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SHOULD WE TRUST A BLACK BOX TO
SAFEGUARD HUMAN RIGHTS?
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AI GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT

The race to take advantage of the numerous economic, security, and social opportunities made possible by artificial intelligence (AI) is on—with states, intergovernmental organizations, cities, and firms publishing an array of AI strategies. Simultaneously, there are various efforts to identify and distill an array of AI norms. Thus far, there has been limited effort to mine existing AI strategies to see whether common AI norms such as transparency, human-centered design, accountability, awareness, and public benefit are entering into these strategies. Such data is vital to identify areas of convergence and divergence that could highlight opportunities for further norm development in this space by crystallizing State practice.

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This Article analyzes more than forty existing national AI strategies paying particular attention to the US context, comparing those strategies with private-sector efforts, and addressing common criticisms of this process within a polycentric framework. Our findings support the contention that State practices are converging around certain AI principles, focusing primarily upon public benefit. AI is a critical component of international peace, security, and sustainable development in the twenty-first century, and as such, reaching consensus on AI governance will become vital to help build bridges and trust.

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INTRODUCTION

The race to take full advantage of the economic, social, strategic, and political opportunities made possible by artificial intelligence (AI) is picking up pace.¹ From using AI to diagnose COVID-19 by listening to speech patterns,² and tracking the spread of the pandemic,³ to designing the next generation of smart weapons,⁴ jurisdictions from small towns to states are strategizing how to best make use of AI. The stakes are high with varying approaches to harness this technology being attempted around the world.⁵ The winner(s) will enjoy not only a massive first mover advantage, but also potential AI dominance for years or even decades to come. As Russia's Vladimir Putin proclaimed: "Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world."⁶

Although such sentiments may turn out to be alarmist hyperbole,⁷ the race to take advantage of the numerous economic, security, and social opportunities made possible by AI is real as states, inter-governmental organizations, cities, and private firms publish an array of AI strategies. Simultaneously, there are various efforts being made

1. See, e.g., Bernard Marr, *What Is the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning?*, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/12/06/what-is-the-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/#69101912742b> [<https://perma.cc/7ENN-ZQ4L>] (noting that "[A]rtificial Intelligence is the broader concept of machines being able to carry out tasks in a way that we would consider 'smart' . . . [while] Machine Learning is a current application of AI based around the idea that we should really just be able to give machines access to data and let them learn for themselves.").

2. See, e.g., Aaron Holmes, *Do I Sound Sick to You? Researchers Are Building AI That Would Diagnose COVID-19 by Listening to People Talk*, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 30, 2020), <https://www.businessinsider.com/ai-labs-diagnose-covid-19-voice-listening-talk-2020-4> [<https://perma.cc/UKJ4-ULT9>].

3. See, e.g., Thomas Macaulay, *AI Model Predicts the Coronavirus Pandemic Will End in December*, NEXT WEB (Apr. 29, 2020), <https://thenextweb.com/neural/2020/04/29/ai-model-predicts-the-coronavirus-pandemic-will-end-in-december/> [<https://perma.cc/3WTC-52HV>].

4. See, e.g., Gordon Cooke, *Magic Bullets: The Future of Artificial Intelligence in Weapons Systems*, U.S. ARMY (June 11, 2019), https://www.army.mil/article/223026/magic_bullets_the_future_of_artificial_intelligence_in_weapons_systems [<https://perma.cc/5UAG-4QJT>]; Kris Osborn, *The U.S. Army's Next Generation of Super Weapons Are Coming*, NAT'L INTEREST (Sept. 16, 2019), <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/us-armys-next-generation-super-weapons-are-coming-80886> [<https://perma.cc/3C6Y-M9LC>].

5. See Adrian Pecotic, *Whoever Predicts the Future Will Win the AI Arms Race*, FOREIGN POL'Y (Mar. 5, 2019, 11:11 AM), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/whoever-predicts-the-future-correctly-will-win-the-ai-arms-race-russia-china-united-states-artificial-intelligence-defense/> [<https://perma.cc/G8UJ-MEAP>].

6. *Id.*

7. See, e.g., Eric Siegel, *The Media's Coverage of AI Is Bogus*, SCI. AM. (Nov. 20, 2019), <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-medias-coverage-of-ai-is-bogus/> [<https://perma.cc/FP2L-J6E8>].

to identify and distill AI norms with an eye toward developing a code of conduct and avoiding some of the most destabilizing outcomes.⁸ Thus far, there has not been an effort to mine existing AI strategies for common AI norms such as transparency, accountability, security, privacy, fairness, human-centered design, and public benefit, or to analyze how these norms are being operationalized through national and local policies. Such data is vital to identify areas of convergence and divergence that could, highlight opportunities for further norm development in this space by crystallizing State practice. This Article makes an original contribution by analyzing more than forty existing national AI strategies and addressing common criticisms of this process within a polycentric framework. It is the first attempt to analyze AI strategies and norm building through such a comparative lens. Since AI is a critical component of both international peace and security and sustainable development in the twenty-first century, reaching consensus on AI governance will become vital to help build bridges, and trust.

The Article is structured as follows: Part I unpacks the role of states in AI governance, tracking parallels between Internet governance and national cybersecurity strategies, with a focus on the US National AI Strategy. Part II analyzes AI strategies from both the public and private sectors paying particular attention to how they treat the topics of transparency, accountability, human-centered design, awareness, and public benefit. Part III explores the implications of our findings for policymakers, assesses criticisms, and discusses necessary next steps to take in norm building for AI policy.

I. ROLE OF STATES IN AI GOVERNANCE

Just as no nation is an island in cyberspace, it can also be said that no nation can insulate itself from the myriad impacts of AI. Indeed, nation states—along with cities and the private sector—are coming up with an array of strategies and principles on how best to harness the power of this coming wave to ensure that economies, militaries, and societies are ready when it does wash ashore. Part I focuses on the role of states in AI governance at a macro-level, beginning by juxtaposing this topic with related debates on the role of the nation-state in Internet

8. See, e.g., Urs Gasser & Carolyn Schmitt, *The Role of Professional Norms in AI Governance: Some Observations and Outline of a Framework*, MEDIUM (Apr. 25, 2019), <https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/the-role-of-professional-norms-in-ai-governance-some-observations-and-outline-of-a-framework-3dc25dcd2bdc> [https://perma.cc/QWL7-UQV2].

governance and cybersecurity strategy in order to provide a foundation for comparative analysis.

A. Parallels with Internet Governance and Cybersecurity Strategies

As with AI governance, there has been increasing interest on the part of states seeking to control cyberspace. A growing list of countries practice “cyber sovereignty,” a state-centric approach to Internet governance in which nations are the primary stakeholders, making decisions over the operations of their perceived slice of the global Internet;⁹ already, it has been reported that “two-thirds of all internet users [are] currently subjected to some degree of censorship of criticism aimed at the government, military, or ruling families.”¹⁰ Indeed, rather than degrading the idea of Westphalian sovereignty, in some ways cyberspace has given regimes around the world new tools to control restive populations through an array of cyber sovereignty campaigns and applications with profound implications for human rights.¹¹ This wave of interest, which is being propounded by a range of authoritarian governments, including China through its Belt and Road Initiative,¹² seeks to “rewrite the rules of the Internet” by deepening and widening the role of states in Internet governance, as compared to the big-tent multi-stakeholder approach favored throughout the history of cyberspace.¹³ These competing visions of Internet governance, including the extent to which states will play a central or coordinating role, remain unresolved, although recent conferences since 2014 in Brazil, South Korea, and New York highlight ongoing support for the multi-stakeholder status quo.¹⁴

9. For an analysis of the Chinese approach to cyber sovereignty, see Scott J. Shackelford & Frank Alexander, *China's Cyber Sovereignty: Paper Tiger or Rising Dragon?*, ASIA & THE PAC. POL'Y F. (Jan. 12, 2018), <https://www.policyforum.net/chinas-cyber-sovereignty/> [https://perma.cc/ZZ2G-XUP7].

10. Andrea Little Limbago, Commentary, *China's Global Charm Offensive*, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Aug. 28, 2017), <https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/chinas-global-charm-offensive/> [https://perma.cc/F9T5-PQAJ].

11. See EVGENY MOROZOV, *THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM* 100 (2011). For more on this topic, see generally SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, *GOVERNING NEW FRONTIERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE: TOWARD CYBER PEACE* (2020).

12. See Samm Sacks, *Beijing Wants to Rewrite the Rules of the Internet*, ATL. (June 18, 2018), <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/zte-huawei-china-trump-trade-cyber/563033/> [https://perma.cc/8SWS-VTA8].

13. See generally Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, *Beyond the New “Digital Divide”: Analyzing the Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity*, 50 STAN. J. INT'L L. 119, 121–22 (2014) (discussing the history of Internet governance and its cybersecurity implications).

14. See *id.*; Scott J. Shackelford, Enrique Oti, Jaclyn A. Kerr, Elaine Korzak & Andreas Kuehn, *Back to the Future of Internet Governance?*, 16 GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 83 (2015).

The race to develop effective AI strategies mirrors in many ways similar efforts to devise national cybersecurity strategies, which began in the early 2000s and have since rapidly picked up speed with more than seventy states publishing such strategies as of April 2020.¹⁵ Previous work assessed how these strategies compare by considering their treatment of human rights,¹⁶ along with cybercrime, critical infrastructure protection, and governance.¹⁷ Among other things, this previous research highlighted the extent to which states are considering these issues through the lens of national security priorities, which may also be seen in the United States approach to AI strategy.

B. Assessing the United States's National AI Strategy

The foundations of the United States's AI strategy largely developed under the Obama administration in 2016, when the White House launched a series of workshops and a subcommittee on Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence.¹⁸ These efforts led to the publication of three reports: *The National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan*;¹⁹ *Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy*;²⁰ and *Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence*.²¹ *Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence* surveyed the state of AI at the time, its potential applications and uses, explored multiple regulatory, policy, and governance issues related to AI, and made over twenty recommendations for future actions.²²

15. See *Cyber Security Strategies*, NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, <https://cdcoe.org/library/strategy-and-governance/?category=cyber-security-strategies> [https://perma.cc/5ZLS-YXB7].

16. See generally Scott J. Shackelford, *Should Cybersecurity Be a Human Right? Exploring the 'Shared Responsibility' of Cyber Peace*, 55 STAN. J. INT'L L. 155 (2019).

17. See generally Scott J. Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, *Toward a State-Centric Cyber Peace?: Analyzing the Role of National Cybersecurity Strategies in Enhancing Global Cybersecurity*, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 895 (2015).

18. Ed Felten & Terah Lyons, *The Administration's Report on the Future of Artificial Intelligence*, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 12, 2016, 6:02 AM), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/10/12/administrations-report-future-artificial-intelligence> [https://perma.cc/Y5XD-Q47P].

19. See Lynne E. Parker, *Creation of the National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan*, 39 AI MAG. 26 (2018).

20. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE ECONOMY (2016), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.PDF> [https://perma.cc/8MQG-YQUH].

21. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL & OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL'Y, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 48 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FAK-AFYJ]; accord Alan Bundy, *Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence*, 32 AI & SOC'Y 285 (2017).

22. See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, *supra* note 21, at

The report titled *AI, Automation, and the Economy*,²³ was drafted as a follow up that broadly forecasted the effects of AI on the US economy and workforce.²⁴ It made recommendations in three broad categories: (1) maximizing the beneficial applications of AI; (2) training the workforce for jobs of the future; and (3) finding ways to assist workers in workforce transitions.²⁵ Relatedly, some have argued that the federal government still lacks a clear understanding of the capabilities of AI and its potential to affect various social and economic sectors including workforce impacts.²⁶

Finally, the *National AI Research and Development Strategic Plan* has received the most attention of the three reports and largely constitutes the core of the current National AI Initiative, which is designed to provide a “a coordinated program across the entire Federal government to accelerate AI research and application for the Nation’s economic prosperity and national security.”²⁷ The plan established seven broad priority areas for the United States government in relation to AI research and development.²⁸ It emphasized the role that the federal government plays in advancing research, development, and education activities in AI through fostering coordination and collaboration between stakeholders to leverage intellectual, physical, and digital resources.²⁹

In May 2018, the Trump administration held a summit on AI for American Industry³⁰ and put out a companion report emphasizing

40–42

23. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE ECONOMY, *supra* note 20.

24. *Id.*

25. *Id.* at 3–4.

26. See Justin Sherman, *Why the U.S. Needs a National Artificial Intelligence Strategy*, WORLD POL. REV. (Mar. 14, 2019), <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27642/why-the-u-s-needs-a-national-artificial-intelligence-strategy> [<https://perma.cc/4LY4-NC2H>].

27. NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVE, <https://www.ai.gov/> (last visited Nov. 3, 2021). See also P. JONATHON PHILLIPS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FOUR PRINCIPLES OF EXPLAINABLE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2020), <https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2020/08/17/NIST%20Explainable%20AI%20Draft%20NISTIR8312%20%281%29.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/EVB7-2HTM>] (discussing explainable AI).

28. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL ET AL., THE NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN 3–4 (2016), https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf [<https://perma.cc/EA89-R5Q3>] (listing seven priority areas: (1) making long-term investments in AI research; (2) developing effective methods for human-AI collaboration; (3) understanding and addressing the ethical, legal, and societal implications of AI; (4) ensuring the safety and security of AI systems; (5) developing shared public datasets and environments for AI training and testing; (6) measuring and evaluating AI technologies through standard benchmarks; and (7) better understanding the national AI R&D workforce needs.).

