Journal of Right-Wing Studies

This paper discusses the regimes of Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland (2015–) and Viktor Orbán in Hungary (2010–) from the perspective of a curious paradox: they are very different in functioning but adhere to right-wing ideological frames that are very similar. First, we argue for a dual-level approach to understanding the formal and informal nature of these regimes, and we identify Poland as a conservative autocratic attempt and Hungary as an established patronal autocracy. After a comparative analysis of the two systems, we analyze the regimes’ common ideological frames and explain how legitimacy panels fit the purposes of an ideology-driven regime (Poland) and an ideology-applying one (Hungary). Finally, the analysis is used to explain the divergent responses of the Polish and the Hungarian regimes to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, which also brought the mutual relations of the two de-democratizing countries in the European Union to a breaking point.

How do the economy, right-wing legacies, and personal style shape today’s autocracies? Analysts have commented that especially three contemporary autocrats—Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Narendra Modi, and Rodrigo Duterte—have similar styles, motivations, or bases of support. Yet, this paper will show that the paths that took them to their thrones are quite distinct. Neoliberalization had disorganized society in Turkey, India, and the Philippines. The rule of “strongmen,” in response, showed the way out of this disorganization. The main divergence, however, is that Erdoğanism introduced statism and mass organization as against the disorganizing thrust of neoliberalization. Modi parallels Erdoğan in the civic paramilitary aspects of rule, but not in statism. Other than a weak infrastructure thrust, Duterte did not make the economy into a central issue in the way Erdoğan and Modi did. Moreover, he did not deploy civic activism at all. These three routes have thoroughly shaped and differentiated the autocrats’ styles too, even though all involve a heavy resort to masculinity. Coming from a thick tradition of mass politics and moving in a state-capitalist direction, Erdoğan’s performance incorporates women’s civic mobilization and heavily emphasizes fertility and productivity. Shorn of such anchors and bedeviled by a fragmented polity, Duterte’s rule sexualizes violence rather than production. Modi’s celibate masculinity is similar to Erdoğan’s in its dramatization of size and production but downplays reproduction, except for deepening the ethnic divide his party relies on. These differences have culminated in hegemonic autocracy in Turkey, ethnic autocracy in India, and oligarchic autocracy in the Philippines.

The terrorist attack on Brazil’s capitol on January 8, 2023, showcased the country’s empowered, embittered extreme right, whose hallmarks will be familiar to students of conservatism further afield: anachronistic anticommunism; hostility to liberal democracy; a sense of embattlement, despite controlling key institutions and platforms; a tapestry of disinformation and conspiracy theory; vaguely Christian cultural sensibilities and militantly Christian chauvinisms; and increasing adherence across national and denominational frontiers to an amorphous, antiglobalist brand of antidemocratic and patriarchal autocracy. This article argues that this right represents the migration of formerly extreme iterations of conservatism—including, remarkably, monarchism—from the fringe to the center of reactionary and even national politics. Monarchism, while by no means controlling Brazil’s fractious and unruly right (or series of rights), shows us what conservativism in Brazil looks like in the present moment—firstly, because it has gained acceptability and even celebration in Brazil’s government and among its most exalted right-wing leaders; and secondly, because its historic and more recent tenets are now virtually indistinguishable from those of the broader right in Brazil. Monarchists, I contend, provide a prism, even a roadmap, for understanding the defiantly retrograde yearnings and (necessarily) vague and contradictory proposals of the current right.

Twenty-first-century elected right-wing regimes share many similarities apart from being led by “authoritarian populists” who centralize power in themselves and represent ethnic or religious majorities at the expense of other citizens. Since higher judiciaries are key to ensuring executive accountability and the separation of powers in a liberal democratic constitutional setup, they are on the front lines of authoritarian attempts at institutional capture. Unlike earlier dictatorships that suspended existing constitutional protections or imposed martial law, current authoritarian regimes maintain a semblance of legality and constitutionalism while in practice attempting to remake the judiciary in their own image. This phenomenon has been variously termed “autocratic legalism,” “abusive constitutionalism,” and “populist constitutionalism.” In this article, I look at how the Indian Supreme Court (SC) has responded to executive incursions under the Narendra Modi regime since 2014. Even today, the court continues to deliver important democracy-enhancing judgments, breaking away from India’s colonial inheritance in matters like criminalizing same-sex relationships and adultery. However, the last decade is strongly marked by two features: first, an unwillingness to hear major constitutional issues that might challenge the regime; and second, judgments that serve as an advertorial for the regime, reinforcing an antiminority ideological orientation, justifying the government’s actions, and promoting Modi’s personality cult. By outsourcing several political decisions to a seemingly disinterested and neutral judiciary, the Modi government has been far more successful than it would have been if it had imposed those decisions purely by legislative majority. In turn, by addressing a variety of political issues as purely legal matters and not addressing them as constitutional questions, the courts have collaborated in the delegitimization of dissent and reinforced the claims of the Modi regime.

The purpose of this article is first to elucidate the nature and worldview of the ideology of pre–World War II Japan that inspired the Japanese elite to embark on global conquest and that mobilized the Japanese masses to fight to the death even after the dropping of the atomic bombs. Second, the aim is to examine how this ideology first emerged in the Meiji period and how it came to dominate Japanese politics until the end of the war. Third, it will illustrate not only what has survived of this form of ultranationalism in the postwar period, identifying the ideas of core thinkers and organizations, but it will also examine the emergence of different, or perhaps more moderate, forms of Japanese nationalism, pinpointing their key ideas and describing their visions for a future Japan. Finally, I will attempt to shed light on the historical forces and scenarios that might return Japanese ultranationalists to the center of political influence and power in the Japanese state and overturn Japan’s postwar pacifist constitution and noninterventionist military foreign policy.