god. He was a god in Greece, and he was represented as a young man, a

> student at the two-year, kind of junior-college preparation they had for policing and for war. (Thompson, 2000: 79; see also Kinneavy, 1983: 93)

But what kind of young man does this god represent? Here Aristotle, true to the spirit of his teacher Plato, provides the best definition. Such education is appropriate not for persons of low tastes, who are the vast majority: 'The utter vulgarity of the herd of men comes out in their preference for the sort of existence a cow leads' (Aristotle, 1955: Eth. Nic. I.5: 30; see also X.9: 309–310). In other words, only ruling-class males, precisely Plato's and Aristotle's students, if not of every philosopher–teacher, are capable of philosophical reflection, rhetorical training and political leadership, thereby excluding slaves, peasants, artisans and women. Yet this particular ideology is assumed to be universal, applicable also to those members of the vulgar herd. At this point, a connection opens up between kairós–ákairos and a wider series of moral, class and economic oppositions, each of which favours one term over another. As Ste. Croix has shown, the apparently innocent Platonic question, 'what is good (*agathos*)?' is far from innocent. It has distinctly class assumptions, in which 'good' designates the values of the ruling, propertied class and 'bad' (*kakos*) those of the ruled. Overlapping with good vs bad are a host of other terms that reveal the intersections between politics, class, ethics and even physical appearance: wealthy vs poor, noble vs ignoble, brave vs cowardly, well-born vs ill-born, blessed vs cursed, lucky vs unlucky, upright vs lowly, elite vs masses, pillars of society vs dregs, beautiful vs ugly. Within this constellation the opposition of kairós and ákairos finds its home, if not the organizing principle itself (Sipiora, 2002: 3). Thus, the harmony of opposites is a harmony from the perspective of the ruling class in which an apparent harmony is actually the domination of one term over another. The universal law of kairós becomes the claim of a particular perspective to universal status at the expense of others.

Since discovering such a universal perspective or metanarrative is both impossible and alien to the aims of kairology, which, rather, seeks to surface and clarify the multiplicity of allomythic ideals, rules, ways, etc., the idea of *kairos* as something like 'establishing the decorous harmony of an idealized good' is certainly to be resisted. Yet, neither does kairology, in the sense I intend it, occupy Boer's akairological stance, celebrating only the "monstrous" subaltern, the untimely strike, etc. Still, Boer's critique is worth further quotation:

> Initially, it may seem that the emphasis on the undeserved and unexpected dimensions of kairós – as blast, rupture, event and miracle – signals that some dimensions of ákairos have crept into the Marxist appropriations of kairós. Thus, revolution has a spontaneous, unseasonable, immeasurably creative element that cannot be predicted or planned. The rupture or event or miracle crashes through the door without a polite knock, or perhaps like a thief in the night; we should

be always alert, for we know not the day or hour, as the New Testament would have it. Apart from the fact that this dimension is contained within the biblical notion of kairós, as I have just indicated, it also resonates a little too uncomfortably with certain elements of capitalism. For instance, the emphasis on the unexpected nature of kairós sounds like 'good' business practice, as when one seizes an unexpected turn in the market to one's advantage. Opportunity, innovation, creativity – these are watchwords for 'successful' business. The catch here is not merely that one may also see a greater plan beneath the unexpected, in which the biblical God becomes Adam Smith's famous 'invisible hand', but that the leaders of business and of wealthy nations are always well-positioned – in the right place and time – to take maximum advantage of such apparently unexpected turns. Thus, the Marxists . . . risk an unwitting connection with those associations, thereby providing a bulwark for the status quo they seek to oppose and overthrow. Does not Benjamin's fulfilled messianic time sound uncomfortably close to Fukuyama's (1992) argument for the end of history with the 'end' of communism in Eastern Europe? Does not Agamben's time that is seized out of kronos and brought to fulfilment lend itself a little too easily to astute business practice? Is not Negri's infinitely creative moment at the tip of the arrow of being too close to the bourgeoisie's attribution of supernatural creative power to labour, as Marx pointed out in *Critique of the Gotha Programme*? Does not Žižek's tension between a search for the genuine shift in the coordinates of existence and refusism echo the business executive caught between the big break-through and throwing it all in for a cottage in the woods? Is not Jameson's growing rumble of a low-key rupture too much like a social-democratic reform program that has made its peace with capitalism? Is not Badiou's event comparable to an unexpected stock market crash that enables one to buy bankrupt businesses at basement prices? And does not Bloch's miraculous leap into the highest newness risk veering towards Schmitt's (1985: 36) counter-Reformation notion of the miracle as the constitutive exception that supports, *sub specie aeternitatis*, the status quo? Is there nothing retrievable from these various efforts at a kairological revolutionary politics? I hinted earlier that the point where they may break out of the heritage of kairós lies in their emphasis on the undeserved, unannounced and unexpected dimension, with a particular emphasis on Bloch's miracle as the *Novum et Ultimum*, now on a radical political trajectory in which miracle is but one, theological code, for revolution. However, what is needed is a push that will take this element of kairós out of the spatial, social and economic dimensions that trail the term from its Greek and thereby biblical heritage, a push that will take it away from its associations with the well-proportioned ruling elites and towards the ill-proportioned and untimely, that is, to ákairos. The catch is that the

> opposition itself is one determined by the ruling classes, a way of asserting their own right and proper role and of marginalizing those who would oppose them. If we were to shift to an akairological perspective, then the very terminology would shift and the opposition itself would be cast aside.

It is enough to account for all this and select those aspects of *kairos* that make sense in terms of studying allomythoi and teaching about and with them.

4. Early in this work, I integrated stasis theory and its questions and identification of topoi with kairological BQ-asking. Others have explicitly put *stasis* and *kairos* into conversation with each other (Carter, 1988; Foster, 2005), and I welcome future researchers to continue the dialog.
5. In "The Kairos of Philosophy," Melissa Shew reviews "three formulations of kairos: as the circumstances that co-determine action (in Aristotle), as a moment that imposes its own time by apprehending us through a genuine asking of questions (in Heidegger), and as a critical event that forces us to recognize our ecstatic nature (in Schelling)" (2013, p. 55). Extending these formulations, she argues that dialog "is the proper kairos of philosophy" because

> dialogue is kairological in two ways: First, dialogue is not just a phenomenon that occurs in a chronological sense of time but, rather, imposes its own time in order to see how life is disclosed to us; and second, dialogue is kairological insofar as it denotes a moment in which we are pushed into the open, a moment that demands our receptivity and response. As such, dialogue is that critical moment, or crisis, without which philosophizing is impossible. (Shew, 2013, p. 55)

Recall, above, § 4.1.1 in light of other references in this work to the dialogical, heteroglossic, polyvocal, polysemous, and so on. Another way of stating the above might be that dialogue makes meaningful, life-giving worlds in a world of worlds that cannot be reduced to a single, universal metanarrative, and at the same time its multiplicity calls us back to that world of worlds within worlds that challenges us with its excess. Shew continues, in a passage I enjoy given this work's interest in BQs and BPs:

> So dialogue is the activity of going through accounts with another, as Socrates does. But we might also think of dialogue in terms of Schelling, who says that we sometimes experience a "doubling of ourselves, this secret circulation in which there are two beings, a questioning being and an answering being, an unknowing being that seeks knowledge and an unknowing being that does not know its knowledge." "This silent dialogue," he continues, "this inner art of conversation, is the authentic mystery of the philosopher" (2000, xxxvi).

Kairology does seem to embody this aspect of the philosophical, attempting to articulate the silent dialogue of surfacing the questions and problems that allomythoi respond to and the answers they supply. It also pertains to the transformative effects of allomythoi (kairosis, fiction-based WWLs) and their use in worldview education:

> The mandates of dialogue are difficult, but its promises are grand: Participate in it, and you will be transformed. The world will become new to you, and ordinary life will appear extraordinary. But participating in dialogue requires risking oneself in the world, throwing oneself into it with uncertainty.

This risky leap that Shew associates with philosophy she also associates with "a loving world-sense" that resists an "atomistic" perspective, which I would connect to the two bookends of this conclusion, §§ 4.1.1 & 4.4.2:

> An antidialogical stance—seen, for example, in the character of Meno or in those who persecute others for their beliefs—seen, for example, in those who perpetuate injustice and exploit the work of others—runs counter to a loving world-sense in which the individual sustains a relationship with the whole, whether the whole is one's community, one's city, nature, or the universe. We are not atomistic, self-determined beings, finding our own individual way in the void; rather, we are ecstatic, creative beings, always pointing beyond ourselves in order to return to ourselves as otherwise, and more, than we ever thought we could be. For these reasons, the kairos of philosophy is dialogue.

Though Shew does not, I would invoke Hegel's conversational, translational, mediated, codependent logic in the way he uses "dialectic." This is not to say that Hegel is the ideal philosopher or representative of philosophy insofar as one can posit a philosophy of kairology, but his notion of how mind comes to know itself historically through, in relation to, and as it emerges from other selves and world(s) certainly resonates with the framework offered in this work, without his scientific aim of totalizing systematicity. Text world theory's methods of breaking down a narrative into world shifts and the other categories of kairology, for example, should be understood as part of a larger dialectical approach that uses analytic parts to return to better comprehend the wholes. I think of what Gadamer has to say about dialogue. I am translating him somewhat, but I don't think I'm being unfaithful to his spirit when I say, a dialogue is located within a received (i.e., "traditional") context of priors, individual and social (e.g., past experiences, present concerns, established schemas, familiarity with a range of genres, ambient WWLs, etc.), i.e., the given horizons of the participants, and as the perspectives of the participants engage with each other in the back and forth of asking and responding, in the fusion of horizons, a question or question emerges, as may an answer or answers reflecting "understanding."

A philosophy of kairology needs to be broad enough to invite the study of all the fantastical worlds our imaginations may create. Taking up the concept of time, I would stress that any philosophy of the fictional worlds and worldviews described in narratives is one of *possibility* and *finitude*. Our experience of time is one of ecstatic, probabilistic simulation; that is, we extend our ordinary self-and-world model to generate other possibilities out of that very stuff.

An allomythos posits responses to BQs and BPs, and BQs and BPs reflect certain fundamental and emergent possibilities. The globalization-BP, for example, only arises as a

possibility – as a problem – in the context of our technoscientific actuality of and potentiality for global anthropogenic effects, contributing to the exploitation-BP as a BP; this global possibility contributed, too, to the possibility of a global mythistory and modernity's metanarratival dreams, while other possibilities promoted the criticism-BP that would call the possibility of such global mythistorical metanarratives into question, both as an actualizable possibility and as another factor contributing to the exploitation-BP. And these are, of course, only a few of the BPs future kairological inquiry might explore.

Concerning possibility, consider two prominent approaches in Continental philosophy of religion. One (e.g., Derrida and Heidegger) suggests that the possibilities of fiction make more life possible than one might think possible. The possibilities of fiction confront us as Gift, as other, as the gift beyond the given. Fictionality itself has something of the logic of futurity (Caputo's formal messianicity or absolute future): the possibility of the impossible, the unexpected, unprophesized, surprising hope for the unforeseeable alterity. I find this approach somewhat dissatisfying since it always rejects any determinate, represented possibility as deconstructable, in contrast to undeconstructable messianity as such:

> The messianic, or messianicity without messianism. This would be the opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of justice, but without horizon of expectation and without prophetic prefiguration. The coming of the other can only emerge as a singular event when no anticipation sees it coming, when the other and death . . . can come as a surprise at any moment. (Derrida, 2002, p. 56)

Another possibility is suggested by Malabou's work. Drawing on Malabou's use of the neurological, perhaps more importantly Hegelian, concept of *plasticity*, as well as the biological, and as she stresses, Kantian concept of the *epigenesis of reason*, in the context of Continental philosophy, I would propose anchoring allomythic possibility in this epigenetic plasticity. Malabou states, regarding Hegel's understanding of the temporality of the subject (2014, p. 211):

> I argued that plasticity might then be considered as temporality itself understood as the relationship of the subject to what is coming, to the accident, the future, and the sudden explosion of the unexpected. Plasticity characterizes the subject's temporal mode of being in relation to events that both give form to it and are formed by it. Plasticity was for me thus able to allow us to displace the locus of time in Hegel, to show that it is not restricted to the exposition of temporality in his *Philosophy of Nature* but spread out everywhere as the very ticking of the absolute.

She finds that both cognitive neuroscience and Hegel suggest a *systematic temporality*, which she explains as follows (Malabou, 2014, p. 213):

> A systematic temporality is a temporality that does not proceed from the opening of an outside, a temporality that is not assimilable to transcendence. On that point, the Hegelian system and what I discovered about the nervous system obviously converged: plasticity, in Hegel as in neurosciences, is precisely the name of the dynamism of events as well of the mode of being and meaning of the future in a world deprived of transcendence, breaches, or holes.

And in Kant, Malabou finds something like a theory of what might today be called a predisposition of the nervous system to epigenetically modularize itself:

> "There remains, therefore, only the second supposition—a system, as it were, of the epigenesis of pure reason." There exists a kind of development of the transcendental, as if reason was a self-formative power, as if it was able, in a certain sense, to form itself, to form its categories. And we see that Kant uses a biological metaphor to describe this strange formation of the transcendental. . . . The a priori is neither a gift from God nor a result of experience. It does not come from outside. It is formed—otherwise it would be given; but formed by itself. In that sense, reason appears to be the power of fashioning its own possibility. Understood from this perspective, the future coincides with the self-shaping of reason. If reason is creative and self-formative, we are then allowed to say that the transcendental itself is plastic, and that there must be a kind of experience within the realm of the a priori. Plasticity of the transcendental: Kant would have at the same time strongly contested this expression. But not Hegel. We might even consider that Hegel's philosophy as a whole is an attempt at reinterpreting, re-elaborating and radicalizing the idea of an epigenesis of reason in assimilating it to a fashionability of truth. The transcendental, all our a priori concepts or categories, are malleable and transformable, both determined and open to transformation. Categories and rational principles of knowledge as well as moral rules are plastic, movable, moldable, deconstructible instances. Accordingly, time would not be the opening of a messianic horizon but the immanent development of the transcendental. (Malabou, 2014, pp. 215–6)

Contemporary imaginative, fantastical genres draw on resources as diverse as the wild technological and scientific possibilities of our most advanced research and the many worldviews of contemporary, ancient, and fictional peoples to project impossible possibilities: the gods or god, the heavens and hells, the christs and antichrists, that do not exist but might yet. These possibilities explored in narrative emplotment in the game of storytelling, as Ricoeur would say, express the plasticity of temporal existence.

And what of *finitude*? Even more obviously than our own, storyworlds are limited. A series may stretch on and on – authors like George R.R. Martin yearning after monumental scale – yet the project will end either in a complete story or one unfinished in death. Even when other authors are invited by the original author or their estate to contribute to the universe, such efforts will inevitably participate in human finitude. Video games, too, may give the illusion of one's capacity to wander endlessly, but those storyworlds also must have limits.

And the stories we hold dear to our hearts are precious for that reason. We return to them to recover them and to discover their other latent possibilities, but we can do this only because of their finitude. They are *mere fictions*, more ephemeral than the hard realities that demand acceptance, and does their emptiness, their nothingness, their foolishness, not make them more worthwhile and wiser in our eyes? Like Nietzsche's yes-saying to life, one feels the call to re-read that novel, to re-watch that film.

Our finitude is closely tied to our embodied, located, lived nature. When Enlightenment moderns sought refuge in the abstraction of reason, it's true that they sought to make the world safe for reason, to overturn arbitrary, hereditary power. But it is also true,

as Boer (2013) argues relative to a powerful strand in the traditional understanding of *kairos*, that an abstract reason concealed itself as universal when it was, in actuality, the white European, cisgender, heteropatriarchal, property-owning subset of humanity positioning its positionality as normative. And deconstruction itself further dematerialized life in its play with signs and symbols.

So with figures like Philip Goodchild, I would argue that a philosophy of kairology must be *critical*; it must respond to the criticism-BP by, among other things, detecting and examining the operation of colonialist and capitalist logics in narrative worlds. It must also be emancipatory, empowering and giving voice to other worldviews and ways of life. I will return to this.

But first, let me step back a bit, zoom out, and start again.

Any philosophy of kairology is a translation—one might say, a construal of a way of studying life as a stance toward life-and-world. In philosophy of religion, one might roughly divide the ways of translating into two camps, the analytic-kataphatic-ontotheological and the continental-apophatic-anti-metaphysical.

Among the first camp, one might think of most chapters in books with titles like like *Harry Potter* and Philosophy or *Battlestar Galactica* and Theology. We are used to the things we subject to philosophical examination when we do philosophy of religion: things like God and other ultimate concerns, metaphysical beings and places. And many scholars hunt down similar concepts in fiction and proceed to do the customary sorts of analyses. Such studies are educational and entertaining, but I question to what degree they move us forward.

I do see at least one promising area. Just as some philosophers of religion in the analytic tradition have found it useful to bracket judgment about the truth value or ontological reality of religious claims to focus on their lived meaning, their effects on people's lives, so too a philosophy of kairology has an even easier time waiving away the obsession with being to attend to the matter of living.

Within what I've instrumentally called the second camp for the purpose of this little overview, one tends to find more engagement here with the complexities of science-informed speculation. Caputo (2014, p. 27) writes:

> Religion, in my view, *is* a *Vorstellung*, a work of imagination, not of the Concept no more than of a supernatural being in the sky but of the "event." Religion gives narratival form and flesh to underlying events—like the promise, forgiveness, hospitality, justice, hope, expectation—and to faith. I treat religious beliefs and practices as a theopoetics, a poetics of the *theos*, or the *theios*, a way of describing what is going on in our lives under the name of "God," the "gods" and/or the "divine." The several "religions" are for me so many ways to poetize the world, similar to the way Merleau-Ponty said that the several languages are so many ways to "sing the world." As a result, it makes no more sense to ask what is the true religion than to ask what the true language is. What Francois Laruelle calls non-theology, using theology to give it a human meaning, is analogous to what I am calling "theopoetics."

Charles Taliaferro, in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, writes: "Philosophy of religion also includes the investigation and assessment of worldviews (such as secular naturalism) that are alternatives to religious worldviews." But it is noteworthy that this

statement is without citation, and Taliaferro does not himself indulge in any such investigation or assessment.

The above "camps" are caricatures to a degree of oversimplification that might render them unrecognizable for many. But beyond that, they have the limitation of exclusively reflecting a Western understanding of "philosophy of religion." The meaning of "religion" and a distinction between theology and philosophy that hinges on it collapses as soon as one starts examining pre-modern and non-Western thinkers. And even in the thinkers of Western modernity, it's often hard to isolate those modes of thought.

But the point is that all of these established and well-studied worldviews supply tools and categories for the project of disciplined, critical, philosophical translation of kairology.

A phenomenon unveils itself to us in experience; from lower-level processing outside conscience awareness, it presents itself as a situation; a kairos does likewise to someone engaged in composing a storyworld, but with intentionality of selection, a harmony of communicative organism, sensed environment, and responsive audience. A phenomenology of allomythoi would require a prophetic confidence that I am unwilling to adopt in this context. But I have tried to offer a kairology of fictional WWLs that honors their fictive nature and is responsible to what we know so far. As Lakoff would say, one seeking to supply a framework must choose one's metaphors carefully. One taking up the fraught and perilous tools of religious studies – and even other tools, like those of cognitive science – must be even more cautious.

What has been the lateral diathesis of this work? Is everything cognitively reducible to a system of information-processing systems, to mechanistic automata, to fungible, instrumentally masterable things, to disembodied, dislocated abstractions? Has the bird been cut apart, left dead on the table, and then translated into the virtual reality of an anatomical text? I hope not. I hope that I have provided an ecological vision of worlds within worlds, all communicating, yes, but ultimately untranslatable, irreducible, and alive. The pragmatism and embodied-spatial focus of the framework offered herein respond to ubiquitous masculinist, white supremacist, capitalist, presentist, Euro-centrist, and kindred biases in cognitive science and religious studies, laying a foundation for confronting fictions like whiteness and masculinity as they appear in various allomythoi so that we may understand all WWLs and allomythoi more clearly.

There is an obvious tension in this work between life as fiction and life as nature. But we sense that we are both. Life as dynamic flow, as the raw, infinitely-knowable world, is natural; as fiction, among other things, we conceptualize the flow as events that we can narrate.

Similarly, textual worlds, especially ones that acknowledge their fictionality, return us in some ways to the old problem of idealism versus realism (and other dichotomies like mind and body and space and time). The topic seems to suggest the idealist perspective that our cherished worldviews (indeed, our very worlds and selves) are fictional, virtual, simulated. Recall the virtuality-BP; Hayles (1999) states, "[L]iving in a condition of virtuality implies we participate in the cultural perception that information and materiality are conceptually distinct and that information is in some sense more essential, more important, and more fundamental than materiality." But this work's approach to kairology is rooted in a philosophy of embodied realism based on empirical studies of evolution, biology, history, and space (i.e., the real-world sources of any abstracted categories of understanding). The theme of the "problem" or the provocative situation runs through this

work, but there is an intimate, co-constitute dialectic between the empirical (and conceptual) situation that an allomythos is developed in response to and the (concrete, materialized) narrative storyworld and allomythoi. A focus on text and language can threaten to dematerialize and dislocate the body into a deconstructed play of signifiers, but only if it forgets that language and text emerge from and are tools and actions in the service of life in our bodies together in our environment. Information cannot exist apart from its material-energetic instantiation.

Treating allomythoi as a BP (that is, allomythoi as a BP for people in general and kairology, the practice and philosophy of which I have outlined here, as a BP for scholars) is consistent with kairology and worldview studies; any WWL may be subjected to worldview studies analysis, and it is appropriate to subject any proposed philosophy of kairology to such an analysis (compare Gadamer's "transformation into structure").

| **This Framework for Kairology – WWL Family: Pragmatism (and its contributors: post-foundationalism, post-positivism, post-modernity, critical theory generally); rhetoric and writing/composition studies; religious studies and cognitive science of religion; worldview studies; global studies; translation studies; cognitive narratology (including text world theory and other tools and approaches); historiography; mythography; genre studies; science fiction studies; horror studies; fantasy studies; biblical studies; borderlands studies; and others** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kairological Categories** | | | | **Big Questions (BQs)/ Stasis Theory** | |
| *Kairology* | | | | What is the situation (standpoint, or common ground) confronting me? What world am I inhabiting? What is appropriate in this situation? | Kairology confronts the allomythoi-BP, seeking to use and develop effective methods to understand (interpret and explain) the worlds within worlds that produced allomythoi, constitute allomythoi as such, and are received by recreational percipients, devotees of allomythoi-based WWLs, scholars, and students. |
| | *Cosmology (World)* | | | Where am I, and who are these with whom I dwell? What happened? Why is this | This kairological framework or hermeneutic offers some historical insights into the emergence of the genres of fantastika and the allomythoi that are |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | happening? What will happen? Is there meaningful, significant, actionable evidence of a situation? | aspects of such storyworlds; it also uses a variety of tools to better understand how such worlds are made. It recognizes contemporary allomythoi as a BP calling out for increased understanding. |
| | | | *Ætiology* | What happened? Why is this happening? What *caused* this situation? | Someone made a storyworld containing at least one allomythos, responding to fundamental BQs, contextual BPs, and other things like internal constraints and opportunities and external exigencies. |
| | | | *Mellonology* | What will happen? What will likely happen with or without intervention? What ought to happen? What should (or should not) be done? | Kairology should interpret and explain allomythoi using all available, relevant tools. In the absence of this, a powerful aspect of the contemporary world will operate without scholarly analysis, but kairological intervention should provide improved understanding of this potent phenomenon. |
| | | *Ontology* | | What exists? What situation, issue, problem, or concern exists? What do we agree is a real issue? | People make and enjoy fantastical storyworlds containing allomythoi. These are constituted by elements like neologies, novums, text worlds, world switches, the use of ways of worldmaking, and so on. |
| | | | *Œcology* | Where am I? Who are these others? How do the | Kairology dwells within worldview studies and reaches out, interdisciplinarily, for |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | others with whom I dwell – and whose expectations I anticipate – and the world in which I dwell relate to this issue? What is the nature and meaning of this situation? Who apart from myself is affected? | tools and insights from many other disciplines, theories, methods. But apart from academia, the phenomenon of the allomythos concerns and matters to all whose lives are impacted by allomythoi, whether or not they recognize it as a BP. |
| | *Ethology (Way of Life)* | | | Who and in what manner am I? What matters? To what degree and in what way does the situation matter, and in what manner, then, ought one to proceed? What should I do? What is warranted and appropriate in this situation? How do I know? | This entire work illustrates my own kairological way of doing and approaching the allomythoi-BP. Most other kairologists will probably conduct smaller, narrower inquiries. They should feel free to draw on any tools or insights they find productive here, but feel a pragmatic liberty to adjust their inquiry to their specific axiological aims. |
| | | | *Autology* | Who am I? How do I relate to this situation? In | Someone engaged in kairological inquiry is also likely someone who enjoys allomythoi, |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | what manner am I? What is my nature in this context? | studies fiction-based WWLs, or is interested in worldview studies more broadly. They should be aware, then, of an autoethnographic element to their inquiry, even if they do not foreground that. A kairologist, whatever their fondness for or commitment to a specific storyworld's allomythology and/or allomythos/oi, should relate to allomythoi on a more general level, seeking to contribute to understanding them. |
| | | *Epistemology* | | What are valid sources of knowledge? Are my sources of knowledge, my evaluations, my plan of action, and so on valid? How do I know? How did I come to understand the situation as I do? | A kairologist is epistemologically eclectic, drawing on many methods and models for interpreting and explaining the various interacting elements involved in the emergence of allomythoi historically and socially; their creation by worldmakers using rhetorical, compositional, design techniques, as well as drawing on their fund of experience with genres, stories, "real world" events, experiences, WWLs, and so on; their impact on percipients who use such externalized cues to recreationally re-create experiences of other possibilities; their relationship and potential contributions to other disciplines as well as to |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | general education and worldview education. |
| | | *Axiology* | | Is this situation positive or negative? How serious is this situation? What is special (or "sacred," etc.) to me? What is of value, importance, concern in the world? What are the costs? What is at stake in this situation? What are my goals and motivations, and what should I avoid? | Kairology addresses itself to the allomythoi-BP directly, noting in turn how allomythoi respond to fundamental BQs and to historically and culturally contingent, but still pressing and important, BPs. In seeking to understand allomythoi better, both in terms of explanation and interpretation, I, as a kairologist, felt I should avoid as much as possible a narrow allegiance to a specific allomythos or allomythology (although of course I had to narrow things down to a few examples), a specific subgenre of fantastika or even of fiction generally (although, again, of necessity I did have to place a limit here), a specific medium (see, above, § 4.2.2 and elsewhere – I was again limited in my ability to do this), and a settled resolution of the allomythoi-BP (i.e., that the phenomenon is ultimately positive or negative, liberatory/critical or mystificatory, etc.). That said, individual scholars may and should contribute to kairology through – and may legitimately be motivated |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | by – narrower values, concerns, interests, aims: i.e., loyalty to a specific allomythos or allomythology, a specific genre, a settled "answer" to the allomythoi-BP, and so on. |
| | | *Praxeology* | | What should I do based on what I know to pursue effectively what is of value? What action (if any) should be taken relative to this concern? | This work has approached kairology from a high-level programmatic orientation, seeking to offer a foundation for further inquiry. Other kairologists may operate at the same level of generality, or they might practice kairological inquiry in one of the lower-level subregions of the discipline. That is, one could simply produce a close, detailed kairological study of a single allomythos (individual or social—see, above, § 4.2.1) within a single storyworld. |
| | | *Lateral Diathesis* | | Sinistral, integrated, or dextral? | Integrated (I hope, but perhaps weighted toward the dextral), but other kairological inquiries might adopt a more sinistral (or an even more dextral) approach. |

Again, I will seek to be critical – perhaps, the primary theme of these concluding investigations. Heidegger has come to mind repeatedly in this regard because, though he might tolerate someone who is arrested by the disclosure of being in a new storyworld, he would have contempt for the incessant consumption of novels and their parade of novelty. A novel, being novel, is not inherently or inevitably inauthentic, under his gaze. But curious Dasein does not dwell with the novel, does not give itself to the novel (save, I suppose, for those who embrace its potential for kairosis and adopt an allomythos-based WWL); it passes on to the next new novel or movie or videogame. Dispersed among them and their idle talk,

such curious Dasein, Heidegger would claim, abides nowhere. Thus, we can see how his "idle talk" has much in common with the readiness-to-hand of an absorbed engagement with a fictional world, which being made from elements of the "real" world using the intersubjective norms of public systems of representation inevitably will have a potential to simply reinforce the uncritical, inauthentic they-self, and "curiosity," with its restless desire for novelty, is both closely related to the fundamental nature of fantastika and always has the potential to simply be an easy excuse to evade thought in busy consumption of spectacle. Wood (2008) states:

> Adam Smith, in his *Lectures on Rhetoric* and *Belles Lettres*, complains of the relatively young form of the novel that "as newness is the only merit in a Novel and curiosity the only motive which induces us to read them, the writers are necessitated to make use of this method [i.e., suspense] to keep it up." This is an early, mid-eighteenth- century attack on the mindlessness of suspense—the kind of complaint nowadays made routinely about thrillers and pulp fiction.

But by dwelling for a time in fictional worlds, by giving oneself over to their fascinating, ambiguous, mystifying play, in unserious idleness we may suddenly be confronted by our world in startling, arresting ways that allow it to light up with new significance. The homelessness-BP or world-poor-BP is a major motive for artists' making of livable allomythistories. A fictional world's being a heterotopos and containing an allomythos or allomythoi means that one who tries to dwell in it may realize they are not at home in the world. One seeks to escape the anxiety of living in the world, and does in an alienated alternative world, but finds a new anxious mode of engagement with the "real" world in the other. "Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they.'"

Gadamer, invoked briefly above, may make a contribution here. Growing out of Heidegger's insights (including that any understanding is conditioned by the pre-structures and moods of the self that disclose and attune it to some possibilities and not others and that the web of meaning handed over in language and by history is the source of inauthenticity but also the wellspring of authenticity[10]), Gadamer stresses that the pre-structures into which we find ourselves thrown that orient our understanding of available possibilities, that is, "tradition," is "prejudice," prejudice no method can master, bracket, or escape. A dog that is repeatedly punished, any time she attempts to explore the possibility of leaving her fenced in area, will soon "fatalistically" treat that possibility as simply not part of her story. However, the human animal enjoys greater plasticity, though certainly not unlimited. And the prejudice of a tradition, as expressed for example in a genre, itself contains many possibilities, possibilities that, as Gadamer would say, when we give ourselves over to play the game by being oriented by those possibilities, are taken up and appropriated by us as part of the living process of handing over. The tradition of a genre, its limits and possibilities, are expanded, recreated, and transformed by each new work that appropriates the tradition.[11] Fiction is life living—singing, dancing, playing, fighting, dwelling, cherishing, raising, consuming, growing. And engagement with novel works of human narrative fiction, reflecting different possibilities within the prejudice of tradition, should perform the educative function of expanding our Gadamerian "horizon" to encompass with ever more "universality" the WWLs of humanity and non-human animals.

## § 4.4. Relating to Kairological Pedagogy and Worldview Education

***§ 4.4.1 Just as religious studies (RS) is complimented and informed by religious education (RE), kairology, as the academic study of allomythoi, should attend to kairological education, a subset of worldview education; moreover, due to allomythoi being comparable to the WWL-formative narratives traditionally addressed by religious studies, i.e., because allomythoi can teach people to develop novel selves and social formations, and because kairology lends itself to a "pedagogy of estrangement," harnessing the power of allomythoi presents a distinctive, novel option for intervention in and integration with other evidence-based pedagogical methods from disciplines like writing studies and information literacy and, more broadly, teaching all the subdisciplines of worldview studies (WvS) within a General Education paradigm.***

Stories change the world. Sinclair's *The Jungle*, for example, played no small role in giving people the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906, and, Bruner writes, "*Uncle Tom's Cabin* played as great a part in precipitating the American Civil War as any debate in Congress [....] And a century later [...] the novelists, poets, and playwrights of the Harlem Renaissance set the stage for the antisegregation ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in *Brown v. Board of Education*[12] by humanizing the plight of African-Americans."[13] Stories form the self (McLean and Syed, 2016). What might be called the *agency*[14] *of fictional worlds*, for all that one might still think of them as cognitive tools or mechanisms, as informational structures, becomes highly relevant when one considers their impact on individuals and groups. Why – indeed, should one[15] (see § 4.1.3 above) – use fantastika to teach, invite fantastical worlds to affect one's students, the future generation of our species? A huge number of them will, of course, already be inviting such worlds to affect them.[16] Since allomythoi are so potent and we spend so much time in them, kairology is vital for informed, critical engagement with our culture (i.e., the allomythoi-BP).

