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ology, while downplaying another language ideology apparent in her data—others seem equally comfortable with the idea that a certain kind of language use is appropriate for certain situations. Perhaps further inquiries into a Navajo language shift could include examinations of when speakers are using what languages and under what circumstances, similar to Paul Kroskrity's methods conducting research among the Tewa in *Language, History, and Identity* (1993). Ultimately, *Language Shift Among the Navajo* provides a sound beginning for studying a complex phenomenon that, if it is happening among one of the largest and most populated tribes, must certainly be an issue for other American Indian communities as well.

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Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Philosophy. By Scott L. Pratt. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. 316 pages. \$49.95 cloth; \$21.95 paper.

Pratt's informative book claims that a line of thought originating in large part with northeastern US Indian tribes is supposed to reflect well on that line of thought or on those tribes or both. That line of thought is roughly equivalent to ideas put forth by John Dewey, taken here as a culmination and summary of American pragmatism. Pragmatism, in Pratt's view, consists of commitments to four principles:

1. Things are what they do; or, they *are* the interactions they have with other things, rather than being just self-contained entities for abstract contemplation removed from context.
2. There are many kinds of things, not just one or two; this pluralism is at the most basic level of experience but extends to the highest levels of politics and human endeavor.
3. Experience is not individual but is mediated by community; human beings are not most fundamentally individuals; rather culture and society necessarily shapes and limits our experiences, our knowledge, our identities, and our inquiries.
4. Progress: the universe does not stand still, and a description of how things are now will not be complete in the future. Change is real. Further, human reflective thought cannot help but instigate growth because of the restlessness that prompts it, the changes it brings about in itself, and its striving for more inclusive or better understanding.

Pratt's summary of pragmatism is pretty good (especially regarding Dewey, whose thought upstages C. S. Peirce and William James), but he omits pragmatism's relations to the western problems of philosophy, even though one fairly standard way to summarize pragmatism is by way of its rejections of

European positions on those problems. It also leaves out the serious and ongoing critiques of pragmatist arguments, such as Bertrand Russell's objection to James's view of truth. James proposes that truth is something to be judged in relation to human interests at issue, and Russell objects to the opening for relativism if those interests are thought a legitimate part of appraising truth. But some Wittgensteinian critiques are targeted at assumptions shared both by the pragmatists and their opponents and are based on concerns much like some concerns motivating the pragmatists—suspicion of decontextualized abstraction and of the lines of thought leading up to the posing of philosophical questions. Though these objections start with motivations like the pragmatists, they wind up with accusations that the pragmatists' critiques are shallow and that the pragmatists' views are driven by abstract pictures in common with their opponents and lose track of examples. Because Pratt assumes throughout that pragmatists are on the side of the angels, his book does not help those who might worry about that assumption. A detailed critique of the arguments for tracing all four commitments to American Indian sources would be worthwhile, but let's take a look at one for which the stakes are especially high.

Consider the argument that Indians acquainted whites with what would become a commitment to pluralism among the pragmatists. Pratt makes a strong case that the American Indians with whom colonists interacted possessed ideas similar to the pragmatist conception. His case features Indian practices of *wunnegin*, hospitality and welcome toward strangers. The commitment to this practice shows in Indian stories, including accounts of cannibals and the proper reception of them with welcome and kindness. The articulation of this practice of welcome was known among some of the whites, especially through Roger Williams and Benjamin Franklin's writings; thus, American thinkers knew about a commitment to pluralism as a thread in the nation's history before European contact. Dewey confesses to being influenced by Franklin. Williams was no slouch at building a case so that people would be aware of it, even when he was reviled by those in political and religious power. Suppose all this supporting structure is true. To what extent, then, will we want to credit either the pragmatists with learning from the Indians or the Indians as a major source for this central idea among pragmatists? The justifiable answer seems to suggest that there is something to this connection. That James does not always distinguish between the sources of his ideas and the arguments which support them is old news. The consistencies Pratt traces plainly support the possibility that the pragmatists came to their commitment to pluralism in part based on Indian sources. If we consider any stronger position, however, that in fact the Indian commitment to hospitality is the source for pragmatic pluralism, then the argument is a thin one. That Peirce and Dewey explicitly argue for pluralism in human experience and that Dewey's pluralism is also a political pluralism does not show that their sources are to be found in political history even if the antecedents are there. Pratt finds very little in explicit acknowledgment of American Indian sources among the pragmatists—his main items of support involve working with sources at several removes.