29. *Id.*

30. *White House Summit on AI for American Industry*, THE WHITE HOUSE (2018), <https://>

the administration's support of private sector led development of AI technologies.³¹ In the report, the White House announced plans to open data sources for private companies to train AI technologies while also working within government to speed up the adoption of AI technologies in public services.³² Soon after, the White House also released a short white paper and accompanying website titled *Artificial Intelligence for the American People* outlining the Trump administration's priorities for AI which included: (1) prioritizing funding for AI research, (2) removing regulatory barriers to the deployment of AI technologies, (3) training the future workforce, (4) achieving strategic military advantage, (5) leveraging AI government services, and (6) leading international AI negotiations.³³ These efforts were followed by an AI Summit in September 2019 that explored the use of AI in government.³⁴

In February 2019, the Trump administration issued an executive order launching the American AI Initiative.³⁵ Though the executive order and the Initiative suggest that the federal government plays an important role in promoting AI Research and Development, the American AI Initiative also calls for US companies to "drive technological breakthroughs in AI across the federal government, industry, and academia in order to promote scientific discovery, economic competitiveness, and national security."³⁶ The American AI Initiative was accompanied by a 2019 update of the previously published National AI Research and Development Strategic Plan.³⁷ The updated plan slightly adjusts the seven policy priorities of the Obama R&D strategy and adds public-private partnership as an eighth priority. This eighth priority calling for public-private partnerships continued the trend of the administration largely supporting development of AI being led by the private sector.³⁸ This is an important

trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/ai/executive-order-ai/ [https://perma.cc/LXR6-PDUV].

31. See THE WHITE HOUSE & OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL'Y, SUMMARY OF THE 2018 WHITE HOUSE SUMMIT ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICAN INDUSTRY (2018), <https://www.nitrd.gov/nitrdgroups/images/2/23/Summary-Report-of-White-House-AI-Summit.pdf>.

32. *Id.*

33. See *Artificial Intelligence for the American People*, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 10, 2018), <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/ai/> [https://perma.cc/LXR6-PDUV].

34. See THE WHITE HOUSE & OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL'Y, SUMMARY OF THE 2019 WHITE HOUSE SUMMIT ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN GOVERNMENT (2019), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Summary-of-White-House-Summit-on-AI-in-Government-September-2019.pdf> [https://perma.cc/R4G-F93M].

35. Exec. Order No. 13859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019).

36. *Id.*

37. See SELECT COMM. ON A.I., NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN: 2019 UPDATE (2019), <https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/National-AI-RD-Strategy-2019.pdf> [https://perma.cc/6TR8-7LJ5].

38. See Darell West, *Assessing Trump's Artificial Intelligence Executive Order*,

contrast when comparing the United States's strategic approach to AI to that of other countries (particularly China).³⁹

In summary, when speaking of the US AI strategy, analysts are usually referring to the American AI Initiative, updates to the AI R&D Strategic Plan, and the brief AI for the American People report.⁴⁰ The US strategy, however, remains limited in scope and detail. Some time-lines are given within the executive order discussed above,⁴¹ but actual commitments are scarce, that is, the strategy does not currently include any new funding.⁴² Rather the initiative calls for the Office of Management and Budget to prioritize existing funding for AI research, and President Trump's FY2020 budget included nearly \$1 billion in funding for non-defense AI R&D. Furthermore, the President's budget request also called for increased investment in AI specifically, but decreased funding for federal research and development overall.⁴³ The FY2021 budget request maintains the same trend in increasing funding for AI while decreasing R&D funding overall.⁴⁴ There are concerns that other governments, particularly China, are far outspending the United States.⁴⁵ Government figures for China are hard to pinpoint, but in comparison, the City Government of Shanghai alone plans to invest \$15 billion on AI research and development over the next ten years.⁴⁶ In short, the US AI strategy, in its current state lacks a clear timeline, measurable milestones, or sufficient funding and thus provides the Biden administration with fruitful ground for further engagement.

BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 12, 2019), <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/02/12/assessing-trumps-artificial-intelligence-executive-order/> [<https://perma.cc/U3ZH-2XPH>].

39. See Kai-Fu Lee, *The Great AI Duopoly*, 36 NEW PERSPS. Q. 27, 27–28 (2019).

40. Despite the aforementioned diverging views on whether the United States has what can effectively be deemed a strategy or whether the United States is doing enough in this area, the National AI Initiative refers to itself as the United States National Strategy. See *Artificial Intelligence for the American People*, *supra* note 33.

41. See Exec. Order No. 13859, *supra* note 35.

42. *Id.*

43. See generally OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (2019) (discussing budget priorities, including with regards to AI).

44. See JOHN F. SARGENT JR., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46341, FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) FUNDING: FY 2021, at 3, 12 (2020), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R46341.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/CB3K-V962>].

45. See THOMAS J. COLVIN ET AL., INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES SCI. & TECH. POL'Y INST., A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE R&D iii (2020), <https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/a/ab/a-brief-examination-of-chinese-government-expenditures-on-artificial-intelligence-r-and-d/d-12068.ashx> [<https://perma.cc/A2KC-NDHQ>].

46. See Daniel Ren, *Shanghai Aims to Raise US\$15 Billion in Funds to Gain an Upper Hand in AI Development*, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 5, 2018, 6:03 AM), <https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2153792/shanghai-aims-raise-us15b-funds-gain-upper-hand-ai-development> [<https://perma.cc/3K3R-VJBT>].

To fully assess the state of the US AI strategy, however, given the degree of decentralized policymaking, it is helpful to also consider developments in the US Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and state and local governments.

1. Department of Defense Strategy and Investment in AI

The day after the release of the executive order discussed above, the US Department of Defense (DoD) released its own AI strategy.⁴⁷ The DoD AI Strategy outlines four strategic focus areas: (1) delivering AI-enabled capabilities that address key missions; (2) partnering with leading private sector technology companies, academia, and global allies; (3) cultivating a leading AI workforce; and (4) leading in military ethics and AI safety.⁴⁸ Central to the DoD strategy is the establishment of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Committee (JAIC) “to accelerate the delivery of AI-enabled capabilities, scale the Department-wide impact of AI, and synchronize DoD AI activities to expand Joint Force advantages.”⁴⁹ In 2018, the DoD pledged \$2 billion through 2023 on AI research and development through the Defense Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA) in support of its AI strategy.⁵⁰ These funds are in addition to ongoing R&D funding and do not include classified projects,⁵¹ while the past several National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAs) have included multiple sections dealing directly with AI.⁵²

As required by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), RAND was contracted as an independent auditor to assess the state of the DoD’s AI efforts and its ability to scale. RAND’s report found that the DoD strategy lacked “baselines and metrics in conjunction with its AI vision” and that the JAIC lacked the visibility and

47. See Terri Moon Cronk, *DOD Unveils Its Artificial Intelligence Strategy*, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 12 2019), <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1755942/dod-unveils-its-artificial-intelligence-strategy/> [<https://perma.cc/8XEV-R5D9>].

48. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY: HARNESSING AI TO ADVANCE OUR SECURITY AND PROSPERITY 11–16 (2019), <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF> [<https://perma.cc/VYS9-V2YW>].

49. *Id.* at 9.

50. See *DARPA Announces \$2 Billion Campaign to Develop Next Wave of AI Technologies*, DARPA (Sept. 7, 2018), <https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-09-07> [<https://perma.cc/Z7CY-JZCG>].

51. *Id.*

52. See “Artificial intelligence” Search Results, CONGRESS.GOV, <https://www.congress.gov/search?searchResultViewType=expanded&q={%22source%22:%22legislation%22,%22search%22:%22Artificial+intelligence%22,%22bill-status%22:%22law%22}> [<https://perma.cc/M33T-D6S2>].

authority to carry out its mission effectively.⁵³ In June 2020, following the RAND report, the DoD Inspector General also found that the DoD's strategic efforts were hindered by a lack of a clear organizational definition of AI, and thus lacked appropriate governance structures or consistent security controls.⁵⁴ The 2021 NDAA implements many of these recommendations, particularly bolstering the role of the JAIC.⁵⁵ The JAIC will focus on DOD-wide AI transformation, moving away from building products.⁵⁶ The Defense Authorization Act also included funding for a congressional National AI initiative. The topic of human rights is not discussed anywhere in these documents and initiatives, an omission that we unpack below.

2. US Congress

In August 2018, Congress established the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) as an independent bipartisan commission “to consider the methods and means necessary to advance the development of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the United States.”⁵⁷ The Commission now releases quarterly recommendations to Congress.⁵⁸ The first set of recommendations were released in the Key Considerations Report of July 2020, which did not discuss human rights concerns other than noting a general need to “advance ethical and responsible AI.”⁵⁹ Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has also called for the creation of a new federal agency that

53. See DANIELLE C. TARRAF ET AL., RAND CORP., *THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSTURE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS* 45 (2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html [<https://perma.cc/D5TR-5BAG>].

54. See INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., *AUDIT OF GOVERNANCE AND PROTECTION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DATA AND TECHNOLOGY* 8–10 (2020), <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/01/2002347967/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2020-098.PDF> [<https://perma.cc/U3PM-KG33>].

55. See Jackson Barnett, *Nearing Passage, the NDAA Is Full of AI and Cyber Policy Changes*, FEDSCOOP (Dec. 9, 2020), <https://www.fedscoop.com/ndaa-ai-house-law-cybersecurity-policy-changes/> [<https://perma.cc/2MV9-VKSW>].

56. See Jackson Barnett, *'JAIC 2.0' Moves Away From Building Products to Focus on DOD-Wide AI Transformation*, FEDSCOOP (Nov. 6, 2020), <https://www.fedscoop.com/jaic-2-0-moving-away-from-products-artificial-intelligence/> [<https://perma.cc/D8VG-E36Z>].

57. THE NAT'L SEC. COMM'N ON A.I., <https://www.nscai.gov/> [<https://perma.cc/LK7H-SAW5>]; see Bert Chapman, *Literature Review: How U.S. Government Documents Are Addressing the Increasing National Security Implications of Artificial Intelligence*, 11 J. ADVANCED MIL. STUD. 209, 212–13 (2020).

58. THE NAT'L SEC. COMM'N ON A.I., *supra* note 57.

59. See THE NAT'L SEC. COMM'N ON A.I., *KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT & FIELDING OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE* 5 (2020), <https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Key-Considerations-for-Responsible-Development-Fielding-of-AI.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/6P6U-LU4H>].

would invest an additional \$100 billion over five years on basic research in AI, but as of this writing the legislation has not been advanced.⁶⁰

The Congressional Artificial Intelligence Caucus was launched in 2017.⁶¹ It is currently chaired by Pete Olson (R, TX-22) and Jerry McNerney (D, CA-09).⁶² Its members have supported and introduced multiple house bills on AI.⁶³ The Senate Artificial Intelligence Caucus was launched in March 2019 after the introduction of the Trump administration's National AI Initiative.⁶⁴ The bipartisan caucus is led by Senators Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) and Rob Portman (R-Ohio).⁶⁵ The National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act and the National AI Research Resource Task Force Act were both included in the FY2021 Defense Authorization Act, which increased funding for AI R&D and use across government.

3. State and Local Developments

Multiple states have created AI taskforces, including New York,⁶⁶ Vermont,⁶⁷ and Washington.⁶⁸ At a city level, many municipalities have incorporated AI into their smart city strategies and plans. Stockton, California was the first city in the United States to release a strategy specifically focused on AI and the future of work and is currently running a well-publicized Universal Basic Income Trial for 500 residents as one potential policy response to the disruptions caused by AI.⁶⁹ Stud-

60. See Sebastian Moss, *Senator Schumer Proposes New US Government Agency With \$100bn AI Budget*, DCD (Nov. 6, 2019), <https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/senator-schumer-proposes-new-us-government-agency-100bn-ai-budget/> [<https://perma.cc/BU24-K5BQ>].

61. See *Delaney Launches Bipartisan Artificial Intelligence (AI) Caucus for 115th Congress*, CONG. A.I. CAUCUS (May 24, 2017), <https://artificialintelligencecaucus-olson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/delaney-launches-ai-caucus> [<https://perma.cc/EGM2-PHMV>].

62. *Id.*

63. See, e.g., H.R. 6216, 116th Cong. (2020); FUTURE of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2020, H.R. 7559, 116th Cong. (2020); TRUST Act, H.R. 2575, 116th Cong. (2019).

64. See *Portman, Heinrich Launch Bipartisan Artificial Intelligence Caucus*, ROB PORTMAN (Mar. 13, 2019), <https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-heinrich-launch-bipartisan-artificial-intelligence-caucus> [<https://perma.cc/F8MW-4Y3D>].

65. *Id.*

66. See Albert Fox Cahn, *The First Effort to Regulate AI Was a Spectacular Failure*, FAST Co. (Nov 26, 2019), <https://www.fastcompany.com/90436012/the-first-effort-to-regulate-ai-was-a-spectacular-failure> [<https://perma.cc/9V35-Z5JE>].

67. See Grace Elleston, *As Artificial Intelligence Grows in Vermont, Task Force Mulls State Policies*, VTDIGGER (Nov. 10, 2019), <https://vtdigger.org/2019/11/10/as-artificial-intelligence-grows-in-vermont-task-force-mulls-state-policies/> [<https://perma.cc/T6DV-KZHE>].