This subsection invites integration of different disciplinary frameworks and tools for teaching, which is worthwhile in itself and an interdisciplinary advance.[17] But what is the pedagogical justification for using fantastical texts in the worldview studies or religious studies classroom? As discussed in Chapter 3, ancient myths and mythologies are in many ways analogous to contemporary allomythoi and allomythologies. Thus, the discipline that, among other things, studies ancient myths and related texts is a proper home for the study of their contemporary analogues. Further, given the transformative role of narratives in self- and group-formation,[18] including the formation of fiction-based NRMs and other worldviews, conscious study of such texts may help students be more critical and deliberate relative to the transformative processes that are happening around them and that they participate in.[19] Finally, fantasy and play are conducive to free inquiry; fictional narratives are more detached from the anxious, serious immediacy of life, and fantastical narratives even more so—they are less threatening spaces in which to confront the challenging questions and problems of life and the answers of others.

This subsection is a continuation of the overall approach of the framework or paradigm proposed throughout this work (*e.g.*, its evasion of "religion"[20] to attend rather to WWLs, its situated, spatial orientation, its use of rhetoric and cognitive narratology, its attention to conscious, critical awareness of how texts are constructed, transform, and in turn

construct and transform selves), offering the insights of research to the classroom. The question of how texts and storyworlds relate to identity formation is uniquely relevant to the religious studies or worldview studies classroom, but it is also central to the university experience, which is inherently initiatory and transformative.

This is because we all do it. The formation of a new self-schema (*i.e.*, a new cognitive network of related representations, spaces, facts) is the making of a new world composed of many worlds, a new narrative, an allomythos, or, perhaps more accurately, an *allomythology*. Both neurotypical and -atypical people shift situationally between different self-schemata. And the creation of and recreational encounter with novel situations and characters (*i.e.*, self-schema models), as in a storyworld, offers the raw material for potential re-creation and modification of one's self-schema, which one might activate briefly (as in role-play) or more persistently. These represent examples of a more general phenomenon: the reception of self-models or -narratives from others in environments that make them intelligible. Some cultures, for example, promote highly porous and distributed understandings of the "self" while others cultivate intensely buffered, individualistic identities;[21] specific concrete features (skin color, genitalia, the trappings of wealth or poverty, etc.) may become anchors for dominant self-schemata and narratives, and one's changed environment may cue one to activate a different self-schema. Memory studies show that one's narrative self is perpetually reconstructed and subject to creative flux—this is not something that happens uniquely to or in the case of the insane and delusional (Braun-LaTour, Braun-LaTour, Pickrell, & Loftus, 2004; cf. Gerrans, 2014).

Narrative effects on self-formation vary, and one must reflect carefully and critically on the implications of exposing students to their influences. The present pressures students and teachers feel – especially in the religious studies/religious education classroom under the traditional expectation of contribution to the formation of a specific kind of ethical character – to shape selfhood in specific ways should be judiciously interrogated, as we are called to be every more disciplined, efficient, productive, and (even while working under great pressure and often precarity) content, empathetic, calm. Cognitive studies of narrative effects suggest that many desirable qualities and abilities may be promoted by engagement with fictional texts.[22] And thus such studies supply support for using fictional texts in classroom, but consciously and intentionally. The things one pays attention to, the habits one cultivates, affect the mind's plasticity, nurturing and enervating latent capacities. This work's attention to what I have called the kairological category of "Lateral Diathesis" reflects my conviction that an important goal of a historically and cognitively informed critical pedagogy should be to counteract the left-hemispheric bias dominating our present civilization.

The sinistral disposition is especially evident in the O-mode, but it may be observed in allomythoi in storyworlds that, overall, present in the M- and N-modes. My concern with its excesses in our era comes to the fore in this subsection, where I seek to think about the impact of allomythoi on people's lived WWLs. At the level above that focused on in this work, that is, at the level of fiction-based, hyper-real, or invented NRMs and other WWLs, one may express the soft expectation that M-mode works may be more likely to produce or inspire novel, full-fledged hyper-real WWLs, but it is an interesting question how or even whether Possamai's three ideal-types of hyper-real religious actors turn out to correlate to the allomythic modes I have identified as part of this work's kairological framework (Possamai, 2012, pp. 3–9).[23] In any case, it seems evident that memorable, persuasive

representations that conform to effective teaching practices and draw on skilled use of the ways of worldmaking[24] are more likely to generate individual persuasion and, thence, collective persuasion or, one might say simply, faith.[25] Curriculum, syllabus, teacher, students, and colleagues of both must all work together, if they do, to produce the effect of kairosis.[26] Above, I noted that education is "inherently initiatory and transformative," and it is in this regard—because one should not play with fire without caution and care—that I urge responsible attention to the full implications of using evidence-based pedagogical methods in combination with allomythoi as part of a critical worldview studies curriculum.

One of the goals of contemporary education should be awareness of the specific academic culture and subcultures, or discourse communities or communities of practice, to which one is being socialized, habituated, and initiated. The academic WWL (no less than the disciplinary WWLs) seeks to produce a distinctive kind of subjectivity, and an introductory course in kairology (or, more generally, an introductory worldview studies course that exposes students to traditional and contemporary WWLs) is an excellent space in the curriculum for students to critically engage with this issue.

The worldview studies approach appealed to in this framework for understanding allomythoi has much to recommend it over, say, studying "religion in fiction";[27] this is because it directly addresses several problems faced by religious studies. Because religious studies scholars would be the first to admit the problematic character of "religion" as a category, together with its many subcategories like the "transcendent" and the "sacred," problems of disciplinary incoherence, bias, and so on are live concerns for the discipline, not simply for skeptical outsiders. Moreover, religious studies/religious education courses tend to be based on idiosyncratic interests, theories, and methods of instructors, emphasizing specialist content rather than domain-general skills and habits (Erricker, 2010). This does not detract from the fact that such courses model for students and inculcate in them sophisticated, nuanced engagement with complex and central human phenomena, but it does suggest that the discipline could benefit from identifying fundamental categories and concepts that could stabilize inquiry without improperly, hegemonically setting one WWL up as prototypical. Worldview studies categories—and the kairological BQ categories I have proposed herein as a subdiscipline within worldview studies—are panhuman and even panspecies (including their kairological application to imagined alien and supernatural beings). This intervention solves a lot of the problems faced by religious studies; retains and facilitates the religious studies value of WWL comparison—thereby promoting the transferable skill of translation; provides an expansive space in which students can engage a wide range of WWLs that people actually draw upon without worrying if they are actually "religious" or not; and lays a foundation within religious studies for increased meaningful interdisciplinary collaboration (i.e., it supports the diversify the curriculum movement).

Turning from the vision of humanity at the end of Chapter 3, if "the human is, to the core, a creature of education, a student from premature [neotenic] beginning to [neotenic] never wholly accomplished end" because, "[i]nsofar as the human is born without having, or knowing, a given program or path, these remain ever to be invented and cultivated, recurrently to be learned and recurrently to be taught" (Carlson, 2019, p. 6), how may kairology, the study of how these storyworlds, these arrangements of meaningful situations, and their allomythoi, play a role in a contemporary curriculum of general education, that is, an education that promotes critical reflection on, not dissipation in or anesthetization by, these storyworlds and their allomythoi, that empowers people to understand how such

worlds are made and how they act upon us, that thus enables them to respond authentically to their persuasive power?

Some disciplines have devoted themselves with extraordinary earnestness and systematicity to the problems of pedagogy, and among these professionals in writing studies and LIS (library and information science) focused on information literacy stand out. Writing studies and information literacy threshold concepts represent useful course objectives for courses to function well within the general education[28] (GE) framework, and adopting them instantly supplies one with a vast pool of evidence-based pedagogical methods and examples of use of such methods for their promotion. A basic understanding of central concepts like "Decoding the Disciplines" and "backward course design" with "threshold concepts"[29] may be derived from the *ACRL Framework for Information Literacy for Higher Education* (2015), Linda Adler Kassner and Elizabeth Wardle's (2015) *Naming What We Know: Threshold Concepts of Writing Studies*, and the *AAR Religious Literacy Guidelines* (2019).[30]

So, a foundational goal of kairological education should be identifying and integrating threshold concepts from kairology (which will involve not only expert metareflection on one's own experience with it but also observation of student difficulties and triumphs in actual kairological courses), religious studies,[31] and worldview studies, as well as writing studies and information literacy, as well as other evidence-based pedagogical methods, such as those I have explored in some of my previously published educational research (of which earlier, unpublished drafts are reproduced with permission in "Appendix 48: Designing a Course Integrating Critical Pedagogy, Fantasy Literature, and Religious Studies," "Appendix 49: Designing a Course Integrating Critical, Genre-based Pedagogy, Horror Literature, and Religious Studies," and "Appendix 50: Queer Composition, Fantasizing Phlebotinum, and Worldmaking with the Whedonverse – A Course in Religious Studies Using Critical, Genre-based, and Technology-Supplemented Pedagogical Methods").

By inviting students to and, in fact, helping them to, cross various disciplinary thresholds, most of those of us who have spent time teaching—and teaching is a ubiquitous human activity, from parents teaching children to employers teaching employees to lawyers instructing juries and judges and then be instructed by them to doctors instructing patients about their bodies, habits, environments, etc.—have likely been motivated by a desire to welcome their "students" into a wider world of possibilities, of expanded potential for imagination and action.

Carlson (2019) makes the argument that love is a special mode of human engagement with reality that discloses reality, or offers it pedagogically, through a gesture of estrangement. "Love," as the solicitude that leaps ahead rather than in, inviting one to and in fact supporting one in the task of taking up a task authentically, rather than jumping in to take over the task on behalf of the other, is a charged term, but one worthy of its weight.

Kairology's openness to transformation and even "conversion" through structured, critical, compassionate encounter of others and inquiry with them into the big questions of life and big contemporary problems is obviously rather different from the methods of quantification and standardization one often finds in education. Conformity and uniformity are not the only or even, in many contexts, the best goals of education. What is sought might be called the Deweyan aim of growth as an "ever-enduring process of perfection, maturing, refining" (see Saito, 2006, pp. 5, 62-63, in part quoting Dewey, 1920, p. 177). And any

pragmatic teacher must approach the task with compassion for how stressful it is for certainties to be called into question, for the self to be thrown into doubt, for the tragedies, traumas, and confusions one must face in gazing honestly upon experience, history, and the range of human worldviews, "real" and fictional.

This work has been undertaken in part to lay the groundwork for and assist, in light of an embodied, locative understanding of human cognition and the pregnant situation (one sense of *kairos*) we encounter today and sense in the days and worlds ahead, a certain kind of education enabled by fantastical texts. That is, the making of educative situations (kairosis). Teaching may be "love," according to Carlson, in the sense of letting the other be, enabling the other to discover or write herself – to be "authentic" as the author of one's being (but see n. 9 – I have some reservations about this language). In other words, one may empower students by encouraging a mood that helps disclose possibility—fantastika is especially good at evoking this. In this context, I think too of postcritical thinking—there is a time for agitating and problematizing and breaking free from and also a time for being free for, valuing, being absorbed, enjoying, and loving. Using fantastical worlds is a fine method for honoring the limited magisterium of an inquiry-based pedagogy that seeks to empower and promote the positive liberty of the student to realize herself, which is not realized simply by letting a student be in the sense of not doing anything, but, rather, by using effective methods, stimulating examples and objects of inquiry, and other tools to enable self-directed development.

## Notes

[1] Here, as elsewhere – and perhaps it need not be stated, but – my attempt to posit structural and structuring elements is of course done in the light of poststructuralist insights and is, thus, provisional, strategic, and instrumental. I am keenly aware of the danger that structures and problems identified may conceal the fact of their imposition in their representation as discovered.

[2] Nuttall, 2018, p. 60: "I have argued elsewhere (Nuttall 2014 ) that C[ognitive] G[rammar] offers a detailed grammatical framework for the contribution of specific linguistic structures to 'world building' and 'function advancing' in text world theory (Gavins 2007 ). On the other hand, what text world theory offers CG is a detailed model of the mental spaces, or 'worlds', we construct and connect during our processing of discourse, and the multiple conceptualizers, or ontologically distinct 'enactors', we attend to within them. Such a systematic account of fictional worlds and points of view are crucial for a cognitive stylistic approach to mind style."

[3] At the lower level of linguistic choices, I have made much of neologism (and the novum signaled thereby) in this work, including offering a few myself. Tolkien's famous invention of languages for each of his fictional peoples is a robust example of this. Few living today (and I only in a glass darkly) can imagine the languages Tolkien navigated as a philologist. To understand Old English, one inevitably has to contend with it in relation to a host of other Indo-European languages and cultures. I can promise that a native speaker of English who spends some time simply working through a foundational Old English grammar, perhaps with some background in Latin and Greek and a little German, will quickly gain a humbling sense of the temporal depth and the insights into the variety of human experience that Tolkien knew on a regular basis. I do not say this as hagiography; I point it out to stress that his intuitions, which I have somewhat elaborated on herein, were solidly grounded.

The Vulcan live-long-and-prosper gesture and John Williams's "Imperial March" are neologisms no less than "dilithium" and "the Force." Anyone who takes some time to investigate animal signaling will find neologies aplenty for all that human (all-too-human) narratives are, if not unprecedented or incomparable, a rarity. (And every day the voices of whole species silenced forever.) What I seek to stress, even for those not interested in our non-human relatives, is that *the novum and the neology should be sought in gesture, in dance, in clothing and architecture, in foodways—in short, in ways of life—even when one is focused primarily on a linguistic text* (compare Palmer, 2004, 2010), as one may be in a kairological study of a novel (rather than, say, the latest video game that has consumed the lives of thousands or an old mosaic that was used as a memory palace).

For example, in Brian Jacques *Redwall Series*, not only do each of the animal species communicate in characteristic dialects using various neologisms expressive of their allomythoi, but one also encounters neologies and novums in the titillating parade of fantastical foods and drinks Jacques invents for the frequent meals and feasts that occur in his storyworld. For all that Jacques, like Tolkien, generally avoids the vocabulary of "religion" (with notable exceptions for references to the demonic, infernal, hypnotic, and divinatory relative to evil characters—rats, snakes, foxes, and so on), his overall allomythos is obviously Catholic, with Martin the Warrior as Redwall's patron saint (see, e.g., the riddle-rhyme found beneath the Great Hall tapestry) and Redwall itself characterized by a monastic way of life that is defended by Martin and his warrior successors, as is well illustrated by this passage early in *Redwall*:

> The Abbot sat down slowly on the cool stone floor, resting his back against the wall.
>
> "Listen to what I say, Matthias. You have been like a son to me, ever since you first came to our gates as an orphaned woodland mouse, begging to be taken in. Come, sit by me and I will try to explain to you what our Order is all about.
>
> "We are mice of peace. Oh, I know that Martin was a warrior mouse, but those were wild days when strength was needed. The strength of a champion such as Martin. He arrived here

> in the deep winter when the Founders were under attack from many foxes, vermin and a great wildcat. So fierce a fighter was Martin that he faced the enemy single-pawed, driving them mercilessly, far from Mossflower. During the rout Martin fought a great battle against overwhelming odds. He emerged victorious after slaying the wildcat with his ancient sword, which became famous throughout the land. But in the last bloody combat Martin was seriously wounded. He lay injured in the snow until the mice found him. They brought him back to the Abbey and cared for his hurts until he regained his strength.
>
> "Then something seemed to come over him. He was transformed by what could only be called a mouse miracle. Martin forsook the way of the warrior and hung up his sword.
>
> "That was when our Order found its true vocation. All the mice took a solemn vow never to harm another living creature, unless it was an enemy that sought to harm our Order by violence. They vowed to heal the sick, care for the injured, and give aid to the wretched and impoverished. So was it written, and so has it been through all the ages of mousekind since.
>
> "Today, we are a deeply honored and highly respected Society. Anywhere we go, even far beyond Mossflower, we are treated with courtesy by all creatures. Even predators will not harm a mouse who wears the habit of our Order. They know he or she is one who will heal and give aid. It is an unwritten law that Redwall mice can go anywhere, through any territory, and pass unharmed. At all times we must live up to this. It is our way, bur very life."

[4] A study of individual minds' distinctive WWLs and allomythoi might find it useful to consider in more depth such concepts from this work as microgenres (§ 3.5), the Greek concept of *ethos* and its musical sense in terms of modes/moods (Chapter 1, n. 5; in addition to *raga*, mentioned there, one might also compare the Indian concept of *rasa* (Schwartz (2004))); and so on.

[5] Transitioning from the preceding subsection, consider *Baldur's Gate 3*, which, as I understand it (never having played it or anything like it), may be played multiple times from the unique perspective or mind style of (related, but not reducible, to the different possibilities for action in the gameworld available to) different central characters, somewhat like the ancient pleasure of experiencing the performance of an *aoidos* singing a traditional Homeric tale, the plot of which would be known to the audience, who would nonetheless enjoy the new, spontaneously composed details of each telling. Building on the elaborate worldmaking encyclopedia of *Dungeons & Dragons*, hundreds of artists over many years developed branching storylines to support the sensation of open-ended choice that adds to the sensation of depth already enabled by, for example, that encyclopedia (of objects, spells, beings, etc.) built by past worldmakers of the D&D role-playing game, the artists' and programmers' design of complex spaces in the gameworld that may be explored and manipulated, and so on. The different perspectives of specific characters include the distinctive ways others relate to a given character's appearance, behavior, style of speech, etc., a narrative framing that one might decide to alter by casting an illusion spell to appear differently; for example, the lens of racial bigotry might shape the experience of being a dark elf, inviting a player to think about the BP of race/ism.

[6] Dasein is being-there — we are fundamentally constituted by our being-in-the-world in a relational, social, linguistic entanglement of involvements with others, with histories, which is to say, with stories: "Dasein is "a way of life shared by the members of some community". (As Haugeland notes, there is an analogy here, one that Heidegger himself draws, with the way in which we might think of a language existing as an entity, that is, as a communally shared way of speaking.)" The BQs are explicitly (i.e., articulately) capable of being asked and answered only by linguistic beings—Dasein; and only such beings, having access to transcendent, externalized, re-presentations, seem to have access to the transcendent fictional worlds constituted thereby. (In Heideggerian language, one might say that a fictional storyworld is encountered as ready-to-hand when one is absorbed in it and as present-to-hand when considered as a symbol representation.) But a worldview studies approach, by being grounded in an evolutionary understanding of human continuity with other living creatures, helpfully counters the anthropocentric (and perhaps crypto-racist: there is a Kantian and Hegelian abstraction

in Heidegger that is in many ways guilty of what he condemns in Descartes: "According to Heidegger, Descartes presents the world to us "with its skin off" (Being and Time 20: 132)") arrogance of the Heideggerian formulation and stresses the fact that all mobile organisms are implicitly concerned with the BQs and in possession of ways of life. Language makes a difference, permitting the recursive self-alienation that allows for robust criticism of the given and creation of the new, but the signaling, receiving, and processing of information — which is always a material process of dynamically interrelated material objects — is in no way unique to humans. Though their stories are often simple, other organisms, too, are meaning-making beings in the little worlds they interpret, create, and inhabit. The modest fictions of nests and ritualized play- and mating-dances and hiding before striking to kill and so on may not rise to the heights of Homer and Shakespeare and Tolkien, but our non-human kin are also, as the poet says, music-makers and dreamers of dreams. Dasein's freedom in projecting itself into possibilities reflects the open, adaptive, multiplicity inherent in the Bayesian character of cognition, and its determination in its thrownness and fallenness into the normative script of the they-self (and in its thrownness in discourse) reflects the role of priors in Bayesian cognition.

[7] I reference *The Dawn of Everything* in Chapter 3 and the ancient multiplicity of possibilities that work argues then prevailed. With Carlson's (2019), I would argue against figures like Charles Taylor who would characterize this secular "world" as (merely) offering a flat, arrogant, instrumental idol of human self-worship in technology-driven mastery of "nature" by reduction to it as a presencing of the human will — as against the offering of a world with a transcendent anchor (i.e., a rejection of mortal finitude, disappointment, and confusion that has rightly been criticized as childish) — I would argue that the secular, for many, involves a great deal of time and care spent with loved ones imagining and playing in and with other possible worlds and selves. If I may for a moment take my experience as a subject of inquiry, I and my friends neither represent those who attend groups devoted to secular humanism, atheism, or related groups of nonbelievers nor do all or even most represent what is sometimes called the "Metaphysical tradition." But we do spend a lot of time, together and in our solitude, meditating and conversing and celebrating, with allomythoi as our subjective and intersubjective foci.

In the mode of care and as another expression of human, earthly love, such stories, worlds, and selves may return, remind, and awaken us to the things that matter most. The makers of storyworlds generally do so with relational care, perhaps even as a gift, attentive to the interdependent details often overlooked as trivial as well as to the evocation of our most pressing concerns. The problems and questions that energize narratives reflect both the solidity and irreducible reality of the body and the world and the impermanence, uncertainty, and vulnerability of all things. Virtual worlds in which we seek comfort and rest often offer it by offering back to us our anxieties and sorrows, no less than our joys. In surrendering to a story, allowing ourselves to lose ourselves to and in its flow, we may surrender an illusion of control we cling to otherwise. There is a potential posture of humility and gratitude in the world-stance of an allomythic percipient. But for all this to be the case, the journey must be "there and back again." One may dream—one must—but then one must return to the waking world and the task of living together in it.

[8] In the spirit of caution and criticism that is one of the primary themes of this Conclusion, I would quote a passage from Ritchie (2004):

> The metaphorical language used by Fauconnier and Turner (1998; 2002) may help to facilitate initial understanding of the theory, but it may also lead the novice astray. What is necessary is to recognize the limitations and pitfalls of such metaphorical language, and to elaborate the theory without the irrelevant and even contradictory entailments of the metaphors. Reconceptualized without the entailments of the "*space*" and "*blending*" metaphors and their entailments, Conceptual Integration Theory promises to contribute to major advances in our understanding of language processing, and of metaphor in particular. A formulation of the theory in terms of neural connections or other physiologically realizable mechanisms would help provide a basis for specifying falsifiable hypotheses, and for linking the model to the work of other cognitive theorists and to research on neurological processes in the human brain. . . .

> A similar criticism can be leveled against the metaphorical entailments of Kintsch's (1998) connectionist model of language learning and processing. It appears from a close reading of the text that Kintsch originally introduced a vector representation of concept meanings as a way of metaphorically representing the strength of synaptic connections among neurons or neuron groups in computable form. However, in later sections of the same book, and in other writings (Kintsch, 2000; Landauer & Dumais, 1997), Kintsch and his colleagues seem to reify the vector representation by treating it as a more or less literal model of word meanings.
>
> Hutchins (1995) has sharply criticized the entire "*computer*" metaphor for cognition, arguing that it has led cognitive scientists to focus on an artificially constrained model of information processing that disregards the crucial contributions of social and cultural structure to "cognition in the wild." We are still a long way from understanding how complex concepts are represented in human memory, and consequently from understanding how complex concepts are combined and applied in processing discourse, figurative or otherwise. Until we have detailed knowledge of these processes at the neuronal level, we will almost certainly have to rely on evocative metaphors to help us understand and reason about cognitive processes. Rigorous criticism of our own metaphors will be required if we are not to become enmeshed in their unintended but seductive entailments.

[9] What might be the – or is there even a – distinction between *kairology* and *allomythography*? *Mythistoriography* is the foundation and context for conducting and understanding *allomythography*, which makes a soft, practical demarcation (i.e., focusing on certain material, allomythoi) without asserting rupture in the manner of a historical schematization or orienting itself to a reified powerful CCC (like *myth* and *history*). *Kairology* is more suggestive of the cognitive-rhetorical aspects of this framework, especially emphasizing the rhetorical. In Chapter 3, the shift to diachronic considerations and the critical interrogation of categories like *myth* and *history* (*mythistoriography*) might favor the alternative use of *allomythography* or even *allomythistoriography*, but *kairos*, by virtue of its long associations with myth and history, also points in this direction and is thus the more general term.

[10] The "self" is a fundamental solution to many adaptive problems (see, e.g., Chittka, 2022), and the "worlds" of tradition and storytelling can be satisfying for similar reasons. However, belief in the essential reality of the self or of a tradition, and the quest to uncover them, discover them, reveal them, receive them, in their "authentic" being, concerning these I have grave doubts and questions.

[11] I will risk theological language in this footnote for the sake of being exploratory and experimental. Storytelling (which is always also an interpretation and translation) and kairological hermeneutics, both, to draw on the insights of thinkers like Durkheim and Mark C. Taylor, who take note of how vast storehouses of possibility like the social, the psyche, the webs of information circulating in the environment, economy, Internet, and so on, all resemble traditional notions of the divine, may humanize those "divine" founts of possibility in each concretization, and each concretization "divinizes" in that it, as happened to Enoch, "translates" the participating percipient of the story or interpretation into new aspects of those other "divine" (or "demonic") worlds.

[12] In light of affirmative action in higher education having been eliminated in 2023—a great blow to the aspirations of *Brown v. Board of Education* dramatically decreasing future access to the living stories racially diverse students bring into the classroom—diverse narratives as written or otherwise recorded and as explicated by worldview studies and kairological experts become even more necessary as interventions to bring about a world that enjoys the benefits of pluralism and multiculturalism. Many outsider, non-normative, minority identities, racial and otherwise, have historically experienced the problems of being demonized, pathologized, criminalized—of having the great powers of our civilization turned against them to perpetuate their subordination. I think it useful here to respond to the Supreme Court's recent *Students for Fair Admissions* decision that dealt the final death-blow to remedial affirmative action in higher education, for the arguments the decision relies on present challenges to worldview studies pedagogy and its educational subfields, including kairology. Not surprisingly, the opinion plays always-invidious racial categorization and

its stereotypes against the virtue of the atomic, sovereign individual one encounters, for example, in American libertarianism (see Krause, 2015).

I would note that the very-much-invented BPs of race- and ethnicity-, sex- and sexuality-based, and similar oppressions and corresponding need for political resistance has forced what has been called "strategic essentialism," political mobilization of minorities around identity categories, while critical theorists of race and other identity categories have consistently noted racialization and related processes as constructive, that is, as fictional. White, straight, cisgender people may be those least likely to even experience or identify with their whiteness, straightness, or gender, but their sometimes call to abandon the divisive, unimportant "labels" (or even their warning of the peril of using the master's tools to attempt to dismantle his house) often fails to attend to the urgency of the political problem(s). So although I am called to point out the fictionality of religious, racial, sexual, class-based and other identities, I must yet stress, at the same time, how profoundly weighty such fictions are.

But how may they be characterized relative to this overall framework? Drawing on the insights of the late José Esteban Muñoz (e.g., 2020), I would say that such identities—lacking any "authentic" essence (though simultaneously often challenged to prove their authenticity), but, insofar as they have any substance—subsist most authentically as aesthetics and performance, nothing as stable as a metanarrative, but, rather, many, many stories, each evocative of memories and feelings that coordinate senses of disidentification, affiliation, celebratory rest, and *possibility*. More to the point, I would draw attention to Muñoz use of W.E.B. Du Bois's concept of double consciousness and his question, "How does it feel to be a problem?":

> [O]ne can also ruminate on the ways in which feeling like a problem is also a mode of belonging, a belonging through recognition. [F]eeling like a problem is a mode of minoritarian recognition. Rather than mapping belonging through exhausted narratives of identity, there may be considerable value in thinking about the problem of feeling like a problem as not simply an impasse but, instead, an opening. Thus, I aim to take two tracks: one considers what it means to feel like a problem, while the other considers the problem of feeling itself and how it functions in relation to belonging and knowing the other through [...] the transmission of affect. More specifically, I am interested in making sense of a certain modality of what I will call intraracial empathic projective identification. (Muñoz, 2020, p. 37)

The respondent's *amici* in *Grutter v. Bollinger* (2003) provided a great amount of evidence for the educational benefits of exposure to "diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints" (*see Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003). And in defense of Harvard's and UNC's affirmative action programs, a number of other *amici* in *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.* (2023) presented evidence regarding the cognitive-developmental benefits of racial diversity in education, such as N. Bowman's (2010) "College Diversity Experiences and Cognitive Development: A Meta-Analysis." However, Justice Thomas, in his concurrence dismisses any claimed educational benefits of racial diversity as vague and abstract, unquantified and unquantifiable. I would suggest that problem-oriented kairological research and, more broadly, worldview studies research that explicitly attends to how networks of narratives transmit feeling—especially the feeling of being a problem—together with a kairological pedagogy and, more generally, a worldview studies pedagogy that critically frames such affective contact would produce results neither vague nor unquantifiable.

[13] Bruner, 2002, p. 10; in the realm of economics, see Robert J. Shiller's recent (2019) *Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events*.

[14] The viral metaphorical character of the meme concept happily captures what might be called the "new animist" or (really) "new fetishist" line of thought I draw on here, depending on the insights of areas of inquiry such as new materialism, thing theory, and renewed respect for Indigenous ontologies. Sometimes it is instrumentally useful to think of individuals, for example, in mechanistic terms relative to large social and structural forces; likewise, "objects" brought into human life may, situationally, be profitably understood agentively. Because viruses share some but not all of the properties that conventionally identify living

organisms as "alive," I appreciate how memetics, at least at a core metaphorical level and in some thinkers more explicitly, invites one to think about the quasi-intentionality of the storyworlds that dwell within us and that we move among. Agency, intentionality, and, put most strongly, sovereignty, are often understood in terms of novelty, decisive exceptionality, and the internal coherence or government of self-possession (cf. the Nazi Schmitt and the slavery-apologist Aristotle), and certainly fantastical storyworlds abound with these properties; however, a case can be made (as does the nature poet Mary Oliver in *Long Life*) for the sovereignty of habit, of norms. The regularities of a genre and the skeletal architecture of a storyworld may act more powerfully, decisively, pedagogically than the startling little novelties, incidents, and perspectives. The narratives we encounter are affordances, extensions of the cognitive processes that take place "in the brain," training capacities like theory of mind, memory, etc.

Rosenblatt states, "I have used the terms *transaction* and *transactional* to emphasize the essentiality of both reader and text, in contrast to other theories that make one or the other determinate. *Interaction*, the term generally used, suggests two distinct entities acting on each other, like two billiard balls. *Transaction* lacks such mechanistic overtones and permits emphasis on the to-and-fro spiraling, nonlinear, continuously reciprocal influence of reader and text in the making of meaning" (2016). The idea that texts (together with the worlds of settings and characters within them) have life and agency beyond that of their authors is hardly new at this point; it is a pragmatic fact that texts, as independent instruments, will take on novel functions in changed circumstances and when put through the filters of different receptors. In the American context, one thinks of the organicist, experimentalist-pragmatist (as opposed to mechanistic, scientistic, supposedly value-neutral methodology of the originalist) "living" Constitution, of which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. writes in *Missouri v. Holland* 252 U.S. 416 (1920):

> With regard to [the Constitution] we may add that when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.

No less than the Framers, artists in general (though of course there are exceptions who write esoterically—compare Strauss's (1952) *Persecution and the Art of Writing*) write with broad, general, flexible intentions that honor their readers' sovereignty (much like Jefferson's conception of generational sovereignty) so that many may receive and use their words and worlds in the many unforeseeable ways that they may be taken up by different people for unforeseen ends. In a way, however, the originalist does honor the agency of the text, an anchor and harbor in the seas of relativism, sovereign and even sacred in itself ("we are a nation of laws, not of men"), and not because of some functional or situational aim, so perhaps the analogy to styles of constitutional interpretation is imperfect.

[15] I am not alone in calling for this pedagogical intervention. Dubourg and Baumard (2022, p. 13) call for it: "The fact that children are intrinsically captivated by imaginary worlds suggests that such fictions should be brought into the classrooms. The links between curiosity and learning being increasingly understood (Gordon et al., 2015; Wade & Kidd, 2019), cultural attraction theory could be a relevant and useful framework to design curiositybased learning interventions." But Dubourg and Baumard are far more optimistic about "imaginary worlds" as almost mechanically promoting positive values than I would dare be.

Contemporary "mythmaking," which is to say, an allomythos, provides people with worlds, histories, myths to make their lives livable. But in doing so there is no certainty that a given allomythos will supply a good way of life. Some allomythoi are rooted in and naturalize good things that are worthy of preservation; others empower past prejudices and errors, breathing new life into monstrous forms; and still others open up new possibilities, new forms of good and evil. Scholars may be able to describe the phenomenon of the allomythos more successfully and evenhandedly using the tools supplied by cutting-edge methods, but after this analytical and explanatory work is done and in addition to it, we should not neglect the critical and evaluative interpretive approaches of doing "work on" myth (*sensu* Blumenberg, 1979 – cf. Lincoln, 1999, p.

209: “scholarship is myth with footnotes”) so that we, too, may contribute to making a livable history. And we should recognize our mythmaking activity in both phases. In this respect, I particularly admire Rue’s work (1994, 2005).

[16] So much YA literature is fantastical, I submit, not just because of historical inertia that still codes fairy tales, fantasy, and sci-fi as childish, but also because adolescence is a major borderland and crossroads in life, a situation and period of life that calls for great personal efforts of self-formation and world(view)-making. So texts that engage in robust worldmaking and invite attentive and even critical reflection are potentially useful cognitive tools.