The arguments to feel like resourceful historical detective work that supports only claims to possibilities. If the idea of pluralism were really an odd idea, an anomaly in history rather than an idea featured in debates throughout the history of philosophy, then finding a possible explanation would have more force, would be more of an accomplishment. But the Greeks argued with each other over the problem of the One and the Many since before Socrates, and philosophers have continued ever after. Monotheisms versus polytheisms were prominent concerns as western traditions met other civilizations. David Hume reminds us of the dangers of carrying our philosophical theorizing with us as we leave our study and go out into the street. The recognition that injustice and intolerance feed on conceptual rigidity and overly abstract theorizing is given by the British legal historian F. W. Maitland as one reason why common law survived in England past the Renaissance. An awareness of Euro-American excesses fueled by narrow dogmatism might serve to raise issues for which pluralism seems an appropriate answer. It's unclear if we need an explanation for why a school of philosophers would endorse a commitment to pluralism, and if we grant there is some such need James seems to supply it in the form of positions and arguments in several places, and Dewey in others. And none of those seems to point strongly toward Indian sources.

There may be some overreaching in the book, then. Nevertheless, it is richly informative and provocative regarding the development of relationships between whites and Indians during colonial times and during the first decades of the United States. Some of those relationships may have been intellectual, even philosophical, and promising at the time; others are more grim and of course more permanent. Pratt offers ways to think of Indian intellectuals with respect and accounts of such white intellectuals as Roger Williams, Franklin, and Cadwallader Colden. These historical analyses have their own value even if separate from the main argument. Read this way—as essays rather than as a book, perhaps—his work's importance is less problematic. Let's take another piece, with a little more detail.

Pratt traces Franklin's methodological sources in his scientific work (with implications for all his thinking, perhaps) to Cadwallader Colden's being-is-as-being-does commitments and to Newton's experimental (rather than his other mathematical or more broadly theoretical) work in the *Opticks*. Colden, Pratt asserts, helped legitimize a more problems-oriented approach (rather than one geared toward theory). This is a theme later among the pragmatists. At the same time Colden helps propagate through Franklin a metaphysical and epistemological attitude toward a thing's identity and its knowability as proceeding from its interactions with other things, a view which Pratt takes to be strikingly like the Haudenosaunee idea of *orenda*, the voice or song of a thing's expressing itself to others. It's undeniably a beguiling idea. For songs, we are tempted to think, *esse percipi est* ("to be is to be perceived"). This line resonates with a lot of pragmatist stemware, but it is from Berkeley's idealism, and a part of the line of thought leading to the rejection of the existence of physical objects. The idea is beguiling because then the song's being knowable and its existence are the same thing. The cicada's song exists as, and exists in, its interaction with the corn and the sun, a cause in the sense a

request or a lullaby can be a cause. Further, such an interaction can be understood only by taking for granted the community of those who do interact and their practices. This means often that we also take for granted a place and a style which have crucial importance for defining, for example, the Delaware nation. By starting with something like Colden's principle of interaction or the Iroquoian notion of *orenda*, Franklin is able to approach science free of the usual expectations about the importance of finding truths (p. 197). Pratt seems to be thinking here that truths only mean abstract theories (though it's unclear that Franklin or Colden or Newton would agree or understand).