68. See S.B. 5527, H.B. 1655, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019)

69. See Hannah Miller & Isak Nti Asare, *Why Every City Needs to Take Action on*

ies have indicated that AI-driven job displacement will have uneven effects on the US workforce and estimate that job displacements will be as high as 63 percent in some municipalities.⁷⁰ A handful of AI-related bills have similarly been introduced at state and local levels. California has been the most proactive US state by far in this vein, as seen in the 2018 California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the state's adoption of the Asilomar AI Principles.⁷¹

4. International Collaboration

The current federal US AI strategy calls to maintain US leadership in AI while increasing international collaboration. Though the authors of this piece acknowledge the prevalence of an “AI race” narrative, we think it important to consider the negative implications of such rhetoric. Stephen Cave and Sean ÓhÉigeartaigh, for example, have argued that the “AI race” narrative presents a multitude of risks including incentives to cut corners around AI ethics and safety.⁷² Furthermore, the AI-race narrative encourages competition, which may make international coordination and collaboration on norms and governance more difficult. Part II analyzes existing national AI strategies and demonstrates multiple areas of potential collaboration that the US government, particularly the Biden administration, could pursue in fostering international collaborative efforts. Part III makes a broader call for polycentric approaches to AI governance to better conceptualize the distributed governance structure in this domain. This Article highlights areas of convergence in international strategy documents that point toward the possibility of fostering collaborative efforts around AI governance and policymaking.

In June 2020, together with Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, the United States launched the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI).⁷³ The GPAI builds from the OECD AI recommendations that

AI, OXFORD INSIGHTS (Aug. 1, 2018), <https://www.oxfordinsights.com/insights/2018/8/1/why-every-city-needs-to-take-action-on-ai> [<https://perma.cc/5XVC-JCUS>].

70. *Id.*

71. See *State of California Endorses Asilomar AI Principles*, FUTURE OF LIFE INST. (Aug. 31, 2018), <https://futureoflife.org/2018/08/31/state-of-california-endorses-asilomar-ai-principles/> [<https://perma.cc/36NY-R5FH>].

72. See Stephen Cave & Seán S. ÓhÉigeartaigh, *An AI Race for Strategic Advantage: Rhetoric and Risks*, 2018 AAAI/ACM CONF. ON AI, ETHICS, & SOCIETY 36, 37 (2018).

73. See *Joint Statement From Founding Members of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence*, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (June 15, 2020), <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-from-founding-members-of-the-global-partnership-on-artificial-intelligence/> [<https://perma.cc/M48N-3CGN>].

the US signed and adopted in May 2019.⁷⁴ This development points to the desire among governments to collaborate around AI policy and governance, which likewise points to the contribution of the current Article. Identifying opportunities for norm creation based on current national AI initiatives is a necessary first step in establishing lasting international collaborative efforts to ensure the benefits of AI, including its impacts on human rights. The multi-stakeholder initiative has established multiple working groups around major themes such as responsible AI, the future of work, data governance, and industrialization and commercialization of AI technologies. These collaborative efforts are a positive development that should be fostered and expanded. The findings of the current paper should contribute to this end.

As argued by Kimberly Houser and Anjanette Raymond, AI development vastly benefits from being placed within a global community and viewed as a shared global good. They argue that to accomplish this, work needs to be done to foster collaborative communities and collective investment that can lead to the “betterment of mankind.”⁷⁵ This Article demonstrates that there are shared strategic goals and priorities among countries relating to AI, particularly around the areas relating to public benefit. This shared starting point can serve as the foundation to foster communities of trust and cooperative mindsets.

II. ANALYSIS OF AI STRATEGIES

This Part analyzes AI strategies to highlight areas of policy convergence and divergence that could lead to opportunities for norm development, and eventually customary international law. We begin by discussing the methodology utilized in this Article before moving on to analyze the dimensions surveyed.

A. Methodology

This Article makes an original contribution by conducting content analysis on more than forty existing national AI strategies. To limit the scope of this Article, we only analyzed national initiatives on AI similar to the US case study in Part I. Appendix 1 contains a list of the documents surveyed. Cross-national or regional strategies (e.g. the European Union’s AI Strategy) were excluded. Likewise, countries that have

74. See *OECD Principles on AI*, OECD (2019), <https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/> [<https://perma.cc/TMM3-EJD6>].

75. Kimberly A. Houser & Anjanette H. Raymond, *It is time to move beyond the ‘AI race’ narrative: Why investment and international cooperation must win the day*, 18 *Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.* 129, 129 (2021).

initiatives but no document at the time of publication were excluded. The UAE, for example, was the first country to appoint a Minister for Artificial Intelligence in government and has a website on its strategy,⁷⁶ but the policy document could not be found; it was, therefore, excluded from the analysis. Similarly, examples such as Kenya, which has established an AI taskforce but has yet to publish their findings, were likewise excluded. Countries with multiple national AI initiatives, policies, or strategy documents only had one representative publication included in the parsing and quantitative analysis so as not to skew the results.⁷⁷

We conducted both quantitative and qualitative comparative content analysis of each document. Content analysis is a flexible research methodology that has been widely used in several disciplines. Klaus Krippendorff defines content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.”⁷⁸ This method “uses analytical constructs or rules of inference to move from the text to the answers of the research questions.”⁷⁹ To this end, in our quantitative analysis, we equated the number of times that keywords were mentioned in the document as a rough proxy for the focus of the strategy.

This quantitative analysis allows for reproduction using different themes, keywords, or documents. It also permits the longitudinal study of emerging trends as new initiatives are published or old initiatives changed.

We selected the dimensions to be surveyed based on existing analyses of AI initiatives. We then built word lists based on existing literature on each theme. These word lists are included at the end of each subsection. In addition, Appendix 2 contains graphs reflecting how much each dimension is represented in each country surveyed, broken down by the number of times categorical keywords appear. Appendix 3 contains a breakdown of how often each specific keyword appears across the strategies and documents examined, organized by dimension.

76. See *UAE National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence 2031*, NAT'L PROG. FOR A.I., <https://ai.gov.ae/strategy/>.

77. In conducting the qualitative content analysis, we found that many of these additional texts were specialized in nature, for example focusing specifically on the future of work, ethics, or research development. We felt that their inclusion in the word parsing would skew the results and as such opted to exclude them, with the exception of the Consultation on the OPC's Proposals for ensuring appropriate regulation of artificial intelligence, which specifically examines Canada's approach to AI privacy laws. In total, twenty-seven national initiatives were analyzed using our word parser.

78. KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, *CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS METHODOLOGY* 18 (2012).

79. JULIAN LABOY, *FROM TAO TO PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BRIDGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST* 28 (2012).

Using these terms, we used a word parser to determine the relative percentages of each theme within each document. The documents sourced for this initiative come from various countries, and when available, we used a version written in English, and if this option was not available, we used an officially translated resource. The policy documents varied in word count, with the shortest document coming to 3,214 words, and the longest capping at 65,708 words. Some countries had multiple official AI policies, while most had a singular document. We have tracked the total word count of each term or set of terms as they appear in the collection of policies we studied to see if our word choice was effective. Next, to identify the AI governance priorities of study countries as well as the degree of priority convergence among these countries, we combined the word counts of all the documents and divided them into our chosen dimensions to see which dimensions were most prominent by percentage. This quantitative content analysis was supplemented by qualitative content analysis focusing on meaning, intentions, and policy context.

B. Dimensions Surveyed

This section summarizes the key findings across the seven dimensions surveyed in this study: transparency, accountability, security, privacy, fairness, human-centered design, and public benefit. Many of these dimensions include significant overlap with human rights issues and concerns,⁸⁰ as is discussed below.

1. Transparency

Transparency, which may be defined as “[o]penness; clarity; lack of guile and attempts to hide damaging information,”⁸¹ is commonly used in the context of financial disclosures and organizational policies and practices. When used in the context of AI, transparency has come to signify openness as it relates to a particular aspect of the AI, for example, transparency into the inner workings of artificial intelligence models.⁸² This transparency would ideally not only be apparent to system engineers, but also would be conveyed in such a way that all humans (including consumers) interacting with the AI will understand how information is used and how decisions are made.

80. See, e.g., Shackelford, *supra* note 16.

81. *Transparency*, INTERPARES TRUST, <https://interparestrust.org/terminology/term/transparency> [<https://perma.cc/TC2V-PLDL>].

82. See Catherine Yeo, *What is Transparency in AI?*, MEDIUM (May 20, 2020), <https://medium.com/fair-bytes/what-is-transparency-in-ai-bd08b2e901ac> [<https://perma.cc/Z3GP-FN6T>].

Transparent AI is often made analogous with explainable AI,⁸³ trustworthy AI,⁸⁴ responsible AI,⁸⁵ and vice-versa.⁸⁶ When discussing transparency in AI, scholars, analysts, and commentators often describe AI as a “black-box” due to the opaque or closed nature of many AI systems.⁸⁷ There is also some discussion in the literature on using transparent AI to counter data and algorithmic bias.⁸⁸ As seen in the Appendices, each of these terms and themes were captured in our word list.⁸⁹ Figure 1 highlights the prevalence across all documents of each of the terms reviewed.




Figure 1: Transparency Keyword Representation

83. A 2020 report by Deloitte said that “Transparent AI is explainable AI. It allows humans to see whether the models have been thoroughly tested and make sense, and that they can understand why particular decisions are made.” *A Call for Transparency and Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence*, DELOITTE (2020), <https://www2.deloitte.com/nl/nl/pages/innovatie/artikelen/a-call-for-transparency-and-responsibility-in-artificial-intelligence.html> [<https://perma.cc/ASF8-UXTU>].

84. See generally Irfan Saif & Beena Ammanath, ‘Trustworthy AI’ Is a Framework to Help Manage Unique Risk, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 25, 2020), <https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/25/950291/trustworthy-ai-is-a-framework-to-help-manage-unique-risk/> [<https://perma.cc/9PR2-EV8Z>].

85. See generally MIMI WHITEHOUSE, ACCENTURE, RESPONSIBLE AI: A FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING TRUST IN YOUR AI SOLUTIONS (2018), https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-132/Accenture-AFS-Responsible-AI-updated.pdf [<https://perma.cc/A3HF-TEXT>].

86. See, e.g., *Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI*, EUR. COMM’N (2019), <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai> [<https://perma.cc/Q54U-22GH>].

87. See Will Knight, *The Financial World Wants to Open AI’s Black Boxes*, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 13, 2017), <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604122/the-financial-world-wants-to-open-ais-black-boxes> [<https://perma.cc/8DM4-NMVV>].

88. See, e.g., Gregory S. Nelson, *Bias in Artificial Intelligence*, 80 N.C. MED. J. 220 (1998).

89. ‘Responsible AI’ and its cognates were removed from the word list due to the prevalence of false positives in the initial parsing. It can be argued that transparency overlaps and intersects with accountability which we have chosen to treat as a separate theme in our analysis.

We found that many of the strategies contain explicit statements on transparency. Uruguay's strategy, for example, states that "AI solutions used in the public sphere must be transparent" and that this transparency must: "[m]ake available the algorithms and data used for training the solution and its implementation, as well as the tests and validations performed [and] [e]xplicitly make visible, through active transparency mechanisms, all those processes that use AI"90 As this example indicates, some of the emphasis on transparency in these strategies focuses on the use of AI in government and in administering public services. Norway's AI strategy, for example, states explicitly that the government will "set requirements for transparency and accountability in new public administration systems in which AI is part of the solution."⁹¹ Italy's statement on the topic of transparency is similar.⁹²

Several countries emphasized the need for further R&D in creating transparent AI systems. The United States's strategy, for example, states: "To garner trust and confidence, AI technologies should be transparent in how they work and provide reasonable guarantees on the safety, security, robustness, and resiliency of their operation. Many existing AI systems, however, lack these characteristics due to unsolved technical hurdles that require further R&D."⁹³ Likewise, Lithuania's strategy maintains that "AI applications should be ethical, safe, reliable and transparent."⁹⁴ Though the principles of transparency and trustworthiness are espoused in many of the national initiatives, Finland notes that "it has yet to be specified what these principles mean in practice from the viewpoint of various actors and regulatory systems."⁹⁵ This

90. AGESIC & PRESIDENCIA, REPÚBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URU., *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY FOR THE DIGITAL GOVERNMENT* 9 (2019).

91. NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF LOC. GOV'T & MODERNISATION, *NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE* 28 (2020), https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/1feb5bb2c4fd4b7d92c67ddd353b6ae8/en-gb/pdfs/ki-strategi_en.pdf [<https://perma.cc/T5R9-HPCY>].

92. AGENCY FOR DIGIT. IT., *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AT THE SERVICE OF CITIZENS* 37 (2018), <https://ia.italia.it/assets/whitepaper.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/UVV9-PHH6>] ("The issue of the responsibility of public administration also has to do with the duties of the latter with respect to citizens, when it decides to provide them with services or to make decisions that concern them, using Artificial Intelligence solutions. The functioning of the latter must meet criteria of transparency and openness. Transparency becomes a fundamental prerequisite to avoid discrimination and solve the problem of information asymmetry, guaranteeing citizens the right to understand public decisions.").