[17] More than that, this chapter considers how kairology might relate to an imagined “worldview education” (WE) curriculum; that is, just as research advances in “religious studies” (RS) ideally inform reforms in “religious education” (RE, an educational curriculum which varies from place to place (see, e.g., Von Brömssen et al., 2020), sometimes taking on insights from other disciplines like ethics, history, etc.), so too academic research in the study of fictional worldviews and ways of life may, again, ideally, contribute to the broader teaching of worldviews and ways of life to promote subject-specific and domain-general knowledge and abilities. I write “ideally” twice above because just as the form RE takes throughout the world is often shaped more by politics (see Muller and Young, 2019, p. 198) than the findings of experts in disciplinary research or evidence-based education, so too it may be unrealistic to expect worldview studies and its subdiscipline kairology to be taught at lower levels.

(With regard to Muller and Young’s arguments referenced *supra* and the influential concept of “powerful knowledge” (see Young, 2008), I would note that, while academic disciplines do produce “powerful knowledge” (PK) through careful, critical, open-ended observation and refinement (and even rejection) of concepts, categories, models, and so on, producing knowledge with a greater degree of “objectivity” and claim to validity, so too do other disciplined communities of discourse and practice, such that “powerful knowledge” does reside within, for example, indigenous, female, queer, working-class, and other communities whose previously-dismissed knowledge has been promoted by the diversify-the-curriculum movement and would rightly continue to be worldviews and ways of life of great interest in an ideal WE curriculum. PK advocates tend to praise abstract, disembodied, theoretical knowledge, which is indeed hard-won and a worthy educational aim, *at the expense of* students’ ordinary, general knowledge, which should always be the foundation for making new knowledge interesting, meaningful, and comprehensible. And their chosen term celebrates what should often be critiqued, decolonized, etc. Others have made similar and other objections to the concept, most along Deweyan lines that are consistent with my own perspective; see Miedema, 2023; White, 2018, 2019; Carlgren, 2020; Biesta, 2014.)

[18] To produce novel social formations, I would submit the need, minimally, for (1) a *platform* (the mass publication of texts is powerful, certainly, but audiovisual platforms are more immediately tied to the bodily senses and perhaps more compelling; this suggests that one would need corporate patronage or significant independent means—though the costs do seem to be decreasing steadily); (2) a *problem* (the fictional work needs to relate compellingly to a BQ or BQs, a BP or BPs, or some other major concern of an existing social formation or proto-social-formation); (3) *persuasion* (elaborating on “compellingly” in the preceding parenthetical, one likely will find rhetorically effective use of ways of worldmaking, including neologisms, techniques of realism and depth, and so on); and (4) *place-making* (by this, I refer to setting up boundaries, not only raising problems but offering determinate responses to questions and problems raised).

[19] David Herman is one example of a researcher who understands storytelling as a kind of training, scaffolding people’s inferential capacities to mindread, construct models for action. “Present manifestations of brain plasticity assume a range of pedagogical impulses,” writes John Lardas Modern in a recent critical work, “from the geriatric to the explicitly pious to the popular and pedestrian” (2021, p. 24). *Cf*. Tony D. Sampson, *The Assemblage Brain: Sense Making in Neuroculture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), xi. We are called by ambient culture to discipline ourselves into untroubled, cognitively-efficient capitalist instruments or to at least dissipate our will-to-change among a thousand worlds of titillating superstimuli. I think of these hard words in a recent article:

> If what we seek in imaginary worlds is true novelty, then we would likely learn to search elsewhere. We would eschew fantasy books and superhero movies for classes on quantum mechanics and differential equations. Science and mathematics involve ideas that have no familiar precursors; they defy intuition and are thus truly novel from a conceptual perspective (Shtulman, 2017). Yet, rather than devote ourselves to learning evolutionary biology or celestial mechanics, most people would prefer to spend their time assimilating the mundane details of imaginary worlds, like the ancestries of Pokémon characters or the names of Star Wars planets. (Shtulman, 2022, p. 49)

Hard words, to be taken seriously, but perhaps not entirely fair. The virtual unicorns of L'Engle's *Many Waters* or the Dust, indeed, the dark material, of Pullman's *His Dark Materials* arise from serious engagement with the strangeness of quantum mechanical and astrophysical discoveries. Fantastical narratives not only reckon seriously with the findings of science, but, as I discuss in particular in Chapter 3, they deal with the serious implications and consequences of technoscientific advances and the subjectivities and cultures that have arisen in relationship with them.

That said, the guilty and anxious responsibility of navigating the presently highly-individually-delegated task of intentional, ethical, brand-conscious self-creation (and, in general, self-creation not through original, local inventiveness and entertainment but through passive (however careful) consumption of specialist- or expert-created fictional worlds in a broader culture allergic to the value of solitude and boredom – what Bertrand Russell calls "fruitful monotony" – that uses novel, exciting, spectacular, supernormally-stimulating storyworlds to energize the hedonic treadmill of storyworld consumerism), in light of the dizzying multiverse of possible worlds and the worlds therein, is well expressed in Rollo May's reflection on Kierkegaard in *The Meaning of Anxiety* (1950):

> We can understand Kierkegaard's ideas on the relation between guilt and anxiety only by emphasizing that he is always speaking of anxiety in its relation to creativity. Because it is possible to create — creating one's self, willing to be one's self, as well as creating in all the innumerable daily activities (and these are two phases of the same process) — one has anxiety. One would have no anxiety if there were no possibility whatever. Now creating, actualizing one's possibilities, always involves negative as well as positive aspects. It always involves destroying the status quo, destroying old patterns within oneself, progressively destroying what one has clung to from childhood on, and creating new and original forms and ways of living. If one does not do this, one is refusing to grow, refusing to avail himself of his possibilities; one is shirking his responsibility to himself. Hence refusal to actualize one's possibilities brings guilt toward one's self. But creating also means destroying the status quo of one's environment, breaking the old forms; it means producing something new and original in human relations as well as in cultural forms (e.g., the creativity of the artist). Thus every experience of creativity has its potentiality of aggression or denial toward other persons in one's environment or established patterns within one's self. To put the matter figuratively, in every experience of creativity something in the past is killed that something new in the present may be born. Hence, for Kierkegaard, guilt feeling is always a concomitant of anxiety: both are aspects of experiencing and actualizing possibility. The more creative the person, he held, the more anxiety and guilt are potentially present. (cite)

What, in light of all this, is the responsibility of the teacher who would expose students to the persuasive possibilities of fantastika? One cannot undertake it with the naïve optimism of Gernsback, who justified scientifiction based on its science-educational function. (In fact, the patent metaphor strongly shaped his thinking, with him arguing that scientifiction authors' role in pushing forward the imaginative boundaries of technology should be legally recognized and promoted (Hrdy and Brean, 2022). One might say his notion of patent is at odds with the purpose of copyright in a way that is comparable to how his writing ideals are at odds with the conventional charms of literary texts. In the culture of electronics hobbyists that he inhabited and whom he worked to support, the big questions that mattered were almost exclusively technoscientific (not, say, psychological, sociological, ethico-legal—or even biological-evolutionary), and that meant that the stories that

resonated with him, that responded to his concerns, were those that took up the issues of electronics, physics, and so on in ways that felt to him sufficiently pedagogical to be potential prior art.

[20] The discussion in n. 1 *supra* invokes legal discourse. In the context of this footnote's referent, it is well to observe that the law has similarly tended to attempt (with uneven success) avoiding defining "religion" (see Freeman, 1983) while yet identifying "viewpoints" concerning which it endeavors to be neutral and enforcing the dichotomous distinction between the religious and the secular (see *Frazee v. Illinois Employment Security Department*, 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989)).

[21] For one work on how literary works contributed to producing this sort of self-model and its correlate legal order in Stuart England, see Visconsi, 2008.

[22] These include mental flexibility and analogical reasoning (metaphor and blending; *e.g.*, Dias & Harris, 1990); empathy, compassion, and cooperation (theory of mind—*i.e.*, parasocial relationships in paracosms; see, *e.g.*, Mar & Oatley, 2008; Oatley, 2016; Johnson, Cushman, Borden, & McCune, 2013; Johnson, 2012; Smith, Schlaepfer, Major, Dyble, Page, Thompson, Chaudhary, Salali, Mace, Astete, Ngales, Vinicius & Migliano, 2017; Martins & Baumard, 2020); sovereignty and empowerment; self-exploration and self-cultivation (individuation—n.b. how often sinistral oppositionality is a fundamental technique of individuation; see Szolin and Griffiths, 2022; Meyer, Zhao & Tamir, 2019); escape and anxiety reduction (*e.g.*, Scrivner & Christensen, 2021, on using horror stories therapeutically to develop anxiety-management skills); and irony, detachment, even cynicism (closely related to comparison, critique, and evaluation). It could even be the case that by promoting a taste for exploratory, speculative fiction, teachers might cultivate the cognitive style or personality trait of Openness, which is positively correlated with intellectual curiosity and higher academic achievement (Hakimi, Hejazi, & Lavasani, 2011; Sorić, Penezić, & Burić, 2017).

[23] Possamai, a self-identified Weberian, in his earlier work on hyper-real religion, also asserts three "teleologies of the being" (ideal-types of aims for spiritual development). All three of my modes appear to satisfy his spiritual teleology of "entertainment," though the N-mode by way of its balanced approach may have the broadest appeal as an entertaining form of faith-seeking-understanding, formation of a better self, that is, "illumination development" (spirituality as an end-in-itself seeking one's full potential, insight into transcendence, etc.) while O-mode works perhaps appeal more to his "instrumental development" and the M-mode most to development as entertainment, delighting in novelty rather than reinforcing and resisting allomythically-translated WWLs (Possamai, 2005, pp. 75–6).

I defer to Possamai's broader experience studying and categorizing lived fiction-based NRMs and other WWLs, but his three ideal-types and his small empirical study (2012, pp. 10–17) are, indeed, consistent with the M-, N-, and O-modes together with their lateralized dispositions. His ideal-types are (1) *active* consumers of popular culture, who use it to inform and empower their WWL; (2) *casual* consumers of popular culture, who yet make it part of their WWL ("If the following analogy is permitted, hyper-real actors of the first type would be like Catholics attending church regularly, whereas actors of the second type would be like Catholics who believe without belonging" (Possamai, 2012, p. 7)); and (3) "[r]eligious and secular actors *opposed* to the consumption of popular culture leading to the practice of, or to the sharing of characteristics with, hyper-real religions" (emphasis added, Possamai, 2012, p. 8). His third ideal type, consisting of actors opposed to hyper-real WWLs, correlates to the O-mode; his intermediate category of lukewarm dabblers, who remain located in their home WWLs but indulge in popular culture and see it as a valid source for inspiration, correlates to the N-mode style of worldmaking; and those actively willing and seeking absorption in the novel, externalized dreams of makers of allomythoi seem to be the (actively) receptive counterparts of M-mode worldmakers.

Outside those predisposed by loyalty to a home WWL to respond oppositionally to most allomythoi, one may think, broadly, about how Possamai's active-consumer ideal type comes to be. Such group formation, as a distinctive collective entity, may generally occur after individuals have undergone a kind of "pre-training" process of learning and being influenced by a work of fantastika before they seek out others, especially others with more expertise, who have been similarly moved. That is, self-directed, intrinsically-motivated learning is already present, energized by the incentives of entertainment, certainly, but also reflecting in some individuals

an already-present novelty-seeking disposition that will bring them into a zone of proximal development where the feedback of others may step in to confirm and stabilize the novel self-and-world model with which they are experimenting. Another factor is the simple fact that stories are more memorable than facts (Mar, Li, Nguyen, & Ta, 2021).

[24] Davidsen proposes that texts leading to the formation of fiction-based religions contain, additionally, textual elements he designates "religious affordances":

> Religious narratives, i.e. narratives that are usable as authoritative texts for religion, tend to contain one or more of four types of religious affordances: (a) they include *fantastic elements* which are real within the narrative world, but supernatural from the perspective of the world of the reader; (b) they include *narrative religion*, especially in the form of ritual interaction with superhuman beings; (c) they thematise and assert their own *veracity*; and (d) they claim to stem from a *divine source*. (2014, p. 30; cf. Davidsen, 2014, pp. 96 ff.)

Put differently, the claim might be something to the effect that allomythic storyworlds that afford production of fiction-based WWLs assert the *reality* and *truth* (one method of doing this is by using a narrative frame of "feigned history" anchoring them in this world (Davidsen, 2014, p. 41)) of the fantastical elements or novums they posit (often, I would note, using neologies), reinforcing this reality and truth by claiming a *divine source* and depicting "narrative religion" ("divine powers and rituals directed at them; morality, cosmology, and eschatology" (Davidsen, 2014, p. 41); "On the narrate level, religious narratives often include what I will term *narrative religion*, i.e. more or less organised systems of practices directed at supernatural agents who are considered divine within the narrative world, together with information given in the narrative about these agents, their actions, and their projects. The core of narrative religion is constituted by religious practice engaged in by the characters of the narrative and instructions by authoritative characters on how to do so [....] The function of narrative religious practices is to provide the text's readers with a model for their own religious practice in the actual world. Also other information about the divine beings (theology), about the actions of the divine beings (such as the creation of the world), and about their projects (soteriology; eschatology), fall under narrative religion. The function of these parts of the narrative religion is to demonstrate why it is worthwhile to engage in a relationship with the divine agent(s). Analogous to the divine source claim being really a sub-type of 'thematisation and assertion of veracity', narrative religion is strictly speaking a sub-type of fantastic elements." (Davidsen, 2014, pp. 101–2)). If *narrative religion* is a sub-type of *fantastic elements* and *divine source* is a sub-type of *veracity assertion*, we are left with something like "narratives with novums attributed truth and reality." Not all fantastical stories present themselves as true or real; in the postmodern style, many invite doubt about their veracity and reality. But most fantastical narratives present themselves as true and/or real, and I agree with the general idea that a fantastical storyworld without at least one allomythos would be an impoverished thing, if not an impossibility. I like that Davidsen's analysis starts to move away from just "divine beings" with "projects" and to point toward more general categories ("morality, cosmology, eschatology"). And I find much more interesting Davidsen's efforts to identify whether and how the use of specific texts with determinate properties leads to modeling or configuring self-other-and-world in specific ways by those using them as cues for WWL-making (e.g., Davidsen, 2014, p. 157 and elsewhere).

[25] See n. 15 above and "Appendix 43: The Call to Canonization." *Is it really real?* Just to make the point again, fixation on the "reality" of a narrative is very Christian by way of the influence of Greek philosophy. Luhrmann's recent work (2020) makes good use of Johnston's (2018) on how Greek myths made the gods, heroes, and other places and events of mythic time real in Greek religion. Johnston rightly attends to the power of metaphor to bring the sacred and mythic together with the quotidian, the power of concrete spatial references to anchor the experience in memory, and the persuasive effects of serialization (see my discussion of Saler *infra*) and about plurimediality (see my discussion of Besson *infra*). Johnston distinguishes the Greeks' "pragmatic" or psychologized use of metaphoric fusion of the mythic and the mundane (I would quibble with her specialized appropriation of the concept of kennings, which Luhrmann unhappily replicates) and surrounding cultures' less self-conscious "magical" use of historiolae (pp. 68 ff.), which may reflect the Greek ontological anxieties I refer to. It is more productive to focus on how a narrative becomes more or less persuasive and salient in given situations or in life in general than on whether it is tagged as "really real."

[26] Compare Harker (2007) on "teaching kairotically," where he converts the Aristotelean triangle (logos-pathos-ethos) into a pyramid by including kairos as a fourth dimension and where he offers kairos-based questions for students to ask themselves and reflect on "the ethical responsibility that accompanies the project of evaluating context before decisions are made in the writing classroom" (p. 94), just as they would to identify the roles of logos, pathos, and ethos in their writing.

[27] One might still use an attribution like "religion" within a narrative to identify WWLs to study, and religious studies will, of course, always retain a special focus on the use of such a descriptor for WWLs, just as feminist studies, masculinity studies, or gender studies, or Black studies, whiteness studies, or race and ethnic studies (to give some examples of greater and lesser degrees of generality within worldview studies) would attend with special interest to WWLs oriented around their constitutive CCCs.

[28] The political and theory-of-education implications of GE are not obvious; indeed, they vary widely. J. Z. Smith's (1998) "Teaching the Bible in the Context of General Education" gets at some of this variety with his distinctions among *general education* (the general abilities that a properly educated person may be presumed to have—with connotations of knowing the "great books" (the "canon") and of having possession of a range of skills and concepts shared by the powerful—a liberal education in the old sense), *generalist education* (having a broad sense of the intellectual terrain through a survey of the disciplines and what they have to offer), and *generalizing education* (a reflexive, integrative, abstracting process sometimes promoted throughout the curriculum but often addressed to disciplines' seniors through, for example, a capstone project or an interdepartmental thematic or topical seminar).

Power should be thought about by any teacher developing a curriculum, a syllabus, a class session—maybe especially in a worldview studies/worldview education subdiscipline. As Kjeldsen writes, "Should the school mainly socialise pupils into traditional cultural knowledge and values, qualify them for further education and future jobs, aim at personal formation/development and/or enable the future generation to critically analyse, understand, challenge and even change existing values, ideologies, social interests and structures of power?" (2023, p. 169).

[29] The following explanation comes from Meyer, Land, and Baillie, 2010:

> [T]here are certain concepts, or certain learning experiences, which resemble passing through a portal, from which a new perspective opens up, allowing things formerly not perceived to come into view. This permits a new and previously inaccessible way of thinking about something. It represents a transformed way of understanding, or interpreting, or viewing something, without which the learner cannot progress, and results in a reformulation of the learners' frame of meaning. The thresholds approach also emphasises the importance of disciplinary contexts. As a consequence of comprehending a threshold concept there may thus be a transformed internal view of subject matter, subject landscape, or even world view. Typical examples might be 'Personhood' in Philosophy; 'The Testable Hypothesis' in Biology; 'Gravity' in Physics; 'Reactive Power' in Electrical Engineering; 'Depreciation' in Accounting; 'Legal Narrative' in Law; 'Geologic Time' in Geology; 'Uncertainty' in Environmental Science; 'Deconstruction' in Literature; 'Limit' in Mathematics or 'Object-oriented Programming' in Computer Science.

As in worldview studies' BQ approach, Wiggins and McTighe, in explaining "backward course design," focus on identifying core concepts and essential questions as the fundamental first step in course design; these are in essence the "frames" of the ACRL framework. In the framework, each frame has a set of associated "Knowledge Practices," which are ways to increase understanding, and "Dispositions," which signal the valuing dimension of learning (closely linked to affective and attitudinal). One may note that both "dispositions" and "knowledge practices" may be understood within the context or religious studies or worldview studies as responding to the old pedagogical value of *character formation*, but in a more critical and academic register.

[30] See also, Shopkow, L (2010); Shopkow and Middendorf J (2020). It is important to note, as Brukhardt (2016) does, that

> threshold concepts . . . are not self-explanatory. They are theoretical [or abstract] in nature and they don't offer much help to the instructor. . . . The [*ACRL*] *Framework* [*for Information Literacy for Higher Education*, much like Kassner and Wardle's *Naming What We Know* and the *AAR Religious Literacy Guidelines*,] does not offer any hints or examples. It describes what an expert in information literacy does in the context of each threshold concept, but it does not suggest how the expert came by the expertise, nor how to introduce and/or develop those practices in the classroom. . . . It lists dispositions—what learners often do to develop information literacy abilities—but it does not suggest the means by which such learners will develop the habits of mind that will eventually make learners into experts. All these considerations are left entirely to each institution [and department and instructor] to formulate individually. (pp. 3–4)

I had the good fortune to be trained in teaching writing studies by UCSB's Writing Program, taking special coursework and working under experienced mentors (and, later, earning additional credentials—the Certificate in College and University Teaching and the Writing Studies Ph.D. Emphasis). This helped expose me to specific methods, assignments, and exercises oriented to the threshold concepts of writing studies as I taught introductory writing for UCSB's Writing Program nine times over four years. At some point, I may adapt such methods, assignments, and exercises from writing studies to the subject matter of kairology. To design practices and exercises oriented to the threshold concepts of information literacy, I would adapt suggestions in Burkhardt (2016) and the *ACRL Framework for Information Literacy Sandbox: A platform and repository for sharing Framework materials* to the subject matter of kairology. Appendix 1 of the *ACRL Framework* promotes the idea of a coordinated, campus-wide information-literacy program comparable to Writing Across the Curriculum; it would be gratifying to someday answer this call relative to kairology/worldview studies since lifelong learning (research), effective communication (writing), and worldview literacy (not just knowing random facts about assorted WWLs, but being able to decipher, analyze, compare, and coherently synthesize fundamental components of WWLs) are – or should be – some of the foremost interrelated aims of higher education.

[31] I have proposals of threshold concepts I think would be effective for course design in religious studies that would also be useful in a course focused on kairological study of allomythoi, but it would take too much time and space to go into that now. Perhaps I hope to publish something on that in the future.

# Appendix 48: Designing a Course Integrating Critical Pedagogy, Fantasy Literature, and Religious Studies

This chapter is intended as an aid for teachers contemplating designing either a full course on the intersection of critical thinking, fantasy literature, and religious studies or at least material for one or two lessons along these lines in a course in religious studies or English. This is based on the conviction that both the teaching of literature and the teaching of religion may benefit from each other's material and critical insights. Furthermore, my hope is that this chapter's proposals will be flexible enough to help aid course development for high school, undergraduate, and graduate levels.

To support these goals and possible applications, this chapter is structured thematically, moving through a variety of topics that might be discussed in a course of this sort. Under each topic, a bibliography of potential texts is provided, stratified by grade level. It is presumed that at the high school level the students would only read the fantasy texts themselves and that other information would be delivered through lectures and classroom discussions. Perhaps advanced high school students might be asked to read some of the readings in the higher-level strata. The necessarily abbreviated discussion offered here under each topical heading should give a sense of how a lecture or lectures might be structured and what sources one might use for planning it. The topics are as follows: (1) defining key terms, (2) colonialism, (3) capitalism, (4) perspectivism and pragmatism, (5) feminism and queer theory, (6) interrogating the self, (7) royal ideology and the monomyth, and (8) critical pedagogy and reflexivity. These topics are intended to link together and produce a course that makes a larger coherent argument, but since they are subdivided, they may be used in isolation or even spread out into a two-semester undergraduate course.

Other details of course design have been omitted from this chapter since they will vary depending on the type and level of course being offered, as well as individual instructor preference and personality. To turn this chapter's suggestions into a full course, an instructor would need to decide on course objectives and the concrete measures of their achievement (e.g., traditional papers, quizzes, and exams or alternatives like composing a critically literate fantasy story or making a website, blog, or Tumblr for fantasy critique), classroom policies and expectations, modes or platforms of access to materials and assignments (e.g., in person or online), and so on.

## Justification

Using fiction to motivate action and promote critical thinking is a familiar feature of evidence-based syllabus design, and, following McCutcheon (2001) and others, religious studies may be regarded as a *critical* field that should welcome the use of fantasy literature both as datum for study and subject for pedagogy, given fantasy's capacity to promote alternative perspective taking. Likewise, critically literate students will benefit from knowledge of religious studies.

Fundamental to the study of religion is the realization that "religion" itself is a power-laden term. Critical analyses of religion have traced its development and contestation (e.g., Asad, 1993, 2003; McCutcheon, 1997, 2001; Fitzgerald, 2000, 2007a, 2007b; Styers, 2004; Masuzawa, 2005; Nongbri, 2013). One of religion's primary conceptual opposites is "magic" – a term often used, especially in some of the foundational theorists of religion, to

describe the practices and beliefs of the so-called "primitive" or "superstitious" peoples of the world. Relative to a normative Protestantism, Catholicism was for some theorists the model of magical superstition, unconsciously mirroring early and proto-orthodox Christian critiques of so-called pagans. However, magic and religion are not so easily distinguished. For example, in the cultural life of many African Americans, it is not reasonable to attempt to make a sharp divide between religion and magic (Chireau, 2003). Hence the utility of looking at fantasy literature to think critically about religion: fantasy literature tends to favor the sort of Medieval (Catholic) or pagan worlds against which "religion" tends to be understood.

Fantasy literature, in which magic is ontologically affirmed—often together with the affirmation of medieval, ancient, or alternative forms of social and economic organization, provides a unique space in which and with which to think through classical theorists of religion critically. Indeed, although sometimes framed as a reason for reluctance to include in a curriculum (Dickerson & O'Hara, 2006), the prominence of religious elements in fantasy is a positive reason for its use in the religious studies classroom. Furthermore, since the genre generally contains fictional races, such as dwarves and orcs, who have essentialized moral and intellectual properties linked to bodily traits (cf. Omi & Winant, 1994), fantasy literature provides a useful, relatively detached space for critical thought regarding the representation of marginalized and stigmatized people. Although the genre contains many examples of sexism, contemporary fantasy authors have been some of the most adventurous and experimental in pushing the boundaries of categories like gender, sexuality, and even the bounds of human nature, again giving a voice to the silenced and representations of empowerment to the oppressed. Some have argued that "estranged" literatures are inherently more critical and generative of social change than mimetic literature, though emphasis is usually placed on science fiction (e.g., Easton & Schroeder, 2008). This may or may not be the case. Some of the potential topics and texts discussed in this chapter provide opportunities for students to read suspiciously because they illustrate things like misogyny or racism, but other texts chosen for this course are resistant writings, expressions of critically literate authors. This variety is intended to help cultivate the recursive or reflexive attitude that is one of the primary characteristics of critical thinking.

Fiction allows one to approach the perspective of the other both in safety and yet with vulnerability. One of the primary objectives of this course is *conscientização*, "conscientization," which is to say, both critical consciousness and consciousness raising. The students and the teacher should be transformed, and this should include transformed, enlarged behavior, not merely some new vocabulary words or memorized facts. As an intervention in society, the course seeks to use the educational system and popular fantasy works, which often function to socialize people into mystified complicity in the naturalized existing order (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 471; cf. Berger, 1967; Barthes, 2012), instead to, in Elkins and Suvin's words (1979, p. 269), "be the advocate of an ideal non-alienated and libertarian reader who has the right to receive all the evidence of how, why and in whose interest the text has interpreted our common universe." By the end of the imagined course(s) that follows, a student should be able to affirm such a statement and simultaneously be critical of many of its terms.

### 1. Defining "Religion," "Magic," and "Fantasy"

This topic sets the groundwork for the rest of the course. As discussed briefly above, "religion" and "magic" are problematic terms. One might base an overview of the meanings of "religion" on J. Z. Smith's (1998) essay "Religion, Religions, Religious."

Moving on to the topic of "magic" one might begin discussion with a question like, "Why might thinkers influenced by Protestant thought see a similarity between Catholicism and magic?" This way of framing the question makes explicit the fact that magic is defined from a particular perspective, and that definition serves specific interests. If there are any Catholics in the class, perhaps they might be called on to explain what the sacraments are, and the instructor could then explain the concept of sacramentality. This may provide a more sympathetic basis for a Smith-like historical overview of "magic" that draws on Otto and Stausberg's (2013) introductory sections in *Defining Magic: A Reader* (pp. 1-18, 68-70, 126-128, 194-196).

What is meant by "fantasy" may also be introduced. At higher levels, excerpts form texts like James and Mendlesohn (2012), Mass and Levine (2002), Mendlesohn (2008), and Mendlesohn and James (2012) might be assigned. For high school and lower undergraduate levels, however, it may be sufficient to brainstorm together a list of the stereotypical features of the fantasy genre. Once the students are helped to realize that there are entertainment industries reinforcing these conventions, that these are *conventions* and thus could be otherwise, and that some of these conventions may be problematic (e.g., racist, misogynist, etc.), they should have a good foundation for the rest of the course.

***Bibliography 1***

Fictional texts (high school):

Rowling, J. K., & GrandPré, M. (2000). *Harry Potter and the goblet of fire*.

- One might use the *Harry Potter*- series because of its familiarity and likely connection to the backgrounds and interests of the students since, as Dewey notes, effective pedagogy requires such connections. Furthermore, an unusual number of useful critical resources have been written on *Harry Potter*. I specifically suggest *Goblet of Fire* because of its focus on the global wizarding culture as represented by education and by athletic and academic contest. This supplies material for discussion of issues like colonialism and globalization.

Stroud, J. (2006). *Ptolemy's gate*. New York: Miramax Books/Hyperion Books For Children.

- This may be a less familiar series, and students might be encouraged to read plot summaries of the first two books before reading this one. I selected *Ptolemy's Gate* because it is the volume in which Stroud has Bartimaeus explain the cyclical nature of the history of domination and rebellion. This may be returned to in the discussion of Marx's way of reading history. This storyworld should pair nicely with discussions of the colonialist formation of concepts like "religion" and "magic" and, later, the critique of the monomyth.

Clarke, S. (2006). *Jonathan Strange & Mr Norrell*. New York: Tor.

- Clarke's work is long and would take a few weeks to complete, but it is a rich source of material for classroom discussion. Her narrative structure is playful and self-subverting in a way that promotes critical engagement, and her narrative itself picks

up on important themes in the course: for example, her depiction of empire and magic, her theory of history, her heroes, her female characters, and her psychology and treatment of madness.

Undergraduate:

Martin, C. (2012). *A critical introduction to the study of religion*. Sheffield; Bristol, CT : Equinox Publishing Ltd.

- One might focus on the introductory chapter, "Studying Religion: Laying the Groundwork."

Otto, B.-C., & Stausberg, M. (Eds.). (2013). *Defining magic: A reader*. Sheffield; Bristol, CT: Equinox.

Smith, J.Z. (1998). Religion, religions, religious. In M. C. Taylor (Ed.), *Critical terms for religious studies* (269-284). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- What are some of the stages in the development of the meaning of the words "religion," "religions," and "religious," and how do these relate to historical developments in who had the power to decide what counted as normative? What do you think "religion" means, and what challenges to defining it can you see as you try?

Graduate:

Bush, S. S. (2014). *Visions of religion: Experience, meaning, and power*. New York, NY : Oxford University Press.

- In particular, one might assign the chapter "From Meaning to Power."

James, E., & Mendlesohn, F. (Eds.). (2012). *The Cambridge companion to fantasy literature*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mass, W., & Levine, S. P. (Eds.). (2002). *Fantasy*. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press.

Mendlesohn, F. (2008). *Rhetorics of fantasy*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press.

Mendlesohn, F., & James, E. (2012). *A Short History of Fantasy*. Chicago: Libri Publishing.

Styers, R. (2004). *Making magic: Religion, magic, and science in the modern world*. New York: Oxford University Press.

**2. Colonialism**

This topic may pick up on the previous topic of "religion" versus "magic" by beginning with the notion of "othering" (cf. Rana, 2009). After students are helped to appreciate the necessity of others for the formation of a sense of self, they may be helped to realize how a Western, "civilized," Protestant, scientific, rational discourse of religion needed to define itself against an "Oriental," primitive, Catholic other, namely, magic. Pals's (2006) chapter on Tylor (1889) and Frazer (1998) might be read with this in mind. Drawing again on Smith (1998), one may point out the historical link between contact with and colonization of other peoples and the project of categorization, the Orientalist project of mastery through the representation of the other (cf. Said, 1978). At the graduate level, one might consider Masuzawa's (2005) discussion of Buddhism, Islam, and the World's Parliament of Religions. Tylor's and Frazer's (cf. Pals, 2006) developmental schemas of cultural evolution – in which magic begins as psychological error and social manipulation, turns into religion, and culminates in Protestant Christianity and science – may be discussed

relative to the colonialist and modern (and racist) project of maintaining hegemony through conceptual hierarchy (cf. Lincoln, 1989; West, 1982, pp. 47-65).

Again drawing on Smith (1998), the instructor might note that one of the oldest forms of comparative religion is the heresiological model, giving an account of the false forms of religion. Indeed, it is through the definition of the false other (e.g., heretical Christianity, Judaism, paganism) that the orthodox and true comes to know itself. At the college level, this may lead to a discussion of contemporary Christian opposition to the *Harry Potter* books informed by McAvan's (2012) "*Harry Potter* and the Origins of the Occult." The instructor might draw on Albanese's (2007) work on Metaphysical religion in the United States to explain further the class division in American culture between (Neoplatonic) high and (African, native, and European) folk magic. Again, following McAvan, one can observe that certain Christians' anxieties are provoked by *Harry Potter* because it contains features that embody a conceptual opposite, an "other," against which they know themselves.

One might use the Lamb (2015) chapter to discuss how fantasy texts often reflect the colonialist project. Lamb notes that Rowling in some ways undermines her decolonizing project through unconscious adoption of a British nostalgia for a colonial and imperial past—a past depicted even more explicitly in *Ptolemy's Gate*, if the instructor picks that work instead. (Students reading *Ptolemy's Gate* might be asked, "What sort of critique of empire and slavery might one derive from the way the magician-jinn relationship is described?") Furthermore, the touristic appeal of fantasy worlds and quests resembles in some respects the exoticized spectacles colonizers enjoyed turning the colonized into. On the other hand, by treating pre-modern worlds as desirable and worthy of imaginative touristic exploration, perhaps well-made fantasy texts help dethrone the modern worldview from its privileged status.

***Bibliography 2***


Undergraduate:

Lamb, H. (2015). The wizard, the muggle, and the other: (Post) colonialism in Harry Potter. In C. K Farr (Ed.), *Wizard of their age: Critical essays from the Harry Potter generation*. Albany: SUNY Press.

McAvan, E. (2012). *Harry Potter* and the origins of the Occult. In C. J. Hallett & P. J. Huey (Eds.), *J.K. Rowling: Harry Potter*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rana, M. (2009). *Creating magical worlds: Otherness and othering in Harry Potter*. Frankfurt am Main; New York: Peter Lang.

