Institute of European Studies

Industrialization and urbanization are seen as twin processes of economic development. However, the exact nature of their causal relationship is still open to considerable debate. This paper uses firm-level data from the manuscripts of the decennial censuses between 1850 and 1880 to examine whether the adoption of the steam engine as the primary power source by manufacturers during industrialization contributed to urbanization. While the data indicate that steam-powered firms were more likely to locate in urban areas than water-powered firms, the adoption of the steam engine did not contribute substantially to urbanization.

This paper considers works of romance fiction produced between 1933 and 1943 by two prolific writers, both with Nationalist sympathies, whose works sold widely (and can still be purchased today), attracting numerous film adaptations. It explores the ways in which their romances illustrate a conservative modernity, through their choice of upwardly mobile, active female protagonists and through their plots driven by change and speed. The paper also examines the self-reflexive dimensions of these romances, arguing that we should not assume that self-reflexivity is the prerogative of high culture. Particular stress is based on the repeated plotlines based on fraudulent marriages which blossom into ‘true love’. The paper concludes that, although these novels in no way reflect the reality of their time, at a structural level their stress on spatial dislocation, chance, and impersonation speaks to the popular imaginary in two periods – the Second Republic and the early Franco regime – characterized by personal and political upheaval.

During the Cold War, European-American relations were often marked by differences over tactics, but we did share for the most part a strategic goal that was to be achieved on the basis of the twin principles of deterrence and détente. Yet there are some that would argue that this past year has been different; that the transatlantic rift goes deeper and will last longer. If the Americans and Europeans cannot find common ground in certain regulatory areas, it may be that we will agree to disagree on the use of GMO’s, technological standards, or Anti-trust legislation. This could lead to more competition but also to duplication in an increasingly interwoven global market. Yet, because we face a vastly more complicated environment today than during previous years — full of threats and opportunities — it will remain a challenge for the coming decade to strategize as to how transatlantic political policy problems can best be dealt with.

On first sight, a comparison between restitution for Nazi victims in Germany West and East does not seem to leave ample space for interpretation: While the Federal Republic at least in principle accepted their obligation to compensate former Nazi victims and paid huge amounts for that purpose over the last 50 years, the GDR only offered elaborated social security for the tiny faction of Nazi victims who decided to live in the GDR after 1949. As a consequence, while restitution in the West has been a predominantly Jewish affair, restitution in the East was chiefly a communist matter. However, in my talk I will not focus on a comparison of material payments. Rather, I am interested in the different structure of the answers of two German societies to the same problem: the persecution and killing of millions of people by the Nazi regime. This implies three sets of questions. First: On which perception of the events between 1933 and 1945 were the respective attempts at rehabilitation and compensation for Nazi victims in the two German societies based? Second: What relation between former Nazi victims and German post war societies underpinned the respective attempts at restitution? And third: What consequences did German reunification have for this process?

Jost Halfmann argues that fundamentalist terrorism is an extreme expression of protest against the separation of state and religion; this form of protest is motivated by a utopian vision of society as a community of the faithful. The protest against secular states arises in states with forced modernization politics (such as Iran or Egypt), but also in states which base national identity on religion (such as Israel) and in states with high popular religiosity (such as the US). The terrorist form of protest exhibits an extreme form of self-ascribed marginality. Terrorism seems to be the only expression of protest when the enemy is considered overwhelmingly powerful, the struggle must, however, not be lost. Fundamentalist terrorists view themselves as being engaged in a cosmic war enforced on them by the enemy. Terrorist assaults are, therefore, symbolic acts of violence against symbols of the enemy's power to demonstrate emporarily the enemy's weakness.

This lecture considers how Europe’s monetary union will evolve in the next five to ten years. It concentrates on what is likely to be the most important change in that period, namely, the increasing number and heterogeneity of participating states. By 2006, less than four years from now, it is virtually certain that EMU will be enlarged to include a number of Eastern European countries that have not yet been admitted to the EU itself. These new members will differ sharply from the incumbents in terms of their economic structures, their per capita incomes, and their growth rates. The analysis focuses on the implications of this momentous change for the structure, organization and operation of EMU.