93. THE WHITE HOUSE & OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL'Y, *AMERICAN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVE: YEAR ONE ANNUAL REPORT* 6 (2020), <https://www.nitrd.gov/nitrdgroups/images/c1/American-AI-Initiative-One-Year-Annual-Report.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/5NNT-USLN>].

94. MINISTRY OF THE ECON. & INNOVATION, *LITHUANIAN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY: A VISION OF THE FUTURE* 9 (2019), [https://eimin.lrv.lt/uploads/eimin/documents/files/DI_strategija_ENG\(1\).pdf](https://eimin.lrv.lt/uploads/eimin/documents/files/DI_strategija_ENG(1).pdf) [<https://perma.cc/ZRS3-DFEQ>].

95. MINISTRY OF ECON. AFFS. & EMP. OF FIN., *FINLAND'S AGE OF ARTIFICIAL*

presents a clear opportunity for international collaboration to define and establish clear frameworks for transparent AI. Defining and establishing a clear framework will almost certainly require an emphasis on public-private partnerships, which should deepen the opportunities and incentives for international cooperation.

There is a tension, particularly among those countries that position themselves primarily as users of AI technology (rather than creators of new solutions), between transparency and the use of proprietary solutions. Many strategies discuss the need to establish standards, guidelines, and procedures for algorithmic transparency. It is unclear how this could be done effectively without cross-border collaboration. India emphasizes this point in saying that “[o]pening the Black Box, assuming it is possible and useful at this stage . . . , should not aim towards opening of code or technical disclosure – few clients of AI solutions would be sophisticated AI experts – but should rather aim at ‘*explainability*.’”⁹⁶ Extended sharing and disclosure, the document notes, requires a balancing between parameters and actions of stakeholders, further noting that it may be possible to “game the system.”⁹⁷ More collaborative research is required in this area.

transparency	transparent
open	openness
closed	trustworthy
trust	explainability
explainable	understandable
black-box	black box
opacity	opaque
data bias	available data
algorithmic bias	data sharing
loss of trust	access to data

Table 1: Transparency Keywords

INTELLIGENCE: TURNING FINLAND INTO A LEADING COUNTRY IN THE APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 40 (2017), https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/160391/TEMrap_47_2017_verkkojulkaisu.pdf [<https://perma.cc/ZKG9-S8H3>].

96. NITI AAYOG, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE #AIFORALL 86 (2018).

97. *Id.*

2. Accountability

Accountability, which may be understood as “responsible” or “answerable,”⁹⁸ in the context of AI is often considered as being responsible for what one does and the ability to give reasons for one’s actions or choices. Within AI, the topic of accountability is one of considerable debate due to the separation between the initial programming and the outcome, leading to questions about who is liable for the actions made by AI. In our definition of accountability, we have examined the need for accountability in the design process, within deployment, and after any sort of harm has occurred. Thus, we have focused on terminology such as ‘oversight’ and ‘framework’ to address the need for accountability in AI development, and ‘liability’ and ‘victim’ to cover the need for redress in the event of a failure. In this dimension, it is important to note that while there is a general convergence on the focus on accountability, this does not indicate that there was a consensus on how accountability would be best achieved. Some documents will include references to specific entities that would be liable if harm occurs from AI.

During our research, we identified several general terms such as ‘framework’, ‘model’, and ‘law’ which have been broadly applied in the policies. Unsurprisingly, given that the documents are centered around policy, these keywords appear quite frequently without substance, being sprinkled in with generic qualifiers such as ‘ethical AI.’ The most telling discussions around accountability frequently accompanied the ‘responsibility’ keyword, highlighting important principles for developing frameworks, governance, and regulations.




Figure 2: Accountability Keyword Representation

98. *Accountability*, DICTIONARY.COM, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/accountable> [<https://perma.cc/V9G5-7PRY>].

States seem to be converging upon the idea that in order to utilize AI, it must be done within a responsible framework. Some countries set a timeline for when they want a regulatory system in place to govern AI, such as Russia, which plans to have a flexible regulatory system in place by 2030.⁹⁹ Denmark's policy specifies that they will have a working group to examine and apply existing law to AI, and if there are gaps present, there "may be a need to launch legislative initiatives at national or EU level."¹⁰⁰ A microcosm which exposes the need for specialized AI regulation is that of autonomous vehicles (AVs). If an autonomous vehicle is involved in an accident, then it is often unclear on whom the blame lies—the owner of the vehicle, the company that developed the software, or perhaps even the car manufacturer. New Zealand's statement on AI discusses this dilemma.¹⁰¹ While there are no definite answers at the moment, New Zealand's Allen Institute for Artificial Technology have created three rules for regulating AI:

- (1) An AI system must be subject to the full gamut of laws that apply to its human operator.
- (2) An AI system must clearly disclose that it is not human.
- (3) An AI system cannot retain or disclose confidential information without explicit approval from the source of that information.¹⁰²

Even if these regulations were to be put into place, there remains the question of oversight. China's *A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan* proposes an AI supervision system, with a two-tiered structure to manage the entire process of AI development, from design to result application.¹⁰³ This supervision system would

99. *Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation*, CSET 17 (Oct. 28, 2019), <https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/decreed-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-on-the-development-of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-russian-federation/> [<https://perma.cc/2T5V-QHXM>].

100. See THE DANISH GOV'T, MINISTRY OF FIN. & MINISTRY OF INDUS., BUS. & FIN. AFFS., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 30 (2019), https://en.digst.dk/media/19337/305755_gb_version_final-a.pdf [<https://perma.cc/Z84Z-HNHK>].

101. See THE A.I. F. OF N.Z., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: SHAPING A FUTURE NEW ZEALAND 68 (2018), <https://aiforum.org.nz/reports/artificial-intelligence-shaping-a-future-new-zealand/> [<https://perma.cc/FH6R-SDDA>]; see generally Scott J. Shackelford & Rachel Dockery, *Governing AI*, 30 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 279 (2020) (discussing the prospects of governing AI through a polycentric framework with an AV case study).

102. Oren Etzioni, Opinion, *How to Regulate Artificial Intelligence*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/opinion/artificial-intelligence-regulations-rules.html> [<https://perma.cc/ACB3-EB5N>].

103. See CHINA STATE COUNCIL, NEXT GENERATION ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 26 (July 20, 2017), <https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/translation-fulltext-8.1.17.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/3P58-RYFQ>].

encourage “AI industry and enterprise self-discipline, and earnestly strengthen management, increase disciplinary efforts aimed at the abuse of data, violations of personal privacy, and actions contrary to moral ethics,”¹⁰⁴ suggesting that this system would be implemented in all private sector companies that create and use AI. Supervision is also a necessary element in accountability because AI may also make mistakes. For example, in the healthcare context, it is imperative that a doctor does not settle for a diagnosis or treatment plan simply because it was suggested by AI, especially when a better alternative may exist.¹⁰⁵

While oversight and regulations may provide a beginning to AI legal policy, there must also be dialogue between the government, corporations, academia, and civil society to identify any potential accountability gaps. Canada’s policy encourages such active discourse between these separate groups to “ensure that harms are identified and addressed, and that policy adequately reflects public interest objectives and addresses concerns from specific groups.”¹⁰⁶ Suggested strategies include running hackathons, public consultations, and increasing engagement with stakeholders when developing policies. Denmark will label brands and products that utilize ethical data practices to encourage accountability within the business sector.¹⁰⁷ Discussions on accountability within the private sector have also included equipping the workforce with the right skillset to be able to integrate AI into their workflow. Finland emphasizes the idea that AI technologies will result in job losses, and that it is society’s responsibility to take responsibility for these losses. As AI technology was funded primarily by taxpayer funds, Finnish leaders argue that it is unfair for citizens to be negatively affected by these very capabilities, a potentially potent line of argument for other states seeking to safeguard human rights in the AI Age.¹⁰⁸ In addition to this line of argument, Italy’s white paper presents the idea that the State bears a responsibility to create an educational system that will keep up with the changing landscape shaped by AI.¹⁰⁹ While the State bears responsibility, it must also collaborate with academia to

104. *Id.*

105. See AGENCY FOR DIGIT. IT., *supra* note 92, at 25.

106. SARAH VILLENEUVE, GAGA BOSKOVIC & BRENT BARRON, CIFAR & BII + E, REBOOTING REGULATION: EXPLORING THE FUTURE OF AI POLICY IN CANADA 7 (2019), <https://cifar.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/rebooting-regulation-exploring-the-future-of-ai-policy-in-canada.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/JX58-ZK9U>].

107. THE DANISH GOV’T, *supra* note 100, at 31.

108. *Id.* at 51.

109. See AGENCY FOR DIGIT. IT., *supra* note 92, at 7.

ensure that there are enough AI professionals that have the necessary skillset to develop and effectively utilize AI technologies in a capable, ethical manner.

As is apparent, accountability is quite a broad topic in AI, and there are several more factors that remain unexamined in this Subpart. One of these is accountability within data governance, which places a responsibility on the State to protect public data from misuse.¹¹⁰ This topic is further covered in our Subpart II(B)(4) about privacy in which data governance is addressed. Additionally, there also exists a responsibility to protect vulnerable populations from discrimination caused or exacerbated by AI technologies. Subpart II(B)(5) on fairness covers this below and specifically concerns topics on equality, bias, and equity.

decision making	impact assessment
risk management	internal control
accountability	external control
accountable	responsible
responsibility	justice
regulate	law
regulations	liability
liable	governance
govern	causality
compensate	compensation
victim	victims
laws	decision-making
guidelines	oversight
audit	auditing
redress	sandbox
framework	organization
decentralized	model

Table 2, Accountability Keywords

110. See generally STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, WILSON C. FREEMAN & CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45631, DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW (2019), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45631.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/A3ZS-QHDW>].

Overall, there has not been a nation-state level, comprehensive regulatory framework developed to govern AI. Many countries discuss the possibility of implementing such a regime, but these plans remain nascent as of this writing. There is likewise divergence on the extent that the State, the private sector, and/or civil society bear responsibility for the myriad effects of AI, similar to the debate that is playing out in discussions around AI security.

3. Security

In general, security may be defined as being free from danger.¹¹¹ However, in the context of technology, security is often thought of in terms of cybersecurity, which is defined by the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) as “the art of protecting networks, devices, and data from unauthorized access or criminal use and the practice of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.”¹¹² Typically, these definitions will address the security of the AI from external threats, although security also plays a role in internal threats such as fail-safe mechanisms. Within AI security, the overall safety of the technology involves leveraging AI to identify and mitigate cyber threats with less human intervention than is typically expected. Within the keywords selected, the dimension of ‘security’ will cover a broad range of topics, from implementing security features into AI to utilizing AI to achieve security goals.

The most common keyword in the documents surveyed was ‘security’ by a wide margin. Nevertheless, it must be noted that ‘security’ sometimes appeared with other terms, such as ‘social security’ or ‘job security’, which did not necessarily represent the dimension being examined. Attempts were made to exclude these terms where possible. Overall, the discussion of security encompasses a wide range of considerations, many of which this Subpart addresses. Our keywords also took into account basic cybersecurity principles, such as availability, integrity, and confidentiality of data, but these were not widely discussed in the policy papers surveyed in this study.

111. *Security*, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/security> [<https://perma.cc/ZH39-VCYU>].

112. *Security Tip (ST04-001): What Is Cybersecurity?*, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY (Nov. 14, 2019), <https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-001> [<https://perma.cc/WC7V-G44R>].




Figure 3: Security Keyword Representation

The international community acknowledges that security is an important consideration when formulating an AI strategy, but there is a strong divergence in terms of where and how this security should be applied. In US AI policy, there is a strong emphasis on employing AI to enhance national security, both by developing offensive AI technology and also by defending against attacks driven by AI.¹¹³ DARPA and Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) have created a variety of programs designed to combat attacks against AI, such as Secure, Assured, Intelligent Learning Systems (SAILS), Trojans in Artificial Intelligence (TrojAI), and Guaranteeing AI Robustness against Deception (GARD).¹¹⁴ The United Kingdom takes a similar approach to the United States, having created the National Security Strategic Investment Fund, which would contribute up to £85 million in advanced technologies to protect national security.¹¹⁵ New Zealand's policy specifically mentions the need to bolster political security against AI related attacks such as social media manipulation and the related issue of deep fakes.¹¹⁶

Discussions on national security are sometimes supplemented by considerations of implementing AI security in the private sector.

113. See SELECT COMM. ON A.I., NAT'L SCI. & TECH COUNCIL, *supra* note 37, at 1.

114. *Id.* at 23.

115. DEP'T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY: BUILDING A BRITAIN FIT FOR THE FUTURE, 2017, Cm. 9528, at 180,

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664563/industrial-strategy-white-paper-web-ready-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PU7-QXAS].