- The two most useful chapters are "The Process of Othering" and "The Presentation of Otherness in the *Harry Potter*- Novels."

Graduate:

Albanese, C. L. (2007). *A republic of mind and spirit: A cultural history of American metaphysical religion*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Barratt, B. (2012). *The politics of Harry Potter*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- The two most useful chapters in this are "Purebloods and Mudbloods: Race, Species, and Power" and "Death Eaters and Dark Wizards: Terror and Counterterror."

Frazer, J. G., & Fraser, R. (1998). *The golden bough: a study in magic and religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lincoln, B. (1989). *Discourse and the construction of society: Comparative studies of myth, ritual, and classification*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Masuzawa, T. (2005). *The invention of world religions: Or, how European universalism was preserved in the language of pluralism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pals, D. L. (2006). *Eight theories of religion*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.
Tylor, E. B. (1889). *Primitive culture: Researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, language, art, and custom*. New York: Holt.
West, C. (1982). *Prophesy deliverance!: An Afro-American revolutionary Christianity*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

## 3. Capitalism

One might begin by telling the story of capitalism along Weberian lines. The goal should be to help students realize the ways the secular economy depends on the sacred in order to be intelligible. Weber's (1905/1958) argument is that the Protestant ethic, as a universalized form of Catholic monasticism, generated the spirit of capitalism by turning the whole world itself – the secular – into the field of ascetic, disenchanted, rationalized labor (cf. Pals, 2006). It transformed the Catholic sacramental economy of grace (e.g., Southern, 1970, pp. 100-169) into the secular economy of capital. Thus, capitalism finds part of its origin in religious motives and logics. This story may be complicated and linked to the previous theme of colonization by pointing out that Europe's massive expansion as an economic power also coincided with its colonialist conquests in the Americas, Africa, and Asia, which not only expanded its markets but also reduced its slave laborers to interchangeable, industrialized components of an increasingly global apparatus. Christian theological notions of blood as emblematic of difference and superiority (Anidjar 2014) as well as royal sovereignty and calling to evangelize all were used to justify colonial economic domination and transfer of wealth. Finally, the religion of capital, which threatens to reduce all – especially those not of European "blood" – to capital, is softened by a doctrine of common humanity and innate human rights. This, too, may be linked to Reformed Protestant understandings of human equality before God, covenant, and conscience (Witte 2007; but cf. Lewis, 1954, pp. 39-41), as well as Christian humanism and Enlightenment critiques that defined themselves against religious "superstition."

Capitalism's opposite tends to be presented, not as religion, to which as we have seen it is closely tied, but as Marxism. It has often been noted (e.g., Pals, 2006; Russell, 1945) that Marxism itself may be aptly compared to a religion and that its way of reading and critiquing history is in some respects "religious." It is a transformed, materialist system that retains much of its Hegelian logic. Hegel's logic, in turn, is fundamentally Christian, and Marxism offers a similarly totalizing way of understanding history's progress, as well as a messianic figure, Marx, who possesses the key to reading it and its apocalyptic consummation. Indeed, although continuing the Enlightenment critique of the Christian order, Marx and Engels found in early Christianity, the Peasant War, and the figure of Münzer an anticipation of the coming revolution and its ideal of a classless society (cf. Badiou, 2009).

When one thinks about these two economic systems relative to fantasy literature, some very interesting possible lines of class discussion open up. For example, one of the foremost theorists of science fiction, Darko Suvin, who was also heavily influenced by Marxist thought, expressed a great deal of skepticism regarding whether fantasy might evoke critical thinking. Suvin (1979) understands fantasy as another mystificatory expression of the superstructure that alienates people from re-presenting reality to themselves in a "cognitive" mode. Why might he have this attitude? Is it not likely that it is because fantasy tends to take readers into pre-modern worlds? However, rather than viewing this as an obstacle to critical analysis of the globalized, capitalist order, might it not be an opportunity to see the world in a different way? Students should be encouraged to criticize how the genre of fantasy is constrained and determined by market forces, which sometimes promote formulaic writing, but they should also think about how such forces incentivize creativity.

***Bibliography 3***


Fictional text:

Goodkind, T. (2000). *Faith of the fallen*. New York: Tor.

- Again, students may want to read plot summaries of the preceding books before reading this one. *Faith of the Fallen* may be used to think about what is "religion"-like in contemporary neoliberal Capitalism and Libertarianism. What do we think of Goodkind's critique of a socialist society? According to Guilfoy (2014), Terry Pratchett's fantasy series reflects Libertarian ideology, and it is in this respect comparable to Goodkind's. In what ways may Goodkind's narrative be designed to naturalize and support a particular ideology? What values and ideals does he stress, and to what ideals is he indifferent and antagonistic?

Undergraduate:

Barratt, B. (2012). *The politics of Harry Potter*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- The most relevant chapter is "Grunnings and Galleons: Materialsim in the Wizarding and Muggle Worlds."

Guilfoy, K. (2014). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy on the Diskworld. In J. M. Held & J. B. South (Eds.), *Philosophy and Terry Pratchett*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY : Palgrave Macmillan.

Pals, D. L. (2006). *Eight theories of religion*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Students might read the chapter, "A Source of Social Action: Max Weber."

Graduate:

Anidjar, G. (2014). *Blood: a critique of Christianity*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Badiou, A. (2009). St. Paul, founder of the universal subject. In J. D. Caputo & L. Alcoff (Eds.), *St. Paul among the philosophers*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Lewis, C. S. (1954). *English literature in the sixteenth century, excluding drama*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Russell, B. (1945). *A history of western philosophy, and its connection with political and social circumstances from the earliest times to the present day*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Southern, R. W. (1970). *Western society and the Church in the Middle Ages*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books.
Suvin, D. (1979). *Metamorphoses of science fiction: On the poetics and history of a literary genre*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Weber, M. (1958). *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism.* New York: Scribner.
Witte, J. (2007). *The reformation of rights: law, religion, and human rights in early modern Calvinism*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

**4. Perspectivism and Pragmatism**

Rather than treating the contemporary, secular perspective as natural, as if it were the only objective, rational point of view, a "view from everywhere and nowhere," the previous topic should have helped students to realize that its fundamental values have a history and are contingent on a vast network of constitutive factors. This leads quite smoothly into the next topic: perspectivism and pragmatism.

Like Marx and Weber in the previous topic, Nietzsche is one of the seminal critical figures who forever altered the way the contemporary world thinks. Like everyone else, his way of thinking is in part defined against and in relation to received ways of thinking. As with Marx and the Protestants who reformed the Western world, it may be useful to think about how Nietzsche was engaged in creating a "religion." What are his distinctive values and ideals, his myth? How are they meant, like Christian denunciations of heresy, both as refutations of contradictory values and ideals and as ways of creating a new way of being, a new kind of identity?

At one point or another, Nietzsche turns his critical, "despising" gaze on most of his contemporary influences, including Schopenhauer, Wagner and the völkisch movement, Christianity, Buddhism, Judaism, socialism, democracy, and capitalism. Instructors might focus on the critical Nietzschean postures they feel most comfortable helping students understand. It may be more important, however, to explain the positive, "yes-saying" aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy: the manner in which he celebrated values that he felt had been lost in the modern, Christian world through his creative, artistic project (see Benson, 2008; Roberts, 1998; Young, 2006).

Nietzsche's philosophical project attempted to represent an alternative constellation of "pagan" values: his Overman is faithful to the earth, tied to his people, rejects lifeless abstractions, has an aristocratic and manly self-confidence, and willingly squanders himself in the creative artistic act. By representing a robust alternative to the values of his contemporaries, Nietzsche enacted the perspectivism at the heart of his philosophy. He illustrated the manner in which perspective, motivated by the will-to-power that defines all life, generates values that serve its interests, including the sexist, anti-democratic, iconoclastic consequences of his ideals. But unlike Marx, who has a similar critical insight regarding the way the values celebrated by the superstructure serve the modes of production of the material base, Nietzsche maintains an attitude of ironic humor regarding even his own project.

After outlining Nietzsche's critical project, an instructor might return to Weber and explain how he, influenced by Nietzsche, predicted that the secularized world would be characterized by a new polytheism and a movement to re-enchant the world. Students might then be encouraged to think about how different stories by different authors celebrate and promote new and different values or "gods." They might be asked to brainstorm a list of

fantasy subgenres and their characteristics. Each of these reflects the desires and interests of scattered communities in the contemporary world. Likewise, perhaps the growing popularity of fantasy worlds in the entertainment industries and even the development of real religions based on them are manifestations of or methods for re-enchantment (e.g., Cusack, 2010; Kirby, 2013).

An instructor might point out the parallels between perspectivism and pragmatism in philosophy of science. That is, just as Nietzsche's perspectivism critiques a Christian worldview that claims to know the one truth, the total narrative of the world, and the one ultimate essence of humanity, so too pragmatism rejects a realist interpretation of science. Rather than claiming, as realism does, that science describes the ultimately true, fundamental constituents of the world in the pure language of mathematics, pragmatism treats the models supplied and constantly refined by scientists as useful or instrumental insofar as they seem to be warranted by their accurate predictions of phenomena at different levels. But they remain *models*, abstractions that are actually less real than the phenomena from which they are derived and to which they refer.

Turning to fantasy literature, students may be encouraged to reflect on how reading fantasy allows them to shift out of this world into a variety of other worlds and how, within those worlds, readers are permitted to shift among the perspectives of different characters. They should be developing a growing awareness of how and why fantasy is a genre that invites critical thinking.

***Bibliography 4***

Fictional texts:

Pullman, P. (2000). *The amber spyglass*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

- Again, students may wish to read plot summaries of the previous books. Some Christians condemned Pullman's work for describing the "death of God." Since the death of the incarnate God is central to many forms of Christianity, one might ask students why placing emphasis on the death of God would be so controversial. In what ways does Pullman's story reflect how Nietzsche changed the world? How is Pullman engaged in a similar critique to Nietzsche's? For those students familiar with C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien, how is Pullman trying to "challenge" their narratives (see the Hatlen (2005) reading)?

Grossman, L. (2010). *The magicians: A novel*. New York: Penguin Books.

- Questions for students: How does the novel seem to relate critically to other famous fantasy stories like *The Chronicles of Narnia* and the *Harry Potter*- series? How do its characters reflect contemporary consciousness as influenced by Nietzsche? What do you think of Quentin's nostalgia and his locating "real meaning" in Fillory? What went wrong in the case of Martin? How, then, is Grossman's narrative critical of its protagonists and its own tradition?

Undergraduate:

Blount, D. (2003). Überhobbits: Tolkien, Nietzsche, and the will to power. In G. Bassham & E. Bronson (Eds.), *The Lord of the rings and philosophy: One book to rule them all*. Chicago; [Berkeley, Calif.]: Open Court ; Distributed by Publishers Group West.

Hatlen, B. (2005). Pullman's His dark materials: A challenge to the fantasies of J. R. R. Tolkien and C. S. Lewis, with an epilogue on Pullman's neo-romantic reading of Paradise lost. In M. Lenz & C. Scott (Eds.), *His dark materials illuminated: Critical essays on Philip Pullman's trilogy*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
Mayock, R. (2010). Perspectivism and tragedy: A Nietzschean interpretation of Alice's adventure. In R. B. Davis (Ed.), *Alice in Wonderland and philosophy: Curiouser and curiouser*. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons.

Graduate:

Albertson, D. (2014). *Mathematical theologies: Nicholas of Cusa and the legacy of Thierry of Chartres*. New York City: Oxford University Press.
Benson, B. E. (2008). *Pious Nietzsche: Decadence and Dionysian faith*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Cusack, C. M. (2010). *Invented religions: Imagination, fiction and faith*. Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Dewey, J. (1934). *A common faith*. New Haven; London: Yale University Press; H. Milford, Oxford University Press.
Kirby, D. (2013). *Fantasy and belief: Alternative religions, popular narratives and digital cultures*. Bristol, CT: Equinox.
Roberts, T. T. (1998). *Contesting spirit: Nietzsche, affirmation, religion*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Yates, F. (1964). *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*. London: Routledge.
Yates, F. (1972). *The Rosicrucian Enlightenment*. London: Routledge.
Yates, F. (1979). *The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age*. London: Routledge.
Young, J. (2006). *Nietzsche's philosophy of religion*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

## 5. Feminism and Queer Theory

The previous theme's focus on Nietzsche naturally invites a critique of his sexism, which leads smoothly into the topic of feminism. What happens when one privileges the perspective of those who have been historically silenced, marginalized, and stigmatized? Nietzsche chose to select as his ideal the figure of an aristocratic male pagan, but feminism invites us to hear new voices and presents us with different ideals.

One might begin with a brief history of first-, second-, and third-wave feminism in the United States, from the initial struggle for suffrage and freedom from coverture, to the struggle against domestic abuse and sexual exploitation and for reproductive and employment rights, to the deeper poststructural critique of previous feminist essentialism. In the context of a class like this, one might make a point to discuss examples of feminist myth- and history-making, which illustrate the fact that religious myths advance particular interests (e.g., goddess religions meant to celebrate the female, Nation of Islam's pro-black mythic history, Christian Identity, etc.) and that histories are narratives (cf. Nietzsche & Fritzsche, 2007, pp. 51-65), constructed through omission as much as through citation. Indeed, "womanism," usually treated as a feature of third-wave feminism, may be used to point out the constructedness or fictionality of history. That is, women of color, working-class and lower-class women, and lesbian women were all active in feminism expressing their concerns and interests even before the so-called "third wave."

Depending on the fantasy texts one has read in the class so far, the discussion of feminism relative to fantasy may go in two main directions. The text or texts the instructor chooses to highlight may be critically literate; they may explicitly depict female characters with empowered subjectivities who break free from or intentionally inhabit what would normally be regarded as essentialized female qualities, roles, or stereotypes. On the other hand, the text or texts may be useful in a more negative sense, as examples or opportunities for criticism precisely because they represent women in traditionally essentialist ways.

Moving on to queer theory, the instructor might use third-wave feminism as a starting point. Just as women may not be encompassed by a single perspective—they are of many religions and none, of all classes, cultures, and backgrounds, and so on—human sexuality is fantastically diverse. For the purpose of a class like this, it's worth reflecting on how sexual identity, like other aspects of identity, may take a narrative form. Indeed, in some kinds of sexual expression, people intentionally adopt specific roles and scripts, sometimes supplied by fantasy stories. More generally, gender and sexuality are performed in accord with regulative discourses and disciplinary regimes that we learn by being socialized into the norms of our society. Our society tends to assume or imply a binary body and a compulsory heterosexuality, neither of which reflect the actual complexity of the world. This has historically led to oppression and violence against sexual minorities. "Queer theory" resists essentialism in the realm of gender and sexuality, asserting that there are people who fall outside the normative categories. Indeed, queer as a category that denies categorization even resists "gay" and "lesbian" as identities with, again, presumed roles, scripts, and other essentialized traits. On the other hand, transgender individuals explicitly affirm and desire to enact relatively conventional gender roles. Students might be encouraged to think critically about all of this by adopting different perspectives. Why would a transgender person find queer theory unhelpful? How might a Marxist critique the identity politics of a gay rights activist? Given past discussions of otherness and how identity is formed, might that help one understand why some people feel that speech, stories, and laws that support LGBT people are attacks? How may telling stories be a form of activism?

Students may be encouraged to think about whether a gay student would be able to find a positive representation of himself in the stories the course has considered so far. Who would a lesbian student identify with in this course's fantasy stories? Students might even be asked how a queer or kinky reader might reinterpret one of the course's stories.

### *Bibliography 5*

Fictional texts:

Butler, O. E. (1988). *Wild seed*. New York: Popular Library.

- Butler's narrative stands out as exceptional for its time. As a critically literate text, it offers many opportunities to think about the intersection and negotiation of issues like race, gender, subjectivity, and power. I also considered the following:
    - Bradley, M. Z. (1982). *The mists of Avalon*. New York: Knopf.

Meyer, S. (2008). *Twilight*. New York: Little, Brown and Co.

- If this novel is selected, the instructor may find it useful to spend some time explaining the connections between Mormon deification and marriage, including such concepts as celestial marriage and sealing, plural marriage and the godhead, and

Heavenly Mother. Possible questions for students include the following: In what ways does Bella express her own character, resist conformity to expectations, and demonstrate her incompatibility with female stereotypes? In what ways might Bella disappoint as a feminist hero? Think particularly about how she relates to men and sexuality. For those of you who have watched *Buffy the Vampire Slayer* or *True Blood* or who have read Anne Rice novels, how does *Twilight* compare to other popular contemporary representatives of the vampire genre? Who is marginalized or silenced in *Twilight*? How might someone interpret (either negatively or positively) *Twilight* through a gay or kinky lens (cf. *Fifty Shades of Grey* (2011), which is itself worthy of critique)?

- James, E. L. (2012). *Fifty shades of Grey*. New York: Vintage Books.

Undergraduate:

Gendler, T. S. (2010). Is Dumbledore gay?: Who's to say? In G. Bassham (Ed.), *The ultimate Harry Potter and philosophy: Hogwarts for Muggles*. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley.

McClimans, L. & Wisnewski, J. (2009). Undead patriarchy and the possibility of love. In R. Housel & J. Wisnewski (Eds.), *Twilight and philosophy: Vampires, vegetarians, and the pursuit of immortality*. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons.

Myers, A. E. (2009). Edward Cullen and Bella Swan: Byronic and feminist heroes... or not. In R. Housel & J. Wisnewski (Eds.), *Twilight and philosophy: Vampires, vegetarians, and the pursuit of immortality*. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons.

Rhonda, N. (2011). "When you kiss me, I want to die": Arrested feminism in Buffy the vampire slayer and the Twilight series. In G. L. Anatol & M. Kramar (Eds.), *Bringing Light to Twilight: Perspectives on a Pop Culture Phenomenon*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Graduate:

Melzer, P. (2006). *Alien constructions: Science fiction and feminist thought*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

- I would focus on the chapter, "Beyond Binary Gender: Genderqueer Identities and Intersexed Bodies in Octavia E. Butler's *Wild Seed* and *Imago* and Melissa Scott's *Shadow Man*."

Nietzsche, F. W., & Fritzsche, P. (2007). *Nietzsche and the death of God: selected writings*. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin.

Sedgwick, E. K. (1997). *Novel gazing: Queer readings in fiction*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

- Students might focus on the Introduction.

**6. Interrogating the Self**

Previous topics have dwelt more at the level of criticizing the social. This topic turns to the individual. Since gender and sexuality are important aspects of the human psyche, however, this topic hopefully connects smoothly with the developing argument of the course.

One way of understanding the "postmodern" world is, as Lyotard (1984) states, that it is characterized by skepticism regarding meta-narratives, totalizing accounts of

everything. Certainly, we saw this in our discussion of perspectivism and pragmatism. However, the postmodern may also be understood in terms of a transformed understanding of the self, and Freud was one of the seminal thinkers who brought about this new, critical stance.

The instructor might begin with a guided class discussion of Freud's vocabulary (cf. Pals, 2006). Do students know what terms like "psychoanalysis," "unconscious," "ego," "superego," "id," "repression" and "wish fulfillment" mean? Students tend to want to focus on the apparent absurdity of Freud's fixation on sexual motives, but they should be encouraged to appreciate how dramatically he changed the way people think about the self. Instead of a cohesive, conscious, rational agent, we now often think of ourselves as a bundle of conflicting drives and functions. This is significant. If the "self" is composed of dynamic components, is it also, in a sense, fictional? If the moderns thought that a rational human self would be able to represent itself and its world to itself with a perfect clarity leading to mastery, we tend not to be as confident. We tend to think that human motives are less clear, even to the actors themselves, and that our powers are more finite and frail.

Novels let us have direct access to the minds of characters, and we guess even more based on what they say and do. However, one might ask one's students, "How may this Freudian, psychoanalytic perspective make readers more suspicious of human motives and behaviors that they otherwise might accept at face value because the novel seems to let them see 'directly' into the minds of characters? What might some of the consequences be if one were to read a sacred text in a psychological register?"

Bettelheim (1976) has argued that fairy tales have a therapeutic structure that helps account for their popularity. Similarly, Campbell (2004) drew on the Jungian perspective (cf. Cech, 1992) to argue that myths and legends help integrate the self, putting the conscious mind in touch with its unconscious forces as identified by Jung. Students might be asked whether they think reading has a therapeutic value and if so, why that might be the case.

The instructor might also encourage the class to think critically about theories like Freud's and Jung's. Yes, they encourage a critical view of the self. The mind is not just "given," and it certainly is not unitary or purely rational. However, these theories also claim to know what human nature is. Some of its components are unconscious, but they may still be discovered and named through analysis of things like dreams and stories. What if the self, especially insofar as it is technical and creative, is never finished or complete? What if individual human cognition is actually distributed and extended among its social, built, and natural environments? Realizing that we are intimately linked to our world may help us be critical of policies and practices that are harmful to it. Might fantasy literature be used to help people understand challenging concepts like vast, geological timescales?

As with the weeks before, the fantasy text or texts selected may facilitate interrogation of the self in either a positive or a negative way. They may uncritically assume a stable, rational self that is the master of the natural world and that uses the other living things and natural materials to advance its interests. Or they may be critically literate and directly interrogate the self.

***Bibliography 6***

Fictional texts:

Le Guin, U. K. (1968). *A wizard of earthsea*. Berkeley: Parnassus Press.

- Students might be asked, "Why was it necessary for Ged to accept and integrate with his shadow? How is this consistent with the religious or magical system in the novel? How might one interpret this psychologically?" Other texts already suggested, such as *Jonathan Strange & Mr Norrell* and *The Magicians*, also have robust psychological components.

Hobb, R. (2005). *Shaman's crossing*. New York: EOS.

- The devastation of the natural world inevitably has a stronger and more immediate impact on the lives of those who live in more intimate relation to it, with less of a technological buffer and with less reserved resources. Hobb links various themes we have discussed so far—anti-imperialism/colonialism, posthumanism, and environmentalism. Students might evaluate and critique her narrative's success relative to these aims, consulting a plot summary of the rest of the *Soldier Son Trilogy* if they so wish.

Undergraduate:

Gooding, R. (2011). Clockwork: Philip Pullman's Posthuman Fairy Tale. *Children's Literature in Education*, *42*(4), 308–324.

Light, A. (2003). Tolkien's green time: Environmental themes in The lord of the rings. In G. Bassham & E. Bronson (Eds.), *The Lord of the rings and philosophy: One book to rule them all*. Berkeley, California: Open Court.

Pals, D. L. (2006). *Eight theories of religion*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- They might read "Religion and Personality: Sigmund Freud."

Graduate:

Bettelheim, B. (1976). *The uses of enchantment: The meaning and importance of fairy tales*. New York: Random House.

Campbell, J. (2004). *The hero with a thousand faces*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Cech, J. (1992). Shadows in the classroom: Teaching children's literature from a Jungian perspective. In G. E. Sadler (Ed.), *Teaching children's literature: Issues, pedagogy, resources*. New York: Modern Language Association of America.

Hollywood, A. M. (2002). *Sensible ecstasy: Mysticism, sexual difference, and the demands of history*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lyotard, J.-F., Bennington, G., & Massumi, B. (1984). *The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Rieff, P. (1987). *The triumph of the therapeutic: Uses of faith after Freud*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wood, R. C. (2015). Tolkien and postmodernism. In R. C. Wood (Ed.), *Tolkien among the moderns*. Notre Dame, Indiana : University of Notre Dame Press.

## 7. Royal Ideology and the Monomyth

The previous theme introduced Campbell's (2004) thought, although the monomyth itself was not explicitly discussed. This theme is quite specific to fantasy literature, which is heavily determined by royal ideology. Students should be helped to realize how theological ideas embedded in story structure may help maintain political and social structures.

After outlining at least some of Campbell's 17 stages of the monomyth, students might be invited to think of films and texts that seem to fit the monomyth structure. They might further be asked to group them into stories they enjoy and stories they do not. What makes a version of the monomyth satisfying? What makes a story feel cliché?

The instructor may then point out how certain traditional stories fit the monomyth (e.g., Gilgamesh and Enkidu, David and Jonathan, Odysseus, Aeneas, Jesus). And then the students may be asked what political structure these stories help to naturalize. Once they realize that the stories justify kingship, the divine nature of that kingship should be explained: the king deserves to rule because of divine choice, making his victory and rule both hard-won and inevitable; as the earthly embodiment of divine rule, a king establishes and sustains the natural and social (i.e., legal) order and is the primal enemy of chaos and lawlessness.

Students should be helped to consider how this way of telling stories is conventional—it could be otherwise. Yet, it is so persistent and useful, it shapes the way we tell history in terms of "great men" and the way we still tend to tell stories. As an example, the instructor might help the students think through some of the royal ideology in C. S. Lewis's *The Chronicles of Narnia*. In fact, the instructor might point out, people are encouraged to tell stories this way if they want to be financially successful. Whether the story is treated as reflective of innate psychological aspects of the human mind (Campbell, 1949) or as a formula for storytelling sanctified by its success in the marketplace (cf. Vogler, 2007), both interpretations naturalize an ideology that is intended to support a political order (cf. Jewett & Lawrence, 1977). Students might reflect on the way the presidential race dominates all other aspects of an election or on how plantation owners were thought of as patriarchal sovereigns over their slaves and husbands were, until quite recently, thought of as Christ-like lords and owners of their wives and children.

I would agree with those, Campbell included, who see the monomyth as possessing an initiatory structure. It is, as it were, a "therapeutic" (cf. Bettelheim, 1976) initiation into an integrated subjectivity that identifies with the royal self. Indeed, as the self-sufficient source of law and the master of its world, the modern subject that we previously criticized in contrast to the postmodern self is characterized by these royal or sovereign qualities. Through a form of wish fulfillment, one fantasizes living a sovereign life, the "American dream" of a nation of kings or Christ-figures, but this fantasy may help sustain actual oppression.

The royal figure that tends to be the focus of fantasy stories naturally calls forth a host of subservient others. Students may notice how our critical perspective taking—seeing the story from the perspectives of marginalized races, the poor and powerless, sexual minorities, "lower" animals, and so on—tends to dethrone the sovereign around whom many fantasy stories are structured, and in this way we may find ourselves agreeing with aspects of Suvin's critique of fantasy as mystificatory.

***Bibliography 7***

Fictional text:

Eddings, D. (1984). *Enchanters' end game*. New York: Ballantine Books.

- This is a fine example of a standard popular fantasy work that exhibits the royal ideological character of the monomyth.

Undergraduate:

Campbell, J. (2004). *The hero with a thousand faces*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Graduate:

Bettelheim, B. (1976). *The uses of enchantment: The meaning and importance of fairy tales*. New York: Random House.

Jewett, R., & Lawrence, J. S. (1977). *The American monomyth*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press.

Vogler, C. (2007). *The writer's journey: mythic structure for writers*. Studio City, CA: Michael Wiese Productions.

## 8. Critical Pedagogy and Reflexivity

This final theme is the most optional and potentially the most uncomfortable for instructors. It offers an opportunity for students to critique critical pedagogy and the instructor's implementation of it, to think about the goals of the class and the methods used to achieve and measure them. As mentioned above, this chapter does not define the specific course objectives and measures individual instructors might select, but it is probably the case that every course may be improved. And this theme may be one of the only occasions in the students' academic lives in which they are helped to realize that their educational system may, in addition to liberating and empowering them, also be hampering such goals through some of its conventional and routinized features.

The instructor might explain Freire's (2000) notion of the "banking approach" to education and how features of the course – probably those most required by the educational institution itself – have been designed to help students memorize information and prove that they have done so. Likewise, one might point out how students have been introduced to critical thinkers and their vocabulary and have been taught to read texts in terms of those perspectives and concepts. This, one may note, will give them social capital; they may now use some impressive concepts to show that they are part of an elite, critically literate group.

However, as Dewey (1916) would say, education should be part of a progressive project that helps reform and transform democracy, extending its goods and enlarging its participants. Through social, interactive experience, the students' educative environment should have raised their consciousness and expanded their powers for activity in the world. Let students evaluate to what degree and in what ways this has or has not been true.

For some, this course might have caused distress. Each theme has asked one to question something foundational, sometimes the very assumptions and perspectives of the weeks before. The students may have asked themselves, "Is nothing certain?" Dewey (1934) offers an alternative ideal, at the heart of both art and science, instead of certainty: namely,

what Keats (1899, p. 277) called "negative capability," the ability to live and act outside the bounds of a predetermined or certain world (cf. Jeffcoat, 2014).

Many of the concepts we have discussed are very abstract. Students might be asked how can they be used to help ordinary people. How can they be converted into action? Can fantasy literature help in this process, and, if so, how? Is there a kind of magic or enchantment in making people desire and dream? This may lead into a discussion of the students' papers or projects.

***Bibliography 8***


Fictional text:

Dahl, R. (1988). *Matilda*. New York, N.Y.: Viking Kestrel.

Undergraduate:

Jeffcoat, T. (2014). Dewey's marvelous medicine: Negative capability and the wonder of Roald Dahl. In J. M. Held (Ed.), *Roald Dahl and philosophy: A little nonsense now and then*. Lanham, Maryland : Rowman & Littlefield

Karavitis, J. V. (2014). Matilda and the philosophy of education: Or, what's an education for? In J. M. Held (Ed.), *Roald Dahl and philosophy: A little nonsense now and then*. Lanham, Maryland : Rowman & Littlefield

Graduate:

Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of education*. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Dewey, J. (1934). *Art as experience*. New York: Minton, Balch & Company.

Keats, John (1899). *The Complete Poetical Works and Letters of John Keats, Cambridge Edition*. Houghton, Mifflin and Company.

Freire, P. (2000). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. New York: Continuum.


**Works Cited in the Pre-thematic Sections**


Asad, T. (1993). *Genealogies of religion: Discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Asad, T. (2003). *Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Barthes, R. (2012). *Mythologies*. New York: Hill and Wang.

Berger, P. L. (1967). *The sacred canopy: Elements of a sociological theory of religion*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Chireau, Y. P. (2003). *Black magic: Religion and the African American conjuring tradition*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

Dickerson, M. & O'Hara, D. (2006) *From Homer to Harry Potter: A handbook on myth and fantasy*. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press.

Easton, L., & Schroeder, R. (2008). *The influence of imagination: Essays on science fiction and fantasy as agents of social change*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co.

Elkins, C., & Suvin, D. (1979). Preliminary Reflections on Teaching Science Fiction Critically. *Science-Fiction Studies*, *6*, 263–70.
Fitzgerald, T. (2000). *The ideology of religious studies*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fitzgerald, T. (2007a). *Discourse on civility and barbarity: A critical history of religion and related categories*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fitzgerald, T. (2007b). *Religion and the secular: Historical and colonial formations*. London; Oakville, CT: Equinox Pub.
Masuzawa, T. (2005). *The invention of world religions: Or, how European universalism was preserved in the language of pluralism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McCutcheon, R. T. (1997). *Manufacturing religion: The discourse on sui generis religion and the politics of nostalgia*. New York: Oxford University Press.
McCutcheon, R. T. (2001). *Critics not caretakers: Redescribing the public study of religion*. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
Nongbri, B. (2013). *Before religion: A history of a modern concept*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1994). *Racial formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*. New York: Routledge.
Styers, R. (2004). *Making magic: Religion, magic, and science in the modern world*. New York: Oxford University Press.

# Appendix 49: Designing a Course Integrating Critical, Genre-based Pedagogy, Horror Literature, and Religious Studies

> They cannot scare me with their empty
> spaces
> Between stars—on stars where no human
> race is.
> I have it in me so much nearer home
> To scare myself with my own desert places.
> —Robert Frost

> Perhaps the whole root of our trouble, the human trouble, is that we will sacrifice all the beauty of our lives, will imprison ourselves in totems, taboos, crosses, blood sacrifices, steeples, mosques, races, armies, flags, nations, in order to deny the fact of death, which is the only fact we have. It seems to me that one ought to rejoice in the *fact* of death—ought to decide, indeed, to *earn* one's death by confronting with passion the conundrum of life. – James Baldwin, "Letter from a Region in My Mind"

Jonathan Z. Smith, in his 2013 book, *On Teaching Religion*, states that "a syllabus is not self-evident, but (hopefully) a carefully constructed argument" (pp. 16). The course design described in the chapter that follows attempts to provide students with a carefully constructed and interesting argument that is faithful to what Smith calls religious studies teachers' "solemn [...] obligation to 'keep up' with the literature and research in education and learning" (2013, pp. 15-16). The course is designed to take concrete, potentially contestable positions regarding the functions and meanings of selected fictional works and religious concepts, and the course attempts to cultivate their active contestation and criticism by students. Its design is grounded in pedagogical research that has demonstrated the value of genre-based teaching.

The specific argument of the course and the specific genre or genres chosen are, one may note, significantly *less important* from a pedagogical standpoint than that the argument models (and its presentation in the classroom invites) careful, critical thought. The course should help students analyze the features that constitute a genre or genres, the social and political implications of such discursive features and their rhetorical deployment, and the critical techniques and modes of thought that enable their analysis.