Pratt's account follows Franklin as he gives up or at least reduces his racism regarding the Indians. His paper on the population increase of 1751 does not take indigenous peoples seriously, but his attitude seems to change just two years later when he offers an account of human nature that rejects the story that Indians are lazy in ways different from whites. By the end of a conference in 1756 on Indian claims to land and British responsibility for war in the Delaware Valley, Franklin was clearly paying attention in a serious way to Indians' views. During the massacres by the Paxton Boys at Lancaster at the end of 1763, Franklin's rhetorically polished and outraged account on behalf of the Indians both discredited the Paxton Boys and made so many enemies for Franklin that his political career in Pennsylvania was effectively finished. Pratt makes much of Franklin using diversity or pluralism as grounds for rejecting the claim that the Indians under Pontiac, who had besieged Detroit, could be attacked by fighting the Indians in Pennsylvania. Franklin asks, in effect, "Shall the Dutch take revenge on the English if the French injure them?" Pratt notes that this is in contrast to an expected invocation of the Golden Rule: the argument might go, we are obliged not to kill others because we ourselves do not wish to be killed (p. 205). But Franklin understands more than Pratt that such an argument requires the audience to identify with the Indians, whereas his argument may work better if the audience identifies with a nation among nations. Pratt points out that thinking of the Conestoga Indians as the inhabitants of a place might help direct attention to particulars rather than to abstractions. Franklin goes on to speak of particular practices of hospitality in various places and times of history, by everyone apparently except for the Christian whites in the New World. Conspicuously, he does not attempt a justification for these practices based on philosophical abstractions. The practices (rather than any theory) of hospitality he enumerates are enough to reveal the behavior of the Paxton Boys—and the behavior of those who did not resist them and did not protect the 140 tribal members who had taken refuge in Philadelphia—as atrocities.

This work, then, has mixed success, but it is a worthwhile book for readers interested in possibilities of whites and Indians in relationships featuring real listening. Pratt avoids the mistake of treating the Iroquois League and other tribes near the colonies as representative of American Indians in general. Nevertheless, comparisons with tribes of other regions regarding commitments, for example, to pluralism or to practice rather than theory would be helpful to readers. One editorial flaw: Indiana University Press's style sheet apparently does not call for dates of original composition as well as the dates

of the standard editions of historical documents, such as Franklin's works, in footnotes or bibliography. Pratt often gives these in his first mentions of the works, but several go without. This format is a poor choice for historically based research because it leaves the reader in the dark as to dates and sequences of events.

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Ojibwe Waasa Inaabidaa: We Look in All Directions. By Thomas Peacock and Marlene Wisuri. Afton: Afton Historical Society Press, 2002. 159 pages. \$39.00 cloth; \$29.95 paper.

Ojibwe Waasa Inaabidaa by Thomas Peacock and photo-edited by Marlene Wisuri is a long-needed addition to Ojibwe scholarship. Rather than focusing in detail on a specific period of Ojibwe history, as others such as Brenda Child, Rebecca Kugel, and Melissa Meyers have done so admirably, Peacock's text provides the big picture. While this necessarily limits the detail of topics treated in the book, as Peacock himself admits, it gives the author the opportunity to historicize the causes of issues pertinent to Ojibwe communities today. Further, rather than ending on a note of despair reminiscent of the "vanishing Indian" motif as texts by Ruth Landes and Christopher Vecsey have done, Peacock ends each topic with an examination of actions that Native communities themselves have taken to address contemporary issues and problems. Written as a companion volume to the six-part public television series *Waasa Inaabidaa* narrated by Winona LaDuke, each of the book's six chapters stands alone as an individual essay, yet is united with the others by the intent to express how Ojibwe have experienced, interpreted, and lived their history. These essays explore various topics according to the manner in which Ojibwe people themselves often classify and categorize areas of knowledge.

Chapter one, "Ojibwemowin," explores Ojibwe oral tradition and includes a discussion of the importance of indigenous languages to cultural survival, as well as an examination of written and artistic expressions of Ojibwe culture. Next, in "Gakina-Awiya: We are All Related," Peacock describes the traditional Ojibwe understanding of the familial relationship between human beings, plants, and animals. Then he uses this understanding to interpret the cultural impact of how land was gradually lost to colonial regimes and how this land loss has impacted Ojibwe communities. Finally, Peacock addresses how Ojibwe communities today are addressing land management issues. In "Gikinoo'Amaadiwin: We Gain Knowledge," Peacock looks at traditional ways of learning, the impact of governmental attempts to "civilize and educate" through missions and boarding schools and the contemporary establishment of tribally controlled schools. Because civilization policy, especially the boarding school system, assaulted many Ojibwe families at a fundamental level by attempting to replace Ojibwe kinship systems with western models, Peacock also explores the construction of the traditional family and the future of Ojibwe fam-