116. See THE A.I. F. OF N.Z., *supra* note 101, at 67–68, 81–82.

Critical infrastructure, which is often managed by the private sector,¹¹⁷ is particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks, and the growth of AI technology will only exacerbate these risks. India presents a policy whereby the private sector will be held accountable for AI security. This policy revolves around a negligence standard in which the neglect of security could result in serious fines for the company, but the law introduces safe harbors for companies who take appropriate steps to monitor, test, and improve AI products.¹¹⁸ Similar safe harbor laws focusing on cybersecurity have been passed by a variety of US states, including Ohio.¹¹⁹

One aspect of AI security where many states seem to be converging is the need to implement security into the AI's design. The United States, Sweden, France, and Germany mention that "safety and security considerations cannot be an afterthought; they must be an integral part of the early design stage."¹²⁰ South Korea takes a proactive approach to AI security by creating a policy to implement quantum computing to reduce the risk of cyber-attacks at their root. The country vowed to test quantum cryptography on exclusive networks to maximize security for national facilities by 2020.¹²¹ By 2025, these quantum code protected networks would include other sectors, such as healthcare and finance, and by 2030 South Korea intends to develop the core technology for a quantum Internet.¹²²

Most of the discussion until this point has centered upon securing AI technologies from outside intervention, but it is important to note that AI can also be used to enhance security. The UK government, for example, has argued that "[m]achine learning can identify, categorize and analyse [cyber threats] more effectively than individual researchers. By working simultaneously on different tasks across a large number

117. See *Critical Infrastructure Sectors*, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, <https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors> [<https://perma.cc/8ZY5-5VJU>].

118. See NITI AAYOG, *supra* note 96, at 88–89.

119. See Michael Kassner, *Ohio Law Creates Cybersecurity 'Safe Harbor' for Businesses*, TECH. REPUBLIC (Jan. 3, 2019), <https://www.techrepublic.com/article/ohio-law-creates-cybersecurity-safe-harbor-for-businesses/> [<https://perma.cc/75TL-QBLL>].

120. GOV'T OFFS. OF SWED., NATIONAL APPROACH TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 5 (2018), <https://www.government.se/4a7451/contentassets/fe2ba005fb49433587574c513a837fac/national-approach-to-artificial-intelligence.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/JAK9-5AXN>]; see also *French Strategy for Artificial Intelligence*, AI FOR HUMAN. (Mar. 29, 2018), <https://www.ai-forhumanity.fr/en/> [<https://perma.cc/VMF3-R652>].

121. GOV'T OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOR., MID- TO LONG-TERM MASTER PLAN IN PREPARATION FOR THE INTELLIGENT INFORMATION SOCIETY: MANAGING THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 39 (2017), <http://www.msip.go.kr/dynamic/file/afeldfile/msse56/1352869/2017/07/20/Master%20Plan%20for%20the%20intelligent%20information%20society.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/YUV4-Q2AW>].

122. *Id.*

of devices and systems, AI can help defend against large attacks.¹²³ While attackers will be utilizing AI to target cyber vulnerabilities, AI can also be employed by defenders. Robots boasting AI capabilities have the capacity to assist people in natural disasters, where traditional rescue crews may not be able to function. Germany, for example, has “plans for robots to be used especially in critical circumstances arising in an inhospitable environment, for instance when there has been a calamity in a chemical factory or when the structure of buildings has to be assessed in the wake of an earthquake.”¹²⁴

secure	security
confidentiality	availability
integrity	vulnerability
vulnerabilities	vulnerable
compromise	safety
reliability	robust
robustness	predictability
repeatability	accuracy
reproducibility	cybersecurity
data management	

Table 3, Security Keywords, September 2020

Finally, there have been discussions on using AI to improve policing and security via surveillance.¹²⁵ Such efforts, though, are double-edged and can both promote public safety and enable authoritarian regimes. China, for example, is pushing for the development of new AI technologies to assist law enforcement, such as “detection sensor technology, video image information analysis and identification technology, biometric identification technology, intelligent security and police products.”¹²⁶ Nonetheless, these investments have been noted to carry the risk of mass surveillance, human rights violations, and reduce individual autonomy,¹²⁷ which is the next topic of discussion.

123. Dame Wendy Hall & Jérôme Pesenti, *Growing the Artificial Intelligence Industry in the UK*, Gov.UK, at 21 (Oct. 15, 2017), <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/growing-the-artificial-intelligence-industry-in-the-uk> [<https://perma.cc/B778-EEC6>].

124. NAT'L STRATEGIE FÜR KÜNSTLICHE INTEL., *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY* 17 (2018).

125. See GOV'T OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOR., *supra* note 121, at 13.

126. CHINA STATE COUNCIL, *supra* note 103, at 20.

127. See CÉDRIC VILLANI, *FOR A MEANINGFUL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: TOWARDS A FRENCH AND EUROPEAN STRATEGY* 124 (2018), <https://www.aiforhumanity.fr/pdfs/>

4. Privacy

Privacy was famously defined as “the right to be let alone”¹²⁸ in the nineteenth century, but as of the twenty-first century privacy has become a vast concept encompassing (among much else) freedom of thought, bodily integrity, solitude, information integrity, freedom from surveillance, along with the protection of reputation, and personality.¹²⁹ Still, there are widely differing views as to the bounds of privacy rights, including whether privacy should be considered a property right (and whether companies like Facebook, for example, should pay users for their information),¹³⁰ and especially how to update core privacy concepts for the AI Age.

We have found that the term which appears the most from this category is ‘private.’ Upon examination of the source material, however, we have found that most of the word usage revolves around the ‘private sector,’ or ‘private companies,’ rather than private information. The keywords ‘privacy’ and ‘personal’ were usually accompanied by rather insightful discussions on the matter. Many states present privacy as a fundamental consideration when shaping AI policy, but there is a wide divergence on how this complex concept should be implemented. For example, some AI applications require an enormous amount of data, which itself has privacy and human rights implications,¹³¹ especially when the most sensitive data, either commercial or personal, can yield the greatest benefits.¹³²

MissionVillani_Report_ENG-VF.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2MK-JQLR] [hereinafter Villani Report].

128. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, *The Right to Privacy*, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890); cf. *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).

129. See Scott J. Shackelford, *Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights of Public Figures*, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 125–27 (2012); see generally Daniel J. Solove, *Conceptualizing Privacy*, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002) (advocating for a pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy).

130. See, e.g., Leonid Bershidsky, *Let Users Sell Their Data to Facebook*, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2019), <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-31/facebook-users-should-be-free-to-sell-their-personal-data> [https://perma.cc/8HHD-P626].

131. See THE A.I. F. OF N.Z., *supra* note 101, at 61.

132. Hall & Pesenti, *supra* note 123, at 44.




Figure 4: Privacy Keyword Representation

Nonetheless, data has long been a commodity for many companies to utilize for personalized advertising and other AI applications. However, the amount of information being collected quickly became a concern of the public following the Snowden revelations on how much data the United States government was collecting and after the previous data regulations outlined by Privacy Shield proved to be ineffective. Shortly thereafter, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was implemented in Europe, which protected the rights of European citizens to understand what information was being gathered, to access this information, to correct this information, and to erase the personal information which has been gathered about them.¹³³ AI developers operating in Europe will therefore need to consider this existing policy when creating their AI systems.

Some countries advocate for the availability of data over the protection of privacy. Finland plans to release a legislative framework to ensure the availability of data to business operations, as opposed to

133. In the EU, for example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides European citizens with access to and control over what data is collected and how it is used. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (discussing the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC). The EU has also Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms with Article 7 providing that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications,” and Article 8 ensuring that “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.” Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7–8, Mar. 30, 2010, O.J. (2010/C 83/02); see also *Complete Guide to GDPR Compliance*, GDPR.EU, <https://gdpr.eu> [<https://perma.cc/E3YY-UAWX>].

focusing on data protection.¹³⁴ China¹³⁵ and the United States¹³⁶ mention protecting privacy in passing in their AI policy documents, but both have limited legal protection of privacy. Russia's AI policy does not mention privacy rights at all.¹³⁷ The question therefore remains for states with existing privacy protection frameworks on how to best translate these regulations into AI. One of the states which possesses the strictest privacy protection laws is South Korea, with their Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA), a predecessor to the GDPR.¹³⁸ South Korea's AI framework presents a tripartite policy on data privacy.¹³⁹ Out of all the states surveyed, Canada discusses the need for consumer privacy the most and has implemented their own privacy protection laws: a GDPR equivalent known as the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).¹⁴⁰ Canada's policy recognizes privacy as a fundamental human right,¹⁴⁰ taking the time to clarify how AI must be utilized to comply with existing privacy principles:

1. Organizations should be required to disclose the use of AI tools and AI-powered services should be opt-in;
2. Create a public complaint and reporting structure for the use of non-evidence-based algorithms, with an option for a formal response from the subject of the complaint;
3. Require the anonymization of individual data when shared publicly to protect privacy;

134. MINISTRY OF ECON. AFFS. & EMP. OF FIN., *supra* note 95, at 44.

135. CHINA STATE COUNCIL, *supra* note 103, at 26.

136. See *Artificial Intelligence for the American People*, *supra* note 33.

137. See *Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation*, *supra* note 99, at 17–18.

138. The European Commission announced in November 2020 that it had presented a new regulation on data governance. In particular, the Commission outlined that the regulation will facilitate data sharing across the EU and between sectors to create wealth for society. See *EU: Commission Presents New Data Governance Regulation*, ONE TRUST DATA GUIDANCE (Nov. 25, 2020), <https://www.dataguidance.com/news/eu-commission-presents-new-data-governance-regulation> [<https://perma.cc/BRH5-V66L>].

139. The first level would be for general data, which includes no private information, and this data would essentially be available for open-source usage. The second level contains personal information but anonymizes it so that individuals cannot be identified. This data will be used to launch 'free data zones' which allows data corporations to perform data synthesis. The third level contains private data, which is implemented into K-MyData, "a government program that allows businesses to share the personal information of their clients with other businesses, subject to clients' consent." See GOV'T OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOR., *supra* note 121, at 34.

140. See *Consultation on the OPC's Proposals for Ensuring Appropriate Regulation of Artificial Intelligence*, OFF. OF THE PRIV. COMM'R OF CAN. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/completed-consultations/consultation-ai-pos_ai_202001/ [<https://perma.cc/T8JP-KC57>].

4. Develop a robust appeal process for those who feel they have been wrongly assessed.¹⁴¹

When discussing privacy rights in the context of AI, Canada not only mentions the need to comply to current privacy regulations but discusses the need to modernize and strengthen these regulations to protect users.¹⁴² Finally, the policy even discusses several grey areas regarding consumer privacy, such as when meaningful consent is not practicable.¹⁴³

private	privacy
personal	confidential
control over data	consent
data protection	data governance
protected data	protected information

Table 4, Privacy Keywords, September 2020

To summarize, the views on privacy in relation to AI vary greatly from country to country. Although keyword use in the privacy dimension is generally equally distributed among surveyed states, many notable outliers exist, such as Canada, which drafted a document specifically meant to address privacy concerns within AI, and Russia, which does not mention privacy regulations within their AI strategy.¹⁴⁴ This dimension is likely the most divergent when it comes to its implementation and adoption by different members of the international community. As a result, the differences between each nation's existing privacy laws make global norm-building progress difficult.

5. Fairness

Fairness is a relatively new topic of interest in the AI community. In general, fairness is the state, condition, or quality of being fair, or free from bias or injustice,¹⁴⁵ but within machine learning it takes on special meaning. In the AI community, a given algorithm is said to be 'fair' if its results are independent of certain sensitive variables such as

141. See VILLENEUVE, BOSKOVIC & BARRON, *supra* note 106, at 6.

142. See *id.* at 8.

143. See *Consultation on the OPC's Proposals for Ensuring Appropriate Regulation of Artificial Intelligence*, *supra* note 140.

144. *Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation*, *supra* note 99, at 17–18.

145. *Fairness*, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fairness> [<https://perma.cc/6ES4-4U6K>].

gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or disability status.¹⁴⁶ Nonetheless, the discussion on fairness is not without complication. Training AI algorithms to be fair relies heavily on non-biased datasets, which may be difficult to identify and qualify as unbiased. Maintaining fairness requires continued input from academia and industry to identify and address current bias issues trending within datasets and algorithms. There have been attempts to create tools that identify bias within algorithms, such as Facebook's Fairness Flow.¹⁴⁷ However, since the source code for Fairness Flow has not been released, it is impossible to determine whether this tool truly corrects bias. Statistical means of detecting discrimination in algorithms also exist, but these have yet to be deeply researched and integrated into a broader AI strategy. The researchers at Brookings observed:

there is no simple metric to measure fairness that a software engineer can apply, especially in the design of algorithms and the determination of the appropriate trade-offs between accuracy and fairness. Fairness is a human, not a mathematical, determination, grounded in shared ethical beliefs. Thus, algorithmic decisions that may have a serious consequence for people will require human involvement.¹⁴⁸

The two keywords that appeared most frequently in the documents surveyed were 'ethical' and 'ethics.' These terms present an idea that is much more vague than some other keywords, as fairness is assumed to be ethical, but what is ethical may not always be referring to fairness specifically. As it stands, many entities use 'ethical' as a catch-all term to justify their policy decisions, which may not always be supporting fairness. While it is important to take an ethical approach to AI, our definition of fairness is more accurately represented by other keywords such as bias, diversity, inclusion, and discrimination.

146. *Principles for Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for Algorithms*, FAT / ML, <https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms> [<https://perma.cc/CW3E-ZMMR>].

147. Dave Gershgorn, *Facebook Says It Has a Tool to Detect Bias in Its Artificial Intelligence*, QUARTZ (May 3, 2018), <https://qz.com/1268520/facebook-says-it-has-a-tool-to-detect-bias-in-its-artificial-intelligence/> [<https://perma.cc/R2NT-UR74>]; cf. Anjanette H. Raymond, Emma Arrington Stone Young & Scott J. Shackelford, *Building a Better HAL 9000: Algorithms, the Market, and the Need to Prevent the Engraving of Bias*, 15 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215 (2018).

148. Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick & Genie Barton, *Algorithmic Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms*, BROOKINGS (May 22, 2019), <https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/> [<https://perma.cc/Q2TL-MXFJ>].




Figure 5: Fairness Keyword Representation

While there are many policy manifestos that use the term ‘ethical,’ most of them skirt the issue of fairness. Most policies, such as Sweden’s, include a paragraph discussing how biased datasets can lead to discrimination and a loss of trust,¹⁴⁹ but refrain from delving further into the issue. Although a standalone category, fairness is often related to two additional dimensions—transparency and privacy. Several documents discuss the need for algorithmic transparency to ensure fairness, with the United States citing that the lack of transparency and biased data can lead to financial damages and consequences for democratic functions.¹⁵⁰ Nonetheless, a certain level of opacity is inevitable within machine learning algorithms, which can provide high levels of accuracy but do not explain why any classification was made. The need for fairness is also discussed through the lens of privacy, since many researchers have already noted that existing stereotypes and prejudices against certain groups will be reproduced in the data used by such technologies, leading to unfair and discriminatory decisions.¹⁵¹ There are some notable exceptions to this trend, however, such as Mexico’s AI White Paper and the Villani Report,¹⁵² which place a special emphasis on how AI affects gender equality in the workplace.¹⁵³

149. See GOV’T OFFS. OF SWED., *supra* note 120, at 4.

150. Cf. SELECT COMM. ON A.I., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, *supra* note 37, at 19–20.

151. See, e.g., Aylin Caliskan, Joanna J. Bryson & Arvind Narayanan, *Semantics Derived Automatically From Language Corpora Contain Human-Like Biases*, 356 *SCI.* 183 (2017).

152. Villani Report, *supra* note 127, at 140.

153. EMMA MARTINHO-TRUSWELL ET AL., BRITISH EMBASSY IN MEXICO, *TOWARDS AN AI STRATEGY IN MEXICO: HARNESSING THE AI REVOLUTION* 27–28 (2018).

In addition to the overlap with transparency and privacy, fairness is also deeply connected to public benefit. Fairness within AI impacts the ability of all members of the public to reap in the benefits provided by AI, but this is especially important to marginalized populations. It is widely documented that black faces are underrepresented in data sets used to train facial recognition software,¹⁵⁴ and when, for example, a vending machine which operates on facial recognition is unable to recognize a black customer, the technology is rendered inaccessible. Many countries reference the importance of access to data, but a lot of discussions on access are framed from a business perspective rather than a social one. There are some countries, such as Italy, which emphasize the need to utilize AI to reduce inequalities in the healthcare and education sectors.¹⁵⁵ The Villani Report takes this a step forward, specifically acknowledging that algorithms reinforce biases against women and black communities, which limits accessibility to employment to employment, housing, and access to goods and services.¹⁵⁶

Overall, the most comprehensive discussions on fairness and bias through the lens of AI can be found in the Villani Report and 'Shaping a Future New Zealand.'¹⁵⁷ New Zealand brings up a specific case study from the United States: an AI system was being used by judges to set sentencing in a way to reduce the risk of repeat offenses, but because this algorithm relied on historical data, it developed a bias against black defendants, who then received longer prison sentences.¹⁵⁸ New Zealand's policy proposes to curb this bias by diversifying the pool of AI developers and the datasets upon which AI are trained.¹⁵⁹ France's policy mentions similar situations in which women are offered lower paid jobs by Google and proposes to rectify these inequalities through legal frameworks and auditing systems which can identify and quantify bias.¹⁶⁰

154. See Spencer Buell, *MIT Researcher: Artificial Intelligence Has a Race Problem, and We Need to Fix It*, BOSTON MAG. (Feb. 23, 2018, 10:42 AM), <https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2018/02/23/artificial-intelligence-race-dark-skin-bias/> [<https://perma.cc/NQ8Q-YMCZ>].

155. See AGENCY FOR DIGIT. IT., *supra* note 92, at 9.

156. Villani Report, *supra* note 127, at 116.

157. See *id.*; THE A.I. F. OF N.Z., *supra* note 101, at 64–67.

158. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, *Machine Bias: There's Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It's Biased Against Blacks.*, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), <https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing> [<https://perma.cc/86RC-NSMX>].

159. THE A.I. F. OF N.Z., *supra* note 101, at 66.

160. Villani Report, *supra* note 127, at 116.

Nonetheless, there are some unique aspects of fairness that are not seen in France’s and New Zealand’s policies. Germany’s AI policy includes a subsection specifically relating to fairness within culture and media. The manifesto states that even in the AI age, the “freedoms of a democratic society will still primarily be measured in terms of cultural and media diversity and the independence of the media.”¹⁶¹ While AI will not replace human creativity, it will play a vital role in providing an environment for media consumption. In order to protect this environment so that free speech can flourish, AI must abide by the principles of transparency and non-discrimination.¹⁶²

Discussions on equity are notably absent from any of the documents we have surveyed. While the keyword is occasionally used in the text, none of the documents attempt to discuss the difference between equality and equity. There are statistical tools which can be used to identify bias within algorithms, but the idea of fairness is not rooted merely in the absence of bias. Bias can be used within algorithms to create equitable outcomes. The MIT-D lab presents a hypothetical situation in which an algorithm was more likely to disqualify women from receiving a business loan over men, regardless of creditworthiness. A bias can be introduced to the algorithm to rate women’s creditworthiness higher than men to alleviate the inequality faced by women entrepreneurs.¹⁶³ Thus, the introduction of a bias in this case could be said to be promoting fairness.

Fairness is an incredibly important aspect of AI but is vastly underrepresented in international AI policy. Most policies converge on the idea that fairness is a crucial consideration to machine learning algorithms, yet they rarely expand on the topic to discuss how this fairness will be measured and ensured. Discussions of fairness are shallow and limited, and the topic is overrepresented in our dataset due to the abundance of the keyword ‘ethical’, which does not always refer to algorithmic fairness and protection against discrimination.

Table 5: Fairness Keywords

fairness	ethics
ethical	unethical

161. NAT’L STRATEGIE FÜR KÜNSTLICHE INTEL., *supra* note 124, at 44.

162. *Id.*

163. YAZWEED AWWAD ET AL., USAID, EXPLORING FAIRNESS IN MACHINE LEARNING FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 2–3 (2020), https://d-lab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/inline-files/Exploring_fairness_in_machine_learning_for_international_development_04012020_pages.pdf [<https://perma.cc/S8LY-BVBH>].

discriminate	discriminatory
discrimination	bias
debiasing	inclusion
diversity	equality
equal	equitable
democratic	representation
objectivity	inclusiveness
non-discrimination	values
features	harm
mitigation	data quality

6. Human-Centered Design

Human-Centered Design is an approach to problem solving, commonly used in design and management frameworks that develops solutions to problems by involving the human perspective in all steps of the problem-solving process. Humans have become the measuring stick for AI performance, with many documents noting that while AI can outperform humans at a specific task, the intelligence associated with humans cannot be reproduced in AI at this time.¹⁶⁴ Instead, the best way to utilize AI would be to use them as prosthetics to enhance human cognitive ability. Big data and algorithms alone cannot accurately gauge reality without specific guidance, and human-centered design is crucial to avoid biased algorithms and a reduction of effectiveness.¹⁶⁵ Ultimately, human-centered design is at the core of the creation of AI, as humans are creating AI to serve their needs, rather than the other way around. When referring to human-centered design, we must also keep in mind societal norms which shape our ideas of how AI should function in society. Different states will likely have different mindsets of how AI should interact with humanity.

To address this broad spectrum of concerns, we used the keyword ‘human’ to track the amount of space dedicated to discussing human-centered design, and relatedly, human rights. This was by far the most widely used keyword among all chosen keywords across different dimensions, numbering over 500 uses throughout all our chosen

164. See generally Katja Grace, John Salvatier, Allan Dafoe, Babao Zhang & Owain Evans, *Viewpoint: When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts*, 62 J.A.I. RSCH. 729 (2018).

165. Jim Guszczka, *Smarter Together: Why Artificial Intelligence Needs Human-Centered Design*, 22 DELOITTE REV. 36, 38 (2018).

documents. While this may initially seem to be too general, every time an AI interacts with humans, human-centered design is a key consideration within this interaction.

Another keyword that appeared was ‘augmented,’ referring to the term ‘augmented intelligence.’ This terminology refers to augmenting AI with Human-Centered Design components to better adjust to human expectations to achieve the goals set by the creators of the AI. In this sense, the AI plays an assistive role to human cognition.¹⁶⁶ Machine learning, on its own, lacks what we would call ‘common sense,’ and this augmentation is necessary to bridge the gap between humans and machines.




Figure 6: Human-Centered Design Keyword Representation

We have found that human-centered design manifests in policies in several different forms. Firstly, there is the need for AI to be integrated into society in a way that humans will accept. Secondly, there is a need to set up a standard of fundamental human rights that shape AI development and policy. Thirdly, following the integration of AI into society, there is the need for human oversight and control over AI. Finally, we have found that there is the emphasis on adapting AI to resemble human-beings, creating a special subset of human-AI interaction.

The three countries that spend the most time discussing human-centered design in our study were the United States, Austria, and Japan. Japan represents a bit of an outlier, as the majority of the keyword count comes from the term ‘human resources,’ which refers to the people representing the workforce of an organization rather than the interaction of

166. *Augmented Intelligence*, GARTNER, <https://www.gartner.com/en/information-technology/glossary/augmented-intelligence> [<https://perma.cc/5URU-XYGD>].

humans with AI. Nonetheless, Japan still mentions the necessity of social acceptance of AI and the need for AI to be ‘human-friendly.’¹⁶⁷ Italy, another country which focuses on the idea of human-centered design lays out a similar thought upon the inclusion of AI into society: “laws, regulations and good technical and technological practices are not enough (though necessary): we need a narrative and [a vision] built by society in an inclusive way outlining the meanings of AI and the roles we want to assign to it.”¹⁶⁸ Not all countries address the need for this narrative directly, but the fundamental concepts behind it can be summarized as follows: the need for AI to acknowledge basic human rights, the amount of control humans retain over AI decisions, and the humanization of AI.

The first aspect of the narrative lies in the necessity for AI to observe human rights. Some countries specifically mention fundamental human rights within their AI strategy, such as Austria. Austria’s framework principles state that “[t]he use of robotics and AI must guarantee the safety of people and comply with ethical standards, fundamental human rights and European values,”¹⁶⁹ meaning that AI must be created with human rights at the forefront of their development. These human rights include “human freedom and dignity, economic, cultural and social rights and the protection of privacy.”¹⁷⁰ Italy also focuses on the protection of human rights, citing that ‘human well-being is the highest virtue for a society,’ and to necessitate this, certain inalienable human rights are required.¹⁷¹ It should be noted that this discussion is absent from some policy manifestos but this omission cannot be definitively stated as an objection to fundamental human rights or the need for AI to observe them.

Another cornerstone issue commonly addressed in these policies was the amount of influence humans have over AI decision-making processes. This topic shares a significant overlap with the dimension of Accountability, yet the foundation of this issue lies within human-machine interaction. Many AI units have manual override options incorporated in their design to account for human agency. Italy’s policy suggests that AI should be primarily used to improve human judgement, rather than to override it completely.¹⁷² Austria’s manifes-

167. See COUNCIL FOR SCI., TECH. & INNOVATION, GOV’T OF JAPAN, INTEGRATED INNOVATION STRATEGY 73 (2018), https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/doc/integrated_main.pdf [<https://perma.cc/82HA-CGUK>].

168. See AGENCY FOR DIGIT. IT., *supra* note 92, at 65.

169. See AUSTRIAN COUNCIL ON ROBOTICS & A.I., SHAPING THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA WITH ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 8 (2018).

170. *Id.* at 17.

171. See AGENCY FOR DIGIT. IT., *supra* note 92, at 10.

172. See *id.* at 24.

to outright states that “[m]achines cannot and should not assume moral responsibility. Ethical responsibility for robotics and AI systems must ultimately remain with humans.”¹⁷³ We have found that many documents that address this topic come to the same conclusion. Interestingly, China’s policy specifies utilizing a hybrid approach to human-machine decision making, such as utilizing human-machine collective driving.¹⁷⁴

The last aspect of human-centered design addresses the humanization of AI. Although not all countries have a specific section addressing this topic, the policies set forth by the United States and Austria contain a special emphasis placed upon creating humanoid robots. The Austrian manifesto claims that “anthropomorphic design features such as faces, eyes and arms are used to transmit non-verbal signals known from interpersonal communication to the robot, thus promoting a ‘social’ connection with the machine.”¹⁷⁵ This provision acts as a catalyst to integrate AI into human society and culture, and is further backed by social science literature, which “suggests that people—depending on personal and situational factors—tend to perceive intentionality or other human characteristics in robots and AI systems.”¹⁷⁶

human	people oriented
psychology	interact with
HCI	augmented
operationalized	

Table 6: Human-Centered Design Keywords

In our research, we have found that the countries who choose to discuss human-centered design tend to converge on the same topics, though not generally on human rights. The divergence is noted mostly in the omission of the topics themselves, which may be a result of prioritization of different AI principles rather than espousing different ideologies upon human-AI interaction.