Although the specific content is not the most important aspect of the course, it does matter. Religious literacy is an important component of critical literacy in a democratic, pluralistic, and increasingly global society (Wright, 2007, pp. 104-127; cf. Jackson, 2004, pp. 75-86), but it is unfortunately neglected in primary and secondary public education in the United States and optional even at the college and university level for most institutions that are not religiously affiliated. This course assumes that because genre-based pedagogy cultivates students' critical capacities and that because religious studies is an inherently critical discipline, genre-based methods may be productively applied in a religious studies context. The religious subject matter of the course naturally leads to the cultivation of critical sensitivity to particular issues (for example, how horror may express distinctly

religious forms of prejudice and bigotry), and the focus on the horror genre relative to a concrete argument further narrows the critical focus of the course. Whereas my previous chapter in the *Challenging Genres* series described a course that provided a broader survey of critical perspectives using fantasy literature in the context of religious studies (Fredrickson 2016), this course design is more narrowly focused and constrained "(hopefully) [by] a carefully constructed argument."

There is a growing body of evidence for genre-based teaching, emerging particularly in the context of writing studies (see, e.g., Bawarshi and Reiff, 2010; Devitt, 2004; Devitt, Reiff, and Bawarshi, 2004). Exposure to multiple genres, in which students are encouraged to use analytical skills to observe their varying features, is consistent with arguments that variation in experience is central to learning (e.g., Wright, 2007, p. 238). Genre-based pedagogy (1) helps cultivate critical, metareflective thought, (2) prepares students with transferrable skills to respond adaptively to new tasks (cf. Devitt 2007), and (3) perhaps even increases empathy, which is tied to humans' metacognitive abilities – i.e., the ability to reflect on what others are thinking, the capacity known as "theory of mind" (for a critical perspective on this, see Keen, 2007). The trends in writing studies that have led to the promotion of genre-based teaching are consistent with the larger trends in scholarship that led to the development of critical literacy (e.g., Rosenblatt, 1995; Freire, 2000). The rhetorical and discourse-oriented methods and perspectives promoted in writing studies encourage a critical, detached stance that allows students to entertain multiple perspectives, detect the political and ideological aims of texts, and read and write texts against themselves—in short, critical literacy (cf. McLaughlin and DeVoogd, 2004).

As Oziewicz notes, "Each genre, and specifically each individual work, offers its own didactic potential and usually can be adapted for a variety of educational 'purposes'" (2007, p. 45). Horror is particularly conducive to the genre-based approach because, as many commentators have noted, it is a genre that playfully blends multiple genres. As Fahy notes,

> [H]orror is preoccupied with novelty, variation, hybridity (through monsters that are living and dead, human and animal, and so on), and collapse. It is self-referential and parodic. And it thrives on drawing from a range of genres (suspense, thriller, fantastic, science fiction, mystery, and the like) and themes in provocative and disturbing ways. (Fahy 2010: 3)

The horror corpus presents students with a challenging variety of genres, particularly when they are called on to identify them and reflect on the features they use to identify them.

Recalling the demand for imaginative empathy, epoch, and eidetic vision required by the phenomenological approach founded by Edmund Husserl, and applied by phenomenologists to the study of religion, Lovecraft notes that horror is not for everyone: "The appeal of the spectrally macabre is generally narrow because it demands from the reader a certain degree of imagination and a capacity for detachment from everyday life" (Lovecraft, 2000, p. 12). Below is figure 2.2 from Kevin Kumashiro's (2015, p. 25) *Against Common Sense*. It illustrates the value of discomfort and disorientation and learning how to navigate such experiences.





Fig. 2.2

Rather than simply confirming a student's perspective and perhaps adding to a body of knowledge that conforms to it, one may make more of a demand on a student by confronting the student with a disconfirmatory, disorienting perspective that calls for detached reflection and creative reformulation of what is known. Horror literature, together with the genres from which it primarily draws, namely, science fiction and fantasy, is particularly suited to discomforting ways of learning.

## The Core Argument

The course is entitled, "*Horror Vacui*: Grotesque Emblems of Nothing as Provocations to Religio-secular Authenticity and Inauthenticity." In addition to learning about particular works of horror fiction (especially those of King and Lovecraft) and about the Christian mystical tradition and its philosophical and literary influences, this course hopes to help students reflect on the general nature of horror and its connections to religion and critical literacy. It tells a certain history or genealogy of horror, arguing that if Protestantism is, in a sense, a worldly or (in the old sense of the word) a *secularized* form of monasticism or (in the old sense of the world) *religious* life, horror has been, in the American tradition, a further secularization of Protestantism's ultimate concern, particularly the negative or apophatic mode of the mystic's God.

If one way of understanding horror is as the defense of quotidian life from the irruption of the abnormal and deadly or, put differently, as a cathartic release of the always-already-present deadly and abnormal aspects of reality in order to, through their narrative release and management, effect a restoration of their suppression below the threshold of

consciousness, horror represents a state of exception that calls for detection, deduction, and decision. Faced with the crises of perversion and negation, the very limits of being, will people fall into inauthentic, reflexive, uncritical thoughtlessness, or will they awaken to the critical, reflective, authentic heroism that is, when configured in this way, a sovereign life? This course explores this double potential inherent in humanity, as revealed particularly in limit situations, and finds it present, too, in religious representations of transcendent beings. It tells a story of horror from selected sacred symbols in the past to a secular present. In this secular perspective, as represented by Lovecraft and those, such as King, who have been strongly influenced by him, for some the double potential of human and god, in which distinction between being and nothing, good and evil becomes indistinct, becomes a cosmicism that is indistinct – there is neither good nor evil – due to the cosmos's vastness and irrationality.

Genres are based in and reinforce the conventions of discourse communities, so they naturally perform conservative and authoritative functions. However, some texts and text types are more critically competent than others when deployed for critical aims, and horror is one of these. In other words, certain genres have certain typical cognitive effects on people. There is a vast literature debating what makes horror a distinct genre—whether it is communally decided, rooted in fascination with discovery and comprehension of monsters, tied to a specific kind of pleasure, and so on. But there is a broad consensus that it, like erotic literature, for example, is intended to elicit a particular affective response. For various reasons, I favor Holland-Toll's definition,

> For the purpose of this analysis, therefore, horror fiction will be handily defined as any text which has extreme or supernatural elements, induces (as its primary intention and/or effect) strong feelings of terror, horror, or revulsion in the reader, and generates a significant degree of unresolved dis/ease within society. (2001, p. 6)

Horror and pornography are also similar in that many regard them as innately irreligious (e.g., Stone, 2001). Holland-Toll's word, "dis/ease," reminds one that it is uncomfortable for some to consider how often, in fact, the religious has to do with the body in its sexual and violent activities, and for religious studies as a critical discipline, this makes such genres pedagogically useful. The religious studies component of this course reflects on what is desirable or even queerly erotic about the horrific (cf. Freud's "death wish" and Nietzsche's "will-to-death") relative to the mystical tradition and developments in cognitive science.

Cognitive science of religion (CSR) is a rapidly growing sub-discipline in religious studies, and a course using horror texts presents a fine opportunity to expose religious studies students to research on the disgust response (relevant, among other things, to religious taboos and boundary maintenance) and terror management theory. Lovecraft's words may be regarded as anticipating this:

> There is here involved a psychological pattern or tradition as real and as deeply grounded in mental experience as any other pattern or tradition of mankind; coeval with the religious feeling and closely related to many aspects of it, and too much a part of our inmost biological heritage to lose keen potency over a very important, though not numerically great, minority of our species. (Lovecraft, 2000, p. 21)

Research has demonstrated that individuals cued with mortality salience, as when one experiences a horror story, shift into a simpler, less metacognitively reflective mode of

thought. For example, they are strongly inclined to favor their in-group and worldview assumptions and discriminate against out-groups (Greenberg et al., 1994; Arndt et al., 2002; Routledge et al., 2008), and they display increased desire to punish minor moral transgressions harshly (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). This psychological tendency takes the detective-story type pleasure of estranged genres (i.e., what are the rules of this world?) and gives it a moral inflection—what marks someone as worthy of death? Unfortunately, this can play into shallow biases such as racism and misogyny. Horror storyworlds often conform to this inauthentic, "they-self" logic (cf. Jancovich, 1992, p. 9), and knowledge of this is useful for problematizing the genre. For example, Hawreliak has considered the effects of inducing mortality salience in video games to provoke terror management responses, such as clinging more intensely to one's worldview (cf. Routledge et al., 2016):

> If one's worldview is a way to overcome existential anxiety, then videogames which at once induce [mortality salience] and convey ideological messages may be powerful propagandistic tools; in effect, they could "open" the player to ideological susceptibility by creating existential anxiety and then offer a remedy through a particular worldview. (Hawreliak, p. 548)

So one can see why people like Stephen King regard horror as a naturally conservative genre. Cooper (2010, pp. 40-46), for example, enumerates four "gothic threats," namely, (1) threats to the young, (2) threats to gender norms, (3) the threat of superstition, and (4) the threat of revolution, each of which suggest that horror threatens the norms of modern society. For some time now (e.g., Fisher and Fisher 1993), there has developed a body of literature on how humans use "tactics of make-believe" to buffer themselves from and manage the aspects of life that are terrifying and bewildering. Nickel (2010) is a useful reading one might assign that captures this perspective – namely, that humans fashion worldviews to buffer themselves from a sense of vulnerability but that horror may help remind them of their frailty and the value of acting in the face of fear.

However, some of those confronted with their being-toward-death in horror stories find in their confrontation with their negation and its monstrous signs that they are thrown back on their authentic selves; the horror of sickness, death, and negation may become the foundation of their heroic and self-creative being. Horror can destabilize meaning by questioning the status quo and offering the opportunity for doubt and interpretation. Hell, monsters, and the Devil don't just have to be stimuli that compel compliance to social norms (cf. Bivins, 2008); they can be provocations to critical re-examination and re-creation of ourselves and our worlds.

***N.B.***

The degree to which the themes described in this course design may be explored and reflected on critically will vary depending on the level of the students involved (graduate, undergraduate, high school), the nature of the academic institution and calendar (e.g., semester system vs. quarter system, private or religious institution vs. public), and the personalities and interests of the students and teacher. It is rather challenging, and so it might be simplified as desired. This chapter is intended as an aid to course design, not as a syllabus dictating everything students would read in the course, since that would probably not be feasible.

## The Fictional Texts

The course is focused on selected texts of Stephen King and H. P. Lovecraft. More narrowly still, the course's primary chosen text is the novella (1980, 1985) and the film (2007) versions of *The Mist*, which are of special interest given the recent TV series adaptation. By having students consider more than one version of the story, in multiple media and in relation to its Lovecraftian intertexts ("At the Mountains of Madness" and "The Unnamable"), students may be helped to consider how different media transform the story, how there is not, in fact, a stable or canonical text, and how active, critical engagement with texts may empower them as readers. If teachers' wish, they might add other texts according to their tastes and interests, and some possibilities are proposed at the end of this chapter.

## The Course

In King's *The Mist*, we witness a town's fall into madness – a madness that takes the form of innovative religion-creation (or, as King implies, superstitious reversion) – when they are, as it were, cued with mortality salience by the presence of Lovecraftian monsters. However, some of those confronted with their being-toward-death find in their confrontation with their negation and its monstrous signs that they are thrown back on their authentic selves; the horror of the mist becomes the foundation of their heroic and self-creative being, but their tragic surrender to knowledge of death proves to be their undoing.

The basic premise of the story is that a mysterious mist envelops a small town, forcing its inhabitants to take refuge in a supermarket. Monsters come from the mist – or in terms of King's larger mythos – creatures of "todash space" emerge from a "thinny." These monster-of-the-week type creatures belie the true horror, always present in King's work, of human madness. As one character in film version of the *The Mist* states, "As a species we're fundamentally insane. Put more than two of us in a room, we pick sides and start dreaming up reasons to kill one another. Why do you think we invented politics and religion?" King's theory of religion is more complex than an insane dreamed up reason to kill, and the unsettling and unreal premise of both the novella (1980, 1985) and film (2007) versions aptly fit the technical sense of the "fantastic" in contemporary fantasy theory and recall Freud's notion of the uncanny. King's (and Lovecraft's) fascination with insanity and frequent use of world-making, artistic protagonists, moreover, has much to do with his critical reception as a postmodern author.

This course's interpretation of the story and its theory of religion seeks to unpack *The Mist*'s eclectic range of sources—from King's mythos to Lovecraft, himself influenced by the classical past, to ancient notions of the scapegoat, violence, and human sacrifice. King's mythos illustrates the enduring influence of Greek myth and tragic drama and, as in Tolkien, a romantic nostalgia for a vanished antiquity, the "Imperium" of the "Old Ones." In sum, this course's reflection on the cultural resources that may underlie *The Mist* reveals, in continuity with the speculative tradition inaugurated by Shelly's *Frankenstein*, a western, technoscientific culture in uneasy, ambivalent tension with its past and still participating in an occult or esoteric state of indeterminacy between magic and science.

Thus, *The Mist* takes up the metaphysical religious tradition in America (cf. Albanese, 2007) in a distinctly un-healthyminded register characteristic of those artists who participate in the Cthulhu mythos legacy, in sharp contrast to, for example, progressive Spiritualist novels like those of Elizabeth Stuart Phelps. It centers around a Lovecraftian apocalypse, in which alien creatures reminiscent of Cthulhu and the Old Ones break through into this world due to human pursuit of forbidden knowledge inspiring blood- and guilt-mad religiosity. King's affinity for Lovecraft's mythos and use of it in the creation of his own is considered in conjunction with other parallels discussed in the critical literature on the two authors. In particular, the theme of a decaying and perhaps doomed civilization that reinforces humanity's mortality, ephemerality, and irrelevance – dominant in Lovecraft (cf. Joshi, 1990), and linked to his interest in the fall of the Roman Empire (cf. McInnis, 1985) – is central to King's Dark Tower mythos, which is itself the unifying myth underlying his many fictional worlds (cf. McAleer, 2009).

Metaphysical religion is often associated with a therapeutic, progressive, and optimistic quest for and confidence in the achievability of health, self-actualization, and prosperity. Its horrific cultural manifestations, such as the popular TV show *Supernatural* or the children's novels by John Bellairs, complicate the picture, illustrating border contestations of other possibilities. Jeffrey J. Kripal, in works like *Authors of the Impossible: The Paranormal and the Sacred* (2010) and *Mutants and Mystics: Science Fiction, Superhero Comics, and the Paranormal* (2011) has argued along such healthy-minded lines concerning a mystical, transhumanist *telos* running throughout literature drawing on metaphysical elements, though Kripal recognizes the terrifying aspect of the beings mediated by these literatures. Certainly, this is part of the story, part of the range of possibilities explored by American speculative fiction, but it contains dire prognostications as well as promises of posthuman triumph. These secular stories of taboo and lethal knowledge present a distinct alternative to the ideal that no knowledge should be forbidden and that no cost is too high in its pursuit. Indeed, as we shall see shortly, although the metaphysical tradition does trace back to, among other things, Neoplatonic esotericism, I would trace the more sinister vision of history we find in horror and, in particular, in King and Lovecraft, to evangelical and charismatic Protestantism, and even to Catholic mysticism.

One's "ultimate concern" (Tillich, 1964) must be *concerning*; again, the numinous is by Otto's (1950) definition *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. Put more simply, C.S. Lewis's Mr. Beaver tells us of Aslan: "Safe? Don't you hear what Mrs. Beaver tells you? Who said anything about safe? 'Course he isn't safe" (Lewis, 1988, p. ; cf. Smith, 1982, p. 110). Tillich's language for the divine, namely, that it is a *concern*, is here invoked precisely because of its existential character, for it hints at the anthropology underlying theology. Is not Dasein's essential concern its self, realized in its being-toward its own negation? Mythically expressed, as in Augustine contra Plotinus, creation came *ex nihilo* and is therefore distinct from God and contains *other* wills characterized by a freedom of conformity-in-possibility-of-violation. A monistic plenum would be a singularity in stasis, but Augustine's world has the space or absence at its core that enables difference. Being, then, finds at its base the presence of a void. In Augustine's paradisiac harmony was yet a latent violence, a potential to be unfree by being disharmonious with God. But creation was good in spite of its potential to slide into nothing. To press this paradox is to threaten the identification of the divine and the monstrous, as in the case of Cthulhu. Many religious

traditions explicitly assert that the divine ought to be feared and that contact with it is terrifying. Are our monsters and demons, too, our alienated selves? And is nothing the foundation of our self-creative being?

Again, the title of the course is "*Horror Vacui*: Grotesque Emblems of Nothing as Provocations to Religio-secular Authenticity and Inauthenticity." Beginning with the concept of the "grotesque," consider the following excerpt from Holland-Toll's (2001), *As American as Mom, Baseball, and Apple Pie: Constructing Community in Contemporary American Horror Fiction*:

> One of the frequent structures connected with the dialectical conflict between the rational and the intuitive is the Apollonian/Dionysian interface originally postulated by Friedrich Nietzsche (1886/2000) in *The Birth of Tragedy*. This conflict has been extended in horror fiction criticism, specifically by Stephen King [2010], to encompass the dialectical move from the existing order to the loss of order to its subsequent restoration [....] King reads this intrusion as temporary and postulates that since horror fiction is a conservative genre, one which upholds accepted conservative values, Apollonian order must be restored [....] This view is not always incorrect: in fact, quite often horror fiction does reaffirm existing *mores* via the restoration of order and the vindication of social values. I do, however, contend that King's reading is too simplistic and too monolithic, as it does not account for those texts in which King's move toward affirmation does not take place. (Holland-Toll, 2001, pp. 18-19)

The irruption of the Dionysian into the Apollonian order is well captured by the word "grotesque." Like Nietzsche's Dionysian, "Bakhtin's grotesque is a matter of pleasure in corporeal existence, the rich and funky gaiety that sees life processes intimately flowing into one another, rejecting the abstract divisions and intellectual puritanism of the elites, and consequently threatening and shocking only to them" (Csicsery-Ronay). Unlike the "uncanny," another useful concept in which one finds the unfamiliar in the familiar, the grotesque finds that the pure is polluted, the irrational and impossible is actualized. This moment of actualization, whether resolved later or not, is critical. Csicsery-Ronay further states that the grotesque "has to do with the struggle to accommodate mutable, unstable objects and beings in the world" (). The unstable and mutable resists classification and naming. As shall be discussed further shortly, this taps into the core, paradoxical category – i.e., the uncategorizable – of mystical theology. The grotesque also possesses an incarnational logic: "It traps the sublime in the body" (Csicsery-Ronay). Recalling Douglas's (2005) analysis of religious pollution and impurity as category violation, Csicsery-Ronay points to Geoffrey Galt Harpham's understanding of the "grotesque" as more useful than Bakhtin's concept: "[T]he grotesque involves not only the free and happy interflow of human carnal processes and the removal of boundaries between bodies, but the shock of detecting different physical processes in the same body, violating the sense of the stability and integrity of things, and revealing unsuspected dimensions that escape direct rational, human control" (Csicsery-Ronay). If God as Sovereign and Creator is ultimately responsible for all things, this would include pollution, impurity, and disease. Thacker proposes such a grotesque theological interpretation of medieval responses to disease:

> It is tempting to understand the Medieval hermeneutics of plague and pestilence as Neoplatonic – a supernatural force emanating from a divine

> center. However this would require that we understand the relation between Creator and creatures as pathological, a divine sovereign that emanates itself through a miasmatic diffusion of decay. But what is being emanated here is not creation itself but rather its opposite, a kind of de-creation. (Thacker, 2011, p. 106)

The grotesque mingles and destabilizes categories. Likewise, the genres of the grotesque, especially horror, are characterized by mingling. Salmon states, "Horror narrative involves thresholds—a narrative in which two worlds, settings, environments impinge, where crossing (and the resulting experience of horror) is the basic action" (Salomon, 2002, p. 9). This is precisely what happens in *The Mist*. Humans break through the barrier between this world and a horrific other reality, and chaos and death are the result.

> Here [in Salomon's book] I will describe the reality of chaos or nullity or some kind of categorical negation. In effect, with horror we are dealing with a material or metaphysical experience, with mystery, with that which by its nature cannot be explained but can only be described as a phenomenon that impinges to a greater or lesser degree on the human condition. (Salomon, 2002, p. 2)

It is this violation of human mastery and knowledge that I would stress in presenting the course argument and in interpreting the course's texts.

Of the concrete instantiations of nothing, students may first be asked to reflect on death as the limit of their being. The foremost figure with whom they might think about this limit and human finitude is Heidegger. I find Heidegger's analogy of reaching for the absent hammer quite useful. Just as the hammer's being – its network of relations and its significance – shines out when confronted with its absence when one reaches for it in the workshop, so too in the confrontation with one's mortal horizon of death, one's authentic being is illuminated (cf. Thacker, 2015, pp. 66-67). Instead of living in the empty circulation of routine speech and social roles, the self appears as singular, given, wondrous, even numinous.

> Because he is intent on tracing our intellectual life back to its unremembered source, and uncovering its transcendental conditions, Lonergan identifies our primordial astonishment before the world with the simple experience of wonder itself. Heidegger, on the other hand, emphasizes the fact that, in our everyday, circumspective concern, this original amazement is repressed; only the horrifying possibility of losing one's world as a whole can reawaken it. (Miller, 1992, p. 57)

Csicsery-Ronay notes that the grotesque may perform a similar function: "The grotesque obstructs the mind from completing its effort of quick understanding, arresting it when it wishes to get on with its routine of knowing, and forces it to learn something it is not sure it wants to know" (, p. ). In the grotesque monsters and forces of horror, death, which is transcendent precisely because in its presence one is absent, may be embodied either as symbol or incarnation.

A number of classic thinkers regarded dread as the primordial origin of religion (e.g., Otto, 1950, p. 14-15). Regarding Feuerbach, Hollywood states,

> Feuerbach argued that religion emerges from emotion, fear of mortality and limitation, and the desire for immortality and transcendence of the limitations of individual embodied existence. Against the reification and alienation of

> human beings in a divine other, he called for a recognition that God's predicates are in fact attributes of humanity in its species being, and that faith in God is thus "belief in the absolute reality of subjectivity." (Hollywood, 2002, p. 17)

Fear of the self's impermanence and mortality provokes an alienated, projected, transcendent self, but this being that should be a refuge from fear is, yet, founded on fear.

> For Otto, the numinous describes a contradictory experience of horror and wonder that is encapsulated in his phrase, *mysterium tremendum*. Both mystery and the "overpoweringness" of tremors or terror play into Otto's theory of religious experience. (Thacker, 2011, p. 111)

The numinous is not only overpowering (*tremendum*); it is also desired, fascinating (*fascinans*). Feuerbach gives a rather reductive account of why it is desired—namely, as an abstracted refuge from the impermanence of the world of becoming. Its fascination is probably also linked to its terror.

Miller illustrates the phenomenological character of this blended experience by imagining a child about to open a door to a secret room:

> What is the phenomenological structure of wonder as exemplified by such venturing? Let us concentrate, for the moment, on the example of the child on the verge of opening the door to a secret room. What fascinates the child, and terrifies her at the same time, is the unknown in its very character as unknown. To the degree that she is held in the grip of that fascination and terror, she is incapable of picturing or imagining what lies behind the door. This inability to picture is not a consequence of her being seized with terror; rather, it would be more accurate to say that the sense of terror is awakened by her inability to picture. (Miller, 1992, pp. 34-35)

As shall be discussed in more detail below, this is an aspect of the *apocalyptic* character of science fiction in general and horror more narrowly. This rupture with the world of the past, this collapse of one's world model as it proves insufficient and in need of re-creation, represents an end of the world. Miller continues,

> We cannot know, when we first respond to our intimations of nothingness, what insights they might lead us to—only that they must be devastating because they will require us to suffer with an open mind the end of our world. For someone who has entered the world of an other, and allowed that other to become the radiant center of his own life—for someone who is religious in the sense I have described above—the encounter with nothingness necessarily precipitates a religious crisis. For to realize that the other which I have come to recognize as inexhaustibly precious is caught irretrievably in the throe of nothingness, can only mean that nothingness is more ultimate than the other, and that all we will ever love is fated to be swallowed up in a nameless abyss. No being that wonder ever leads us to discover, no world we enter, however radiant its center, will be exempt from the liability to nothingness of which horror gives us an intimation. Nothingness, in this sense, is deeper than being, horror deeper than wonder, the loss of life deeper than the celebration of it. (Miller, 1992, pp. 183)

The nihilistic response suggested by the end of this quote will also be considered more carefully below, for it represents an opportunity for critical reflection on the primary critical

lens being used to interpret King's and Lovecraft's texts in this course. Does death open up an affirmative wonder or simply one that is open, questioning? Do death and its emblems (the vampire, the zombie, the giant predator) reveal one's heroic authenticity or simply one's ephemerality? Does one's finitude make one precious and meaningful, or meaningless?

Barrows treats the vampire – specifically, Stoker's Dracula – as a provocation for reflection on these kinds of questions:

> Stoker's greatest contribution to the vampire legend is to focus our attention not only on the physical grotesqueries and violence of blood-sucking, but also on the far more troubling psychological fear of becoming "false," of having one's death, a fundamental part of one's natural being, taken away, leaving the core of "true" humanity encased in a pallid deathless shell of skin and bone. (Barrows, 2006, p. 71)

By this reading, denial of one's death puts one into a state of bad faith with one's self, which is mortal and finite. In Feuerbach's Hegelian language, one becomes self-alienated: "Dracula's entire existence gives the lie to death, presenting a possibility of life without end [....] Dracula's attitude toward death is 'inauthentic.' His notorious inability to be reflected by mirrors is a metaphor for his inability to 'reflect' on his own true state of being" (Barrows, 2006, pp. 74, 75). One might interpret King's *Revival* and *Pet Cemetery*, for example, along similar lines. Such a being, living-and-dead, may mirror one's inauthentic mode of being. However, as an instance of the nouminous (cf. McDonald, 2004), one might push students to consider how its ineffable, contradictory properties provide an occasion for thinking about human openness. Cohen, in *Monster Theory*, states, "The monster always escapes because it defies easy categorization" (1996, p. 6).

For this purpose, I would encourage students to focus on the different ending in the movie version of *The Mist*, compared to King's novella. This strikes me as a great example of what Holland-Toll calls "disaffirmative horror." It forces the viewer to remain with a world that has not been cathartically restored to its prior state, before invaded by the grotesque:

> I contend that disaffirmative horror is that fiction which does not supply a happy ending, however qualified, and allow people to retain intact their basic assumptions about such value systems as those embedded in communities; on the contrary, it works to deconstruct those value systems and lay them bare as the agenda-ridden social constructs they undoubtedly are. Horror fiction tends to continually point out that those "accepted values," the cultural models and unarticulated rules which many people endorse, do not come straight down from Mt. Sinai but are human constructions. As such, these constructs have an agenda. And an agenda is always to someone's benefit as well as to someone else's liability. Horror fiction tends to point up the gaps, discontinuities, and deliberate exclusions which must take place to allow people to accept the values in the first place; it then relentlessly presses "the phobic pressure points" of contemporary life. (Holland-Toll, 2001, pp. 10-11)

So students may be encouraged to brainstorm a list of what is negative or unspeakable in themselves and their society. Some of these potentialities are wondrous, and others are terrible.

Heidegger's move secularizes and humanizes the mystical and theological God (cf. Carlson, 1999; Kerr, 1997), in terms of whose excess and ineffability the human, as *imago*

*dei*, was also defined as endlessly creative and open (Carlson, 2008). By defining the authentic self in relation to mortality, Heidegger emphasizes the negative aspect of the Neoplatonic tradition, as preserved in apophatic mysticism. Others before me have noted how similar Plotinus' description of the One is to the language he uses to describe the nothing into which it emanates. The concept of nothing is used to make sense of the One relative to determinate beings and properties (e.g., 6.7.32), and it is *not* a being and cannot be named (e.g., 6.9.5). In the later mystical tradition, the negative features of the divine are frequently emphasized, as under the figures of darkness and silence. Thacker notes,

> Before Anselm offers his famous ontological proof for the existence of God (God as "that beyond which nothing greater can be thought"), the 9th century Irish philosopher John Scottus Eriugena provides one of the most elaborate theories of the divine as "nothing" (*nihil*) [....] In Book III, Eriugena puts forth a notion of "divine darkness," in which the divine is *nihil* precisely because of its superlative nature. (Thacker, 2011, pp. 126-127)

Indeed, the divine as Love and one's self-annihilation in Love, in the presence of the unfathomable God and one's fear of absence from this awful presence, may be felt as a (desired) torment in hell. Hollywood observes that "In a poem on the seven names of love, Hadewijch makes the spectacular claim that love, Hadewijch's favored name for the divine, is hell" (2016, p. 156).

Cunningham has called this mystical tradition "meontological":

> This [tradition] I refer to as *meontotheology*. This is an appropriate name because it stems from what is termed *meontology*. *Meontology* is evident in the work of Plotinus when he places the One beyond being, which means that being is grounded in non-being (*meon*). When Deleuze grounds thought in what he calls 'nonthought' he appears to place his philosophy within a *meontotheological* legacy. The same goes for Heidegger when he speaks of Being by speaking of *das Nicht*. (Cunningham, 2002, p. xiii)

One might continue tracing the philosophical tradition of reflection on nothingness (e.g., Nietzsche, Sartre, and Eastern thinkers), but in this course, focused on King's and Lovecraft's American horror texts, I would turn student's attention to American Protestantism.

Lovecraft, perhaps thinking of Machen's "The Great God Pan" (1894) and related tales, writes of a hidden, primeval paganism, which in America provoked the anxieties that led to the Salem witch trials,

> Much of the power of Western horror-lore was undoubtedly due to the hidden but often suspected presence of a hideous cult of nocturnal worshippers whose strange customs—descended from pre-Aryan and pre-agricultural times when a squat race of Mongoloids roved over Europe with their flocks and herds—were rooted in the most revolting fertility-rites of immemorial antiquity. This secret religion, stealthily handed down among peasants for thousands of years despite the outward reign of the Druidic, Graeco-Roman, and Christian faiths in the regions involved, was marked by wild "Witches' Sabbaths" in lonely woods and atop distant hills on Walpurgis-Night and Hallowe'en, the traditional breeding-seasons of the goats and sheep and cattle; and became the source of vast riches of sorcery-legend, besides provoking extensive witchcraft-prosecutions of which the Salem affair forms

> the chief American example. Akin to it in essence, and perhaps connected with it in fact, was the frightful secret system of inverted theology or Satan-worship which produced such horrors as the famous "Black Mass." (Lovecraft, 2000, p. 24)

Elsewhere, Lovecraft continues his fevered religious genealogy as follows:

> America, besides inheriting the usual dark folklore of Europe, had an additional fund of weird associations to draw upon; so that the spectral legends had already been recognized as fruitful subject-matter for literature [....] This additional fund proceeded, as Paul Elmer More has pointed out, from the keen spiritual and theological interests of the first colonists, plus the strange and forbidding nature of the scene into which they were plunged. The vast and gloomy virgin forests in whose perpetual twilight all terrors might well lurk; the hordes of coppery Indians whose strange, saturnine visages and violent customs hinted strongly at traces of infernal origin; the free rein given under the influence of Puritan theocracy to all manner of notions respecting man's relation to the stern and vengeful God of the Calvinists, and to the sulphureous Adversary of that God, about whom so much was thundered in the pulpits each Sunday; and the morbid introspection developed by an isolated backwoods life devoid of normal amusements and of the recreational mood, harassed by commands for theological self-examination, keyed to unnatural emotional repression, and forming above all a mere grim struggle for survival—all these things conspired to produce an environment in which the black whisperings of sinister grandams were heard far beyond the chimney corner, and in which tales of witchcraft and unbelievable secret monstrosities lingered long after the dread days of the Salem nightmare. (Lovecraft, 2000, pp. 46-47)

Lovecraft's account differs substantially from the way I would tell the story, but insofar as it points to the Protestant experience of submission to an angry, terrible, and inscrutable God, his history resembles mine.

I would begin the next portion of the course's argument by having students think about what the properties of "gothic" literature are. One might assign (or summarize) Roberts (2012):

> The primary signification of 'Goth' at this time [the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries] was that of barbarous anti-enlightenment. When George Berkeley, the English rationalist and philosopher, pondered 'whether every enemy to learning be not a Goth? And whether every such Goth among us be not an enemy to the country?', he was using the sackers of Rome as a shorthand for 'enemy of classicism'. (p. 22) [in James and Mendlesohn]

The gothic, like the romantic, appeals to a pre-Enlightenment era. Oddly enough, the gothic (i.e., the sackers of Rome) is *romantic* precisely because it valorized the medieval. Into the rationalist, materialist order, it intrudes the supernatural and the irrational. Gothic literature may, in this sense, be regarded not only as similar to romantic literature, but also as a subset of fantasy literature. Oziewicz states,

> Fantasy literature, which Richard Matthews calls in his *Fantasy: The Liberation of Imagination* (2002) "a literature of liberation and subversion [which] seeks to liberate the feminine, the unconscious, the repressed, the

> past, the present, and the future," is a category which emerged as a protest against assumptions of a reductionist, post-Enlightenment worldview. (Oziewicz, 2007, p. 46)

Likewise, Ingebretsen states, "Fantasy writes its story in the margins—in the blank, white spaces around the normative, hegemonic story that culture insists on telling, and telling loudly. Works of fantasy thus give voice to what a culture chooses to silence" (1996, xxxii). With its element of the "grotesque," as discussed above, horror, like and as fantasy or science fiction, "introduces mythic thought in a nonmythic context, "polluting" the pure aspirations of reason with the fluctuating, mutagenic, class-defying world-picture of the sacred" (Csicsery-Ronay). If Weber (2009) told a realist story of Protestant rationalization and disenchantment, gothic responds against this, like Durkheim (1995), by looking back to past models and re-enchanting or sacralizing the bare, material world.