7. Public Benefit

In general, public benefit is a benefit accrued to the public. For example, enhanced mobility of people or goods, environmental protection or enhancement, congestion mitigation, enhanced trade and economic development, improved air quality or land use, more efficient

173. AUSTRIAN COUNCIL ON ROBOTICS & A.I., *supra* note 169, at 27.

174. CHINA STATE COUNCIL, *supra* note 103, at 12.

175. AUSTRIAN COUNCIL ON ROBOTICS & A.I., *supra* note 169, at 38.

176. *Id.*

energy use, enhanced public safety or security, and similar benefits that accrue to the public. With regard to AI, public benefit can take on two different meanings. In the context of government use of AI, public benefit can be AI that is designed to achieve a public benefit- or enhance its occurrence- using AI. In the context of private use, public benefit can mean the use of AI in a manner that – despite a private actor – seeks to benefit the public through deployment.

‘Public’ is the most frequently used keyword in the documents surveyed, but like many terms, not every instance of ‘public’ refers directly to public benefit, or human rights. Often ‘public’ can be used to refer to the ‘public sector,’ which is only tangentially related to public benefit. Several terms not included in the list of keywords were ‘transportation,’ ‘utilities,’ and ‘agriculture,’ but they frequently came up in discussions on how AI would benefit the public. States would frequently group several of these terms together to discuss public benefit, such as Denmark presenting the grouping of ‘healthcare, energy and utilities, agriculture, and transport.’¹⁷⁷ Different states focus on varying aspects of public benefit, but the most common benefits described were healthcare, education, agriculture, energy and utilities, transportation, and environment. Although ‘economy’ was included as one of the terms in public benefit, many discussions about economy concerned only the business side of AI rather than its role as a public benefit and thus is not covered in this Subpart.




Figure 7: Public Benefit Keyword Representation

Healthcare was one of the most frequently covered examples of the public benefit that AI will bring. It is slightly underrepresented in

177. See THE DANISH GOV'T, *supra* note 100, at 62.

Figure 7 due to some countries referring to this issue as ‘healthcare’ or ‘health management,’ or simply ‘health.’ Some states, such as India, noted that there was a lack of access to healthcare in their country, and AI would help many people gain access to these services who may not have had access to them before.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, the induction of AI into the healthcare system will help with inefficiency and save money. New Zealand noted in its policy that “algorithms could save the global health sector up to US\$100 billion a year, as a result of AI assisted efficiencies in clinical trials, research and better decision making in the doctor’s office.”¹⁷⁹ Many states that are facing an aging demographic noted that AI can be utilized to care for elderly populations with “robotic systems designed for use in in-patient and out-patient care or in people’s homes Smart robotic systems can be used for treatment purposes, communication and interaction, moving people and helping them stay mobile, assisting and accompanying them.”¹⁸⁰ In addition to these benefits, AI also excels at chronic disease prevention and management by “analy[zing] clinical data, medical images, health behaviours and genomic data to create a personalised risk score for individuals,”¹⁸¹ promoting the human right to health, as noted in the policies for both India and New Zealand.

AI has also been found to assist in education. While AI cannot replace the teacher directly, it can “greatly assist teachers in efficiently and effectively managing multi-level/multi-grade classrooms, by judging learning levels of individual students, and allowing automated development of customised educational content adapted to each child’s class and learning level.”¹⁸² Italy has invested in developing automated tutoring, personalized learning, and even has AI calculating drop-out risk through predictive indicators.¹⁸³ Education has also been discussed thoroughly in advancing AI knowledge among the population to empower citizens on how to best take advantage of the benefits AI has to offer.

As many states still rely on agriculture as an integral part of their economy, AI is also being used to promote efficiency in this industry, and thus indirectly promote the human right to food.¹⁸⁴ India is invest-

178. See NITI AAYOG, *supra* note 96, at 24.

179. THE A.I. F. OF N.Z., *supra* note 101, at 59.

180. NAT’L STRATEGIE FÜR KÜNSTLICHE INTEL., *supra* note 124, at 18–19.

181. SMART NATION & DIGIT. GOV’T OFF., NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY: ADVANCING OUR SMART NATION JOURNEY 30 (2019).

182. NITI AAYOG, *supra* note 96, at 37.

183. AGENCY FOR DIGIT. IT., *supra* note 92, at 40.

184. Joseph Bennington-Castro, *AI Is a Game-Changer in the Fight Against Hunger*

ing in robotic technologies to produce agribots, which will weed fields, fertilize plants and harvest crops.¹⁸⁵ Countries that struggle with limited amounts of water, such as India and New Zealand, found that AI can promote effective water usage (another human right).¹⁸⁶ Advanced sensors can keep track of the soil status and weather forecast to prevent under and over irrigation, helping alleviate water usage inefficiency.¹⁸⁷

The increased efficiency would also benefit the energy and utility sector. Singapore's AI strategy mentions that fault detection and maintenance management in critical infrastructure can reduce the risk of system failure.¹⁸⁸ Lithuania's strategy notes that AI can be used to create more efficient ways to distribute power, and therefore decrease their reliance on foreign sources of energy while increasing sustainability.¹⁸⁹ The focus on sustainability is also noted in other countries' policies; Italy, Japan, and France have a special focus dedicated to environmental sustainability.

AI monitoring systems can not only promote sustainability, but also track any potential damage to the environment and deploy appropriate solutions. Japan, on the other hand, pledges to use AI to "practice energy/climate change diplomacy . . . dealing with climate change and improving energy security by means of assisting other countries' initiatives to achieve SDGs mainly with the use of low-carbon type infrastructure technologies including renewable energies and hydrogen."¹⁹⁰ France takes the opportunity to use "AI in the field of ecology: AI can help us understand the dynamics and the evolution of whole ecosystems by focusing on their biological complexity; it will allow us to manage our resources more efficiently (particularly in terms of energy), preserve our environment and encourage biodiversity."¹⁹¹ Increasing efficiency to reduce greenhouse gases is a crucial idea to yet another public sector—transportation. As well as promoting the reduction of greenhouse gases, India's AI policy proposes using semi-autonomous vehicles to reduce congestion and fatalities on the road.¹⁹² South

and Poverty. Here's Why, NBC NEWS (June 21, 2017, 12:26 PM), <https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/tech/ai-game-changer-fight-against-hunger-poverty-here-s-whyncna774696> [<https://perma.cc/NBU2-9QKS>].

185. See NITI AAYOG, *supra* note 96, at 32–33.

186. See *Water for Life Decade: Human Right to Water*, U.N., https://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/human_right_to_water.shtml [<https://perma.cc/N825-EBAU>].

187. See NITI AAYOG, *supra* note 96, at 32–34.

188. SMART NATION & DIGIT. GOV'T OFF., *supra* note 181, at 47.

189. MINISTRY OF THE ECON. & INNOVATION, *supra* note 94, at 13.

190. COUNCIL FOR SCI., TECH. & INNOVATION, *supra* note 167, at 91.

191. Villani Report, *supra* note 127, at 102.

192. NITI AAYOG, *supra* note 96, at 43.

Korea's AI policy boasts several innovations that would assist with transportation including preventative maintenance on vehicles, parking spot finders, and real time data for traffic reduction.¹⁹³

AI can also be used to increase security. This has been briefly discussed earlier in the 'Security' dimension, but it must be noted that China focuses on security as a public benefit derived from AI. Singapore also lists security as one of the benefits which come from AI, although their policy has a specific focus: that of border control. Singapore aims "to deploy AI to achieve 100% automated immigration clearance for all travellers, including first-time social visitors. Singaporeans and departing visitors will experience 'BreezeThrough' immigration clearance, without the need to present their passports."¹⁹⁴ This will be achieved through Singapore Arrival Cards submitted by travelers and passenger information from various airlines.¹⁹⁵

public	safety
welfare	economy
economics	healthcare
education	services
improvement	environment
stakeholder	peace
sustainable	sustainability
climate	mitigating risk
benefits of	general interest

Table 7: Public Benefit Keywords

Finally, all these developments play into the realization of smart cities. Smart cities "being developed are trying to solve challenges such as low visibility on usage of utilities such as electricity, water, and waste management."¹⁹⁶ They also meet the demands of a rapidly growing urban population, resulting in a better quality of life. Several states discuss the creation of smart cities in their AI strategies, including India, South Korea, and Singapore, although many states are not quite ready to commit to such a usage of AI. Overall, there is a lot of convergence on utilizing AI for public benefit, although many states

193. GOV'T OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOR., *supra* note 121, at 15.

194. SMART NATION & DIGIT. GOV'T OFF., *supra* note 181, at 34.

195. *Id.* at 35.

196. NITI AAYOG, *supra* note 96, at 39.

have unique ideas on how to do so, complicating the path for AI norm development.

C. Summary

Our research showed several emerging patterns on multiple AI themes, in particular for the public benefit. To better discern potential convergence in the themes the documents discussed, we have examined the overall word count for each dimension surveyed across national policies. Overall, we have found that there is a general convergence among countries in the amount of verbiage used to discuss each of the dimensions defined in this paper. This convergence provides a strong impetus for global collaboration and norm creation in this domain.




Figure 8: Total Word Count for Each AI Dimension

Of course, it must be noted that every nation had unique issues that it would discuss within each given dimension. For example, the most popular public benefits brought about by AI according to the surveyed documents were in the healthcare sector, education, and transportation. However, not every nation discussed education and transportation in depth, and other states were strongly focused on less prolific topics within the sphere of public benefit, such as agriculture. Similar patterns were found in other categories, as shown in Figure 9. The topic of security was present in almost every policy we examined, but the attitudes of utilizing AI to promote security were varied. China, Singapore, and South Korea wanted to use AI to promote security, but other states such as France and Canada highlight how security using AI can lead to mass surveillance and the deterioration of personal autonomy. In this case, AI policy reflected each country's cultural attitudes towards the concept of collective security versus individual privacy. However, we have generally found that countries spent most of their paper discussing the public benefit of AI and how to ensure accountability. Security, privacy, fairness, transparency, and human-centered designs were themes that were touched upon, but were overshadowed by the other two categories by a wide margin.




Figure 9: Total percentage of Overall Word Count Per Dimension

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS

The findings from Part II should merely be used as a starting point for broader discussions within the area of AI norm development pertaining to human rights protections. Part III draws upon the above survey and corresponding conclusion make specific recommendations as to next steps. This Part initially explores the limitations of the study, and then continues by highlighting the areas of convergence highlighted above. The Part concludes with a discussion of criticisms that arise within the AI strategies themselves, and by making suggestions for future work and considerations.

A. Study Limitations

This Article did not explore a variety of categories related to AI given space and conceptual constraints. Specifically related technologies such as blockchain, Internet of Things, 5G, and quantum computing were not examined in detail. These microcosms contain their own parallel discussions on cybersecurity, privacy, and other dimensions within themselves, and thus were only considered in the context that they added depth and nuance to each dimension surveyed. Attempting to discuss each specific technology, technique, or application would likely merit a paper of its own. For example, we did not discuss the topic of AI being used in defense, though the issue does come up in both France and Russia’s AI Strategies.¹⁹⁷ The United States, moreover, has spent billions on unclassified and classified AI

197. Tim Dutton, *An Overview of National AI Strategies*, MEDIUM (June 28, 2018), <https://medium.com/politics-ai/an-overview-of-national-ai-strategies-2a70ec6edfd> [<https://perma.cc/4RK2-YAFG>].

research and development for the military, and in 2018 the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center was established to oversee US defense agency AI research.¹⁹⁸

Industry collaboration and public-private AI partnership is another sector that we did not consider. Although it belongs to the category of public benefit, this is a subject that deserves special attention given the extent to which the public sector can influence the private sector, and vice versa, in different states. Idiosyncrasies can arise due to the varied norms and expected levels of government oversight in various states. In the EU, many countries have revealed their plans to share government research with private firms in support of startups. The United Kingdom is catalyzing “over £300 million in private sector [AI] investment.”¹⁹⁹ Japan has taken it one step further, integrating the private sector into the development of their AI strategy.²⁰⁰ France has described their plans to create four or five research facilities, with Germany joining in to help fund a Franco-Germany research and development collaboration.²⁰¹ These distributed, multi-stakeholder approaches to coordinate AI governance could be considered polycentric, as is noted below, though that does not necessarily make them more robust or successful than other governance models.

As is evident, we hope that this brief survey of the current state of AI strategies and the core dimensions that many of them touch on is among the first, but certainly not the last, word on the topic. Follow-up can, and should, discuss the interrelationships between these arenas and how they are being operationalized in domestic policy. Further study could explore whether or not the entire enterprise of crafting separate strategies for AI, cybersecurity, data governance, and more is in fact creating artificial separations that are making it more challenging for states to tackle such deeply connected, multifaceted domains, as is discussed further below.

B. Taking Stock of AI Norm Development

As is detailed in Part II, there is an extensive amount of movement in the field of AI strategy and governance. Governments, private sector organizations, and civil society groups around the globe continue to

198. *Id.*

199. *Id.*

200. *See id.* (“The 11-member council,” which created the Public-Private Dialogue towards Investment for the Future “had representatives from academia, industry, and government, including the President of Japan’s Society for the Promotion of Science, the President of the University of Tokyo, and the Chairman of Toyota.”).