Tillich (1964) argues that culture is the shape of religion. And, with Nelson (2012) and Braudy (2016), I would argue that horror and gothic fiction preserve the shape of a culturally specific experience of an ineffable God whose excess includes the awful and the negative and whose worshipers desire the feeling of emptiness (cf. Corrigan, 2015):

> In *The Secret Life of Puppets* I argued that a historically distorted supernaturalism, configured after the Protestant Reformation as a free-floating "demonic" loosely attached to a Christian belief system, has long been an important dimension of American popular culture [....] The result has been that outside the purview of organized religion, the genre of supernatural horror has been the preferred mode, or even the only allowed one, a predominantly secular-scientific culture such as ours has had for imagining and encountering the sacred, albeit in unconscious ways. (Nelson, 2012, p. xi)

> Religion and horror are so intimately connected because both are suffused by the distinction between good and evil, and both deal centrally with the uncertain border between life and death. So the question might be asked: Is horror a basically secular form that uses religious trappings, or is it a religious form tricked out in the details of secular reality? [...] Like the rituals of religion, the repetitions of horror literature and film are a mantra against death, one way of controlling our fears. Like prayers they are formulas connected to basic feelings that have to be validated again and again, repeating and reenacting conflicts and contradictions that can never be finally resolved. Horror in literature, art, films, therefore constitutes a prime way of keeping the spiritual perspective alive in a technological and rational world. (Braudy, 2016, p. 33)

American gothic literature's connection to a tradition of religious terror might be considered in more detail by assigning or summarizing the findings of Baker (2007), in *America's Gothic Fiction: The Legacy of* Magnalia Christi Americana. Baker traces the gothic imagination, as exemplified in Cotton Mather's *Magnalia Christi Americana*, through the fiction of writers like Edgar Allan Poe, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Nathaniel Hawthorne. As in Lovecraft's story above, this takes one back to the world of the Salem witch trials, and, particularly in the figure of Poe, Baker's account creates a bridge to Lovecraft's work.

Note how similar to Lovecraft's words above are to those of Jason Bivins in his more recent text, *Religion of Fear: The Politics of Horror in Conservative Evangelicalism* (2008, p. 10):

> The marriage of religion and fear in the United States is no shocking one. Who needs reminding, after all, of the ghoulish imaginations of the early English settlers in the Northeast, of the fantastic frights and visions experienced by early evangelicals, or of the antimodernist paranoia that haunted the first fundamentalists? The mingling of religions with politics and popular entertainments is not unique to our time either; it has flared up regularly in periods of sociopolitical instability when proclaiming radical change to be evil's handiwork provides—in all its complexity—at least some form of comfort.

One might explore the religion and politics of horror in conservative Christian authors in more depth, perhaps by reading with students a novel like LaHaye and Jenkins's *Left Behind: a Novel of the Earth's Last Days* (1995) or Frank E. Peretti's *The Oath* (2011).

For nonfiction readings to make this part of the course argument, students might be assigned Nelson's *The Secret Life of Puppets* (2001), but Ingebretsen's *Maps of Heaven, Maps of Hell: Religious Terror as Memory from the Puritans to Stephen King* (1996) is also excellent:

> I argue that the religious imperatives woven into the fabric of American culture keep its citizenry dutiful during the day and frightened at night. [...] I argue that the habit of religious uncertainty (the threat of mystical self-loss, otherwise understood as the promise of conversion and change) articulates and focuses aspects of the American imagination that otherwise remain opaque and unreadable; and further, that the pieties of a traditional American religious discourse, inverted and debased, drive a fertile tradition of dark fantasy. (Ingebretsen, 1996, p. xii)

The desired and threatened self-emptying mentioned by Ingebretsen (cf. Corrigan, 2015) obviously connects to the mystical tradition discussed above. Gothic may function as a mystical literature. "Theology and Gothic, then, are in effect narratives of the Unspeakable," states Ingebretsen, "together they fence off that which cannot be spoken—either because it exists *beyond* boundaries of grammar (and thus beyond human knowing) or because it cannot *permissibly* be spoken within human boundaries" (Ingebretsen, 1996, p. xxiv). This unspeakable is symbolized or embodied in gothic literature in monstrous, grotesque figures:

> Not for nothing does Lovecraft sound like John Calvin of *The Institutes* gone mad. Whether you choose Lovecraft's so-called Elder Gods or his dancing, blind, and tyrannous Cthulhu, or the One God of Calvin—each is inscrutable, and thus incomprehensible and quite literally unspeakable. (Ingebretsen, 1996, p. xxviii)

Of Lovecraft's stories that explore this concept of the unspeakable, which both mystical and horror literature attempt to communicate, one particularly effective example is "The Unnamable" (1923; in Lovecraft, 2008).

A nonfiction reading that might be assigned to accompany a reading of "The Unnamable," or at least support guided discussion of it, is chapter seven of Goho's *Journeys into Darkness: Critical Essays on Gothic Horror*, which is entitled, "What Is 'The Unnamable'? H. P. Lovecraft and the Problem of Evil." Goho's history of the Christian God as ineffable and unspeakable, drawing on Robert Graves's *The White Goddess* (1948/1966),

fits well with that made so far in the course (cf. Goho, 2014, p. 114); Lovecraft's "unnamable" reflects a metaphysics that is "founded on dread and the horror of existence," an irrational metaphysics "of dread and nothingness, a philosophy of death and negation," which is "the only way to make sense of our blood-stained time" (Goho, 2014, p. 113). Ingebretsen agrees: "In 'The Unnameable,' [...] Lovecraft turns the ineffable Divine into a metaphor. He describes a ravening, repining spiritual entity haunting an abandoned house near Salem" (1996, p. 133). Lovecraft cues his readers with a location that would induce mortality salience, a graveyard: "'The Unnamable' opens with two friends, Randolph Carter and Joel Manton, 'speculating about the unnamable' (201). They are in a graveyard, literally reposing on the past, with the vast hosts of the dead stacked underneath them" (Goho, 2014, p. 115).

In a graveyard, the dead are sensed but unseen. While students are encouraged to reflect on death as the actual limit of their mortal being, the dead, who are unseen, may provide occasion and provocation for thinking about other unthinkable aspects of existence that exceed a human's capacity to know. As Thacker puts it,

> The world is increasingly unthinkable – a world of planetary disasters, emerging pandemics, tectonic shifts, strange weather, oil-drenched seascapes, and the furtive, always-looming threat of extinction. In spite of our daily concerns, wants, and desires, it is increasingly difficult to comprehend the world in which we live and of which we are a part. To confront this idea is to confront an absolute limit to our ability to adequately understand the world at all – an idea that has been a central motif of the horror genre for some time. (Thacker, 2011, p. 1)

Lovecraft's prose is replete with symbols of the unthinkable and un-representable.

> In Lovecraft's prose, the Shoggoths are the alterity of alterity, the species-of-no-species, the biological empty set. When they are discovered to still be alive, they are described sometimes as formless, black ooze, and sometimes as mathematical patterns of organic "dots," and sometimes as a hurling mass of viscous eyes. Formless, abstract, faceless. (Thacker, 2011, p. 103; cf. p. 130)

In *The Mist*, the mist performs the function of rendering all the death-dealing monsters formless and faceless, save for glimpses and guesses. It is a formless emblem that amplifies the formless and the unthinkable in life itself: "If horror – as we have been discussing it – is a way of thinking the world as unthinkable, and the limits of our place within that world, then really the specter that haunts horror is not death but instead life" (Thacker, 2011, pp. 98-99).

Mystical literature, as a genre, may be characterized as a genre that attempts to speak the unspeakable and articulate the ineffable experience of the numinous. In this way, it shares a number of properties with another religious genre, the apocalyptic. It is typically in the apocalyptic genre that one finds descriptions of the afterworlds, the other levels of the cosmos above and below this one, and the times before and, especially, after now. Horror presents a range of hells and heavens, catastrophes and eucatastrophies. It has been an apocalyptic genre, in which "[o]riginal visions of inheritance—theo-national dreams of a new Heaven and Earth, for instance—slipped, slid, coalesced, and mixed with less-clear fears of apocalyptic Hell and civil dispossession" (Ingebretsen, 1996, p. xiii).

To reflect on the apocalyptic nature of horror, notably in its science fiction mode, Lovecraft's "At the Mountains of Madness" is the text I would assign. First of all, like most of Lovecraft's works, it provides further instances of the failure of human technoscientific mastery:

> In "At the Mountains of Madness," a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions slips into the opaqueness of sheer, *embodied* nihilism. Human technologies of knowing are successively undercut, while one anthropocentric certainty after another is overturned, until in the end even the last must give way. (Ingebretsen, 1996, p. 144)

Secondly, it is an apocalyptic text that reflects Lovecraft's dystheistic refraction of the dark strand running through American religion, as discussed above. Bloom (1992) has proposed a Gnostic strand running throughout and distinctive of American religion; the monstrousness of the Lovecraftian deities, like that worshipped with bloody sacrifice in the supermarket in *The Mist*, is reminiscent of the Gnostic demiurge, Ialdabaoth. As a literature of grotesque, hybrid blending and fascinated speculation regarding the impossible, a seeking after a dreaded understanding, horror is an apocalyptic and revelatory genre, and "At the Mountains of Madness" is an expression of horror in this revelatory mode:

> "At the Mountains of Madness" is an essential document in an ongoing cultural critique of religion. As an apocalyptic tale, "At the Mountains of Madness" offers a reading of history not as conversion (Edwards), but as judgment and the failure of conversion. Lovecraft's obsession with the shape of final things (eschatology), and by implication, its *theological* pressure upon the political imagination, connects Lovecraft to a wider tradition of American apocalyptic readings. [...] Lovecraft's Gothic tales then become part of a process by which the Gothic writes the "negative" of culture, and by that very process, saving the repressed and disallowed at the very limits of culture. Pulp fiction, of course, represents both a cultural judgment and aesthetic boundary; its repudiated texts form a "borderland." (Ingebretsen, 1996, pp. 146-147)

The liminal and borderland quality is expressed, likewise, throughout *The Mist*: the broken barrier between the worlds, the thin walls of the supermarket, the negotiated borders between rational civilization and religious barbarism.

Again, according to Ketterer, apocalyptic literature may be expressive of "a sense of outrage at the void and an expression of the nullity or chaotic fragmentation of human experience. The ultimate critical negative extension of the word apocalyptic, then, connotes chaos or non-meaning" (Ketterer, 1974, pp. 9-10). This results in a coincidence of religious and cultural logics: "If, at its most exalted level, apocalyptic literature is religious, the concerns of such a literature, at its most popular level, find expression in the gothic mode and especially in science fiction" (Ketterer, 1974, p. 15; cf. Kreuziger, 1982, 1986). Ketterer defines the apocalyptic more fully as follows:

> An adequate definition of the apocalyptic imagination must depend upon combining my fractured survey above. In so doing, we discover a series of related tensions to be implicit in the term [....] The destruction of an old world, generally of mind, is set against the writer's establishment of a new world, again generally of mind. Secondly, satire comes up against a prophetic mysticism to provide a form of "judgment." Thirdly, the creation of purpose

> and meaning (see Kermode) collides with the possibility of non-meaning and chaos (see Hassan). And fourthly, all the commentators I have cited at least imply that apocalyptic literature involves a certain magnitude or breadth of vision which militates against an interest in detailed characterization. (Ketterer, 1974, pp. 12-13)

In the discussion of Miller (1992) above, I promised a return to consideration of the notion that apocalyptic is defined in part by a mental destruction of one's world. Lovecraft and King both reflect repeatedly, in various explicit and thinly concealed ways, on the fall of Rome. Historical cases like that help one appreciate, not only what is unfathomable about present life, the manner in which the systems and networks modern humans find themselves enmeshed exceed their comprehension and mastery, but also the fragility even of such a civilization. By running up against the limits of one's understanding, by being faced with something without precedent, one's prior expectations may be abandoned, and one may respond by entering into a state of openness that might be called mystical (cf. Ketterer, 1974, p. 18). This is a critical stance. Some of King's secular heroes in *The Mist*, confronted with the end of all things, including their own finitude, become critical, open, adaptive, and creative.

Still, taking seriously the critical purpose of the course, students might be encouraged to think suspiciously about the negative tradition described so far, running from Neoplatonic Christian mysticism through philosophy and occult literature. If it is focused on the negative, is it not nihilistic? Is it really a resource for creative engagement with life, or is it merely a nihilistic system of reductive, deconstructive, death worship?

In Cunningham's perspective, the logic traced so far in the course, running from Plotinus through Heiddeger, is nihilisitic. Cunningham finds "nihilism" in any discourse he regards as reductive or relativistic, including sciences like biology and the quest for life on other planets—the former because it reduces the living creature to its constituent biochemical mechanisms, the latter because it apparently trivializes life on this planet. Cunningham laments the "fundamental [...] and foundational neutrality in modern discourse" as nihilistic (2002, p. 176). Cunningham's move may be illustrated by the following statement about the significance of a tree:

> The *significance* required to see a tree, and seen in seeing a tree, is infinite. It takes an infinitude of delicate significance to enable the presentation of the tree, while it takes an infinity of transcendent significance to preserve the tree in that cognition, to make it something irreducible, something which requires an eternity to be fully known. (2002, p. 180)

Without a transcendent anchor in a divine being who will know the infinite fullness of things in Godself's eternity, Cunningham regards things as bereft of value, reduced to mechanistic neutrality. Cunningham returns to Plato's allegory of the cave to identify his understanding of the error of the logic of nihilism. Whereas ontotheological thinkers err "because of their certain categories," the meontotheological thinkers are guilty of a "compulsion to go beyond these categories towards another reality" (Cunningham, 2002, p. 261):

> The move to leave the cave is epitomized by the *meontological* impulse witnessed in Neoplantonism. This is the case because the move *beyond* being, so as to *be* otherwise, is guided and motivated by a presumptuous knowledge of being; those who seek to go beyond, or to speak of a beyond, do so on the basis of their certain knowledge of being. (Cunningham, 2002, pp. 261-262)

Cunningham observes something like the reification or materialization of nothing, as exhibited in horror fiction, in the mystical and philosophical tradition, and he is troubled by it:

> If we are to speak seriously of nihilism we must, it seems, understand nihilism precisely to be an absence of nihilism: nihilism is not nihilistic. Indeed, it may well be best to characterize nihilism in plenitudinal, rather than negative, terms. If we realize that nihilism can be understood as a negative plenitude – what has been referred to throughout as the nothing *as* something – then we can realise that nihilism will not fail to provide what it is usually supposed to preclude. Nihilism will provide values, gods, and most of all, it seems, intelligibility. Indeed, as we shall see, nihilism generates and excessive intelligibility [....] What we can witness in the *form* of nihilistic discourse (which is in 'reality' the nihilism of discourse, in the sense that it is nothing to discourse), is the constant provision of 'all choices'. Nihilism is not a choice but all choices. It endeavours to be so in an attempt to avoid lack. (Cunningham, 2002, p. 170)

In endless discourse, a boundless play of referential signifiers points to the unspeakable, the unknowable, and this nothing, therefore, becomes the empty foundation of everything. For Cunningham, this dissolves the possibility of meaning and significance.

> Its inability to speak significantly, to speak 'real' difference, carries all peoples and persons away. In 'modern' death there are no people, no one dies. Here we see the de-differentiating effect of nihilism. Bodies come apart as different discourses carry limbs away. This cool epistemic intelligibility of a Dionysian frenzy fashions whole systems of explanatory description. (Cunningham, 2002, p. 176)

Cunningham longs, it seems, for certainty, for a stable ground of meaning. It may be that this leads him to project an attitude of rest in certainty of nothing onto those whose "logic of nihilism" he criticizes. By remaining open to possibility as possibility, Heidegger resists a reductive technoscientific hubris that draws on humanism's transferal of ultimate value from the divine to the human and that would make humanity its own creator. Heidegger insists on humanity's historical contingence and finitude and promotes openness relative to possible gods (cf. Veddder, 2007, pp. 4, 6-7). In fact, Heidegger's opposition to the notion of human self-creation and insistence on being's givenness leads him to the conclusion that Nietzsche is a metaphysician and critique Nietzsche for reasons quite similar to those that lead Cunningham to critique Heidegger himself:

> Since the beginning of the modern age, the being of an entity has been understood from the perspective of will, which is understood by Nietzsche as will to power. The will to power is the last ground of entities. It is because of this that Heidegger interprets Nietzsche as a metaphysician. [...] In a certain sense, Nietzsche executes the end of metaphysics. What happens when the history of metaphysics ends? One of its dominant characteristics is that the supersensible becomes a product of the natural; in other words, the supersensible is reduced to the sensible. [...] This devaluation, this pulling-down or reduction of the supersensible, ends for man in a world without meaning. (Vedder 2007: 140)

How might one guide students in responding to these powerful critiques back and forth?

I would point to Schneider's balanced perspective, rooted in what he calls "wonderment":

> The spiritual challenge of classic horror, then, is wonderment. Wonderment affirms the radical "foundations" of the great religions but warns against two subsequent developments—the tendencies either to preempt or to exaggerate human potentiality [....] [S]o many of us, both secular and religious, continue to seek guarantees: God, the state, the machine, the lover, the job—*it* will ultimately come through, *it* will shield us from chaos, *it* will charge us with glory. Wonderment reminds us that, yes, we all need something to save or justify our lives; the question is, who or what? What do we affirm, and what do we give up? Although the monster tale does not specifically answer these queries, it does suggest an approach to the questions. It suggests that human being, in its starkness, is *both* freeing *and* limiting. (Schneider, 1993, pp. 126-127)

Heidegger observes that authenticity is a variation on inauthenticity. Only by having been thrown into the network of significance that supplies one with a pre-given meaning does one acquire the capacity for authentic departure from or variation on the given. The inauthentic is the condition that makes possible one's moments of authenticity. Although history and finitude may not be escapable, there remains in each human and society the potential for potentiality, for self-creation that exceeds prediction. Horror, however, performs a valuable function by arresting one's perhaps unjustified optimism, one's certainty of progress (cf. Salomon 2002: 15-16). It refuses to allow people to refuse to think of individual and civilizational dissolution, either through their incomprehensible destruction (cf. Salomon, 2002, pp. 18, 23-24) or their innate lack of ability to comprehend themselves in all their psychological and social multiplicity and instability (e.g., Ananthaswamy, 2015; Modern, 2011; cf. Taylor, 2007).

Whereas Bakhtin links cosmic horror to priestcraft, one might instead regard it as a result of a technoscience that reduces away all things, but which is haunted by a sense of always being exceeded. In an analysis reminiscent of Modern's (2011) discussion secularism in antebellum America's haunted relationships with modern developments like communication networks, Houston (2005) has discussed the manner in which the imagery and vocabulary of Victorian economics, particularly banking crises, resonated with the images and language of Gothic fiction—"panic," ghosts, forces. The world of increasing calculative mastery – technical, economic, communicative, scientific – is simultaneously haunted by uncanny, unnamable inklings of incalculable forces. Jameson (1991) has suggested that the play of signifiers in the mass media are suggestive of the haunting, absent, unrepresentable cause – the Invisible Hand – of global capitalism, much as the apophatic God calls forth "an endless naming and representation whose meaning and stability are constantly undone" (Carlson, 1999, p. 53). And this unspeakable cause, while desired, is also critiqued and opposed; it and its annihilation, its presence and its absence, are desired all at once. The military-industrial, technoscientific, market-driven quest for mastery and its doom are aptly represented in *The Mist* by the Arrowhead Project scientists who opened the thinny and participated in the beam quake and the soldiers who defended the project.

Holland-Toll proposes a spectrum of horror, running from what I would call the inauthentic to the authentic or the critically illiterate to the critically literate:

> If we were to establish a spectrum of horror, one which moves from the affirmative text in which the monsters are completely but temporarily defeated, life resumes much of its normal placidity, and the dis/ease is subtle, such a text would be at the affirmative pole of the spectrum, whereas texts which not only call societal constructs into question but leave them deliberately unresolved and which affirm nothing but the Void would occupy the disaffirmative pole of the spectrum. (Holland-Toll, 2001, p. 8)

By this point it should be clear, both in cognitive and historical terms, how horror might promote either authentic or inauthentic responses to monstrous mortality cues. The film and novella versions of *The Mist* actually provide an opportunity to reflect comparatively on both sorts of horror fictions. Students might be asked, "What is the meaning of the tragic incomplete murder-suicide at the end?" This ending is key difference between King's original, affirmative work and the disaffirmative movie, and King himself has stated that he wishes he had written that ending. A conservative reading of the story might note that Mrs. Carmody, secure in her faith, is unharmed by the monster, and, once the human child she wanted to sacrifice is killed, the mist parts. One might say that, deprived of death, David is defiled, in a sense, by becoming monstrous himself, and, if one were to explore the idea of a Cthulhu-like god demanding human sacrifice with one's class, one might compare David's role to that of Judas in handing Jesus over to death. Note that the woman who left the grocery store recovered her children. If David had waited, put his faith in love, and not taken the power of death into his own hands, would they all have survived?

I already mentioned King's use of the Apollonian/Dionysian dichotomy, drawing on Nietzsche's (2003) formulation of the Dionysian ideal in *The Birth of Tragedy*, but the subject of sacrifice and sacrificial violence suggests another use of the concept of the Dionysian, namely, that of Girard's (1979). For Girard, who also looked at the intersections of literature and religion, the Dionysian is inherently violent. One fictional work one could assign that explicitly taps into the theme of the intrusion of the Dionysian is *Dominion* (1996) by Bentley Little. Girard regards violence as inescapable, due to the manner in which one comes to resent as a "monstrous double" the one who teaches one what to desire and whom, in fact, one desires to be (cf. Mack, 1987, pp. 8-9). It is easy to see the Freudian echoes in Girard's interpretation of desire for and hatred of the other, though Girard anxiously tried to downplay Freud's influence, and the concept closely resembles Kristeva's (1982) idea of "abjection." Violence is also terrifying – a primal source of religious dread – and solvable only through ritual killing understood as a sacrifice (cf. Mack, 1987, pp. 6-7). Religion is thus useful *because* it alienates humanity from the violent aspect of itself and manages this violence (cf. Girard, 1979, p. 134)

However, one might encourage students to push back on Girard, and the violence of horror fiction, by asking whether identity need only be formed oppositionally. (1) Might it not also be formed through indentification, through mystical (even grotesque) union (i.e., accepting the other as oneself)? (2) Furthermore, even if oppositional relations are inherent to identity formation, might one not form an identity without violence toward a human scapegoat? Regading the latter question, in *Escape from Evil*, Becker proposes that "a hate object need not be any special class or race or even human enemy, but could be things that take impersonal but real forms, like poverty, disease, oppression, natural disasters, etc." (1975, p. 144). And Cole (2006) proposes that the repulsive abject may actually be a vehicle

for the identificatory strategy suggested in my first question because the abject disrupts the stability of boundaries:

> Our physical bodies embody death; we are already in the process of dying, and the dead bits of us (discarded hair, fingernails, skin, and shit and piss) are sources of revulsion and we flush them away in panic. But the abject has the power to disrupt the boundary of the body because it is both inside and outside of that boundary. However much we try to expel it and keep our borders secure, the abject undermines all such attempts. The abject is precisely that which connects us with death and shows us that death is already within the boundary, however much we try to expel it. (Cole, 2006, p. 189)

There are no easy answers to these two questions, the course argument outlined above, or to the issues raised by horror texts in general, but they provide fruitful material for critical reflection.

## Additional Suggested Texts

The course might explore other forms of negation and emblems of abjection and alienation. As already pointed out, mortality salience intensifies certain features of identity formation, particularly the rejection of difference and the adherence to sameness. Horror is "a fiction of the margins, a fiction of the outer limits of humanity, a fiction of 'Otherness'" (Holland-Toll, 2001, p. 7), so a teacher might focus on an instance of rejected or negated otherness to look at other potential sources.

### *The Satanic Opposite and the Animal Monster*

Whether God is understood as the Being of beings or as the highest being, a positive, ontotheological understanding of the divine, which implies a positive anthropology of human nature as the image of God, calls forth a host of conceptual opposites—shadows, as it were, of Divinity and its human image.

In its grotesque embodiments, the transcendent is routinely presented in animal, bestial, dehumanized form. The corporeality of monsters stresses their animality and links into associations of women and non-European races with the body. This is a sinister move, and it should be engaged with critically. Cunningham attributes the logic of nihilism to the National Socialists, whose discourse eliminated the Jewish people as people, as a prerequisite to murdering them: "So the living-dead are always unable to die; death is taken away from them before their life, in order that their life can be made to disappear without trace and without 'loss'" (2002, p. 175). The political questions suggested by a critical engagement with the treatment of animals may help students reflect on animal rights and the cruelties humans thoughtlessly inflict on other life forms as well as the potential of the ideology of animality as a tool for human oppression; the industrialized killing of animals, both as deadly violence and mastery over their entire lives, may be critiqued with the military-industrial and prison-industrial complexes (cf., e.g., Sanbonmatsu, 2011). Girard connects this collapsing of the human into the level of bare animality to the Dionysian logic of violence: "We also find in *The Bacchae* reference to that loss of distinction between man [sic] and beast that is always linked to violence" (Girard, 1979, p. 128).

With regard to *The Mist* and King's mythos, I think of King as trying to supply an alternative to an anthropocentric theology by embodying the good ultimate deities in non-human structures. There are of course minor gods and goddesses with human forms, but do we have any more evidence of their reality than superstitions like the Cult of Amoco? So Gan's body is the Dark Tower linked to Mid-World; his wife Bessa's body is the Rose, which is on the Keystone World; the guardians have animal forms, and the six fraternal spirits that used to support Gan were embodied as beams. In another sense the *Dark Tower* and King-as-author seem to be intimately tied to the Elephant-Wolf beam (Gan's beam) and to the Dark Tower itself. So the deity, which takes the form of a structure, is supported by a literary structure. If Gan is the spirit of the Dark Tower, perhaps this parallels King as the author of the *Dark Tower*.

Texts one might consider for this topic include Clive Barker's "Down, Satan!" in *The Inhuman Condition* (1987), in which a man unable to find God seeks the devil; T. E. D. Klein's *The Ceremonies* (1984), in which the Satan seeking the end of the world may naturally lead to discussion of Lovecraft's mythos; and Anne Rice's *Memnoch the Devil* (1995), in which one might have the class consider the liminal state of the vampire, Lestat, in light of the above discussion of human hybridity.

### *The Catholic and Jewish Other*

Consideration of H. P. Lovecraft's work certainly raises the issue of racism and anti-Semitism. Cohen (2006) has considered how Medieval English identity was formed through the monsterization of the Welsh, Irish and Jews. Elliott (1999) also discusses Medieval anti-Semitism, and the demonized figure of the Jew has, from the very origin of Christianity, as illustrated by the particular figure of Judas Iscariot (e.g., Maccoby, 1992; cf. Halberstam, 1995, p. 92), played a central role in the formation of Christian Europeans' positive understandings of themselves as the new Israel, while at the same time Rabbinic Judaism came to know itself through the same process of distinguishing itself from the Christian other (cf. Boyarin, 2004). Christians' self-understanding as chosen, elect, and called as children of God – images of the Father who created and adopted them – may be traced into a number of other racially inflected deployments of identity-constructing negative figures: particularly, the "Oriental," the black, and, especially for Americans, the native or "Indian." These "others" are discussed in the next section. Here, one might reflect on how anti-Catholicism performed a foundational identity formation function for Protestants comparable to the dynamic that one may observe in the formation of early Christianity and early Rabbinic Judaism.

Jones notes that this identity formation process worked itself out, among other place, in literature,

> Modern nations can be understood, to use Benedict Anderson's famous phrase, as 'imagined communities', potentially disparate political, cultural and ethnic groupings willed into unity by acts of imagination, articulated through narrative, myth and symbol (Anderson 1991). National identities are often formed oppositionally, that is in a Self—Other relationship to a (usually neighbouring) rival nation, which is made to embody all that is venal, reprehensible, archaic, or otherwise rejected. For Britain, this vilified Other was France [....] Colley [1992] further suggests that the major identifying

> feature of British national identity at the time [1689-1815] was *Protestantism*. Certainly the Gothic novel is collusive in this enterprise, shoring up the British, Protestant identity of its readers chauvinistically, through its presentation of a catalogue of caricatured untrustworthy foreigners. (Jones, 2002, p. 8)

Jones goes on to use the early example of *The Monk* to elaborate on what Protestants imagined regarding Catholic foreigners:

> [*The Monk*] allows its readers vicariously to indulge in what must be called an Anglican's wet-dream [...] of Catholicism: homoeroticism, blasphemy, nuns, transvestitism, Satanism, rape, murder, incest, and necrophilia – these are apparently the things that Catholics (and foreigners!) do. (Jones, 2002, p. 11)

By vilifying those on the Continent, British people established and preserved the contrasting desired traits for themselves:

> Thus, by imaging forth the European Other as Catholic, superstitious, barbarous, irrational, chaotic, rooted in the past, the Gothic novel allowed a British audience conversely to identify itself as Protestant, rational, ordered, stable, and modern: Continental Europe is the domain of fantastic unreality, whereas England is rooted in contemporary realism. (Jones, 2002, p. 9)

As suggested by the term "Gothic," Protestants frequently used "pagan" as a code for "Catholic." Salomon states,

> I have already pointed out that science fiction also can generate these alternate worlds, but then, so can all those invocations of "paganism" in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from Blackwood and Arthur Machen to H. P. Lovecraft and others. For eighteenth-century Gothic writers some essentially "Catholic" locus or setting often served as the place of horror. Most of the well-known and often clumsy Gothic apparatus—the castles, convents, dungeons, underground passages, and so on—serve to mark off this alternate space. (Salomon 2002: 13)

Horror, at least at its outset and for much of its tradition, has thus been a distinctly Protestant genre. Horror as a kind of detective story or game, wherein one is called on to make sense of the clues and hints of an alien presence and determine the rules of another order of existence, for example, resonates with the Protestant drive to interpret the signs of God's inscrutable will (cf. Salomon 2002: 87). Mrs. Carmody certainly endeavors to make sense of the signs of the times, but her representation as superstitious and perhaps insane hearkens back to horror's anti-Catholic roots.

For a text to explore this theme in more depth, one might use Whitley Strieber's *The Night Church* (1983). This could be an interesting alternative to standard picks like Lewis's *The Monk* (2002) or Levin's *Rosemary's Baby* (1967).

### *The Feminine Other*

Mrs. Carmody, again, might be read as a monstrous double, a hysterical female monster. The interior of the supermarket might also be coded as feminine. Brakke (2006) has discussed at length how the idea of the Christian monk, the monk's very identity, was formed through a narrative of combat with the demonic, associated with the self, the non-

Christian, and the feminine other. Elsewhere, Frilingos (2004) traces how the Christian book of *Revelation* reflects an ideology of spectatorship that forms masculine identity in contrasting relation to feminized monsters. This continued to be a central feature of the religious hero's identity formation. Elliott (1999) has observed how Medieval clerical identity is contrasted with and constructed in resistance to the polluting influence, particularly, of the feminine. The feminine was often associated with irrationality and madness, and one might consider Foucault's genealogy of madness (1972/2006), in which the insane came to occupy the social and ideological negative space left by the emptying of the leper houses. Similarly, the medieval veneration of the side wound of Jesus supplies a decisively yonic symbol of the divine – and the divine as absence or lack – but with troubling implications of woundedness, even castration (cf. Hollywood, 2016, pp. 171 ff.). The feminine's equation, as Other, with monstrosity, madness, and even mortality has been widely discussed by feminist scholars and specifically feminist studies of horror (to be guided to some of this literature, see Wisker, 2005).

Some texts one might use for this theme include Kathryn Meyer Griffith's *The Calling* (1994), in which an ancient Egyptian queen punishes men who abuse women; Elizabeth Hand's *Waking the Moon* (1995), in which New Age feminists oppose the brotherhood that rules the world and seek to restore the Mood Goddess; and T. Chris Martindale's *Demon Dance* (1991), which combines the Native American and feminine other in the figure of a vengeful medicine woman.

***The Black, Indian, or Pagan Other***

Lovecraft's racism is infamous, so, again, the topic will probably come up naturally in class. Whereas orientalism's logic of mastery was an ontological or cataphatic discourse of categorization and knowledge (Said, 1978/2003) and black people have certainly suffered under an infantilizing, scientistic discourse of knowledge as well, Mbembe (2001) understands the postcolonial situation in Africa as one defined by monstrous absence, *nothingness*, lack, and animalistic immanence. To go into any of these critical insights in more depth, one might have students read a fictional horror text focused on madness or monstrosity and apply critical lenses that are attentive to categories like race and gender. The above should give some sense of how a critical focus on something like feminism or anti-Semitism might link up with the argument about nothingness made in this chapter. In *Approaches to Teaching Gothic Fiction: The British and American Traditions*, Tamar Heller provides an annotated bibliographic survey of critical approaches, which someone contemplating such a course using horror literature might consult (Heller, 2003, pp. 15-26).

Lovecraft's "He" is an excellent example of his racism. One might also use Chesnutt's *The Conjure Woman* (1927), which is also conducive to discussion of the feminine other. Alternatively, one might consider James Herbert's *Portent* (1992) or S. P. Somtow's *Darker Angels* (1999). (This last is long and complex, so it might present a challenge to some students.)

Gray Muriel's *Trickster* (1995) is the story of an evil, murderous Indian spirit might be read critically along with excerpts from Mann's *Spirits of Blood, Spirits of Breath: The Twinned Cosmos of Indigenous America* (2016) both as an alternative tradition to that described above and in order to consider whether Muriel's narrative might be projecting a Western cosmological dualism onto a Native American mythic figure. Mann (p. 100)

suggests Joseph Bruchac's *Skeleton Man* (2001) as a good example of an indigenous American horror story, since the monster is monstrous, not as an inherently negative or evil thing that is the opposite of being and goodness, but as an excessive, unbalanced instance (i.e., blood) of the twinned, coordinated cosmic forces (blood and breath).

Finally, Dan Simmons's *Song of Kali* (1986) gives one a cult of goddess-worshiping murderous pagans to discuss.

## Works Cited


Albanese, C. L. (2007). *A republic of mind and spirit: a cultural history of American metaphysical religion*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ananthaswamy, A. (2015). *The man who wasn't there: investigations into the strange new science of the self*. New York: Dutton.

Anderson, B. R. O. (2016). *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*.

Arndt J, Greenberg J, Schimel J, Pyszczynski T, & Solomon S. (2002a). To belong or not to belong, that is the question: terror management and identification with gender and ethnicity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*(1), 26–43.

Baker, D. Z. (2007). *America's Gothic fiction: the legacy of Magnalia Christi Americana*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Barker, C., & Warren, J. (1987). *The inhuman condition: tales of terror*. New York: Pocket Books.

Bawarshi, A. S., & Reiff, M. J. (2010). *Genre: an introduction to history, theory, research, and pedagogy*. Fort Collins, Colo.: The WAC Clearinghouse.

Becker, E. (1975). *Escape from evil*. New York: Free Press.

Bivins, J. (2008). *Religion of fear: the politics of horror in conservative evangelicalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bloom, H. (1992). *The American religion: the emergence of the post-Christian nation*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Boyarin, D. (2004). *Border lines: the partition of Judaeo-Christianity*. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Brakke, D. (2006). *Demons and the making of the monk: spiritual combat in early Christianity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Braudy, L. (2016). *Haunted: on ghosts, witches, vampires, zombies, and other monsters of the natural and supernatural worlds*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bruchac, J. (2001). *Skeleton man*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Carlson, T. A. (1999a). Consuming Desire's Deferral: A Theological Shadow in the Culture of Image. *Parallax*, *5*(1).

Carlson, T. A. (1999b). *Indiscretion: finitude and the naming of God*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carlson, T. A. (2008). *The indiscrete image: infinitude & creation of the human*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.

Carroll, N. (1990). *The philosophy of horror, or, Paradoxes of the heart*. New York: Routledge.

Chesnutt, C. W. (1927). *The conjure woman*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Cohen, J. J. (1996). *Monster theory: reading culture*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Cohen, J. J. (2006). *Hybridity, identity, and monstrosity in medieval Britain: On difficult middles*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cole, P. (2006). Rousseau and the vampires: toward a political philosophy of the undead In R. Greene & K. S. Mohammad (Ed.), *The undead and philosophy: chicken soup for the soulless*. Chicago: Open Court.
Colley, L. (2009). *Britons: forging the nation, 1707-1837*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Cooper, L. A. (2010). *Gothic realities: The impact of horror fiction on modern culture*. Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Co.
Corrigan, J. (2015). *Emptiness: feeling Christian in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cowan, D. E. (2008). *Sacred terror: religion and horror on the silver screen*. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press.
Csicsery-Ronay, I. (2008). *The seven beauties of science fiction*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press.
Cunningham, C. (2002). *Genealogy of nihilism: philosophies of nothing and the difference of theology*. New York: Routledge.
Deszcz-Tryhubczak, J., Międzynarodowa Konferencja "W Stronę Wartości--Powrót do Tradycji czy Jej Przeformułowanie? Duchowe i Moralne Wymiary Współczesnej Literatury Fantasy", & Oziewicz, M. (2007). *Rozważając fantasy: etyczne, dydaktyczne i terapeutyczne aspekty literatury i filmu fantasy*. Wrocław: Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT--Wrocławskie Wydawn. Oświatowe.
Devitt, A. J. (2004a). Transferability and genres In C. Weisser and C. Keller (Eds.), *The locations of composition* (pp. 215-27). New York: State University of New York Press.
Devitt, A. J. (2004b). *Writing genres*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Devitt, A. J., Reiff, M. J., & Bawarshi, A. S. (2004). *Scenes of writing: strategies for composing with genres*. New York: Pearson/Longman.
Douglas, M. (2005). *Purity and danger: an analysis of concept of pollution and taboo*. London; New York: Routledge.
Durkheim, E. (1995). *The elementary forms of religious life* (K. E. Fields, Trans.). New York: Free Press.
Elliott, D. (1999). *Fallen bodies: pollution, sexuality, and demonology in the Middle Ages*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Fahy, T. R. (2010). *The philosophy of horror*. Lexington, Ky: University Press of Kentucky.
Fisher, S., & Fisher, R. L. (1993). *The psychology of adaptation to absurdity: tactics of make-believe*. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.
Foucault, M., & Khalfa, J. (2006). *History of madness*. London; New York: Routledge.
Freire, P. (2000). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. New York: Continuum.
Frilingos, C. A. (2004). *Spectacles of empire: monsters, martyrs, and the book of Revelation*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Girard, R. (1979). *Violence and the sacred*. Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press.
Goho, J. (2014). *Journeys into darkness: critical essays on gothic horror*.

Graves, R. (1966). *The White Goddess: a historical grammar of poetic myth*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Gray, M. (1995). *The trickster*. New York: Doubleday.
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Simon, L., & Breus, M. (1994). Role of Consciousness and Accessibility of Death-Related Thoughts in Mortality Salience Effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.*, *67*(4), 627.
Griffith, K. M. (1994). *The calling*. New York, NY: Kensington Pub. Corp.
Halberstam, J. (1995). *Skin shows: gothic horror and the technology of monsters*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Hand, E. (1995). *Waking the moon*. New York: HarperPrism.
Hawreliak, J. (2013). "To be shot at without result": gaming and the rhetoric of immortality In R. Luppicini (Ed.), *Handbook of research on technoself: identity in a technological society*. Hershey, Pa.: Information Science Reference.
Herbert, J. (1997). *Portent*. New York, N.Y.: HarperPrism.
Hoeveler, D. L., & Heller, T. (2003). *Approaches to teaching Gothic fiction: the British and American traditions*. New York: Modern Language Association of America.
Holland-Toll, L. J. (2001). *As American as mom, baseball, and apple pie: constructing community in contemporary American horror fiction*. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press.
Houston, G. T. (2005). *From Dickens to Dracula: Gothic, economics, and Victorian fiction*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ingebretsen, E. J. (1996). *Maps of heaven, maps of hell: religious terror as memory from the Puritans to Stephen King*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Jackson, R. (2004). *Rethinking religious education and plurality: issues in diversity and pedagogy*. London; New York: RoutledgeFalmer.
James, E., & Mendlesohn, F. (2012). *The Cambridge companion to fantasy literature*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Jameson, F. (1991). *Postmodernism, or, The cultural logic of late capitalism*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Jancovich, M. (1992). *Horror*. London: Batsford.
Jones, D. (2002). *Horror: a thematic history in fiction and film*. London: Arnold.
Joshi, S. T. (1990). *H.P. Lovecraft: the decline of the West*. Mercer Island, WA: Starmont House.
Keen, S. (2007). *Empathy and the Novel.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA.
Keller, C. J., & Weisser, C. R. (2007). *The locations of composition*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Kerr, F. (1997). *Immortal longings: versions of transcending humanity*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Ketterer, D. (1974). *New worlds for old; the apocalyptic imagination, science fiction, and American literature.* Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press.
King, S. (2010). *Danse macabre*. New York: Gallery.
Klein, T. E. D. (1984). *The ceremonies*. New York: Viking Press.
Kreuziger, F. A. (1982). *Apocalypse and science fiction: a dialectic of religious and secular soteriologies*. Chico, CA: Scholars Press.
Kreuziger, F. A. (1986). *The religion of science fiction*. Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State University Popular Press.

Kripal, J. J. (2010). *Authors of the impossible: the paranormal and the sacred*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press.
Kripal, J. J. (2011). *Mutants and mystics: science fiction, superhero comics, and the paranormal*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kristeva, J. (1982). *Powers of horror: an essay on abjection* (L. S. Roudiez, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.
Kumashiro, K. K. (2015). *Against common sense: teaching and learning toward social justice*. New York and London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Ltd.
LaHaye, T., & Jenkins, J. B. (1995). *Left behind: a novel of the earth's last days*. Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers.
Levin, I. (1967). *Rosemary's baby; a novel.* New York: Random House.
Lewis, C. S., & Baynes, P. (1988). *The lion, the witch, and the wardrobe*. New York: Macmillan.
Lewis, M. G. (2002). *The monk*. New York: Modern Library.
Little, B. (1996). *Dominion*. New York: Penguin.
Lovecraft, H. P., & Jones, S. (2008). *Necronomicon: the best weird tales of H.P. Lovecraft*. London: Gollancz.
Lovecraft, H. P., & Joshi, T. S. (2000). *The annotated supernatural horror in literature*. New York: Hippocampus Press.
Maccoby, H. (1992). *Judas Iscariot and the myth of Jewish evil*. New York; Toronto; New York: Free Press ; Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International.
Mack, B. (1987). Introduction: religion and ritual In W. Burkert, R. Girard, J. Z. Smith, & R. Hamerton-Kelly (Eds.). *Violent origins: Walter Burkert, René Girard & Jonathan Z. Smith on ritual killing and cultural formation*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Mann, B. A. (2016). *Spirits of blood, spirits of breath: the twinned cosmos of indigenous America*. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1107431
Martindale, T. C. (1991). *Demon dance*. New York: Pocket Books.
Mbembe, A. (2001). *On the postcolony*. Berkeley: University of California Press. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.02640
McAleer, P. (2009). *Inside the Dark tower series: art, evil, and intertextuality in the Stephen King novels*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company.
McDonald, B. E. (2004). *The vampire as numinous experience: spiritual journeys with the undead in British and American literature*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., Publishers.
McInnis, J. (1985). H. P. Lovecraft's immortal culture In C. B. Yoke & D. M. Hassler (Eds.). *Death and the serpent: immortality in science fiction and fantasy* (pp. 125-134). Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
McLaughlin, M., & DeVoogd, G. L. (2004). *Critical literacy: enhancing students' comprehension of text*. New York: Scholastic.
Miller, J. A. (1992). *In the throe of wonder: intimations of the sacred in a post-modern world*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Modern, J. L. (2011). *Secularism in antebellum America: with reference to ghosts, Protestant subcultures, machines, and their metaphors : featuring discussions of*

*mass media, Moby-Dick, spirituality, phrenology, anthropology, Sing Sing State Penitentiary, and sex with the new motive power*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press.
Ndalianis, A. (2012). *The horror sensorium: media and the senses*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co.
Nelson, V. (2001). *The secret life of puppets*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Nelson, V. (2012). *Gothicka: vampire heroes, human gods, and the new supernatural*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Nickel, P. J. (2010). Horror and the idea of everyday life: on skeptical threats in Psycho and The birds In T. R. Fahy (Ed.), *The philosophy of horror*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky.
Nietzsche, F. W., & Kaufmann, W. (2000). *Basic writings of Nietzsche*. New York: Modern Library.
Nietzsche, F. W., Whiteside, S., & Tanner, M. (2003). *The birth of tragedy: out of the spirit of music*. London; New York: Penguin.
Otto, R. (1950). *The idea of the holy; an inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational.* London: Oxford University Press G. Cumberlege.
Oziewicz, M. (2008). *One earth, one people: the mythopoeic fantasy series of Ursula K. Le Guin, Lloyd Alexander, Madeleine L'Engle and Orson Scott Card*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co.
Peretti, F. E. (2011). *The oath*. Nashville: Thomas Nelson.
Porte, J. In the hands of an angry god: religious terror in Gothic fiction In G. R. Thompson (Ed.), *The Gothic imagination: essays in dark romanticism*. Pullman: Washington State University Press.
Pyszczynski, T. A., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (2003). *In the wake of 9/11: the psychology of terror*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Rice, A. (1995). *Memnoch the Devil*.
Roberts, A. (2012). Gothic and horror fiction In E. James & F. Mendlesohn (Eds.), *The Cambridge companion to fantasy literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rosenblatt, L. M. (1995). *Literature as exploration*. New York: Modern Language Association of America.
Routledge C, Abeyta A.A, & Roylance C. (2016). Death and end times: the effects of religious fundamentalism and mortality salience on apocalyptic beliefs. *Relig. Brain Behav. Religion, Brain and Behavior*, 1–10.
Routledge, C., & Arndt, J. (2008). Self-sacrifice as self-defence: Mortality salience increases efforts to affirm a symbolic immortal self at the expense of the physical self. *EJSP European Journal of Social Psychology*, *38*(3), 531–541.
Said, E. W. (2003). *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.
Salomon, R. B. (2002). *Mazes of the serpent: an anatomy of horror narrative*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Sanbonmatsu, J. (2011). *Critical theory and animal liberation*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Retrieved from

http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/concordiaab-ebooks/detail.action?docID=730743
Schneider, K. J. (1993). *Horror and the holy: wisdom-teachings of the monster tale*. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court.
Simmons, D. (1986). *Song of Kali*. New York, NY: Tom Doherty Associates.
Smith, J. Z. (1982). *Imagining religion: from Babylon to Jonestown*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Smith, J. Z. (2013). *On teaching religion: Essays by Jonathan Z. Smith*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Somtow, S. P. (1999). *Darker angels*. New York: Tor.
Stone, B. (2001). The Sanctification of Fear: Images of the Religious in Horror Films. *JRandF Journal of Religion and Film*, *5*(2), 43 paragraphs.
Strieber, W. (1983). *The Night Church*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Taylor, M. C. (2007). *After God*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Thacker, E. (2011). *In the dust of this planet*. Winchester, UK: Zero.
Thacker, E. (2015). *Starry speculative corpse*. Lanham: John Hunt Publishing.
Tillich, P. (1964). *Theology of culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Vedder, B. (2007). *Heidegger's philosophy of religion: from God to the gods*. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press.
Weber, M., & Kalberg, S. (2009). *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, J. (2014). *Storyworld First: Creating a Unique Fantasy World for Your Novel*. Place of publication not identified: Novel Teen Press.
Wisker, G. (2005). *Horror fiction: an introduction*. New York: Continuum.
Wright, A. (2007). *Critical religious education, multiculturalism and the pursuit of truth*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

# Appendix 50: Queer Composition, Fantasizing Phlebotinum, and Worldmaking with the Whedonverse – A Course in Religious Studies Using Critical, Genre-based, and Technology-Supplemented Pedagogical Methods

[1] As noted in Christine Jarvis's 2016 article in *Slayage*, "Whedon scholarship has a strong pedagogical strand" (Jarvis, 2016), and although others have considered Whedon's work relative to the concerns and methods of religious studies (e.g., Santana & Erickson, 2016, pp. 149-160; Mills, Morehead, & Parker, 2013; Koontz, 2008; Stevenson, 2003), I hope to demonstrate how Whedonverse texts provide material for an enjoyable course, well-suited to undergraduate liberal arts or advanced secondary education, that pulls together three valuable pedagogical techniques in the context of religious studies: critical pedagogy, genre-based pedagogy, and technology-supplemented pedagogy. Although a full course of this sort may only be possible for liberal arts professors who have relatively high degrees of control over the courses they design and offer, elements of it could be applied to course design by a far greater number of instructors, including in disciplines other than religious studies, such as rhetoric and composition, media studies, and sex and gender studies. The suggestions presented here attempt to provide concrete ideas without supplying an overly constrained, fully determined syllabus. Broadly, for a teacher with the freedom to present a full course, I propose a course unit devoted to an introduction to genre analysis, followed by three units focused on engagement with Whedon texts and secondary academic texts to support discussion of (a) the queer construction of a selected Whedonverse character, (b) the "queering" of "family," and (c) how a genre may itself be "queer." Finally, students engage in their own critical religious world-building through a multimedia composition project. This is summarized in Table 1 at the end of this introduction.

[2] If religious studies is understood as a discipline fundamentally oriented toward the *critical* analysis of worldviews and world-making processes (cf. Taves & Asprem, forthcoming), its courses are a natural site for the application of critical pedagogy—the methodical use of education to promote the critique of power, the recognition of how its operation naturalizes and conceals itself in human-made worlds, and the liberation of the oppressed. In this case, queer studies is the selected lens for guiding a religious studies critique of world-making. Queer studies is another critical discipline that focuses on the construction, constructedness, and instability of sexual identities and categories, sometimes moving beyond analysis of the normative to celebration of the different (cf. Benshoff, 1997). Queer studies is chosen in part because Whedon's corpus lends itself to this, and in part because it is useful, in the context of religious studies, to remind students that religion is not always or only about purity, stability, or seriousness. Humor, horror, and sex, though often treated as antithetical to "religion," are central to certain religious phenomena and worldviews, and Whedon's worlds and world-making help stimulate reflection on the religious significance of things like blending and boundary-crossing, tricksters and terror. Students attracted to a course using Whedon's work are more likely to be open to the idea that queer, LGBT, and kinky spiritualities and religions, though deemed illegitimate by some religious people, are real and interesting worldviews, fully worthy of study. As a PhD student researching made-up worldviews in speculative fiction, I find that this course design reflects my growing conviction that the use of fictional texts and worldviews in the religious

studies classroom solves a number of challenges unique to religious studies by permitting (1) a less personally threatening, (2) a more detached and critical, and even (3) a playful and entertaining consideration of such questions as how worldviews produce personal experiences, are constructed as meaning-making systems, are shaped by and in turn shape configurations of power, and are enabled and constrained by cognitive factors (cf. Fredrickson, 2016; Fredrickson, forthcoming; Taves & Fredrickson, 2017).

[3] Whedon's approach to religion supports the religious studies instructor in helping students to attend to what Smith (1978) has called religion's *locative* and *utopian* qualities. That is, in its "locative" mode, religion provides people with a coherent, meaningful world to inhabit; however, some religious worldviews also provide occasions for critical reflection on artifice, fictionality, and emptiness—in other words, "utopia," in the sense, not of "good place," but of "no place." Some words for this critically reflective process, to which students are introduced throughout the course, are "deconstruction" (as when one notes inconsistencies and contradictions in Whedon's worlds and symbols), "defamiliarization" (as when something "normal" is presented in such a way as to arrest attention and render it unusual), and "problematization" (as when something unquestioned and natural is converted into a problem, a subject for critique); in fact, "queer" itself may function as an adjective meaning "critical" or "subversive" or as a verb meaning "to critique" or "to subvert."

[4] Santana and Erickson (2016), discussing religion in the *Buffy the Vampire Slayer* storyworld, stress its critical, utopian nature, or, one might say, its anti-nature: "The mythology of *Buffy* is more accurately anti-myth—not an affirmation of older systems of thought—but a continual challenging of them, not stories that explain and comfort us with certainty, but stories that pull the ground out from under our understanding" (p. 158). Just as the "queer" resists stable, essentialized sex-based identity, Whedon's approach to religion:

> resists categorization and static meaning throughout, and, especially in its later years, introduces subversive elements into the conceptual universe of the earlier seasons. The series is an instructive text on the interaction of American popular culture and popular religion in that it presents religious and theological themes in ways that refuse to provide comfort and stability. (Santana & Erickson, 2016, p. 159)

The intentional, active cultivation of awareness of fictionality or constructedness is a central feature, too, of queer studies, which may help account for the abundance of queer material in the Whedonverse.

[5] Of critical pedagogy, genre-based pedagogy, and technology-supplemented pedagogy, perhaps the most intriguing is the growing and impressive body of evidence for genre-based teaching, particularly in the context of writing studies (e.g., Bawarshi & Reiff, 2010; Bazerman et al., 2009; Devitt, 2004), although it is appropriate to note that the close analysis of text types and genres has long been a central method in religious studies. Essentially, genre-based pedagogy encourages students to focus on how genres are constructed. Introducing students to different genres and helping them to think through how these are constructed and how their construction relates to rhetorical concerns promotes a variety of evidence-based pedagogical outcomes. Among the benefits of genre-based pedagogy, it (1) helps cultivate critical, reflective thought, (2) prepares students with transferrable skills to respond adaptively to new tasks, and (3) increases empathy (cf. Keen, 2007), which may be tied to students' metacognitive abilities.

[6] Genre-based pedagogy promotes critical thought because it inherently distances its practitioner from the literary and audiovisual texts and genres it studies. It "queers" them by calling them into question and reading them in alienated and alienating ways. Placing queer studies and religious studies in the foreground of a course using Whedon's corpus intensifies and specifies the critical perspective. Although eleventh century theologian Saint Anselm may have defined "theology" as *faith seeking understanding*, treating faith as unquestioned even while it questions, the suspicious discovery and critique of power and its operations in religion is one of religious studies' primary foci as an academic discipline (Bush, 2014). Its critical focus distinguishes it from theology. And just as religious worldviews may supply their adherents with critical perspectives regarding alternative worldviews (e.g., "heretics," "pagans," and "secularists") as well as positive, even utopian visions of what is possible, so too queer studies may supply, not only a critique of any monolithically signifying sexuality (Sedgwick, 1993), but also utopian hopes of possibility (Muñoz, 2009).

[7] Since Whedon's universes are located in and constituted in terms of the conventions of a range of speculative genres, the Whedon corpus provides a useful body of material in which to apply genre-based pedagogy. Since the Whedon "texts" are already multimedia texts, they likewise lend themselves to pedagogical methods that take advantage of technology and that promote an understanding of composition that embraces more than textual production alone. Finally, Whedon's critically literate works exhibit a "queer" or "utopian" sensibility that may, with the aid of queer studies, help promote critical thought in the religious studies classroom, challenging and transforming previously naturalized and essentialized categories, including not only sex, gender, race, and even species, but also genres themselves.

[8] Regarding technology-supplemented pedagogy (in this case, multimedia or digital composition) and its link to genre-based pedagogy, it is productive to note that, as McLuhan (2003) famously argued, the medium is the message. It is sometimes hard to distinguish between medium and genre in genre-based pedagogy, for the medium necessarily constrains and enables the expressive powers of the story told through it. Wysocki (2004) notes that those who compose in new media need to engage with the rhetorical insights of writing instructors. And, in harmony with Wysocki's argument, this course builds on rhetorical concepts used to interpret and understand how texts are situated and structured in persuasive and informative ways to consider other media. This unit of the course is designed with the TPACK framework in mind (Koehler and Mishra, 2009). "TPACK" refers to "technological, pedagogical, and content knowledge" and is a daunting call for teachers to use technological and digital affordances to supplement and enhance their teaching, but the term also points to the interrelatedness of these abilities. As opposed to focusing on blended learning (cf. Garrison and Vaughan, 2013) or the instructor's assumed use of instructional technologies and effective use of the course management systems like Moodle to facilitate more than ease of access to information (e.g., syllabi, lecture notes, readings, and resource links), the focus here is on teaching students to understand and create narrative content in digital media. Part of the critical awareness students should cultivate, however, should be appreciation of the economic and social factors that make certain media accessible to some people but not others (cf. Warschauer, 2003). By using the genre-based method to consider queer studies and religious studies content in Whedonverse texts, the course itself reinforces the interrelatedness of

technological, pedagogical, and content knowledge. Use of models from Whedon's corpus introduces students to storytelling and analysis in media other than and in addition to the textual, but it demands of its instructor a variety of TPACK competencies.

[9] The degree to which a given teacher will be able to devote class time to digital composition will vary widely. In general, I assume that class time will be limited. Thus, students should be made aware early on that, although some technological skills will be modeled briefly, very little class time be devoted to the numerous specific software and hardware technologies through which students may be able to compose digitally. They will need to factor this outside class time into the homework burden. One's syllabus might explicitly state, "Substantial active, inquiry-based, problem-solving self-instruction and conflict-resolving collaboration is expected." This emphasizes again that pedagogical knowledge is part of technological and content knowledge so that one may be able to assist one's students by providing them with necessary affordances for growth (Chickering and Gamson, 1991; Daniels and Walker, 2001; Michaelsen et al., 2002; Silberman, 1996). And this is good. The play of difference operative in a variety of methods, as in a variety of genres, seems to help promote critical thinking (Yuretich, 2003). To learn technical skills for digital composition, many institutions offer access to sites like Lynda.com, and there are a number of other free online educational websites and resources for learning how to use digital composition technologies. Learning to use such tools will be far easier if students work together. The teacher would do well to point out to students—again, perhaps in the syllabus itself—that though the course is focused on a single creator, Whedon, these media are inherently collective, and the final project is collaborative because that is demanded by the nature of the media. Collaborative composition helps students engage in what Leary calls "macrocomposition," an expression he uses to indicate "a new understanding that, in digital realms, assembling the work of others ought no longer to be viewed as a means to an end, or as 'a preliminary stage' for developing writers, but as an end in itself" (2011-2012, p. 2).

---

**Table 1: Summary of Course Reading and Viewing Suggestions**

**I. Genre-based Pedagogy**

- Suggested Whedon text for class discussion: *Cabin in the Woods* (2011)
- Suggested secondary texts for class discussion: Carroll, 2010; Bunn, 2010; Dirk, 2010; Irvin, 2010

**II. Critical Pedagogy**

*a. Queer Characters*

- Suggested Whedon texts for class discussion: *Buffy*, "Buffy vs. Dracula" (5.1) and *Dollhouse*, "Echoes" (1.7), "Needs" (1.8), and "Meet Jane Doe" (2.7)
- Suggested secondary text for class discussion: Boulware, 2013
- Suggested Whedon text for class discussion of Angel: *Buffy*, "The Wish" (3.9) and "What's My Line?: Part 2" (2.10)
- Suggested secondary texts for class discussion of Angel: McCracken, 2007; Hollywood, 2016;
- Suggested Whedon text for class discussion of Spike: *Buffy*, "Fool for Love" (5:7)
- Suggested secondary texts for class discussion of Spike: Spicer, 2002; Amy-Chinn, 2005; Lavoie, 2011

- Suggested Whedon text for class discussion of Lorne: *Angel*, "The House Always Wins" (4.3)
- Suggested secondary text for class discussion of Lorne: Palmer, 2008

*b. Queer Families*

- Suggested Whedon text for class discussion: *Buffy*, "Family" (5.6)
- Suggested secondary text for class discussion: Chambers, 2009

*c. Queer Genres*

- Suggested Whedon texts for class discussion: "Once More, with Feeling" (6.7) and *Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog* (2008)
- Suggested secondary texts: I suggest one start assigning readings to support the composition project at this point, delivering information about how a genre might be queer or queered in lecture format.

**III. Technology-supplemented Pedagogy: Multimedia Composition**

- Suggested texts for final project:
    - Chapter 6 of Jobling (2010) or Erickson (2008) or the introduction to Wilcox and Cochran (2008)
    - "Fantasizing Phlebotinum – Worldview-making Worksheet" (see Appendix 1), which might be supplemented with Williamson (2014) or Card et al. (2013)
    - excerpts from McCloud (2006)
    - excerpts from Lambert (2010)
    - excerpts from Dancyger and Rush (2002), with Martin (2010)

---

**Genre-based pedagogy:**

[11] For students to benefit from genre-based instruction, they must understand the purpose of the method. They must be active participants in the transformative process. In fact, they would do well to become aware of their "novice" or initiate status (cf. Sommers and Saltz, 2004). The defamiliarized state—like the feeling of opening a new fantasy novel, joining a new RPG, or travelling to a different country—should become *familiar* and desirable, in part because there will always be new genres to learn. And the goal of critical genre awareness is, in a sense, to shift students into a perpetually liminal or queer state relative to the genres they are analyzing and in which they are composing. Whedon appreciates genres such as horror, sci-fi, and the western but resists permitting their conventions to become frozen or naturalized in his understanding. He is able to construct novel variations on and blends of their features precisely because he knows that they are constructed.

[12] Introduce and explain genre-based methods to students early so that they may pay attention to the right things and play an active role in their self-development. Happily, there are a number of accessible online readings about the study of genre for composition students at http://writingspaces.org/essays (e.g., Carroll, 2010; Bunn, 2010; Dirk, 2010; Irvin, 2010). I suggest classroom discussion of at least the four readings just cited, with accompanying small exercises in which students select, analyze, and even compose texts in specific genres. For example, students might be asked to pick two sources from two different genres on the same topic and explain how the differences between the genres shape

their respective treatments of the topic, or students might transform a text in one genre into another genre.

[13] Even at this early point in the class, it is vital to point out that deconstructive analysis of a genre goes hand-in-hand with constructive composition in and with a genre or genres. The rhetorical terms students learn from the readings on composition in order to engage in genre analysis—such as old Greek words like *logos*, *pathos*, and *ethos*—are not ends in themselves. They are not just fancy terms for diagnosing how politicians and advertisers manipulate people. Rather, because rhetorical genre analysis is being combined with critical pedagogy, these rhetorical methods are intended to become tools for liberating people from what they assume to be the limits of the real and persuading people what is possible.

[14] Whedon's *The Cabin in the Woods* (2011) provides material for the entire class to become familiar with genre-based instruction, genre analysis, and the rhetorical categories that facilitate it by focusing on the horror genre. The instructor will guide students who are horror-genre literate to help explain its conformity to and violation of the genre to those students who know less about the genre, with the instructor perhaps referencing clips from comparable genre-critical works—e.g., *Hot Fuzz* (2007), *Shaun of the Dead* (2004), *Behind the Mask: The Rise of Leslie Vernon* (2006), *Funny Games* (2007), etc. Furthermore, the instructor will encourage students who know less about the genre to reflect on and express features they may have found distressing or annoying due to their unfamiliarity or novelty. Use Lipsett's (2012) "'One for the Horror Fans' vs. 'An Insult to the Horror Genre': Negotiating Reading Strategies in IMDb Reviews of *The Cabin in the Woods*" as a secondary reading to promote such a discussion. As background preparation for classroom analysis of *The Cabin in the Woods*, an instructor should become generally familiar with H. P. Lovecraft's Cthulhu mythos and perhaps prepare some example clips from other Lovecraft-influenced works like *In the Mouth of Madness* (1994). Starr's (2013-2014) "Whedon's Great Glass Elevator: Space, Liminality, and Intertext in *The Cabin in the Woods*" can aid an instructor in using the film as a way to introduce some useful critical vocabulary for the queer analyses that students will engage in throughout the course.

## Critical (genre-based) pedagogy

[15] Genres like horror, fantasy, and science fiction lend themselves to critical thinking and are especially popular with critically literate authors. Call (2012, p. 16) states:

> From its inception, SF&F [science fiction and fantasy] has been all about violating norms: first those of literature and later, during the New Wave of the 1960s, its own. It has been about blurring borders, first those of genre and later, again during the 1960s, those of gender and sexuality. SF&F is indeed "something truly outside." It is a genre always already outside literature: a "paraliterature," to use Delany's term.

The queer has often been defined in an oppositional relation to the normative, and so perhaps it is not surprising that genres like science fiction that have been "all about violating norms" have been among the first genres in which non-normative representations of gender and sexuality were most explicitly explored. Early science fiction and fantasy texts—including comics and movies—titillated their audiences with thinly disguised (and sometimes undisguised) queer themes like BDSM, homoeroticism, and even cross-species

(i.e., coded interracial) romance. Such genres let the queer out of the closet, and, as Call (2012, p. 15) observes:

> The thing about coming out of the closet is that you can't go back in again afterwards. Kink is here to stay, and mainstream pop culture will continue trying to represent it. America is hungry for honest, edgy representations of kink. Weiss has documented a "mainstream public" which "continues to look to BDSM as an inspiration for norm violation, a location that promises an attack on borders, boundaries, and closed-down options" (2006a: 129).

In order to attune and sensitize students to some of the queer and kinky aspects of the Whedonverse storyworlds, as stated above I propose three course units following the introductory discussion of genre analysis and preceding the course project. The proposed units focus on (1) the queer construction of a selected character, (2) the queering of family, and (3) how a genre may itself be queer. Depending on time, one might only be able to cover one of these units, or one might want to offer the course as a two-quarter or two-semester sequence, introducing readings and concepts in the first half and devoting the second half of the course to the multimedia composition project.