201. *Id.*

highlight the economic potential of AI while also noting the importance of developing standards around how to use and deploy this revolutionary technology. Many regulators are considering how to encourage innovative uses of AI while also preserving and protecting human rights and societal values. One benefit of examining the numerous national AI strategies and initiatives listed above is to identify areas of convergence and potential for norm-building. Even with the vast array of stakeholders involved and the complexities of legal, ethical, and technical questions around AI, there seems to be considerable agreement around many of the principles examined in Part II. The dimensions surveyed are not only convergent among national strategies, particularly in the public benefit context, but they are also emerging in global and regional intergovernmental initiatives to develop and promote AI.

Perhaps the most well-recognized and wide-reaching of these intergovernmental initiatives is the OECD's Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence, which highlights five "values-based principles" to promote the "responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI."²⁰² These principles are: inclusive growth; sustainable development and well-being; human-centered values and fairness; transparency and explainability; robustness, security and safety; and accountability.²⁰³ The principles are coupled with recommendations on how to invest in and encourage AI development. The OECD "Principles for Responsible Stewardship of Trustworthy AI" have forty signatories and were endorsed and adopted by the G20 (which notably includes China and Russia). The G20 Statement highlighted the potential of the principles to help with "maximizing and sharing the benefits from AI, while minimizing the risks and concerns."²⁰⁴ These principles currently stand as the most well-developed international document of principles applicable to AI development.

The focus on building trustworthy AI is also at the center of regional efforts to develop principles around AI deployment. The Nordic Council of Ministers released "AI in the Nordic-Baltic Region" in May 2018, which detailed the potential of AI for the region and announced collaboration to enhance access to data, develop ethical guidelines and values, and promote those values within the EU.²⁰⁵ The

202. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD/LEGAL/0449, *Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence* (May 21, 2019).

203. *Id.*

204. G20 Trade Ministers and Digital Economy Ministers, *G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy 4* (June 2019), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000486596.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/2BXX-MPZX>].

205. See *AI in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, NORDIC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, GOV'T

European Commission created a High-Level Expert Group on AI (AI HLEG), and they released draft “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI” in 2018.²⁰⁶ The Guidelines encouraged organizations to consider the following principles when developing and deploying AI: human agency and oversight; technical robustness and safety; privacy and data governance; transparency; diversity, non-discrimination and fairness; societal and environmental well-being; and accountability.²⁰⁷ Using these principles, the AI HLEG published “The Assessment List for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (ALTAI)” in 2020, hoping to provide organizations with a self-assessment tool to promote AI in a way that aligns with economic prosperity and innovation while supporting and upholding human rights and other fundamental values.²⁰⁸

These are only a few prominent examples of how initiatives continue to focus on prioritizing economic development of AI while ensuring societal and social well-being. The UN has also emphasized the importance of centering human rights and values with AI to promote sustainable development. Most recently, the United States Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) appointed a 24-member expert group to “draft internationally applicable recommendations on ethical issues raised by the development and use of AI.”²⁰⁹ The Expert Group met for the first time in April and is expected to develop recommendations throughout the next few months and submit them to UNESCO’s Member States at the next general conference.²¹⁰ This intergovernmental effort is still in early stages, but this could prove promising for laying the groundwork for AI norm development.

Another intergovernmental effort in early stages is the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), which is a primarily G7 effort discussed in Part I to “support the responsible and human-centric development and

OF SWED. (May 14, 2018), https://www.regeringen.se/49a602/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/naringsdepartementet/20180514_nmr_deklaration-slutlig-webb.pdf [<https://perma.cc/T9LL-JWHP>].

206. *Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI*, *supra* note 86.

207. *Id.*; see also *Shaping Europe’s Digital Future: A European Approach to Artificial Intelligence*, EUR. COMM’N (July 1, 2021), <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/artificial-intelligence> [<https://perma.cc/3ZTH-AV6P>].

208. See *Assessment List for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (ALTAI) for Self-Assessment*, EUR. COMM’N (July 17, 2020), <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/assessment-list-trustworthy-artificial-intelligence-altai-self-assessment> [<https://perma.cc/YQ4C-TZKF>].

209. *UNESCO Appoints International Expert Group to Draft Global Recommendation on the Ethics of AI*, UNESCO (Mar. 3, 2020), <https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-appoints-international-expert-group-draft-global-recommendation-ethics-ai> [<https://perma.cc/M88F-4PMT>].

210. *Id.*

use of AI in a manner consistent with human rights, fundamental freedoms, and our shared democratic values, as elaborated in the OECD Recommendation on AI.”²¹¹ GPAI members include Australia, Canada, France, the European Union, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.²¹² GPAI will collaborate with various stakeholders to explore the themes of responsible AI, data governance, the future of work, and innovation and commercialization.²¹³ Finally, the EU released potentially groundbreaking guidance on new data governance regulations in November 2020, which as of this writing remain in draft form.²¹⁴

These efforts repeatedly emphasize that society stands to benefit greatly from the enormous potential of AI, but there is also a strong emphasis on developing trust in order to promote its adoption. Perhaps this is the rationale behind why public benefit, accountability, and security are so clearly featured in both national and international AI strategies and principles.

C. Criticisms

After a full review and the examination of convergence in some key areas of AI strategies and policy, the authors contend that while some convergence is occurring potentially highlighting opportunities to crystallize State practice and aid norm development, it would be unfair to not also discuss concerns that are beginning to emerge.

First, one has to ask, is AI, or any technological tool for that matter, capable of being regulated or even honed by the creation of a national strategy? Moreover, AI refers to a suite of technologies with myriad applications. Yet, left unexamined is the question: what exactly makes AI distinct from other technological innovations? Further, one wonders if an AI strategy is in fact appropriate; does any strategy succeed without in-depth consideration for how it may be operationalized? There are a litany of tools, strategies, and other efforts of best practice and community building for self-governance, yet the impacts of these efforts—such as national cybersecurity strategies—remains unclear.²¹⁵

211. *Joint Statement From Founding Members of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence*, *supra* note 73.

212. *Id.*

213. *Id.*

214. See *EU: Commission Presents New Data Governance Regulation*, ONE TRUST DATA GUIDANCE (Nov. 25, 2020), <https://www.dataguidance.com/news/eu-commission-presents-new-data-governance-regulation> [<https://perma.cc/CYU6-N3TD>].

215. See, e.g., Shackelford & Kastelic, *supra* note 17, at 941–42.

Second, the suite of technologies comprising AI and ML does not respect jurisdictional bounds. Thus, there is a legitimate question about the value of such national-level initiatives to address global challenges. There is potential strength with different local, federal, regional, and private-sector stakeholders taking their individual approaches to harnessing the power of AI to promote human rights and sustainable development, but only if such efforts are coordinated.²¹⁶ Without such interaction, communication, and coordination there is a higher likelihood of gridlock and a chaotic fracturing of governance, as is made evident by the literature on polycentric governance.

Putting all of that aside for the sake of argument, there are also fundamental issues with some of the strategies themselves. AI principles and values, if too broadly defined, can become meaningless. Part II outlined the prominent definitions of the principles featured in national strategies, but many of the terms have unclear or ambiguous definitions. For example, what does a strategy mean by fairness, and who gets to define, what is fair?

Moreover, AI strategies are also too narrowly focused on one technology, which is a similar issue with cybersecurity strategies; data governance strategies may be more appropriate to get to the heart of the ethical, legal, and social issues involved. Putting up silos around specific technologies is unlikely to reap the expected benefits, and could cause both confusion and lead to reactive policymaking given that policymakers will constantly be chasing the latest technical trend (blockchain, quantum, etc.) rather than focusing on the bigger picture on how all of these technologies are impacting national security, human rights, and sustainable development.

Finally, many AI deployments are built on large aggregate data sets, are ubiquitous, focus on averages, are opaque, and are often too complex for any regulator to easily monitor. And while AI strategies might state lofty goals of protecting individuals from ever encroaching AI deployments, the simple fact is the technology business model is built on well-understood aspects of human decision-making regarding incentives, rewards for clicks, and a need for interactive growth.²¹⁷ Human rights, personal freedoms, and autonomy are not part of the

216. See generally Michael D. McGinnis, Elizabeth B. Baldwin, & Andreas Thiel, *When Is Polycentric Governance Sustainable? Using Institutional Theory to Identify Endogenous Drivers of Dysfunctional Dynamics* (Sept. 14, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The Ostrom Workshop, Indiana University).

217. See e.g., Chavie Lieber, *Tech Companies Use “Persuasive Design” To Get Us Hooked. Psychologists Say It’s Unethical*, Vox (Aug. 8, 2018, 2:30 PM), <https://www.vox.com/2018/8/8/17664580/persuasive-technology-psychology> [<https://perma.cc/V48Z-FU68>].

typical commercial model, yet this aspect of AI governance—what some may argue is an AI market failure²¹⁸—is often missed in national AI strategies.

D. Next Steps

We view this analysis as among the first, and certainly not the last word in analyzing the convergence of AI strategies as a useful data source for identifying arenas for norm development particularly in the arena of human rights, as is discussed above. Among other promising candidates for future research, we suggest comparing and contrasting national-level AI strategies with those at the city and state level, particularly in federated democracies such as the United States and Australia. This type of analysis would prove vital in better understanding to what extent multilevel stakeholder engagement is being utilized to build support for a common vision of AI governance in a given society. Such open lines of communication, along with the coordination and interaction that they engender, is vital for trust building and successful polycentric partnerships, as Elinor Ostrom demonstrated.²¹⁹

Relatedly, as was discussed in Part III.1, it is important to relate public and private sector AI governance efforts. It would be interesting to see how much overlap there is between the AI-related governance efforts of firms in a particular nation with that country's AI strategy. These data would be another useful proxy for the overall level of multi-stakeholder engagement and related opportunities to engender nested governance structures.

We also recommend a series of case studies in various facets of AI governance, including efforts to control the spread of so-called deep fakes. The research should dive and guide future efforts to address various real-world problems. Part and parcel of this analysis will include a deep dive into prevailing global cultural and ethical considerations

218. See William Magnuson, *Artificial Intelligence on Wall Street Will Be Great, Until It Isn't*, GOVERNING (Nov. 1, 2019), <https://www.governing.com/news/headlines/Artificial-Intelligence-on-Wall-Street-Will-Be-Great-Until-It-Isn't.html> [<https://perma.cc/TG9S-G3TX>].

219. See Elinor Ostrom, *Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action Problems* 1–2 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Pol. Theory and Pol'y Analysis, Working Paper Series No. 08–6, 2008). As originally explained by Professor Vincent Ostrom, “a poly-centric political system would be composed of (1) many autonomous units formally independent of one another, (2) choosing to act in ways that take account of others, (3) through processes of cooperation, competition, conflict, and conflict resolution.” ELINOR OSTROM & VINCENT OSTROM, CHOICE, RULES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE OSTROMS ON THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 46 (2014). The concept, though, has enjoyed wide application, including in the Internet governance context. See SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, GOVERNING NEW FRONTIERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE: TOWARD CYBER PEACE (2020).

as they pertain to AI governance strategies, including the role of deontological, teleological, virtue ethics, Confucian ethics, and other global traditions.

There are overarching questions to consider, including whether it makes sense to maintain separate national AI and cybersecurity strategies, as was mentioned above. Better, one might think, to develop an integrated data and internet governance strategy given the extensive overlap and interests shared across these contexts. To help contextualize such an approach, aside from national security it is useful to consider what the end goals may be, and how best to build an international coalition to support them.

Finally, one must consider if AI strategies are a useful regulatory tool, especially considering the limitations briefly discussed. If AI strategies are to be used, more attention must be given to the complexity of the use of AI.

E. Opportunities for International Engagement

The foregoing analysis has highlighted several areas of convergence among states as they strategize about future AI applications. In particular, as was discussed above, there is widespread agreement as to the importance of utilizing AI for public good, and human-centered design. One lens through which to view such efforts is sustainable development. Although there is not one universal definition of this concept, it is commonly understood as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”²²⁰ This definition has both public benefit and human-centered design at its heart. Increasingly, countries have been promoting an array of initiatives tied to sustainability, notably the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Indeed, the Sustainable Development Goals underscore the need for a broad conception of sustainability, one that includes environmental stewardship, reduced inequality, along with international peace and justice.²²¹ One 2020 study, for example, found that AI can “enable the accomplishment of 134 targets across all the [Sustainable Development] goals,” but that it “may also inhibit 59 targets.”²²² In other words, AI is a double-edged sword, which should be

220. Rep. of the World Comm. on Env't & Dev., *Our Common Future*, ch. 2, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987); see also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slov.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 140 (Sept. 25) (defining sustainable development as “[the] need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment”).

221. See *The SDGS in Action*, UNDP, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html> [<https://perma.cc/4SEN-TKVD>].

222. See Ricardo Vineusa et al., *The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Achieving the*

wielded with skill, lest unintended consequences crowd out the potential positive benefits of AI on human rights and society.

CONCLUSION

This Article has analyzed the national AI strategies of dozens of states across seven identified dimensions: transparency, accountability, security, privacy, fairness, human-centered design, and public benefit. We found that the words and focus areas across national strategies were very similar and that discussions of public benefit were the most prevalent across all strategies. We suggested that sustainable development may be an overarching concept to help drive further international efforts in this arena that could be of particular interest to the Biden administration, and through which AI norm promotion may flourish such as in support of the Sustainable Development Goals.