### *Queer characters*

[16] McCracken's (2007) chapter, "At Stake: Angel's Body, Fantasy Masculinity, and Queer Desire in Teen Television," offers a queer reading of the way the character Angel is presented as pierced and penetrated, wounded so that Buffy is not. Buffy and Angel's relationship is an expression of what Polhemus (1990) calls "erotic faith" and what C. S. Lewis (1959) calls the "religion of love"—a religion in which virtually anything is permitted and any sacrifice is sanctified in the name of Love. For some, love justifies even queer representations and acts that disrupt sexual roles and binaries. While Sedgwick's (1993) discussion of the sentimental contemplation of Jesus' wounded and displayed body might be too challenging for most undergraduates, one might assign students, with the McCracken (2007) reading, Hollywood's (2016) "'That Glorious Slit': Irigaray and the Medieval Devotion to Christ's Side Wound," which examines some of the fascinating ways Jesus was feminized by Christians—male and female—seeking mystical union with the divine. This facilitates a comparative analysis of both (1) the idolized and fetishized male star and religious devotion to Jesus and (2) the queer feminization of the beloved male figure. Or, instead of Angel, one might focus on what is queer in the representation of characters like Spike (Spicer, 2002; Amy-Chinn, 2005; Lavoie, 2011) or Lorne (Palmer, 2008). Another possibility might be to assign the episode "Buffy vs. Dracula" (5.1) and consider, not only the vampire lesbianism that panders to Giles's male gaze, but also Xander's Renfield-esque infatuation with Dracula. (Editor's note: See also Greenwood, this issue.) The episode may continue discussion about the horror genre and Whedon's use of intertextuality, but the queering or "faggotization" (Puar, 2007) of Xander relative to his vampire "Master" may be used to explore, through mature classroom discussion, how "queer" may refer to more than same-sex eroticism, including (1) the dom/sub dynamic and erotic pleasure derived from the play of power and pain and (2) relationships, as in religious attachments, between humans and supernatural beings.

[17] The manner in which Xander, Giles, and Buffy are overcome by the minds, wills, and desires of the vampires leads into a critical discussion of *Dollhouse*'s premise—as

well as the quite literal way its characters are converted from straight to gay and *vice versa*. *Dollhouse* queers its characters by having instances of what Strongman (2008) calls "transcorporeality" (cf. Boulware, 2013), but, unlike the African-derived religious examples Strongman is interested in, the persons whose powers surpass the human individual and who possess them with alternate selves are corporate, not divine. Consent is also less clear in this case, which encourages critical thought about the nature of rape as well as the presumably "voluntary" nature of corporate work and the neoliberal rational self. The surrender or assumption of the self to or into the collective—the very mechanism of salvation in Christian theology—may be, as Durkheim (1995) argues, foundational to religion, but the transcendent and its claims on the human subject may be engaged with greater suspicion when, as in the case of *Dollhouse*, it is realized in a corporate rather than a supernatural person. Draw on cyborg theory to consider how the technology-supplied and supplemented subjectivity relates to our own increasingly enhanced and virtual lives (Hayles, 1999), the conditions of which ultimately seem to lead to the postmodern collapse of the concept of a unitary, masterful, stable subjectivity. Thus, in the consideration of queer characters, the concept of a "character" may itself be deconstructed. *Dollhouse* supports a subjectless critique even while portraying the heroic (re)formation of a new kind of subjectivity. Students read Boulware's (2013) "'I Made Me': Queer Theory, Subjection, and Identity in *Dollhouse*" to assist discussion of these issues. Throughout the classroom discussion, the religious studies instructor helps students appreciate how the "religious" and the "secular" mutually constitute each other and how many central concepts of the public, secular world, such as "sovereign" and "subjectivity," still retain much of the logic of the Christian past. Religious studies, as a discipline that critically examines *worldviews*, does not exempt the secular order from its analyses.

### *Queer families*

[18] In *Buffy*, Whedon makes an explicit analogy between gay identity and Buffy's identity and coming out as the Slayer, Oz as a werewolf, as well as between Willow and Tara's sexuality and witchcraft. In some cases, coming out can threaten the ties of family, and Whedon uses this threat to affirm the real and voluntary character of chosen family. When thinking about Whedon's worldmaking process, one may note that he has invented numerous fictional religions and other worldviews, but his central characters' worlds are founded on the idea of family, sometimes biological, but often not. This theme is, among other places, discussed at length in Battis's (2005) *Blood Relations: Chosen Families in* Buffy The Vampire Slayer *and* Angel, which makes fine background reading for an instructor, and Chambers's (2009) chapter entitled "The Meaning of 'Family'" in *The Queer Politics of Television*, which is a manageable text to assign to students. Whedon's ideal of one's family or tribe or crew as extending beyond and often having nothing to do with the biological is a queer one, and it extends to his relationship with his fans. In interviews, Whedon often discusses his unusually close relationship with his fans. He wants them to take his worlds and extend them—inviting a "participatory culture" wherein the rather authoritarian and one-directional logic of mass media is somewhat disrupted by bottom-up, creative fandom processes (cf. Jenkins, 2006, 2013). For example, Whedon once stated in an interview regarding *Buffy*:

> I designed the show to create that strong reaction. I designed *Buffy* to be an icon, to be an emotional experience, to be loved in a way that other shows can't be loved. Because it's about adolescence, which is the most important thing people go through in their development, becoming an adult. And it mythologizes it in such a way, such a romantic way—it basically says, "Everybody who made it through adolescence is a hero." [. . .] I wanted her to be a cultural phenomenon. I wanted there to be dolls. Barbie with kung-fu grip. [. . .] I wanted people to internalize it, and make up fantasies where they were in the story, to take it home with them, for it to exist beyond the TV show. (Robinson, 2011, pp. 28-29)

Not only is the adoration of pop icons and superstars recognized as religious and as a religious threat by some faith leaders, who lament it as idolatry, but fans also themselves sometimes adopt religious language to explain the fandom experience (see, for example, Erzen, 2012). Participatory culture supplies a way of life and a worldview, as well as a community, whether understood as religious, secular, or otherwise, that is an appropriate and stimulating subject for analysis within the religious studies context and comparison with other worldviews and ways of life. I shall discuss fandom and participatory culture further below in the context of genre, digital media, and particularly *Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog*, but through guided discussion, students may be helped to appreciate how Whedon's notion of family metaleptically extends outside of his storyworlds, again pointing to the queer, transgressive, boundary-crossing quality of utopian religion (cf. n. 6; see also, Tweed, 2006; Albanese, 2013; Kukkonen & Klimek, 2011).

### *Queer genres*

[19] Above, I have already outlined an argument that science fiction, horror, and fantasy are genres that seem to be especially hospitable to queer critique because they are rooted in the exploration of alternative possibilities and that this may play a role in their appeal for Whedon. Gray's (2015) critical reading of Willow and Tara's relationship in her chapter in *New Directions in 21st Century Gothic* argues that *Buffy* represents a postmodern version of the gothic genre. Gothic, as a critical, romantic response to the Enlightenment and modernity's self-confident will-to-mastery and foreclosure of possibility, challenges civilization, patriarchy, and technology with such Whedonesque things as liminality, femininity, nature, magic, and sexuality. Another genre that contrasts with the rationalism, realism, conservatism, and masculinity of genres like the gangster movie, the Western, and the detective film is the musical. Whedon's fondness for the musical genre has been explored by scholars such as (1) Cox (2013), whose dissertation on *Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog* provides fine material for a lecture to guide classroom analysis of the work; and (2) Dvoskin (2010, 2006), who wrote her Master's thesis on the musical episodes in *Xena: Warrior Princess* and *Buffy the Vampire Slayer* and whose work argues—contrary to the idea that the genre is inherently nostalgic, as some have similarly argued regarding country music—that, in fact, the musical is an excellent genre for queering history. One might, like Adorno (2001), criticize the culture industry and genres like the musical for their authoritarian, totalizing impulses—as when everyone starts dancing and singing in spontaneous unison and support of a protagonist; however, the musical's potentially disruptive nature, due to its anti-realist or non-mimetic qualities, which it shares with genres

like science fiction, horror, and fantasy and media like comics and animation, may also be emphasized.

[20] Using *Dr. Horrible*, a classroom discussion of the musical genre transitions to the course's third pedagogical theme of technology and digital composition (see Willis, 2014), and, moving from its critical, queer analyses of world-making elements such as characterization, relationships, and genre, the course shifts into the constructive phase of active, participatory world-making, with guided reflection on the queer potential of participatory culture. But before moving on to the constructive phase of the course, it might be productive to have students turn in a short critical reflection on a chosen aspect of the Whedonverse. For example, students might be given the following short-essay prompt:

> In three to five double-spaced pages (with standard 12-point font and 1-inch margins), please explain in your own words (but using course readings, concepts, and terms) how either a particular Whedon character, community, or genre expresses the critical, queer, and utopian functions of religion.

## Technology-supplemented (critical, genre-based) pedagogy

> "The best weapon against myth is perhaps to mythify it in its turn, and to produce an artificial myth; and this reconstituted myth will in fact be a mythology" (Barthes, 1972, p. 135).

[21] Let's begin consideration of this challenging unit with an anecdote. In the interview with *The Onion* cited above, Whedon was asked how he deals with the emotional intensity that some of his fans display when interacting with him (crying, inability to speak, etc.) (Robinson, 2011, pp. 27-28). Whedon replied:

> It's about the show, and I feel the same way about it. I get the same way. It's not like being a rock star. It doesn't feel like they're reacting to me. It's really sweet when people react like that, and I love the praise, but to me, what they're getting emotional about is the show. And that's the best feeling in the world. There's nothing creepy about it. *I feel like there's a religion in narrative, and I feel the same way they do. I feel like we're both paying homage to something else; they're not paying homage to me.* (emphasis added, Robinson, 2011, p. 28)

How may one engage creatively in the kind of world-making in which "there's a religion in narrative"? (Cf. Lavery, 2002). Moreover, is digital or multimedia composition really appropriate for a religious studies classroom?

[22] Religious studies teachers are responsible, not only for teaching domain-specific information about worldviews, but also for helping students to develop a range of domain-general competencies that will help them be successful in the contemporary world. In harmony with the objectives and disciplinary expectations of Writing Across the Curriculum (WAC), religious studies teachers should fulfill their obligation to help cultivate students' compositional abilities by promoting "rhetorical dexterity" (Carter, 2008), including "digital dexterity" (Patterson, Hancock, & Reid, 2014). Moreover, important religious phenomena are occurring in popular culture media, such as movies, TV shows, videogames, and in online communities (cf., e.g., Cusack, 2010, 2017; Campbell & Grieve, 2014; Possamai, 2005, 2012; Erzen, 2012; Chidester, 2005). The formation of participatory cultures,

referenced above, and intense fandoms raise important questions regarding the distinctions between and relations among such things as fiction, reality, fandom, and religion (cf. Wilcox, 2015). Thus, some religious studies teachers might feel called to push themselves to learn how to help students become multimedia literate through digital composition projects. This constructive phase is also an appropriate balance to the deconstructive activity that dominates the preceding course units. By this point in the course, students have been thinking deconstructively for quite some time; they should find it positive or even refreshing to shift into the constructive mode.

[23] As with the students' critical relationship to genre, they should be assisted in coming to view storytelling in other media both analytically and constructively. For this reason, the course not only examines Whedon's work and worlds, but also calls on students to engage in world-building of their own. In this way, they will develop new skills and critical awareness of media other than traditional written texts—particularly visual genres that, due to their immediacy, may be unusually compelling and coercive. And they may come to see both how Whedon uses his media as instruments for realizing his visions of alternative worlds—that is, how a medium may *function as a tool* of one's will—and how a medium may *be an extension* of one's own imagination, not as a tool with a function to be mastered, but as a manifestation of the possible worlds one projects as extensions of one's most intimate being and thinking (cf. Heidegger, 1977). Of course, many students will not develop the fluency with their medium that is assumed in such a realization of extended self-expression and cognition, and that is fine.

[24] To facilitate the constructive phase of the course, the instructor might assign Chapter 6 of Jobling's (2010) *Fantastic Spiritualities: Monsters, Heroes, and the Contemporary Religious Imagination*. An alternative reading that focuses on Whedonverse materials in order to reflect on religious worldmaking is Erickson's (2008) chapter, "Humanity in a 'Place of Nothin'': Morality, Religion, Atheism, and Possibility in *Firefly*," in Wilcox and Cochran's (2008) edited volume, *Investigating Firefly and Serenity: Science Fiction on the Frontier*, the introduction of which might also be used (Wilcox & Cochran, 2008). To assist students in the challenging task of making their own fictional worlds and worldviews, it is helpful to review in lecture some of the common story formulas, many of them religious in origin, that Whedon plays with and reformulates in a postmodern style. Many scholars have thought about Whedon's heroes relative to Campbell's (2004) monomyth (e.g., Buckman, 2008; Money, 2008), which many screenwriters are indoctrinated to follow rather slavishly; others have noted his use of apocalyptic themes (Weaver, 2013) and other formulas. Dancyger and Rush's (2002) text on alternative scriptwriting foregrounds the problem of formulaic writing; Martin (2010) has written a chapter on teaching film production using *Buffy*; McCloud (2006) provides a useful and digestible synthesis of visual composition advice that is relevant to both comics and movies; and, more generally, Williamson (2014) and others (e.g., Card et al., 2013) have written guides to storyworld building that pay attention to the issue of making worldviews, whether magical, religious, or more generically "cultural." Joe Lambert's (2010) seven steps or "elements" in his *Digital Storytelling Cookbook* help students break the digital storytelling task into manageable parts. Based on Taves and Asprem's (forthcoming) arguments in favor of "worldviews" rather than "religions" as the analytical category in the discipline of religious studies, a worksheet is appended to this article to aid in the construction of a fictional worldview, taking up Taves and Asprem's (forthcoming) suggestion that

worldviews might be organized around or defined in terms of "Big Questions" in categories like ontology, cosmology, epistemology, axiology, and praxeology.

[25] Students should brainstorm individually before collaborating in person and online. Digital composition options include making (a) a short film or (b) a web comic, thereby emulating two of Whedon's media. Students should practice pitching their ideas (using Keynote, Prexi, PowerPoint, or related platforms), with others providing critical responses. Then, they will draft a script using trelby.org (or Final Draft if one's university or college provides computers with it downloaded). For those who want to turn the script into a short film, Lynda.com and other sites provide advice on using iMovie. Students are encouraged to watch *Tangerine* (2015) to see the potential of filming a queer movie with smartphones. If a group instead chooses to make a web comic, it might either (1) draw, scan, and post on a webcomic hosting platform or (2) compose digitally and post directly on a webcomic hosting platform. After the creative, constructive phase is complete, students should write reflective responses to their work critiquing its production and content. This will help cultivate the reflexive habit of metacognitive deconstruction and critique that should accompany creative and associative work.

[26] At the conclusion of the course, the instructor's final assessment will reflect an evaluation of (1) students' degree of active engagement with course concepts as measured by tracking attendance, participation, comprehension throughout the course, (2) their ability to critically analyze the features and functions of genres through engagement with Whedon's works, as represented in particular by their short paper, and (3) their efforts to apply their knowledge of critical world-making in their digital or multimedia composition. Successful participation in the course will not necessarily produce great art, but it will display the gradual cultivation of the habit of recursive or "metacognitive" self-reflection, which is the hallmark of critical thinking, and an effort to build connections among course concepts, examples, and past knowledge and experience.

---

## Appendix 1: Fantasizing Phlebotinum – Worldview-making Worksheet

**Ontological (What exists? What is real? What kinds of beings, forces, and things are there?)** What are the levels of reality? Are there beings, forces, or things that are supernatural? Think about their biology, the rules that govern their properties and activities, their spiritual nature, their personalities and relationships, whether they are mild or dangerous, good or evil (but also think about more complex or ambiguous relationships than clear binaries and dualisms), and what functions, powers, and limits they have. Make little stories about them. Notice that beings like gods may embody issues like ideal family structure, economic and political systems, and anthropology. They may suggest the validity of or problems with social hierarchies or racial and sexual essentialism. The degree to which levels of reality or kinds of beings interact should also be considered.

**Cosmological (Where do we come from? Where are we going?)** Make or adapt a simple story of the origin of the cosmos. How did it develop? Think not only about the *actual* history, but also about how it might be told differently by different people. What are

important locations, natural and made? What are important times? Try to make up stories for these. What do people expect, hope, or fear will happen? Make an alternate version.

**Epistemological (What is true? How do we know?)** What are the sources of knowledge in your world? For example, sources could include texts, songs, stories, and experts of various types. What is unknown, unexplained, or unexplainable? Note that faith seems to be possible only when certain knowledge is not present. What degrees or kinds of knowledge are there? Describe how people learn what is true. How does this relate to your ontology? Are certain kinds of knowledge or ways of getting it better than others? What knowledge is forbidden or esoteric? How are valued things represented and thereby known? How does the style and medium of representation shape the knowledge?

**Axiological (What should we value? What is good?)** Make or adapt a story about a value (for example, a kind of being, a state (such as health, happiness, or courage), a location, a practice, the elimination of a practice, a time, etc.). Then make another, competing story about a different value. What are some negative aspects of the value or ideal? Do people worship a kind of being (e.g., deities) or pick a specific member of that class of beings, or does worship matter at all? Who decides what is worthwhile? What is trivial or unimportant?

**Praxeological (What should we do?)** Relate correct behavior to the different kinds of beings, forces, and objects—how should different kinds of things relate to each other? What practices accomplish basic life functions: food acquisition and preparation, warfare, building, commerce, and so on. Invent a ritual or custom (e.g., foodway, song, dance, way of dressing, posture or movement, saying, gift-giving and charity, prayer, curses, object-making, etc.), perhaps related to a certain time, place, practice, state of body or mind, event, or other value. Turn this into a story. How did it change over time? How might someone disagree? How costly is the practice? What does it demand of someone? How might the ritual be different in a different place? How might it affirm a value or repeat (or foretell) a cosmological event? Who knows the correct ways of doing things and keeps track of whether they are done correctly? How free or constrained are beings to do or not do what they ought?

*Go back through and try to think of ways to link these categories further given the details and stories you have started. Develop a theory of religion applicable to your world*.

## References


Adorno, T. W., & Bernstein, J. M. (2001). *The culture industry: Selected essays on mass culture*. London; New York: Routledge.

Albanese, C. L. (2013). *America, religions, and religion*. Australia: Thomson/Wadsworth.

Amy-Chinn, D. (2005). Queering the bitch: Spike, transgression and erotic empowerment. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 8(3), 313-328.

Battis, J. (2005). *Blood relations: Chosen families in Buffy, the vampire slayer and Angel.* Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland.

Bawarshi, A. S., & Reiff, M. J. (2010). *Genre: An introduction to history, theory, research, and pedagogy*. West Lafayette, Indiana: Parlor Press.
Bazerman, C., Bonini, A., & Figueiredo, D. de C. (2009). *Genre in a changing world*. West Lafayette, Indiana: Parlor Press.
Benshoff, H. M. (1997). *Monsters in the closet: Homosexuality and the horror film*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Boulware, T. (2013). "I made me": Queer theory, subjection, and identity in Dollhouse. *Slayage: The journal of the Whedon Studies Association*, 10.1 (35).
Buckman, A. R. (2008). "Much madness is divinest sense": Firefly's "big damn heroes" and little witches. In R. Wilcox and T. R. Cochran (Eds.), *Investigating Firefly and Serenity: Science fiction on the frontier*. New York: I.B. Tauris.
Bunn, M. (2010). How to read like a writer. In C. Lowe & P. Zemliansky (Eds.), *Writing spaces: Readings on writing*. Anderson, South Carolina: Parlor Press.
Bush, S. S. (2014). *Visions of religion: experience, meaning, and power*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Butler, J. (2006). *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York: Routledge.
Call, L. (2012). *BDSM in American science fiction and fantasy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Campbell, H., & Grieve, G. P. (Eds.). (2014). *Playing with religion in digital games*. Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press.
Campbell, J. (2004). *The hero with a thousand faces*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Card, O. S., Athans, P., & Lake, J. (2013). *Writing fantasy & science fiction: How to create out-of-this-world novels and short stories*. Cincinnatti, Ohio : Writer's Digest Books.
Carroll, L. B. (2010). Backpacks vs. briefcases: Steps toward rhetorical analysis. In C. Lowe & P. Zemliansky (Eds.), *Writing spaces: Readings on writing*. Anderson, South Carolina: Parlor Press.
Carter, S. (2008). *The way literacy lives: Rhetorical dexterity and basic writing instruction*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Chambers, S. A. (2009). *The queer politics of television*. New York: I.B. Tauris.
Chickering, A. W., & Gamson, Z. F. (1991). *Applying the seven principles for good practice in undergraduate education*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, Inc.
Chidester, D. (2005). *Authentic fakes: Religion and American popular culture*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Collier, N. R., Lumadue, C. A., & Wooten, H. R. (2009). *Buffy, the vampire slayer and Xena: Warrior princess*: Reception of the texts by a sample of lesbian fans and web site users. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 56.5, 575-609.
Cox, J. I. (2013). *"Lovingly tweaked": Genre and gender in Joss Whedon's Dr. Horrible's sing-along blog* (M.A.). Colorado State University, United States – Colorado.
Cusack, C. M. (2010). *Invented religions: Imagination, fiction and faith*. Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate.
Cusack, C. M., & Kosnác, P. (Eds.). (2017). *Fiction, invention, and hyper-reality: From popular culture to religion*. New York: Routledge.
Dancyger, K., & Rush, J. (2002). *Alternative scriptwriting: successfully breaking the rules*. Boston, MA: Focal Press.

Daniels, S. E., & Walker, G. B. (2001). *Working through environmental conflict: the collaborative learning approach*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
Devitt, A. J. (2004). *Writing genres*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Dirk, K. (2010). Navigating genres. In C. Lowe & P. Zemliansky (Eds.), *Writing spaces: Readings on writing*. Anderson, South Carolina: Parlor Press.
Durkheim, E. (1995). *The elementary forms of religious life* (K. E. Fields, Trans.). New York: Free Press.
Dvoskin, M. G. (2010). *"Listen to the stories, hear it in the songs": Musical theatre as queer historiography* (Ph.D.). The University of Texas at Austin, United States – Texas.
Dvoskin, M. G. (2006). *Under their spell: How the musical episodes of Xena: Warrior princess and Buffy, the vampire slayer queer the audience* (M.A.). University of Texas – Austin, United States – Texas.
Erickson, G. (2008). Humanity in a "place of nothin'": Morality, religion, atheism, and possibility in *Firefly*. In R. Wilcox & T. R. Cochran (Eds.), *Investigating* Firefly *and* Serenity*: Science fiction on the frontier*. New York: I.B. Tauris,
Erzen, T. (2012). *Fanpire: The Twilight saga and the women who love it*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Fredrickson, N. (forthcoming). Designing a course integrating critical, genre-based pedagogy, horror literature, and religious studies. In M. A. Fabrizi (Ed.), *Horror literature and dark fantasy: Challenging genres*. Boston: Sense Publishers.
Fredrickson, N. (2016). Designing a course integrating critical pedagogy, fantasy literature, and religious studies. In M. A. Fabrizi (Ed.), *Fantasy literature: Challenging genres*. Boston: Sense Publishers.
Garrison, D. R., & Vaughan, N. D. (2013). *Blended learning in higher education: Framework, principles, and guidelines*. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass.
Gray, E. (2015). Writing "lesbian, gay-type lovers": Buffy, postmodern gothic and interruptions to the lesbian clichél In L. Piatti-Farnell & D. L. Brien (Eds.), *New directions in 21st-century gothic: the gothic compass*. New York: Routledge.
Hayles, K. (1999). *How we became posthuman: Virtual bodies in cybernetics, literature, and informatics*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
Heidegger, M. (1977). *The question concerning technology, and other essays*. New York: Garland Pub.
Hollywood, A. M. (2016). *Acute melancholia and other essays: Mysticism, history, and the study of religion*. New York : Columbia University Press.
Irvin, L. L. (2010). What is "academic" writing? In C. Lowe & P. Zemliansky (Eds.), *Writing spaces: Readings on writing*. Anderson, South Carolina: Parlor Press.
Jameson, F. (1991). *Postmodernism, or, The cultural logic of late capitalism*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Jarvis, C. (2016). Battle of the blockbusters: Joss Whedon as public pedagogue. *Slayage: The journal of Whedon studies*, 14.1 (43).
Jenkins, H. (2006). *Convergence culture: Where old and new media collide*. New York: New York University Press.
Jenkins, H. (2013). *Textual poachers: Television fans and participatory culture*. New York: Routledge.

Jobling, J. (2010). *Fantastic spiritualities: Monsters, heroes and the contemporary religious imagination*. New York: T & T Clark.
Keen, S. (2007). *Empathy and the novel.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kirsch, G. E., & Royster, J. J. (2010). Feminist rhetorical practices: In search of excellence. *College Composition and Communication*, 61.4, 640-672.
Koehler, M. J., & Mishra, P. (2009). What is technological pedagogical content knowledge? *Contemporary Issues in Technology and Teacher Education*, *9*(1), 60–70.
Koontz, K. (2008). *Faith and choice in the works of Joss Whedon*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Kreider, J. A., & Winchell, M. K. (2010). *Buffy in the classroom: Essays on teaching with the vampire slayer*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co.
Kukkonen, K., & Klimek, S. (2011). *Metalepsis in popular culture*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Lambert, J. (2006). *Digital storytelling cookbook*. Berkeley, California: Digital Diner Press.
Lavery, D. (2002). "A religion in narrative": Joss Whedon and television creativity. *Slayage: The online international journal of* Buffy *studies*, 2.3 (16).
Lavery, D., & Burkhead, C. (2011). *Joss Whedon: Conversations*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.
Lavoie, E. (2011). Sex, love and sadomasochism: Buffy/Spike as a queer relationship. *Watcher junior: The undergraduate journal of Whedon studies*, 6.2 (8).
Leary, C. (2011-2012). Meshing digital & academic identities in basic writing classrooms. *Basic Writing eJournal*, 10.1/11.1.
Lewis, C. S. (1959). *The allegory of love: A study in medieval tradition*. London: Oxford University Press.
Lipsett, J. (2012). "One for the horror fans" vs. "an insult to the horror genre": Negotiating reading strategies in IMDb reviews of The cabin in the woods. In K. Woofter & J. Stokes (Eds.), *"We are not who we are": Critical reflections on The cabin in the woods*, special issue of *Slayage: The journal of the Whedon Studies Association*, 10.2-11.1 (36-37).
Lunsford, A. (1999). Rhetoric, feminism, and the politics of textual ownership. *College English*, 61.5, 529-544.
Lunsford, A., & Ede, L. (1990). Rhetoric in a new key: Women and collaboration. *Rhetoric Review*, 8.2, 234-241.
Martin, J. (2010). Show, don't tell: Teaching the elements of film production. In J. A. Kreider & M. K. Winchell (Eds.), *Buffy in the classroom: Essays on teaching with the vampire slayer*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co.
Masson, C., & Stanley, M. (2006). Queer eye of that vampire guy: Spike and the aesthetics of camp. Buffy *and Aesthetics*. M. Pateman (Ed.), Special issue of *Slayage: The online international journal of Buffy studies*, 6.2 (22).
McCloud, S. (2006). *Making comics: Storytelling secrets of comics, manga and graphic novels*. New York: Harper.
McCracken, A. (2007). At stake: Angel's body, fantasy masculinity, and queer desire in teen television. In E. Levine & L. Parks (Eds.), *Undead TV: Essays on* Buffy the vampire slayer. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 116-144.

McLuhan, M. (2003). *Understanding media: the extensions of man*. Corte Madera, CA: Gingko Press.
Michaelsen, L. K., Knight, A. B., & Fink, L. D. (2002). *Team-based learning: A transformative use of small groups*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
Mills, A, Morehead, J., & Parker, R. (Eds.). (2013). *Joss Whedon and religion: Essays on an angry atheist's explorations of the sacred.* Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Money, M. A. (2008). *Firefly*'s "out of gas": Genre echoes and the hero's journey. In R. Wilcox & T. R. Cochran (Eds.), *Investigating Firefly and Serenity: Science fiction on the frontier*. New York: I.B. Tauris.
Muñoz, J. E. (2009). *Cruising utopia: The then and there of queer futurity*. New York: New York University Press.
Nünning, V., Nünning, A., & Neumann, B. (2010). *Cultural ways of worldmaking: Media and narratives*. New York: De Gruyter.
Palmer, L. (2008). Ruby red and emerald green: The queer demon diva of my dreams. *Camera Obscura*, 23, 194-199.
Pateman, M. (2017). Brand Whedon, feminism, and the damage done. *Pateman's ponderings—the musings of Matthew Pateman.* Retrieved from patemanponders.blogspot.com.
Patterson, A., Hancock, N., & Reid, L. (2014). Encouraging digital dexterity in basic writers. *Kairos: A journal of rhetoric, technology, and pedagogy, 18,* 2.
Polhemus, R. M. (1990). *Erotic faith: Being in love from Jane Austen to D.H. Lawrence*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Possamai, A. (2005). *Religion and popular culture: A hyper-real testament*. New York: P.I.E.-Peter Lang.
Possamai, A. (Ed.). (2012). *Handbook of hyper-real religions*. Leiden: Brill.
Puar, J. K. (2007). *Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Robinson, T. (2011). The Onion A.V. Club interview with Joss Whedon. In D. Lavery & C. Burkhead (Eds.), *Joss Whedon: Conversations*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.
Royster, J. J., & Kirsch, G. (2012). *Feminist rhetorical practices: New horizons for rhetoric, composition, and literacy studies*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Santana, R. W., & Erickson, G. (2016). *Religion and popular culture: Rescripting the sacred*. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc.
Sedgwick, E. K. (1993). *Tendencies*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Selfe, C. L. (1985). An emerging rhetoric of collaboration: Computers, collaboration, and the composing process. *Collegiate microcomputer*, 4(4), 289-294.
Silberman, M. L. (1996). *Active learning: 101 strategies to teach any subject*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Smith, J. Z. (1978). *Map is not territory: Studies in the history of religions*. Leiden: Brill.
Sommers, N., & Saltz, L. (2004). The novice as expert: Writing the freshman year. *College composition and communication*, *56*(1), 124–149.
Spicer, A. (2002). "Love's bitch but man enough to admit it": Spike's hybridized gender. *Slayage: The online international journal of Buffy studies*, 2.3 (7).
Starr, M. (2013-2014). Whedon's great glass elevator: Space, liminality, and intertext in The cabin in the woods (2012). In K. Woofter & J. Stokes (Eds.), "*We are not who we*

*are": Critical reflections on* The cabin in the woods. Special issue of *Slayage: The journal of the Whedon Studies Association*, 10.2-11.1 (36-37).
Stevenson, G. (2003). *Televised morality: The case of* Buffy the Vampire Slayer. Lanham: Hamilton Books, University Press of America.
Strongman, R. (2008). Transcorporeality in Vodou. *Journal of Haitian studies*, *14*(2), 4–29.
Taves, A. & Asprem, E. (forthcoming). Scientific worldview studies: A programmatic proposal. In Petersen, A. K., Gilhus, I. S., Martin, L. H., Jensen, J. S. & Sørensen, J. (Eds.), *A new synthesis: Cognition, evolution, and history in the study of religion*. Leiden: Brill.
Taves, A., & Fredrickson, N. (2017). Visions of Religion: Experience, Meaning, and Power, by Stephen S. Bush, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, xi + 259 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-938740-3, $78 (hardcover). *Religion, 47,* 1.
Tweed, T. A. (2006). *Crossing and dwelling: A theory of religion*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Warschauer, M. (2003). *Technology and social inclusion: Rethinking the digital divide*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Weaver, R. (2013). Apocalypse now and again: The apocalyptic paradigm and the meaning of life and (un)death in Buffy the vampire slayer. In A. R. Mills, J. W. Morehead, & J. R. Parker (Eds.), *Joss Whedon and religion: Essays on an angry atheist's explorations of the sacred*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Wilcox, R. V. (2015). Whedon, Browncoats, and the Big Damn Narrative: The unified meta-myth of *Firefly* and *Serenity*. In J. P. Telotte and Gerald Duchovnay (Eds.), *Science fiction double feature: The science fiction film as cult text*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Wilcox, R. V., & Cochran, T. R. (2008). *Investigating Firefly and Serenity: Science fiction on the frontier*. New York: I.B. Tauris.
Wilcox, R. V., & Cochran, T. R. (2008). "Good myth": Joss Whedon's further worlds. In R. V. Wilcox & T. R. Cochran (Eds.), *Investigating Firefly and Serenity: Science fiction on the frontier*. New York: I.B. Tauris.
Williamson, J. (2014). *Storyworld first: creating a unique fantasy world for your novel*. Hillsboro, OR: MacGregor Literary, Inc.
Willis, V. (2014). Joining the Evil League of Evil: The rhetoric of posthuman negotiation in *Dr. Horrible's Sing-Along Blog*. In R. V. Wilcox, T. R. Cochran, C. Masson, and D. Lavery (Eds.), *Reading Joss Whedon*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
Wysocki, A. F. (2004). *Writing new media: Theory and applications for expanding the teaching of composition*. Logan: Utah State University Press.
Yuretich, R. F. (2003). Encouraging critical thinking: Measuring skills in large introductory science classes. *Journal of college science teaching*, *33*(3), 40–45.